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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

In the Preface to the first edition of this work, the author stated

its purpose to be, to furnish to the practitioner and the student of

the law such a presentation of elementary constitutional principles

as should serve, with the aid of its references to judicial decisions,

legal treatises, and historical events, as a convenient guide in the

examination of questions respecting the constitutional limitations

which rest upon the power of the several State legislatures. In

the accomplishment of that purpose, the author further stated that

he had faithfully endeavored to give the law as it had been settled

by the authorities, rather than to present his own views. At the

same time, he did not attempt to deny — what he supposed would

be sufficiently apparent — that he had written in full sympathy

with all those restraints which the caution of the fathers had im-

posed upon the exercise of the powers of government, and with

faith in the checks and balances of our republican system, and in

correct conclusions by the general public sentiment, rather than

in reliance upon a judicious, prudent, and just exercise of authority,

when confided without restriction to any one man or body of men,

whether sitting in legislative capacity or judicial. In this sympa-

thy and faith he had written of jury trials and the other safeguards

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:00 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

to personal liberty, of liberty of the press and of vested rights;

and he had also endeavored to point out that there are on all sides

definite limitations which circumscribe the legislative authority,

independent of the specific restrictions which the people impose by

their State constitutions. But while not predisposed to discover

in any part of our system the rightful existence of any unlimited

power, created by the Constitution, neither on the other hand had

he designed to advance new doctrines, or to do more than state

clearly and with reasonable conciseness the principles to be de-

duced from the judicial decisions.

iv

PREFACE.

The unexpected favor with which the work has been received

having made a new edition necessary, the author has reviewed

every part of it with care, but without finding occasion to change

in any important particular the conclusions before given. Further

reflection has only tended to confirm him in his previous views of

the need of constitutional restraints at every point where agents

are to exercise the delegated authority of the people; and he is

gratified to observe that in the judicial tribunals the tendency is

not in the direction of a disregard of these restraints. The reader

will find numerous additional references to new cases and other

authorities; and some modifications have been made in the

phraseology of the text, with a view to clearer and more accurate

expression of his views. Trusting that these modifications and

additions will be found not without value, he again submits his

work "to the judgment of an enlightened and generous pro-

fession."

THOiMAS M. COOLEY.

University of Michigan, 1

Ann Abbob, July, 1871. J
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PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

The second edition being exhausted, the author, in preparing a

third, has endeavored to give full references to such decisions as

have recently been made or reported, having a bearing upon the

points discussed. It will be seen on consulting the notes that

the number of such decisions is large, and that some of them are

of no little importance.

THOMAS M. COOLEY.

University of Michigan )

Ann Abbob, December, 1873. J
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITIONS.

A State is a body politic, or society of men, united together for

the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by the

joint efforts of their combined strength.1 The terms nation and

Slate are frequently employed, not only in the law of nations, but

in common parlance, as importing the same thing;2 but the term

nation is more strictly synonymous with people, and while a single

State may embrace different nations or peoples, a single nation will

sometimes be so divided politically as to constitute several States.

In American constitutional law the word State is applied to the

several members of the American Union, while the word nation is

applied to the whole body of the people embraced within the juris-

diction of the Federal government.

Sovereignty, as applied to States, imports the supreme, absolute,

uncontrollable power by which any State is governed.3 A State is

called a sovereign State when this supreme power resides within

itself, whether resting in a single individual, or in a number of

individuals, or in the whole body of the people.4 In the view of

1 Vattel, b. 1, p. 1, § 1; Story pn Const. § 207; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 1,
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c. 2, § 2; Halleck, Int. Law, 63; Bouv. Law Diet. " State." "A multitude of

people united together by a communion of interest, and by common laws, to

which they submit with one accord." Burlamaqui, Politic Law, p. 5.

'Thompson, J., in Cheiokee Nation o. Georgia, 5 Pet. 52; Chase, Ch. J.,

in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 720; Vattel, supra.

3 Story on Const. § 207; 1 Black. Com. 49; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 1, p. 2,

§5; Halleck, Int. Law, 63, 64; Austin, Province of Jurisprudence, Lep. VI.;

Chipman on Government, 137. "The right of commanding finally in civil soci-

ety." Burlamaqui, Politic Law, p. 5.

4 Vattel, b. 1, p. 1, § 2; Story on Const. § 207; Halleck, Int. Law, 65. In

other words, when it is an independent State. Chipman on Government, 137.

1 [1]

* 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. I.

\

international law, all sovereign States are and must be

[* 2] equal in rights, * because, from the very definition of sover-

eign State, it is impossible that there should be, in respect

to it, any political superior.

The sovereignty of a State commonly extends to all the subjects

of government within the territorial limits occupied by the asso-

ciated people which compose it;' and, except upon the high seas,

which belong equally to all men, like the air, and no part of which

can rightfully be appropriated by any nation,1 the dividing line

between sovereignties is usually a territorial line. In American

constitutional law, however, there is a division of the powers of

sovereignty between the national and State governments by sub-

jects: the former being possessed of supreme, absolute, and uncon-

trollable power over certain subjects throughout all the States and

territories, while the States have the like complete power, within

their respective territorial limits, over other subjects.2 In regard

to certain other subjects, the States possess powers of regulation

which are not sovereign powers, inasmuch as they are liable to be

controlled, or for the time being to become altogether dormant by
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the exercise of a superior power vested in the general government

in respect to the same subjects.

A Constitution is sometimes defined as the fundamental law of

a State, containing the principles upon which the government is

-founded, regulating the division of the sovereign powers, and

directing to what persons each of these powers is to be confided,

and the manner in which it is to be exercised.8 Perhaps an

equally complete and accurate definition would be, that body of

rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sover-

eignty are habitually exercised.

In a much qualified and very imperfect sense every State may

be said to possess a constitution; that is to say, some leading

1 Vattel, b. 1, c. 23, § 281; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 2, c. 4, § 10.

2 McLean, J., in License Cases, 5 How. 588. "The powers of the* general

government and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the

fame territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting sepa-

rately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres. And the

O sphere of action appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of

/ the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court, as if the Hue of

division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye." Taney,

Cb. J., in Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 516. See Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 406.

3 1 Bouv. Inst. 9; Uuer, Const. Juris. 26.

[2] •

ch. I.]

*2

DEFINITIONS.

principle has prevailed in the administration of its government,

until it lias become an understood part, of its system, to

which obedience * is expected and habitually yielded; like [* 3]

the hereditary principle in most monarchies, and the

custom of choosing the chieftain by the body of the people which

prevails among some barbarous tribes. But the term constitio-

tional government is applied only to those whose fundamental rules

or maxims not only locate the sovereign power in individuals or

bodies designated or chosen in some prescribed manner, but also

define the limits of its exercise so as to protect individual rights,

and shield them against the assumption of arbitrary power. The

number of these is not great, and the protection they afford to

individual rights is far from being uniform.1

In American constitutional law, the word Constitution is used in

a restricted sense, as implying the written instrument agreed upon

by the people of the Union, or of any one of the States, as the

absolute rule of action and decision for all departments and officers

of the government, in respect to all the points covered by it, which
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must control until it shall be changed by the authority which

established it, and in opposition to which any act or regulation of

any such department or officer, or even of the people themselves,

will be altogether void.

The term unconstitutional law must vary in its meaning in differ-

ent States, according as the powers of sovereignty are or are not

possessed by the individual or body which exercises the powers of

ordinary legislation. Where the law-making department of a State

is restricted in its powers by a written fundamental law, as in the

American States, we understand by unconstitutional law one which,

being opposed to the fundamental law, is therefore in excess of

legislative authority, and void. Indeed, the term unconstitutional

1 Absolute monarchs, under a pressure of necessity, or to win the favor of

their people, sometimes grant them what is called a constitution; but this, so

long as the power of the monarch is recognized as supreme, can be no more than

his promise that he will observe its provisions, and conduct the government ac-

cordingly. The mere grant of a constitution does not make the government a

constitutional government, until the monarch is deprived of power to set it aside

at will. The mere grant of Magna Charta did not make the English a constitu-

tional monarchy; it was only after repeated violations and confirmations of that

instrument, and when a further disregard of its provisions had become dangerous

to the Crown, that fundamental rights could be said to have constitutional guar-

anties, and the government to be constitutional.

'[3]

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[CH. I.

law, as employed in American jurisprudence, is a misnomer, and

implies a contradiction; that enactment which is opposed to the

Constitution being in fact no law at all. But where, by the theory

of the government, the exercise of complete sovereignty is vested in

the same individual or body which enacts the ordinary laws, any

law, being an exercise of power by the sovereign authority, must be

obligatory, and, if it varies from or conflicts with any existing con-

stitutional principle, must have the effect to modify or abrogate such

principle, instead of being nullified by it. This must be so in Great

Britain witli every law not in harmony with pre-existing constitu-

tional principles ; since, by the theory of its government, Parliament

exercises sovereign authority, and may even change the

[* 4] Constitution * at any time, as in many instances it has done,

by declaring its will to that effect.1 And when thus the

power to control and modify the Constitution resides in the ordi-

nary law-making power of the State, the term unconstitutio?ial law

can mean no more than this: a law which, being opposed to the

settled maxims upon which the government has habitually been

conducted, ought not to be, or to have been, adopted.2 It follows,
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therefore, that in Great Britain constitutional questions are for the

most part to be discussed before the people or the Parliament, since

the declared will of the Parliament is the final law; but in America,

after a constitutional question has been passed upon by the legis-

lature, there is generally a right of appeal to the courts when it is

attempted to put the will of the legislature in force. For the will

of the people, as declared in the Constitution, is the final law; and

thejitill of the legislature is only law when it is in^harmony with,

or at least is not opposed to, that controlling instrument which

governs the legislative body equally with the private citizen.3 —

1 1 Black. Coin. 161; De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, c. 6; Broom,

Const. Law, 795.

* Mr. Austin, in his Province of Jurisprudence, Lec. VI., explains and enlarges

upon this idea, and gives illustrations to show that in England, and indeed under

most governments, a rule prescribed by the law-making authority may be uncon-

stitutional, and yet legal and obligatory.

3 See Chapter VII. pott.

[4]

CH. n.] THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES.

*5

♦CHAPTER II.- [*5]

THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES.

The government of the United States is the existing represent-

ative of the national government which has always in some form

existed over the American States. Before the Revolution, the

powers of government, which were exercised over all the colonies

in common, were so exercised as pertaining either to the Crown of

Great Britain or to the Parliament; but the extent of those powers,

and how far vested in the Crown and how far in the Parliament, were

questions never definitely settled, and which constituted subjects

of dispute between the mother country and the people of the colo-

nies, finally resulting in hostilities.1 That the power over peace

and war, the general direction of commercial intercourse with other

nations, and the general control of such subjects as fall within the

province of international law, were vested in the home government,

and that the colonies were not, therefore, sovereign States in the

full and proper sense of that term, were propositions never seriously

disputed in America, and indeed were often formally conceded;

and the disputes related to questions as to what were or were not
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matters of internal regulation, the control of which the colonists

insisted should be left exclusively to themselves.

Besides the tie uniting the several colonies through the crown

of Great Britain, there had always been a strong tendency to a

more intimate and voluntary union, whenever circumstances of

danger threatened them; and this tendency led to the New Eng-

land Confederacy of 1643, to the temporary Congress of 1690, to

the plan of union agreed upon in Convention of 1754, but rejected

by the Colonies as well as the Crown, to the Stamp Act Congress

of 1765, and finally to the Continental Congress of 1774. When

the difficulties with Great Britain culminated in actual war, the

1 1 Pitkin's Hist. TJ. S. c. 6; Life and Works of John Adams, Vol. I. pp.

122, 161; Vol. II. p. 311; Works of Jefferson, Vol. IX. p. 294; 2 Marshall's

Washington, c. 2; Declaration of Rights by Colonial Congress of 1765; Ram-

say":) Revolution in South Carolina, pp. 6-11; 5 Bancroft's U. S. c. 18; 1

Webster's Works, 128; Story on Const. § 183, et teq.

[5]

*5

[CH. II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

Congress of 1775 assumed to itself those powers of external con-

trol which before had been conceded to the Crown or to

[* 6] the * Parliament, together with such other powers of sov-

ereignty as it seemed essential a general government

should exercise, and thus became the national government of the

United Colonies. By this body, war was conducted, independence

declared, treaties formed, and admiralty jurisdiction exercised. It

is evident, therefore, that the States, though declared to be "sov-

ereign and independent," were never strictly so in their individual

character, but that they were always, in respect to the higher powers

of sovereignty, subject to the control of a central power, and were

never separately known as members of the family of nations.1

1 "All the country now possessed by the United States was [prior to the

Revolution] a part of the dominions appertaining to the Crown of Great Britain.

Every acre of land in this country was then held, mediately or immediately, by

grants from that crown. All the people of this country were then subjects of the

king of Great Britain, and owed allegiance to him; and all the civil authority

then existing or exercised here flowed from the head of the British empire. They
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were in a strict sense fellow-aubjeets, and in a variety of respects one people.

When the Revolution commenced, the patriots did not assert that only the same

affinity and social connection subsisted between the people of the colonies, which

subsisted between the people of Gaul, Britain, and Spain while Roman provinces,

namely, only that affinity and social connection which result from the mere cir-

cumstance of being governed by one prince; different ideas prevailed, and gave

occasion to the Congress of 177-1 and 1775.

"The Revolution, or rather the Declaration of Independence, found the people

already united for general purposes, and at the same time providing for their

more domestic concerns by State conventions and other temporary arrangements.

From the Crown of Great Britain the sovereignty of their country passed to the

people of it; and it was not then an uncommon opinion that the unappropriated

lands which belonged to the Crown passed, not to the people of the colony or

State within whose limits they were situated, but to the whole people. On what-

ever principles this opinion rested, it did not give way to the other, and thirteen

sovereignties were considered as emerged from the principles of the Revolution,

combined with local convenience and considerations; the people, nevertheless,

continued to consider themselves, in a national point of view, as one people; and

they continued without interruption to manage their national concerns accord-

ingly. Afterwards, in the hurry of the war, and in the warmth of mutual confi-

dence, they made a confederation of the States the basis of a general government.

Experience disappointed the expectations they had formed from it; and then the

people, in their collective capacity, established the present Constitution." Per

Jay, Ch. J., in Chi.^holm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 470. See this point forcibly put

and elaborated by Mr. A. tT. Dallas, in his Life and Writings, by G. it. Dallas,

200-207. Also in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 724.

[6]

CH. II.] THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

The Declaration of Independence made them sovereign and

independent States, by altogether abolishing the foreign juris-

diction, and substituting a national government of their own

creation.

But while national powers were assumed by and conceded

to * the Congress of 1775-76, that body was nevertheless [* 7]

strictly revolutionary in its character, and, like all revolu-

tionary bodies, its authority was undefined, and could be limited

only, first, by instructions to individual delegates by the States

choosing them; second, by the will of the Congress; and third, by

the power to enforce that will.1 As in the latter particular it was

essentially feeble, the necessity for a clear specification of powers

which should be exercised by the national government became

speedily apparent, and led to the adoption of the Articles of Con-

federation. But those articles did not concede the full measure of

power essential to the efficiency of a national government at bome,

the enforcement of respect abroad, or the preservation of the public

faith or public credit; and the difficulties experienced induced the

election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held in 1787,

by which a Constitution was formed which was put into operation
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hi 1789. As much larger powers were vested by this instrument

in the general government than had ever been exercised in this

country, by either the Crown, the Parliament, or the Revolutionary

Congress, and larger than those conceded to the Congress under

the Articles of Confederation, the assent of the people of the sev-

eral States was essential to its acceptance, and a provision

was inserted in the Constitution that the ratification * of [* 8]

the conventions of nine States should be sufficient for the

establishment of the Constitution between the States so ratifying

the same. In fact, the Constitution was ratified by conventions of

delegates chosen by the people in eleven of the States, before the

new government was organized under it; and the remaining two,

North Carolina and Rhode Island, by their rgfusal to accept, and k

by the action of the others in proceeding separately, were excluded w

altogether from that national jurisdiction which before had embraced

them. This exclusion was not warranted by any thing contained

in the Articles of Confederation, which purported to be articles of

1 See remarks of Iredell, J., in Pcnhallow v. Doane's Adm'r, 3 Dall. 91, and

of Blair, J., in tbe same case, p. 111. The true doctrine on this subject is very

clearly explained by Chase, J., in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 231.

[7]

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[ch. n.

"perpetual union"; and the action of the eleven States in making

radical revision of the Constitution, and excluding their associates

for refusal to assent, was really revolutionary in character,1 and

only to be defended on the same ground of necessity on which all

revolutionary action is justified, and which in this case was the

absolute need, fully demonstrated by experience, of a more efficient

general government.2

1 Mr. Van Buren has said of it that it was "an heroic, though perhaps a

lawless act." Political Parties, p. 50.

* "Two questions of a very delicate nature present themselves on this occa-

sion: 1. On what principle the confederation, which stands in the form of a

solemn compact among the States, can be superseded without the unanimous con-

sent of the parties to it; 2. What relation is to subsist between the nine or more

States ratifying the Constitution, and the remaining few who do not become

parties to it. The first question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute

necessity of the case; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the tran-

scendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the safety and

happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and

to which all such institutions must be sacrificed. Perhaps, also, an answer may be
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found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been

heretofore noted, among the defects of the confederation, that in many of the

States it had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification.

The principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligation on the other

States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent

sovereigns, founded on acts of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher

validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doc-

trine on the subject of treaties, that all of the articles are mutually conditions of

each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and

that a breach committed by either of the parties absolves the others, and author-

izes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should

it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for

dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal

pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the multi-

plied and important infractions with which they may be confronted? The time

has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph

exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives

dictate. The second question is not less delicate, and the flattering prospect of

its being merely hypothetical forbids an over-curious discussion of it. It is one

of those cases which must be left to provide for itself. In general it may he

observed, that although no political relation can subsist between the assenting

and dissenting States, yet the moral relations will remain uncancelled. The

claims of justice, both on one side and on the other, will be in force and must be

fulfilled; the rights of humanity must in all cases be duly and mutually respected;

whilst considerations of a common interest, and above all the remembrance of

the endearing scenes which are past, and the anticipation of a speedy triumph

[8]

CH. n.] THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES. * 9

* Left at liberty now to assume complete powers of sover- [* 9]

eignty as independent governments, these two States saw

fit soon to resume their place in the American family, under a per-

mission contained in the Constitution ; and new States have since

been added from time to time, all of them, with the exception of

one, organized by the consent of the general government and em-

bracing territory previously under its control. The exception was

Texas, which had previously been an independent sovereign State,

but which, by the conjoint action of its government and that of the

United States, was received into the Union on an equal footing

with the other States.

Without therefore discussing, or even designing to allude to

any abstract theories as to the precise position and actual power

of the several States at the time of forming the present Constitu-

tion,1 it may be said of them generally that they have at all times

been subject to some common national government, which has

exercised control over the subjects of war and peace, and other

matters pertaining to external sovereignty; and that when the

only three States which ever exercised complete sovereignty

accepted the Constitution and came into the Union, on an equal
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footing with all the other States, they thereby accepted the same

relative position to the general government, and divested them-

selves permanently of those national powers which the others had

never exercised.

The government of the United States is one of enumerated

powers; the national Constitution being the instrument which

specifies them, and in which authority should be found for the

exercise of any power which the national government assumes

to possess.2 In this respect it differs from the constitutions of

over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain moderation on

one side, and prudence on the othep." Federalist, No. 43 (by Madison).

1 See this subject discussed in Gibbons v. Ogdcn, 9 Wheat. 1.

'"The government of the United States can claim no powers which are not

granted to it by the Constitution; and the powers actually granted must be such

as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication." Per Marshall, Ch.

J., in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 326. "This instrument contains an

enumeration of the powers expressly granted by the people to their government."

Marshall, Cb. J., in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 187. See Calder v. Bull, 3

Ball. 386; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Gilman v. Philadelphia,

3 Wall. 713; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 477. The tenth amendment to the

Constitution provides that " the powers not delegated to the United States by

[9]

* 10

[CH. II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[* 10] the * several States, which are not grants of powers to

the States, but which apportion and impose restrictions

upon the powers which the States inherently possess. The gen-

eral purpose of the Constitution of the United States is declared

by its founders to be, " to form a more perfect union, establish

justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common

defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of

liberty to ourselves and our posterity." To accomplish these

purposes, the Congress is empowered by the eighth section of

article one: —

1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to

pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general

welfare of the United States. But all duties, imposts, and excises

shall be uniform throughout the United States.

2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States.

3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the

several States, and with the Indian tribes.

4. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform
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laws on the subject of bankruptcy, throughout the United States.

5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign

coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures.

6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities

and current coin of the United States.

7. To establish post-offices and postrroads.

8. To promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by

securing for limited terms to authors and inventors the exclusive

right to their respective writings and discoveries.

9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. To

define and punish piracies and felonies committed upon the high

seas, and offences against the law of nations.

10. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and

make rules concerning captures on land and water.

11. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money

to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.

12. To provide and maintain a navy.

the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States

respectively, or to the people." No power is conferred by the Constitution upon

Congress to establish mere police regulations within the States. United States

v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41.

[10]

CH. II.] THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES.

* 10

13. To make rules for the government and regulation of the

land and naval forces.

* 14. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute [* 11]

the laws of the nation, suppress insurrections, and repel

invasions.

15. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the

militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed

in the service of the United States, reserving to the States re-

spectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of

training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by

Congress.

16. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,

over such district not exceeding ten miles square as may, by ces-

sion of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become

the seat of government of the United States; and to exercise like

authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legis-

lature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of

forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.

17. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
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carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers

vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States,

or in any department or officer thereof.

Congress is also empowered by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and

fifteenth - amendments to the Constitution to enforce the same

by appropriate legislation. The thirteenth amendment abolishes

slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for

crime,, throughout the United States and all places subject to

their jurisdiction. The fourteenth amendment has several objects.

1. It declares all persons born or naturalized in the United States,

and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, to be citizens of the United

States and of the State wherein they reside; and it forbids any,

State to make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-

leges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or to deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,

or to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-

tion of the laws. 2. It provides that when the right to vote at

any election for the choice of electors for president or vice-presi-

dent of the United States, representatives in Congress, the ex-

ecutive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the

legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of

I

[H]

* 11

[ch. n.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the

United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation ir

rebellion or other crime, the basis of Congressional representat.bn

therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the, number of

such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens

twenty-one years of age in such State. 3. It disqualifies from

holding federal or State offices certain persons who shall have

engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or

given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. 4. It declares the

inviolability of the public debt of the United States, and forbids

the United States or any State assuming or paying any debt or

obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the

United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any

slave. The fifteenth amendment declares that the right of citizens

of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the

United States or by any State, on account of race, color, or pre-

vious condition of servitude.1

The executive power, is vested in a president, who is made
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commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and of the militia of

the several States when called into the service of the United

States; and who has power, by and with the consent of the Senate,

to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senate concur, and,

with the same advice and consent, to appoint ambassadors and

other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court,

and other officers of the United States, whose appointments are

not otherwise provided for.2

The judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in

law and equity arising under the national Constitution, the laws

of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made,

under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other

public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and mar-

itime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States

shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States;

between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens

1 See these amendments construed in the recent cases of Live Stock Dealers

and Butchers' Association v. The Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaugh-

ter House Co., and Bradwell v. Illinois, decided by the Supreme Court of the

United States in 1878, and to appear in 15 Wallace. See also Story on Const.

4th ed. c. 46, 47, 48, and App. to Vol. II.

2 U. S. Const, art. 2.

[12]

CH. II.] THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES. * 11

of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming

lands under grants of different States; and between a

* State or citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens [* 12]

or subjects.1 But a State is not subject to be sued in

the courts of the United States by the citizens of another State,

or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.2

The Constitution and the laws of the United States, made in

pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of

the United States, are declared to be the supreme law of the

land; and the judges of every State are to be bound thereby,

any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary

notwithstanding.3

It is essential to the protection of the national jurisdiction, and

to prevent collision between State and national authority, that the

final decision upon all questions arising iu regard thereto should

rest with the courts of the Union;4 and as such questions must

frequently arise first in the State courts, provision is made by the

Judiciary Act of 1789 for removing to the Supreme Court of the

United States the final judgment or decree in any suit, rendered in

the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision
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could be had, in which was drawn in question the validity of a

treaty, or statute of, or authority exercised under the United States,

and the decision was against their validity; or where was drawn in

question the validity of a statute of, or au authority exercised un-

der any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Con-

1 U.a Const, art. 3, § 2. * U. S. Const. 11th Amendment.

1 D. S. Const, art. 6; Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 348; McCul-

loch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314; Cook v.

Moffat, 5 How. 295; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331. When a treaty has been

ratified by the proper formalities, it is, by the Constitution, the supreme law of

the land, and the courts have no power to inquire into the authority of the per-

sons by whom it was entered into on behalf of the foreign nation: Doe v. Braden,

16 How. 635, 657; or the powers or rights recognized by it in the nation with

which it was made: Maiden v. Ingersoll, 6 Mich. 373. A State law in conflict

with it must give way to its superior authority. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 99;

Teaker v. Yeaker, 4 Met. Ky. 33. See, further, United States p. Aredondo,

6 Pet. 691; United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511;

Ropes p. Clinch, 8 Blatch. 304; The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616.

4 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 334; Cohens v. Virginia, 6

Wheat. 264; Bank of United States v. Norton, 3 Marsh. 423; Braynard v.

Marshall, 8 Pick. 196, per Parker, Ch. J.; Spangler's Case, 11 Mich. 298;

Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397.
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stitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision

was in favor of such their validity; or where was drawn in quo-

tion the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a

treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United

[* 13] States, and the decision was against the right, * title,

privilege, or exemption specially set up or claimed by either

party under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute, or

commission.1

But to authorize the removal under that act, it must appear by

the record, either expressly or by clear and necessary intendment,

that some one of the enumerated questions did arise in the State

court, and was there passed upon. It is not sufficient that it

might have arisen or been applicable.2 And if the decision of the

State court is in favor of the right, title, privilege, or exemption

so claimed, the Judiciary Act does not authorize such removal.3

Neither does it where the validity of the State law is drawn in

question, and the decision of the State court is against its validity.4

But the same reasons which require that the final decision upon
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all questions of national jurisdiction should be left to the national

courts will also hold the national courts bound to respect the

decisions of the State courts upon all questions arising under the

State constitutions and laws, where no question of national au-

1 1 Statutes at Large, 83; Brightly's Digest, 259.

* Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 344; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,

1 Wheat. 304; Inglee v. Coolidge, 2 Wheat. 363; Miller v. NichoUs, 4 Wheat.

311; Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117; Hickie v. Starke, 1 Pet. 98; Harris v.

Dennie, 3 Pet. 292; Fisher's Lessee v. Cockerell, 5 Pet. 256; New Orleans v.

De Armas, 9 Pet. 223, 234; Keene v. Clarke, 10 Pet. 291; Crowell v. Randell,

10 Pet. 368; MeKinny v. Carroll, 12 Pet. 66; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540;

Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 343; Smith v. Hunter, 7 How. 738; Williams v. Oliver,

12 How. Ill; Calcote v. Stanton, 18 How. 243; Maxwell v. Newbold, 18 How.

511; Hoyt v. Shelden, 1 Black, 518; Farney v. Towle, 1 Black, 350; Day ».

Gallup, 2 Wall. 97. It is not sufficient that the presiding judge of the State

court certifies that a right claimed under the national authority was brought in

question. Railroad Co. e. Rock, 4 Wall. 177.

■ Gordon v. Caldcleuj-h, 3 Cranch, 268 ; McDonough v. Millaudon, 3 How.

G93; Fulton v. McAffee, 16 Pet. 149; Linton v. Stanton, 12 How. 423; Burke

r. Gaines, 19 How. 388; Reddall v. Bryan, 24 How. 420; Roosevelt v. Meyer,

1 Wall. 512 ; Ryan v. Thomas, 4 Wall. 603.

4 Commonwealth Bank v. Griffith, 14 Pet. 56; Walker t>. Taylor, 5 How. 64.

We take no notice here of the statutes for the removal of causes from the State

to the Federal courts for the purposes of original trial, as they are not impor-

tant to any discussion we shall have occasion to enter upon in this work.

[14]
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thority is involved, and to accept those decisions as correct, and

to follow them whenever the same questions arise in the national

courts.1 With the power to revise the decisions of the State

'In Beauregard p. New Orleans, 18 How. 502, Mp. Justice Campbell says:

"The constitution of this court requires it to follow the laws of the several

States as rules of decision wherever they apply. And the habit of the court

has been to defer to the decisions of their judicial tribunals upon questions

arising out of the common law of the State, especially when applied to the title

of lands." In Bank of Hamilton p. Dudley's Lessee, 2 Pet. 524, it was con-

tended that the exclusive power of State courts to construe legislative acts did

not extend to the paramount law, so as to enable them to give eificacy to an act

which was contrary to the State constitution; but Marshall, Ch. J., said: "We

cannot admit this distinction. The judicial department of every government is

the rightful expositor of its laws, and emphatically of its supreme law." Again

in Elmendorf p. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 159, the same eminent judge says: "The

judicial department of every government, where such department exists, is the

appropriate organ for construing the legislative acts of that government. Thus

no court in the universe which proposed to be governed by principle would, we

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:00 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

presume, undertake to say that the courts of Great Britain or France, or of any

other nation, had misunderstood their own statutes, and therefore erect itself into

a tribunal which should correct such misunderstanding. We receive the construc-

tion given by the courts of the nation as the true sense of the law, and feel our-

selves no more at liberty to depart from that construction than to depart from

the words of the statute. On this principle, the construction given by this court

to the Constitution and laws of the United States is received by all as the true

construction; and on the same principle the construction given by the courts of

the several States to the legislative acts of those States is received as true,

unless they come in conflict with the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States." And in Green p. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. 298, it is said by McLean, J.:

"The decision of the highest judicial tribunal of a State should be considered

as final by this court, not because the State tribunal in such a case has any

power to bind this court, but because, in the language of the court iu Shelby p.

Guy, 11 Wheat. 361, a fixed and received construction by a State, in its own

courts, makes a part of the statute law." And see Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat.

16:.', per Thompson, J.; also the following cases: Sims v. Irvine, 3 Dall. 425;

McKeen p. Delancy, 5 Cranch, 22; Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 87;

Preston p. Browder, 1 Wheat. 115; Mutual Assurance Co. v. Watts, ib. 279;

Shipp p. Miller, 2 Wheat. 316; Thatcher p. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119; Bell v.

Morrison, 1 Pet. 351; Waring v. Jackson, ib. 570; DeWoIf v. Rabaud, ib.

476; Fulli-rton p. Bank of United States, t'6. 604; Gardner v. Collins, 2 Pet.

58; Beach v. Viles, 2 Pet. 675; Inglis p. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99;

United States p. Morrison, 4 Pet. 124; Henderson p. Griffin, 5 Pet. 151;

Hinde p. Vattier, ib. 398; Ross p. McLung, 6 Pet. 283; Marlatt p. Silk, 11

Pet. 1; Bank of United States p. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32; Clarke p. Smith, 13 Pet.

195; Ross p. Duval, ib. 45; Wilcox p. Jackson, ib. 498; Harpending p.

Reformed Church, 16 Pet. 445; Martin v. Waddell, ib. 367; Amis p. Smith,

[15]
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[* 14] * courts in the cases already pointed out, the due observ-

ance of this rule will prevent those collisions of judicial

ib. 303; Porterfield v. Clark, 2 How. 76; Lane ». Vick, 3 How. 464; Jbx-

croft v. Mallett, 4 How. 353; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 103; Rowan t. Run-

nels, ib. 134; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297; Pease v. Peck, 18

How. 595; Fisher v. Haldcman, 20 How. 186; Parker v. Kane, 22 How. 1;

Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427; Sumner v. Hicks, 2 Black, 532; Chicago

t>. Robbins, ib. 418; Miles v. Caldwell, 2 Wall. 35; Williams v. Kirkland, 13

Wall. 300; Springer v. Foster, 2 Story C. C. 383; Neal v. Green, 1 McLean,

18; Paine v. Wright, 6 McLean, 395 ; Boyle v. Arledge, Hemp. 620; Grilling r.

Gibb, McAll. 212; Bayerque v. Cohen, ib. 113; Wick v. The Samuel Strong,

Newb. 187; N. F. Screw Co. v. Bliven, 3 Blatch. 240 ; Bronson v. Wallace, 4

Blatch. 465; Van Bokelen v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 5 Blatch. 379; United

States v. Mann, 1 Gall. 5; Society, &c. v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105; Coatcs r.

Muse, Brock. 539; Meade v. Bcale, Taney, 339; Parker v. Phetteplace, 2

Cliff. 70; King v. Wilson, 1 Dill. 555. In Green v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. 291,

an important question was presented as to the proper course to be pursued by

the Supreme Court of the United States under somewhat embarrassing circum-
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stances. That court had been called upon to put a construction upon a State

statute of limitations, and had done so. Afterwards the same question had

been before the Supreme Court of the State, and in repeated cases had been

decided otherwise. The question now was whether the Supreme Court would

follow its own decision, or reverse that, in order to put itself in harmony with the

State decisions. The subject is considered at length by McLean, J., who justly

concludes that "adherence by the federal to the exposition of the local law,

as given by the courts of the State, will greatly tend to preserve harmony in the

exercise of the judicial power in the State and federal tribunals. This rule is

not only recommended by strong considerations of propriety, growing out of our

system of jurisprudence, but it is sustained by principle and authority." The

court accordingly reversed its rulings to make them conform to those of the State

court. See also Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427; Leffingwell v. Warren,

2 Black, 599; lilossburg, &c, R.R. Co. v. Tioga R.R. Co., 5 Blatch. 387;

Smith v. Shriver, 3 Wall. Jr. 219. It is of course immaterial that the court may

still be of opinion that the State court has erred, or that the decisions elsewhere

are different. Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 300. But where the Supreme Court had

held that certain contracts for the price of slaves were not made void by the

State constitution, and afterward the State court held otherwise, the Supreme

Court, regarding this decision wrong, declined to reverse their own ruling.

Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134. Compare this with Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7

How. 812, in which the court followed, without examination or question, the

State decision, that a State general banking law was in violation of the consti-

tution of the State. The United States Circuit Court had held otherwise pre-

vious to the State decision. Falconer v. Campbell, 2 McLean, 195.

This doctrine does not apply to questions not at all dependent upon local

statutes or usages; as, for instance, to contracts and other instruments of a com-

mercial and general nature, like bills of exchange; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1;

and insurance contracts; Robinson v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 3 Sum. 220.

[16]
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authority which would otherwise be inevitable, and which,

besides being unseemly, * would be dangerous to the peace, [* 15]

harmony, and stability of the Union under our peculiar

system.

Besides conferring specified powers upon the national govern-

ment, the Constitution contains also certain restrictions upon the

action of the States, a portion of them designed to prevent en-

croachments upon the natioual authority, and another portion to

protect individual rights against possible abuse of State powep.

Of the first class are the following: No State shall enter into any

treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of marque or re-

prisal, coin money, emit bills of credit,1 or make any thing but gold

and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. No State shall,

without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties upon

imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for

executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties

and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports shall be for

the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws
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shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress. No State

shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage,

And see Reimsdyke v. Kane, 1 Gall. 376; Austen p. Miller, 5 McLean, 153;

Glouster Ins. Co. v. Younger, 2 Curt. C. C. 322; Bragg v. Meyer, 1 McAll.

408. And of course cases presenting questions of conflict with the Constitution

of the United States cannot be within it. State Bank v. Knoup, 16 How. 369;

Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelley, 1 Black, 436. And where a contract had

been made under a settled construction of the State constitution by its highest

court, the Supreme Court sustained it, notwithstanding the State court had

since overruled its former decision. Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 176. Of late

it has seemed that new and doubtful grounds were being taken for disregarding

State decisions, and in several cases nearly one half the members of the federal

Supreme Court have deemed it necessary to protest against an abandonment of

the sound and safe doctrine of the earlier decisions.

1 To constitute a bill of credit within the meaning of the Constitution, it must

be issued by a State, involve the faith of the State, and be designed to circulate

as money on the credit of the State in the ordinary uses of business. Briscoe v.

Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 209. The

facts that a State owns the entire capital stock of a bank, elects the directors,

makes its bills receivable for the public dues, and pledges its faith for their

redemption, do not make the bills of such bank " bills of credit" in the constitu-

tional sense. Darrington p. State Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12. See, further,

Craig p. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410; Byrne p. Missouri, 8 Pet. 40; Curran v. Arkan-

sas, 15 How. 317; Moreau v. Detchamendy, 41 Mo. 431; Bailey v. Milner, 35

Geo. 330; City National Bank p. Mahan, 21 La. Ann. 751.

2 [ 17 ]
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keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agree-

ment or compact with another State or with a foreign power, or

engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent

danger as will not admit of delay. Of the second class are the

following: No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto

law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts,1 or make or en-

force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of

citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any per-

son of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws,2 nor base discriminations in suffrage on race, color, or

previous condition of servitude.3

Other provisions have for their object to prevent discriminations

by the several States against the citizens and public authority and

proceedings of other States. Of this class are the provisions that

the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges

and immunities of citizens in the several States;4 that fugitives

1 Const, of U. S. art. 1, § 10; Story on Const, c. 33, 34.
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* Const, of U. S. 14th Amendment; Story on Const. 4th ed. c. 47.

'Const, of U. S. loth Amendment; Story on Const. 4th ed. c. 48.

4 Const, of U. S. art. 4. "What are the privileges and immunities of citi-

zens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions

to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental; which

belong of right to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all

times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this

Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What

those fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult

to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following

general heads: protection by the government, the enjoyment of life and lib-

erty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue

and obtain happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to such restraints as the

government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right

of a citizen of one State to pass through, or to reside in any other State, for

purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the

benefit of- the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of every

kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either

real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are

paid by the citizens of the other State, may be mentioned as some of the particu-

lar privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the

general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be

added the elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitu-

tion of the State in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which

might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and tb,e

enjoyment of them by the citizens of each State in every other State wr.s mani-

[ 18 ]
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from justice shall * be delivered up,1 and that full faith [* 16]

festly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding

provision in the old Articles of Confederation) 'the better to secure and perpet-

uate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States

of the Union.'" Washington, J., in Corfield r. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 380.

The Supreme Court will not describe and define those privileges and immunities,

in a general classification; preferring to decide each case as it may come up. ■

Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418. For discus-

sions upon this subject, see Murray t>. McCarty, 2 Munf. 398; Lemmon v. Peo-

ple, 26 Barb. 270, and 20 N. Y. 562; Campbell v. Morris, 3 Har. & M'H. 554;

Amy v. Smith, 1 Lit. 326; Crandall t>. State, 10 Conn. 840; Butler v. Farns-

worth, 4 Wash. C. C. 101; Commonwealth v. Towles, 5 Leigh, 743; Haney

r. Marshall, 9 Md. 194; Slaughter r>. Commonwealth, 13 Grat. 767; State v.

Medbury, 3 R. I. 138; People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68; People v. Coleman, 4

Cal. 46; People v. Thurber, 13 111. 544; Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Common-

wealth, 5 Bush, 68; Ducat v. Chicago, 48 111. 172; Fire Department v. Noble,

3 E. 1). Smith, 441; Same v. Wright, t'6. 453; Same v. Holfenstein, 16 Wis.

136; Sears v. Commissioners of Warren Co., 36 Ind. 267 ; Cincinnati Health

Association v. Rosenthal, 55 111. 85; State v. Fosdick, 21 La. Ann. 434. The

constitutional provision does not apply to corporations. Warren Manuf. Co. v.
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£tna Ins. Co., 2 Paine, 501; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. A discrimination

between local freight on railroads and that which is extra;territorial is not per-

sonal, and therefore not forbidden by this clause of the Constitution. Shipper v.

Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 47 Penn. St. 338. A State cannot impose, for the priv-

ilege of doing business within its limits, a heavier license tax upon non-residents

than is required of residents. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418.

1 For decisions under this clause, see Ex paiie Joseph Smith, 3 McLean, 133;

Dow's Case, 18 Penn. St. 89; State v. HufFord, 28 Iowa, 391; Kingsbury's Case,

106 Mass. 223; Matter of Clark, 9 Wend. 221; Johnson v. Riley, 13 Geo. 97;

Matter of Fetter, 3 Zab. 311. The three cases last cited decide that the alleged

offence need not be an offence at the common law; it is sufficient that it be a

crime against the State from which the accused has fled. But it must have been

actually committed within the State reclaiming the alleged offender, and he must

have been an actual fugitive therefrom. Ex parte Smith, supra. The whole

subject was considered in Commonwealth of Kentucky v, Dennison, 24 How. 66.

One Lago was indicted in Kentucky for enticing and assisting a slave to escape

from his master, and a requisition was made upon the governor of Ohio for his

surrender to the Kentucky authorities as a fugitive from justice. The governor

of Ohio refused to surrender him, on the ground that the act with which he was

charged was not an offence known to the laws of Ohio, and not an act affecting

the public safety, or regarded as malum in se by the general judgment and con-

science of civilized nations. Application was then made to the Supreme Court of

the United States for a mandamus to compel the governor of Ohio to perform

this duty. The application was denied, on the ground that, although the gov-

ernor erred in his refusal, no power was delegated to the general government,

either through the judicial or any other department, to employ any coercive

means to compel him. See Matter of Voorhies, 32 N. J. 141.

[19]
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[* 17] and credit shall be given in * each State to the public acts,

records, and judicial proceedings of every other State.1

The last provisions that we shall here notice are that the United

States shall guarantee to every State a republican form of govern-

ment,2 and that no State shall grant any title of nobility.3 The

purpose of these is to protect a Union founded on republi-

[* 18] can principles, and composed entirely of * republican mem-

bers against aristocratic and monarchial innovations.4

1 Const, of U. S. art. 4. This clause of the Constitution has been the sub-

ject of a good deal of discussion in the courts. It is well settled that if the record

of a judgment shows that it was rendered without service of process or appear-

ance of the defendant, or if that fact can be shown without contradicting the reci-

tals of the record, it will be treated as void in any other State, notwithstanding

this constitutional provision. Benton v. Burbot, 10 S. & R. 242; Thurber v.

Blnckbournc, 1 N. H. 242; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Aldrich v. Kinney,

4 Conn. 380; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Robinson v. Ward's Execu-

tors, 8 Johns. 86; Fenton v. Garlick, ib. 194; Kilbourn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns.

37; Pawling v. Bird's Executors, 13 Johns. 192; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend.
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161; Noyes v. Butler, C Barb. 613; Woodward v. Tremere, 6 Pick. 354; Lin-

coln v. Tower, 2 McLean, 473; Westervelt v. Lewis, t'6. 511; Bimelar v. Daw-

son, 4 Scam. 536; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Warren u. M'Carthy, 25 111.

95; Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328; Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500; Norwood

v. Cobb, 24 Texas, 551; McLaurine v. Monroe, 30 Mo. 462; Commonwealth v.

Blood, 97 Mass. 538. But whether it would be competent to show, in opposi-

tion to the recitals of the record, that a judgment of another State was rendered

without jurisdiction having been obtained of the person of the defendant, is not

settled by the authorities. Many cases hold not. Field v. Gibbs, 1 Pet. C. C.

156; Green v. Sarmiento, ib. 76; Lincoln v. Tower, 2 McLean, 473; Wester-

velt v. Lewis, ib. 511; Roberts v. Caldwell, 5 Dana, 512; Hensley v. Force, 7

Eng. 756; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544; Hoxie v. Wright, 2 Vt. 2G3; New-

comb o. Peck, 17 Vt. 302; Willcox r. Kassick, 2 Mich. 165; Bimelar v. Dawson,

4 Seam. 536; Welch v. Sykes, 3 Gil. 197; Harbin v. Chiles, 20 Mo. 314;

Wetherell v. Stillman, 65 Penn. St. 105. Other cases admit such evidence.

Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 148; Holbrook v. Murray, ib. 161; Shumway v.

Stillman, 6 Wend. 447; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Hall v. Williams, 6

Pick. 232.; Aldrich ». Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407;

Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Kane r.

Cook, 8 Cal. 449; Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Texas, 551. The same defences may

be made to a judgment when sued in another State which could have been made

to it in the State where rendered. Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234; Mills

v. Duryea, 7 Cranch, 484; Steele v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447; Bank of the State

r. Dalton, 9 How. 528. But no others: Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139;

Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108; People e.

Dawell, 25 Mich. 247.

« Const, of U. S. art. 4, § 4. 3 Const, of U. S. art. 1, § 10.

* Federalist, Nos. 43 and 44. It does not fall within our province to discuss

[20]
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So far as a particular consideration of the foregoing provisions

falls within the plan of our present work, it will be more convenient

to treat of them in another place, especially as all of them which

have for their object the protection of person or property are

usually repeated in the bills of rights contained in the State con-

stitutions, and will require some notice at our hands as a part of

State constitutional law.

Where powers are conferred upon the general government, the

exercise of the same powers by the States is impliedly prohibited,

wherever the intent of the grant to the national government would

be defeated by such exercise. On this ground it is held that the

States cannot tax the agencies or loans of the general government;

since the power to tax, if possessed by the States in regard to these

objects, might be so exercised as altogether to destroy such agen-

cies and impair or even destroy the national credit.1 And where by

the national Constitution jurisdiction is given to the national courts

with a view to the more efficient and harmonious working of the

system organized under it, it is competent for Congress in its wis-
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dom to make that jurisdiction exclusive of the State courts.2 On

some other subjects State laws may be valid until the power of

Congress is exercised, when they become superseded, either wholly,

or so far as they are found inconsistent. The States may legislate

on the subject of bankruptcy if there be no law of Congress which

will conflict.3 State laws for organizing and disciplining the mili-

tia are valid except as they may conflict with national legislation ;4

and the States may constitutionally provide for punishing the coun-

terfeiting of coin5 and the passing of counterfeit money,0 since

these provisions. They have been much discussed in Congress within a few

years, but in a party, rather than a judicial spirit. See Story on Const. 4th ed. -

p. 41 and notes.

1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 427; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet.

449. See cases collected, post, p. 482.

1 Martin p. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 334; The Moses Taylor p. Hammons,

4 Wall. 411; The Ad Hine v. Trevor, ib. bob. And see note to these cases in

the Western Jurist, Vol. I. p. 241.

* Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; McMillan v. McNeill, ib. 209.

And see past, pp. 293-94.

4 Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 51.

* Harlan v. People, 1 Doug. Mich. 207.

6 Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560. And

see Hendrick's Case, 5 Leigh, 707; Jett v. Commonwealth, 18 Grat. 933; Moore

e. People, 14 How. 13.

[21]
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these acts are offences against the State, notwithstanding they my

be offences against the nation also.

[* 19] * The tenth amendment to the Constitution provides that

the powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-

stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the

States respectively, or to the people. And it is to be observed of

this instrument, that being framed for the establishment of a na-

tional government, it is a settled rule of construction that the limi-

tations it imposes upon the powers of government are in all cases

to be understood as limitations upon the government of the Union

only, except where the States are expressly mentioned.1

With other rules for the construction of the national Constitu-

tion, we shall have little occasion to deal. They have been tlie

subject of elaborate treatises, judicial opinions, and legislative de-

bates, which are familiar alike to the legal profession and to the

public at large. So far as that instrument apportions powers to

the national judiciary, it must be understood, for the most part, as

simply authorizing Congress to pass the necessary legislation for

the exercise of those powers by the federal courts, and not as

directly, of its own force, vesting them with that authority. The
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Constitution does not, of its own force, give to national courts

jurisdiction of the several cases which it enumerates, but an act

of Congress is essential, first, to create courts, and afterwards to

apportion the jurisdiction among them. The exceptions are of

those few cases of which the Constitution confers jurisdiction

upon the Supreme Court by name. And although the courts of

the United States administer the common law in many cases, they

do not derive authority from the common law to take cognizance

of and punish offences against the government. Offences against

1 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Livingston's Lessee v. Moore, 7 Pet. 551;

Fox !•. Ohio, 5 How. 432; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71; Buonaparte v. Cam-

den & Amboy R.R. Co., Baldw. 220; James v. Commonwealth, 12 S. & R. 221;

Barker v. People, 3 Cow. G86; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; Jane v. Common-

wealth, 3 Met. (Ky.) 18; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 336; Matter of Smith, 10

Wend. 449; State v. Barnett, 3 Kansas, 250; Reed v. Rice, 2 J. J. Marsh. 45;

North. Mo. R.R. Co. v. Maguire, 49 Mo. 490; Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5

Wall. 475; Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 Wall. 321. For instance, though the

right of trial by jury is preserved by the Constitution of the> United States, the

States may, nevertheless, if they choose, provide for the trial of all offences

against the States, as well as the trial of civil cases in the State courts, without

the intervention of a jury.

[22]
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the nation are defined and their punishment prescribed by acts of

Congress.1

1 Demurrer to an indictment for a libel upon the President and Congress. By

the court: "The only question which this case presents is, whether the circuit

courts can exercise a common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases. . . . The gen-

eral acquiescence of legal men shows the prevalence of opinion in favor of the

negative of the proposition. The course of reasoning which leads to this con-

clusion is simple, obvious, and admits of but little illustration. The powers of

the general government are made up of concessions from the several States;

whatever is not expressly given to the former, the latter expressly reserve. The

judicial power of the United States is a constitutional part of these concessions:

that power is to be exercised by courts organized for the purpose, and brought

into existence by an effort of the legislative power of the Union. Of all the

courts which the United States may, under their general powers, constitute, one

only, the Supreme Court, possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the

Constitution, and of which the legislative power cannot deprive it. All other

courts, created by the general government, possess no jurisdiction but what is

given them by the power that created them, and can be vested with none but

what the power ceded to the general government will authorize them to confer.

It is not necessary to inquire whether the general government, in any and what

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:00 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

extent, possesses the power of conferring on its courts a jurisdiction in cases

similar to the present; it is enough that such jurisdiction has not been conferred

by any legislative act, if it does not result to those courts as a consequence of

their creation." United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, .'32. See United States v.

Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415. "It is clear there can be no common law of the United

States. The federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and

independent States, each of which may have its local usages, customs, and com-

mon law. There is no principle which pervades the Union, and has the authority

of law, that is not embodied in the Constitution or laws of the Union. The com-

mon law could be made a part of our federal system only by legislative adop-

tion." Per McLean, J., in Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 658. See also Kendall

v. United States, 12 Pet. 524; Lorman v. Clarke, 2 McLean, 568; U. S. v. Lan-

caster, ib. 433; U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. & M. 435; U. S. v. Wil-

son, 3 Blatch. 435. As to the adoption of the common law by the States, see

Van Nest v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 144, per Story, J.; post, p. 23, and cases cited in

notes.

[23]
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[ch. nr.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[*21] 'CHAPTER III.

THE FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OP STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

The Constitution of the United States assumes the existence

of thirteen distinct State governments, over whose people its au-

thority was to be extended if ratified by conventions chosen for

the purpose. Each of these States was then exercising the powers

of government under some form of written constitution, and that

instrument would remain unaffected by the adoption of the national

Constitution, except in those particulars in which the two would

come in conflict; and as to those, the latter would modify and

control the former.1 But besides this fundamental law, every State

had also a body of laws, prescribing the rights, duties, and obli-

gations of persons within its jurisdiction, and establishing those

minute rules for the various relations of life which cannot be prop-

erly incorporated in a constitution, but must be left to the regula-

tion of the ordinary law-making power.

By far the larger and more valuable portion of that body of laws

consisted of the common law of England, which had been trans-
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planted in the American wilderness, and which the colonists, now

become an independent nation, had found a shelter of protection

during all the long contest with the mother country, brought at

last to so fortunate a conclusion.

The common law of England consisted of those maxims of

freedom, order, enterprise, and thrift which had prevailed in the

conduct of public affairs, the management of private business, the-

regulation of the domestic institutions, and the acquisition, con-

trol, and transfer of property from time immemorial. It was the

outgrowth of the habits of thought and action of the people, and

was modified gradually and insensibly from time to time as those

1 State v. Cape Girardeau, &c. R.R. Co., 48 Mo. 468; Mayor, &c. of Mobile

v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310.

[24]
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J

habits became modified, and as civilization advanced, and new in-

ventions introduced new wants and conveniences,, and new modes

of business. Springing from the very nature of the people them-

selves, and developed in their own experience, it was obviously the

body of laws best adapted to their needs, and as they took with

them their nature, so also they would take with them these laws

whenever they should transfer their domicile from one country to

another.

* To eulogize the common law is no part of our pres- [* 22]

ent purpose. Many of its features were exceedingly harsh

and repulsive, and gave unmistakable proofs that they had their

origin in times of profound ignorance, superstition, and barbarism.

The feudal system, which was essentially a system of violence, dis-

order, and rapine,1 gave birth to many of the maxims of the com-

mon law; and some of these, long after that system has passed

away, may still be traced in our law, especially in the rules which

govern the acquisition, control, and enjoyment of real estate. The

criminal code was also marked by cruel and absurd features, some

of which have clung to it with wonderful tenacity, even after the
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most stupid could perceive their inconsistency with justice and

civilization. But, on the whole, the system was the best foundation

on which to erect an enduring structure of civil liberty which the

world has ever known. It was the peculiar excellence of the com-

mon law of England that it recognized the worth, and sought es-

pecially to protect the rights and privileges of the individual man.

Its maxims were those of a sturdy and independent race, accus-

tomed in an unusual degree to freedom of thought and action, and

to a share in the administration of public affairs; and arbitrary

power and uncontrolled authority were not recognized in its prin-

ciples. Awe surrounded, and majesty clothed the king, but the

humblest subject might shut the door of his cottage against him,

and defend from intrusion that privacy which was as sacred as the

kingly prerogatives.2 The system was the opposite of servile; its

1 "A feudal kingdom was a confederacy of a numerous body, who lived in a

state of war against each other, and of rapine towards all mankind, in which the

king, according to his ability and vigor, was either a cipher or a tyrant, and a

great portion of the people were reduced to personal slavery." Mackintosh,

History of England, p. 3.

*&eepost, p. 299.

[ 25 y
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[CH. III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

features implied boldness, and independent self-reliance on the part

of the people; and if the criminal code was harsh, it at least

escaped the inquisitorial features which fastened themselves upon

criminal procedure in other civilized countries, and have ever been

fruitful of injustice, oppression, and terror.

For several hundred years, however, changes had from time to

time been made in the common law by means of statutes. Origi-

nally the purpose of general statutes was mainly to declare and

re-affirm such common-law principles as, by reason of usurpations

and abuses, had come to be of doubtful force, and which,

[* 23] therefore, * needed to be authoritatively announced, that

king and subject alike might understand and observe

them. Such was the purpose of the first great statute, promul-

gated at a time when the legislative power was exercised by the

king alone, and which is still known as the Magna Charta of King

John.1 Such also was the purpose of the several confirmations of

that charter, as well as of the Petition of Right,2 and the Bill of

Rights,3 each of which became necessary by reason of usurpations.
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But further statutes also became needful because old customs and

modes of business were unsuited to new conditions of things, when

property had become more valuable, wealth greater, commerce more

extended, and when all these changes had brought with them new

desires and necessities, and also new dangers against which society

as well as the individual subject needed protection. For this Teason

the Statute of Wills,4 and the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries6 be-

came important; and the Habeas Corpus Act6 was also found

necessary, not so much to change the law,7 as to secure existing

principles of the common law against being habitually set aside

and violated by those in power.

1 It is justly observed by Sidney that " Magna Charta was not made to restrain

the absolute authority, for no such thing was in being or pretended (the folly of

such visions seeming to have been reserved to complete the misfortunes and

ignominy of our age), but it was to assert the native and original liberties of our

nation by the confession of the king then being, that neither he nor his successors

should any way encroach upon them." Sidney on Government, c. 3, sec. 27.

! 1 Charles I. c. 1.

3 1 William & Man-, Sess. 2, c. 2.

4 32 Henry VIII. c. 7, and 34 and 35 Henry Vin. c. 5.

5 29 Charles II. c. 3.

8 31 Charles n. c 2.

7 "I dare not advise to cast the laws into a new mould. The work which I

[26]
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From the first the colonists in America claimed the benefit and

protection of the common law. In some particulars, however, the

common law as then existing in England was not suited to their

condition and circumstances in the new country, and those partic-

ulars they omitted as it was put in practice by them.1 They

also claimed the benefit of * such statutes as from time to [* 24]

time had been enacted in modification of this body of

rules.2 And when the difficulties with the home government sprung

propound tendeth to the pruning and grafting of the law, and not the plowing

up anil planting it again, for such a remove I should hold for a perilous innova-

tion." Bacon's Works, Vol. II. p. 281, Phil. Ed. 1852.

1 " The common law of England is not to be taken, in all respects, to be that

of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general principles, and

claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only that

portion which was applicable to their condition." Story, J., in Van Nest v.

Packard, 2 Pet. 144. "The settlers of colonies in America did not carry with

them the laws of the land as being bound by them wherever they should settle.

They left the realm to avoid the inconveniences and hardships they were under,

where some of these laws were in force; particularly ecclesiastical laws, those
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for payment of tithes and others. Had it been understood that they were to

carry these laws with them, they had better have stayed at home among their

friends, unexposed to the risks and toils of a new settlement. They carried with

them a right to such parts of laws of the land as they should judge advantageous

or useful to them; a fight to be free from those they thought hurtful, and a right

to make such others as they should think necessary, not infringing the general

rights of Englishmen; and such new laws they were to form as agreeable as

might be to the laws of England." Franklin, Works by Sparks, Vol. IV. p. 271.

See, also, Cbisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 435; Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2

Mass. 534; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 122; Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N. H: 58;

Houghton i!. Page, 2 N. H. 44; State v. Rollins, 8 N. H. 550; State v. Buchanan,

5 H. & J. 356 ; Lindsey ». Coats, 1 Ohio, 245; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio, N. s. 390;

Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. & R. 330; Craft v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 219; Dawson v.

Coffman, 28 Ind. 220; Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. 757; Morgan

v. King, 30 Barb. 9 ; Lansing v. Stone, 37 Barb. 15; Simpson v. State, 5 Yerg.

350; Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. Mich. 184; Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18; Pier-

son t;. State, 12 Cal. 149; Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 226; Hamilton v. Kneeland,

1 Nev. 40. The courts of one State will presume the common law of a sister

State to be the same as their own in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Abell v. Douglass, 4 Denio, 305; Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181; Schurman v.

Marley, 29 Ind. 458.

2 The acts of Parliament passed after the settlement of a colony were not in

force therein, unless made so by express words, or by adoption. Commonwealth

r. Lodge, 2 Grat. 579; Pemble v. Clifford, 2 McCord, 31. See Swift v. Tousey,

a Ind. 196; Baker v. Mattocks, Quincy, 72; Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 280.

Those amendatory of the common law, if suited to the condition of things in

[27]

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[ch. in.

up, it was a source of immense moral power to the colonists Jiat

they were able to show that the rights they claimed were conferred

by the common law, and that the king and Parliament were seeking

to deprive them of the common birthright of Englishmen. Did

Parliament attempt to levy taxes in America, the people demanded

the benefit of that maxim with which for many generations every

intelligent subject had been familiar, that those must vote the tax

who are to pay it.1 Did Parliament order offenders against the laws

in America to be sent to England for trial, every American was

roused to indignation, and protested against the trampling under

foot of that time-honored principle that trials for crime must be by

a jury of the vicinage. Contending thus behind the bulwarks of

the common law, Englishmen would appreciate and sympathize

with their position, and Americans would feel doubly strong in a

cause that was right not only, but the justice of which must be

confirmed by an appeal to the consciousness of their enemies them-

selves.

The evidence of the common law consisted in part of the declar-

atory statutes we have mentioned,2 in part of the commentaries of
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such men learned in the law as had been accepted as authority,

but mainly in the decisions of the courts applying tbe

[* 25] * law to actual controversies. While .colonization con-

America, were generally adopted by tacit consent. For the differing views taken

by English and American statesmen upon the general questions here discussed,

see the observations by Governor Pownall, and the comments of Franklin

thereon, 4 Works of Franklin, by Sparks, 271.

'" The blessing of Judah and Issachar will never meet; that the same people

or nation should be both the lion's whelp and the ass between burdens; neither

will it be that a people overlaid with taxes should ever become valiant and mar-

tial. It is true that taxes levied by consent of the State do abate men's courage

less, as it hath been seen notably in the exercise of the Low Countries, and in

some degree in the subsidies of England, for you must note that we speak now

of the heart and not of the purse; so that although the same tribute or tax laid

by consent or by imposing be all one to the purse; yet it works diversely upon

the courage. So that you may conclude that no people overcharged with tribute

is fit for empire." Lord Bacon on the True Greatness of Kingdoms.

* These statutes upon the points which are covered by them are the best

evidence possible. They are the living charters of English liberty, to the present

day; and as the forerunners of the American constitutions and the source from

which have been derived many of the most important articles in their bills of

rights, they are constantly appealed to when personal liberty or private rights

are placed in apparent antagonism to the claims of government.

[28]
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tinued, — that is to say, until the war of the Revolution actually

commenced,— these decisions were authority in the colonies, and

the changes made in the common law up to the same period were

operative in America also if suited to the condition of things here.

The opening of the war of the Revolution is the point of time at

which the continuous stream of the common law hecame divided,

and that portion which had been adopted in America flowed on by

itself, no longer subject to changes from across the ocean, but

liable still to be gradually modified through changes in the modes

of thought and of business among the people, as well as through

statutory enactments.

The colonies also had legislatures of their own, by which laws

had been passed which were in force at the time of the separation,

and which remained unaffected thereby. When, therefore, they

emerged from the colonial condition into that of independence, the

laws which governed them consisted, first, of the common law of

England, so far as they had tacitly adopted it as suited to their

condition; second, of the statutes of England, or of Great Britain,

amendatory of the common law, which they had in like manner

adopted; and third, of the colonial statutes.1 The first and second
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constituted the American common law, and by this in great part

are rights adjudged and wrongs redressed in the American States

to this day.2

* Every colony had also its charter, emanating from the [* 26]

'The like condition of things is found to exist in the new States formed and

admitted to the Union since the Constitution was adopted. Congress creates

territorial governments of different grades, but generally with plenary legislative

power either in the governor and judges, a territorial council, or a territorial

legislature chosen by the people, and the authority of this body extends to all

rightful subjects of legislation, subject, however, to the disapproval of Congress.

Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14 How. 273; Miners' Bank v. Iowa, 12

How. 1. The legislation, of course, must not be in conflict with the law of

Congress conferring the power to legislate, but a variance from it may be sup-

posed approved by that body, if suffered to remain without disapproval for a

series of years after being duly reported to it. Clinton v. Englebrect, 13 Wall.

446.

'A few of the States, to get rid of confusion in the law, deemed it desirable

to repeal the acts of Parliament, and to re-enact such portions of them as were

regarded important here. See the Michigan repealing statue, copied from that

of Virginia, in Code of 1820, p. 459. In some of the new States there were

also other laws in force than those to which we have above alluded. Although it

[29]
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1

Crown, and constituting its colonial constitution. All but t»

of these were swept away by the whirlwind of revolution, and

has been said in La Plaisance Bay Harbor Co. v. The City of Monroe, Wal.

Ch. 155, and Depew v. Trustees of Wabash & Erie Canal, 5 Ind. 8, that the

ordinance of 1787 was superseded in each of the States formed out of the

North-VVest Territory by the adoption of a State constitution, and admission to

the Union, yet the weight of judicial authority is probably the other way. In

Hogg v. The Zanesville Canal Manufacturing Co., 5 Ohio, 410, it was held that

the provision of the ordinance that the navigable waters of the territory, and the

carrying-places between should be common highways and for ever free, was per-

manent in its obligation, and could not be altered without the consent both of the

people of the State, and of the United States, given througli their representatives.

"It is an article of compact; and until we assume the principle that the sover-

eign power of a State is not bound by compact, this clause must be considered

obligatory." Justices McLean and Leavilt, in Spooner r. McConnell, 1 Mc-

Lean, 337, examine this subject at considerable length, and both arrive at the

same conclusion with the Ohio court. The view taken of the ordinance in that

case was, that such parts of it as were designed temporarily to regulate the gov-

ernment of the territory were abolished by the change from a territorial to a
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State government, while the other parts, which were designed to be permanent,

are unalterable except by common consent. Some of these, however, being

guaranteed by the federal Constitution, afterwards adopted, may be regarded

as practically annulled, while any others which are opposed to the constitution of

any State formed out of the territory must also be considered as annulled by

common consent; the people of the State assenting in forming their constitution,

and Congress in admitting the State into the Union under it. The article in

regard to navigable waters is therefore still in force. The same was also said in

regard to the article prohibiting slavery, though that also may now be regarded

as practically annulled by the amendment to the federal Constitution covering

the same ground. The like opinion was subsequently expressed in Palmer v.

Commissioners of Cuyahoga Co., 3 McLean, 226, and in Jolly v. Terre Haute

Drawbridge Co., 6 McLean, 23?. See also Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 82;

Doe ii. Douglass, 8 Blackf. 12; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cross, 18

Wis. 109; Milwaukee Gaslight Co. v. Schooner Gamecock, 23 Wis. 141; Wis-

consin River Improvement Co. v. Lyons, 30 Wis. 61. Compare Woodburn v.

Kilbourn Manuf. Co., 1 Abb. U. S. 158. In the cases in the first and third Mc-

Lean, however, the opinion was expressed that the States might lawfully improve

the navigable waters and the carrying-places between, and charge tolls upon the

use of the improvement to obtain reimbursement of their expenditures.

In some of the States formed out of the territory acquired by the United States

from foreign powers, traces will be found of the laws existing before the change

of government. Louisiana has a code peculiar to itself, based upon the civil law.

Much of Mexican law, and especially as regards lands and land titles, is retained

in the systems of Texas and California. In Michigan, when the acts of Parlia-

ment were repealed, it was also deemed important to repeal all laws derived from

[30]
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hers substituted which had been framed by the people themselves,

through the agency of conventions which they had chosen. The

exceptions were the States of Connecticut and Rhode Island, each

of which had continued its government as a State under the colo-

nial charter, finding it sufficient aud satisfactory for the time being,

and accepting it as the constitution for the State.1

New States have since, from time * to time, formed con- [* 27]

stitutions either regularly in pursuance of enabling acts

passed by Congress, or irregularly by the spontaneous action of

the people, or under the direction of the legislative or executive

authority of the Territory to which the State succeeded. Where

irregularities existed, they must be regarded as having been cured

by the subsequent admission of the State into the Union by Con-

gress; and there were not wanting in the case of some States

plausible reasons for insisting that such admission * had [* 28]

become a matter of right, and that the necessity for an

enabling act by Congress was dispensed with by the previous stip-

ulations of the national government in acquiring the Territory from

which sucIi States were formed.2 Some of these constitutions

pointed out the mode for their own modification; others were
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silent on that subject; but it has been assumed that in such cases

France, through the connection with the Canadian provinces, including the

Contume de Paris, or ancient French common law. In the mining States and

Territories a peculiar species of common law, relating to mining rights and titles,

his sprung up, having its origin among the miners, but recognized and enforced

by the courts.

1 It is worthy of note, that the first case in which a legislative enactment was

declared unconstitutional and void, on the ground of incompatibility with the

constitution of the State, was decided under one of these royal charters. The

case was that of Trevett p. Weeden, decided by the Superior Court of Rhode

Island in 1786. See Arnold's History of Rhode Island, Vol. II. p. 24. The

case is further referred to, post, p. 160, n.

* This was the claim made on behalf of Michigan; it being insisted that the

citizens, under the provisions of the ordinance of 1787, whenever the 'Territory

acquired the requisite population, had an absolute right to form a constitution

and be admitted to the Union under it. See Scott v. Detroit Young Men's

Society's Lessee, 1 Doug. Mich. 119, and the contrary opinion in Myers v. Man-

hattan Bank, 20 Ohio, 283. The debates in the Senate of the United States on

the admission of Michigan to the Union go fully into this question. See Benton's

Abridgment of Congressional Debates, Vol. XHI. pp. 69-72. And as to the

right of the .people of a Territory to originate measures looking to an application

for admission to the Union, see Opinions of Attorneys-General, Vol. II. p. 726.

[31]

* 28

[CH. III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

the power to originate proceedings for that purpose rested with

the legislature of the State, as the department most nearly repre-

senting its general sovereignty; and this is doubtless the correct

. view to take of this subject.1

The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sover-

eignty is in the people, from whom springs all legitimate author-

ity.2 The people of the Union created a national constitution, and

conferred upon it powers of sovereignty over certain subjects, and

the people of each State created a State government, to exercise

the remaining powers of sovereignty so far as they were disposed

to allow them to be exercised at all. By the constitution which

they establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official

agencies, but their own hands as well, and neither the officers of

the State, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty

to take action in opposition to this fundamental law. But in

every State, although all persons are under the protection of the

government, and obliged to conform their action to its laws, there

are always some who are altogether excluded from participation
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in the government, and are compelled- to submit to be ruled by

an authority in the creation of which they have no choice. The

political maxim, that government rests upon the consent of the

governed, appears, therefore, to be practically subject to many

exceptions; and when we say the sovereignty of the State is

vested in the people, the question very naturally presents itselT,

What are we to understand by The People as used in this con-

nection?

[* 29] * What should be the correct rule upon this subject, it

does not fall within our province to consider. Upon this

men will theorize; but the practical question lies back of the for-

mation of the Constitution, and is addressed to the people them-

selves. As a practical fact, the sovereignty is vested in those

persons who are permitted by the constitution of the State to

exercise the elective franchise. These persons may have been

designated by description in the enabling act of Congress permit-

ting the formation of the constitution, if any such there were, or

the convention which framed the constitution may have determined

1 See Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, c. 8.

1 McLean, J., in Spooner e. McConnell, 1 McLean, 347; Potter's Dwarru

on Stat. c. 1.

[32]
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1 <rithflie qualifications of electors without external dictation. In either

rec° case, however, it was essential to subsequent good order and satis-

faction with the government, that those classes in general should

be admitted to a voice in its administration, whose exclusion

on the ground of want of capacity or of moral fitness could not

reasonably and to the general satisfaction be defended.

Certain classes have been almost universally excluded, — the

slave, because he is assumed to be wanting alike in the intelligence

and the freedom of will essential to the proper exercise of the

right; the woman, from mixed motives, but mainly perhaps, be-

cause, in the natural relation of marriage, she was supposed to be

under the influence of her husband, and, where the common law

prevailed, actually was in a condition of dependence upon and

subjection to him; the infant, for reasons similar to those which

exclude the slave; the idiot, the lunatic, and the felon, on obvious

grounds; and sometimes other classes for whose exclusion it is

difficult to assign reasons so generally satisfactory.

The theory in these cases we take to be that classes are ex-

cluded because they lack either the intelligence, the virtue, or the

liberty of action essential to the proper exercise of the elective
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franchise. But the rule by which the presence or absence of these

qualifications is to be determined, it is not easy to establish on

grounds the reason and propriety of which shall be accepted by

all. It must be one that is definite and easy of application, and

it must be made permanent, or an accidental majority may at any

time change it, so as to usurp all power to themselves. But to be

definite and easy of application, it must also be arbitrary. The

infant of tender years is wanting in competency, but he is daily

acquiring it, and a period is fixed at which he shall conclusively

be presumed to possess what is requisite. The alien may know

nothing of our political system and laws, and he is

excluded until * he has been domiciled in the country [* 30]

for a period judged to be sufficiently long to make him

familiar with its institutions; races are sometimes excluded

arbitrarily; and there have been times when in somo of the

States the possession of a certain amount of property, or the

capacity to read, were regarded as essential to satisfactory proof

of sufficient freedom of action and intelligence.1

1 State e. Woodruff, 2 Day, 504; Catlin v. Smith, 2 S. & R. 267 ; Opinions of

3 [ 33 ]

* 30 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. III.

Whatever the rule that is once established, it must remain fixed

until those who by means of it have the power of the State put

into their hands see fit to invite others to participate with them in

its exercise. Any attempt of the excluded classes to assert their

right to a share in the government, otherwise than by operating

upon the public opinion of those who possess the right of suffrage,

would be regarded as an attempt at revolution, to be put down

by the strong arm of the government of the State, assisted, if need

be, by the military power of the Union.1

In regard to the formation and amendment of State constitu-

tions, the following appear to be settled principles of American

constitutional law: —

I. The people of the several Territories may form for them-

selves State constitutions whenever enabling acts for that purpose

are passed by Congress, but only in the manner allowed by such

enabling acts, and through the action of such persons as the en-

abling acts shall clothe with the elective franchise to that end.

If the people of a Territory shall, of their own motion, without

such enabling act, meet in convention, frame and adopt a consti-

tution, and demand admission to the Union under it, such action
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does not entitle them, as matter of right, to be recognized as

a State; but the power that can admit can also refuse, and the

territorial status must be continued until Congress shall be satis-

fied to suffer the Territory to become a State. There are always

in these cases questions of policy as well as of constitutional law

to be determined by the Congress before admission becomes a

matter of right, — whether the constitution formed is republi-

can; whether the proper State boundaries have been fixed upon;

whether the population is sufficient; whether the proper qualifi-

cations for the exercise of the elective franchise have been agreed

to; whether any inveterate evil exist in the Territory which is

Judges, 18 Pick. 575. For some local elections it is quite common still to require

property qualification or the payment of taxes in the voter; but statutes of this

description are generally construed liberally. See Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb.

504. Many special statutes, referring to the people of a municipality the ques-

tion of voting aid to internal improvements, have confined the right of voting on

the question to tax-payers.

1 The case of Rhode Island and the "Dorr Rebellion," so popularly known,

will be fresh in the minds of all. For a discussion of some of the legal aspects

of the case, see Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.

[34]
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now subject to control, but wbich might be perpetuated under a

State government, — these and the like questions, in which the

wliole country is interested, cannot be finally solved by the people

of the Territory for themselves, but the final decision must rest

with Congress, and the judgment must be favorable before admis-

sion can be claimed or expected.

II. In the original States, and all others subsequently admitted

to the Union, the power to amend or revise their constitutions

resides in the great body of the people as an organized body poli-

tic, who, being vested with ultimate sovereignty, and the source

of all State authority, have power to control and alter the law

which they have m.ade at their will. But the people, in the legal

sense, must be understood to be those who, by the existing consti-

tution, are clothed with political rights, and who, while that in-

strument remains, will be the sole organs through which the will

of the body politic can be expressed.

III. But the will of the people to this end can only be expressed

in the legitimate modes by which such a body politic can act, and

which must either be prescribed by the constitution whose revision

or amendment is sought, or by an act of the legislative department
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of the State, which alone would be authorized to speak for the

people upon this subject, and to point out a mode for the expres-

sion of their will in the absence of any provision for amendment

or revision contained in the constitution itself.1

1 Opinions of the Judges, 6 Cush. 573; Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100. The

first constitution of New York contained no provision for its own amendment,

and Mr. Hammond, in his Political History of New York, Vol. I. c. 26, gives a

very interesting account of the controversy before the legislature and in the coun-

cil of revision as to the power of the legislature to call a convention for revision,

and as to the mode of submitting its work to the people. In Collier v. Frierson,

24 Ala. 108, it appeared that the legislature had proposed eight different amend-

ments to be submitted to the people at the same time; the people had approved

them, and all the requisite proceedings to make them a part of the constitution

had been had, except that in the subsequent legislature the resolution for their

ratification bad by mistake omitted to recite one of them. On the question

whether this one had been adopted, we quote from the opinion of the court:

"The constitution can be amended in but two ways; either by the people who

originally framed it, or in the mode prescribed by the instrument itself. If the

last mode is pursued, the amendments must be proposed by two-thirds of each

house of the General Assembly; they must be published in print, at least three

months before the next general election for representatives; it must appear from

the returns made to the Secretary of State that a majority of those voting for

[35]

* 32

[CH. III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[* 32] * IV. In accordance with universal practice, and from

the very necessity of the case, amendments to an ex-

isting constitution, or entire revisions of it, must be prepared

and matured by some body of representatives chosen for the pur-

pose. It is obviously impossible for the whole people to meet,

prepare, and discuss the proposed alterations, and there seems

to be'no feasible mode by which an expression of their will can

be obtained, except by asking it upon the single point of assent

or disapproval. But no body of representatives, unless specially

clothed with power for that purpose by the people when choosing

them, can rightfully take definitive action upon amendments or

revisions; they must submit the result of their deliberations to

the people — who alone are competent to exercise the powers of

sovereignty in, framing the fundamental law — for ratification or

rejection. The constitutional convention is the representative of

sovereignty only in a very qualified sense, and for the specific

purpose, and witli the restricted authority to put in proper form

the questions of amendment upon which the people are to
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[* 33] pass; but the changes in the * fundamental law of the

State must be enacted by the people themselves.1

representatives have voted in favor of the proposed amendments, and they must

be ratified by two-thirds of each house of the next General Assembly after such

election, voting by yeas and nays, the proposed amendments having been read at

each session three times on three several days in each house. We entertain no

doubt that to change the constitution in any other mode than by a convention,

every requisition which is demanded by the instrument itself must be observed,

and the omission of any one is fatal to the amendment. We scarcely deem any

argument necessary to enforce this proposition. The constitution is the supreme

and paramount law. The mode by which amendments are to be made under it

is clearly defined. It has been said that certain acts are to be done, certain

requisitions are to be observed, before a change can be effected. But to what

purpose are those acts required or those requisitions enjoined, if the legislature or

any department of the government can dispense with them? To do so would be

to violate the instrument which they are sworn to support, and every principle of

public law and sound constitutional policy requires the courts to pronounce against

any amendment which is not shown to have been made in accordance with the

rules prescribed by the fundamental law." See also State v. McBride, 4 Mo.

803.

1 See upon this subject Jameson on the Constitutional Convention, §§ 415-418,

and 47i'-o^O. This work is so complete and satisfactory in its treatment of the

general subject, as to leave little to be said by one who shall afterwards attempt

to cover the same ground. The Supreme Court of Missouri have expressed the

opinion that it was competent for a convention to put a new constitution in force

I 36]
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V. The power of the people to amend or revise their constitu-

tions is limited by the Constitution of the United States in the

following particulars: —

1. It must not abolish the republican form of government, since

such act would be revolutionary in its character, and would call

for and demand direct intervention on the part of the government

of the United States.1

2. It must not provide for titles of nobility, or assume to violate

the obligation of any contract, or attaint persons of crime, or pro-

vide ex post facto for the punishment of acts by the courts which

were innocent when committed, or contain any other provision

which would, in effect, amount to the exercise of any power ex-

pressly or impliedly prohibited to the States by the Constitution

of the Union. For while such provisions would not call for the

direct and forcible intervention of the government of the Union,

it would be the duty of the courts, both State and national, to

refuse to enforce them, and to declare them altogether void, as

much when enacted by the people in their primary capacity as

makers of the fundamental law, as when enacted in the form of

statutes through the delegated power of their legislatures.2
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VI. Subject to the foregoing principles and limitations, each

State must judge for itself what provisions shall be inserted in its

constitution; how the powers of government shall be apportioned

in order to their proper exercise; what protection shall be thrown

around the person or property of the citizen; and to what extent

private rights shall be required to yield to the general

good.3 * And the courts of the State, still more the [* 34]

courts of the Union, would be precluded from inquiring

without submitting it to the people. State v. Neal, 42 Mo. 119. But this was

obiter.

1 Const, of U. S. art. 4, § 4; Federalist, No. 43.

'Cummings p. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1

Black, 436; State v. Keith, 63 N. C. 140; Jackoway p. Denton, 25 Ark. 525;

Union Bank v. State, 9 Yerg. 490; Girdner v. Stephens, 1 Heis. 280; Railroad

Co. p. McClure, 10 Wall. 511; White p. Hart, 13 Wall. 649.

'Matter of the Reciprocity Bank, 22 N. Y. 9; McMullen v. Hodge, 5 Texas,

34; Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.'s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9. In the case last cited,

Denio, J., says: "The [constitutional] convention was not obliged, like the legis-

lative bodies, to look carefully to the preservation of vested rights. It was com-

petent to deal, subject to ratification by the people, and to the Constitution of

the federal government, with all private and social rights, and with all the exist- *

[87]

* 34 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. in.

into the justice of their action, or questioning its validity, because

of any supposed conflict with fundamental rules of right or of

government, unless they should be able to show collision at some

point between the instrument thus formed and that paramount

law which constitutes, in regard to the subjects it covers, the

fundamental rule of action throughout the whole United States.1

How far the constitution of a State shall descend into the par-

ticulars of government is a question of policy addressed to the

convention which forms it. Certain things are to be looked for

in all these instruments; though even as to these there is great

variety, not only of substance, but also in the minuteness of their

provisions to meet particular cases.

I. We are to expect a general framework of government to be

designed, under which the sovereignty of the people is to be exer-

cised by representatives chosen for the purpose, in such manner

ing laws and institutions of the State. If the convention had so willed, and the

people had concurred, all former charters and grants might have been annihilated.

When, therefore, we are seeking for the true construction of a constitutional pro-

vision, we are constantly to bear in mind that its authors were not executing a

delegated authority, limited by other constitutional restraints, but are to look
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upon them as the founders of a State, intent only upon establishing such princi-

ples as seemed best calculated to produce good government and promote the pub-

lic happiness, at the expense of any and all existing institutions which might

stand in their way."

1 All the State constitutions now contain within themselves provisions for their

amendment. Some require the question of calling a convention to revise the

constitution to be submitted to the people at stated periods: others leave it to the

legislature to call a convention or to submit to the people the question of calling

one; while the major part allow the legislature to mature specific amendments to

be submitted to the people separately, and these become a part of the constitu-

tion if adopted by the requisite vote.

When the late rebellion had been put down by the military forces of the United

States, and the State governments which constituted a part of the disloyal svs-

tem had been displaced, serious questions were raised as to the proper steps to

be taken in order to restore the States to their harmonious relations to the Union.

These questions, and the controversy over them, constituted an important part of

the history of our country during the administration of President Johnson; but

as it is the hope and trust of our people that the occasion for discussing such

questions will never arise again, we do not. occupy space with them in this work.

It suffices for the present to say, that Congress claimed, insisted upon, and

enforced the right to prescribe the steps to be taken and the conditions to be

observed in order to restore these States to their former positions in the Union,

and the right also to determine when the prescribed conditions had been com-

* plied with, so as to entitle them to representation in Congress.

[38]
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as the instrument provides, and with such reservations as it

makes.

II. Generally the qualifications for the right of suffrage will

be declared, as well as the conditions under which it shall be

exercised.

ILL Separate departments will be created for the exercise of

legislative, executive, and judicial power, and care taken to keep

the three as separate and distinct as possible, except so far as

each is made a check upon the other to keep it within proper

bounds, or to prevent hasty and improvident action. The

executive * is a check upon the legislature in the veto [* 35]

power, which most States allow; the legislature is a check

upon both the other departments through its power to prescribe

rules for the exercise of their authority, and through its power

to impeach their officers; and the judiciary is a check upon the

legislature by means of its authority to annul unconstitutional

laws.

IV. Local self-government having always been a part of the

Engiish and American systems, we shall look for its recognition

in any such instrument. And even if not expressly recognized,
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it is still to be understood that all these instruments are framed

with its present existence and anticipated continuance in view.

V. We shall also expect a declaration of rights for the pro-

tection of individuals and minorities. This declaration usually

contains the following classes of provisions : —

1. Those declaratory of the general principles of republican

government; such as, that all freemen, when they form asocial

compact, are equal, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to ex-

clusive, separate public emoluments or privileges from the com-

munity, but in consideration of public services; that absolute,

arbitrary power over the lives, liberty, and property of freemen

exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority;

that all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments

are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace,

safety, happiness, security, and the protection of property; that

for the advancement of these ends they have at all times an in-

alienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish their

government in such manner as they may think proper; that all

elections shall be free and equal; that no power of suspending

the laws shall be exercised except by the legislature or its author-

[ 39 ]

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[ch. in.

ity; that standing armies are not to be maintained in time of

peace; that representation shall be in proportion to population;

that the people shall have the right freely to assemble to consult

of the common good, to instruct their representatives, and petition

for redress of grievances; and the like.

2. Those declaratory of the fundamental rights of the citizen:

as that all men are by nature free and independent, and have cer-

tain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying aud

defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting

property, and pursuing and obtaining safety aud happiness; that

the right to property is before and higher than any consti-

[* 36] tutional * sanction; that the free exercise and enjoyment

of religious profession and worship, without discrimination

or preference, shall for ever be allowed; that every man may freely

speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being re-

sponsible for the abuse of that right; that every man may bear

arms for the defence of himself and of the State; that the right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not .be
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violated, nor shall soldiers be quartered upon citizens in time of

peace; and the like.

3. Those declaratory of the principles which ensure to the citizen

an impartial trial, and protect him in his life, liberty, and property

against the arbitrary action of those in authority: as that no bill

of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that the right to

trial by jury shall be preserved; that excessive bail shall not be

required, nor excessive punishments inflicted; that no person shall

be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence, nor

be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,

nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of

law ; that private property shall not be taken for public use without

compensation; and the like.

Other clauses are sometimes added declaratory of the principles

of morality and virtue; and it is also sometimes expressly de-

clared — what indeed is implied without the declaration — that

every thing in the declaration of rights contained is excepted out

of the general powers of government, and all laws contrary thereto

shall be void.

Many other things are commonly found in these charters of

'[ 40 ]
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government;1 but since, while they continue in force, they are to

remain absolute and unchangeable rules of action and decision, it

is obvious that they should not be made to embrace within their

iron grasp those subjects in regard to which the policy or interest

of the State or of its people may vary from time to time, and

which are therefore more properly left to the control of the legis-

lature, which can more easily and speedily make the required

changes.

In considering State constitutions we must not commit the mis-

take of supposing that, because individual rights are guarded and

protected by them, they must also be, considered as owing their

origin to them. These instruments measure the powers of the

rulers, but they do not measure the rights of the governed.

*" What is a constitution, and what are its objects? It is [* 37]

easier to tell what it is not than what it is. It is not the

beginning of a community, nor the origin of private rights; it

is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of government;

it is not the cause, but consequence, of personal and political free-

dom; it grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of their

power, the instrument of their convenience. Designed for their
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protection in the enjoyment of the rights and powers which they

possessed before the constitution was made, it is but the framework

of the political government, and necessarily based upon the pre-

existing condition of laws, rights, habits, and modes of thought.

There is nothing primitive in it: it is all derived from a known

source. It presupposes an organized society, law, order, property,

personal freedom, a love of political liberty, and enough of culti-

vated intelligence to know how to guard it against the encroach-

ments of tyranny. A written constitution is in every instance a

limitation upon the powers of government in the hands of agents;

for there never was a written republican constitution which del-

egated to functionaries all the latent powers which lie dormant

1 " This, then, is the office of a written constitution: to delegate to various

public functionaries such of the powers of government as the people' do not

intend to exercise for themselves; to classify these powers, according to their

uture, and to commit them to separate agents ; to provide for the choice of these

agents by the people; to ascertain, limit, and define the extent of the authority

thus delegated; and to reserve to the people their sovereignty over all things not

expressly committed to their representatives." E. P. Hurlbut in Human Rights

ind their Political Guaranties.

[41] _
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in every nation, and are boundless in extent, and incapable of

definition." 1

1 Hamilton v. St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo. 13, per Bales, arguendo. • And

see Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.'s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9; Lee v. State, 2(5 Ark. 205-6.

"Written constitutions sanctify and confirm great principles, but the latter are

prior in existence to the former." 2 Webster's Works, 392. See, also, 1 Bl.

Com. 124; 2 Story, Life and Letters, 278; Sidney on Government, c. 3, sec. 27

and li.'i. "If this charter of State government which we call a Constitution were

all there was of constitutional command; if the usages, the customs, the maxims,

that have sprung from the habits of life, modes of thought, methods of trying

facts by the neighborhood, and mutual responsibility in neighborhood interests;

the precepts that have come to usirom the revolutions which overturned tyran-

nies; the sentiments of manly independence and self control which impelled our

ancestors to summon the local community to redress local evils, instead of relying

upon king or legislature at a distance to do so, — if a recognition of all these

were to be stricken from the body of our constitutional law, a lifeless skeleton

might remain, but the living spirit, that which gives it force and attraction, which

makes it valuable, and draws to it the affections of the people; that which dis-

tinguishes it from the numberless constitutions, so called, which in Europe have
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been set up and thrown down within the last hundred years, many of which, in

their expressions, seemed equally fair and to possess equal promise with ours,

and have only been wanting in the support and vitality which these alone can

give, — this living and breathing spirit which supplies the interpretation of the

words of the written charter would be utterly lost and gone." People t.

Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 107.

[42]
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•CHAPTER IV. [*38]

OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

The deficiencies of human language are such that if written

instruments were always carefully drawn, and by persons skilled

in the use of words, we should not be surprised to find their mean-

ing often drawn in question, or at least to meet with difficulties

in their practical application. But these difficulties are greatly

increased when draughtsmen are careless or incompetent; and they

multiply rapidly when the instruments are to be applied, not only

to the subjects directly within the contemplation of those who

framed them, but also to a great variety of new circumstances

which could not have been anticipated, but which must nevertheless

be governed by the general rules which the instruments establish.

Moreover, the different points of view from which different interests

regard these instruments incline them to different views of the

instruments themselves. All these circumstances tend to render

the subjects of interpretation and construction prominent in the

practical administration of the law, and often suggest questions of

no little difficulty.
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Interpretation differs from construction in that the former "is

the act of finding out the true sense of any form of words; that is,

the sense which their author intended to convey; and of enabling

others to derive from them the same idea which the author in-

tended to convey. Construction, on the other hand, is the drawing

of conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct ex-

pressions of the text, from elements known from and given in the

text; conclusions which are in the spirit, though not in the letter

of the text. Interpretation only takes place if the text conveys

some meaning or other. But construction is resorted to when, in

comparing two different writings of the same individual, or two

different enactments by the same legislative body, there is found

contradiction where there was evidently no intention of such con-

tradiction one of another, or where it happens that part of a writ

[43]
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ing or declaration contradicts the rest. When this is the case,

and the nature of the document or declaration, or whatever else it

may be, is such as not to allow us to consider the whole as being

invalidated by a partial or other contradiction, then resort must be

had to construction; so, too, if found to act in cases which have

not been foreseen by the framers of those rules, by which we are

nevertheless obliged, for some binding reason, faithfully to regulate

as well as we can our action respecting the unforeseen case." 1 In

common use, however, the word construction is generally employed

in the law in a sense embracing all that is properly covered by

both when used in a sense strictly and technically correct; and

we shall so employ it in the present chapter.

[* 39] Prom the earliest periods in the history of * written law,

rules of construction, sometimes based upon sound rea-

son, and seeking the real intent of the instrument, and at other

times altogether arbitrary or fanciful, have been laid down by

those who have assumed to instruct in the law, or who have been

called upon to administer it, by the aid of which the meaning of
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the instrument was to be resolved. Somo of these rules have been

applied to particular classes of instruments only; others are more

general in their application, and so far as they are sound, may be

made use of in any case where the meaning of a writing is in dis-

pute. To such of these as seem important in constitutional law

we shall refer, and illustrate them by references to reported cases,

where they have been applied.

A few preliminary words may not be out of place, upon the

questions, who are to apply these rules; what person, body, or

department is to enforce the construction; and how far a deter-

mination, when once made, is to be binding upon other persons,

bodies, or departments.

We have already seen that we are to expect in every constitu-

tion an apportionment of the powers of government. We shall

also find certain duties imposed upon the several departments, as

well as upon specified officers in each, and we shall likewise dis-

1 Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics. See Smith on Stat, and Const-

Construction, 600. Bouvier defines the two terms succinctly as follows: " Inter-

pretation, the discovery and representation of the true meaning of any signs used

to convey ideas." "Construction, in practice, determining the meaning and

application as to the case in question of the provisions of a constitution, statute,

will, or other instrument, or of an oral agreement." Law Die.

[ 44 ]
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cover that the constitution has sought to hedge about their action

in various ways, with a view to the protection of individual rights,

and the proper separation of duties. And wherever any oue is

called upon to perform any constitutional duty, or to do any act

in respect to which it can be supposed that the constitution has

spoken, it is obvious that a question of construction may at once

arise, upon which some oue must decide before the duty is per-

formed or the act done. From the very nature of the case, this

decision must commonly be made by the person, body, or depart-

ment upon whom the duty is devolved, or from whom the act is

required.

Let us suppose that the constitution requires of the

legislature, * that, in establishing municipal corporations, [* 40]

it shall restrict their powers of taxation ; and a city charter

is proposed which confines the right of taxation to the raising of

money for certain specified purposes, but in regard to those pur-

poses leaves it unlimited; or which allows to the municipality

unlimited choice of purposes, but restricts the rate; or which

permits persons to be taxed indefinitely, but limits the taxation of
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property: in either of these cases the question at once arises,

whether the limitation in the charter is such a restriction as the

constitution intends. Let us suppose, again, that a board of su-

pervisors is, by the constitution, authorized to borrow money upon

the credit of the county for any county purpose, and they are

asked to issue bonds in order to purchase stock in some railway

company which proposes to construct a road across the county;

the propositiou is met with the query, Is this a county purpose,

and can the issue of bonds be regarded as a borrowing of money,

within the meaning of the people as expressed in the constitu-

tion? And once again : let us suppose that the governor is em-

powered to convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions,

and he is requested to do so in order to provide for a ,class of

private claims whose holders are urgent; can this with any pro-

priety be deemed an extraordinary occasion?

In these and the like cases our constitutions have provided no

tribunal for the specific duty of solving in advance the questions

which arise. In a few of the States, indeed, the legislative de-

partment has been empowered by the constitution to call upon

the courts for their opinion upon the constitutional validity of a

proposed law, in order that, if it be adjudged without warrant,

[45]
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the legislature may abstain from enacting it.1 But those pro-

visions are not often to be met with, and judicial decisions, espe-

cially upon delicate and difficult questions of constitutional law,

can seldom be entirely satisfactory when made, as they commonly

will be under such calls, without the benefit of argument at the

bar, and of that light upon the points involved which might

[* 41] * be afforded by counsel learned in the law, and interested

in giving them a thorough investigation.

It follows, therefore, that every department of the government

and every official of every department may at any time, when a

duty is to be performed, be required to pass upon a question of

constitutional construction.2 Sometimes the case will be such

that the decision when made must, from the nature of things, be

conclusive and subject to no appeal or review, however erroneous

it may be in the opinion of other departments or other officers;

but in other cases the same question may be required to be passed

upon again before the duty is completely performed. The first of

these classes is where, by the constitution, a particular question
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is plainly addressed to the discretion or judgment of some one

department or officer, so that the interference of any other de-

partment or officer, with a view to the substitution of its own

discretion or judgment in the place of that to which the consti-

tution has confided the decision, would be impertinent and intru-

sive. Under every constitution cases of this description are to

be met with; and though it will sometimes be found difficult to

1 By the constitutions of Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, the

judges of the Supreme Court are required, when called upon by the governor,

council, or either house of the legislature, to give their opinions " upon impor-

tant questions of law, and upon solemn occasions." In Missouri, they are to

give their opinions " upon important questions of constitutional law, and upon

solemn occasions;" and the Supreme Court has held that while the governor

determines for himself whether the occasion is such as to authorize him to call on

the judges for their opinion, they must decide for themselves whether the occa-

sion is such as to warrant the governor in making the call. Opinions of Judges,

49 Mo. 216.

2 "It is argued that the legislature cannot give a construction to the constitu-

tion relative to private rights secured by it. It is true that the legislature, in

consequence of their construction of the constitution, cannot make laws repug-

nant to it. But every department of government, invested with certain consti-

tutional powers, must, in the first instance, but not exclusively, be the judge of

its powers, or it could not act." Parsons, Ch. J., in Kendall v. Inhabitants of

Kingston, 5 Mass. 533.

[46]
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classify them, there can be no doubt, when the case is properly

determined to be one of this character, that the rule must prevail

which makes the decision final.

We will suppose, again, that the constitution empowers the

executive to convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions,

and does not in terms authorize the intervention of any one else

in determining what is and what is not such an occasion in the

constitutional sense; it is obvious that the question is addressed

exclusively to the executive judgment, and neither the legislature

nor the judicial department can intervene to compel action if he

decide against it, or to enjoin action if, in his opinion, the proper

occasion has arisen.1 And again, if, by the constitution,

* laws are to take effect at a specified time after their [* 42]

passage, unless the legislature, for urgent reasons, shall

otherwise order, we must perceive at once that the legislature

alone is competent to pass upon the urgency of the alleged

reasons.2 And to take a judicial instance: If a court is required

to give an accused person a trial at the first term after indictment,

1 In exercising his power to call out the militia in certain exigencies, the Pres-

ident is the exclusive and final judge when the exigency has arisen. Martin p.
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Mott, 12 Wheat. 29.

'In Gillinwater v. Mississippi & Atlantic Railroad Co., 13 11l. 1, it was urged

that a certain restriction imposed upon railroad corporations by the general rail-

poad law was a violation of the provision of the constitution which enjoins it upon

the legislature " to .encourage internal improvements by passing liberal general

laws of incorporation for that purpose." The court say of this provision: "This

is a constitutional command to the legislature, as obligatory on it as any other of

the provisions of that instrument; but it is one which cannot be enforced by the

courts of justice. It addresses itself to the legislature alone, and it is not for us

to say whether it has obeyed the behest in its true spirit. Whether the provisions

of this law are liberal, and tend to encourage internal improvements, is matter of

opinion, about which men may differ; and as we have no authority to revise legis-

lative action on the subject, it would not become us to express our views in rela-

tion to it. The law makes no provision for the construction of canals and turn-

pike roads, and yet they are as much internal improvements as railroads, and we

might as well be asked to extend what we might consider the liberal provisions of

this law to them, because they are embraced in the constitutional provision, as to

ask us to disregard such provisions of it as we might regard as illiberal. The

argument proceeds upon the idea that we should consider that as done which ought

to be done; but that principle has no application here. Like laws upon other

subjects within legislative jurisdiction, it is for the courts to say what the law is,

not what it should be." It is clear that courts cannot interfere with matters of

legislative discretion. Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. s. 68ii.

[47]
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unless good cause be shown for continuance, it is obvious that the

question of good cause is one for the court alone to pass upon,

and that its judgment when exercised is, and must be from the

nature of the case, final. And when in any of these and similar

cases the decision is once made, other departments or other

officers, whatever may have been their own opinions, must assume

the decision to be correct, and are not at liberty to raise any

question concerning it, unless some duty is devolved upon them

which presents the same question anew.

But there are cases where the question of construction is equally

addressed to two or more departments of the government, and it

then becomes important to know whether the decision by one is

binding upon the others, or whether each is to act upon its

own judgment. Let us suppose once more that the governor,

being empowered by the constitution to convene the

[* 43] * legislature upon extraordinary occasions, has regarded

a particular event as being such an occasion, and has

issued his proclamation calling them together with a view to the
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enactment of some particular legislation which the event seems

to call for, and which he specifies in his proclamation. Now the

legislature are to enact laws upon their own view of necessity

and expediency; and they will refuse to pass the desired statute

if they regard it as unwise or unimportant. But in so doing they

indirectly review the governor's decision, as in refusing to pass

the law they also decide that the specific event was not one calling

for action on their part. In such a case it is clear that, while the

decision of the governor is final so far as to require the legislature

to meet, it is not final in any sense that would bind the legislative

department to accept and act upon it when they are called to enter

upon the performance of their duty in the making of laws.1

So also there are cases where, after the two houses of the legis-

lature have passed upon the question, their decision is in a certain

sense subject to review by the governor. If a bill is introduced

the constitutionality of which is disputed, the passage of the bill

by the two houses must be regarded as the expression of their

judgment that, if approved, it will be a valid law. But if the

constitution confers upon the governor a veto power, the same

question of constitutional authority will be brought by the bill

before him, since it is manifestly his duty to withhold approval

1 See Opinions of Judges, 49 Mo. 216.

[48]

\
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from any bill which, in his opinion, the legislature ought not for

any reason to pass. And what reason so valid as that the con-

stitution confers upon them no authority to that end? In all

these and the like cases, each department must act upon its own

judgment, and cannot be required to do that which it regards as

a violation of the constitution, on the ground solely that another

department which, in the course of the discharge of its own duty,

was called upon first to act, lias reached the conclusion that it will

not be violated by the proposed action.

But setting aside now those cases to which we have referred,

where from the nature of things, and perhaps from explicit terms

of the constitution, the judgment of the department or officer

acting must be final, we shall find the general rule to be, that

whenever an act is done which may become the subject of a

proceeding in court, any question of constitutional authority

that might have been raised when the act was done will

be* open for consideration in such proceeding, and that as [* 44]

the courts must finally settle the controversy, so also will
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they finally determine the question of constitutional law.

For the constitution of the State is higher in authority than any

law, direction, or decree made by any body or any officer assuming

to act under it, since such body or officer must exercise a dele-

gated authority, and one that must necessarily be subservient to

the instrument by which the delegation is made. In any case of

conflict the fundamental law must govern, and the act in conflict

with it must be treated as of no legal validity. But no mode has

yet been devised by which these questions of conflict are to be

discussed and settled as abstract questions, and their determination

is necessary or practicable only when public or private rights

would be affected thereby. They then become the subject of legal

controversy, and legal controversies must be settled by the courts.

The courts have thus devolved upon them the duty to pass upon

the constitutional validity, sometimes of legislative, and sometimes

of executive acts. And as judicial tribunals have authority, not

only to judge, but also to enforce their judgments, the result of

a decision against the constitutionality of a legislative or executive

act will be to render it invalid through the enforcement of the

paramount law in the controversy which has raised the question.1

1 "When laws conflict in actual cases, they [the courts] must decide which is

•lie superior law, and which must yield; and as we have seen that, according to

4 [49]
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[* 45] * The same conclusion is reached by stating in consecu-

tive order a few familiar maxims of the law. The adminis-

tration of public justice is referred to the courts. To perform this

duty, the first requisite is to ascertain the facts, and the next cb

determine the law that is applicable. The constitution is the funda-

mental 'law of the State, in opposition to which any other law, or

any direction or decree, must be inoperative and void. If, therefore,

such other law, direction, or decree seems to be applicable to the

facts, but on comparison with the fundamental law it is found to be

in conflict, the court, in declaring what the law of the case is, must

necessarily determine its invalidity, and thereby in effect annul

it.1 The right and the power of the courts to do this are so plain,

our principles, every officer remains answerable for what he officially does, a cit-

izen, believing that the law he enforces is incompatible with the superior law, the

constitution simply sues the officer before the proper court as having unlawfully

aggrieved him in the particular case. The court, bound to do justice to every

one, is bound also to decide this case as a simple case of conflicting laws. The

court does not decide directly upon the doings of the legislature. It simply
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decides for the case in hand, whether there actually are conflicting laws, and if

so which is the higher law that demands obedience, when both may not be obeyed

at the same time. As, however, this decision becomes the leading decision for

all future cases of the same import, until, indeed, proper and legitimate authority

should reverse it, the question of constitutionality is virtually decided, and it is

decided in a natural, easy, legitimate, and safe manner, according to the prin-

ciple of the supremacy of the law, and the dependence of justice. It is one of

the most interesting and important evolutions of the government of law, and one

of the greatest protections of the citizen. It may well be called a very jewel of

Anglican liberty, and one of the best fruits of our political civilization." Lieber,

Civil Liberty and Self-Government.

"Whenever a law which the judge holds to be unconstitutional is argued in a

tribunal of the United States, he may refuse to admit it as a rule; this power is

the only one which is peculiar to the American magistrate, but it gives rise to

immense political influence. Few laws can escape the searching analysis; for

there are few which are not prejudicial to some private interest or other, and

none which may not be brought before.a court of justice by the choice of par-

ties, or bythe necessity of the case. But from the time that a judge has refused

to apply any given law in a case, that law loses a portion of its moral sanction.

The persons to whose interest it is prejudicial learn that means exist for evading

its authority; and similar suits are multiplied until it becomes powerless. One

of two alternatives must then be resorted to, — the people must alter the con-

stitution, or the legislature must repeal the law." De Tocqueville, Democracy

in America, c. 6.

1 "It is idle to say that the authority of each branch of the government is

defined and limited by the constitution, if there be not an independent power

able and willing to enforce the limitations. Experience proves that the consti-

[50]
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* and the duty is so generally — we may almost say uni- [* 46]

versally — conceded, that we should not be justified in

wearying the patience of the reader in quoting from the very

numerous authorities upon the subject.1

tution is thoughtlessly but habitually violated; and the sacrifice of individual

rights is too remotely connected with the objects and contests of the masses to

attract their attention. From its very position it is apparent that the conserva-

tive power is lodged in the judiciary, which, in the exercise of its undoubted

rights, is bound to meet any emergency; else causes would be decided, not only

by the legislature, but sometimes without hearing or evidence." Per Gibson,

Ch. J., in De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18.

"Nor will this conclusion, to use the language of one of our most eminent

jurists and statesmen, by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the

legislative power. It will only be supposing that the power of the people is

superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its stat-

utes, stands in opposition to that declared by the people in the constitution, the

judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought

to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by those which

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:00 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

are not fundamental. Neither would we, in doing this, be understood as im-

pugning the honest intentions, or sacred regard to justice, which we most cheer-

fully aceord to the legislature. But to be above error is to possess an entire

attribute of the Deity; and to spurn its correction, is to reduce to the same

degraded level the most noble and the meanest of his works." Bates v. Kimball,

2 Chip. 77.

"Without the limitations and restraints usually found in written constitutions,

the government could have no elements of permanence and durability; and the

distribution of its powers and the vesting their exercise in separate departments

would be an idle ceremony." Brown, J., in People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 558.

1 1 Kent, 500-507; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Webster on the

Independence of the Judiciary, Works, Vol. III. p. 29. In this speech Mr.

Webster has forcibly set forth the necessity of leaving with the courts the power

to enforce constitutional restrictions. "It cannot be denied," says he, "that

one great object of written constitutions is, to keep the departments of govern-

ment as distinct as possible; and for this purpose to impose restraints designed

to have that effect. And it is equally true that there is no department on which

it is more necessary to impose restraints than upon the legislature. The ten-

dency of things is almost always to augment the power of that department in its

relation to the judiciary. The judiciary is composed of few persons, and those

not such as mix habitually in the pursuits and objects which most engage public

men. They are not, or never should be, political men. They have often un-

pleasant duties to perform, and their conduct is often liable to be canvassed and

censured where their reasons for it are not known or cannot be understood.

The legislature holds the public purse. It fixes the compensation of all other

departments; it applies as well as raises all revenue. It is a numerous body,

and necessarily carries along with it a great force of public opinion. Its mem-

bers are public men, in constant contact with one another and with their constit-

[51]
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[* 47] * Conclusiveness of Judicial Decisions.

But a question which has arisen and been passed upon in one

case may arise again in another, or it may present itself under

different circumstances for the decision of some other department

or officer of the government. It therefore becomes of the highest

importance to know whether a principle once authoritatively de-

clared is to be regarded as conclusively settled for the guidance,

not only of the court declaring it, but of all courts and all depart-

ments of the government; or whether, on the other hand, the

decision settles the particular controversy only, so that a different

decision may be possible; or, considering the diversity of human

judgments, even probable, whenever in any new controversy other

tribunals may be required to examine and decide upon the same

question.

In some cases and for some purposes the conclusiveness of a

judicial determination is, beyond question, final and absolute. A

decision once made in a particular controversy, by the highest

court empowered to pass upon it, is conclusive upon the parties to
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the litigation and their privies, and they are not allowed afterwards

to revive the controversy in a new proceeding for the purpose of

raising the same or any other questions. The matter in dispute

has become res judicata; a thing definitely settled by judicial

uents. It would seem to be plain enough that, without constitutional provisions

which should be fixed and certain, such a department, in case of excitement,

would be able to encroach on the judiciary." "The constitution being the

supreme law, it follows, of course, that every act of the legislature contrary to

that law must be void. But who shall decide this question? Shall the legisla-

ture itself decide it? If so, then the constitution ceases to be a legal, and be-

comes only a moral restraint upon the legislature. If they, and they only, arc to

judge whether their acts be conformable to the constitution, then the constitution

is admonitory or advisory only, not legally binding; because if the construction

of it rests wholly with them, their discretion, in particular cases, may be in

favor of very erroneous and dangerous constructions. Hence the courts of law,

necessarily, when the ease arises, must decide on the validity of particular acts."

"Without this check, no certain limitation could exist on the exercise of legisla-

tive power." See also, as to the dangers of legislative encroachments, De Toc-

queville, Democracy in America, c. 6; Story on Const. 4th ed. § 532 and note.

The legislature, though possessing a larger share of power, no more represents

the sovereignty of the people than either of the other departments; it derives its

authority from the same high source. Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c, Railroad Co., 4

Harr. 402; WhittJngton v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 244.

[52]

CH. IV.]

* 47

CONSTRUCTION OP STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

decision; and the judgment of the court imports absolute verity.

Whatever the question involved, — whether the interpretation of a

private contract, the legality of an individual act, or the validity of

a legislative enactment, — the rule of finality is the same. The

controversy has been adjudged, and once finally passed upon is

never to be renewed.1 It must frequently happen, therefore, that

a question of constitutional law will be decided in a private litiga-

tion, and the parties to the controversy, and all others subsequently

acquiring rights under them, in the subject-matter of the suit, will

thereby become absolutely and for ever precluded from renewing

the question in respect to the matter then involved. The rule of

conclusiveness to this extent is one of the most inflexible

principles * of the law; insomuch that even if it were sub- [* 48]

sequently held by the courts that the decision in the par-

ticular case was erroneous, such holding would not authorize the

reopening of the old controversy in order that the final conclusion

might be applied thereto.2

1 Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2 Smith's Lead. Cas. 424; Etheridge v. Osborn,
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12 Wend. 399; Hayes v. Reese, 34 Barb. 151; Hyatt v. Bates, 35 Barb. 308;

Harris v. Harris, 36 Barb. 88; Young p. Black, 7 Cranch, 567; Chapman v.

Smith, 16 How. 114; Wales v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 276 ; Prentiss v. Holbrook, 2 Mich.

372; Van Kleek v. Eggleston, 7 Mich. 511; Newberry v. Trowbridge, 13 Mich.

278; Crandall v. James, 6 R. L 144; Babcock v. Camp, 12 Ohio, n. s. 11;

Warner v. Scott, 39 Penn. St. 274; Kerr p. Union Bank, 18 Md. 396; Eimer v.

Richards, 25 1ll. 289; Wright v. Leclaire, 3 Iowa, 241; Whittaker v. Johnson

County, 12 Iowa, 595; Peay v. Duncan, 20 Ark. 85; Madox p. Graham, 2 Met.

(Ky.) 56; George p. Gillespie, 1 Greene (Iowa), 421; Clark v. Sammons, 12

Iowa, 368; Taylor p. Chambers, 1 Iowa, 124; Skelding p. Whitney, 3 Wend.

154; Hawkins v. Jones, 19 Ohio, n. s. 22; Slade v. Slade, 58 Me. 157; Geary

p. Simmons, 39 Cal. 224; Cannon v. Brame, 45 Ala. 262; Dwyer v. Goran, 29

Iowa, 126; Verner v. Carson, 66 Penn. St. 440; Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82;

Harris v. Colquit, 44 Geo. 663; Finney v. Boyd, 26 Wis. 366; Ram on Legal

Judgment, p. 14. A judgment, however, is conclusive as an estoppel as to those

&cts without the existence and proof of which it could not have been rendered;

and if it might have been given on any one of several grounds, it is conclusive

between the parties as to neither of them. Lea v. Lea, 97 Mass. 493. And see

Dickinson p. Hayes, 31 Conn. 417; Church v. Chapin, 35 Vt. 223; Packet Co.

V. Sickles, 5 Wall. 580; Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Vt. 98.

* McLean v. Hugarin, 13 Johns. 184; Morgan v. Plumb, 9 Wend. 287;

Wilder p. Case, 16 Wend. 583; Baker v. Rand, 13 Barb. 152; Kelley v. Pike,

5Cush. 484; Hart v. Jewett, 11 Iowa, 276; Colburn v. Woodworth, 31 Barb.

S81; Newberry p. Trowbridge, 13 Mich. 278; Skildin v. Herrick, 3 Wend. 154;

Brockway v. Kinney, 2 Johns. 210; Platner v. Best, 11 Johns. 530; Phillips v.

Berick, 16 Johns. 136; Page v. Fowler, 37 Cal. 100.
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But if important principles of constitutional law can be thus

disposed of in suits involving only private rights, and when private

individuals and their counsel alone are heard, it becomes of interest

to know how far, if at all, other individuals and the public at large

lare affected by the decision. And here it will be discovered that

quite a different rule prevails, and that a judicial decision has no

such force of absolute conclusiveness as to other parties as it is

allowed to possess between the parties to the litigation in which

the decision has been made, and those who have succeeded to their

rights.

A party is estopped by a judgment against him from disputing

its correctness, so far as the point directly involved in the case

was concerned, whether the reasons upon which it was based were

sound or not, and even if no reasons were given therefor. And if

the parties themselves are estopped, so also should be all those

who, since the decision, claim to have acquired interests in the

subject-matter of the judgment from or under the parties, as per-
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sonal representatives, heirs-at-law, donees, or purchasers, and who

are therefore considered in the law as privies. But if strangers who

have no interest in that subject-matter are to be in like manner

concluded, because their controversies are supposed to involve the

same question of law, we shall not only be forced into a series of

endless inquiries, often resulting in little satisfaction, in order to

ascertain whether the question is the same, but we shall also be

met by the query, whether we are not concluding parties by deci-

sions which others have obtained in fictitious controversies and by

collusion, or suffered to pass without sufficient consideration and

discussion, and which might have been given otherwise had other

parties had an opportunity of being heard.

[* 49] * We have already seen that the force of a judgment

does not depend upon the reasons given therefor, or upon

the circumstance that any were or were not given. If there were,

they may have covered portions of the controversy only, or they

may have had such reference to facts peculiar to that case, that in

any other controversy, though somewhat similar in its facts, and

apparently resembling it in its legal bearings, grave doubts might

arise whether it ought to fall within the same general principle.

If one judgment were absolutely to conclude the parties to any

similar controversy, we ought at least to be able to look into the

judicial mind, in order that we might ascertain of a surety that all

[54]
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those facts which should influence the questions of law were sub-

stantially the same in each, and we ought also to be able to see

that the fir§t litigation was conducted in entire good faith, and that

every consideration was presented to the court which could prop-

erly have weight in the construction and application of the law.

All these things, however, are manifestly impossible; and the law

therefore wisely excludes judgments from being used to the preju-

dice of strangers to the controversy, and restricts their conclusive-

ness to the parties thereto and their privies.1 Even parties and

privies are bound only so far as regards the subject-matter then

involved, and would be at liberty to raise the same questions anew

in a distinct controversy affecting some distinct subject-matter.2

All judgments, however, are supposed to apply the existing law

to the facts of the case; and the reasons which are sufficient to

influence the court to a particular conclusion in one case ought to

be sufficient to bring it or any other court to the same conclusion

in all other like cases where no modification of the law has inter-

vened. There would thus be uniform rules for the administra-
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tion of justice, and the same measure that is meted out

* to one would be received by all others. And even if the [* 50]

same or any other court, in a subsequent case, should be

in doubt concerning the correctness of the decision which has been

made, there are consequences of a very grave character to be con-

templated and weighed before the experiment of disregarding it

should be ventured upon. That state of things, when judicial de-

cisions conflict, so that a citizen is always at a loss in regard to

his rights and his duties, is a very serious evil; and the alterna-

tive of accepting adjudged cases as precedents in future controver-

sies resting upon analogous facts, and brought within the same

reasons, is obviously preferable. Precedents, therefore, become

1 Burrill v. West, 2 N. H. 190; Davis v. Wood, 1 Wheat. 6; Jackson v.

Yedder, 3 Johns. 8; Case v. Reeve, 14 Johns. 79; Alexander t>. Taylor, 4 Denio,

302; Van Bokkelin v. Ingersoll, 5 Wend. 315; Smith o. Ballantyne, 10 Paige,

101; Orphan House v. Lawrence, 11 Paige, 80; Thomas v. Hubbell, 15 N. Y.

405; Wood v. Stephen, 1 Serg. & R. 175; Peterson v. Lothrop, 34 Penn. St.

223; Twambly v. Henley, 4 Mass. 441; Este v. Strong, 2 Ohio, 401; Cowles v.

Harts, 3 Conn. 516; Floyd v. Mintsey, 5 Rich. 361; Riggins's Ex'rs v. Brown,

12 Geo. 271; Persons ». Jones, to. 371.

* Van Alstiner. Railroad Co., 34 Barb. 28; Taylor v. McCracken, 2 Blackf.

280; Cook v. Vimont, 6 T. B. Monr. 284. See, for a discussion of this doctrine

tnd limitations upon it, Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Vt. 98.
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important, and counsel are allowed and expected to call the atten-

tion of the court to them, not as concluding controversies, but as

guides to the judicial mind. Chancellor Kent says: ," A solemn

decision upon a point of law arising in any given case becomes an

authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidence which

we can have of the law applicable to the subject, and the judges

are bound to follow that decision so long as it stands unreversed,

unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood or misap-

plied in that particular case. If a decision has been made upon

solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is in

favor of its correctness, and the community have a right to regard

it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate

their actions and contracts by it. It would therefore be extremely

inconvenient to the public if precedents were not duly regarded,

and implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and stability of

such rules that professional men can give safe advice to those who

consult them, and people in general can venture to buy and trust,

and to deal with each other. If judicial decisions were to be
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lightly disregarded, w$ should disturb and unsettle the great

landmarks of property. When a rule has once been deliberately

adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed unless by a

court of appeal or review, and never by the same court, except for

very urgent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and

if the practice were otherwise, it would be leaving us in a perplex-

ing uncertainty as to the law."1

1 1 Kent, 475. And see Cro. Jac. 527; Goodtitle v. Otway, 7 T. R. 416;

Selby v. Bardons, S B. & Ad. 17 ; Fletcher t>. Lord Somers, 8 Bing. 588 ; Ander-

son v. Jackson, 16 Johns. 402; Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 722; Bates r.

Releyea, 23 Wend. 340; Emerson v. Atwater, 7 Mich. 12; Nelson v. Allen, 1

Terg. 37G ; Palmer v. Lawrence, 5 N. Y. 889; Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis.

458 ; Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246; Rex v. Cox, 2 Burr. 787; King v. Younger,

6 T. R. 450 ; Hammond ». Anderson, 4 B. & P. 69; Broom's Maxims, 109. Dr.

Lieber thinks the doctrine of the precedent especially valuable in a free country.

"Liberty and 6teady progression require the principle of the precedent in all

spheres. It is one of the roots with which the tree of liberty fastens in the soil

of real life, and through which it receives the sap of fresh existence. It is the

weapon by which interference is warded off. The principle of the precedent is

eminently philosophical. The English Constitution would not have developed

itself without it. What is called the English Constitution consists of the funda-

mentals of the British polity, laid down in custom, precedent, decisions,^and stat-

utes; and the common law in it is a far greater portion than the statute law.

The English Constitution is chiefly a common-law constitution; and this reflex

[56]
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* The doctrine of stare decisis, however, is only applica- [* 51]

ble, in its full force, within the territorial jurisdiction of

the courts making * the decisions, since there alone can [* 52]

such decisions be regarded as having established any

rules. Rulings made under a similar legal system elsewhere may

be cited and respected for their reasons, but are not necessarily to

be accepted as guides, except in so far as those reasons commend

themselves to the judicial mind.1 Great Britain and the thirteen

original States had each substantially the same system of common

of a continuous society in a continuous law is more truly philosophical than the

theoretic and systematic, but lifeless constitutions of recent France." Civ. Lib.

and Self-Gov. See also his chapter on precedents in the Hermeneutics. In

Nelson p. Allen, 1 Yerg. 376, where the constitutionality of the " Betterment

Law" came under consideration, the court {White, J.) say: "Whatever might

be my own opinion upon this question, not to assent to its settlement now, after

two solemn decisions of this court, the last made upwards of fourteen years ago,

and not only no opposing decision, but no attempt even by any case, during all

this time, to call the point again in controversy, forming a complete acquiescence,

would be, at the least, inconsistent, perhaps mischievous, and uncalled for by a
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correct discharge of official duty. Much respect has always been paid to the

contemporaneous construction of statutes, and a forbidding caution hath always

accompanied any approach towards unsettling it, dictated no doubt by easily

foreseen consequences attending a sudden change of a rule of property, neces-

sarily introductory at least of confusion, increased litigation, and the disturbance

of the peace of society. The most able judges and the greatest names on the

bench have held this view of the subject, and occasionally expressed themselves

to that effect, either tacitly or openly, intimating that if they had held a part in

the first construction they would have been of a different opinion; but the con-

struction having been made, they give their assent thereto. Thus Lord Ellen-

borough, in 2 East, 302, remarks: 'I think it is better to abide by that deter-

mination, than to introduce uncertainty into this branch of the law, it being often

more important to have the rule settled, than to determine what it shall be. I

am not, however, convinced by the reasoning in this case, and if the point were

new I should think otherwise.' Lord Mansfield, in 1 Burp. 419, says: 'Where

solemn determinations acquiesced under had settled precise cases, and a rule of

property, they ought, for the sake of certainty, to be observed, as if they had

originally formed a part of the text of the statute.' And Sir James Mansfield,

in 4 B. & P. 69, says: 'I do not know how to distinguish this from the case

before decided in the court. It is of greater consequence that the law should be

a s uniform as possible, than that the equitable claim of an individual should

be attended to.'" And see People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283.

A judgment rendered by a court is authority notwithstanding it was one given

under the law of necessity, in consequence of an equal division of the court.

Begina v. Millis, 13 M. & W. 261; Durante. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107.

1 Caldwell n. Gale, 11 Mich. 77.

[57]
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law originally, and a decision now by one of the higher courts of

Great Britain as to what the common law is upon any point is cer-

tainly entitled to great respect in any of the States, though not

necessarily to be accepted as binding authority any more than the

decisions in any one of the other States upon the same point. It

gives us the opinions of able judges as to what the law is, but its

force as an authoritative declaration must be confined to the coun-

try for which the court sits and judges. But an English decision

before the Revolution is in the direct line of authority; and where

a particular statute or clause of the constitution has been adopted

in one State from the statutes or constitution of another, after a

judicial construction had been put upon it in such last-mentioned

State, it is but just to regard the construction to have been

adopted, as well as the words, and all the mischiefs of disregard-

ing precedents would follow as legitimately here as in any other

case.1

It will of course sometimes happen that a court will find a

former decision so unfounded in law, so unreasonable in its deduc-
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tions, or so mischievous in its consequences, as to feel compelled

to disregard it. Before doing so, however, it will be well to con-

sider whether the point involved is such as to have become a rule

of property, so that titles have been acquired in reliance upon it,

and vested rights will be disturbed by any change; for in such a

case it may be better that the correction of the error be

[* 53] left to the legislature, which can control its action so * as

to make it prospective only, and thus prevent unjust con-

sequences.2

1 Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 8 Gray, 450; Bond v. Appleton, 8 Mass. 472;

Rutland v. Mendon, 1 Pick. 154; Campbell v. Quinlin, 3 Scam. 288; Little v.

Smith, 4 Scam. 402; Riggs v. Wilton, 13 III. 15; Ingraham v. Regan, 23 Miss.

213; Tyler v. Tyler, 19 111. 151; Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 18; Adams t>.

Field, 21 Vt. 266; Turnpike Co.' v. People, 9 Barb. 167; Drennan v. People,

10 Mich. 169; Myrick v. Hasey,'27 Me. 9; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46;

Attorney-General v. Brunst, 3 Wis. 787; Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind. 827;

Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23. But it does not necessarily follow that the prior

decision construing the law must be inflexibly followed, since the circumstances

in the State adopting it may be so different as to require a different construction.

Little v. Smith, 4 Scam. 402; Lessee of Gray v. Askew, 3 Ohio, 479.

s "After an erroneous decision touching rights of property has been followed

thirty or forty years, and even a much less time, the courts cannot retrace their

steps without committing a new error nearly as great as the one at the first."

Branson, J., in Sparrow v. Kingman, 1N. Y. 260. See also Emerson v. Atwater,
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OH. IV.] CONSTRUCTION OP STATE CONSTITUTIONS. * 53

Whenever the case is such that judicial decisions which have

been made are to be accepted as law, and followed by the courts

in future cases, it is equally to be expected that they will be fol-

lowed by other departments of the government also. Indeed in

the great majority of cases the officers of other departments have

no option; for the courts possess the power to enforce their con-

struction of the law as well as to declare it; and a failure to

accept and follow it in one case would only create necessity for

new litigation with similar result. Nevertheless, there are excep-

tions to this rule which embrace all those cases where new action

is asked of another department, which that department is at lib-

erty to grant or refuse for any reasons which it may regard as

sufficient. We cannot conceive that, because the courts have

declared an expiring corporation to have been constitutionally

created, the legislature would be bound to renew its charter, or

the executive to sign an act for that purpose, if doubtful of the

constitutional authority, even though no other adverse reasons ex-

isted.1 In the enactment of laws the legislature must act upon

7 Mich. 12; Loeb v. Mathis, 37 Ind. 806. "It is true that when a principle of

law.doubtful in its character or uncertain in the subject-matter of its application, has
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been settled by a series of judicial decisions, and acquiesced in for a considerable

time, and important rights and interests have become established under such

decisions, courts will hesitate long before they will attempt to overturn the result

so long established. But when it is apparently indifferent which of two or more

rales is adopted, the one which shall have been adopted by judicial sanction will

be adhered to, though it may not, at the moment, appear to be the preferable rule.

But when a question involving important public or private rights, extending

through all coming time, has been passed upon on a single occasion, and which

decision can in no just sense be said to have been acquiesced in, it is not only

the right, but the duty of the court, when properly called upon, to re-examine

the questions involved, and again subject them to judicial scrutiny. We are

br no means unmindful of the salutary tendency of the rule stare decisis, but at

the same time we cannot be unmindful of the lessons furnished by our own

consciousness, as well as by judicial history,- of the liability to error and the

advantages of review." Per Smith, J., Pratt v. Brown, 8 Wis. 609. And see

Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 458; Taylor v. French, 19 Vt. 49; Bellows v.

Parsons, 13 N. H. *256; Hannel v. Smith, 15 Ohio, 134; Day v. Munson, 14

Ohio, n. s. 488; Green Castle, &c, Co. v. State, 28 Ind. 382; Harrow v. Myers,

29 Ind. 469; Mead v. McGraw, 19 Ohio, n. s. 62; Ram on Legal Judgment,

fc'H, S3.

'In the celebrated case of the application of the Bank of the United States

for a new charter, President Jackson felt himself at liberty to act upon his own

Tiew of constitutional power, in opposition to that previously declared by the

[59]
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its own reasons; mixed motives of power, justice, and policy influ-

ence its action; and it is always justifiable and laudable to lean

against a violation of the constitution. Indeed cases must some-

times occur when a court should refrain from declaring a

[* 54] statute * unconstitutional, because not clearly satisfied

that it is so, when if the judges were to act as legislators

upon the question of its enactment, they ought with the same

views to withhold their assent, from grave doubts upon that sub-

ject. The duty is different in the two cases, and presumptions

may control in one which do not exist in the other. But those

cases where new legislation is sought stand by themselves, and are

not precedents for those which involve only considerations concern-

ing the constitutional validity of existing enactments. The general

acceptance of judicial decisions as authoritative, by each and all,

can alone prevent confusion, doubt, and uncertainty, and any other

course is incompatible with a true government of law.

Construction to be Uniform.

A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments is that
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they are to receive an unvarying interpretation, and that their

practical construction is to be uniform. A constitution is not to

be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at some sub-

sequent time when the circumstances may have so changed as

perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable. A

principal share of the benefit expected from written constitutions

would be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to

bend to circumstances or be modified by public opinion. It is

with special reference to the varying moods of public opinion, and

with a view to putting the fundamentals of government beyond

their control, that these instruments are framed; and there can

be no such steady and imperceptible change in their rules as in-

heres in the principles of the common law. Those beneficent

maxims of the common law which guard person and property

have grown and expanded until they mean vastly more to us than

they did to our ancestors, 'aud are more' minute, particular, and

pervading in their protections; and we may confidently look for-

Supreme Court, and President Lincoln expressed similar views regarding the

conclusiveness of the Di ed Scott decision upon executive and legislative action.

See Story on Const. 4th ed. § 375, Dote.

[60]

CH. IV.] CONSTRUCTION OP STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

* 54

ward in the future to still further modifications in the direction of

improvement. Public sentiment and action effect such changes,

and the courts recognize them; but a court or legislature which

should allow a change in public sentiment to influence it in giving

construction to a written constitution not warranted by the inten-

tion of its founders, would be justly chargeable with reckless

disregard of official oath and public duty; and if its course

could become a precedent, these instruments would be of

* little avail. The violence of public passion is quite as [* 55]

likely to be in the direction of oppression as in any other;

and the necessity for bills of rights in our fundamental laws lies

mainly in the danger that the legislature will be influenced by

temporary excitements and passions among the people to adopt

oppressive enactments. What a court is to do, therefore, is to de-

dare the law as written, leaving it to the people themselves to make

such changes as new circumstances may require.1 The meaning

of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is not differ-

ent at any subsequent time when a court has occasion to pass

upon it.2
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The Intent to govern.

The object of construction, as applied to a written constitution,

is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it. In the

case of all written laws, it is the intent of the lawgiver that is to

be enforced. But this intent is to be found in the instrument

itself. It is to be presumed that language has been employed with

sufficient precision to convey it, and unless examination demon-

strates that the presumption does not hold good in the particular

case, nothing will remain except to enforce it. "Where a law is

plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or

limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what

they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for

construction."3 Possible or eveu probable meanings, wheu one

1 People v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 584; Newejl v. People, 7 N. Y. 109; Hyatt

v. Taylor, 42 N. Y. 259.

'Campbell, J., in People p. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 138.

! United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 399; Bosley v. Mattingley, 14 B. Monp.

89; Sturgis p. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 202; Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. United

States, 7 Cranch, 60; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, C. C. 84; United States v.

Ragsdale, 1 Hemp. 497; Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 26 Penn. St. 446;
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[* 56] is * plainly declared in the instrument itself, the courts

are not at liberty to search for elsewhere.

Ingalls «. Cole, 47 Me. 530; McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593; Furman r.

New York, 5 Sandf. 16; Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 83; People v. N. Y. Central

R.R. Co., 24 N. Y. 492; Bidwell v. Whittaker, 1 Mich. 479; Alexander e.

Worthington, 5 Md. 471; Cantwell o. Owens, 14 Md. 215; Case ». Wildridge,

4 Ind. 51; Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 49; Putnam v. Flint, 10 Pick. 504; Heirs

of Ludlow v. Johnson, 3 Ohio, 553; District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa,

262; Pattison c. Yuba, 13 Cal. 175; Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Kelly, 146; In re

Murphy, 3 Zab. 180; Attorney-General v. Detroit & Erin P. R. Co., Wal. Ch.

394; Smith v. Thursby, 28 Md. 244; State v. Bladsdel, 4 Nev. 241; State e.

Doron, 5 Nev. 399. The remarks of Mr. Justice Bronson in People v. Purdy,

2 Hill, 35, are very forcible in showing the impolicy and danger of looking

beyond the instrument itself to ascertain its meaning, when the terms employed

are positive and free from all ambiguity. "It is said that the Constitution does

not extend to public corporations, and therefore a majority vote was sufficient.

I do not so read the Constitution. The language of the clause is: 'The assent

of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature shall be
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requisite to evei-y bill creating, continuing, altering, or renewing any body politic

or corporate.' These words are as broad in their signification as any which

could have been selected for the occasion from our vocabulary, and there is not

a syllable in the whole instrument tending in the slightest degree to limit or

qualify the universality of the language. If the clause can be so construed that

it shall not extend alike to all corporations, whether public or private, it may

then, I think, be set down as an established fact that the English language is too

poor for the framing of fundamental laws which shall limit the powers of the

legislative branch of the government. No one has, I believe, pretended that

the Constitution, looking at that alone, can be restricted to any particular class

or description of corporations. But it is said that we may look beyond the

instrument for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief against which the clause

was directed, and thus restrict its operation. But who shall tell us what that

mischief was? Although most men in public life are old enough to remember

the time when the Constitution was framed and adopted, they are not agreed

concerning the particular evils against which this clause was directed. Some

suppose the clause was intended to guard against legislative corruption, and

others that it was aimed at monopolies. Some are of opinion that it only extends

to private without touching public corporations, while others suppose that it only

restricts the power of the legislature when creating a single corporation, and not

when they are made by the hundred. In this way a solemn instrument— for so

I think the Constitution should be considered — is made to mean one thing by

one man and something else by another, until, in the end, it is in danger of being

rendered a mere dead letter; and that, too, where the language is so plain and

explicit that it is impossible to mean more than one thing, unless we first lose

sight of the instrument itself, and allow ourselves to roam at large in the bound-

less fields of speculation. For one, I dare not venture upon such a course.

Written constitutions of government will soon come to be regarded as of little

[62]
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* " Whether we are considering an agreement between [* 57]

parties, a statute, or a constitution, with a view to its in-

terpretation, the thing which we are to seek is the thought which it

expresses. To ascertain this, the first resort in all cases is to the

natural signification of the words employed, in the order of gram-

matical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have

placed them. If thus regarded the words embody a definite mean-

ing, which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between

different parts of the same writing, then that meaning, apparent

on the face of the instrument, is the one which alone we are at

liberty to say was intended to be conveyed. In such a case there

is no room for construction. That which the words declare is the

meaning of the instrument, and neither courts nor legislatures

have a right to add to or take away from that meaning." 1

value if their injunctions may be thus lightly overlooked; and the experiment of

setting a boundary to power will prove a failure. We are not at liberty to pre-

sume that the framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not

understand the force of language." See also same case, 4 Hill, 384, and State

v. King, 44 Mo. 285. Another court has said: "This power of construc-
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tion in courts is a mighty one, and, unrestrained by settled rules, would tend to

throw a painful uncertainty over the effect that might be •given to the most plainly

worded statutes, and render courts, in reality, the legislative power of the State.

Instances are not wanting to confirm this. Judge-made law has overrode the

legislative department. It was the boast of Chief Justice Pemberton, one of the

judges of the despot Charles II., and not the worst even of those times, that he

had entirely outdone the Parliament in making law. We think that system of

jurisprudence best and safest which controls most by fixed rules, and leaves least

to the discretion of the judge; a doctrine constituting one of the points of su-

periority in the common law over that system which has been administered in

France, where authorities had no force, and the law of each case was what the

judge of the case saw fit to make it. We admit that the exercise of an unlimited

discretion may, in a particular instance, be attended with a salutary result; still

history informs us that it has often been the case that the arbitrary discretion of

a judge was the law of a tyrant, and warns us that it may be so again." Spencer

p. State, 5 Ind. 76. "Judge-made law," as here employed, is that made by

judicial decisions which construe away the meaning of statutes, or find meanings

in them the legislature never held. The phrase is sometimes used as meaning,

amply, the law that becomes established by precedent. The uses and necessity

of judicial legislation are considered at length by Mp. Austin, in his Province of

Jurisprudence.

1 Newell p. People, 7 N. Y. 97. And see Den v. Reid, 10 Pet. 524; Green-

castle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 569; Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Port. 266; Leonard

c. Wiseman, 31 Md. 204, per Barlol, Ch. J.; McAdoo v. Benbow, 63 N. C.

464; Broom's Maxims (5th Am. ed.), 551, marg.

[63]
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\

The whole Instrument to he examined.

Nor is it lightly to be inferred that any portion of a written law

is so ambiguous as to require extrinsic aid in its construction.

Every such instrument is adopted as a whole, and a clause which,

standing by itself, might seem of doubtful import, may yet be

made plain by comparison with other clauses or portions of the

same law. It is therefore a rule of construction, that the whole

is to be examined with a view to arriving at the true intention of

each part; and this Sir Edward Coke regards the most natural

and genuine method of expounding a statute.1 "If any section

[of a law] be intricate, obscure, or doubtful, the proper mode of

discovering its true meaning is by comparing it with the other

sections, and finding out the sense of one clause by the words or

obvious intent of another."2 And in making this comparison it

is not to be supposed that any words have been employed without

occasion, or without intent that they should have effect as

[* 58] part of * the law. The rule applicable here is, that effect
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is to be given, if possible, to the whole instrument, and

to every section and clause. If different portions seem to conflict,

the courts must harmonize them, if practicable, and lean in favor

of a construction which will render every word operative, rather

than one which may make some idle and nugatory.3

This rule is especially applicable to written constitutions, in

which the people will be presumed to have expressed themselves

in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense

importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible

to implication.4 It is scarcely conceivable that a case can arise

where a court would be justifiable in declaring any portion of a

written constitution nugatory because of ambiguity. One part

1 Co. Lit. 381, a.

'Stowell v. Lord Zouch, Plowd. 865; Broom's Maxims, 521.

3 Attorney-General v. Detroit and Erin Plank Road Co., 2 Mich. 138; People

v. Burns, 5 Mich. 114; District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262; Manly r.

State, 7 Md. 135; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184; Belleville Railroad Co. v.

Gregory, 15 111. 20; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, C. C. 584; Ryegate v. Wards-

boro, 30 Vt. 746; Brooks v. Mobile School Commissioners, 31 Ala. 227; Den

v. Dubois, 1 Harrison, 285; Den v. Schenck, 3 Halst. 34; Bigelow v. W. Wis-

consin R.R., 27 Wis. 478.

4 Wolcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 49; People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 36, per Bronson,

J.; Grecncastle Township r. Black, 5 Ind. 570; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650.

[64]
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may qualify another so as to restrict its operation, or apply it

otherwise than the natural construction would require if it stood

by itself; but one part is not to be allowed to defeat another,

if by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand

together.1

In interpreting clauses we must presume that words have been

employed in their natural and ordinary meaning. Says Marshall,

Ch. J.: "The framers of the Constitution, and the people who

adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their

natural sense, and to have understood what they meant." 2 This

is but saying that no forced or unnatural construction is to be put

upon their language; and it seems so obvious a truism

that one * expects to see it universally accepted without [* 59]

question; but the attempt is so often made by interested

subtlety and ingenious refinement to induce the courts to force

from these instruments a meaning which their framers never held,

that it frequently becomes necessary to re-declare this fundamen-

tal maxim.3 Narrow and technical reasoning is misplaced when

1 It is a general rule, in the construction of writings, that, a general intent

appearing, it shall control the particular intent; but this rule must sometimes
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give way, and effect must be given to a particular intent plainly expressed in one

part of a constitution, though apparently opposed to a general intent deduced

from other parts. Warren v. Sherman, 5 Texas, 441. In Quick v. Whitewater

Township, 7 Ind. 570, it was said that if two provisions of a written constitution

are irreconcilably repugnant, that which is last in order of time and in local posi-

tion is to be preferred.

J Gibbons ». Ogden, 9 Wheat. 188. See Settle r. Van Enrea, 49 N. Y. 281.

3 State v. Mace, 5 Md. 337; Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135; Green v. Weller,

32 Miss. 650; Greencastle Township t;. Black, 5 Ind. 570; People r. N. Y. Cen-

tral Railroad Co., 34 Barb. 137, and 24 N. Y. 488; Story on Const. § 453.

"The true sense in which words are used in a statute is to be ascertained gen-

erally by taking them in their ordinary and popular signi6cation, or, if they be

terms of art, in their technical signification. But it is also a cardinal rule of

exposition, that the intention is to be deduced from the whole and every part of

the statute, taken and compared together, from the words of the context, and

such a construction adopted as will best effectuate the intention of the lawgiver.

One part is referred to in order to help the construction of another, and the

intent of the legislature is not to be collected from any particular expression,

bat from a general view of the whole act. Dwarris, 658, 698, 702, 703. And

when it appears that the framers have used a word in a particular sense gener-

ally in the act, it will be presumed that it was intended to be used in the same

sense throughout the act, unless an intention to give it a different signification

plainly appears in the particular part of the act alleged to be an exception to

5 [ 65 ]

* 59
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it is brought to bear upon an instrument framed by the people

themselves, for themselves, and designed as a chart upon which

every man, learned and unlearned, may be able to trace the lead-

ing principles of government.

But it must not be forgotten, in construing our constitutions,

that in many particulars they are but the legitimate successors of

the great charters of English liberty, whose provisions declaratory

of the rights of the subject have acquired a well-understood mean-

ing, which the people must be supposed to have had in view in

adopting them. We cannot understand these provisions unless

we understand their history; and when we find them

[* 60] expressed in * technical words, and words of art, we must

suppose these words to be employed in their technical

sense. When the constitution speaks of an ex post facto law, it

means a law technically known by that designation; the meaning

of the phrase having become defined in the history of constitu-

tional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is not neces-

sary to employ language of a more popular character to designate
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it. The technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly un-

derstood, because that is the sense fixed upon the words in legal

and constitutional history where they havo been employed for the

protection of popular rights.1

the general meaning indicated. Ibid'. 704, et seq. When words are used to which

the legislature has given a plain and definite import in the act, it would be dan-

gerous to put upon them a construction which would amount to holding that the

legislature did not mean what it has expressed. It follows from these principles

that the statute itself furnishes the best means of its own exposition; and if the

sense in which words were intended to be used can be clearly ascertained from

all its parts and provisions, the intention thus indicated shall prevail, without

resorting to other means of aiding in the construction. And these familiar rules

of construction apply with at least as much force to the construction of written

constitutions as to statutes; the former being presumed to be framed with much

greater care and consideration than the latter." Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 678.

1 It is quite possible, however, in applying constitutional maxims, to overlook

entirely the reason upon which they rest, and " considering merely the letter, go

but skin deep into the meaning." On the great debate on the motion for with-

drawing the confidence of Parliament from the ministers, after the surrender of

Cornwallis, — a debate which called out the best abilities of Fox and Pitt as well

as of the ministry, and necessarily led to the discussion of the primary principle

in free government, that taxation and representation, shall go together, — Sir

James Mariott rose, and with great gravity proceeded to say, that if taxation

and representation were to go hand in hand, then Britain had an undoubted

right to tax America, because she was represented in the British Parliament.

[66]
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The Common Law to be kept in View.

In the same connection it may be remarked that the constitu-

tions are to be construed in the light of the common law, and of

the fact that its rules are still left in force. By this we do not

mean that the common law is to control the constitution, or that

the latter is to be warped and perverted in its meaning in order

that no inroads, or as few as possible, may be made in the system

of common-law rules, but only that for its definitions we are- to

draw from that great fountain, and that, in judging what

it means, we * are to keep in mind that it is not the begin- [* 61]

ning of law for the State, but that it assumes the existence

of a well-understood system, which is still to remain in force and

be administered, but under such limitations and restrictions as

that instrument imposes. It is a maxim with the courts that

statutes in derogation of the common law shall be construed

strictly;1 a maxim which we fear is sometimes perverted to the

overthrow of the legislative intent; but the same maxim could

seldom be properly applied to constitutions. When these instru-

ments assume to make any change in the common law, the change
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designed is generally a radical one; but as they do not go minutely

into particulars, like the statutes, it will sometimes be easy to

defeat a provision, if courts are at liberty to say that they will

presume against any intention to alter the common law further

than is expressly declared. A reasonable construction is what

such au instrument demands and should receive; and the real

She was represented by the members for the county of Kent, of which the thir-

teen provinces were a part and parcel ; for in their charters they were to hold of

the manor of Greenwich in Kent, of which manor they were by charter to be

parcel! The opinion, it is said, " raised a very loud laugh," but Sir James con-

tinued to support it, and concluded by declaring that he would give the motion

a hearty negative. Thus would he have settled a great principle of constitu-

tional right, for which a seven years' bloody war had been waged, by putting it

In the form of a meaningless legal fiction. Hansard's Debates, Vol. XXII.

■ p. 1184. Lord Mahon, following Lord Campbell, refers the origin of this won-

derful argument to Mr. Hardinge, a Welsh judge, and nephew of Lord Camden.

7 Mahon's Hist. 139. He was said to have been a good lawyer, but must have

read the history of his country to little purpose.

'Broom's Maxims, 33; Sedg. on Stat. & Const. Law, 313. See Harrison v.

Leach, 4 W. Va. 383.

[67]
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question is, what the people meant, and not how meaningless their

words can be made by the application of arbitrary rules.1

[* 62] * As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same

word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a

constitution. Here again, however, great caution must be ob-

served in applying an arbitrary rule; for, as Mr. Justice Story

has well observed, " It does not follow, either logically or gram-

matically, that because a word is found in one connection in the

Constitution with a definite sense, therefore the same sense is to

be adopted in every other connection in which it occurs. This

would be to suppose that the framers weighed only the force of

single words, as philologists or critics, and not whole clauses and

objects, as statesmen and' practical reasouers. And yet nothing

has been more common than to subject the Constitution to this

narrow and mischievous criticism.2 Men of ingenious and subtle

minds, who seek for symmetry and harmony in language, having

1 Under a clause of the Constitution of Michigan which provided that *' the

real and personal estate of every female acquired before marriage, and all prop-
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erty to which she may afterwards become entitled, by gift, grant, inheritance, or

devise, shall be and remain the estate and property of such female, and shall not

be liable for the debts, obligations, or engagements of her husband, and may be

devised or bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried," it was held that a mar-

ried woman could not sell her personal property without the consent of her

husband, inasmuch as the power to do so was not expressly conferred, and the

clause, being in derogation of the common law, was not to be extended by con-

struction. Brown v. Fifield, 4 Mich. 322. The danger of applying arbitrary

rules in the construction of constitutional principles might well, as it seems to us,

be illustrated by this case. For while on the one hand it might be contended

that, as a provision in derogation of the common law, the one quoted should

receive a strict construction, on the other hand it might be insisted with perhaps

equal reason that, as a remedial provision, in furtherance of natural right and

justice, it should be liberally construed, to effect the beneficial purpose bad in

view. Thus arbitrary rules, of directly opposite tendency and force, would be

contending for the mastery in the same case. The subsequent decisions under

the same provision do not appear to have followed this lead. See White v. Zane,

10 Mich. 333; McKee v. Wilcox, 11 Mich. 358; Farr v. Sherman, 11 Mich. 33;

Watson !>. Thurber, 11 Mich. 457; Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Micb. 91; Tong v.

Marvin, 15 Mich. 60; Tillman v. Shackleton, 15 Mich. 447. The common law

is certainly to be kept in view in the interpretation of such a clause, since other-

wise we do not ascertain the evil designed to be remedied, and perhaps are not

able to fully understand and explain the terms employed; but it is to be looked

at with a view to the real intent, rather than for the purpose of arbitrarily

restraining it.

* See remarks of Johnson, J., in Ogden o. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 290.

[68]

CH. IV.] CONSTRUCTION OP 8TATE CONSTITUTIONS. * 62

found in the Constitution a word used in some sense, which falls

in with their favorite theory of interpreting it, have made that the

standard by which to measure its use in every other part of the

instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it were, on the bed

of Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it seemed too large

for their purposes, and extending it when it seemed too short.

They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes, and

crippled where they have sought only to adjust its proportions

according to their own opinions." 1 And he gives many instances

where, in the national Constitution, it is very manifest the same

word is employed in different meanings. So that, while the rule

may be sound as one of presumption merely, its force is but slight,

and it must readily give way to a different intent appearing in the

instrument.

Operation to be Prospective.

We shall venture also to express the opinion that a constitution

should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show

a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect. This

is the rule in regard to statutes, and it is " one of such obvious

convenience and justice, that it must always be adhered to in the
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construction of statutes, unless there is something on the face of

the enactment putting it beyond doubt that the legislature meant

it to operate retrospectively." 2 Retrospective legislation,

except * when designed to cure formal defects, or other- [* 63]

wise operate remedially, is commonly objectionable in

principle, and apt to result in injustice; and it is a sound rule of

construction which refuses lightly to imply an intent to enact it.

And we are aware of no reasons applicable to ordinary legislation

which do not, upon this point, apply equally well to constitutions.3

1 Story on Const. § 454. And see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 19.

'Moon v. Durden, 2 Exch. 22. See Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477;

Sayre p. Wisner, 8 Wend. 661; State v. Atwood, 11 Wis. 422; Hastings v.

Lane, 3 Shep. 134; Brown p. Wilcox, 14 S. & M. 127; Price v. Mott, 52 Penn.

St. 315; Ex parte Graham, 13 Rich. 277; Merwin t> . Ballard, 66 N. C. 398;

Broom's Maxims, 28.

5 In Allbyer v. State, 10 Ohio, N. s. 588, a question arose under the provision

of the constitution that " all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform opera-

tion throughout the State." Another clause provided that all laws then in force,

not inconsistent with the constitution, should continue in force until amended or

repealed. Allbyer was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment under a crimes

[69]
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Implications.

The implications from the provisions of a constitution are some-

times exceedingly important, and have large influence upon its

construction. In regard to the Constitution of the United States

the rule has been laid down, that where a general power is con-

ferred.or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the

exercise of the one, or the performance of the other, is also con-

ferred.1 The same rule has been applied to the State constitution,

with an important modification, by the Supreme Court of Illinois.

"That other powers than those expressly granted may be, and

often are, conferred by implication, is too well settled to

[* 64] be * doubted. Under every constitution implication must

be resorted to, in order to carry out the general grants of

power. A constitution cannot from its very nature enter into a

minute specification of all the minor powers naturally and obvi-

ously included in and flowing from the great and ■ important ones

which are expressly granted. It is therefore established as a gen-

eral rule, that when a constitution gives a general power, or enjoins
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a duty, it also gives, by implication, every particular power neces-

sary for the exercise of the one or the enjoyment of the other.

The implication under this rule, however, must be a necessary,

act previously in force, applicable to Hamilton County only, and the question

was, whether that act was not inconsistent with the provision above quoted, and

therefore repealed by it. The court held that the provision quoted evidently had

regard to future and not to past legislation, and therefore was not repealed. A

similar decision was made in State v. Barbee, 3 Ind. 258. See also State v.

Thompson, 2 Kansas, 432; Slack v. Maysville, &c, R.R. Co., 13 B. Monr. 1;

State v. Macon County Court, 41 Mo. 453. In Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.'s

Bank, 21 N. Y. 12, Denio,J., says: "The rule laid down in Dash v. Van Kleek,

7 Johns. 477, and other cases of that class, by which the courts are admonished

to avoid, if possible, such an interpretation as would give a statute a retrospec-

tive operation, has but a limited application, if any, to the construction of a con-

stitution. When, therefore, we read in the provision under consideration, that

the stockholders of every banking corporation shall be subject to a certain lia-

bility, we are to attribute to the language its natural meaning, without inquiring

whether private interests may not be prejudiced by such a sweeping mandate."

The remark was obiter, as it was found that enough appeared in the constitution

to show clearly that it was intended to apply to existing, as well as to subse-

quently created banking institutions.

1 Story on Const. § 430. See also United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358;

McCulloeh v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 428.

[70]
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not a conjectural or argumentative one. And it is further modified

by another rule, that where the means for the exercise of a granted

power are given, no other or different means can be implied, as

being more effective or convenient." 1 The rule applies to the

exercise of power by all departments and all officers, and will be

touched upon incidentally hereafter.

Akin to this is the rule that " where a power is granted in gen-

eral terms, the power is to be construed as coextensive with the

terms, unless some clear restriction upon it is deducible [ex-

pressly or by implication] from the context."2 This rule has

been so frequently applied in restraining the legislature from

encroaching upon the grant of power to the judiciary, that we

shall content ourselves in this place with a reference to the cases

collected upon this subject and given in another chapter.

Another rule of construction is, that when the constitution

defines the circumstances under which a right may be exercised

or a penalty imposed, the specification is an implied prohibition

against legislative interference, to add to the condition, or to ex-

tend the penalty to other cases. On this ground it has been held
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by the Supreme Court of Maryland, that where the constitution

defined the qualifications of an officer, it was not in the power of

the legislature to change or superadd to them, unless the power to

do so was expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the

constitution itself.3

* The Light which the Purpose to be accomplished may [* 65]

afford in Construction.

The considerations thus far suggested are such as have no regard

to extrinsic circumstances, but are those by the aid of which we

seek to arrive at the meaning of the constitution from an exami-

1 Field i». People, 2 Scam. 83. See Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 298.

■ Story on Const. §§ 424-426.

'Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189. To the same effect see Matter of Dorsey,

7 Port. 293. So the legislature cannot add to the constitutional qualifications of

voters. Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; St. Joseph, &c, R.R. Co. v. Buchanan

County Court, 39 Mo. 485; State v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308; Monroe v. Collins,

17 Ohio, N. 8. 665; State v. Symonds, 57 Me. 148; State v. Staten, 6 Cold.

243; Davies v. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369; McCafferty v. Guyer, 59 Penn. St. 109;

Quin v. State, 35 Md. 485; Clayton v. Harris, 7 Nev. 64; Randolph v. Good,

3 W. Va. 551.
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nation of the words employed. It is possible, however, that after

we shall have made use of all the lights which the instrument itself

affords, there may still be doubts to clear up and ambiguities to

explain. Then, and only then, are we warranted in seeking else-

where for aid. We are' not to import difficulties into a constitu-

tion, by a consideration of extrinsic facts, when none appear upon

its face. If, however, a difficulty really exists, which an examina-

tion of every part of the instrument does not enable us to remove,

there are certain extrinsic aids which may be resorted to, and

which are more or less satisfactory in the light they afford.

Among these aids is a contemplation of the object to be accom-

plished or the mischief designed to be remedied or guarded against

by the clause in which the ambiguity is met with.1 "When we

once know the reason which alone determined the will of the law-

makers, we ought to interpret and apply the words used in a

manner suitable and consonant to that reason, and as will be best

calculated to effectuate the intent. Great caution should always

be observed in the application of this rule to particular given cases;

that is, we ought always to be certain that we do know, and have

actually ascertained, the true and only reason which induced the
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act. It is never allowable to indulge in vague and uncertain con-

jecture, or in supposed reasons and views of the framers of an act,

where there are none known with any degree of certainty." 2 The

prior state of the law will sometimes furnish the clue to the real

meaning of the ambiguous provision,8 and it is especially impor-

tant to look into it if the constitution is the successor to another,

and in the particular in question essential changes have apparently

been made.4

[* 66] * Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention.

When the inquiry is directed to ascertaining the mischief de-

signed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to be accomplished

1 Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471; District Township v. Dubuque, 7

Iowa, 262. See Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330.

a Smith on Stat, and Const. Construction, 634. See also remarks of Bronson,

J., in Purdy v. People, 2 Hill, 35-37. •

3 Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Henry v. Tilson, 19 Vt. 447; Hamilton v.

St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo. 30; People v. Gies, 25 Mich. 83; Story on

Const. § 428.

4 People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 147.

[72]
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by a particular provision, it may be proper to examine the pro-

ceedings of the convention which framed the instrument.1 Where

the proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision, the

aid will be valuable and satisfactory; but where the question is

one of abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive from this

source much reliable assistance in interpretation. Every member

of such a convention acts upon such motives and reasons as

influence him personally, and the motions and debates do not

necessarily indicate the purpose of a majority of a convention in

adopting a particular clause. It is quite possible for a clause to

appear so clear and unambiguous to the members of a convention

as to require neither discussion nor illustration; and the few

remarks made concerning it in the convention might have a plain

tendency to lead directly away from the meaning in the minds of

the majority. It is equally possible for a part of the members to

accept a clause in one sense and a part in another. And even if

we were certain we had attained to the meaning of the convention,

it is by no means to be allowed a controlling force, especially if that
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meaning appears not to be the one which the words would most

naturally and obviously convey.2 For as the constitution does

not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from

the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the

people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any

dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that

they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common

understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that

was the sense designed to be conveyed.3 These proceedings there-

fore are less conclusive of the proper construction of the instru-

ment than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction

of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent of the

* legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeav- [* 67]

oring to arrive at the intent of the people through the dis-

cussions and deliberations of their representatives. The history

1 Per Walworth, Chancellor, Coutant v. People, 11 Wend. 518, and Clark v.

People, 26 Wend. 602; per Bronson, J., Purdy v. People, 2 Hill, 87; People

cN.Y. Central Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 496. See State v. Kennon, 7 Ohio,

». s. 563.

1 Taylor c. Taylor, 10 Minn. 126. And see Eakin ». Racob, 12 S. & R. 352;

Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 1; State v. Doron, 5 Nev. 399.

3 State r. Mace, 5 Md. 348; Manly v. State, 7 Md. 147.

[73]

* 67 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IV.

of the calling of the convention, the causes which led to it, and the

discussions and issues before the people at the time of the election

of the delegates, will sometimes be quite as instructive and satis-

factory as any thing to be gathered from the proceedings of the

convention.

Contemporaneous and Practical Construction.

An important question which now suggests itself is this: How

far the contemporaneous construction, or the subsequent practical

construction of any particular provision of the constitution, is to

have weight with the courts when the time arrives at which a

judicial decision becomes necessary. Contemporaneous construc-

tion may consist simply in the understanding with which the

people received it at the time, or in the acts done in putting it in

operation, and which necessarily assume that it is to be construed

in a particular way. In the first case it can have very little force,

because the evidences of the public understanding, when nothing

has been done under the provision in question, must always

necessarily be vague and indecisive. But where there has been a

practical construction, which has been acquiesced in for a consid-

erable period, considerations in favor of adhering to this construc-
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tion sometimes present themselves to the courts with a plausibility

and force which it is not easy to resist. Indeed, where a particular

construction has been generally accepted as correct, and especially

when this has occurred contemporaneously with the adoption of

the constitution, and by those who had opportunity to understand

the intention of the instrument, it is not to be denied that a strong

presumption exists that the construction rightly interprets the

intention. Especially where this has been given by officers in

the discharge of their duty, and rights have accrued in reliance

upon it, which would be divested by a decision that the construc-

tion was erroneous, the argument ab inconvenienti is sometimes

allowed to have very great weight.

The Supreme Court of the United States has had frequent

occasion to consider this question. In Stewart v. Laird,1 decided

in 1803, that court sustained the authority of its members to sit

as circuit judges on the ground of a practical construction,

[* 68] * commencing with the organization of the government.

1 Cranch, 299.

[74]
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In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,1 Justice Story, after holding

that the appellate power of the United States extends to cases

pending in the State courts, and that the 25th section of the

Judiciary Act, which authorized its exercise, was supported by

the letter and spirit of the Constitution, proceeds to say: "Strong

as this conclusion stands upon the general language of the Con-

stitution, it may still derive support from other sources. It is an

historical fact, that this exposition of the Constitution, extending

its appellate power to State courts, was, previous to its adoption,

uniformly and publicly avowed by its friends, and admitted by its

enemies, as the basis of their respective reasonings both in and

out of the State conventions. It is an historical fact, that at the

time when the Judiciary Act was submitted to the deliberations of

the First Congress, composed, as it was, not only of men of great

learning and ability, but of men who had acted a principal part in

framing, supporting, or opposing that Constitution, the same ex-

position was explicitly declared and admitted by the friends and

by the opponents of that system. It is an historical fact, that the

Supreme Court of the United States have from time to time sus-

tained this appellate jurisdiction in a great variety of cases, brought
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from the tribunals of many of the most important States in the

Union, and that no State tribunal has ever breathed a judicial

doubt on the subject, or declined to obey the mandate of the

Supreme Court until the present occasion. This weight of con-

temporaneous exposition by all parties, this acquiescence by en-

lightened State courts, and these judicial decisions by the Supreme

Court through so long a period, do, as we think, place the doctrine

upon a foundation of authority which cannot be shaken without

delivering over the subject to perpetual and irremediable doubts."

The same doctrine was subsequently supported by Chief Justice

Marshall in a case involving the same point, and in which he says

that " great weight has always been attached, and very rightly

attached, to contemporaneous exposition." 2

In Bank of United States v. Halstead 3 the question was made,

whether the laws of the United States authorizing the courts

of the Union so to alter the form of process of execution used

in the Supreme Courts of the States in September, 1789, as to

1 1 Wheat. 351. See Story on Const. § 405-408.

* Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 418.

8 10 Wheat. 63.

[75]
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[*69] subject to * execution lands and other property not thus

subject by the State laws in force at that time, were con-

stitutional; and Mr. Justice Thompson, in language similar to that

of Chief Justice Marshall in the preceding case, says: "If any

doubt existed whether the act of 1792 vests such power in the

courts, or with respect to its constitutionality, the practical con-

struction given to it ought to have great weight in determining

both questions." And Mr. Justice Johnson assigns a reason for

this in a subsequent case: "Every candid mind will admit that

this is a very different thing from contending that the frequent

repetition of wrong will create a right. It proceeds upon the pre-

sumption tbat the contemporaries of the Constitution have claims

to our deference on the question of right, because they had the

best opportunities of informing themselves of the understanding

of the framers of the Constitution, and of the sense put upon it by

the people when it was adopted by them."1

Great deference has been paid in all cases to the action of the

executive department, where its officers have been called upon,

under the responsibilities of their official oaths, to inaugurate a

new system, and where it is to be presumed, they have carefully
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and conscientiously weighed all considerations, and endeavored

to keep within the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. If

the question involved is really one of doubt, the force of their

judgment, especially in view of the injurious consequences that

may result from disregarding it, is fairly entitled to turn the scale

in the judicial mind.2

Wbere, however, no ambiguity or doubt appears in the law, wo

think the same rule obtains here as in other cases, that the court

should confine its attention to the law, and not allow extrinsic

1 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 290. See Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo. 499;

State v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15.

3 Union Insurance Co. v. Hoge, 21 How. 66; Edward's Lessee v. Darby, 12

Wheat. 210; Hughes v. Hughes, 4 T. B. Monr. 42; Chambers v. Fisk, 22 Texas,

604; Britton v. Ferry, 14 Mich. 66; Plummer v. Plummer, 37 Miss. 185; Bur-

gess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; State v. Mayhew, to. 487; Coutant v. People, 11 Wend.

511; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Smith,

8 S. & R. 63; Norris v. Clymer, 2 Penn. St. 277; Moers v. City of Reading.

21 Penn. St. 188; Washington v. Page, 4 Cal. 388; Surgett v. Lapice, 8 How.

68; Bissell v. Penrose, ib. 336; Troup v. Haight, Hopk. 267; United States v.

Gilmore, 8 Wall..330; Hedgecock v. Davis, 64 N. C. 652; Lafayette, &c. R.R.

Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind. 203.

[76]
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circumstances to introduce a difficulty where the language is plain.

To allow force to a practical construction in such a case would be

to suffer manifest perversions to defeat the evident pur-

pose of the * law-makers. "Contemporary construction [* 70]

. . . can never abrogate the text; it can never fritter

away its obvious sense; it can never narrow down its true limita-

tions; it can never enlarge its natural boundaries."1 While we

conceive this to be the true and only safe rule, we shall be obliged

to confess that some of the cases appear, on first reading, not to

have observed these limitations. In the case first cited of Stewart

v. Laird,2 the practical construction was regarded as conclusive.

To the objection that the judges of the Supreme Court had no

right to sit as circuit judges, the court say: "It is sufficient to

observe that practice and acquiescence under it for a period of

several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial

system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the

construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most

forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obsti-

nate to be shaken or controlled- Of course the question is at rest,

and ought not now to be disturbed." This is certainly very strong
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language; but that of a very similar character was used by the

Supreme Court of Massachusetts in one case where large and val-

uable estates depended upon a particular construction of a statute,

and very great mischief would follow from changing it. The court

said that, " although if it were now res integra, it might be very

difficult to maintain such a construction, yet at this day the argu-

ment ah inconvenienti applies with great weight. We cannot shake

a principle which in practice has so long and so extensively pre-

vailed. If the practice originated in error, yet the error is now so

common that it must have the force of law. The legal ground on

which this provision is now supported is, that long and continued

usage furnishes a contemporaneous construction which must pre-

vail over the mere technical import of the words." 3 Language

nearly as strong was also used by the Supreme Court of Maryland,

where the point involved was the possession of a certain power by

1 Story on Const. § 407. And see Evans v. Myers, 25 Penn. St. 116;

Sadler v. Langbam, 34 Ala. 311; Barnes v. First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass.

417.

'1 Cranch, 299.

J Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 478.
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\

the legislature, which it had constantly exercised for nearly seventy

years.1

It is believed, however, that in each of these cases an examia<-

tion of the Constitution left in the minds of the judges

[* 71] sufficient * doubt upon the question of its violation to

warrant their looking elsewhere for aids in interpretation,

and that the cases are not in conflict with the general rule as

above laid down. Acquiescence for no length of time can legalize

a clear usurpation of power, where the people have plainly ex-

pressed their will in the constitution, and appointed judicial tri-

bunals to enforce it. A power is frequently yielded to merely

because it is claimed, and it may be exercised for a long period,

in violation of the constitutional prohibition, without the mischief

which the Constitution was designed to guard against appearing,

or without any one being sufficiently interested in the subject to

raise the question; but these circumstances cannot be allowed to

sanction a clear infraction of the Constitution.-2 We think we

allow to contemporary and practical construction its full legitimate

force when we suffer it, where it is clear and uniform, to solve in
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its own favor the doubts which arise on reading the instrument to

be construed.3

1 State v. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 487. In Essex Co. v. Pacific Mills, 14 Allen, 389,

the Supreme Court of Massachusetts expressed the opinion that the constitu-

tionality of the acts of Congress making treasury notes a legal tender, ought not

to be treated by a State court as open to discussion after the notes had practi-

cally constituted the currency of the country for five years. At a still later day,

however, the Supreme Court of the United States held these acts void, though

they afterwards receded from this position.

* See further, on this subject, the case of Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311,

834; People v. Allen, 42 N. Y. 384.

8 There are cases which clearly go further than any we have quoted, and

which sustain legislative action which they hold to be usurpation, on the sole

ground of long acquiescence. Thus in Brighani v. Miller, 17 Ohio, 446, the

question was, Has the legislature power to grant divorces? The court say:

"Our legislature have assumed and exercised this power for a period of more

than forty years, although a clear and palpable assumption of power, ami an

encroachment upon the judicial department, in violation of the Constitution. To

deny this long-exercised power, and declare all the consequences resulting from

it void, is pregnant with fearful consequences. If it affected only the rights of

property, we should not hesitate; but second marriages have been contracted

and children born, and it would bastardize all these, although born under the

sanction of an apparent wedlock, authorized by an act of the legislature before

they were born, and in consequence of which the relation was formed which gave

[78]
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1

* Unjust Provisions. [* 72]

We have elsewhere expressed the opinion that a statute cannot

be declared void because opposed to a supposed general

intent or * spirit which it is thought pervades or lies con- [* 73]

cealed in the Constitution, but wholly unexpressed, or be-

thera birth. On account of these children, and for them only, we hesitate.

And in view of this, we are constrained to content ourselves with simply declar-

ing that the exercise of the power of granting divorces, on the part of the legis-

lature, is unwarranted and unconstitutional, an encroachment upon the duties of

the judiciary, and a striking down of the dearest rights of individuals, without

authority of law. We trust we have said enough to vindicate the Constitution,

and feel confident that no department of state has any disposition to violate it,

and that the evil will cease." So in Johnson v. Joliet and Chicago Railroad Co.,

23 111. 207, the question was whether railroad corporations could be created by

special law, without a special declaration by way of preamble that the object to

be accomplished could not be attained by general law. The court say: "It is

now too late to make this objection, since by the action of the General Assembly

under this clause, special acts have been so long the order of the day and the

ruling passion with every legislature which has convened under the Constitution,
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until their acts of this description fill a huge and misshapen volume, and impor-

tant and valuable rights are claimed under them. The clause has been wholly

disregarded, and it would now produce far-spread ruin'to declare such acts un-

constitutional and void. It is now safer and more just to all parties, to declare

that it must be understood, that in the opinion of the General Assembly, at the

time of passing the special act, its object could not be attained under the general

law, and this without any recital by way of preamble, as in the act to incorpo-

rate the Central Railroad Company. That preamble was placed there by the

writer of this opinion, and a strict compliance with this clause of the Constitu-

tion would have rendered it necessary in every subsequent act. But the legisla-

ture, in their wisdom, have thought differently, and have acted differently, until

now our special legislation and its mischiefs are beyond recovery or remedy."

These cases certainly presented very strong motives for declaring the law to be

what it was not; but it would have been interesting and useful if either of these

learned courts had enumerated the evils that must be placed in the opposite scale

when the question is whether a constitutional rule shall be disregarded; not the

least of which is, the encouragement of a disposition on the part of legislative

bodies to set aside constitutional restrictions, in the belief that, if the unconsti-

tutional law can once be put in force, and large interests enlisted under it, the

courts will not venture to declare it void, but will submit to the usurpation, no

matter how gross and daring. We agree with the Supreme Court of Indiana,

that in construing constitutions, courts have nothing to do with the argument ab

inrontenienti, and should not " bend the Constitution to suit the law of the hour."

Greencastle Township 8. Black, 5 Ind. 565; and with Branson, Ch. J., in what

says in Oakley v. Aspinwall, 8 N. Y. 568: "It is highly probable that incon-

veniences will result from following the Constitution as it is written. But that

[79]
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cause, in the opinion of the court, it violates fundamental rights

or principles, if it was passed in the exercise of a power which the

Constitution confers. Still less will the injustice of a constitu-

tional provision authorize the courts to disregard it, or indirectly

to annul it by construing it away. It is quite possible that the

people may, under the influence of temporary prejudice, or mis-

taken view of public policy, incorporate provisions in their charter

of government, infringing upon the right of the individual man, or

upon principles which ought to be regarded as sacred and funda-

mental in republican government; and quite possible also that

obnoxious classes may be unjustly disfranchised. The remedy for

such injustice must rest with the people themselves, through an

amendment of" their work when better counsels prevail. Such pro-

visions, when free from doubt, must receive the same construction

as any other. We do not say, however, that if a clause should be

found in a constitution which should appear at first blush to de-

consideration can have no force with me. It is not for us, but for those who

made the instrument, to supply its defects. If the legislature or the courts may

take that office upon themselves, or if, under color of construction, or upon any

other specious ground, they may depart from that which is plainly declared, the
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people may well despair of ever being able to set any boundary to the powers of

the government. Written constitutions will be more than useless. Believing as

I do that the success of free institutions depends upon a rigid adherence to the

fundamental law, I have never yielded to considerations of expediency in ex-

pounding it. There is always some plausible reason for latitudinarian construc-

tions which are resorted to for the purpose of acquiring power; some evil to be

avoided or some good to be attained by pushing the powers of the government

beyond their legitimate boundary. It is by yielding to such influences that con-

stitutions are gradually undermined and finally overthrown. My rule has ever

been to follow the fundamental law as it is written, regardless of consequences.

If the law does not work well, the people can amend it; and inconveniences can

be borne long enough to await that process. But if the legislature or the courts

undertake to cure defects by forced and unnatural constructions, they inflict a

wound upon the Constitution which nothing can heal. One step taken by the

legislature or the judiciary, in enlarging the powers of the government, opens

the door for another which will be sure to follow; and so the process goes on

until all respect for the fundamental law is lost, and the powers of the govern-

ment are just what those in authority please to call them." Whether there may

not be circumstances under which the State can be held justly estopped from

alleging the invalidity of its own action in apportioning the political divisions of the

State, and imposing burdens on citizens, where such action has been acquiesced

in for a considerable period, and rights have been acquired through bearing the

burdens under it, see Ramsey v. People, 19 N. Y. 41; People t>. Maynard, 15

Mich. 470; Kneeland t>. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454.

[80]
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mand a construction leading to monstrous and absurd conse-

quences, it might not be the duty of the court to question and

cross-question such clause closely, with a view to discover in it, if

possible, some other meaning more consistent with the general

purposes and aims of these instruments. When such a case arises,

it will be time to consider it.1

Duty in Case of Doubt.

But when all the legitimate lights for ascertaining the mean-

ing of the Constitution have been made use of, it may still happen

that the construction remains a matter of doubt. In such a case

it seems clear that every one called upon to act where, in

his * opinion, the proposed action would be of doubtful [* 74]

constitutionality, is bound upon the doubt alone to abstain

from acting. Whoever derives power from the Constitution to

perform any public function is disloyal to that instrument, and

grossly derelict in duty, if he does that which he is not reasonably

satisfied the Constitution permits. Whether the power be legisla-

tive, executive, or judicial, there is manifest disregard of constitu-

tional and moral obligation by one who, having taken an oath to
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observe that instrument, takes part in an action which he cannot

say he believes to be no violation of its provisions. A doubt of the

constitutionality of any proposed legislative enactment should in

any caso be reason sufficient for refusing to adopt it; and, if legis-

lators do not act upon this principle, the reasons upon which are

based the judicial decisions sustaining legislation in very many

cases will cease to be of force.

Directory and Mandatory Provisions.

The important question sometimes presents itself, whether we

are authorized in any case, when the meaning of a clause of the

Constitution is arrived at, to give it such practical construction as

will leave it optional with the department or officer to which it

is addressed to obey it or not as he shall see fit. In respect to

statutes it has long been settled that particular provisions may be

regarded as directory merely; by which is meant that they are to

be considered as giving directions which ought to be followed, but

1 McMullen v. Hodge, 5 Texas, 34. See Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111.

6 [81]
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not as so limiting the power in respect to which the directions

are given that it cannot be effectually exercised without observing

them. The force of many of the decisions on this subject will be

readily assented to by all; while others are sometimes thought to

go to the extent of nullifying the intent of the legislature in essen-

tial particulars. It is not Our purpose to examine the several cases

critically, or to attempt — what we deem impossible — to reconcile

them all; but we shall content ourselves with quoting from a few,

with a view, if practicable, to ascertaining some line of principle

upon which they can be classified.

There are cases where, whether a statute was to be regarded as

merely directory or not, was made to depend upon the employing

or failing to employ negative words which imported that the act

should be done in a particular manner or time, and not

[* 75] * otherwise.1 The use of such words is often very con-

clusive of an intent to impose a limitation; but their

absence is by no means equally conclusive that the statute was

not designed to be mandatory.2 Lord Mansfield would have the

question whether mandatory or not depend upon whether that

which was directed to be done was or was not of the essence of the
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thing required.3 The Supreme Court of New York, in an opinion

afterwards approved by the Court of Appeals, laid down the rule

as one settled by authority, that "statutes directing the mode of

proceeding by public officers are directory, and are not regarded as

essential to the validity of the proceedings themselves, unless it be

so declared iu the statute." * This rule strikes us as very general,

and as likely to include within its scope, in many cases, things

which are of the very essence of the proceeding. The questions

in that case were questions of irregularity under election laws, not

in any way hindering the complete expression of the will of the

electors; and the court was doubtless right in holding that the

election was not to be avoided for a failure in the officers appointed

for its conduct to comply in all respects with the directions of

the statute tfiere in question. The same court in another case

say: "Statutory requisitions are deemed directory only when they

1 Slayton v. Hillings, 7 Ind. 144; King v. Inhabitants of St. Gregory, 2 Ad.

& El. 99; King v. Inhabitants of Hipswell, 8 B. & C. 466.

* District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 284.

3 Rex v. Locksdale, 1 Bun-. 447.

4 People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 290; s. c. 8 N. Y. 6 .
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relate to some immaterial matter, where a compliance is a matter

of convenience rather than of substance." 1 The Supreme Court

of Michigan, in a case involving the validity of proceedings on the

sale of lands for taxes, laid down the rule that "what the law

requires to be done for the protection of the tax-payer is mandatory,

and cannot be regarded as directory merely."2 A similar rule was

recognized in a recent case in Illinois. Commissioners had been

appointed to ascertain and assess the damage and recompense due

to the owners of land which might be taken, on the real estate of

the persons benefited by a certain local improvement, in proportion

as nearly as might be to the benefits resulting to each. By the

statute, when the assessment was completed, the com-

missioners were to sign and return the same to the * city [* 76]

council within forty days of their appointment. This

provision was not complied with, but return was made afterwards,

and the question was raised as to its validity when thus made. In

the opinion of the court, this question was to be decided by

ascertaining whether any advantage would be lost, or right

destroyed, or benefit sacrificed, either to the public or to any

individual, by holding the provision directory. . After remarking
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that they had held an assessment under the general revenue law,

returned after the time appointed by law, as void, because the

person assessed would lose the benefit of an appeal from the

assessment,8 they say of the statute before the court: "There are

no negative words used declaring that the functions of the com-

missioners shall cease after the expiration of the forty days, or

that they shall not make their return after that time; nor have

we been able to discover the least right, benefit, or advantage which

the property owner could derive from having the return made

within that time, and not after. No time is limited and made

dependent on that time, within which the owner of the property

may apply to have the assessment reviewed or corrected. The

1 People v. Schermerhorn, 19 Barb. 558. If a statute imposes a duty and

gives the means of performing that duty, it must be held to be mandatory.

Veazie r. China, 50 Me. 518.

'Clark v. Crane, 5 Mich. 154. See also Shawnee County v. Carter, 2 Kan-

sas, 115. In Life Association v. Board of Assessors, 49 Mo. 512, it is held that

a constitutional provision that "all property subject to taxation ought to be

taxed in proportion to its value" is a prohibition against its being taxed in any

other mode, and the word ought is mandatory.

* Marsh r. Chestnut, 14 111. 223.
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next section requires the clerk to give ten days' notice that the

assessment has been returned, specifying the day when objections

may be made to the assessment before the common council by

parties interested, which hearing may be adjourned from day to

day; and the common council is empowered in its discretion

to confirm or annul the assessment altogether, or to refer it back to

the same commissioners, or to others to be by them appointed. As

the property owner has the same time and opportunity to prepare

himself to object to the assessment and have it corrected, whether

the return be made before or after the expiration of the forty days,

the case differs from that of Chestnut v. Marsh,1 at the very point

on which that case turned. Nor is there any other portion of the

chapter which we have discovered, bringing it within the principle

of that case, which is the well-recognized rule in all the books." 2

The rule is nowhere more clearly stated than by Chief J ustice

Shaw, in Torrey v. Milbury,3 which was also a tax case.

[* 77] "In * considering the various statutes regulating the as-

sessment of taxes, and the measures preliminary thereto,

it is not always easy to distinguish which are conditions precedent
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to the legality and validity of the tax, and which are directory

merely, and do not constitute conditions. One rule is very plain

and well settled, that all those measures that are intended for the

security of the citizen, for insuring equality of taxation, and to

enable every one to know with reasonable certainty for what polls

and for what real estate he is taxed, and for what all those who are

[ 1 14 111. 223.

"* Wheeler v. Chicago, 24 111. 108.

3 21 PicV. 67. We commend in the same connection the views of Lewis, Ch.

J., in Corbett v. Bradley, 7 Nev. 108: "When any requirement of a statute is

held to be directory, and therefore not material to be followed, it is upon the

assumption that the legislature itself so considered it, and did not make the right

conferred dependent upon a compliance with the form prescribed for securing it. It

is upon this principle that the courts often hold the time designated in a statute,

where a thing is to be done, to be directory. No court certainly has the right to

hold any requirement of a law unnecessary to be complied with, unless it be mani-

fest the legislature did not intend to impose the consequence which would naturally

follow from a non-compliance, or which would result from holding the requirement

mandatory or indispensable. If it be clear that no penalty was intended to be

imposed for a non-compliance, then, as a matter of course, it is but carrying out

the will of the legislature to declare the statute in that respect to be simply

directory. But, if there be any thing to indicate the contrary, a full compliance

with it must be enforced."

[84]

CH. IV.] CONSTRUCTION OP STATE CONSTITUTIONS. * 77

liable with him are taxed, are conditions precedent; and if they

are not observed, he is not legally taxed; and he may resist it in

any of the modes authorized by law for contesting the validity of

the tax. But many regulations are made by statutes designed for

the information of assessors and officers, and intended to promote

method, system, and uniformity in the modes of proceeding, a com-

pliance or non-compliance with which does in no respect affect the

rights of tax-paying citizens. These may be considered directory.

Officers may be liable to legal animadversion, perhaps to punish-

ment, for not observing them; but yet their observance is not a

condition precedent to the validity of the tax."

We shall quote further only from a single other case upon this

point. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in considering the va-

lidity of a statute not published within the time required by law,

"understand the doctrine concerning directory statutes to be this:

that where there is no substantial reason why the thing to be done

might not as well be done after the time prescribed as before, no

presumption that by allowing it to be so done it may work an

injury or wrong, nothing in the act itself, or in other acts relating

to the same subject-matter, indicating that the legislature did not
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intend that it should rather be done after the time prescribed than

not to be done at all, there the courts assume that the intent was,

that if not done within the time prescribed it might be done after-

wards. But when any of these reasons intervene, then the limit

is established." 1

These cases perhaps sufficiently indicate the rules, so far as any

of general application can be declared, which are to be made use of

in determining whether the provisions of a statute are mandatory

or directory. Those directions which are not of the essence of the

thing to be done, but which are given with a view merely

*to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of the busi- [* 78]

ness, and by a failure to obey which the rights of those

interested will not be prejudiced, are not commonly to be regarded

as mandatory; and if the act is performed, but not in the time or

in the precise mode indicated, it may still be sufficient, if that

'State v. Lean, 9 Wis. 292. See further, for the views of this court on the

subject here discussed, Wendel v. Durbin, 26 Wis. 390. The general doctrine

of the cases above quoted is approved and followed in French v. Edwards, 13

WalL506.

[85]
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T

which is done accomplishes the substantial purpose of the statute.1

But this rule presupposes that no negative words are employed in

the statute which expressly or by necessary implication forbid the

doing of the act at any other time or in any other manner than as

directed. Even-as thus laid down and restricted, the doctrine is

one to be applied with much circumspection; for it is not to be

denied that the courts have sometimes, in their anxiety to sustain

the proceedings of careless or incompetent officers, gone very far

in substituting a judicial view of wbat was essential for that

declared by the legislature.2

But the courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they

venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and manda-

tory statutes to the provisions of a constitution. Constitutions do

not usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding, ex-

cept when such rules are looked upon as essential to the thing to

be done; and they must then be regarded in the light of limita-

tions upon the power to be exercised. It is the province of an

instrument of this solemn and permanent character to establish

those fundamental maxims, and fix those unvarying rules,
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[* 79] by which all * departments of the government must at all

times shape their conduct; and if it descends to prescribing

1 The following, in addition to those cited, are some of the cases in this coun-

try in which statutes have been declared directory only: Pond v. Negus, 3 Mays.

230; Williams v. School District, 21 Pick. 75; City of Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met.

180; Holland u. Osgood, 8 Vt. 280; Corliss v. Corliss, to. 390; People v. Allen,

6 Wend. 486; Marchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill, 646; Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill,

43; People v. Holley, 12 Wend. 481 ; Jackson v. Young, 5 Cow. 269; Striker

v. Kelley, 7 Hill, 9; People v. Peck, 11 Wend. 604; Matter of Mohawk and

Hudson Railroad Co., 19 Wend. 143; People v. Runkel, 9 Johns. 147; Gale c.

Mead, 2 Denio, 160; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio,252; Elmendorf v. Mayor, &c,

of New York, 25 Wend. 696; Thames Manufacturing Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn.

550; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; People v. Doe, 1 Mich. 451; Parks v. Good-

win, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 56, Hickey v. Hinsdale, 8 Mich. 267; People v. Hartwell,

12 Mich. 508; State v. McGinley, 4 Ind. 7; Slayton i». Hulings, 7 Ind. 144;

New Orleans v. St. Rowes, 9 La. An. 573; Edwards v. James, 13 Texas, 52;

State v. Click, 2 Ala. 26; Savage v. Walshe, 26 Ala. 620; Webster v. French,

12 111. 302; McKim v. Weller, 11 Cal. 47; State v. Co. Commissioners of Bal-

timore, 29 Md. 516; Fry v. Booth, 19 Ohio, n. s. 25. The list might easily be

largely increased.

* See upon this subject the remarks of Mr. Sedgwick in his work on Statutory

and Constitutional Law, p. 375, and those of Hubbard, J., in Briggs v. Georgia,

15 Vt. 72. Also see Dryfuss v. Budges, 45 Miss. 247.
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mere rules of order in unessential matters, it is lowering the proper

dignity of such an instrument, and usurping the proper province of

ordinary legislation. We are not therefore to expect to find in a

constitution provisions which the people, in adopting it, have not

regarded as of high importance, and worthy to-be embraced in

an instrument which, for a time at least, is to control alike the

government and the governed, and to form a standard by which is

to be measured the power which can be exercised as well by the

delegate as by the sovereign people themselves. If directions are

given respecting the times or modes of proceeding in which a

power should be exercised, there is at least a strong presumption

that the people designed it should be exercised in that time and

mode only ; and we impute to the people a want of due appreciation

of the purpose and proper province of such an instrument, when

we infer that such directions are given to any other end. Especially

when, as has been already said, it is but fair to presume that the

people in their constitution have expressed themselves in careful

and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance

of the powers delegated, and with a view to leave as little as

possible to implication.1
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There arc some cases, however, where the doctrine of directory

statutes lias been applied to constitutional provisions; but they are

at variance with the weight of authority upon the precise points

considered, and we do not think, therefore, we should be warranted

in saying that the judicial decisions as they now stand sanction

the application. In delivering the opinion of the New York Court

of Appeals in one case, Mp. Justice Willard had occasion to con-

sider the constitutional provision, that on the final passage of a

bill the question shall be taken by ayes and noes, which shall be

duly entered upon the journals; and he expressed the opinion that

it was only directory to the legislature.2 The remark was obiter

dictum, as the court had already decided that the provision had

been fully complied with; and those familiar with the reasons

which have induced the insertion of this clause in our

* constitutions will not readily concede that its sole design [* 80]

was to establish a mere rule of order for legislative pro-

1 Wolcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 49; per Bronson, J., in People v. Purdy, 2 Hill,

36; Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 566; Opinions of Judges, 6 Shep.

458. See People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177; State v. Johnson, 26 Ark. 281.

* People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y. 328.
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ceedings, which might be followed or not at discretion. Mr. Chief

Justice Thurman, of Ohio, in a case not calling for a discussion ji

the subject, has considered a statute whose validity was assailed

on the ground that it was not passed in the mode prescribed by the

constitution. "By the term mode" he says, "I do not mean to

include the authority in which the law-making power resides, or the

number of votes a bill must receive to become a law. That the

power to make laws is vested in the Assembly alone, and that no

act has any force that was not passed by the number of votes

required by the constitution, are nearly, or quite, self-evident

propositions. These essentials relate to the authority by which,

rather than the mode in which, laws are to be made. Now

to secure the careful exercise of this power, and for other good

reasons, the constitution prescribes or recognizes certain things to

be done in the enactment of laws, which things form a course

or mode of legislative procedure. Thus we find, inter alia, the

provision that every bill shall be fully and distinctly read on three

different days, unless, in case of urgency, three-fourths of the house

in which it shall be pending shall dispense with this rule. This is

an important provision without doubt, but, nevertheless, there is
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much reason for saying that it is merely directory in its character,

and that its observance by the Assembly is secured by their sense

of duty and official oaths, and not by any supervisory power of the

courts. Any other construction, we incline to think, would lead

to very absurd and alarming consequences. If it is in the power

of every court (and if one has the power, every one has it) to

inquire whether a bill that passed the Assembly was 'fully' and

'distinctly' read three times in each house, and to hold it in-

valid if, upon any reading, a word was accidentally omitted, or

the reading was indistinct, it would obviously be impossible to

know what is the statute law of the State. Now the requisition that

bills shall be fully and distinctly read is just as imperative as that

requiring them to be read three times; and as both relate to the

mode of procedure merely, it would be difficult to find any suf-

ficient reason why a violation of one of them would be less fatal

to an act than a violation of the other." 1

A requirement that a law shall be read distinctly, whether

[* 81] * mandatory or directory, is, from the very nature of the

case, addressed to the judgment of the legislative body,

1 Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, n. s. 483.
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whose decision as to what reading is sufficiently distinct to be a

compliance cannot be subject to review. But in the absence of

authority to the contrary, we should not have supposed that the

requirement of three successive readings on different days stood

upon the same footing.1 To this extent a definite and certain rule

is capable of being, and has been, laid down, which can be literally

obeyed; and the legislative body cannot suppose or adjudge it to

have been done if the fact is otherwise. The requirement has an

important purpose, in making legislators proceed in their action

with caution and deliberation; and there cannot often be difficulty

in ascertaining from the legislative records themselves if the con-

stitution has been violated in this particular. There is, therefore,

no inherent difficulty in the question being reached and passed

upon by the courts in the ordinary mode, if it is decided that the

constitution intends legislation shall be reached through the three

readings, and not otherwise.

The opinion above quoted was recognized as law by the Supreme

Court of Ohio in a case soon after decided. In that case the court

proceed to say: "The . . . provision . . . that no bill shall con-

tain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its
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title, is also made a permanent rule in the introduction and passage

of bills through the houses. The subject of the bill is required to

be clearly expressed in the title for the purpose of advising mem-

bers of its subject, when voting in cases in which the reading has

been dispensed with by a two-thirds vote. The provision that a

bill shall contain but one subject was to prevent combinations

by which various and distinct matters of legislation should gain a

support which they could not if presented separately. As a rule

of proceeding in the General Assembly, it is manifestly an impor-

tant one. But if it was intended to effect any practical object for

the benefit of the people in the examination, construction, or oper-

ation of acts passed and published, we are unable to perceive it.

The title of an act may indicate to the reader its subject, and

uuder the rule each act would contain one subject. To suppose

that for such a purpose the Constitutional Convention adopted the

rule under consideration, would impute to them a most minute

provision for a very imperfect heading of the chapters of

laws and their subdivision. This * provision. being in- [* 82]

1 See People v. Campbell, 3 Gilm. 466; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 432.
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tended to operate upon bills in their progress through the Gen-

eral Assembly, it must be held to be directory only. It relates to

bills, and not to acts. It would be most mischievous in practice

to make the validity of every law depend upon the judgment of

every judicial tribunal of the State, as to whether an act or a bill

contained more than one subject, or whether this one subject was

clearly expressed in the title of the act or bill. Such a question

would be decided according to the mental precision and mental dis-

cipline of each justice of the peace and judge. No practical benefit

could arise from such inquiries. We are therefore of opinion that

in general the only safeguard against the violation of these rules

of the houses is their regard for, and their oath to support, the

constitution of the State. We say, in general, the only safeguard;

for whether a manifestly gross and fraudulent violation of these

rules might authorize the court to pronounce a law unconstitu-

tional, it is unnecessary to determine. It is to be presumed no

such case will ever occur." 1

If the prevailing doctrine of the courts were in accord with this

decision, it might become important to consider whether the object
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of the clause in question, as here disclosed, was not of such a

character as to make the provision mandatory even in a statute.

But we shall not enter upon that subject here, as elsewhere we

shall have occasion to refer to decisions made by the highest

judicial tribunals in nearly all of the States, recognizing similar

provisions as mandatory, and to be enforced by the courts. And

we concur fully in what was said by Mr. Justice Emmot, in

speaking of this very provision^ that "it will be found upon full

consideration to be difficult to treat any constitutional provision as

merely directory and not imperative." 2 And with what is said by

Mr. Justice Lumpkin, as to the duty of the courts: "It has been

suggested that the prohibition in the seventeenth section of the first

article of the constitution, 'Nor shall any law pr ordinance pass

containing any matter different from what is expressed in the title

1 Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, n. s. 179. See also the case of Washington v.

Murray, 4 Cal. 388, for similar views. In Hill v. Boyland, 40 Miss. 618, a pro-

vision requiring of all officers an oath to support the constitution, was held not

to invalidate the acts of officials who had neglected to take such an oath. And

in McPherson v. Leonard, 29 Md. 377, the provision that the style of all laws

shall be, "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland," was held

directory.

« People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 186.
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thereof,' is directory only to the legislative and executive or law-

making departments of the government. But we do not so

understand it. On the contrary, we consider it as much a

* matter of judicial cognizance as any other provision in [* 83]

that instrument. If the courts would refuse to execute a

law suspending the writ of habeas corpus when the public safety

did not require it, a law violatory of the freedom of the press, or

trial by jury, neither would they enforce a statute which contained

matter different from what was expressed in the title thereof." 1

We have thus indicated some of the rules which we think are

to be observed in the construction of constitutions. It will be

perceived that we have not thought it important to quote and to

dwell upon those arbitrary rules to which so much attention is

sometimes given, and which savor rather of the closet than of

practical life. Our observation would lead us to the conclusion

that they are more often resorted to as aids in ingenious attempts

to make the constitution seem to say what it does not, than with

a view to make that instrument express its real intent. All exter-

nal aids, and especially all arbitrary rules, applied to instruments

of this popular character, are of very uncertain value; and we do
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not regard it as out of place to repeat here what we have had

occasion already to say in the course of this chapter, that they

are to be made use of with hesitation, and only with much

circumspection.2

1 Protho v. Orr, 12 Geo. 36. See also Opinions of Judges, 6 Shep. 458;

Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 683; People v. Starne, 35 111. 121;

State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224.

* See People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 360, per Johnson, J.; Temple v. Mead, 4

Vt. 540, per Williams, J.; People v. Fancher, 50 N. Y. 291. "In construing so

important an instrument as a constitution, especially those parts which affect the

vital principle of republican government, the elective franchise, or the manner of

exercising it, we are not, on the one hand, to indulge ingenious speculations wliich

may lead us wide from the true sense and spirit of the instrument, nor, on the

other, to apply to it such narrow and constrained views as may exclude the real

object and intent of those who framed it. We are to suppose that the authors of

such an instrument had a thorough knowledge of the force and extent of the

words they employ; that they had a beneficial end and purpose in view; and

that, more especially in any apparent restriction upon the mode of exercising the

right of suffrage, there was some existing or anticipated evil which it was their

purpose to avoid. If an enlarged sense of any particular form of expression

should be necessary to accomplish so great an object as a convenient exercise of

the fundamental privilege or right, — that of election, — such sense must be at-

[91]
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tributed. We are to suppose that those who were delegated to the great business

of distributing the powers which emanated from the sovereignty of the people,

and to the establishment of the rules for the perpetual security of the rights of

person and property, had the wisdom to adapt their language to future as well as

existing emergencies, so that words competent to the then existing state of the

community, and at the same time capable of being expanded to embrace more

extensive relations, should not be restrained to their more obvious and immediate

sense, if, consistently with the general object of the authors and the true prin-

ciples of the compact, they can be extended to other relations and circumstances

which an improved state of society may produce. Qui hceret in litera hceret in

cortice is a familiar maxim of the law. The letter killeth, but the spirit maketh

alive, is the more forcible expression of Scripture." Parker, Ch. J., in Henshaw

v. Foster, 9 Pick. 316.
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♦CHAPTER V. [*85]

OF THE POWERS WHICH THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAT EXERCISE.

In considering the powers which may be exercised by the legis-

lative department of one of the American States, it is natural that

we should recur to those possessed by the Parliament of Great

Britain, after which, in a measure, the American legislatures have

been modelled, and from which we derive our legislative usages

and customs, or parliamentary common law, as well as the prece-

dents by which the exercise of legislative power in this country

has been governed. It is natural, also, that we should incline to

measure the power of the legislative department in America by

the power of the like department in Britain; and to concede

without reflection that whatever the legislature of the country

from which we derive our laws can do, may also be done by the

department created for the exercise of legislative authority in

this country. But to guard against being misled by a comparison

between the two, we must bear in inind the important distinction

already pointed out, that with the Parliament rests practically

the sovereignty of the country, so that it may exercise all the

powers of the government if it wills so to do; while on the other
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hand the legislatures of the American States are not the sovereign

authority, and, though vested with the exercise of one branch of

the sovereignty, they are nevertheless, in wielding it, hedged in

on all sides by important limitations, some of which are imposed

in express terms, and others by implications which are equally im-

perative.

"The power and jurisdiction of Parliament, says Sir Edward

Coke,1 is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be con-

fined, either for persons or causes, within any bounds. And of

this high court it may truly be said: 'Si antiquitatem spectes,

est vetustissima; si dignitatem est honoratissima; si jurisdic-

tionem, est capacissima.' It hath sovereign and uncontrolled

1 4 Inst. 36.
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authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abro-

gating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning

matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or'

[* 86 ] temporal, * civil, military, maritime, or criminal; this

being the place where that absolute despotic power, which

must in all governments reside somewhere, is intrusted by the

constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances,

operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of

the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It

can regulate or new-model the succession to the Crown, as was

done in the reign of Henry VIII. and William III. It can alter

the established religion of the land; as was done in a variety of

instances, in the reign of King Henry VIII. and his three children.

It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the king-

dom and of Parliaments themselves, as was done by the Act of

Union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elec-

tions. It can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impos-

sible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call its power, by a

figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of Parliament. True it is,
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that what the Parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo;

so that it is a matter most essential to the liberties of this king-

dom that such members be delegated to this important trust as

are most eminent for their probity, their fortitude, and their

knowledge; for it was a known apothegm of the great Lord

Treasurer Burleigh, ' that England could never be ruined but by

a Parliament;' and as Sir Matthew Hale observes: 'This being

the highest and greatest court, over which none other can have

jurisdiction in the kingdom, if by any means a misgovernment

should fall upon it, the subjects of this kingdom are left without

all manner of remedy.' " 1

The strong language in which the complete jurisdiction of

Parliament is here described is certainly inapplicable to any

authority in the American States, unless it be to the people of

the States when met in their primary capacity for the formation

of their fundamental law; and even then there rest upon them

the restraints of the Constitution of the United States, which bind

them as absolutely as they do the governments which they create.

It becomes important, therefore, to ascertain in what respect the

'1 Bl. Com. 160.
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| State legislatures resemble the Parliament in the powers they

I exercise, and how far we may extend the comparison without

losing sight of the fundamental ideas and principles of the Amer-

ican system.

* The first and most notable difference is that to which [* 87 ]

we have already alluded, and which springs from the dif-

ferent theory on which the British Constitution rests. While

Parliament is recognized as rightfully exercising the sovereign

authority of the country, it is evident that the resemblance between

it and American legislatures in regard to their ultimate powers

cannot be carried very far. The American legislatures only exer-

cise a certain portion of the sovereign power. The sovereignty is

in the people; and the legislatures which they have created are

only to discharge a trust of which they have been made a depos-

itory, but which has been placed in their hands with well-defined

restrictions.

Upon this difference it is to be observed, that while Parliament,

to any extent it may choose, may exercise judicial authority, one

of the most noticeable features in American constitutional law is

the care which has been taken to separate legislative, executive,
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and judicial functions. It has evidently been the intention of the

people in every State that the exercise of each should rest with a

separate department. The different classes of power have been

apportioned to different departments; and as all derive their

authority from the same instrument, there is an implied exclusion

of each department from exercising the functions conferred upon

the others.

There are two fundamental rules by which we may measure the

extent of the legislative authority in the States : —

1. In creating a legislative department and •conferring upon it

the legislative power, the people must be understood to have con-

ferred the full and complete power as it rests in, and may be exer-

cised by, the sovereign power of any country, subject only to such

restrictions as they may have seen fit to impose, and to the limita-

tions which are contained in the Constitution of the United States.

The legislative department is not made a special agency, for the

exercise of specifically defined legislative powers, but is intrusted

with the general authority to make laws at discretion.

2. But the apportionment to this department of legislative

power does not sanction the exercise'of executive or judicial func-

[95]
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tions, except in those cases, warranted by parliamentary usage,

where they are incidental, necessary, or proper to the exercise of

legislative authority, or where the constitution itself, in specified

cases, may expressly permit it. Executive power is so intimately

connected with legislative, that it is not easy to draw a line of

separation; but the grant of the judicial power to the

[* 88 ] department * created for the purpose of exercising it must

be regarded as an exclusive grant, covering the whole

power, subject only to the limitations which the constitutions

impose, and to the incidental exceptions before referred to.

While, therefore, the American legislatures may exercise the

legislative powers which the Parliament of Great Britain wields,

except as restrictions are imposed, they are at the same time ex-

cluded from other functions which may be, and sometimes habit-

ually are, exercised by the Parliament.

"The people in framing the constitution," says Denio, Ch. J.,

"committed to the legislature the whole law-making power of

the State, which they did not expressly or impliedly withhold.
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Plenary power in the legislature, for all purposes of civil govern-

ment, is the rule. A prohibition to exercise a particular power is

an exception. In inquiring, therefore, whether a given statute is

constitutional, it is for those who question its validity to show that

it is forbidden. I do not mean that the power must be expressly

inhibited, for there are but few positive restraints upon the legis-

lative power contained in the instrument. The first article lays

down the ancient limitations which have always been considered

essential in a constitutional government, whether monarchical or

popular; and there are scattered through the instrument a few

other provisions in restraint of legislative authority. But the

affirmative prescriptions and the general arrangements of the

constitution are far more fruitful of restraints upon the legisla-

ture. Every positive direction contains an implication against

every thing contrary to it, or which would frustrate or disappoint

the purpose of that provision. The frame of the government, the

grant of legislative power itself, the organization of the executive

authority, the erection of the principal courts of justice, create

implied limitations upon the law-making authority as strong as

though a negative was expressed in each instance; but indepen-

dently of these restraints, express or implied, every subject within

[96]
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?, I the scope of civil government is liable to be dealt with by the legis-

J latere." 1

"It has never been questioned, so far as I know," says Redfield,

Ch. J., "that the American legislatures have the same unlimited

power in regard to legislation which resides in the British Parlia-

ment, except where they are restrained by written consti-

tutions. * That must be conceded, I think, to be a fun- [* 89]

damental principle in the political organization of the

American States. We cannot well comprehend how, upon prin-

ciple, it should be otherwise. The people must, of course, possess

all legislative power originally. They have committed this in the

most general and unlimited manner to the several State legis-

latures, saving only such restrictions as are imposed by the Con-

stitution of the United States, or of the particular State in

question." 2

"I entertain no doubt," says Comstock, J., " that aside from

the special limitations of the constitution, the legislature cannot

exercise powers which are in their nature essentially judicial or

executive. These are, by the constitution, distributed to other

departments of the government. It is only the ' legislative power'
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which is vested in the senate and assembly. But where the con-

stitution is silent, and there is no clear usurpation of the powers

distributed to other departments, I think there would be great

difficulty and great danger in attempting to define the limits of

this powep. Chief Justice Marshall said: 'How far the power of

giving the law may involve every other power, in cases where the

constitution is silent, never has been, and perhaps never can be,

definitely stated.'3 That very eminent judge felt the difficulty;

but the danger was less apparent then than it is now, when theo-

ries, alleged to be founded in natural reason or inalienable rights,

but subversive of the just and necessary powers of government,

attract the belief of considerable classes of men, and when too

much reverence for government and law is certainly among the

1 People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 543.

* Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 142. See also Leg-

gett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445; Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365; People

e. Morrell, 21 Wend. 563; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; Mason v. Wait, 4

Seam. 134; People v. Supervisors of Orange, 27 Barb. 593; Taylor v. Porter,

4 Hill, 144, per Bronson, J.

5 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 136.
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least of the perils to which our institutions are exposed. I am

reluctant to enter upon this field of inquiry, satisfied, as I sji,

that no rule can be laid down in terms which may not contain the

germ of great mischief to society, by giving to private opinion and

■ speculation a license to oppose themselves to the just and legiti-

mate powers of government." 1

Numerous other opinions might be cited to the same

[* 90] effect with * those from which we have here quoted; but

as we shall have occasion to refer to them elsewhere, in

considering the circumstances under which a statute may be

declared unconstitutional, we shall refrain from further references

in this place. Nor shall we enter upon a discussion of the ques-

tion suggested by Chief Justice Marshall as above quoted ;2 since,

however interesting it may be as an abstract question, it is made

practically unimportant by the careful separation of duties between

the several departments of the government which has beeii made

by each of the State constitutions. Had no such separation been

made, the disposal of executive and judicial duties must have
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devolved upon the department vested with the general authority

to make laws ;8 but assuming them to be apportioned already, we

are only at liberty to liken the power of the State legislature to

that of the Parliament, when it confines its action to an exercise

of legislative functions; and such authority as is in its uature

1 Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 891.

* The power to distribute the judicial power, except so far as that has been

done by the constitution, rests with the legislature, Commonwealth v. Hippie, 69

Penn. St. 9; but when the constitution has conferred it upon certain specified

courts, this must be understood to embrace the whole judicial power, and the

legislature cannot vest any portion of it elsewhere. State v. Maynard, 14 111.

420; Gibson v. Emerson, 2 Eng. 173; Chandler v. Nash, 5 Mich. 409; Succes-

sion of Tanner, 22 La. Ann. 91; Gough v. Dorsey, 27 Wis. 130. But a general

provision in the constitution for the distribution of the judicial.power, not refer-

ring to courts-martial, would not be held to forbid such courts by implication.

People v. Daniel, 50 N. Y. 274. Nor would it be held to embrace administra-

tive functions of a quasi judicial nature, such as the assessment of property for

taxation. State v. Commissioners of Ormsby County, 7 Nev. 392, and cases cited.

See Auditor of State e. Atchison,. &c, R.R. Co., 6 Kan. 500; 8. c. 7 Am.

Rep. 575.

3 Calder ». Bull, 2 Root, 350, and 3 Dall. 38G; Ross v. Whitman, 6 Cal. 3G1;

Smith t>. Judge, 17 Cal. 547; per Patterson, J., in Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 19;

Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304.
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either executive or judicial is beyond its constitutional powers,

with the few exceptions to which we have already referred.

It will be important therefore to consider those cases where

legislation has been questioned as encroaching upon judicial

authority; and to this end it may be useful, at the outset, to

endeavor to define legislative and judicial power respectively, that

we may the better be enabled to point out the proper line of

distinction when questions arise in their practical application to

actual cases.

The legislative power is the authority, under the constitution, to

make laws, and to alter and repeal them. Laws, in the sense in

which the word is here employed, are rules of civil conduct, or

statutes, which the legislative will has prescribed. "The laws of

a State," observes Mr. Justice Story, "are more usually under-

stood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the legis-

lative authority thereof, or long-established local customs

having * the force of laws." 1 "The difference between [* 91]

the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature

makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes, the

law."2 And it is said that that which distinguishes a judicial
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from a legislative act is, that the one is a determination of what

the existing law is in relation to some existing thing already done

or happened, while the other is a predetermination of what the law

shall be for the regulation of all future cases falling under its pro-

visions.3 And in another case it is said: "The legislative power

extends only to the making of laws, and in its exercise it is limited

and restrained by the paramount authority of the federal and

State constitutions. It cannot directly reach the property or

vested rights of the citizen by providing for their forfeiture or

trausfer to another, without trial and judgment in the courts: for

to do so would be the exercise of a power which belongs to another

branch of the government, and is forbidden to the legislative."4

"That is not legislation which adjudicates in a particular case,

prescribes the rule contrary to the general law, and orders it to be

1 Swift r. Tyson, 16 Pet. 18.

* Per Marshall, Ch. J., in Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 46; per Gibson,

Ch. J., in Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494. See State v. Gleason,

12Fla. 190.

'Bates r. Kimball, 2 Chip. 77.

4 Newland v. Marsh, 19 111. 382.
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enforced. Such power assimilates itself more closely to despotic

rule than any other attribute of government." 1 i

On the other hand, to adjudicate, upon, and protect, the ryrli'

and interests of individual citizens, and to that end to construe

and apply the laws, is the peculiar province of the judicial depart-

ment.2 "No particular definition of judicial power," says Wood-

bury, J., " is given in the constitution [of New Hampshire], and,

considering the general nature of the instrument, none was to be

expected. Critical statements of the meanings in which all im-

portant words were employed would have swollen into volumes;

and when those words possessed a customary signification, a defi-

nition of them would have been useless. But 'powers

[* 92] judicial,' "'judiciary powers,' and 'judicatures' are all

phrases used in the constitution; and though not particu-

larly defined, are still so used to designate with clearness that

department of government which it was intended should inter-

pret and administer the laws. On general principles, therefore,

those inquiries, deliberations, orders, and decrees, which are
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peculiar to such a department, must in their nature be judicial

acts. Nor can they be both judicial and legislative; because a

marked difference exists between the employment of judicial and

legislative tribunals. The former decide upon the legality of

claims and conduct, and the latter make rules upon which, in con-

nection with the constitution, those decisions should be founded.

It is the province of judges to determine what is the law upon

existing cases. In fine, the law is applied by the one, and made

by the other. To do the first, therefore, — to compare the claims

of parties with the law of the land before established, — is in its

nature a judicial act. But to do the last — to pass new rules for

the regulation of new controversies — is in its nature a legislative

1 Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 266. See also Greenough ». Greenough, 11

Penn. St. 494; Dechastellux t>. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18; Trustees, &c, e.

Bailey, 10 Fla. 238.

* Cincinnati, &c., Railroad Co. o. Commissioners of Clinton Co., 1 Ohio,

V. s. 81. See also King v. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass. 454; Gordon c. Ingr&ham,

1 Grant's Cases, 152; People c. Supervisors of New York, 16 N. Y. 432; Beebe

v. State, 6 Ind. 515; Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494; Taylor f.

Place, 4 R. I. 324. In State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570, a legislative act which

declared certain college officers to have vacated their offices by failure to take an

oath prescribed by a previous act, and which proceeded to appoint successors,

was held void as an exercise of judicial power.

[100]
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.'act; and if these rules interfere with the past, or the present, and

do not look wholly to the future, they violate the definition of a

law as ' a rule of civil conduct;'1 because no rule of conduct oan

with consistency operate upon what occurred before the rule itself

was promulgated.

** It is the province of judicial power, also, to decide private

disputes between or concerning persons; but of legislative power

to regulate public concerns, and to make laws for the benefit and

welfare of the State. Nor docs the passage of private statutes

conflict with these principles; because such statutes, when lawful,

are enacted on petition, or by the consent of all concerned; or

else they forbear to interfere with past transactions and vested

rights." 2

With these definitions and explanations, we shall now proceed

to consider some of the cases in which the courts have attempted

to draw the line of distinction between the proper functions of the

legislative and judicial departments, in cases where it has been

claimed that the legislature have exceeded their power by invading

the domain of judicial authority.

* Declaratory Statutes. [* 93]
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Legislation is either introductory of new rules, or it is declar-

atory of existing rules. "A declaratory statute is one which

is passed in order to put an end to a doubt as to what is the com-

mon law, or the meaning of another statute, and which declares

what it is and ever has been." 3 Such a statute, therefore, is always

in a certain sense retrospective; because it assumes to determine

what the law"was before it was passed ; and as a declaratory statute

is important only in those cases where doubts have already arisen,

the statute, when passed, may be found to declare the law to be

different from what it has already been adjudged to be by the

courts. Thus Mp. Fox's Libel Act declared that, by the law of

England, juries were judges of the law in prosecutions for libel; it

1 1 Bl. Comm. 44.

'Merrill p. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 204. See Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg. 69; Tay-

lor p. Porter, 4 Hill, 144; Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch, 272; Dash v. Van

Klerk, 7 Johns. 498; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657; Leland v. Wilkinson,

10 Pet. 297.

• Bouv. Law Diet. "Statute."
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did not purport to introduce a new rule, but to declare a rule

already and always in force. Yet previous to the passage of thi.°

act the courts had repeatedly held that the jury in these <^ses

were only to pass upon the fact of publication and the truth of

the innuendoes; and whether the publication was libellous or not

was a question of law which addressed itself exclusively to the

court. It would appear, therefore, that the legislature declared

the law to be what the courts had declared it was not. So in the

State of New York, after the courts had held that insurance com-

panies were taxable to a certain extent under an existing statute,

the legislature passed another act, declaring that such companies

were only taxable at a certain other rate; and it was thereby

declared that such was the intention and true construction of the

original statute.1 In these cases it will be perceived that the courts,

in the due exercise of their authority as interpreters of the laws,

have declared what the rule established by the common law or by

statute is, and that the legislature has then interposed, put its own

construction upon the existing law, and in effect declared the

judicial interpretation to be unfounded and unwarrantable. The

courts in these cases have clearly kept within the proper limits of
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their jurisdiction, and if they have erred, the error has been one

of judgment only, and has not extended to usurpation of power.

Was the legislature also within the limits of its authority when it

passed the declaratory statute?

[* 94] * The decision of this question must depend upon the

practical application which is sought to be made of the

declaratory statute, and whether it is designed to have practically

a retrospective operation, or only to establish a construction of the

doubtful law for the determination of cases that may arise in the

future. It is always competent to change an existing law by a

declaratory statute; and where it is only to operate upon future

cases, it is no objection to its validity that it assumes the law to

have been in the past what it is now declared that it shall be in the

future. But the legislative action cannot be made to retroact \ipon

past controversies, and to reverse decisions which the courts, in

the exercise of their undoubted authority, have made; for this

would not only be the exercise of judicial power, but it would be

its exercise in the most objectionable and offensive form, since

1 People v. Supervisors of New York, 16 N. Y. 424.
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/ the legislature would in effect sit as a court of review to which

parties might appeal when dissatisfied with the rulings of the

courts.1

As the legislature cannot set aside the construction of the law

already applied by the courts to actual cases, neither can it compel

1 In several different cases the courts of Pennsylvania had decided that a

testator's mark to his name, at the foot of a testamentary paper, but without

proof that the name was written by his express direction, was not the signature

required by the statute, and the legislature, to use the language of Chief Justice

Gibson, "declared, in order to overrule it, that every last will and testament

heretofore made, or hereafter to be made, except such as may have been fully

adjudicated prior to the passage of this act, to which the testator's name is sub-

scribed by his direction, or to which the testator has made his mark or cross,

shall be deemed and taken to be valid. How this mandate to the courts to estab-

lish a particular interpretation of a particular statute, can be taken for any thing

else than an exercise of judicial power in settling a question of interpretation, I

know not. The judiciary had certainly recognized a legislative interpretation of

t statute before it had itself acted, and consequently before a purchaser had been

misled by its judgment; but he might have paid for a title on the unmistakable

meaning of plain words; and for the legislature subsequently to distort or per-
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vert it, and to enact that white meant black, or that black meant white, would

in the same degree be an exercise of arbitrary and unconstitutional power."

Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494. The act in this case was held void

bo far as its operation was retrospective, but valid as to future cases. And see

Reiser v. Tell Association, 39 Penn. St. 187. The constitution of Georgia

entitled the head of a family to enter a homestead, and the courts decided that a

single person, having no others dependent upon him, could not be regarded the

head of a family, though keeping house with servants. Afterwards, the legislature

passed an act, declaring that any single person living habitually as housekeeper

to himself should be regarded as the head of a family. Held void as an exercise

of judicial power. Calhoun v. McLendon, 42 Geo. 405. The fact that the

courts had previously given a construction to the law may show more clearly

a purpose in the legislature to exercise judicial authority, but it would not be

essential to that end. As is well said in Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 Penn. St. 45:

"It would be monstrous to maintain that when the words and intention of an act

were so plain that no court had ever been appealed to for the purpose of declar-

ing their meaning, it was therefore in the power of the legislature, by a retro-

spective law, to put a construction upon them contrary to the obvious letter and

spirit. Reiser v. William Tell Fund Association, 89 Penn. St. 137, is an author-

ity in point against such a doctrine. An expository act of assembly is destitute

of retroactive force, because it is an act of judicial power, and is in contraven-

tion of the ninth section of the ninth article of the constitution, which deilares

that no man can be deprived of his property unless ' by the judgment of his peers

or the law of the land.'" See 8 Am. Rep. 155, 156. And on the force and

effect of declaratory laws in general, see Salters v. Tobias, 8 Paige, 388; Post-

master-General v. Early, 12 Wheat. 148.
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the courts for the future to adopt a particular construction of a law

which the legislature permits to remain in force. "To declare

what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power; to declare what

the law shall be, is legislative. One of the fundamental principles

of all our governments is, that the legislative power

[*95] * shall be separate from the judicial." 1 If the legislature

would prescribe a different rule for the future from that

which the courts enforce, it must be done by statute, and cannot be

done by a mandate to the courts, which leaves the law unchanged,

but seeks to compel the courts to construe and apply it, not ac-

cording to the judicial, but according to the legislative judgment.2

But in any case the substance of the legislative action should

be regarded rather than the form; and if it appears to be the

intention to establish by declaratory statute a rule of conduct for

the future, the courts should accept and act upon it, without too

nicely inquiring whether the mode by which the new rule is estab-

lished is or is not the best, most decorous and suitable that could

have been adopted.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the

courts, by requiring of them a construction of the law according
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to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by set-

ting aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials,

ordering the discharge of offenders,3 or directing what particu-

lar steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.4

1 Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 498, per Thompson, J.; Ogden v. Blackledge,

2 Cranch, 272; Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Penn. St. 25.

8 Governor v. Porter, 5 Humph. 165; People v. Supervisors, &c, 16 N. Y.

424; Reiser v. Tell Association, 39 Penn. St. 137; O'Conner v. Warner, 4 W.

& S. 227; Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Penn. St. 25.

'In State v. Fleming, 7 Humph. 152, a legislative resolve that "no fine,for-

feiture, or imprisonment, should be imposed or recovered under the act of 1837

[then in force], and that all causes pending in any of the courts for such offence

should be dismissed," was held void as an invasion of judicial authority. The

legislature cannot declare a forfeiture of a right to act as curators of a college.

State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570. But to take away by statute a statutory right of

appeal is not an exercise of judicial authority. Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall.

506. And it has been held that a statute allowing an appeal in a particular case

was valid. Prout v. Berry, 2 Gill, 147; State v. Northern Central R. R. Co.,

18 Md. 193. But see cases cited in next note.

4 Opinions of Judges on the Dorr Case, 3 R. I. 299. In the case of Picquet,

Appellant, 6 Pick. 64, the Judge of Probate had ordered letters of administration

to issue to an applicant therefor, on his giving bond in the penal sum of $50,000,
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* And as a court must act as an organized body of judges, [* 96 ]

aud, where differences of opinion arise, they can only

decide by majorities, it/ has been held that it would not be in the

power of the legislature to provide that, in certain contingencies,

the opinion of the minority of a court, vested, with power by the

constitution, should prevail, so that the decision of the court

in such cases should be rendered against the judgment of its

members.1

•with sureties within the Commonwealth, for the faithful performance of his duties.

He was unable to give the bond, and applied to the legislature for relief. There-

upon a resolve was passed "empowering" the Judge of Probate to grant lhe

letters of administration, provided the petitioner should give bond with his

brother, a resident of Paris, France, as surety, and "that such bond should be

in lieu of any and all bond or bonds by any law or statute in this Commonwealth

now in force required," &p. The Judge of Probate refused to grant the letters

on the terms specified in this resolve, and the Supreme Court, while holding that

it was not compulsory upon him, also declared their opinion that, if it were so,

it would be inoperative and void. In Bradford v. Brooks, 2 Aik. 284, it was de-

cided that the legislature had no power to revive a commission for proving claims

against an estate after it had once expired. See also Bagg's Appeal, 43 Penn.
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St. 512. In Hill v. Sunderland, 3 Vt. 507; and Burch v. Newberry, 10 N. Y.

374, it was held that the legislature had no power to grant to parties a right to

appeal after it was gone under the general law. Besides the authorities referred

to, to show that the legislature cannot grant a new trial, see Lewis v. Webb,

3Greenl. 326; Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Greenl. 140; Bates p. Kimball, 2 Chip.

77; Stamford v. Barry, 1 Aik. 314; Merrill p. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 199; Dechas-

tellux p. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18; Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324; Young v.

State Bank, 4 Ind. 301; Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. An. 175; Miller v. State, 8

Gill, 145; Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 515; Atkinson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. Ill; Weaver

p. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224; Saunders v. Cabaniss, ib. 173. In Burt v. Williams,

24 Ark. 91, it was held that the granting of continuances of pending cases was

the exercise of judicial authority, and a legislative act assuming to do this was

void. And where, by the general law, the courts have no authority to grant a

divorce for a given cause, the legislature cannot confer the authority in a particular

case. Simmonds v. Simmonds, 103 Mass. 572; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 576. And

see post, 110, note.

1 In Clapp v. Ely, 8 Dutch. 622, it was held that a statute which provided that

no judgment of the Supreme Court should be reversed by the Court of Errors

and Appeals, unless a majority of those members of the court who were com-

petent to sit on the hearing and decision should concur in the reversal, was

unconstitutional. Its effect would be, if the court were not full, to make the

opinion of the minority in favor of affirmance control that of the majority in

favor of reversal, unless the latter were a majority of the whole court. Such a

provision in the constitution might be proper and unexceptionable; but if the

constitution has created a Court of Appeals, without any restriction of this char-
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Nor is it in the power of the legislature to bind individuals by a

recital of facts in a statute, to be used as evidence against the

parties interested. A recital of facts in the preamble of a statute

may perhaps be evidence, where it relates to matters of a public

nature, as that riots or disorders exist in a certain part of the

country;1 but where the facts concern the rights of individuals,

the legislature cannot adjudicate upon them. As private statutes

are generally obtained on the application of some party interested,

and are put in form to suit his wishes, perhaps their exclusion

from being made evidence against any other party would result

from other general principles; but it is clear that the recital could

have no force, except as a judicial finding of facts; and that such

finding is not within the legislative province.2

[* 97] * We come now to a class of cases in regard to which

there has been serious contrariety of opinion; springing

from the fact, perhaps, that the purpose sought to be accomplished

by the statutes is generally effected by judicial proceedings, so that

if the statutes are not a direct invasion of judicial authority, they

at least cover ground which the courts usually occupy under gen-
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eral laws which confer the jurisdiction upon them. We refer to

Statutes conferring Power upon Guardians and other Trustees to

sell Lands.

Whenever it becomes necessary or proper to sell the estate of

a decedent for the payment of debts, or of a lunatic or other

incompetent person for the same purpose, or for future support,

or of a minor to provide the means for his education and nurture,

or for the more profitable investment of the proceeds, or of ten-

ants in common to effectuate a partition between them, it will

probably be found in every State that some court is vested with

jurisdiction to make the necessary order, if the facts seem to

render it important after a hearing of the parties in interest.

The case is eminently one for judicial investigation. There are

facts to be inquired into, in regard to which it is always possible

that disputes may arise; the party in interest is often incompetent

to act on his own behalf, and his interest is carefully to be in-

acter, the ruling of this case is that the legislature cannot impose it. The court

was nearly equally divided, standing seven to six.

1 Rex v. Sutton, 4 M. & S. 532.

J Elmendorf p. Carniichael, 3 Litt. 478; Parmeleo c. Thompson, 7 Hill, 80.
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quired into and guarded; and as the proceeding will usually be

ex parte, there is more than the ordinary opportunity for fraud

upon the party interested, as well as upon the authority which

grants permission. It is highly and peculiarly proper, therefore,

that by general laws judicial inquiry should be provided for

these cases, and that these laws should provide for notice to all

proper parties, and an opportunity for the presentation of any

facts which might bear upon the propriety of granting the appli-

cations.

But it will sometimes be found that the general laws provided

for these cases are not applicable to some which arise; or if appli-

cable, that they do not always accomplish fully all that seems

desirable; and in these cases, and perhaps also in some others

without similar excuse, it has not been unusual for legislative

authority to intervene, and by special statute to grant the power

which, under the general law, is granted by the courts.

The * power to pass such statutes has often been disputed, [* 98 ]

and it may be well to see upon what basis of authority as

well as of reason it rests.

If in fact judicial inquiry is essential in these cases, it would
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seem clear that such statutes must be ineffectual and void. But

if judicial inquiry is not essential, and the legislature may confer

the power of sale in such a case upon an ex parte presentation of

evidence, or upon the representations of the parties without any

proof whatever, then we must consider the general laws to be

passed, not because the cases fall within the province of judicial

action, but because the courts can more conveniently consider,

aud properly, safely, and inexpensively pass upon such cases, than

the legislative body, where the power primarily rests.1

The rule upon this subject, as we deduce it from the authorities,

seems to be this: If the party standing in position of trustee

applies for permission to make the sale, for a purpose apparently

for the interest of the cestui que trust, and there are no adverse

1 There are constitutional provisions in Kentucky, Virginia, Missouri, Oregon,

Nevada, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Arkansas, Florida, 11linois, Wiscon-

sin, Texas, West Virginia, and Michigan, forbidding special laws licensing the

sale of the lands of minors and other persons under legal disability. Perhaps

the general provision in some other constitutions, forbidding special laws in cases

whvre a general law could be made applicable, might also be held to exclude such

special authorization.
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interests to be considered and adjudicated, the case is not one

which requires judicial action, but it is optional with the legisla-

ture to grant the relief by statute, or to refer the case to the

courts for consideration, according as the one course or the other,

on considerations of policy, may seem desirable.

In the case of Rice v. Parkman,1 it appeared that, certain minors

having become entitled to real estate by descent from their mother,

the legislature passed a special statute empowering their father

as guardian for them, and, after giving bond to the judge of

probate, to sell and convey the lands, and put the proceeds at

interest on good security for the benefit of the minor owners.

A sale was made accordingly; but the children, after coming of

age, brought suit against the party claiming under the sale, insist

ing that the special statute was void. There was in force at the

time this special statute was passed a general statute, under which

license might have been granted by the courts; but it was held

that this general law did not deprive the legislature of that

[* 99 ] full * and complete control over such cases which it would

have possessed had no such statute existed. "If," say

the court, " the power by which the resolve authorizing the sale in
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this case was passed were of a judicial nature, it would be very

clear that it could not have been exercised by the legislature with-

out violating an express provision of the constitution. But it

does not seem to us to be of this description of power; for it was

not a case of controversy between party and party, nor is there

any decree or judgment affecting the title to property. The

only object of the authority granted by the legislature was to trans-

mute real into personal estate, for purposes beneficial to all who

were interested therein. This is a power frequently exercised by

the legislature of this State, since the adoption of the constitution,

and by the legislature of the province and of the colony, while

under the sovereignty of Great Britain, analogous to the power

exercised by the British Parliament on similar subjects, time out

of mind. Indeed, it seems absolutely necessary for the interest of

those who, by the general rules of law, are incapacitated from dis-

posing of their property, that a power should exist somewhere of

converting lands into money. For otherwise many minors might

suffer, although having property ; it not being in a condition to yield

1 16 Mass. 826.

[108]

CH. 7.] POWERS EXERCISED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. * 99

an income. This power must rest in the legislature, in this Com-

monwealth; that body being alone competent to act as the general

guardian and protector of those who are disabled to act for them-

selves.

"It was undoubtedly wise to delegate this authority to other

bodies, whose sessions are regular and constant, and whose struct-

ure may enable them more easily to understand the merits of the

particular application brought before them. But it does not fol-

low that, because the power has been delegated by the legislature

to courts of law, it is judicial in its character. For aught we see,

the same authority might have been given to the selectmen of

each town, or to the clerks or registers of the counties, it being

a mere ministerial act, certainly requiring discretion, and some-

times knowledge of law, for its due exercise, but still partaking

in no degree of the characteristics of judicial power. It is doubt-

less included in the general authority granted by the people to

the legislature by the constitution. For full power and authority

is given from time to time to make, ordain, and establish all

manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, stat-

*utes, and ordinances, directions, and restrictions (so as [*100]
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the same be not repugnant or contrary to the constitu-

tion), as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the

Commonwealth, and of the subjects thereof. No one imagines

that, under this general authority, the legislature could deprive a

citizen of his estate, or impair any valuable contract in which he

might be interested. But there seems to be no reason to doubt

that, upon his application, or the application of those who properly

represent him if disabled from acting himself, a beneficial change

of his estate, or a sale of it for purposes necessary and convenient

for the lawful owner, is a just and proper subject for the exercise

of that authority. It is, in fact, protecting him in his property,

which the legislature is bound to do, and enabling him to derive

subsistence, comfort, and education from property which might

otherwise be wholly useless during that period of life when it might

be most beneficially employed.

"If this be not true, then the general laws, under which so

many estates of minors, persons non compos mentis, and others,

have been sold and converted into money, are unauthorized by

the constitution, and void. For the courts derive their authority

from the legislature, and, it not being of a judicial nature, if the

[109]
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legislature had it not, they could not communicate it to any

other body. Thus, if there were no power to relieve those from

actual distress who had unproductive property, and were disabled

from conveying it themselves, it would seem that one of the

most essential objects of government — that of providing for the

welfare of the citizens — would be lost. But the argument which

has most weight on the part of the defendants is, that the legisla-

ture has exercised its power over this subject in the only consti-

tutional way, by establishing a general provision ; and that, having

done this, their authority has ceased, they having no right to

interfere in particular cases. And if the question were one of

expediency only, we should perhaps be convinced by the argu-

ment, that it would be better for all such applications to be made

to the courts empowered to sustain them. But as a question

of right, we think the argument fails. The constituent, when he

has delegated an authority without an interest, may do the act

himself which he has authorized another to do; and especially

when that constituent is the legislature, and is not prohibited
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by the constitution from exercising the authority. Indeed,

[* 101] the * whole authority might be revoked, and the legisla-

ture resume the burden of the business to itself, if in its

wisdom it should determine that the common welfare required

it. It is not legislation which must be by general acts and rules,

but the use of a parental or tutorial power, for purposes of kind-

ness, without interfering with or prejudice to the rights of any but,

those who apply for specific relief. The title of strangers is not

in any degree affected by such an interposition."

A similar statute was sustained by the Court for the Correction

of Errors in New York. "It is clearly," says the Chancellor,

"within the powers of the legislature, as parens patriae, to prescribe

such rules and regulations as it may deem proper for the superin-

tendence, disposition, and management of the property and effects

of infants, lunatics., and other persons who are incapable of managing

their own affairs. But even that power cannot constitutionally be

so far extended as to transfer the beneficial use of the property to

another person, except in those cases where it can legally be

presumed the owner of the property would himself have given the

use of his property to the other, if he had been in a situation to

act for himself, as in the case of a provision out of the estate of an
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infant or lunatic for the support of an indigent parent or other

near relative." 1

1 Cochran p. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 373. See the same case in the Supreme

Court, sub nom. Clarke v. Van Surlay, 15 Wend. 436. See also Suydam t>.

Williamson, 24 How. 427; Williamson v. Suydam, 6 Wall. 723; Heirs of Hol-

man r. Bank of Norfolk, 12 Ala. 3C9; Flo e tine t>. Barton, 2 Wall. 210. In

Opinions of the Judges, 4 N. H. 572, the validity of such a special statute, under

the constitution of New Hampshire, was denied. The judges say: "The objec-

tion to the exercise of such a power by the legislature i^. that it is in its nature

both legislative and judicial. It is the province of the legislature to prescribe the

rule of law, but to apply it to particular cases is the business of the courts of law.

And the thirty-eighth article in the Bill of Rights declares that ' in the government

of the State the three essential powers thereof, to wit, the legislative, executive, and

judicial, ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other as the

nature of a free government will adinit, or as consistent with that chain of con-

nection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of

union and amity.' The exercise of such a power by the legislature can never be

necesssary. By the existing laws, judges of probate have very extensive juris-

diction to license the sale of real estate of minors by their guardians. If the

jurisdiction of the judges of probate be not sufficiently extensive to reach all
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proper cases, it may be a good reason why that jurisdiction should be extended,

but can hardly be deemed a sufficient reason for the particular interposition of the

legislature in an individual case. If there be a defect in the laws, they should be

amended. Under our institutions all men are viewed as equal, entitled to enjoy

equal privileges, and to be governed by equal laws. If it be fit and proper that

license should be given to one guardian, under particular circumstances, to sell

the estate of his ward, it is fit and proper that all other guardians should, under

similar circumstances, have the same license. This is the very genius and spirit

of our institutions. And we are of opinion that an act of the legislature to

authorize the sale of the land of a particular minor by his guardian cannot be

easily reconciled with the spirit of the article in the Bill of Rights which we have

just cited. It is true that the grant of such a license by the legislature to the

guardian is intended as a privilege and a benefit to the ward. But by the law of

the land no minor is capable of assenting to a sale of his real estate in such a

manner as to bind himself. And no guardian is permitted by the same law to

determine when the estate of his ward ought and when it ought not to be sold.

In the contemplation of the law, the one has not sufficient discretion to judge of

the propriety and expediency of a sale of his estate, and the other is not to be

intrusted with the power of judging. Such being the general law of the land, it

>s presumable that the legislature would be unwilling to rest the justification of an

act authorizing the sale of a minor's estate upon any assent which the guardian

or the minor could give in the proceeding. The question then is, as it seems to

m. Can a ward be deprived of his inheritance without his consent by an act of

toe legislature which is intended to apply to no other individual? The fifteenth

article of the Bill of Rights declares that no subject shall be deprived of his prop-

erty but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. Can an act of the

legislature, intended to authorize one man to sell the land of another without his
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[* 102] * The same ruling has been made in analogous cases.

In Ohio, a special act of the legislature authorizing com-

missioners to make sale of lands held in fee tail, by devisees under

a will, in order to cut off the entailment and effect a partition

between them, — the statute being applied for by the mother of

the devisees and the executor of the will, and on behalf of the

devisees, — was held not obnoxious to constitutional objection, and

as sustainable on immemorial legislative usage, and on the same

ground which would support general laws for the same purpose.1

In a case in the Supreme Court of the United States, where an

executrix who had proved a will in New Hampshire made sale of

lands 'without authority in Rhode Island, for the purpose of

satisfying debts against the estate, a subsequent act of the

[* 103] Rhode Island legislature, * confirming the sale, was held

not an encroachment upon the judicial power. The land,

it was said, descended to the heirs subject to a lien for the pay-

ment of debts, and there is nothing in the nature of the act of

authorizing a sale to satisfy the lien, which requires that it should
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be performed by a judicial tribunal, or that it should be performed

by a delegate rather than by the legislature itself. It is remedial

in its nature, to give effect to existing rights.2 The case showed

the actual existence of debts, and indeed a judicial license for the

sale of lands to satisfy them had been granted in New Hampshire

before the sale was made. The decision was afterwards followed

in a carefully considered case in the same court.8 In each of these

cases it is assumed that the legislature dges not by the special

statute determine the existence or amount of the debts, and dis-

putes concerning them would be determinable in the usual modes.

Many other decisions have been made to the same effect.4

consent, be ' the law of the land' in a free country P If the question proposed

to us can be resolved into these questions, as it appears to us it may, we feel en-

tirely confident that the representatives of the people of this State will agree

with-us in the opinion we feel ourselves bound to express on the question sub-

mitted to us, that the legislature cannot authorize a guardian of minors, by a

special act or resolve, to make a valid conveyance of the real estate of his

wards."

1 Carroll v. Lessee of Olmsted, 16 Ohio; 251.

8 Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 660.

3 Watkins v. Holman's Lessee, 16 Pet. 25-60. See also Florentine v. Barton,

2 Wall. 210; Doe v. Douglass, 8 Blackf. 10.

* Thurston v. Thurston, 6 R. I. 296, 302; Williamson v. Williamson, 3 S.
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This species of legislation may perhaps be properly called pre-

rogative remedial legislation. It hears and determines no rights;

it deprives no one of his property. It simply authorizes one's

real estate to be turned into personal, on the application of the

person representing his interest, and under such circumstances

that the consent of the owner, if capable of giving it, would be

presumed. It is in the nature of the grant of a privilege to one

person, which at the same time affects injuriously the rights of no

other.1

But a different case is presented when the legislature assumes

to authorize a person who does not occupy a fiduciary rela-

tion to * the owner, to make sale of real estate, to satisfy [* 104]

demands which he asserts, but which are not judicially

determined, or for any other purpose not connected with the con-

venience or necessity of the owner himself. An act of the legis-

lature of Illinois undertook to empower a party who had applied

for it to make sale of the lands pertaining to the estate of a

deceased person, in order to raise a certain specified sum of money

which the legislature assumed to be due to him and another per-

son, for moneys by them advanced and liabilities incurred on
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behalf of the estate, and to apply the same to the extinguishment of

their claims. Now it is evident that this act was in the nature of

a judicial decree, passed on the application of parties adverse in

interest to the estate, and in effect adjudging a certain amount to

be due them, and ordering lands to be sold for its satisfaction. As

& M. 715; McComb v. Gilkey, 29 Miss. 146; Boon e. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246;

Stewart c. Griffith, 33 Mo. 13; Estep v. Hutclnnan, 14 S. & R. 435; Snowhill

v. Snowhill, 2 Green, Ch. 20; Dorsey v. Gilbert, 11 G. & J. 87; Norris v. Cly-

raer, 2 Penn. St. 277; Coleman v. Carr, Walker, 258; Davison v. Johonnot, 7

Met 388; Towle v. Forney, 14 N. Y. 423; Leggett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445;

Kibby v. ChetwoodV Adra'rs, 4 T. B. Monr. 94; Sbeban's Heirs v. Barnett's

Heirs, 6 T. B. Monr. 594; Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316; Richardson r.

Monson, 22 Conn. 98; Ward v. New England, &c. Co., 1 Cliff. 565; Sohier v.

Massachusetts, &c. Hospital, 3 Cush. 483; Lobrano v. Nelligan, 9 Wall. 295.

In Moore v. Maxwell, 18 Ark. 469, a special statute authorizing the administrator

of one who held the mere naked legal title to convey to the owner of the equitable

title was held valid. In Stanley v. Colt. 5 Wall. 119, an act permitting the sale

of real estate which had been devised to charitable uses was sustained — no diver-

sion of the gift being made.

1 It would be equally competent for the legislature to authorize a person under

legal disability — e. g. an infant — to convey his estate, as to authorize it to be

conveyed by guardian. McComb v. Gilkey, 29 Miss. 146.

8 [113]
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was well said by the Supreme Court of Illinois, in adjudging the

act void: "If this is not the exercise of a power of inquiry into,

and a determination of facts, between debtor and creditor, and

that, too, ex "parte and summary in its character, we are at a loss

to understand the meaning of terms; nay, that it is adjudging aud

directing the application* of one person's property to another, on a

claim of indebtedness, without notice to, or hearing of, the parties

whose estate is divested by the act. That the exercise of such

power is in its nature clearly judicial, we think too apparent to

need argument to illustrate its truth. It is so self-evident from

the facts disclosed that it proves itself." 1

[* 105] * A case in harmony witli the one last referred to was

decided by the Supremo Court of Michigan. Under the

act of Congress " for the relief of citizens of towns upon the lands

1 Lane v. Dorman, 3 Scam. 242. In Dubois v. McLean, 4 McLean, 486, Judge

Pope assumes that the case of Lane v. Dorman decides a special act, authorizing

an executor to sell lands of the testator to pay debts against bis estate, would

be unconstitutional. We do not so understand that decision. On the contrary,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

another case in the same volume, Edwards v. Pope, p. 465, fully sustains the

cases before decided, distinguishing them from Lane ». Dorman. But that indeed

is also done in the principal case, where the court, after referring to similar cases

in Kentucky, say: "These cases are clearly distinguished from the case at bar.

The acts were for the benefit of all the creditors of the estates, without distinc-

tion; and in one case, in addition, for the purpose of perfecting titles contracted

to be made by the intestate. The claims of the creditors of the intestate were to

be established by judicial or other satisfactory legal proceedings, and, in truth

in the case last cited, the commissioners were nothing more than special com-

missioners. The legislative department, in passing these acts, investigated

nothing, nor did an act which could be deemed a judic al inquiry. It neither

examined proof, nor determined the nature or extent of claims; it merely au-

thorized the application of tie real estate to the payment of debts generally,

discriminating in favor of no one creditor, and giving no one a preference over

another. Not so in the case before us; the amount is investigated and ascer-

tained, and the sale is directed for the benefit of two persons exclusively. The

proceeds are to be applied to the payment of such claims and none other, for

liabilities said to be incurred but not liquidated or satisfied; and those, too,

created after the death of the intestate." See also Mason v. Wait, 4 Scam. 127—

134. The case of Estep v. Hutchman, 14 S. & R. 435, would seem to be

more open to question on this point than any of the others before cited. It wm

the case of a special statute, author zing the guardian of infant heirs to con-

vey their lands in satisfaction of a contract made by their ancestor; and

which was sustained. Compare this with Jones t>. Perry, 10 Yerg. 59, where

an act authorizing a guardian to sell lands to pay the ancestor's debts was held

void.

[114]
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of the United States, under certain circumstances," approved May

23, 1844, and which provided that the trust under said act should

be conducted under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed

by the legislative authority of the State," &c, the legislature passed

an act authorizing the trustee to give deeds to a person named

therein, and those claiming under him; thus undertaking to dis-

pose of the whole trust to the person thus named and his grantees,

and authorizing no one else to be considered or to receive any relief.

This was very plainly an attempted adjudication upon the rights

of the parties concerned; it did not establish regulations for the

administration of the trust, but it adjudged the trust property to

certain claimants exclusively, in disregard of any rights which

might exist in others; and it was therefore declared to be

void.1 And it has also been held that, whether a * cor- [* 106]

poration has been guilty of abuse of authority under its

i Cash, Appellant, 6 Mich. 193. The case of Powers v. Bergen, 6 N. Y. 858,

is perhaps to be referred to another principle than that of encroachment upon

judicial authority. That was a case where the legislature, by special act, bad

undertaken to authorize the sale of property, not for the purpose of satisfying

liens upon it, or of meeting or in any way providing for the necessities or
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wants of the owners, but solely, after paying expenses, for the investment of

the proceeds. It appears from that case that the executors under the will of the

former owner held the lands in trust for a daughter of the testator during her

natural life, with a vested remainder in fee in her two children. The special act

assumed to empower them to sell and convey the complete fee, and apply the

proceeds, first, to the payment of their commissions, costs, and expenses ; second,

to the discharge of assessments, liens, charges, and incumbrances on the land,

of which, however, none were shown to exist; and, third, to invest the proceeds

and pay over the income, after deducting taxes and charges, to the daughter

during her life, and after her decease to convey, assign, orp iy over the same to the

persons who would be entitled under the will. The court regarded this as an un-

authorized interference with private property upon no necessity, and altogether

void, as depriving the owners of their property contrary to the '' law of the land."

At the same time the authority of those cases, where it has been held that the

legislature, acting as the guardian and protector of those who are disabled to act

for themselves by reason of infancy, lunacy, or other like cause, may constitution-

ally pass either general or private laws, under which an effectual disposition of

their property might be made, was not questioned. The court cite, with appar-

ent approval, the cases, among others, of Rice p. Parkman, 16 Mass. 326; Coch-

ran p. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365; and Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657. The

case of Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 256, was similar, in the principles involved,

to Powers p. Bergen, and was decided in the same way. See also Kneass's Ap-

peal, 31 Penn. St. 87, and compare with Kerr p. Kitchen, 17 Penn. St. 438;

Martin's Appeal, 23 Penn. St. 437; Tharp v. Fleming, 1 Houston, 592.

[115]
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charter, so as justly to subject it to forfeiture,1 and whether a

widow is entitled to dower in a specified parcel of land,2 are judicial

questions which cannot be decided by the legislature. In these

cases there are necessarily adverse parties; the questions that

would arise are essentially judicial, and over which the courts pos-

sess jurisdiction at the common law; and it is presumable that

legislative acts of this character must have been adopted carelessly,

and without a due consideration of the proper boundaries which

mark the separation of legislative from judicial duties.3

1 State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Campbell v. Union Bank, 6 How. (Miss.) 661;

Canal Co. v. Railroad Co., 4 G. & J. 122; Regents of University r. William*, 9

G. & J. 3G5. In Miners Bank of Dubuque v. United States, 1 Morris, 482, a

clause in a charter authorizing the legislature to repeal it for any abuse or mis-

user of corporate privileges was held to refer the question of abuse to the legis-

lative judgment. In Erie & North East R. R Co. v. Casey, 26 Penn. St. 287,

on the other hand, it was held that the legislature could not conclude the

corporation by its repealing act, but that the question of abuse of corporate

authority would be one of fact to be passed upon, if denied, by a jury, so tbat
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the act would be valid or void as the jury should find. The authority of both

these cases was denied in Flint & Fentonville P. R. Co. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich.

99, in which it was held that the reservation of a power to repeal a charter for

violation of its provisions necessarily presented a judicial question, and the repeal

must be preceded by a proper judicial finding. In Carey v. Gilt s, 9 Geo. 523i

the appointment by the legislature of a receiver for an insolvent bank was sus-

tained; and in Hindinan v. Piper, 50 Mo. 292, a legislative appointment of a

trustee was also sustained in a peculiar case.

* Edwards v. Pope, 8 Scam. 465.

a The unjust and dangerous character of legislation of this description are

well stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: "When, in the exercise of

proper legislative powers, general laws are enacted which bear, or may bear, on

the whole community, if they are unjust and against the spirit of the constitu-

tion, the whole community will be interested to procure their repeal by a voice

potential. And that is the great security for just and fair legislation. Bat

when individuals are selected from the mass, and laws are enacted affecting

their property, without summons or notice, at the instigation of an interested

party, who is to stand up for them, thus isolated from the mass, in injury and in-

justice, or where are they to seek relief from such acts of despotic power? They

have no refuge but in the courts, the only secure place for determining conflict-

ing rights by due course of law. But if the judiciary give way, and, in the lan-

guage of the Chief Justice in Greenough v. Greenough, in 11 Penn. St. 494,

'confesses itself too weak to stand against the antagonism of the legislature and

the bar,' one independent co-ordinate branch of the government will become the

subservient handmaid of the other, and a quiet, insidious revolution will be

effected in the administration of the government, whilst its form on paper re-

mains the same." Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 268.

[116]
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* We! have elsewhere referred to a number of cases where [* 107]

statutes have been held unobjectionable which validated

legal proceedings, notwithstanding irregularities apparent in them.1

These statutes may as properly be made applicable to judicial as

to ministerial proceedings; and although, when they refer to such

proceedings, they may at first seem like an interference with

judicial authority, yet if they are only in aid of judicial proceed-

ings, and tend to their support by precluding parties from taking

advantage of errors which do not affect their substantial rights,

they cannot be obnoxious to the charge of usurping judicial power.

The legislature does, or may, prescribe the rules under which the

judicial power is exercised by the courts; and in doing so, it may

dispense with any of those formalities which are not essential to

the jurisdiction of the court; and whatever it may dispense with

by statute anterior to the proceedings, we believe it may also dis-

pense with by statute after the proceedings have been taken, if the

court has failed to observe any of those formalities. But it would

not be competent for the legislature to authorize a court to pro-

ceed and adjudicate upon the rights of parties, without giving

them an opportunity to be heard before it; and, for the same rea-
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son, it would be incompetent for it, by retrospective legislation, to

make valid proceedings which had been had in the courts, but

which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties. Such a

legislative enactment would be doubly objectionable: first, as an

exercise of judicial power, since, the proceedings in court being

void, it would be the statute alone which would constitute an

adjudication upon the rights of the parties; and, second, because,

in all judicial proceedings, notice to parties and an opportunity

to defend are essential, — both, of which they would be deprived

of in such a case.2 And for like reasons a statuto validating

1 See post, pp. 371-381.

* In McDaniel v. Correll, 19 HI. 226, it appeared that a statute had been passed

to make valid certain legal proceedings by which an alleged will was adjudged

void, and which were had against non-resident defendants, over whom the courts

bad obtained no jurisdiction. The court say: "If it was competent for the legis-

lature to make a void proceeding valid, then it has been done in this case.

Upon this question we cannot for a moment doubt or hesitate. They can no

more impart a binding efficacy to a void proceeding, than they can take one man's

property from him and give it to another. Indeed, to do the one is to accomplish

the oiher. By the decree in this case the will in question was declared void,

and, consequently, if effect be given to the decree, the legacies -given to those

[117]
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[* 108] proceedings * had before an intruder into a judicial office,

before whom no one is authorized or required to appear,

and who could have jurisdiction neither of the parties nor of the

subject-matter, would also be void.1

absent defendants by the will are taken from them and given to others, according

to our statute of descents. Until the passage of the act in question, they were

not bound by the verdict of the jury in this case, and it could not form the basis

of a valid decree. Had the decree been rendered before the passage of the act,

it would have been as competent to make that valid as it was to validate the ante-

cedent proceedings upon which alone the decree could rest. The want of juris-

diction over the defendants was as fatal to the one as it could be to the other. If

we assume the act to be valid, then the legacies which before belonged to the

legatees have now ceased to be theirs, and this result has been brought about

by the legislative act alone. The effect of the act upon them is precisely the

same as if it had declared in direct terms that the legacies bequeathed by this will

to these defendants should not go to them, but should descend to the heirs-at-Iaw

of the testator, according to our law of descents. This it will not be pretended

that they could do directly, and they had no more authority to do it indirectly,
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by making proceedings binding upon them which were void in law." See, to the

same effect, Richards v. Rote, 68 Penn. St. 248.

1 In Denny ». Mattoon, 2 Allen, 361, a judge in insolvency had made certain

orders in a case pending in another jurisdiction, and which the courts subse-

quently declared to be void. The legislature then passed an act declaring that

they "are hereby confirmed, and the same shall be taken and deemed good and

valid in law, to all intents and purposes whatsoever." On the question of the

validity of this act the court say: "The precise question is, whether it can be

held to operate so as to confer a jurisdiction over parties and proceedings which

it has been judicially determined does not exist, and give validity to acts and proc-

esses which have been adjudged void. The statement of this question seems to

us to suggest the obvious and decisive objection to any construction of the statute

which would lead to such a conclusion. It would be a direct exercise by the

legislature of a power in its nature clearly judicial, from the use of which it is

expressly prohibited by the thirtieth article of the Declaration of Rights. The

line which marks and separates judicial from legislative duties and functions is

often indistinct and uncertain, and it is sometimes difficult to decide within which

of the two classes a particular subject falls. All statutes of a declaratory nature,

which are designed to interpret or give a meaning to previous enactments, or to

confirm the rights of parties either under their own contracts or growing out of

the proceedings of courts or public bodies, which lack legal validity, involve in

a certain sense the exercise of a judicial power. They operate upon subjects

which might properly come within the cognizance of the courts and form the

basis of judicial consideration ami judgment. But they may, nevertheless, be

supported as being within the legitimate sphere of legislative action, on the ground

that they do not declare or determine, but only confirm rights; that they give

effect to the acts of parties according to their intent; that they furnish new and

more efficacious remedies, or create a more beneficial interest or tenure, or, by

[118]
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* Legislative Divorces. [* 109]

There is another class of cases in which it would seem that

action ought to be roferred exclusively to the judicial tribunals,

but in respect to which the prevailing doctrine seems to be, that

supplying defects and curing informalities in the proceedings of courts, or of

public officers acting within the scope of their authority, they give effect to acts to

which there was the express or implied assent of the parties interested. Statutes

which are intended to accomplish such purposes do not necessarily invade the

province, or directly interfere with the action of judicial tribunals. But if we adopt

the broadest and most comprehensive view of the power of the legislature, we

must place some limit beyond which the authority of the legislature cannot go

without trenching on the clear and well-defined boundaries of judicial powep."

"Although it may be difficult, if not impossible, to lay down any general rule

which may serve to determine, in all cases, wh"ther the limits of constitutional

restraint are overstepped by the exercise by one branch of the government of

powers exclusively delegated to another, it certainly is practicable to apply to

each case as it arises some test by which to ascertain whether this fundamental

principle is violated. If, for example, the practical operation of a statute is to

determine adversary suits pending between party and party, by substituting in

place of the well-settled rules of law the arbitrary will of the legislature, and
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thereby controlling the action of the tribunal before which the suits are pending,

no one can doubt that it would be an unauthorized act of legislation, because it

directly infringes on the peculiar and appropriate functions of the judiciary. It

is the exclusive province of the courts of justice to apply established' principles

to cases within their jurisdiction, and to enforce their jurisdiction by rendering

judgments and executing them by suitable process. The legislature have no

power to interfere with this jurisdiction in such manner as to change the decision

of cases pending before courts, or to impair or set aside their judgments, or to

take cases out of the settled course of judicial proceeding. It is on this principle

that it has been held, that the legislature have no power to grant a new trial or

direct a rehearing of a cause which has been once judicially settled. The right

to a review, or to try anew facts which have been determined by a verdict or

decree, depends on fixed and well-settled principles, which it is the duty of the

court to apply in the exercise of a sound judgment and discretion. These can-

not be regulated or governed by legislative action. Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324,

837; Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326; Decbastellux p. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18.

A fortiori, an act of the legislature cannot set aside or amend final judgments

or decrees." The court further consider the general subject at length, and ad-

judge the particular enactment under consideration void, both as an exercise of

judicial authority, and also because, in declaring valid the void proceedings in

insolvency against the debtor, under which assignees had been appointed, it took

away from the debtor his property, "not by due process of law or the law of the

land, but by an arbitrary exercise of legislative will." See, further, Griffin's

Executor v. Cunningham, 20 Grat. 109.

[119]
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[* 110] the legislature * has complete control unless specially

restrained by the State constitution. The granting of

divorces from the bonds of matrimony was not confided to the

courts in England, and from the earliest days the Colonial and

State legislatures in this country have assumed to possess the same

power over the subject which was possessed by the Parliament, and

from time to time they have passed special laws declaring a disso-

lution of the bonds of matrimony in special cases. Now it is clear

that "the question of divorce involves investigations which are

properly of a judicial nature, and the jurisdiction over divorces

ought to be confined exclusively to the judicial tribunals, under

the limitations to be prescribed by law;"1 and so strong is the

general conviction of this fact, that the people in framing their

constitutions, in a majority of the States, have positively forbidden

any such special laws.2

1 2 Kent, 106. See Levins v. Sleator, 2 Greene (Iowa), 607.

* The following are constitutional provisions: — Alabama: Divorces from the

bonds of matrimony shall not be granted but in the eases by law provided for,

and by suit in chancery; but decrees in chancery for divorce shall be final, un-
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less appealed from in the manner prescribed by law, within three months from the

date of the enrolment thereof. Arkansas: The General Assembly shall not

have power to pass any bill of divorce, but may prescribe by law the manner in

which such cases may be investigated in the courts of justice, and divorces granted.

California: No divorce shall be granted by the legislature. The provision is

the same or similar in Iowa, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada,

Nebraska, Oregon, New Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin. Florida: Divorces from

the bonds of matrimony shall not be allowed but by the judgment of a court, as

shall be prescribed by law. Georgia: The Superior Court shall have exclusite

jurisdiction in all cases of divorce, both total and partial. Illinois: The Gen-

eral Assembly shall not pass . . . special laws . . . for granting divorces. Kan-

sas: And power to grant divorces is vested in the District Courts subject to

regulations by law. Kentucky: The General Assembly shall have no power to

grant divorces, . . . but by general laws shall confer such powers on the courts

of justice. Louisiana: The legislature may enact general laws regulating the . . •

granting of divorce; but no special laws shall be enacted relating to particular

or individual cases. Massachusetts: All causes of marriage, divorce, and alimony

. . . shall be heard and determined by the Governor and Council, until the legis-

lature shall by law make other provision. Mississippi: Divorces from the bonds

of matrimony shall not be granted but in cases provided for by law, and by

suit in chancery. New Hampshire: All causes of marriage, divorce, and alimony

. . . shall be heard and tried by the Superior Court, until the legislature shall

by law make other provision. New York: . . . nor shall any divorce be granted

otherwise than by due judicial proceedings. North Carolina: The General

Assembly shall have power to pass general laws regulating divorce and alimony,

[120]
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* Of the judicial decisions on the subject of legislative [* 111]

power over divorces there seem to be three classes of cases.

The doctrine of the first class seems to be this: The granting of a

divorce may be either a legislative or a judicial act, according as

the legislature shall refer its consideration to the courts, or reserve

it to itself. The legislature has the same full control over the sta-

tus of husband and wife which it possesses over the other domestic

relations, and may permit or prohibit it according to its own views

of what is for the interest of the parties or the good of the public.

In dissolving the relation, it proceeds upon such reasons as to it

seem sufficient; and if inquiry is made into the facts of the past,

it is no more than is needful when any change of the law is con-

templated, with a view to the establishment of more salutary rules

for the future. The inquiry, therefore, is not judicial in its nature,

and it is not essential that there be any particular finding of mis-

conduct or unfitness in the parties. As in other cases of legisla-

but shall not have power to grant a divorce or secure alimony in any particular

case. Ohio: The General Assembly shall grant no divorce, nor exercise any

judicial power, not herein expressly conferred. Pennsylvania: The legislature

shall not have power to enact laws annulling the contract of marriage in any case
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where by law the courts of this Commonwealth are, or hereafter may be, empow-

ered to decree a divorce. Tennessee: The legislature shall have no power to

grant divorces, but may authorize the courts of justice to grant them for such

causes as may be specified by law; but such laws shall be general and uniform

in their operation throughout the State. Virginia: The legislature shall confer

on the courts the power to grant divorces, . . . but shall not, by special legis-

lation, grant relief in such cases. West Virginia: The Circuit Courts shall have

power under such general regulations as may be prescribed by law, to grant

divorces, . . . but relief shall not be granted by special legislation in such

cases. Missouri: The legislature shall not pass special laws divorcing any

named parties. Under the Constitution of Michigan it was held that, as the

legislature was prohibited from granting divorces, they could pass no special act

authorizing the courts to divorce for a cause which was not a legal cause for

divorce under the general laws. Toft v. Teft, 3 Mich. 67. See also Clark v.

Clark, 10 N. H. 387; Simonds v. Simonds, 103 Mass. 572; s. c. 4 Am. Rep.

676. The case of White v. White, 105 Mass. 325, was peculiap. A woman pro-

cured a divorce from her husband, and by the law then in force he was prohibited

from marrying again except upon leave procured from the court. He did marry

again, however, and the legislature passed a special act to affirm this marriage.

In pursuance of a requirement of the constitution, jurisdiction of all cases of

marriage and divorce had previously been vested by law in the courts. Held,

that this took from the legislature all power to act upon the subject in special

cases, and the attempt to validate the marriage was consequently ineffectual.

[121]
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tive action, the reasons or the motives of the legislature cannot be

inquired into; the relation which the law permitted before is now

forbidden, and the parties are absolved from the obligations grow-

ing out of that relation wliich continued so long as the relation

existed, but which necessarily cease with its termination. Mar-

riage is not a contract, but a status; the parties cannot have vested

rights of property in a domestic relation; therefore the legislative

act does not come under condemnation as depriving parties

[* 112] of * rights contrary to the law of the land, but, as in other

cases within the scope of the legislative authority, the leg-

islative will must be regarded as sufficient reason for the rule

which it promulgates.1

i The leading case on this subject is Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541. On the

question whether a divorce is necessarily a judicial act, the court say: "A fur-

ther objection is urged against this act; viz., that by the new constitution of 1818,

there is an entire separation of the legislative and judicial departments, and that

the legislature can now pass no act or resolution not clearly warranted by that

constitution; that the constitution is a grant of power, and not a limitation of

powers already possessed; and, in short, that there is no reserved power in the
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legislature since the adoption of this constitution. Precisely the opposite of this

is true. From the settlement of the State there have been certain fundamental

rules by which power has been exercised. These rules were embodied in an

instrument called by some a constitution, by others a charter. All agree that it

was the first constitution ever made in Connecticut, and made, too, by the people

themselves. It gave very extensive powers to the legislature, and left too much

(for it left every thing almost) to their will. The constitution of 1818 proposed

to, and in fact did, limit that will. It adopted certain general principles by a

preamble called a Declaration of Rights; provided for the election and appoint-

ment of certain organs of the government, such as the legislative, executive, and

judicial departments; and imposed upon them certain restraints. It found the

State sovereign and independent, with a legislative power capable of making all

laws necessary for the good of the people, not forbidden by the Constitution of

the United States, nor opposed to the sound maxims of legislation; and it left

them in the same condition, except so far as limitations were provided. There

is now and has been a law in force on the subject of divorces. The law wa»

passed a hundred and thirty years ago. It provides for divorces a vinculo matri-

monii in four cases; viz., adultery, fraudulent contract, wilful desertion, and seven

years' absence unheard of. The law has remained in substance the same as it

was when enacted in 16C7. During all this period the legislature has interfered

like the Parliament of Great Britain, and passed special acts of divorce a vin-

culo matrimonii; and at almost every session since the Constitution of the United

States went into operation, now forty-two years, and for the thirteen years of

the existence of the Constitution of Connecticut, such acts have been, in multi-

plied cases, passed and sanctioned by the constituted authorities of our State.

We are not at liberty to inquire into the wisdom of our existing law upon this
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* The second class of cases to which we have alluded [* 113]

hold that divorce is a judicial act in those cases upon

which the general laws confer on the courts power to adjudicate;

and that consequently in those cases the legislature cannot pass

special laws, but its full control over the relation of marriage will

leave it at liberty to grant divorces in other cases, for such causes

as shall appear to its wisdom to justify them.1

A third class of cases deny altogether the authority of these

special legislative enactments, and declare the act of divorce to

be in its nature judicial, and not properly within the province of

thb legislative powep.2 The most of these decisions, however,

lay more or less stress upon clauses in the constitutions other

than those which in general terms separate the legislative and

judicial functions, and some of them would perhaps have been

diffirently decided but for those other clauses. But it is safe to

say, that the general sentiment in the le,gal profession is against

the rightfulness of special legislative divorces; and it is believed

subject; nor into the expediency of such frequent interference of the legislature.

We can only inquire into the constitutionality of the act under consideration.

The power is not prohibited either by the Constitution of the United States or
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by that of this State. In view of the appalling consequences of declaring the

general law of the State, or the repeated acts of our legislature, unconstitutional

and void, consequences easily perceived, but not easily expressed, — such as

bastardizing the issue and subjecting the parties to punishment for adultery, —

the court should come to the result only on a solemn conviction that their oaths

of office and these constitutions imperiously demand it. Feeling myself no such

conviction, I cannot pronounce the act void." Per Daggett, J., Hosmer, Ch. J.,

and Bisxell, J., concurring. Peters, J., dissented. Upon the same subject, see

Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463; Wright p. Wright, 2 Md. 429; Gaines v.

Gaines. 9. B. Monp. 295; Cabell p. Cabell, 1 Met. (Ky.) 319; Dickson v. Dick-

son, 1 Yerg. 110; Melizet's Appeal, 17 Penn. St. 449; Cronise v. Cronise, 54

Penn. St. 255; Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480 ; Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Harp. 440;

Noel p. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37; and the examination of the whole subject by Mp.

Bishop, in bis work on Marriage and Divorce.

1 Levins p. Sleator, 2 Greene (Iowa), 604; Opinions of Judges, 16 Me. 479;

Adams p. Palmer, 51 Me. 480. See also Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Harp. 440. In

a well-reasoned case in Kentucky, it was held that a legislative divorce obtained

on the application of one of the parties while suit for divorce was pending in a

court of competent jurisdiction, would not affect the rights to property of the

other, growing out of the relation. Gaines v. Gaines, 9 B. Monp. 295.

'Bri^bam p. Miller, 17 Ohio, 445; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 380; Ponder

v. Graham, 4 Flop. 23; State v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120; Bryson v. Campbell, 12 Mo.

498; Bryson v. Bryson, 17 Mo. 590. See also Jones v. Jones, 12 Penn. St.

353, 354.

[123]
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that, if the question could originally have been considered by the

courts, unembarrassed by any considerations of long acquiescence,

and of the serious consequences which must result from affirming

their unlawfulness, after so many had been granted and new

relations formed, it is highly probable that these enactments would

have been held to be usurpations of judicial authority, and we

should have been spared the necessity for the special constitu-

tional provisions which have since been introduced. Fortunately,

these provisions render the question now discussed of little prac-

tical importance; at the same time that they refer the

[* 114] decision * upon applications for divorce to those tribunals

which must proceed upon inquiry, and cannot condemn

without a hearing.1

The force of a legislative divorce must in any case be confined

to a dissolution of the relation; it can only be justified on the

ground that it merely lays down a rule of conduct for the parties

to observe towards each other for the future. It cannot inquire

iuto the past, with a view to punish the parties for their offences
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against the marriage relation, except so far as the divorce itself

can be regarded as a punishment. It cannot order the payment of

alimony, for that would be a judgment;2 it cannot adjudge upon

conflicting claims to property between the parties, but it must leave

all questions of this character to the courts. Those rights of

property which depend upon the continued existence of the relation

will be terminated by the dissolution, but only as in any other case

1 If marriage is a natural right, then it would seem that any particular mar-

riage that parties might lawfully form they must have a lawful right to continue

in, unless by misbehavior they subject themselves to a forfeiture of the right

And if the legislature can annul the relation in one case, without any finding

that a breach of the marriage contract has been committed, then it would seem

that they might annul it in every case, and even prohibit all parties from entering

into the same relation in the future. The recognition of a full and complete

control of the relation in the legislature, to be exercised at its will, leads in-

evitably to this conclusion; so that, under the " rightful powers of legislation"

which our constitutions confer upon the legislative department, a relation essen-

tial to organized civil society might be abrogated entirely. Single legislative

divorces are but single steps towards this barbarism which the application of the

same principle to every individual case, by a general law, would necessarily bring

upon us. See what is said by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Bryson v. Bry-

aon, 17 Mo. 593, 594.

* Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 4G3; Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 48C.
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rights in the future may be incidentally affected by a change in

the law.1

Legislative Encroachments upon Executive Power.

If it is difficult to point out the precise boundary which sep-

arates legislative from judicial duties, it is still more difficult to

discriminate, in particular cases, between what is properly legis-

lative and what is properly executive duty. The authority that

makes the laws has large discretion in determining the means

through which they shall be executed; and the perform-

ance of * many duties which they may provide for by law, [*115]

they may refer either to the chief executive of the State,

or, at their option, to any other executive or ministerial officer, or

even to a person specially named for the duty.2 What can be def-

initely said on this subject is this: That such powers as are specially

conferred by the constitution upon the governor, or upon any other

specified officer, the legislature cannot require or authorize to be

performed by any other officer or authority; and from those duties

which the constitution requires of him he cannot be excused by law.3

1 Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 545.

'This is affirmed in the recent case of Bridges v. Shallcross, in the Supreme
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Court of West Virginia, not yet reported. The constitution of that State pro-

vides that the governor shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of

the Senate appoint, all officers whose offices are established by the constitution,

or shall be created by law, and whose appointment or election is not otherwise pro-

vided for, and that no such officers shall be appointed or elected by the legislature.

The Court decided that this did not preclude the legislature from creating a Hoard

of Public Works of which the State officers should be ex officio the members.

] Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 522. "Whatever power or duty is

expressly given to, or imposed upon, the executive department, is altogether free

from the interference of the other branches of the government. Especially is

this the case where the subject is committed to the discretion of the chief executive

officer, either by the constitution or by the laws. So long as the power is vested

in him, it is to be by him exercised, and no other branch of the government can

control its exercise." Under the Constitution of Ohio, which forbids the exercise

pf any appointing power by the legislature, except as therein authorized, it was

held that the legislature could not, by law, constitute certain designated persons

• State board, with power to appoint commissioners of the State House, and

directors of the penitentiary, and to remove such directors for cause. State v.

Kennon, 7 Ohio, N. s. 546. And see Davis v. State, 7 Md. 161; also, Bridges

Shallcross, Sup. Court of West Va., not yet reported. As to what are public

officers, see State v. Stanley, 66 N. C. 59; s. c. 8 Am. R p. 488. An appointment

<o office was said in Taylor v. Commonwealth, 3 J. J. Marsh. 404, to be intrinsi-
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But other powers or duties the executive cannot exercise or assume

except by legislative authority, and the power which in its discre-

tion it confers it may also in its discretion withhold, or confide to

other hands.1 Whether in those cases where power is given by the

constitution to the governor, the legislature have the same author-

ity to make rules for the exercise of the power, that they have to

make rules to govern the proceedings in the courts, may

[*116] perhaps be a question.2 It would seem * that this must

depend generally upon the nature of the power, and upon

cally an executive act. In a certain sense this is doubtless so, but it would not

follow that the legislature could exercise no appointing power, or could confer

none on others than the chief executive of the State. Where the constitution

contains no negative words to limit the legislative authority in this regard, the

legislature in enacting a law must decide for itself what are the suitable, con-

venient, or necessary agencies for its execution, and the authority of the executive

must be limited to taking care that the law is executed by such agencies.

1 "In deciding this question [as to the authority of the governor], recurrence

must be had to the constitution. That furnishes the only rule by which the court

can be governed. That is the charter of the governor's authority. All the pow-

ers delegated to him by or in accordance with that instrument, he is entided to

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

exercise, and no others. The constitution is a limitation upon the powers of the

legislative department of the government, but it is to be regarded as a grant of

powers to the other departments. Neither the executive nor the judiciary,

therefore, can exercise any authority or power except such as is clearly granted

by the constitution." Field v. People, 2 Scam. 80.

* Whether the legislature can constitutionally remit a fine, when the pardon-

ing power is vested in the governor by the constitution, has been made a question;

and the cases of Haley v. Clarke, 20 Ala. 439, and People v. Bireham, 12 Cal.

50, are opposed to each other upon the point. If the fine is payable to the

State, perhaps the legislature should be considered as having the same right to

discharge it that they would have to release any other debtor to the State from

his obligation. In Morgan v. Buffington, 21 Mo. 549, it was held that the State

Auditor was not obliged to accept as conclusive the certificate from the Speaker

of the House as to the sum due a member of the House for attendance upon it,

but that he might lawfully inquire whether the amount had been actually earned

by attendance or not. The legislative rule, therefore, cannot go to the extent

of compelling an executive officer to do something else than his duty, under any

pretence of regulation. The power to pardon offenders is vested by the several

State constitutions in the governor. It is not, however, a power which neces-

sarily inheres in the executive. State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 22. And several of

the State constitutions have provided that it shall be exercised under such regu-

lations as shall be prescribed by law. There are provisions more or less broad

to this purport in those of Kansas, Florida, Alabama, Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi,

Oregon, Indiana, Iowa, and Virginia. In State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20, an act of

the legislature .requiring the applicant for the remission of a fine or forfeiture
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the question whether the constitution, in conferring it, has fur-

nished a sufficient rule for its exercise. Where complete power to

pardon is conferred upon the executive, it may be doubted if the

legislature can impose restrictions under the name of rules or reg-

ulations; but where the governor is made commander-in-chief of

the military forces of the State, it is obvious that his authority

must bo exercised under such proper rules as the legislature may

prescribe, because the military forces are themselves under the

control of the legislature, and military law is prescribed by that

department. There would be this clear limitation upon the power

of the legislature to prescribe rules for the executive department;

that they must not be such as, under pretence of regulation,

divest the executive of, or preclude his exercising, any of his con-

stitutional prerogatives or powers. Those matters which the

constitution specifically confides to him the legislature cannot

directly or indirectly take from his control.

Delegating Legislative Power.

One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the

power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be

delegated by that department to any other body or authority.
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Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority,

there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency

alone * the laws must be made until the constitution [*117]

itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wis-

dom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted

cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agcn-

to forward to the governor, with his application, the opinion of certain county

officers a.s to the propriety of the remission, was sustained as an act within the

power conferred by the constitution upon the legislature to prescribe regulations

in these cases. And see Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 500. The power to reprieve

is not included in the power to pardon. Ex parte Howard, 17 N. II. 515. It

has been decided that to give parties who have been convicted and fined the

benefit of the insolvent laws is not an exercise of the pardoning powep. Ex parte

Scott, 19 Ohio, n. s. 581. And where the constitution provided that "In all

criminal and penal cases, except those of treason and impeachment, [the

governor] shall have power to grant pardons after conviction, and remit fines

&nd forfeitures," &p.,it was held that this did not preclude the legislature from

passing an act of pardon and amnesty for parties liable to prosecution, but not

jet convicted. State v. Nichols, 26 Ark. 74; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 600.
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cies upon which the power shall'be devolved, nor can it substitute

the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those

to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereigc

trust.1

But it is not always essential that a legislative act should be a

completed statute which must in any event take effect as law, at the

time it leaves the hands of the legislative department. A statute

may be conditional, and its taking effect may be made to depend

upon some subsequent event.2 Affirmative legislation may in some

cases be adopted, of which the parties interested are at liberty to

avail themselves or not at their option. A private act of incor-

poration cannot be forced upon the corporators; they may refuse

the franchise if they so choose.3 In these cases the legis-

[* 118] lative * act is regarded as complete when it has passed

through the constitutional formalities necessary to per-

1 "These are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the society, and

the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of every common-

wealth, in all forms of government: —

"First. They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied

in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at
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court and the countryman at plough.

"Secondly. These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately

but the good of the people.

"Thirdly. They must not raise taxes on the property of the people without

the consent of the people, given by themselves or their deputies. And this

properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being,

or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to

deputies, to be from time to time chosen by tfcemselves.

"Fourthly. The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making

laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." Locke

on Civil Government, § 142.

That legislative power cannot be delegated, see Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb.

112; Bradley v. Baxter, ii. 122; Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483 ; People v. Stout,

23 Barb. 349; Rice r. Foster, 4 Harr. 479; Santo r. State, 2 Iowa, 165: Gee-

brick v. State, 6 Iowa, 491; State t>. Beneke, 9 Iowa, 203; State v. Weir, 33

Iowa, 134; People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343; Railroad Company ». Commissioners

of Clinton County, 1 Ohio, N. S. 77; Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507;

Commonwealth v. McWilliains, 11 Penn. St. 61; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342;

Mohmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 482; State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 862; State v. Swisher,

17 Texas, 441; State v. Copeland, 3 R. I. 33; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458.

1 Brig Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch, 882; Bull v. Read, 13 Grat 78;

State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357; Peck t>. Weddell, 17 Ohio, n. 8. 271; Stater.

Kirkley, 29 Md. 85.

3 Angell and Ames on Corp. § 81.
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fected legislation, notwithstanding its actually going into operation

as law may depend upon its subsequent acceptance. We have

elsewhere spoken of municipal corporations, and of the powers of

legislation which may be and commonly are bestowed upon them,

and the bestowal of which is not to be considered as trenching

upon the maxim that legislative power is not to be delegated, since

that maxim is to be understood in the light of the immemorial

practice of this country and of England, which has always recog-

nized the propriety of vesting in the municipal organizations cer-

tain powers of local regulation, in respect to which the parties

immediately interested may fairly be supposed more competent to

judge of their needs than any central authority. As municipal

organizations are mere auxiliaries of the State government in the

important business of municipal rule, the legislature may create

them at will from its own views of propriety or necessity, and

without consulting the parties interested; and it also possesses the

like power to abolish them, without stopping to inquire what may

be the desire of the corporators on that subject.1

Nevertheless, as the corporators have a special and peculiar

interest in the terms and conditions of the charter, in the powers

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

conferred and liabilities imposed, as well as in the general ques-

tion whether they shall originally be or afterwards remain incor-

porated at all or not, and as the burdens of municipal government

must rest upon their shoulders, and especially as by becoming

incorporated they are held, in law, to undertake to discharge the

duties the charter imposes, it seems eminently proper that their

voice should be heard on the question of their incorporation, and

that their decision should be conclusive, unless, for strong reasons

of State policy or local necessity, it should seem important for the

State to overrule the opinion of the local majority. The right to

refer any legislation of this character to the people peculiarly

interested does not seem to be questioned, and the reference is

by no means unusual.2

1 City of Patterson ». Society, &c, 4 Zab. 385; Cheany v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr.

330; Berlin ». Gorham, 34 N. H. 266. The question of a levee tax may lawfully

be referred to the voters of the district of territory over which it is proposed to

spread the tax, regardless of municipal divisions. Alcorn r. Hamer, 38 Miss.

652. And see, in general, Angell and Ames on Corp. § 31 and note; also post,

pp. 190-192.

* Bull r. Read, 13 Grat. 78; Corning v. Greene, 23 Barb. 33; Morford v.

9 [ 129 ]
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[* 119] * For the like reasons the question whether a county or

township shall be divided and a new one formed,1 or two

townships or school districts formerly one be reunited,2 or a county

seat located at a particular place, or after its location removed

elsewhere,8 or the municipality contract particular debts, or engage

in a particular improvement,4 is always a question which may

with propriety be referred to the voters of the municipality for

decision.

Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; City of Patterson v. Society, &c., 4 Zab. 385; Gorham

v. Springfield, 21 Me. 58; Commonwealth v. Juilges of Quarter Sessions, 8 Penn.

St. 391; Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Penn. St. '.'14; Call v. Chadbourne, 46

Me. 206; State t>. Scott, 17 Mo. 521; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Hobartt.

Supervisors, &c, 17 Cal. 28; Bank of Chenango r. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467;

Steward v. Jefferson, 3 Harr. 335; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; Lafayette, &c,

R. R. Co. u. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185. The right to refer to the people of several

municipalities the question of their consolidation was disputed in Smith r.

McCarthy, 56 Penn. St. 359, but sustained by the court.

1 State o. Reynolds, 5 Gilm. 1. See State v. McNiell, 24 Wis. 149. The

question whether a general school law shall be accepted in a particular munici-
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pality may be referred to its voters. State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458.

* Commonwealth v. Judges, &c, 8 Penn. St. 391; Call v. Chadbourne, 46

Me. 206.

3 Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Penn. St. 214. See People v. Salomon, 51

111. 37.

4 The following are cases in which municipal subscriptions to works of inter-

nal improvement, under statutes empowering them to be made, have been sus-

tained: Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120; Bridgeport ». Housatonic Railroad

Co., 15 Conn. 475; Thomas v. Lelaud, 24 Wend. 65; Clarke v. Rochester, 24

Barb. 446; Benson v. Mayor, &c, of Albany, 24 Barb. 248; Corning v. Greene,

23 Barb. 83; Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb. 232; Starin v. Genoa, 29 Barb. 442,

and 23 N. Y. 439; Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome, 18 N. Y. 38; Pretty-

man v. Supervisors, &c, 19 111. 40G; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 111. 451; John-

son v. Stack, 24 111. 75; Perkins v. Perkins, ib. 2U8; Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis.

195; Clark v. Janesville, ib. 136; Stein v. Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; Mayor of

Wetumpka v. Winter, 29 Ala. 651; Pattison v. Yuba, 13 Cal. 175; Blanding

v. Burr, ib. 343; Hobart v. Supervisors, &c, 17 Cal. 23; Dubuque County ».

Railroad Co., 4 Greene (Iowa), 1; State v. Bissell, ib. 828; Clapp v. Cedar

County, 5 Iowa, 15; Gaines v. Robb, 8 Iowa, 193; McMillen v. Boyles, 6 Iowa,

804; Taylor u. Newberne, 2 Jones Eq. 141; Caldwell v. Justices of Burke, 4

Jones Eq. 323; Louisville. &c, Railroad Co. v. Davidson, 1 Sneed, 637; Nichol

v. Mayor of Nashville, 9 Humph. 252; Railroad Co. v. Commissioners of Clinton

Co., 1 Ohio, n. s. 77; Trustees of Paris v. Cherry, 8 Ohio, N. s. 564; Cass

v. Dillon, 2 Ohio, n. s. 607; State v. Commissioners of Clinton Co., 6 Ohio,

n. s. 280; State v. Van Home, 7 Ohio, n. a. 327; State v. Trustees of Union,

8 Ohio, u. 8. 394; Trustees, &c. v. Shoemaker, 12 Ohio, n. 8. 624; State r.
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The question then arises, whether that which may be

done in * reference to any municipal organization within [* 120]

the State may not also be done in reference to the State

at large? May not any law framed for the State at large be made

conditional on an acceptance by the people at large, declared

through the ballot-box? If it is not unconstitutional to delegate

to a single locality the power to decide whether it will be governed

by a particular charter, must it not quite as clearly be within the

power of the legislature to refer to the people at large, from whom

all power is derived, the decision upon any proposed statute affect-

ing the whole State? And can that be called a delegation of power

which consists only in the agent or trustee referring back to the

principal the final decision in a case where the principal is the

party concerned, and where perhaps there are questions of policy

and propriety involved which no authority can decide so satis-

factorily and so conclusively as the principal to whom they are

referred?

If the decision of these questions is to depend upon the weight

of judicial authority up to the present time, it must be held that

there is no power to refer the adoption or rejection of a general
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law to the people of the State, any more than there is to refer it to

Commissioners of Hancock, 12 Ohio, n. 8. 596; Powers v. Dougherty Co., 23

Geo. 65; San Antonio v. Jones, 28 Texas, 19; Commonwealth v. McWilliams,

11 Penn. St. 61; Sharpless v. Mayor, &c, 21 Penn. St. 147; Moers v. Reading,

to. 188; Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Monr. 526; Slack v. Railroad Co., 13 B. Monr. 1;

City of St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; City of Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74;

Cotton p. Commissioners of Leon, 6 Fla. 610; Copes v. Charleston, 10 Rich.

491; Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 639, and 24 How.

326; Same v. Wallace, 21 How. 547; Zabriske v. Railroad Co., 23 How. 381;

Amey u. Mayor, &c, 24 How. 365; Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1 Wal. 176; Thomp-

son v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; Rogers v. Burlington, ib. 654; Butler v. Dun-

bam, 27 111.. 474; Gibbons v. Mobile & Great Northern Railroad Co., 36 Ala.

410; St. Joseph, &c, Railroad Co. v. Buchanan Co. Court, 39 Mo. 485; State

v. Linn Co. Court, 44 Mo. 504; Stewart c. Supervisors of Polk Co., 30 Iowa,

9; John v. C. R. & F. W. R. R. Co., 35 Ind. 639; Leavenworth County o. Mil-

ler, 7 Kan. 479; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio, n. s. 14; Ex parte Selma, &c,

R.R. Co., 45 Ala. 696; S. & V. R.R. Co. v. Stockton, 41 Cal. 149. In several

of tueui the power to authorize the municipalities to decide upon sucb subscrip-

tions has been contested as a delegation of legislative authority, but the courts —

even those which bold the subscriptions void on other grounds — do not look upon

these cases as being obnoxious to the constitutional principle referred to in the

text.

[ 131 ]
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any other authority. The prevailing doctrine in the courts appears

to be, that, except in those cases where, by the constitution, ttw

people have expressly reserved to themselves a power of decision,

the function of legislation cannot be exercised by them, even to the

extent of accepting or rejecting a law which has been framed for

their consideration. "The exercise of tins power by the people in

other cases is not expressly and in terms prohibited by the constitu-

tion, but it is forbidden by necessary and unavoidable implication.

The Senate and Assembly are the only bodies of men clothed with

the power of general legislation. They possess the entire power,

with the exception above stated. The people reserved no part of

it to themselves [with that exception], and can therefore exercise

it in no other case." It is therefore held that the legislature have

no power to submit a proposed law to the people, nor have the

people power to bind each other by acting upon it. They volun-

tarily surrendered that power when they adopted the constitution.

The government of the State is democratic, but it is a represen-

tative democracy, and in passing general laws the people act only
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through their representatives in the legislature.1

[* 121] * Nor, it seems, can such legislation be sustained as

legislation of a conditional character, whose force is to

depend upon the happening of some future event, or upon some

future change of circumstances. "The event or change of circum-

stances on which a law may be made to take effect must be such

as, in the judgment of the legislature, affects the question of the

1 Per Buggies, Ch. J., in Barto v. Hirarod, 8 N. Y. 489. It is worthy of con-

sideration, however, whether there is any thing in the reference of a statute to

the people for acceptance or rejection which is inconsistent with the representa-

tive system of government. To refer it to the people to frame and agree upon

a statute for themselves would be equally impracticable and inconsistent with

the representative system; but to take the opinion of the people upon a bill

already framed by representatives and submitted to them, is not only practicable,

but is in precise accordance with the mode in which the constitution of the State

is adopted, and with the action which is taken in many other cases. The repre-

sentative in these cases has fulfilled precisely those functions which the people aa

a democracy could not fulfil; and where the case has reached a stage when the

body of the people can act without confusion, the representative has stepped

aside to allow their opinion to be expressed. The legislature is not attempting

in such a case to delegate its authority to a new agency, but the trustee, vested

with a large discretionary authority, is taking the opinion of the principal upon

the necessity, policy, or propriety of an act which is to govern the principal

himself. See Smith v. Jauesville, 26 Wis. 291.
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expediency of the law; an event on which the expediency of the

law in the opinion of the law-makers depends. On this question

of expediency, the legislature must exercise its own judgment

definitively and finally. When a law is made to take effect upon

the happening of such an event, the legislature in effect declared

the law inexpedient if the event should not happen, but expedient

if it should happen. They appeal to no other man or men to judge

for them in relation to its present or future expediency. They

exercise that power themselves, and then perform the duty which

the constitution imposes upon them." But it was held that in the

case of the submission of a proposed free-school law to the people,

no such event or change of circumstances affecting the expediency

of the law was expected to happen. The wisdom or expediency

of the School Act, abstractly considered, did not depend on the

vote of the people. If it was unwise or inexpedient before that

vote was taken, it was equally so afterwards. The event on which

the act was to take effect was nothing else than the vote of the

people on the identical question which the constitution makes

it the duty of the legislature itself to decide. The legislature

has no power to make a statute dependent on such a
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* contingency, because it would be confiding to others [* 122]

that legislative discretion which they are bound to exer-

cise themselves, and which they cannot delegate or commit to

any other man or men to be exercised.1

1 Per Ruggles, Ch. J., in Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 490. And see Santo v.

State, 2 Iowa, 165; State v. Beneke, 9 Iowa, 203; State v. Swisher, 17 Texas,

441; State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 470;

People v. Stout, 23 Barb. 349; State v. Wil eox, 45 Mo. 458. But upon this

point there is great force in what is said by Redfield, Ch. J., in Slate v. Parker,

26 Vt 357: "If the operation of a law may fairly be made to depend upon a

future contingency, then, in my apprehension, it makes no essential difference

what is the nature of the contingency, so it be an equal and fair one, a moral and

legal one, not opposed to sound policy, and so far connected with the object and

purpose of the statute as not to be a mere idle and arbitrary one. And to us the

contingency, upon which the present statute was to be suspended until another

legislature should meet and have opportunity of reconsidering it, was not only

proper and legal, and just and moral, but highly commendable and creditable to

the legislature who passed the statute; for at the very threshold of inquiry into

the expediency of such a law lies the other and more important inquiry, Are the

people prepared for such a law? Can it be successfully enforced? These ques-

tions being answered in the affirmative, he must be a bold man who would even

vote against the law; and something more must he be who would, after it had

[133]
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[* 123] * The same reasons which preclude the original enact-

ment of a law from being referred to the people woatl

been passed with that assurance, be willing to embarrass its operation or rejoice

at its defeat.

"After a full examination of the arguments by which it is attempted to be

sustained that statutes made dependent upon such contingencies are not valid

laws, and a good deal of study and reflection, I must declare that I am fully

convinced — although at first, without much examination, somewhat inclined to

the same opinion — that the opinion is the result of false analogies, and so founded

upon a latent fallacy. It seems to me that the distinction attempted between

the contingency of a popular vote and other future contingencies is without all

just foundation in sound policy or sound reasoning, and that it has too often been

made more from necessity than choice, — rather to escape from an overwhelming

analogy than from any obvious difference in principle in the two classes of cases;

for . . . one may find any number of cases in the legislation of Congress, where

statutes have been made dependent upon the shifting character of the revenue

laws, or the navigation laws, or commercial rules, edicts, or restric tions of other

countries. In some, perhaps, these laws are made by representative bodies, or,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

it may be, by the people of these States, and in others by the lords of the treas-

ury, or the boards of trade, or by the proclamation of the sovereign; and in all

these cases no question can be made of the perfect legality of our acts of Congress

being made dependent upon such contingencies. It is, in fact, the only possible

mode of meeting them, unless Congress is kept constantly in session. The same

is true of acts of Congress by which power is vested in the President to levy

troops or draw money from the public treasury, upon the contingency of a decla-

ration or an act of war committed by some foreign state, empire, kingdom, prince,

or potentate. If these illustrations are not sufficient to show the fallacy of the

argument, more would not avail." See also State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 292; Bull

t>. Read, 13 Grat. 78; Johnson v. Rich, 9 Barb. 680; State v. Reynolds, 5 Gilm.

1; Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 349. In the recent case of Smith v. Janesville,

26 Wis. 291, Chief Justice Dixon discusses this subject in the following lan-

guage: "But it is said that the act is void, or at least so much of it as pertains

to the taxation of shares in national banks, because it was submitted to a vote

of the people, or provided that it should take effect only after approval by a

majority of the electors voting on the subject at the next general election. This

was no more than providing that the act should take effect on the happening of

a certain future contingency, that contingency being a popular vote in its favor.

No one doubts the general power of the legislature to make such regulations and

conditions as it pleases with regard to the taking effect or operation of laws.

They may be absolute, or conditional and contingent; and if the latter, they

may take effect on the happening of any event which is future and uncertain.

Instances of this kind of legislation are not unfrequent. The law of Congress

suspending the writ of habeas corpus during the late rebellion is one, and several

others are referred to in the case In re Richard Oliver, 17 Wis. 681. It being

conceded that the legislature possesses this general power, the only question here

would seem to be, whether a vote of the people in favor of a law is to be excluded

from the number of those future contingent events upon which it may be pro-

[134]
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■t- render it equally incompetent to refer to their decision the ques-

tion, whether an existing law should be repealed. If the one is

"a plain surrender to the people of the law-making power," so

also is the other.1 It would seem, however, that if a legislative

act is, by its terms, to take effect in any contingency, it is not

unconstitutional to make the time when it shall take effect depend

upon the event of a popular vote being for or against it, — the

time of its going into operation being postponed to a later day in

the latter contingency.2 It would also seem that if the question

of the acceptance or rejection of a municipal charter can be

referred to the voters of the locality specially interested, it would

be equally competent to refer to them the question whether a

State law establishing a particular police regulation should be of

force in such locality or not. Municipal charters refer most

questions of local government, including police regulations, to the

local authorities; on the supposition that they are better able to

Tided that it shall take effect. A similar question was before this court in a late

case (State ex rel. Attorney-General v. O'Neill, Mayor, &c, 24 Wis. 149), and

was very elaborately discussed. We came unanimously to the conclusion in that
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case that a provision for a vote of the electors of the city of Milwaukee in favor

of an act of the legislature, before it should take effect, was a lawful contingency,

and that the act was valid. That was a law affecting the people of Milwaukee

particularly, while this was one affecting the people of the whole State. There

the law was submitted to the voters of that city, and here it was submitted to

those of the State at large. What is the difference between the two cases? It

is manifest, on principle, that there cannot be any. The whole reasoning of that

case goes to show that this act must be valid, and so it has been held in the best-

congidered cases, as will be seen by reference to that opinion. We are con-

strained to hold, therefore, that this act is and was in all respects valid from the

time it took effect, in November, 1866; and consequently that there was no want

of authority for the levy and collection of the taxes in question." This decision,

though opposed to many others, appears to us entirely sound and reasonable.

1 Geebrick p. State, 5 Iowa, 491; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 492 j Parker v. Com-

monwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507.

1 State p. Parker, 26 Vt. 857. The act under consideration in that case was,

by its terms, to take effect on the second Tuesday of March after its passage,

unless the people, to whose votes it was submitted, should declare against it, in

which case it should take effect in the following December. The case was dis-

tinguished from Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 488, and the act sustained. At the

same time the court express their dissent from the reasoning upon which the New

York case rests. In People p. Collins, 8 Mich. 848, the court was equally divided

in a case similar to that in Vermont, except that in the Michigan case the law,

which was passed and submitted to the people in 1858, was not to go into effect

until 1870, if the vote of the people was against it.

P [135]
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decide for themselves upon the needs, as well as the sentiments, of

their constituents, than the legislature possibly can be, and are

therefore more competent to judge what local regulations are

important, and also how far the local sentiment will assist in their

enforcement. The same reasons would apply in favor of permit-

ting the people of the locality to accept or reject for themselves a

particular police regulation, since this is only allowing them less

extensive powers of local government than a municipal charter

would confer; and the fact that the rule of law on that

[* 124] subject might be different in different * localities, accord-

ing as the people accepted or rejected the regulation,

would not seem to affect the principle, when the same result is

brought about by the different regulations which municipal cor-

porations establish for themselves in the exercise of an undisputed

authority.1 It is not to be denied, however, that there is con-

siderable authority against the right of legislative delegation in

these cases.

The legislature of Delaware, in 1847, passed an act to authorize

the citizens of the several counties of the State to decide by bal-
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lot whether the license to retail intoxicating liquors should be per-

mitted. By this act a general election was to be held; and if a

majority of votes in any county should be cast against license, it

1 In New Hampshire an act was passed declaring bowling-alleys, situate within

twenty-five rods of a dwelling-house, nuisances; but the statute was to be in

force only in those towns in which it should be adopted in town meeting. In

State v. Noyes, lOlFost. 293, this act was held to be constitutional. "Assuming,"

say the court, "that the legislature has the right to confer the power of local

regulation upon cities and towns, that is, the power to pass ordinances and by-

laws, in such terms and with such provisions, in the classes of cases to which the

power extends, as they may think proper, it seems to us hardly possible seriously

to contend that the legislature may not confer the power to adopt within such

municipality a law drawn up and framed by themselves. If they may pass a

law authorizing towns to make ordinances to punish the keeping of billiard-rooms,

bowling-alleys, and other places of gambling, they may surely pass laws to punish

the same acts, subject to be adopted by the town before they can be of force in

it." And it seems to us difficult to answer this reasoning, if it be confined to such

laws as fall within the proper province of local government, and which are there-

fore usually referred to the judgment of the municipal authorities or their constit-

uency. A similar question arose in Smith v. Village of Adrian, 1 Mich. 495, but

was not decided. In Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467, it was held

competent to authorize the electors of an incorporated village to determine for

themselves what sections of the general act for the incorporation of villages should

apply to their village. See, further, People o. Salomon, 51 111. 87.
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should not thereafter be lawful for any person to retail intoxicat-

ing liquors within such county; but if the majority should be cast

in favor of license, then licenses might be granted in the county

so voting, in the manner and under the regulations in said act

prescribed. The Court of Errors and Appeals of that State held

this act void, as an attempted delegation of the trust to make laws,

and upon the same reasons which support the cases before cited,

where acts have been held void which referred to the people of the

State for approval a law of general application.1 The same de-

cision was made near the same time by the Supreme

•Court of Pennsylvania,2 followed afterwards in an elabo- [* 125]

rate opinion by the Supreme Court of Iowa.3

By statute in Indiana it was enacted that no person should retail

spirituous liquors, except for sacramental, mechanical, chemical,

medicinal, or culinary purposes, without the consent of the

majority of the legal voters of the proper township who might

cast their votes for license at the April election, nor without filing

with the county auditor a bond as therein provided; upon the filing

of which the auditor was to issue to the person filing the same a

license to retail spirituous liquors, which was to be good for one
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year from the day of the election. This act was held void upon

similar reasons to those above quoted.4 This case follows the

decisions in Pennsylvania and Delaware,6 and it has since been

followed by another decision of the Supreme Court of that State,

except that while in the first case only that portion of the statute

which provided for submission to the people was held void, in the

later case that unconstitutional provision was held to affect the

whole statute with infirmity, and render the whole invalid.6

Irrepealable Laws.

Similar reasons to those which forbid the legislative department

of the State from delegating its authority will also forbid its pass-

1 Rice o. Foster, 4 Harr. 479.

'Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507.

'Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa, 495.

4 Maize o. State, 4 Ind. 342.

s Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507; Rice «. Foster, 4 Harr. 479.

See also State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529; Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 11 Penn.

St. 61; State v. Copeland, 8 R. I. 38.

„ * Meshmeier o. State, 11 Ind. 484.
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ing any irrepealable law. The constitution, in conferring the leg-

islative authority, has prescribed to its exercise any limitations

which the people saw fit to impose; and no other power than the

people can superadd other limitations. To say that the legislature

may pass irrepealable laws, is to say that it may alter the very

constitution from which it derives its authority; since in so far as

one legislature could bind a subsequent one by its enactments, it

could in the same degree reduce the legislative power of its suc-

cessors, and the process might be repeated until, one by one, the

subjects of legislation would be excluded altogether from

[* 126] their control, and the constitutional provision, that the * leg-

islative power shall be vested in two houses, would be to a

greater or less degree rendered ineffectual.1

"Acts of Parliament," says Blackstone, "derogatory to the

power of subsequent Parliaments, bind not; so the statute 11

Henry VII. c. 1, which directs that no person for assisting a king

de facto shall be attainted of treason by act of Parliament or

otherwise, is held to be good only as to common prosecutions for
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high treason, but it will not restrain- or clog any parliamentary

attainder. Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign

power, is always of equal, and always of absolute authority; it

acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature

must have been if its ordinances could bind a subsequent Parlia-

ment. And upon the same principle, Cicero, in his letters to Atti-

cus, treats with a proper contempt those restraining clauses which

endeavor to tie up the hands of succeeding legislatures. 'When

1 "Unlike the decision of a court, a legislative act does not bind a subsequent

legislature. Each body possesses the same power, and has a right to exercise

the same discretion. Measures, though often rejected, may receive legislative

sanction. There is no mode by which a legislative act can be made irrepealable,

except it assume the form and substance of a contract. If in any line of

legislation, a permanent character could be given to acts, the most injurious

consequences would result to the country. Its policy would become fixed and

unchangeable on great national interests, which might retard, if not destroy, the

public prosperity. Every legislative body, unless restricted by the constitution,

may modify or abolish the acts of its predecessors; whether it would be wise to

do so, is a matter for legislative discretion." Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean,

161. See this subject considered in Wall v. State, 23 Ind. 150, and State c.

Oskins, 28 Ind. 364. In Kellogg v. Oshkosh, 14 Wis. C23, it was held that one

legislature could not bind a future one to a particular mode of appeal.
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you repeal the law itself,' says he,' you at the same time repeal the

prohibitory clause which guards against such repeal.' " 1

Although this reasoning does not in all its particulars apply to

the American legislatures, the principle applicable in each case is

the same. There is a modification of the principle, however, by

an important provision of the Constitution of the United States,

forbidding the States from passing any laws impairing the obliga-

tion of contracts. Legislative acts are sometimes in substance

contracts between the State and the party who is to derive some

right under them, and they are not the less under the protection

of the clause quoted because of having assumed this form. Char-

ters of incorporation, except those of a municipal character,—

and which, as we have already seen, create mere agencies

of government, — * are held to be contracts between the [* 127] ^

State and the corporators, and not subject to modification

or change by the act of the State alone, except as may be author-

ized by the terms of the charters themselves.2 And it now seems <

to be settled, by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United

States, that a State, by contract to that effect, based upon a con-

sideration, may exempt the property of an individual or corpora-
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tion from taxation for any specified period or even permanently.

And it is also settled, by the same decisions, that where a charter

containing an exemption from taxes, or an agreement that the

taxes shall be to a specified amount only, is accepted by the cor-

porators, the exemption is presumed to be upon sufficient con- 1< 'v i ,

sideration, and consequently binding upon the State.3 ''IVW'AiiY •

'1 Bl. Com. 90. ^ 1 \*. .

'Dartmouth College p. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Planters Bank v. Sharp,

6 How. 301.

3 Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133; New Jersey p. Wilson, 7 Cranch,

164; Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co.

p. Debolt, 16 How. 416, 432; Dodge 0. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Mechanics and

Traders Bank v. Debolt, 18 How. 381; Jefferson Branch Bank p. Skelly, 1 Black,

436. See also Hunsaker p. Wright, 30 1ll. 146; Spooner p. McConnell, 1 McLean,

347; post, 280. The right of a State legislature to grant away the right of tax-

ation, which is one of the essential attributes of sovereignty, has been strenuously

denied. See Debolt v. Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co., 1 Ohio, n. s. 568; Mechanics

and Traders Bank v. Debolt, ib. 591; Brewster p. Hough, 10 N. H. 143; Mott

v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 30 Penn. St. 9. And see Thorpe v. Rutland and

B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 146; post, 280 and note. In Brick Presbyterian Church

p. Mayor, &c, of New York, 5 Cow. 538, it was held that a municipal corpora-

tion had no power, as a party, to make a contract which should control or em-
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Territorial Limitation to State Legislative Authority.

The legislative authority of every State must spend its

[* 128] force * within the territorial limits of the State. The

legislature of one State cannot make laws by which people

outside the State must govern their actions, except as they may

have occasion to resort to the remedies which the State provides,

or to deal witli property situated within the State. It can have no

authority upon the high seas beyond State lines, because there is

the point of contact with other nations, and all international ques-

tions belong to the national government.1 It cannot provide for the

punishment as crimes of acts committed beyond the State boundary,

because such acts, if offences at all, must be offences against the

sovereignty within whose limits they have been done.2 But if the

consequences of an unlawful act committed outside the State have

reached their ultimate and injurious result within it, it seems

that the perpetrator may be punished as an offender against such

State.3

barrass its discharge of legislative duties. And see post, p. 206. In Coats v.
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Mayor, &c, of New York, 7 Cow. 585, it was decided that though a municipal

corporation grant lands for cemetery purposes, and covenant for their quiet

enjoyment, it will not thereby be estopped afterwards to forbid the use of the

land, by by-law, for that purpose, when such use becomes or is likely to become a

nuisance. See also, on the same subject, Morgan v. Smith, 4 Minn. 104;

Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Penn. St. 411; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 377; Hamrick v. Rouse,

17 Geo. 56, where it was held that the legislature could not bind its successors

not to remove a county seat; Bass v. Fontleroy, 11 Texas, 698; Shaw v. Macon,

21 Geo. 280; Regents of University v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 390; Mott v. Penn-

sylvania Railroad Co., 30 Penn. St. 9. In Bank of Republic v. Hamilton, 21 111-

53, it was held that, in construing a statute, it will hot be intended that the

legislature designed to abandon its right as to taxation. This subject is con-

sidered further, post, pp. 280-284.

1 1 Bish. Cr. Law, § 120.

s State v. Knight, 2 Hayw. 109; People ». Merrill, 2 Park. Cr. R. 590;

Adams v. People, 1 N. Y. 173; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; Morrissey v.

People, 11 Mich. 327; Bromley v. People, 7 Mich. 472; State v. Main, 16 Wis.

898.

* In Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320, it was held constitutional to punish in

Michigan a homicide committed by a mortal blow in Canadian waters, from which

death resulted in the State. In Morrissey o. People, 11 Mich. 827, the court

was divided on the question whether the State could lawfully provide for the

punishment of persons who, having committed larceny abroad, brought the stolen
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Other Limitations of Legislative Authority.

Besides the limitations of legislative authority to which we have

referred, others exist which do not seem to call for special remark.

Some of these are prescribed by constitutions,1 but

* others spring from the very nature of free government. [* 129]

The latter must depend for their enforcement upon legis-

lative wisdom, discretion, and conscience. The legislature is to

make laws for the public good, and not for the benefit of individu-

als. It has control of the public moneys, and should provide for

property within the State. The power was sustained in People v. Williams,

24 Mich. 156, where the larceny was in another State. And see State v. Main,

16 Wis. 398.

1 The restrictions upon State legislative authority are much more extensive in

some constitutions than in others. The Constitution of Missouri has the following

provision: "The General Assembly shall not pass special laws divorcing any

named parties, or declaring any named person of age, or authorizing any named

minor to sell, lease, or encumber his or her property, or providing for the sale

of the real estate of any named minor or other person laboring under iegal

disability, by any executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or other person, or

establishing, locating, altering the course, or effecting the construction of roads,
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or the building or repairing of bridges, or establishing, altering, or vacating any

street, avenue, or alley in any city or town, or extending the time for the assess-

ment or collection of taxes, or otherwise relieving any assessor or collector of

taxes from the due performance of his official duties, or giving effect to informal

or invalid wills or deeds, or legalizing, except as against the State, the unauthor-

ized or invalid acts of any officer, or granting to any individual or company the

right to lay down railroad tracks in the streets of any city or town, or exempting

any property of any named person or corporation from taxation. The General

Assembly shall pass no special law for any case for which provision can be made

hy a general law, but shall pass general laws providing, so far as it may deem

necessary, for the cases enumerated in this section, and for all other cases where

a general law can be made applicable." Constitution of Missouri, art. 4, § 27.

We should suppose that so stringent a provision would, in some of these cases,

lead to the passage of general laws of doubtful utility in order to remedy the

hardships of particular cases. As to when a general law can be made appli-

cable, see Thomas v. Board of Commissioners, 5 Ind. 4; State v. Squires, 26

Iowa, 340; Johnson p. Railroad Co., 23 111. 202. In State v. Hitchcock, 1 Kan-

sas, 178, it was held that the constitutional provision, that "in all cases where a

general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted," left a dis-

cretion with the legislature to determine the cases in which special laws should

be passed. See to the same effect Gentile p. State, 29 Ind. 409, and Marks v.

Trustees of Pirdue University, 37 Ind. 163, overruling Thomas v. Board of

Commissioners, supra. To the same effect is State v. County Court of Boone,
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disbursing them only for public purposes. Taxes should only

be levied for those purposes which properly constitute a public

burden. But what is for the public good, and what are public

purposes, and what does properly constitute a public burden, are

questions which the legislature must decide upon its own judgment,

and in respect to which it is vested with a large discretion which

cannot be controlled by the courts, except, perhaps, where its action

is clearly evasive, and where, under pretence of a lawful authority,

it has assumed to exercise one that is unlawful. Where the power

which is exercised is legislative in its character, the courts can

enforce only those limitations which the constitution imposes, and

not those implied restrictions which, resting in theory only, the

people have been satisfied to leave to the judgment, patriotism, and

sense of justice of their representatives.1

50 Mo. 317. Compare Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23; Darling v. Rogers, 7 Kan.

692; Ex parte Pritz, 9 Iowa, 30. Where the legislature is forbidden to pass

special or local laws regulating county or township business, a special act allow-

ing and ordering payment of a particular claim is void, even though the claim,
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being merely an equitable one, cannot be audited by any existing board. Wil-

liams t>. Bidleman, 7 Nev. 68. See Darling v. Rogers, 7 Kan. 592. An act

creating a criminal court for a particular county is not in conflict with the consti-

tutional prohibition of special legislation. Eitel v. State, 33 Ind. 201. See

Matter of Bovle, 9 Wis. 261. A constitutional provision that requires all laws

of a general nature to have uniform operation throughout the State is eomplied

with in a statute applicable to all cities of a certain class having less than one

hundred thousand inhabitants, though in fact there be but one city in the State

of that class. Welker c. Potter, 18 Ohio, n. s. 85. See, further, Bourland v.

Hildreth, 26 Cal. 162; Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366; McAurich v. Mississippi,

&c, R.R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338; Rice v. State, 3 Kansas, 141; Jackson v. Shawl,

29 Cal. 267; Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409; State v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15;

Ensworth o. Albin, 46 Mo. 450.

1 State v. McCanu, 21 Ohio St. 211,212.
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*CHAPTER VI. [*130]

OP THE ENACTMENT OP LAWS.

When the supreme power of a country is wielded by a single

man, or by a single body of men, few questions can arise in the

courts concerning the manner of its exercise, and any discussion of

rules by which it is to be governed, in the enactment of laws, can be

of very little practical value. For whenever the sovereign power

expresses its will that a certain rule shall be established, that

expression must be conclusive, whether such forms have been ob-

served in making the declaration as are customary and proper or

not. We may query whether the will has been declared; we may

question and cross-question the words employed, to ascertain the

real sense that they express; we may doubt and hesitate as to the

intent; but when discovered, it must govern, and it is idle to talk

of forms that should have surrounded the expression, but do not.

But when the legislative power of a State is to be exercised by a

department composed of two branches, or, as in most of the

American States, of three branches, and these brandies have their
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several duties marked out and prescribed by the law to which they

owe their origin, and which provides for the exercise of their

powers in certain modes and under certain forms, there are other

questions to arise than those of the mere intent of the law-makers,

and sometimes forms become of the last importance. For in such

case not only is it important that the will of the law-makers be

clearly expressed, but it is also essential that it be expressed in

due form of law; since nothing becomes law simply and solely

because men who possess the legislative power will that it shall be,

unless they express their determination to that effect, in the mode

pointed out by the instrument which invests them with the power,

and under all the forms which that instrument has rendered

essential. And if, when the constitution was adopted, there were

known and settled rules and usages, forming a part of the law of

the country, in reference to which the constitution has evidently

been framed, and these rules and usages required the observance of
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particular forms, the constitution itself must also be understood as

requiring them, because in assuming their existence, and

[* 131] being * framed with reference to them, it has in effect

adopted them as a part of itself, as much as if they were

expressly incorporated in its provisions. Where, for an instance,

the legislative power is to be exercised by two houses, and by

settled and well-understood parliamentary law, these two houses

are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the deter-

mination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the

separate determination of the other, the constitution, in providing

for two houses, has evidently spoken in reference to this settled

custom, incorporating it as a rule of constitutional interpretation;

so that it would require no prohibitory clause to forbid the two

houses from combining in one, and jointly enacting laws by the

vote of a majority of all. All those rules which are of the essentials

of law-making must be observed aud followed ; and it is only the

customary rules of order and routine, such as in every deliberative

body are always understood to be under its control, and subject to
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constant change at its will, that the constitution can be understood

to have left as matters of discretion, to be established, modified, or

abolished by the bodies for whose government in non-essential

matters they exist.

Of the two Houses of the Legislature}

In the enactment of laws the two houses of the legislature are

of equal importance, dignity, and power, and the steps which result

in laws may originate indifferently in either. This is the general

rule; but as one body is more numerous than the other and more

directly represents the people, and in many of the States, is

renewed by more frequent elections, the power to originate all money

bills, or bills for the raising of revenue, is left exclusively, by the

constitutions of some of the States, with this body, in accordance

1 The wisdom of a division of the legislative department has been demon-

strated by the leading writers on constitutional law, as well as by general expe-

rience. See De Lolme, Const, of England, b. 2, c. 3; Federalist, No. 22; 1

Kent, 208; Story on Const. §§ 5-15-570. The early experiments in Pennsylvania

and Georgia, based on Franklin's views, for which see his Works, Vol. V. p. 165,

were the only ones made by any of the original States with a single house. The

first Constitution of Vermont also provided for a single legislative body.
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with the custom in England which does not permit bills of this

character to originate with the House of Lords.1 To these

• bills, however,' the other house may propose alterations, [* 132]

and they require the assent of that house to their passage,

the same as other bills. The time for the meeting of the legisla-

ture will be such time as is fixed by the constitution or by statute;

but it may be called together by the executive in special session as

the constitution may prescribe, and the two houses may also

adjourn any general session to a time fixed by them for the holding

of a special session, if an agreement to that effect can be arrived

at; and if not, power is conferred by a majority of the constitutions

upon the executive to prorogue and adjourn them. And if the

executive in any case undertake to exercise this power to prorogue

and adjourn, on the assumption that a disagreement exists between

the two houses which warrants his interference, and his action is

acquiesced in by those bodies, who thereupon cease to hold their

regular sessions, the legislature must be held in law to have

adjourned, and no inquiry can be entered upon as to the rightful-
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ness of the governor's assumption that such a disagreement

existed.2

1 There are provisions in the Constitutions of Massachusetts, Delaware, Min-

nesota, Missi>sippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,

Vermont, Indiana, Oregon, Kentucky, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,

Virginia, and Maine, requiring revenue bills to originate in the more popular

branch of the legislature, but allowing the Senate the power of amendment usual

io other cases. During the second session of the-forty-first Congress, the House

of Representatives by their vote denied the right of the Senate under the Con-

stitution to originate a bill repealing a law imposing taxes; but the Senate did

not assent to this conclusion. In England the Lords are not allowed to amend

money bills, and by resolutions of 5th and 6th July, 1860, the Commons deny

their right even to reject them.

'This question became important and was passed upon in People v. Hatch,

33 111. 9. The Senate had passed a resolution for an adjournment of the session

line die on a day named, which was amended by the House by fixing a different

day. The Senate refused to concur, and the House then passed a resolution

expressing a desire to recede from its action in amending the resolution, and

requesting a return of the resolution by the Sem.te. While matters st.iod thus,

the governor, assuming that such a disagreement existed as empowered him to

interfere, sent in his proclamation, declaring the legislature adjourned to a day

named, and which was at the very end of the official term of the members. The

message created excitement; it does not seem to have been at once acquiesced

in, and a protest against the governor's authority was entered upon the journal;

but for eleven days in one house and twelve in the other no entries were made
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[*133] "There are' certain matters which each house deter-

mines for itself, and in respect to which its decision is

conclusive. It chooses its own officers, except where, by consti-

tution or statute, it is otherwise provided; it determines its own

rules of proceeding, it decides upon the election and qualification

of its own members.1 These powers it is obviously proper should

rest with the body immediately interested, as essential to enable it

to enter upon and proceed with its legislative functions, without

liability to interruption and confusion. In determining questions

concerning contested seats, the house will exercise judicial power,

but generally in accordance with a course of practice which has

sprung from precedents in similar cases, and no other authority is

at liberty to interfere.

Each house has also the power to punish members for disor-

derly behavior, and other contempts of its authority, as well as to

expel a member for any cause which seems to the body to render

it unfit that he continue to occupy one of its seats. This power

is generally enumerated in the constitution among those which

the two houses may exercise, but it need not be specified in that

instrument, since it would exist whether expressly conferred or
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not. It is " a necessary and incidental power, to enable the house

to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of

upon their journals, and it was unquestionable that practically they had acqui-

esced in the action of the governor, and adjourned. At the expiration of the

twelve days, a portion of the members came together again, and it was claimed

by them that the message of the governor was without authority, and the two

houses must be considered as having been, in point of law, in session during the

intervening period, and that consequently any bills which had before been passed

by them and sent to the governor for his approval, and which he had not returned

within ten days, Sundays excepted, had become laws under the constitution.

The Supreme Court held that, as the two houses had practically acquiesced in

the action of the governor, the session had come to an end, and that the mem-

bers had no power to reconvene on their own motion, as had been attempted.

The case is a very full and valuable one on several points pertaining to legisla-

tive proceedings and authority.

1 In People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, it was held that the correctness of a

decision by one of the houses, that certain persons had been chosen members,

could not be inquired into by the courts. In that case a law was assailed as void,

on the ground that a portion of the members who voted for it, and without whose

votes it would not have had the requisite majority, had been given their seats in

the House in defiance of law, and to the exclusion of others who had a majority

of legal votes. See the same principle in State v. Jarrett, 17 Md. 309. See

also Lamb v. Lynd, 44 Penn. St. 33G.
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the State. It is a power of protection. A member may be phys-

ically, mentally, or morally wholly unfit; he may be affected with a

contagious disease, or insane, or noisy, violent, and disorderly, or in

the habit of using profane, obscene, and abusive language." And,

"independently of parliamentary customs and usages, our legisla-

tive houses have the power to protect themselves by the punish-

ment and expulsion of a member "; and the courts cannot inquire

into the justice of the decision, or even so much as examine the

proceedings to see whether opportunity for defence was furnished

or not.1

* Each house may also punish contempts of its authority [* 134]

by other persons, without express authority from the con-

stitution therefor ; 2 but where imprisonment is imposed as a pun-

ishment, it must terminate with the final adjournment of the house,

and if the prisoner be not then discharged by its order, he may be

released on habeas corpus?

By common parliamentary law, the members of the legislature

are privileged from arrest on civil process during the session of
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that body, and for a reasonable time before and after to enable

them to go to and return from the same. 'By the constitutions of

some of the States this privilege lias been enlarged, so as to

exempt the persons of legislators from any service of civil process,4

and in others their estates are exempt from attachment for some

prescribed period.5 For any arrest contrary to the parliamentary

1 Hiss v. Bartlett, 3 Gray, 468. And see Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204.

* Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 1; Stock-

dale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & El. 231; Burnham v. Morissey, 14 Gray, 226; State

b. Matthews, 87 N. H. 450.

* Jefferson's Manual, § 18; Priehard's Case, 1 Lev. 165.

* " Senators and representatives shall, in all cases except treason, felony, or

breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest. They shall not be subject to

any civil process during the session of the legislature, or for fifteen days next

before the commencement and after the termination of each session." Const, of

Mich. art. 4, § 7. The same exemption from civil process is found in the Con-

ititutions of Kansas, Nebraska, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Missouri, Mis-

sissippi, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Oregon: Exemption from arrest is not vio-

lated by the service of citations or declarations in civil cases. Gentry v. Griffith,

27 Texas, 461; Case «. Rorabacker, 15 Mich. 537.

'The Constitution of Rhode Island provides that "the person of every

member of the General Assembly shall be exempt from arrest, and his

estate from attachment, ip any civil action, during the session of the General

Asaembly, and two days before the commencement and two days after the
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law or to these provisions, the house of which the person arrested

is a member may give summary relief by ordering his discharge,

and if the order is not complied with, by punishing the persons

concerned in the arrest as for a contempt of its authority. The

remedy of the member, however, is not confined to this mode of

relief. His privilege is not the privilege of the house merely, but

of the people, and is conferred to enable him to discharge the trust

confided to him by his constituents;1 and if the house neglect to

interfere the court from which the process issued should set it

aside on the facts being represented, and any court or officer

having authority to issue writs of habeas corpus may also

[* 135] * inquire into the case, and release the party from the un-

lawful imprisonment.2

Each house must also be allowed to proceed in its own way in

the collection of such information as may seem important to a

proper discharge of its functions, and whenever it is deemed

desirable that witnesses should be examined, the power and

authority to do so is very properly referred to a committee, with
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any such powers short of final legislative or judicial action as

may seem necessary or'expedient in the particular case. Such a

committee has no authority to sit during a recess of the house

which has appointed it, without its permission to that effect; but

the house is at liberty to confer such authority if it see fit.3 A

refusal to appear or to testify before such committee, or to pro-

duce books or papers, would be a contempt of the house;4 but

the committee cannot punish for contempts; it can only report

the conduct of the offending party to the house for its action.

The power of the committee will terminate with the final dissolu-

tion of the house appointing it.

Each house keeps a journal of its proceedings, which is a public

termination thereof, and all process served contrary hereto shall be void."

Art. 4, § 5.

1 Coffin p. Coffin, 4 Mass. 27.

* On this subject, dishing on Law and Practice of Parliamentary Assemblies,

§§ 546-597, will be consulted with profit.

3 Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497; Marshall v. Harwood, 7 Md. 466. See

also parliamentary cases, 5 Grey, 374; 9 Grey, 350; 1 Chandler, 50.

4 Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226. But the privilege of a witness to be

exempt from a compulsory disclosure of his own criminal conduct is the same

when examined by a legislative body or committee as when sworn in court.

Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172.
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record, and of which the courts are at liberty to take judicial

notice.1 If it should appear from these journals that any act did

not receive the requisite majority, or that in respect to it the legis-

lature did not follow any requirement of the constitution, or that

in any other respect the act was not constitutionally adopted,

the courts may act upon this evidence, and adjudge the statute

void.2 But whenever it is acting in the apparent performance

of legal functions, every reasonable presumption is to be made

in favor of the action of a legislative body; it will not be pre-

sumed in any case, from the mere silence of the journals, that

either house has exceeded its authority, or disregarded a

* constitutional requirement in the passage of legislative [* 136]

acts, unless where the constitution has expressly required

the journals to show the action taken, as, for instance, where it

requires the yeas and nays to be entered.8

The law also seeks to cast its protection around legislative ses-

sions, and to shield them against corrupt and improper influences,

by making void all contracts which have for their object to influ-
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ence legislation in any other manner than by such open and pub-

lic presentation of facts and arguments and appeals to reason as

are recognized as proper and legitimate with all public bodies.

While counsel may be properly employed to present the reasons

in favor of any public measure to the body authorized to pass

upon it, or to any of its committees empowered to collect facts

! Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 111. 297; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 475; People

r. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 2 Penn. St. 446;

McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 430; State v. Moffit, 5 Ohio, 358; Turley v. Logan

Co. 17 111. 151; People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y. 317; Jones v.

Hutchinson, 43 111. 721; Forelyce v. Goodman, 20 Ohio, N. 6. 1.

1 See cases cited in preceding note. Also Prescott v. Trustees of 111. & Mich.

Canal, 19 111. 324. The case of Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal, 253, appears to be

contra. And see Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Richoux, 23 La. An. 458; s. c.

8 Am. Rep. 600. A remarkable case recently came under judgment in South

Carolina. An act to simplify practice passed the two houses of the legislature.

By the previous law the courts for the county of Barnwell were held at Black-

ville, and the new act contained a provision continuing them at that place. As

presented to and signed by the governor, however, it substituted Barnwell for

Btakville. Held that the provision thus changed was void, — the journals show-

in;: the change, — and that the courts must still be held at Blackville. State v.

Piatt, 2 S. C. (N. 8.) 150.

1 Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, x. s. 475; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424; Super-

iors v. People, 25 111. 181.
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and hear arguments, and parties interested may lawfully contract

to pay for this service, yet to secretly approach the members of

such a body with a view to influence their action at a time and

in a manner that do not allow the presentation of opposite views,

is improper and unfair to the opposing interest; and a contract

to pay for this irregular and improper service would not be en-

forced by the law.1

1 This whole subject was very fully considered in the case of Frost v. Inhabi-

tants of Belmont, 6 Allen, 152, which was a bill filed to restrain the payment by

the town of demands to the amount of nearly S9000, which the town had voted

to pay as expenses in obtaining their act of incorporation. By the court, Chap-

man, J.: "It is to be regretted that any persons should have attempted to

procure an act of legislation in this Commonwealth, by such means as some of

these items indicate. By the regular course of legislation, organs are provided

through which any parties may fairly and openly approach the legislature, and

be heard with proofs and arguments respecting any legislative acts which they

may be interested in, whether public or private. These organs are the various

committees appointed to consider and report upon the matters to be acted upon
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by the whole body. When private interests are to be affected, notice is given

of the hearings before these committees; and thus opportunity is given to

adverse parties to meet face to face and obtain a fair and open hearing. And

though these committees properly dispense with many of the rules which regu-

late hearings before judicial tribunals, yet common fairness requires that neither

party shall be permitted to have secret consultations, and exercise secret influ-

ences that are kept from the knowledge of the other party. The business of

'lobby members' is not to go fairly and openly before the committees, and present

statements, proofs, and arguments that the other side has an opportunity to meet

and refute, if they are wrong, but to go secretly to the members and ply them

with statements and arguments that the other side cannot openly meet, however

erroneous they may be, and to bring illegitimate influences to bear upon thera.

If the 'lobby member' is selected because of his political or personal influence,

it aggravates the wrong. If his business is to unite various interests by means

of projects that are called 'log rolling,' it is still worse. The practice of pro-

curing members of the legislature to act under the influence of what they have

eaten and drank at houses of entertainment tends to render those who yield to

such influences wholly unfit to act in such cases. They are disqualified from

acting fairly towards interested parties or towards the public. The tendency

and object of these influences are to obtain by corruption what it is supposed

cannot be obtained fairly.

"It is a well-established principle, that all contracts which are opposed to

public policy, and to open, upright, and fair dealing, are illegal and void. The

principle was fully discussed in Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472. In several other

States it lias been applied to cases quite analogous to the present case.

"In Pingrey ». Washburn, 1 Aiken, 264, it was held in Vermont that an

agreement, on the part of a corporation, to grant to individuals certain privileges

[ 150 ]

GH. VI.]

* 137

OP THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS.

* The Introduction and Passage of Bills. [* 137]

Any member may introduce a bill in the house to which he

belongs, in accordance with its rules; and this he may do

in consideration that they would withdraw their opposition to the passage of a

legislative act touching the interests of the corporation, is against sound policy,

prejudicial to just and correct legislation, and void. In Gulick v. Ward, 5 Halst.

87, it was decided in New Jersey that a contract which contravenes an act of

Congress, and tends to defraud the United States, is void. A. had agreed to

give B. $100, on condition that B. would forbear to propose or offer himself

to the Postmaster-General to carry the mail on a certain mail route, and it was

held that the contract was against public policy and void. The general principle

as to contracts contravening public policy was discussed in that case at much

length. In Wood o. McCann, 6 Dana, 366, the defendant had employed the

plaintiff to assist him in obtaining a legislative act in Kentucky legalizing his

divorce from a former wife, and his marriage with his present wife. The court

say: 'A lawyer may be entitled to compensation for writing a petition, or even

for making a public argument before the legislature or a committee thereof;

but the law should not hold him or any other person to a recompense for exer-
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cising any personal influence in any way, in any act of legislation. It is certainly

important to just and wise legislation, and therefore to the most essential interest

of the public, that the legislature should be perfectly free from any extraneous

influence which may either corrupt or deceive the members, or any of them.'

"In Clippinger c. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S. 315, it was decided in Pennsyl-

vania that a contract to procure or endeavor to procure the passage of an act of

the legislature, by using personal influence with the members, or by- any sinister

means, was void, as being inconsistent with public policy and the integrity of

our political institutions. And an agreement for a contingent fee to be paid on

the passage of a legislative act was held to be illegal and void, because it would

be a strong incentive to the exercise of personal and sinister influences to effect

the object

"The subject has been twice adjudicated upon in New York. In Harris o.

Roof, 10 Barb. 489, the Supreme Court held that one could not recover for ser-

vices performed in going to see individual members of the house, to get them to

aid in voting for a private claim, the services not being performed before the

house as a body, nor before its authorized committees. In Sedgwick v. Stanton,

4 Kernan, 289, the Court of Appeals held the same doctrine, and stated its proper

limits. Selden, J., makes the following comments on the case of Harris v. Roof:

'Now the court did not mean by this decision to hold that one who has a claim

against the State may not employ competent persons to aid him in properly pre-

senting such claim to the legislature, and in supporting it with the necessary

proofs and arguments. Mr. Justice Hand, who delivered the opinion of the court,

very justly distinguishes between services of the nature of those rendered in that

case, and the procuring and preparing the necessary documents in support of a

claim, or acting as counsel before the legislature or some committee appointed
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[* 138] at any * tim6 when the house is in session, unless the

constitution, the law, or the rules of the house forbid.

[* 139] The Constitution of Michigan * provides that no new bill

shall be introduced into either house of the legislature

after the first fifty days of the session shall have expired ;1 and the

Constitution of Maryland provides that no bill shall originate iu

either house within the last ten days of the session.2 The purpose

of these clauses is to prevent hasty and improvident legislation,

and to compel, so far as any previous law can accomplish that

by that body. Persons may, no doubt, be employed to conduct an application to

tbe legislature, as well as to conduct a suit at law; and may contract for and re-

ceive pay for their services in preparing documents, collecting evidence, making

statements of facts, or preparing and making oral or written arguments, provided

all these are used or designed to be used before the legislature or some committee

thereof as a body; but they cannot, with propriety, be employed to exert their

personal influence with individual members, or to labor in any form privately with

such members out of the legislative halls. Whatever is laid before the legislature

in writing, or spoken openly or publicly in its presence or that of a committee, if
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false in fact, may be disproved, or if wrong in argument may be refuted; but

that which is whispered into the private ear of individual members is frequently

beyond the reach of correction. The point of objection in this class of cases then

is, the personal and private nature of the services to be rendered.'

"In Fuller v. Dame, cited above, Shair, Ch. J., recognizes the well-established

right to contract and pay for professional services when the promisee is to act as

attorney and counsel, but remarks that ' the fact appearing that persons do so act

prevents any injurious effects from such proceeding. Such counsel is considered

as standing in the place of his principal, and his arguments and representations

are weighed and considered accordingly.' He also admits the right of disinter-

ested persons to volunteer advice; as when a person is about to make a will, one

may represent to him the propriety and expediency of making a bequest to a par-

ticular person; and so may one volunteer advice to another to marry another

person; but a promise to pay for such service is void.

"Applying the principles stated in these cases to the bills which the town voted

to pay, it is manifest that some of the money was expended for objects that are

contrary to public policy, and of a most reprehensible character, and which could

not, therefore, form a legal consideration for a contract:"

See f urther a full discussion of the same subject, and reaching the same con-

clusion, by Mr. Justice Grier, in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 16 How.

814. See also Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152; Frankfort v. Winterport, 54

Me. 250. A contract to assist by money and influence to secure the election of

a candidate to a public office in consideration of a share of its emoluments, in the

event of election, is void as opposed to public policy, and if voluntarily rescinded

by the parties a recovery cannot be had of the moneys advanced under it. Mar-

tin v. Wade, 37 Cal. 168.

1 Art. 4, § 28. » Art. 3, § 26.
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result, the careful examination of proposed laws, or at least the

affording of opportunity for that purpose; which will not always be

done when bills may be introduced up to the very hour of adjourn-

ment, and, with the concurrence of the proper majority, put im-

mediately upon their passage.1

For the same reason it is required by the constitutions of several

of the States, that no bill shall have the force of law until on three

several days it be read in each house, and free discussion allowed

thereon; unless, in case of urgency, four-fifths or some other

specified majority of the house shall deem it expedient to dispense

with this rule. The journals which each house keeps of its pro-

ceedings ought to show whether this rule is complied with or not;

but in case they do not, the passage in the manner provided by

the constitution must be presumed in accordance with the gen-

eral rule which presumes the proper discharge of official duty.2

1 A practice has sprung up of evading these constitutional provisions by intro-'

dueing a new bill after the time has expired when it may constitutionally be

done, as an amendment to some pending bill, the whole of which, except the
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enacting clause, is struck out to make way for it. Thus, the member who thinks

he may possibly have occasion for the introduction of a new bill after the consti-

tutional period has expired, takes care to introduce sham bills in due season

which he can use as stocks to graft upon, and which he uses irrespective of their

character or contents. The sham bill is perhaps a bill to incorporate the city of

Siam. One of the member's constituents applies to him for legislative permission

to construct a dam across the Wild Cat Rivep. Forthwith, by amendment, the

bill entitled a bill to incorporate the city of Siam has all after the enacting clause

stricken out, and it is made to provide, as its sole object, that John Doe may con-

struct a dam across the Wild Cat. With this title and in this form it is passed;

bat the house then considerately amends the title to correspond with the purpose

of the bill, and the law is passed, and the constitution at the same time saved!

This dodge is so transparent, and so clearly in violation of the constitution, and

the evidence at the same time is so fully spread upon the record, that it is a matter

of surprise to find it so often resorted to.

• Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People, 25 1ll. 181; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio,

k. s. 480. In People v. 'Starne, 35 1ll. 121, it is said the courts' should not

enforce a legislative act unless there is record evidence, from the journals of the

two houses, that every material requirement of the constitution has been satisfied.

The clause in the Constitution of Ohio is: "Every bill shall be fully and dis-

tinctly read on three different days, unless, in case of urgency, three-fourths of

the house in which it shall be pending shall dispense with this rule "; and in Mil-

ler p. State, 3 Ohio, n. s. 481, and Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, n. s. 178, this

provision was held to be merely directory. The distinctness with which any bill

must be read cannot possibly be defined by any law; and it must always, from

the necessity of the case, rest with the house to determine finally whether in this
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[* 140] * As to what shall constitute a reading of a bill, it seems

to be held sufficient to read the written instrument that

is adopted by the two houses; and if any thing else becomes law

in consequence of its passage, and by reason of being referred to

in it, it is nevertheless not essential that it be read with the reading

of the bill.1 Thus, a statute which incorporated a military compauy

by reference to its constitution and by-laws, was held valid notwith-

standing the constitution and by-laws, which would acquire the

force of law by its passage, were not read in the two houses as a

part of it.2 But there cannot be many cases, we should suppose,

to which this ruling would be applicable.

It is also provided in the constitutions of some of the States that,

on the final passage of every bill the yeas and nays shall be entered

on the journal. Such a provision is designed to serve an important

purpose in compelling each member present to assume as well as

to feel his due share of responsibility in legislation; and also in

furnishing definite and conclusive evidence whether the bill has

been passed by the requisite majority or not. "The constitution
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prescribes this as the test by which to determine whether the

requisite number of members vote in the affirmative. The office of

the journal is to record the proceedings of the house, and authen-

ticate and preserve tho same. It must appear on the face of

the journal that the bill passed by a constitutional majority.

These directions are all clearly imperative. They are

[* 141] * expressly enjoined by the fundamental law, and cannot

be dispensed with by the legislature." 8

particular the constitution has been complied with or not; but the rule respect-

ing three several readings on different days is specific, and capable of being

precisely complied with, and we do not see how, even under the rules applied to

statutes, it can be regarded as directory merely, provided it has a purpose beyond

the mere regular and orderly transaction of business. That it has such a pur-

pose, (hat it is designed to prevent hasty and improvident legislation, and is

therefore not a mere rule of order, but one of protection to the public interests

and to the citizens at large, is very clear; and independent of the question wheiher

definite constitutional principles can be dispensed with in any case on the ground

of their being merely directory, we cannot see how this can be treated as any

thing but mandatory. See People v. Campbell, 3 Gilm. 466 ; McCulloch v. State,

11 Ind. 424.

1 Dew v. Cunningham, 28 Ala. 466.

* Bibb County Loan Association v. Richards, 21 Geo. 592.

'Spangler v. Jacoby, 14' 111. 297; Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People, 25

HI. 183. There have been cases, as we happen to know, in which several bills
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For the vote required in the passage of any particular law,

the reader is referred to the constitution of his State. A sim-

ple majority of a quorum is sufficient, unless the constitution

establishes some other rule ; and where, by the constitution, a two-

thirds or three-fourths vote is made essential to the passage of any

particular class of bills, two-thirds or three-fourths of a quorum

will be understood, unless the terms employed clearly indicate

that this proportion of all the members, or of all those elected, is

intended.1

The Title of a Statute.

The title of an act was formerly considered no part of it; and

although it might be looked to as a guide to the intent of the law-

makers when the body of the statute appeared to be in any respect

ambiguous or doubtful,2 yet it could not enlarge or restrain the

provisions of the act itself,3 and the latter might therefore be

good when that and the title were in conflict. The reason for this

was that anciently titles were not prefixed at all, and when after-

wards they came to be introduced, they were usually prepared by
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the clerk of the house in which the bill first passed, and attracted

but little attention from the members. They indicated the clerk's

understanding of the contents or purpose of the bills, rather than

that of the house; and they therefore were justly regarded as

have been put on their passage together, the yeas and nays being once called for

them all, though the journal is made to state falsely a separate vote on each. We

need hardly say that this is a manifest violation of the constitution, which requires

separate action in every case, and that when resorted to, it is usually for the pur-

pose of avoiding another provision of the constitution which seeks to preclude

"log-rolling" legislation, by forbidding the incorporation of distinct measures

in one and the same statute.

1 Southworth v. Palmyra & Jacksonburg Railroad Co., 2 Mich. 287; State v.

McBride, 4 Mo. 303. By most of the constitutions either all the laws, or laws

on some particular subjects, are required to be adopted by a majority vote or

some other proportion of "all the members elected," or of " the whole repre-

sentation.'' These and similar phrases require all the members to be taken into

account whether present or not. Where a majority of all the members elected is

required in the passage of a law, an ineligible person is not on that account to be

excluded in the count. Satterlee v. San Francisco, 22 Cal. 314.

* United States p. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio, 480;

Eastman v. McAlpin, 1 Kelley, 157; Cohen v. Barrett, 5 Call, 195. See Dwarris

on Statutes, 502.

» Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wal. 107.
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furnishing very little insight into the legislative intention. Titles

to legislative acts, however, have recently, in some States, come to

possess very great importance, by reason of constitutional pro-

visions, which not only require that they shall correctly indicate

the purpose of the law, but which absolutely make the title to

control and exclude every thing from effect and operation as law

which is incorporated in the body of the act but is not within the

purpose indicated by the title. These provisions are given in the

note, and it will readily be perceived that they make a very great

change in the law.1

[* 142] * In considering these provisions it is important to re-

gard, —

1. The evils designed to be remedied. The Constitution of New

Jersey refers to these as "the improper influences which may

result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as

have no proper relation to each other." In the language of the

1 The Constitutions of Minnesota, Kansas, Maryland, Kentucky, Nebraska,

Ohio, and Pennsylvania provide that "no law shall embrace more than one sub-
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ject, which shall be expressed in its title." Those of Michigan, New Jersey,

Louisiana, and Texas are similar, substituting the word object for suhjed. The

Constitutions of South Carolina, .Alabama, Tennessee, Arkansas, and California

contain similar provisions. The Constitution of New Jersey provides that, "to

avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same

act such things as have no proper re ation to each other, every law shall embrace

but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title." The Constitution of

Missouri contains a similar provision, with the addition, that, "if any subject

embraced in an act be not expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to

so much thereof as is not so expressed." The Constitutions of Indiana, Oregon,

and Iowa provide that " every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters prop-

erly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any

subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such

act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title."

The Constitution of Nevada provides that " every law enacted by the legislature

shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which

subject shall be briefly expressed in the title." The Conslitutions of New York

and Wisconsin provide that " no private or local bill which may be passed by the

legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in

the title." The Constitution of Illinois is in this regard nearly identical with that

of Missouri. Whether the word object is to have any different construction from

the word subject, as used in these provisions, is a question which may some time

require discussion; but as it is evidently employed for precisely the same purpose,

it would seem that it ought not to have. Compare Hingle v. State, 24 Ind. 28,

and People v. Lawrence, 86 Barb. 192.
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Supreme Court of Louisiana, speaking of the former practice:

"The title of an act often afforded no clue to its contents. Im-

portant general principles were found placed in acts private or

local in their operation; provisions concerning matters of practice

or judicial proceedings were sometimes included in the same

statute with matters entirely foreign to them, the result of which

was that on many important subjects the statute law had become

almost unintelligible, as they whose duty it has been to examine

or act under it can well testify. To prevent any further accu-

mulation to this chaotic mass was the object of the constitutional

provision under consideration." 1 The Supreme Court of Michigan

say: "The history and purpose of this constitutional pro-

vision are too well understood to require any * elucidation [* 143]

at our hands. The practice of bringing together into one

bill subjects diverse in their nature and having no necessary con-

nection with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all,

and thus secure the passage of several measures, no one of which

could succeed upon its own merits, was one both corruptive of the
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legislator and dangerous to the State. It was scarcely more so,

however, than another practice, also intended to be remedied by

this provision, by which, through dexterous management, clauses

were inserted in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and

their passage secured through legislative bodies whose members

were not generally aware of their intention and effect. There was

no design by this clause to embarrass legislation by making laws

unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation, and thus

multiplying their number; but the framers of the constitution

meant to put an end to legislation of the vicious character referred

to, which was little less than a fraud upon the public, and to re-

quire that in every case the proposed measure should stand upon

its own merits, and that the legislature should be fairly satisfied

of its design when required to pass upon it." 2 The Court of

Appeals of New York declare the object of this provision to be

"that neither the members of the legislature nor the people should

be misled by the title." 3 The Supreme Court of Iowa say: "The

1 Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. An. 298. See Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 298.

* People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 491. And see Board of Supervisors v. Heenan,

2 Miun. 336; Davis v. Bank of Fulton, 31 Geo. 69; St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo.

878.

'Sun Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 8 N. Y. 253.
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intent of this provision of the constitution was, to prevent the

union, in the same act, of incongruous matters, and of objects

having no connection, no relation. And with this it was designed

to prevent surprise in legislation, by having matter of one nature

embraced in a bill whose title expressed another."1 And similar

expressions will be found in many other reported cases.2 It may

therefore be assumed as -settled that the purpose of these provi-

sions was: first, to prevent hodge podge, or "log-rolling" legis-

lation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature,

by means of provisions in bills of which the titles

[* 144] * gave no intimation, and which might therefore be over-

looked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and,

third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of

legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of

legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have

opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if

they shall so desire.

2. The particularity required in stating the object. The gen-
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eral purpose of these provisions is accomplished when a law has

but one general object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To

require every end and means necessary or convenient for the

accomplishment of this general object to be provided for by a

separate act relating to that alone, would not only be unreason-

able, but would actually render legislation impossible. It has

accordingly been held that the title of "an act to establish a

police government for the city of Detroit," was not objectionable

for its generality, and that all matters properly connected with

the establishment and efficiency of such a government, including

taxation for its support, and courts for the examination and trial

of offenders, might constitutionally be included in the bill under

this general title. Under any different ruling it was said, "the

police government of a city could not be organized without a dis-

tinct act for each specific duty to be devolved upon it, and these

could not be passed until a multitude of other statutes had taken

1 State v. County Judge of Davis Co., 2 Iowa, 282.

* See Conner v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 5 N. Y. 293; Davis t>. State, 7 Md.

151. The Supreme Court of Indiana also understand the provision in the con-

stitution of that State to be designed, among other things, to assist in the codifi-

cation of the laws. Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 685; Hingle

t>. State, 24 Ind. 28.
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the same duties from other officers before performing them. And

these several statutes, fragmentary as they must necessarily be,

would often fail of the intended object, from the inherent diffi-

culty in expressing the legislative will when restricted to such

narrow bounds." 1 The generality of a title is therefore no objec-

tion to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongru-

ous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered

as having a necessary or proper connection.2 The legislature must

determine for itself how broad and comprehensive shall be the

object of a statute, and how much particularity shall be employed

in the title in defining it.3 One thing, however, is very

* plain ; that the use of the words " other purposes," which [* 145]

has heretofore been so common in the title to acts, with a

1 People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 495. See also Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82,

and Whiting p. Mount Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Bright v. McCulloch, 27 Ind.

223; Mayor, &c, of Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 112; State v. Union, 33 N. J.

354; Humboldt County e. Churchill Co. Commissioners, 6 Nev. 30.

1 Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681; People p. Briggs, 50
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N. T. 563.

'In State v. Powers, 14 Ind. 195, an act came under consideration, the title

to which was, "An act to amend the first section of an act entitled 'An act

concerning 1 censes to vend foreign merchandise, to exhibit any caravan, mena-

gerie, circus, rope and wire dancing puppet-shows, and legerdemain,' approved

June 15, 1852, and for the encouragement of agriculture, and concerning the

licensing of stock and exchange brokers." It was held that the subject of the

act was licenses, and that it was not unconstitutional as containing more than

one subject. But it was held also that, as the licenses which it author zed and

required were specified in the title, the act could embrace no others, and conse-

quently a provision in the act requiring concerts to be licensed was void. In

State p. County Judge of Davis County, 2 Iowa, 280, the act in question was

entitled "An act in relation to certain State roads therein named." It contained

sixty-six sections, in which it established some forty-six roads, vacated some, and

provided for the re-location of others. The court sustained the act. "The

object of an act may be broader or narrower, more or less extensive; and the

broader it is, the more particulars will it embrace. . . . There is undoubtedly

great objection to uniting so many particulars in one act, but so long as they are

of the same nature, and come legitimately under one general determination or

object, we cannot say that the act is unconstitutional." P. 284. Upon this sub-

ject see Indiana Central Railroad Co. p. Potts, 7 Ind. 684, where it is considered

at length. Also Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Hall v. Bunte, 20 Ind.

304; People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 182. An act entitled "An act fixing the time

md mode of electing State printer, defining his duties, fixing compensation, and

repealing all laws coming in conflict with this act," was sustained in Walker v.

Dunham, 17 Ind. 483.
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view to cover any and every thing, whether connected with the

main purpose indicated by the title or not, can no longer bo of any

avail .»I ere these provisions exist. As was said by the Supreme

Court of New York in a case where these words had been made

use of in the title to a local bill: "The words ' for other purposes'

must be laid out of consideration. They express nothing, and

amount to nothing as a compliance with this constitutional require-

ment. Nothing which the act could not embrace without them can

be brought in by their aid." 1

3. What is embraced by the title. The repeal of a statute on a

given subject, it is held, is properly connected with the subject

matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a

repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding

the title is silent on that subject.2 So an act to incorpo-

[* 146J rate a railroad * company, it has been held, may authorize

counties to subscribe to its stock, or otherwise aid the

construction of the road.3 So an act to incorporate the Firemen's

Benevolent Association may lawfully include under this title pro-
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visions for levying a tax upon the income of foreign insurance

companies, at the place of its location, for the benefit of the corpo-

ration.4 So an act to provide a homestead for widows and children

was held valid, though what it provided for was the pecuniary means

1 Town of Fishkill v. Fishkdl and Beekman Plank Road Co., 22 Barb. 642.

See, to the same effect, Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42

Mo. 578. An act entitled "An act to repeal certain acts therein named," is

void. People v. Mellen, 32 111. 181. An act, having for its sole object to legal-

ize certain proceedings of the Common Council of Janesville, but entitled merer/

"An act to legalize and authorize the assessment of street improvements and

assessments," was held not to express the subject, because failing to specify the

locality. Durkee v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 697.

s Gabbert v. Railroad Co., 11 Ind. 365. The constitution under which tin's

decision was made required the law to contain but one subject, and matters

properly connected therewith; but the same decision was made under the New

York Constitution, which omits the words here italicized; and it may well be

doubted whether the legal effect of the provision is varied by the addition of

those words. See Guilford v. Cornell, 18 Barb. 640.

3 Supervisors, &c. v. People, 25 111. 181. So a provision for the costs on

appeal from a justice, is properly connected with the subject of an act entitled

of "the election and qualification of justices of the peace, and defining their

jurisdiction, powers, and duties in civil cases." Robinson v. Skipworth, 28 Ind.

311.

* Firemen's Association v. Lounsbury, 21 111. 611.
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sufficient to purchase a homestead.1 So an act "to regulate pro-

ceedings in the county court" was held to properly embrace a

provision giving an appeal to the District Court, and regulating

the proceedings therein on the appeal.2 So an act entitled " an act

for the more uniform doing of township business" may properly

provide for the organization of townships.3 So it is held that the

changing of the boundaries of existing counties is a matter properly

connected with the subject of forming new counties out of those

existing.4 So a provision for the organization and sitting of courts

in new counties is properly connected with the subject of the

formation of such counties, and may be included in " an act to

authorize the formation of new counties, and to change county

boundaries." 5 Many other cases are referred to in the note which

will further illustrate the views of the courts upon this subject.

There has been a general disposition to construe the constitutional

provision liberally, rather than to embarrass legislation by a con-

struction whose strictness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of

the beneficial purposes for which it has been adopted.6
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1 Succession of Lanzetti, 9 La. An. 329.

* Morphey v. Menard, 11 Texas, 673.

3 Clinton v. Draper, 14 Ind. 295.

'Haggard p. Hawkins, 14 Lid. 299. And see Duncombe p. Prindle, 12

Iowa, 1.

s Brandon v. State, 16 Ind. 197. In this case, and also in State v. Bowers,

14 Ind. 198, it was held that if the title to an original act is sufficient to embrace

the matters covered by the provisions of an act amendatory thereof, it is unneces-

sary to inquire whether the title of an amendatory act would, of itself, be sufficient.

And see Morford p. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82.

• Green v. Mayor, &c, R. M. Charlt. 368; Martin v. Broach, 6 Geo. 21;

Protho p. Orr, 12 Geo. 36; Wheeler v. State, 23 Geo. 9; Hill v. Commissioners,

22 Geo. 203; Jones v. Columbus, 25 Geo. 610; Denham p. Holeman, 26 Geo.

182; Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Texas, 184; Battle v. Howard, 13 Texas, 345;

Robinson v. State, 15 Texas, 311; Conner v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 2 Sandf.

355, and 5 N. Y. 285; Fisbkill v. Plank Road Co., 22 Barb. 634; Brewster v.

Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58; Williams v. People,

24 2s. Y. 405; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177; Sharp v. Mayor, &c, of New

York, 31 Barb. 572; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 51; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525;

Parkinson p. State, 14 Md. 184; Bossier v. Steele, 13 La. An. 433; Lasfon p.

Dufoe, 9 La. An. 329; State v. Harrison, 11 La. An. 722; Williams v. Payson,

14 La. An. 7; Fletcher p. Oliver, 25 Ark. 298; Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199;

Gabbert v. Railroad Co., ib. 365; Railroad Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217; Wil-

kins v. Miller, 9 Ind. 100; Foley v. State, ib. 363; Gillespie v. State, ib. 380;

Henry p. Henry, 13 Ind. 250; Igoe p. State, 14 Ind. 239; Haggard v. Hawkins,

ll [161]
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[* 147] * 4. The effect if the title embrace more than one object.

Perhaps in those States where this constitutional provision

t'6. 299; Reed v. State, 12 Ind. 641; Sturgeon v. Hitchens, 22 Ind. 107; Lauer

v. State, ib. 461; Central Plank Road Co. v. Hannaman, ib. 484; Gifford t.

Railroad Co., 2 Stoekt. 171 j Johnson ». Higgins, 8 Met. (Ky.) 566; Chiles t.

Drake, 2 Met. (Ky.) 146; Louisville, &c, Co. ». Ballard," ib. 165; Phillips

v. Covington, &c, Co.,«6. 219; Chiles v. Monroe, 4 Met. (Ky.) 72; Common-

wealth p. Dewey, 15 Grat. 1; Whiting v. Mount Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Tuttle

v. Strout, 7 Minn. 465; Supervisors, &c. v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330; Railroad Co.

c. Gregory, 15 111. 20; People p. Mellen, 32 111. 181; Cutlip v. Sheriff, 3 W. Va.

588; McAunich v. Mississippi, &c. R.R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338; State v. Gut, 13

Minn. 341; People v. Allen, 42 N.Y. 404; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495.

In Davis v. Woolnough, 9 Iowa, 104, an act entitled "An act for revising

and consolidating the laws incorporating the city of Dubuque, and to establish

a city court therein," was held to express by its title but one object, which

was, the revising and consolidating the laws incorporating the city; and the

city court, not being an unusual tribunal in such a municipality, might be pro-

vided for by the act, whether mentioned in the title or not. "An act to enable
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the supervisors of the city and county of New York to raise money by tax,"

provided for raising money to pay judgments then existing, and also any there-

after to be recovered; and it also contained the further provision, that whenever

the controller of the city should have reason to believe that any judgment then

of record or thereafter obtained had been obtained by collusion, or was founded

in fraud, he should take the proper and necessary means to open and reverse the

same, &c. This provision was held constitutional, as properly connected with

the subject indicated by the title, and necessary to confine the payments of the

tax to the objects for which the moneys were intended to be raised. Sharp t\

Mayor, &c., of New York, 31 Barb. 672. In O'Leary v. Cook Co., 28 III. 634,

it was held that a clause in an act incorporating a college, prohibiting the sale

of ardent spirits within a distance of four miles, was so germane to the primary

object of the charter as to be properly included within it. By the first section

of "an act for the relief of the creditors of the Lockport and Niagara Falls

Railroad Company," it was made the duty of the president of the corporation, or

one of the directors to be appointed by the president, to advertise and sell the

real and personal estate, including the franchise of the company, at public auction

to the highest bidder. It was then declared that the sale should be absolute,

and that it should vest in the purchaser or purchasers of the property, real or

personal, of the company, all the franchise, rights, and privileges of the cor-

poration, as fully and as absolutely as the same were then possessed by the

company. The money arising from the sale, after paying costs, was to be applied,

first, to the payment of a certain judgment, and then to other liens according

to priority; and the surplus, if any, was to be divided ratably among the other

creditors, and then if there should be an overplus, it was to be divided ratably

among the then stockholders. By the second section of the act, it was declared

that the purchaser or purchasers should have the right to sell and distribute

stock to the full amount which was authorized by the act of incorporation, and
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is limited * in its operation to private and local bills, it [* 148]

might be held that an act was not void for embracing two

or more objects which were indicated by its title, provided one of

them only was of a private and local nature. It has been held in

New York that a local bill was not void because embracing general

provisions also ;1 and if they may constitutionally be embraced in

the act, it is presumed they may also be constitutionally embraced

in the title. But if the title to the act actually indicates, and the

act itself actually embraces, two distinct objects, when the consti-

tution says it shall embrace but one, the.whole act must be treated

as void, from the manifest impossibility in the court choosing

between the two, and holding the act valid as to the one and void

as to the other.

5. The effect where the act is broader than the title. But if the

act is broader than the title, it may happen that one part of it can

stand because indicated by the title, while as to the object not

iudicated by the title it must fail. Some of the State constitutions,

it will be perceived, have declared that this shall be the rule; but
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the declaration was unnecessary ; as the general rule, that so much

of the act as is not in conflict with the constitution must be sus-

tained, would have required the same declaration from the courts.

If by striking from the act all that relates to the object not

indicated by the title, that which is left is complete in itself,

sensible, capable of being executed, and wholly independent of

that which is rejected, it must be sustained as constitu-

tional. * The principal questions in each case will there- [*149]

fore be, whether the act is in truth broader than the title;

and if so, then whether the other objects in the act are so intimately

connected with the one indicated by the title that the portion of the

the several amendments thereto; and to appoint an election, choose directors,

and organize a corporation anew, with the same powers as the existing company.

There was then a proviso, that nothing in the act should impair or affect the

subscriptions for new stock, or the obligations or liabilities of the company

which had been made or incurred in the extension of the road from Lockport to

Rochester, &c. The whole act was held to be constitutional. Mosier r. Hilton,

15 Barb. 667. And see Mills t>. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400, — a very liberal case;

Erlinger v. Boneau, 51 111. 94; State v. Newark, 34 N. J. 286; Smith v. Com-

monwealth, 8 Bush, 108; State v. St. Louis Cathedral, 23 La. An. 720; Simpson

v. Bailey, 3 Oreg. 515; Neifing r. Pontiac, 56 111. 172.

1 People r. McCann, 16 N. Y. 68.
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act relating to them cannot be rejected, and leave a comulfte and

sensible enactment which is capable of being executed.1

As the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as

they please, it is obvious that they may sometimes so frame it as

to preclude many matters being included in the act which might

with entire propriety have been embraced in one enactment with

the matters indicated by the title, but which must now be excluded,

because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The

courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title; they are vested with

no dispensing power; the constitution has made the title the

conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall have

operation; it is no answer to say that the title might have been

made more comprehensive, if in fact the legislature have not seen

fit to make it so. Thus, " An act concerning promissory notes and

bills of exchange" provided that all promissory notes, bills of

exchange, or other instruments in writing, for the payment of money,

or for the delivery of specific articles, or to convey property, or

to perform any other stipulation therein mentioned, should be
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negotiable, and assignees of the same might sue thereon in their

own names. It was held that this act was void, as to all the

instruments mentioned therein except promissory notes and

bills of exchange;2 though it is obvious that it would have

been easy to frame a title to the act which would have embraced

them all, and which would have been unobjectionable. It has

also been held that an act for the preservation of the Muskegon

River Improvement could not lawfully provide for the levy and

collection of tolls for the payment of the expense of constructing

the improvement, as the operation of the act was carefully limited

by its title to the future.8 So also it has been held that " au act

to limit the number of grand jurors, and to point oiit the mode of

1 People i). Briggs, 50 N. Y. 566. "None of the provisions of a statute

should be regarded as unconstitutional where they all relate, directly or indirectly,

to the same subject, have a natural connection, and are not foreign to the subject

expressed in the title." Phillips v. Bridge Co., 2 Met. (Ky.) 222, approved,

Smith t). Commonwealth, 8 Bush, 112. See Ex parte Upshaw, 45 Ala. 234.

2 Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199. See also State v. Kiusella, 14 Minn. 524.

3 Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269. See further Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala.

229; Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9; Stuart v. Einsella, 14 Minn.

624. In Cutlip v. Sheriff, 3 W. Va. 588, it was held that if an act embraces two

objects, only one of which is specified in the title, the whole is void; but this is

opposed to the authorities generally.
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their selection, denning their jurisdiction, and repealing all laws

inconsistent therewith," couM not constitutionally contain pro-

visions which should authorize a defendant in a criminal case, on

a trial for any offence, to be found guilty of any lesser

offence necessarily * included therein.1 These cases must [* 150]

suffice upon this point; though the cases before referred

to will furnish many similar illustrations.

In all we have said upon this subject we have assumed the con-

stitutional provision to be mandatory. Such has been the view of

the courts almost without exception. In California, however, a ■

different view has been taken, the court saying: "We regard this

section of the constitution as merely directory; and, if we were

inclined to a different opinion, would be careful how we lent our-

selves to a construction which must in effect obliterate almost

every law from the statute-book, unhinge the business and destroy

the labor of. the last three years. The first legislature that met

under the constitution seems to have considered this section as

directory ; and almost every act of that and the subsequent sessions
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would be obnoxious to this objection. The contemporaneous

exposition of the first legislature, adopted or acquiesced in by

every subsequent legislature, and tacitly assented to by the courts,

taken in connection with the fact that rights have grown up under

it, so that it has become a rule of property, must govern our

decision."2 Similar views have also been expressed in the State

of Ohio.3 These cases, and especially what is said by the Califor-

nia court, bring forcibly before our minds a fact, which cannot be

kept out of view in considering this subject, and which has a very

important bearing upon the precise point which these decisions

cover. The fact is this: that whatever constitutional provision can

be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated by

the legislature as if it was devoid even of moral obligation, and to

be therefore habitually disregarded. To say that a provision is

directory seems, with many persons, to be equivalent to saying

that it is not law at all. That this ought not to be so must be con-

ceded; that it is so we have abundant reason and good authority

1 Foley v. State, 9 Ind. 363; Gillespie v. State, ib. .380. See also Indiana

Cent. Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681; State v. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; State

t. Lafeyette Co. Court, 41 Mo. 39; People r. Denahy, 20 Mich. 349.

'Washington c. Murray, 4 Cal. 388.

• Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, n. s. 475; Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, n. s. 177.
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for saying. If, therefore, a constitutional provision is to be enforced

at all, it must be treated as mandator. And if the legislature habit-

ually disregard it, it seems to us that there is all the more urgent

necessity that the courts should enforce it. And it also

[* 151] seems to us that there are few evils which * can be inflict-

ed by a strict adherence to the law, so great as that which

is done by the habitual disregard, by any department of the gov-

ernment, of a plain requirement of that instrument from which it

derives its authority, and which ought, therefore, to be scrupulously

observed and obeyed. Upon this subject we need only refer here

to what we have said concerning it in another place.1

Amendatory Statutes.

.It has also been deemed important, in some of the States, to

provide by their constitutions, that "no act shall ever be revised

or amended by mere reference to its title; but the act revised or

section amended shall be set forth and published at full length."3

Upon this provision an important query arises. Does it mean

that the act or section revised or amended shall be set forth and
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published at full length as it stood before, or does it mean only

that it shall be set forth and published at full length as amended

or revised? Upon this question perhaps a consideration of the

purpose of the provision may throw some light. "The mischief

designed to be remedied was the enactment of amendatory stat-

utes in terms so blind that legislators themselves were sometimes

deceived in regard to their effects, and the public, from the diffi-

culty in making the necessary examination and comparison, failed

to become apprised of the changes made in the laws. An

amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to

1 Ante, p. 74.

2 This is the provision as it is found in the Constitutions of Indiana, Nevada,

Oregon, Texas, and Virginia. In Kansas, Ohio, Nebraska, Michigan, Louisiana,

Wisconsin, Missouri, and Maryland there are provisions of similar import. In

Tennessee the provision is: "All acts which revive, repeal, or amend former

laws, shall recite, in their caption or otherwise, the title or substance of the law

repealed, revived, or amended." Art. 1, § 17.

In Texas it appears to be held that the legislature may repeal a definite por-

tion of a section without the re-enactment of the section with such portion omitted.

Chambers v. State, 25 Texas, 307. But qucere of this. Any portion of a section

amended which is not contained in the amendatory section as set forth and pub-

lished is repealed. State v. Ingersoll, 17 Wis. 631.
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substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was

only referred to, but not published, was well calculated to mis-

lead the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes

drawn in that form for the express purpose. Endless confusion

was thus introduced into the law, and the constitution wisely pro-

hibited such legislation."1 If this is a correct view of the pur-

pose of the provision, it does not seem to be at all important to

its accomplishment that the old law should be republished, if the

law as amended is given in full, with such reference to the old

law as will show for what the new law is substituted.

Nevertheless, * it has been decided in Louisiana that the [* 152]

constitution requires the old law to be set forth and pub-

lished ;2 and the courts of Indiana, assuming the provision in their

own constitution to be taken from that of Louisiana after the deci-

sions referred to had been made, at one time adopted and followed

them as precedents.3 It is believed, however, that the general

understanding of the provision in question is different, and that

it is fully complied with in letter and spirit, if the act or section
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revised or amended is set forth and published as revised or amended,

and that any thing more only tends to render the statute unneces-

sarily cumbrous.4 Statutes which amend others by implication,

however, are not within this provision; and it is not essential that

they even refer to the acts or sections which by implication they

amend.5

1 People ». Mahaney, 13 Mich. 497.

* Walker o. Caldwell, 4 La. An. 297.; Heirs of diverge v. Salter, 5 La. An.

94.

'Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind. 327; Rogers ». State, 6 Ind. 31. These

cases were overruled in Greencastle, &c, Co. v. State, 28 Ind. 382.

4 See Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9; People v. Pritchard, 21

Mich. 236; People v. McCallun, 1 Neb. 182; State v. Draper, 47 Mo. 29;

Booneville v. Trigg, 46 Mo. 288. Under such a constitutional provision where

a statute simply repeals others, it is not necessary to set them out. Falconer v.

Robinson, 46 Ala. 340. Compare Bird v. Wasco County, 3 Oreg. 282.

s People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 496; Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41; Branhara v.

Lange, 16 Ind. 497; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio, n. s. 573. Repeals by

implication, however, are not favored. Ibid. And see Naylor v. Field, 5 Dutch.

287; State v. Berry, 12 Iowa, 58; Attorney-General ». Brown, 1 AVis. 525;

Dodge v. Gridley, 10 Ohio, 177; Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio, n. 8. 20; McCool v.

Smith, 1 Black, 459; New Orleans v. Southern Bank, 15 La. An. 89; Blain v.

Bailey, 25 Ind. 165; Swann r. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151;

State v. The Treasurer, 41 Mo. 16; Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Wal. 652.
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It was a parliamentary rule that a statute should not be re-

pealed at the same session of its enactment, unless a clause per-

mitting it was inserted in the statute itself;1 but this rule did

not apply to repeals by implication,2 and it is possibly not recog-

nized in this country at all, except where it is incorporated in the

State constitution.8

Signing of Bills.

When a bill has passed the two houses, it is engrossed for the

signatures of the presiding officers. This is a constitutional re-

quirement in most of the States, and therefore cannot be dis-

pensed witli; though, in the absence of any such requirement, it

would seem not to be essential.4 And if, by the consu-

lt* 153] tution of * the State, the governor is a component part of

the legislature, the bill is then presented to him for his

approval.

Approval of Laws.

The qualified veto power of the governor is regulated by the

constitutions of those States which allow it, and little need be said

here beyond referring to the constitutional provisions for informa-

tion concerning them. It has been held that if the governor, by
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statute, was entitled to one day, previous to the adjournment of the

legislature, for the examination and approval of laws, this is to be

understood as a full day of twenty-four hours, before the hour of

the final adjournment.6 It has also been held that, in the approval

of laws, the governor is a component part of the legislature, and

that unless the constitution allows further time for the purpose, he

1 Dwarris on Statutes, Vol. I. p. 269; Sedgw. on Stat and Const. Law, 122;

Smith on Stat, and Const. Construction, 908.

* Ibid. And see Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41.

* Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41; Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 513; Smith

on Stat, and Const. Construction, 908; Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. p. State, 29

Ala. 573.

4 Speer v. Plank Road Co., 22 Penn. St. 376.

6 Hyde v. White, 24 Texas, 137. The five days allowed in New Hampshire

for the governor to return bills which have not received his assent, include days

on which the legislature is not in session, if it has not'finally adjourned. Opinions

of Judges, 45 N. H. 607. But the day of presenting the bill to the governor

should be excluded. Ibid. As to the power of the governor, derived from long

[168]
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must exorcise his power of approval before the two houses adjourn,

or his act will be void.1 But under a provision of the Constitution

of Minnesota, that the governor may approve and sign "within

three days of the adjournment of the legislature any act passed

during the last three days of the session," it has been held that

Sundays were not to be included as a part of the prescribed time ;2

and under the Constitution of New York, which provided that, " if

any bill shall not be returned by the governor within ten days,

Sundays excepted, after it shall have been presented to him, the

same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless

the legislature shall, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in

which case it shall not be a law," it was held that the governor

might sign a bill after the adjournment, at any time within the ten

days.3 The governor's approval is not complete until the

bill has passed beyond his control * by the constitutional [* 154]

and customary mode of legislation; and at any time prior

to that he may reconsider and retract any approval previously

usage, to approve and sign bills after the adjournment of the legislature, see
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Solomon v. Cartersville, 41 Geo. 157.

Neither house can, without the consent of the other, recall a bill after its

transmission to the governor. People v. Devlin, 33 N. Y. 269.

The delivery of a bill passed by the two houses to the secretary of the com-

monwealth according to custom, is not a presentation to the governor for his

approval, within the meaning of the constitutional clause which limits him to a

certain number of days after the presentation of the bill to veto it. Opinions of

the Justices, 99 Mass. 636.

1 Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165. The court also held in this case that, notwith-

standing an act purported to have been approved before the actual adjournment,

it was competent to show by parol evidence that the actual approval was not

until the next day. In support of this ruling, People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31, was

cited, where it was held that the court might go behind the statute-book and in-

quire whether an act to which a two-thirds vote was essential had constitutionally

passed. That, however, would not be in direct contradiction of the record,

but it would be inquiring into a fact concerning which the statute was silent, and

other records supplied the needed information.

* Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. 366.

8 People v. Bowen, 30 Barb. 24. Where on the tenth day the governor sent

a bill with his objections to the house with which it originated, but the messenger,

finding the house had adjourned for the day, returned it to the governor, who

retained it, it was held that to prevent the bill becoming a law it should have

been left with the proper officer of the house instead of being retained by the

governor. Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189.
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made.1 His disapproval of a bill is communicated to the house in

which it originated, with his reasons; and it is there reconsidered,

and may be again passed over the veto by such vote as the consti-

tution prescribes.2

1 People v. Hatch, 19 111. 283. An act apportioning the representatives was

passed by the legislature and transmitted to the governor, who signed his appro-

val thereon by mistake, supposing at the time that he was subscribing one of

several other bills then lying before him, and claiming his official attention; his

private secretary thereupon reported the bill to the legislature as approved, not

by the special direction of the governor, nor with his knowledge or special assent,

but merely in his usual routine of customary duty, the governor not being con-

scious that he had placed his signature to the bill until after information was

brought to him of its having been reported approved; whereupon he sent a mes-

sage to the speaker of the house to which it was reported, stating that it had

been inadvertently signed and not approved, and on the same day completed a

veto message of the bill which was partially written at the time of signing his

approval, and transmitted it to the house where the bill originated, having first

erased his signature and approval. It was held that the bill had not become a
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law. It had never passed out of the governor's possession after it was received

by him until after be had erased his signature and approval, and the court was

of opinion that it did not pass from his control until it had become, a law by the

lapse often days under the constitution, or by his depositing it with his approval

in the office of the secretary of state. It had long been the practice of the gov-

ernor to report, formerly through the secretary of state, but recently through his

private secretary, to the house where bills originated, his approval of them; but

this was only a matter of formal courtesy, and not a proceeding necessary to the

making or imparting vitality to the law. By it no act could become a law which

without it would not be a law. Had the governor returned the bill itself to the

house, with his message of approval, it would have passed beyond his control,

and the approval could not have been retracted, unless the bill had been with-

drawn by consent of the house; and the same result would have followed his

filing the bill with the secretary of state with his approval subscribed.

The Constitution of Indiana provides, art. 5, § 14, that, "if any bill shall not

be returned by the governor within three days, Sundays excepted, after it shall

have been presented to him, it shall be a law without his signature, unless the

general adjournment shall prevent its return; in which case it shall be a law

unless the governor, within five days next after the adjournment, shall file suc'1

bill with his objections thereto, in the office of the secretary of state," &c. Under

this provision it was held that where the governor, on the day of the final ad-

journment of the legislature, and after the adjournment, filed a bill received that

day, in the office of the secretary of state, without approval or objections thereto,

it thereby became a law, and he could not file objections afterwards. Tarlton v.

Peggs, 18 Ind. 24.

* A bill which, as approved and signed, differs in important particulars from

the one signed, is no law. Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721.

If the governor sends back a bill which has been submitted to him, stating
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* Other Powers of the Governor. [* 155]

The power of the governor as a branch of the legislative depart-

ment is almost exclusively confined to the approval of bills. As

executive, he communicates to the two houses information con-

cerning the condition of the State, and may recommend measures

to their consideration, but he cannot originate or introduce bills.

He may convene the legislature in extra session whenever extra-

ordinary occasion seems to have arisen; but their powers when

convened are not confined to a consideration of the subjects to

which their attention is called by his proclamation or his message,

and they may legislate on any subject as at tho regular sessions.1

An exception to this statement exists in those States where, by the

express terms of the constitution, it is provided that when convened

in extra session the legislature shall consider no subject except

that for which they were specially called together, or which may

that he cannot act upon it because of some supposed informality in its passage,

this is in effect an objection to the bill, and it can only become a law by further

action of the legislature, even though the governor may have been mistaken as
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to the supposed informality. Birdsall v. Carrick, 3 Nev. 154.

In practice the veto power, although very great and exceedingly important in

this country, is obsolete in Great Britain, and no king now ventures to resort to

it As the Ministry must at all times be in accord with the House of Commons,

— except where the responsibility is taken of dissolving the Parliament and

appealing to the people, — it must follow that any bill which the two houses have

passed must be approved by the monarch. The approval has become a matter

of course, and the governing power in Great Britain is substantially in the House

of Commons. 1 Bl. Com. 184-5, and notes.

1 The Constitution of Iowa, art. 4, § 11, provides that the governor "may,

on extraordinary occasions, convene the General Assembly by proclamation, and

shall state to both houses, when assembled, the purpose for which they have been

convened." It was held in Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82, that the General

Assembly, when thus convened, were not confined in their legislation to the pur-

poses specified in the message. "When lawfully convened, whether in virtue of

the provision in the constitution or the governor's proclamation, it is the ' General

Assembly' of the State, in which the full and exclusive legislative authority of

the State is vested. Where its business at such session is not restricted by some

constitutional provision, the General Assembly may enact any law at a special or

extra session that it might at a regular session. Its powers, not being derived

from the governor's proclamation, are not confined to the special purpose for

which it may have been convened by him."

[ 171 ]
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have been submitted to them by special message of the gov-

ernor.1

. Wlien Acts are to take Effect.

The old rule was that statutes, unless otherwise ordered, took

effect from the first day of the session on which they were

[* 156] passed ;2 * but this rule was purely arbitrary, based upon

no good reason, and frequently working very serious in-

justice. The present rule is that an act takes effect from the time

when the formalities of enactment are actually complete under the

constitution, unless it is otherwise ordered, or unless there is some

constitutional or statutory rule on the subject which prescribes

otherwise. By the Constitution of Mississippi,3 " no law of a gen-

eral nature, unless otherwise provided, shall be enforced until sixty

days after the passage thereof." By the Constitution of Illinois,1

no' act of the General Assembly shall take effect until the first day

of July next after its passage, unless in case of emergency (which

emergency shall be expressed in the preamble or body of the act)

the General Assembly shall, by a vote of two-thirds of all the mem-

bers elected to each house, otherwise direct. By the Constitution

of Michigan,6 no public act shall take effect, or be in force, until
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the expiration of ninety days from the end of the session at which

the same is passed, unless the legislature shall otherwise direct by

a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house. These

and similar provisions are designed to secure, as far as possible,

the public promulgation of the law before parties are bound to

take notice of and act under it, and to obviate the injustice of a

rule which should compel parties at their peril to know and obey a

law of which, in the nature of things, they could not possibly have

heard; they give to all parties the full constitutional period in

which to become acquainted with the terms of the statutes which

1 Provisions to this effect will be found in the Constitutions of Illinois, Michi-

gan, Missouri, and Nevada; perhaps in some others.

* 1 Lev. 91; Latless e. Holmes, 4 T. R. 660. This is changed by 33 Geo.

HI. c. 13, by which statutes since passed take effect from the day when they

receive the royal assent, unless otherwise ordered therein. Where an act is to

take effeot from and after its passage, it will do so, even though not promulgated

in the official journal. Thomas o. Scott, 23 La. An. 689. And its effect covers

the whole day of its approval. Wood v. Fort, 42 Ala. 641.

3 Art. 7, § 6. 4 Art. 3, § 23. 6 Art. 4, § 20.
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are passed, except when the legislature has otherwise directed ; and

no one is bound to govern his conduct by the new law until that

period has elapsed.1 And the fact that, by the terms of the statute,

something is to be done under it before the expiration of the consti-

tutional period for it to take effect, will not amount to a legislative

direction that the act shall take effect at that time, if the act itself

is silent as to the period when it shall go into operation.2

* The Constitution of Indiana provides3 that "no act [* 157]

shall take effect until the same shall have been published

and circulated in the several counties of this State, by authority,

except in case of emergency; which emergency shall be declared

in the preamble, or in the body of the law." Unless the emer-

gency is thus declared, it is plain that the act cannot take earlier

effect.4 But the courts will not inquire too nicely into the mode

of publication. If the laws are distributed in bound volumes, in

a manner and shape not substantially contrary to the statute on

that subject, and by the proper authority, it will be held sufficient,

notwithstanding a failure to comply with some of the directory
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provisions of the statute on the subject of publication.5

1 Price v. Ilopkin, 13 Mich. 318. See, however, Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick.

430; Stine v. Bennett, 13 Minn. 153. Where a law has failed to take effect for

want of publication, all parties are chargeable with notice of that fact. Clark

r. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136.

* Supervisors of Iroquois Co. v. Ready, 34 111. 293. An act for the removal

of a county seat provided for taking the vote of the electors of the county upon

it on the 17th of March, 1863, at which time the legislature had not adjourned.

It was not expressly declared in the act at what time it should take effect, and it

was therefore held that it would not take effect until sixty days from the end of

the session, and a vote of the electors taken on the 17th of March was void.

And it was also held in this case, and in Wheeler r. Chubbuck, 16 111. 361, that

"the direction must be made in a clear, distinct, and unequivocal provision, and

could not be helped out by any sort of intendment or implication,1' and that the

act must all take effect at once, and not by piecemeal.

* Art. 4, § 28.

4 Carpenter v. Montgomery, 7 Blackf. 415; Hendrickson t>. Hendrickson, 7

Ind. 13; Mark v. State, 15 Ind. 98. The legislature must necessarily in these

cases be judge of the existence of the emergency. Carpenter v. Montgomery,

tupra. The Constitution of Tennessee provides that "No law of a general

nature shall take effect until forty days after its passage, unless the same, or the

caption, shall state that the public welfare requires that it should take effect

Kroner." Art. 1, § 20.

s State v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46. See further, as to this constitutional provision,

Jones r. Cavins, 4 Ind. 305.
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The Constitution of Wisconsin, on the other hand, provides1

that "no general law shall be in force until published "; thus

leaving the time when it should take effect to depend, not alone

upon the legislative direction, but upon the further fact of publi-

cation. But what shall be the mode of publication seems to be

left to the legislative determination. It has been held, however,

that a general law was to be regarded as published although

printed in the volume of private laws, instead of the volume of

public laws as the statute of the State would require.2 But an

unauthorized publication — as, for example, of an act for the in-

corporation of a city in two local papers instead of the State

paper — is no publication in the constitutional sense.3

[* 158] * The Constitution of Iowa provides that " no law of the

General Assembly, passed at a regular session, of a public

nature, shall take effect until the fourth day of July next after the

passage thereof. Laws passed at a special session shall take

effect ninety days after the adjournment of the General Assembly

by which they were passed. If the General Assembly shall deem
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any law of immediate importance, they may provide that the same

shall take effect by publication in newspapers in the State."4

Under this section it is not competent for the legislature to con-

fer upon the governor the discretionary power which the consti-

tution gives to that body, to fix an earlier day for the law to take

effect.6

'Art. 7, § 21.

* Matter of Boyle, 9 Wis. 264. Under this provision it has been decided that

a law establishing a municipal court in a city is a general law. Matter of Boyle,

supra. See Eitel t>. State, 83 Ind. 201. Also a statute jbr the removal of a

county seat. State t>. Lean, 9 Wis. 279. Also a statute incorporating a muni-

cipality, or authorizing it to issue bonds in aid of a railroad. Clark v. Janes-

ville, 10 Wis. 136. And see Scott v. Clark, 1 Iowa, 70.

3 Clark p. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136. See; further, Mills v. Jefferson, 20 Wis.

50.

4 Art. 3, § 26.

5 Scott v. Clark, 1 Iowa, 70; Pilkey v. Gleason, ib. 522.
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* CHAPTER VII. [*159]

OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT

MAY BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

We have now examined somewhat briefly the legislative power

of the State, and the bounds which expressly or by implication are

set to it, and also some of the conditions necessary to its proper

and valid exercise. In so doing it has been made apparent that,

under some circumstances, it may become the duty of the courts

to declare that what the legislature has assumed to enact is void,

either from want of constitutional power to enact it, or because the

constitutional forms or conditions have not been observed. In the

further examination of our subject, it will be important to consider

what the circumstances aro under which the courts will feel im-

pelled to exercise this high prerogative, and what precautions

should be observed before assuming to do so.

It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legis-

lative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the

fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in

any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty

and official oath decline the responsibility. The legislative and
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judicial are co-ordinate departments of the government, of equal

dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper func-

tions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the

limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or supervision of

the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of

power which, by the constitution, is not conferred upon it. The

constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not

make any one of the three departments subordinate to another,

when exercising the trust committed to it. The courts may declare

legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but

not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to

the legislative. Being required to declare what the law is in the

cases which come before them, they must enforce the con-

stitution as the paramount law, whenever a legislative * en- [* 160]
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actment comes in conflict with it.1 But the courts sit, not to

review or revise the legislative action, but to enforce the legisla-

tive will; and it is only where they find that the legislature has

failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at

liberty to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what

every private citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the

courts when the judges assume to act and to render judgments or

decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high authority,

the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the adminis-

trators of the public will. If an act of the legislature is held void,

it is not because the judges have any control over the legislative

power, but because the act is forbidden by the constitution, and

because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is para-

mount to that of their representatives expressed in any law." 2

Nevertheless, in declaring a law unconstitutional, a court must

necessarily cover the same ground which has already been covered

by the legislative department in deciding upon the propriety of

enacting the law, and they must indirectly overrule the decision of
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that co-ordinate department. The task is therefore a delicate one,

and only to be entered upon with reluctance and hesitation. It is

a solemn act in any case to declare that that body of men to whom

the people have committed the sovereign function of making the

laws for the commonwealth, have deliberately disregarded the limi-

tations imposed upon this delegated authority, and usurped power

which the people have been careful to withhold; and it is almost

equally so when the act which is adjudged to be unconstitutional

appears to be chargeable rather to careless and improvident action,

or error in judgment, than to intentional disregard of obligation.

But the duty to do this in a proper case, though at one time

doubted, and by some persons persistently denied, it is now gener-

ally agreed that the courts cannot properly decline, and in its per-

formance they seldom fail of proper support if they proceed with

due caution and circumspection, and under a proper sense as well

of their own responsibility, as of the respect due to the action and

judgment of the law-makers.3

1 Rice v. State, 7 Ind. 834; Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson Railroad Co.,

18 Wend. 53.

* Lindsay v. Commissioners, &p., 2 Bay, 61.

• There are at least two cases in American judicial history where judges have

been impeached as criminals for refusing to enforce unconstitutional enactments.
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* I. Ia view of the considerations which have been sug- [* 161]

gested, the rule which is adopted by some courts, that they

One of these — the case oi'Trevett v. Weedon, decided by the Superior Court of

Rbode Island in 1786 — is particularly interesting as being the first case in which

a legislative enactment was declared unconstitutional and void on the ground of

incompatibility with the State constitution. Mr. Arnold, in his history of Rhode

Island, vol. 2, ch. 24, gives an account of this case; and the printed brief in

opposition to the law, and in defence of the impeached judges, is in possession

of the present writer. The act in question was one which imposed a heavy

penalty on any one who should refuse to receive on the same terms as specie the

bills of a bank chartered by the State, or who should in any way discourage

the circulation of such bills. The penalty was made collectible on summary

conviction, without jury trial; and the act was held void on the ground that jury

trial was expressly given by the colonial charter, which then constituted the

constitution of the State. Although the judges were not removed on impeach-

ment, the legislature refused to re-elect them when their terms expired at the

end of the year, and supplanted them by more pliant tools, by whose assistance

the paper money was forced into circulation, and public and private debts extin-

guished by means of it. Concerning the other case, we copy from the Western

Law Monthly, " Sketch of Hon. Calvin Pease," vol. 5, p. 3, June, 1863: "The

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

first session of the Supreme Court [of Ohio] under the constitution was held at

Warren, Trumbull County, on the first Tuesday of June, 1803. The State was

divided into three circuits. . . . The third circuit of the State was composed of

the counties of Washington, Belmont, Jefferson, Columbiania, and Trumbull.

At this session of the legislature, Mr. Pease was appointed President Judge of

the Third Circuit in April, 1803, and though nearly twenty-seven years old, he

was very youthful in his appearance. He held the office until March 4, 1810,

when he sent his resignation to Governor Huntingdon. . . . During his term of

service upon the bench many interesting questions were presented for decision,

and among them the constitutionality of some portion of the act of 1805, defining

the duties of justices of the peace; and he decided that so much of the fifth

section as gave justices of the peace jurisdiction exceeding $20, and so much of

the twenty-ninth section as prevented plaintiffs from recovering costs in actions

commenced by original writs in the Court of Common Pleas, for sums between

$20 and $50, were repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and of the

State of Ohio, and therefore null and void. . . . The clamor and abuse to which

this decision gave rise was not in the least mitigated or diminished by the circum-

stance that it was concurred in by a majority of the judges of the Supreme Court,

Messrs. Huntingdon and Tod. ... At the session of the legislature of 1807-8,

steps were taken to impeach him and the judges of the Supreme Court who con-

curred with him; but the resolutions introduced into the house were not acted

upon during the session. But the scheme was not abandoned. At an early day

of the next session, and with almost indecent haste, a committee was appointed

to inquire into the conduct of the offending judges, and with leave to exhibit

articles of impeachment, or report otherwise, as the facts might justify. The

committee without delay reported articles of impeachment against Messrs. Pease

12 [ 177 ]

* 162

[CH. TO.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[* 162] will not * decide a legislative act to be unconstitutional by

a majority of a bare quorum of the judges only, — less than

a majority of all,— but will instead postpone the argument until

the bench is full, seems a very prudent and proper precaution to

be observed before entering upon questions so delicate and so im-

portant. The benefit of the wisdom and deliberation of every

judge ought to be had under circumstances so grave. Something

more than private rights are involved; the fundamental law of the

State is in question, as well as the correctness of legislative actiou;

and considerations of courtesy, as well as the importance of the

question involved, should lead the court to decline to act at all,

where they cannot sustain the legislative action, until a full bench

has been consulted, and its deliberate opinion is found to be against

it. But this is a rule of propriety, not of constitutional obligation;

and though generally adopted and observed, each court will regu-

late, in its own discretion, its practice in this particular.1

and Tod, but not against Huntingdon, who in the mean time had been elected

governor of the State. . . . The articles of impeachment were preferred by the
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House of Representatives on the 23d day of December, 1808. He was sum-

moned at once to appear before the Senate as a high court of impeachment, and

he promptly obeyed the summons. The managers of the prosecution on the

part of the House were Thomas Morris, afterwards Senator in Congress from

Ohio, Joseph Sharp, James Pritehard, Samuel Marrett, and Othniel Tooker. . . •

Several days were consumed in the investigation, but the trial resulted in the

acquittal of the respondent." Sketch of Hon. George Tod, August number of

same volume: "At the session of the legislature of 1808-9, he was impeached

for concurring in decisions made by Judge Pease, in the counties of Trumbull

and Jefferson, that certain provisions of the act of the legislature, passed in

1805, defining the duties of justices of the peace, were in conflict with the Con-

stitution of the United States and of the State of Ohio, and therefore void.

These decisions of the courts of Common Pleas and of the Supreme Court, it

was insisted, were not only an assault upon the wisdom and dignity, but also

upon the supremacy of the legislature, which passed the act in question. This

could not be endured; and the popular fury against the judges rose to a very

high pitch, and the senator from the county of Trumbull in the legislature at

that time, Calvin Cone, Esq., took no pains to soothe the offended dignity of the

members of that body, or their sympathizing constituents, but pressed a con-

trary line of conduct. The udges must be brought to justice, he insisted

vehemently, and be punished, so that others might be terrified by the example,

and deterred from committing similar offences in the future. The charges against

Mr. Tod were substantially the same as those against Mr. Pease. Mr. Tod was

first tried, and acquitted. The managers of the impeachment, as well as the

result, were the same in both cases."

1 Briscoe v. Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky, 8 Pet. 118. It has been
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* II. Neither will a court, as a general rule, pass upon a [* 163]

constitutional question, and decide a statute to be invalid,

unless a decision upon that very point becomes necessary to the

determination of the cause. "While the courts cannot shun the

discussion of constitutional questions when fairly presented, they

will not go out of their way to find such topics. They will not seek

to draw in such weighty matters collaterally, nor on trivial occa-

sions. It is both more proper and more respectful to a co-ordinate

department to discuss constitutional questions only when that is

the very lis mota. Thus presented and determined, the decision

carries a weight with it to which uo extra-judicial disquisition is

entitled." 1 In any case, therefore, where a constitutional question

is raised, though it may be legitimately presented by the record,

yet if the record also presents some other and clear ground upon

intimated that inferior courts should not presume to pass upon constitutional

questions, but ought in all cases to treat statutes as valid. Ortman o. Greenman,

4 Mich. 291. But no tribunal can exercise judicial power, unless it is to decide

according to its judgment; and it is difficult to discover any principle of justice

which can require a magistrate to enter upon the execution of a statute when he

believes it to be invalid, especially when he must thereby subject himself to
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prosecution, without any indemnity in the law if it proves to be invalid. Undoubt-

edly when the highest courts in the land hesitate to declare a law unconsti-

tutional, and allow much weight to the legislative judgment, the inferior courts

should be still more reluctant to exercise this power, and a becoming modesty

would at least be expected of those judicial officers who have not been trained

to the investigation of legal and constitutional questions. But in any case a

judge or justice, being free from doubt in his own mind, and unfettered by any

judicial decision properly binding upon him, must follow his own sense of duty

upon constitutional as well as upon any other questions. See Miller v. State,

3 Ohio, JJ. 8. 483; Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, n. S. 180; Mayberry v. Kelly,

1 Kansas, 116. In the case last cited it is said: "It is claimed by counsel for

the plaintiff in error, that the point raised by the instruction is, that inferior

courts and ministerial officers have no right to judge of the constitutionality of a

law passed by a legislature. But is this law? If so, a court created to interpret

the law must disregard the constitution in forming its opinions. The constitution

is law, — the fundamental law, — and must as much be taken into consideration

by a justice of the peace as by any other tribunal. When two laws apparently

conflict, it is the duty of all courts to construe them. If the conflict is irrec-

oncilable, they must decide which is to prevail; and the constitution is not an

exception to this rule of construction. If a law were passed in open, flagrant

violation of the constitution, should a justice of the peace regard the law, and

pay no attention to the constitutional provision? If that is his duty in a plain

case, is it less so when the construction becomes more difficult?"

1 Hoover v. Wood, 9 Ind. 287; Ireland v. Turnpike Co., 19 Ohio, n. s. 373.
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which the court may rest its judgment, and thereby render the

constitutional question immaterial to the case, that course will be

adopted, and the question of constitutional power will be left for

consideration until a case arises which cannot be disposed of with-

out considering it, and when consequently a decision upon such

question will be unavoidable.1

III. Nor will a court listen to an objection made to the constitu-

tionality of an act by a party whose rights it does not affect, and

who has therefore no interest in defeating it. On this ground it

has been held that the objection that a legislative act was

unconstitutional, because divesting the rights of remainder-men

against their will, could not be successfully urged by the owner of

the particular estate, and could only be made on behalf

[* 164] * of the remainder-men themselves.2 And a party who has

assented to his property being taken under a statute

cannot afterwards object that the statute is in violation of a

provision in the constitution designed for the protection of private

property.3 The statute is assumed to be valid, until some one
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complains whose rights it invades. "Prima facie, and on the face

of the act itself, nothing will generally appear to show that the act

is not valid; and it is only when some person attempts to resist its

operation, and calls in the aid of the judicial power to pronounce

it void, as to him, his property or his rights, that the objection of

unconstitutionality can be presented and sustained. Respect for

the legislature, therefore, concurs with well-established principles

of law in the conclusion that such an act is not void, but voidable

only; and it follows, as a necessary legal inference from this

position, that this ground of avoidance can be taken advantage of

by those only who have a right to question the validity of the act,

and not by strangers. To this extent only is it necessary to go, in

order to secure and protect the rights of all persons against the

unwarranted exercise of legislative power, and to this extent only,

therefore, are courts of justice called on to interpose." 4

1 Ex parte Randolph, 2 Brock. 447; Frees c. Ford, 6 N. T. 177, 178;

White v. Scott, 4 Barb. 56; Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 573.

* Sinclair v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 543. See also Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Penn.

St. 859; Antoni o. Wright, 22 Grat. 857.

3 Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511; Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47; Mobile and

Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 586.

4 Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 96. And see Uingham, &c, Turnpike Co.
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IV. Nor can a court declare a statute unconstitutional and void,

solely on the ground of unjust and oppressive provisions, or

because it is supposed to violate the natural, social, or political

rights of the citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is

prohibited or such rights guaranteed or protected by the constitu-

tion. It is true there are some reported cases in which judges

have been understood to intimate a doctrine different from what

is here asserted; but it will generally be found, on an examination

of those cases, that what is said is rather by way of argument and

illustration, to show the unreasonableness of putting upon consti-

tutions such a construction as would permit legislation of the

objectionable character then in question, and to induce a more

cautious and patient examination of the statute, with a

view to * discover in it, if possible, some more just and [* 165]

reasonable legislative intent, than as laying down a rule

by which courts would be at liberty to limit, according to their

own judgment and sense of justice and propriety, the extent of

legislative power in directions in which the constitution had im-
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posed no restraint. Mp. Justice Story, in one case, in examining

the extent of power granted by the charter of Rhode Island,

which authorized the General Assembly to make laws in the most

ample manner, "so as such laws, 4c, be not contrary and repug-

nant unto, but as near as may be agreeable to, the laws of Eng-

land, considering the nature and constitution of the place and

people there," expresses himself thus: " What is the true extent

of the power thus granted must be open to explanation as well by

usage as by construction of the terms in which it is given. In

a government professing to regard the great rights of personal

liberty and of property, and which is required to legislate in sub-

ordination to the general laws of England, it would not lightly

be presumed that the great principles of Magna Charta were to be

disregarded, or that the estates of its subjects were liable to be

taken away without trial, without notice, and without offence.

Even if such authority could be deemed to have been confided by

the charter to the General Assembly of Rhode Island, as an exer-

t. Norfolk Co., 6 Allen, 353; De Jarnette p. Haynes, 23 Miss. 600; Sinclair e.

Jackson, 8 Cow. 543, 579; Heyward p. Mayor, &c, of New York, 8 Barb. 489;

Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. 149; Williamson v. Carlton, 51 Me. 449; State

'.Rich, 20 Miss. 393.

[181]
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cise of transcendental sovereignty before the Revolution, it can

scarcely be imagined that that great event could have left the

people of tbat State subjected to its uncontrolled and arbitrary

exercise. That government can scarcely be deemed to be free,

where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the

will of a legislative body, without any restraint. The fundamental

maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of

personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At

least no court of justice in this country would be warranted in

assuming that the power to violate and disregard them — a power

so repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty

— lurked under any general grant of legislative authority, or

ought to be implied from any general expressions of the will of the

people. The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights

so vital to their security and well-being, without very strong and

direct expressions of such an intention." "We know of no case in

which a legislative act to transfer the property of A. to B., without

his consent, has ever been held a constitutional exercise of

[*166] legislative power in any State in *the Union. On the

contrary, it has been constantly resisted, as inconsistent
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with just principles, by every judicial tribunal in which it has been

attempted to be enforced."1 The question discussed by the

learned judge in this case is perceived to have been, What is the

scope of a grant of legislative power to be exercised in conformity

with the laws of England? Whatever he says is pertinent to that

question; and the considerations he suggests are by way of argu-

ment to show that the power to do certain unjust and oppressive

1 Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657. See also what is said by the same judge

in Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43. "It is clear tbat statutes passed against plain

and obvious principles of common right and common reason are absolutely null

and void, so far as they are calculated to operate against those principles." Ham

v. McClaws, 1 Bay, 98. But the question in that case was one of construction;

whether the court should give to a statute a construction which would make it

operate against common right and common reason. In Bowman v. Middlcton, 1

Bay, 282, the court held an act which divested a man of his freehold and passed

it over to another, to be void "as against common right as well as against Magna

Charta." In Regents of University v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. 365, it was said

that an act was void as opposed to fundamental principles of right and justice

inherent in the nature and spirit of the social compact. But the court bad

already decided that the act was opposed, not only to the constitution of the

State, but to that of the United States also. See Mayor, &c, of Baltimore

v. State, 15 Md. 376.

[182]
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acts was not covered by the grant of legislative power. It is not

intimated that if they were within the grant, they would be im-

pliedly prohibited because unjust and oppressive.

In another case arising in the Supreme Court of New York,

one of the judges, in considering the rights of the city of New

York to certain corporate property, has said: "The inhabitants

of the city of New York have a vested right in the City Hall, mar-

kets, water-works, ferries, and other public property, which cannot

be taken from them any more than their individual dwellings or

storehouses. Their rights, in this respect, rest not merely upon

the constitution, but upon the great principles of eternal justice

which lie at the foundation of all free governments." 1 The great

principles of eternal justice which affected the particular case

had been incorporated in the constitution; and it therefore be-

came unnecessary to consider what would otherwise have been

the rule; nor do we understand the court as intimating any

opinion upon that subject. It was sufficient for the case,

to find * that the principles of right and justice had been [* 167]

recognized and protected by the constitution, and that the

people had not assumed to confer upon the legislature a power to
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deprive the city of rights which did not come from the constitution,

but from principles antecedent to and recognized by it.

So it is said by Hosmer, Ch. J., in a Connecticut case: "With

those judges who assert the omnipotence of the legislature in all

cases where the constitution has not interposed an explicit re-

straint, I cannot agree. Should there exist — what I know is not

only an incredible supposition, but a most remote improbability —

a case of direct infraction of vested rights, too palpable to be ques-

tioned and too unjust to admit of vindication, I could not avoid

considering it as a violation of the social compact, and within the

control of the judiciary. If, for example, a law were made without

any cause to deprive a person of his property, or to subject him to

imprisonment, who would not question its legality, and who would

aid in carrying it into effect? On the other hand I cannot harmo-

nize with those who deny the power of the legislature, in any case,

to pass laws which, with entire justice, operate on antecedent legal

rights. A retrospective law may be just and reasonable, and the

right of the legislature to enact one of this description I am not

1 Benson v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 10 Barb. 244.

[ 183 ]
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speculatist enough to question." 1 The cases here supposed of

unjust and tyrannical enactments would probably be held not to

be within the power of any legislative body in the Union. One

of them would be clearly a bill of attainder; the other, unless it

was in the nature of remedial legislation, and susceptible of being

defended on that theory, would be an exercise of judicial power,

and therefore in excess of legislative authority, because not included

in the apportionment of power made to that departmeut. No ques-

tion of implied prohibition would arise in either of these cases;

but if the grant of power had covered them, and there had been

no express limitation, there would, as it seems to us, be very

great probability of unpleasant and dangerous conflict of author-

ity if the courts were to deny validity to legislative action on

subjects within their control, on the assumption that the legis-

lature had disregarded justice or sound policy. The moment

a court ventures to substitute its own judgment for that of the

legislature, in any case where the constitution has vested the

legislature with power over the subject, that moment it

[* 168] enters * upon a field where it is impossible to set limits to

its authority, and where its discretion alone will measure
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the extent of its interference.2

The rule of law upon this subject appears to be, that, except

where the constitution has imposed limits upon the legislative

power, it must be considered as practically absolute, whether it

1 Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 225.

* "If the legislature should pass a law in plain and unequivocal language,

within the general scope of their constitutional powers, I know of no authority

in this government to pronounce such an act void, merely because, in the opinion

of the judicial tribunals, it was contrary to the principles of natural justice;

for this would be vesting in the court a latitudinarian authority which might be

abused, and would necessarily lead to collisions between the legislative and

judicial departments, dangerous to the well-being of society, or at least not in

harmony with the structure of our ideas of natural government." Per lingers, J-,

in Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 2 Rawle, 374. "All the courts can do with

odious statutes is to chasten their hardness by construction. Such is the imper-

fection of the best human institutions, that, mould them as we may, a large dis-

cretion must at last be reposed somewhere. The best and in many cases the

only security is in the wisdom and integrity of public" servants, and their identity

with the people. Governments cannot be administered without committing powers

in trust and confidence." Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 528, per Stuart, J. And see

Johnston r. Commonwealth, 1 Bibb, 603; Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster,

5 Geo. 194; State c. Kruttschnitt, 4 Nev. 178.

[184]
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operate according to natural justice or not in any particular case.

The courts are not tho guardians of the rights of the people of the

State, except as those rights are secured by some constitutional

provision which comes within the judicial cognizance. The protec-

tion against unwise or oppressive legislation, within constitutional

bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and patriotism of the repre-

sentatives of the people. If this fail, the people in their sovereign

capacity can correct the evil; but courts cannot assume their

rights.1 The judiciary can only arrest the execution of a statute

when it conflicts with the constitution. It cannot run a race of

opinions upon points of right, reason, and expediency with the law-

making power.2 Any legislative act which does not encroach upon

the powers apportioned to the other departments of the govern-

ment, being prima facie valid, must be enforced, unless restrictions

upon the legislative authority can be pointed out in the constitu-

tion, and the case shown to come within them.3

1 Bennett p. Bull, Baldw. 74.

'Perkins, J., in Madison & Indianapolis Railroad Co. p. Whiteneck, 8 Ind.

222: Bull p. Read, 13 Grat. 98, per Lee, J.

• Sill p. Village of Corning, 15 N. Y. 803; Varick p. Smith, 5 Paige, 137;
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Cochran p. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365; Morris v. People, 3 Denio, 381; Wyne-

hamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 430; People v. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y. 235;

People p. New York Central Railroad Co., 34 Barb. 138; People v. Toynbee, 2

Park. Cp. R. 490; Dow t. Norris, 4 N. H. 16; Derby Turnpike Co. p. Parks, 10

Conn. 522, 543; Hartford Bridge Co.p. Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210; Holden

p. James, 11 Mass. 896; Norwich p. County Commissioners, 13 Pick. 60; Daw-

son v. Shaver, 1 Blackf. 206; Beauchamp p. State, 6 Blackf. 305; Doe v. Doug-

lass, 8 Blackf. 10; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 327;

Beebe p. State, 6 Ind. 528; Newland p. Marsh, 19 1ll. 376, 384; Bliss p. Com-

monwealth, 2 Litt. 90; State v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 513; Campbell p. Union Bank,

6 How. Miss. 672; Tate's Ex'r p. Bell, 4 Yerg. 206; Andrews v. State, 3 Heis.

165; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 8; Whittington p. Polk, 1 Harp. & J. 236; Norris v.

Abingdon Academy. 7 Gill. & J. 7; Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 491; State v.

Lyles, 1 McCord, 238; Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 341; Ex parte Newman, t'6.

502; Hobart p. Supervisors, 17 Cal. 28; Crenshaw p. Slate River Co., 6 Rand.

245; Lewis p. Webb, 3 Greenl. 326; Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Greenl. 140;

Lunt's Case, 6 Greenl. 412; Scott v. Smart's Ex'rs, 1 Mich. 306; Williams v.

Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Tyler p. People, 8 Mich. 820; Cotton v. Commissioners

of Leon County, 6 Fla. 610; State v. Robinson, 1 Kansas, 27; Santo v. State,

2 Iowa, I65; Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa, 804; Stoddart v. Smith, 5 Binn.

355; Moore p. Houston. 8 S. & R. 169; Braddee p. Brownfield, 2 W. & S. 271;

Harvey p. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63 ; Commonwealth p. Maxwell, 27 Penn. St.

456; Carey v. Giles, 9 Geo. 253; Macon and Western Railroad Co. v. Davis,

13 Geo. 68; Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14 Geo. 80; Boston v. Cummins, 16

[ 185 ]
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[* 169] * V. If the courts are not at liberty to declare statutes

void because of their apparent injustice or impolicy, neither

can they do so because they appear to the minds of the judges to

violate fundamental principles of republican government, unless it

shall be found that those principles are placed beyond legislative

encroachment by the constitution. The principles of republican

government are not a set of inflexible rules, vital and active in

the constitution, though unexpressed, but they are subject to

variation and modification from motives of policy and public

necessity; and it is only in those particulars in which experience

has demonstrated any departure from the settled practice to work

injustice or confusion, that we shall discover an incorporation of

them in the constitution in such form as to make them definite

rules of action under all circumstances. It is undoubtedly a

maxim of republican government, as we understand it, that

taxation and representation should be inseparable; but where the

legislature interferes, as in many cases it may do, to compel taxa-

tion by a municipal corporation for local purposes, it is evident

that this maxim is applied in the case in a much restricted

[* 170] and very imperfect sense only, since the * representation
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of the locality taxed is but slight in the body imposing

the tax, and the burden may be imposed, not only against the pro-

test of the local representative, but against the general opposition

of the municipality. The property of married women is taxable,

notwithstanding they are not allowed a voice in choosing repre-

sentatives.1 The maxim is not entirely lost sight of in such cases,

but its application in the particular case, and the determination

how far it can properly and justly be made to yield to considerations

of policy and expediency, must rest exclusively with the law-making

power, in the absence of any definite constitutional provisions so

embodying the maxim as to make it a limitation upon legislative

authority.2 It is also a maxim of republican government that local

Geo. 102; Van Home v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 309; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 886;

Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 18; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128.

1 Wheeler v. Wall, 6 Allen, 568.

* "There are undoubtedly fundamental principles of morality and justice which

no legislature is at liberty to disregard, but it is equally undoubted that no

court, except in the clearest cases, can properly impute the disregard of those

principles to the legislature. . . . This court can know nothing of public policy

except from the constitution and the laws, and the course of administration and

[186]
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concerns shall be managed in the local districts, which shall chooso

their own administrative and police officers, and establish for them-

selves police regulations ; but this maxim is subject to such excep-

tions as the legislative power of the State shall see fit to make ; and

when made, it must be presumed that the public interest, con-

venience, and protection are subserved thereby.1 The State may

interfere to establish new regulations against the will of the local

constituency; and if it shall think proper in any case to assume

to itself those powers of local police which should be executed by

the people immediately concerned, we must suppose it has been

done because the local administration has proved imperfect and

inefficient, and a regard to the general well-being has demanded

the change. In these cases the maxims which have prevailed in

the government address themselves to the wisdom of the legis-

lature, and to adhere to them as far as possible is doubtless to

keep in the path of wisdom; but they do not constitute restrictions

so as to warrant the other departments in treating the exceptions

which are made as unconstitutional.2

decision. It has no legislative powers. It cannot amend or modify any legis-

lative acts. It cannot examine questions as expedient or inexpedient, as pol-
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itic or impolitip. Considerations of that sort must in general be addressed to

the legislature. Questions of policy there are concluded here." Chase, Ch. J.,

in License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 469.

1 People p. Draper, 15 N. Y. 547. See post, p. 191, 192.

1 In People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 500, where the Metropolitan Police Act of

Detroit was claimed to be unconstitutional on various grounds, the court say:

"Besides the specific objections made to the act as opposed to the provisions of

the constitution, the counsel for respondent attacks it on ' general principles,' and

especially because violating fundamental principles in our system, that govern-

ments exist by consent of the governed, and that taxation and representation go

togethep. The taxation under the act, it is said, is really in the hands of a police

board, a body in the choice of which the people of Detroit have no voice. This

argument is one which might be pressed upon the legislative department with

great force, if it were true in point of fact. But as the people of Detroit are

really represented throughout, the difficulty suggested can hardly be regarded as

fundamental. They were represented in the legislature which passed the act,

and had the same proportionate voice there with the other municipalities in the

State, all of which receive from that body their powers of local government, and

such only as its wisdom shall prescribe within the constitutional limit. They were

represented in that body when the present police board were appointed by it,

and the governor, who is hereafter to fill vacancies, will be chosen by the State

at large, including their city. There is nothing in the maxim that taxation and

representation go together which requires that the body paying the tax shall

[187]
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[* 171] * VI. Nor are the courts at liberty to declare an act

void, because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit sup-

posed to pervade the constitution, but not expressed in words.

"When the fundamental law has not limited, either in terms or by

necessary implication, the general powers conferred upon the legis-

lature, we cannot declare a limitation under the notion of having

discovered something in the spirit of the constitution which is

not even mentioned in the instrument"1 "It is difficult," says

Mr. Senator Verplanck, "upon any general principles, to limit

the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by judicial

interposition, except so far as the express words of a written con-

stitution give that authority. There are indeed many dicta and

some great authorities holding that acts contrary to the first

principles of right are void. The principle is unquestion-

[* 172] ably * sound as the governing rule of a legislature in rela-

tion to its own acts, or even those of a preceding legislature.

It also affords a safe rule of construction for courts, in the inter-

pretation of laws admitting of any doubtful construction, to pre-
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sume that the legislature could not have intended an unequal and

unjust operation of its statutes. Such a construction ought never

to be given to legislative language if it be susceptible of any other

more conformable to justice; but if the words be positive and

without ambiguity, I can find no authority for a court to vacate or

alone be consulted in its assessment; and if there were, we should find it violated

at every turn in our system. The State legislature not only has a control in this

respect over inferior municipalities, which it exercises by general laws, but it

sometimes finds it necessary to interpose its power in special cases to prevent

unjust or burdensome taxation, as well as to compel the performance of a clear

duty. The constitution itself, by one of the clauses referred to, requires the

legislature to exercise its control over the taxation of municipal corporations, by

restricting it to what that body may regard as proper bounds. And municipal

bodies are frequently compelled most unwillingly to levy taxes for the payment

of claims, by the judgments or mandates of courts in which their representation

is quite as remote as that of the people of Detroit in this police board. It can-

not therefore be said that the maxims referred to have been entirely disregarded

by the legislature in the passage of this act. But as counsel do not claim that,

in so far as they have been departed from, the constitution has been violated, we

cannot, with propriety, be asked to declare an act void on any such general

objection." And see Wynehamer p. People, 13 N. Y. 429, per Selden, J-i

Benson v. Mayor, &c, of Albany, 24 Barb. 256 et seq.; Baltimore v. State, 15

Md. 376; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; White v. Stamford, 37 Conn. 587.

1 People v. Fisher, 24 Wend. 220; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 233.

[188]
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repeal a statute on that ground alone. But it is only in express

constitutional provisions, limiting legislative power and controlling

the temporary will of a majority, by a permanent and paramount

law, settled by the deliberate wisdom of the nation, that I can

find a safe and solid ground for the authority of courts of justice

to declare void any legislative enactment. Any assumption of

authority beyond this would be to place in the hands of the

judiciary powers too great and too undefined either for its own

security or the protection of private rights. It is therefore a

most gratifying circumstance to the friends of regulated liberty,

that in every change in their constitutional polity which has yet

taken place here, whilst political power has been more widely

diffused among the people, stronger and better-defined guards

have been given to the rights of property." And after quoting

certain express limitations, he proceeds: "Believing that we are

to rely upon these and similar provisions as the best safeguards

of our rights, as well as the safest authorities for judicial direction,

I cannot bring myself to approve of the power of courts to annul

any law solemnly passed, either on an assumed ground of its being

contrary to natural equity, or from a broad, loose, and vague in-
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terpretation of a constitutional provision beyond its natural and

obvious sense." 1

The accepted theory upon this subject appears to be this: Iu

every sovereign State there resides an absolute and uncontrolled

power of legislation. In Great Britain this complete power rests

in the Parliament: in the American States it resides in the people

themselves as an organized body politic. But the people,

by * creating the Constitution of the United States, have [* 173]

delegated this power as to certain subjects, and under

certain restrictions to the Congress of the Union; and that

portion they cannot resume, except as it may be done through

amendment of the national Constitution. For the exercise of the

legislative power, subject to this limitation, they create, by their

State constitution, a legislative department upon which they confer

it; and granting it in general terms, they must be understood to

grant the whole legislative power which they possessed, except so

1 Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 881-383. See also People v. Gallagher,

4 Mich. 244; Benson v. Mayor, &e., of Albany, 24 Barb. 252 et seq.; Grant v.

Courter, ib. 232; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 391, per Comslock, J.; ib.

p. 453, per Selden, J.; ib. p. 477, per Johnson, J.
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far as at the same time they saw fit to impose restrictions. While,

therefore, the Parliament of Britain possesses completely the abso-

lute and uncontrolled power of legislation, the legislative bodies of

the American States possess the same power, except, first, as it

may have been limited by the Constitution of the United States;

and, second, as it may have been limited by the constitution of

the State. A legislative act cannot, therefore, be declared void,

unless its conflict with one of these two instruments can be pointed

out.1

It is to be borne in mind, however, that there is a broad dif-

ference between the Constitution of the United States and the

constitutions of the States as regards the power which may be

exercised under them. The government of the United States is

one of enumerated powers; the governments of the States are

possessed of all the general powers of legislation. When a lav

of Congress is assailed as void, we look in the national Constitu-

tion to see if the grant of specified powers is broad enough to

embrace it; but when a State law is attacked on the same ground,
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it is presumably valid in any case, and this presumption is a con-

clusive one, unless in the Constitution of the United States or of

the State we are able to discover that it is prohibited. We look

in the Constitution of the United States for grants of legislative

power, but in the constitution of the State to ascertain if any

limitations have been imposed upon the complete power with

which the legislative department of the State was vested in its

creation. Congress can pass no laws but such as the Constitution

authorizes either expressly or by clear implication; while the

State legislature has jurisdiction of all subjects on which its

legislation is not prohibited.2 "The law-making power of

[* 1,74] the * State," it is said in one case, " recognizes no re-

straints, and is bound by none, except such as are imposed

by the constitution. That instrument has been aptly termed a

1 People v. New York Central Railroad Co., 34 Barb. 138; Gentry v. Grif-

fith, 27 Texas, 461. And see the cases cited, ante, p. 168, note 4.

* Sill v. Village of Corning, 15 N. Y. 303; People v. Supervisors of Orange,

27 Barb. 593; People c Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 257;

People v. New York Central Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 497, 504; People e.

Toynbee, 2 Park. Cp. R. 490; State v. Gutierrez, 15 La. An. 190; Walpole e.

Elliott, 18 Ind. 258; Smith p. Judge, 17 Cal. 547; Commonwealth v. Hartman,

17 Penn. St. 119; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 260; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn.

St. 477.
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legislative act by the people themselves in their sovereign capacity,

and is therefore the paramount law. Its object is not to grant

legislative power, but to confine and restrain it. Without the

constitutional limitations, the power to make laws would be abso-

lute.^rKese^ITmitations are~created and imposed by express words,

or arise by necessary implication. The leading feature of the con-

stitution is the separation and distribution of the powers of the

government. It takes care to separate the executive, legislative,

and judicial powers, and to define their limits. The executive can

do no legislative act, nor the legislature any executive act, and

neither can exercise judicial authority." 1

It does not follow, however, that in every case the courts, be-

fore they can set aside a law as invalid, must be able to find in

the constitution some specific inhibition which has been disre-

garded, or some express command which has been disobeyed.

Prohibitions are only important where they are in the nature of

exceptions to a general grant of power; and if the authority to

do an act has not been granted by the sovereign to its represent-

ative, it cannot be necessary to prohibit its being done. If in
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one department was vested the whole power of the government,

it might be essential for the people, in the instrument delegating

this complete authority, to make careful and particular exception

of all those cases which it was intended to exclude from its cog-

nizance; for without such exception the government might do

whatever the people themselves, when met in their sovereign

capacity, would have power to do. But when only the legislative

power is delegated to one department, and the judicial to another,

it is not important that the one should be expressly forbidden to

try causes, or the other to make laws. The assumption of judi-

cial power by the legislature in such a case is unconstitutional,

because, though not expressly forbidden, it is nevertheless

* inconsistent with the provisions which have conferred [* 175]

upon another department the power the legislature is

seeking to exercise.2 And for similar reasons a legislative act

wliich should undertake to make a judge the arbiter in his own

controversies would be void, because, though in form a provision

for the exercise of judicial power, in substance it would be the crea-

1 Sill o. Corning, 15 N. Y. 303.

8 Ante, p. 87-114, and cases cited.
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tion of an arbitrary and irresponsible authority, neither legislative,

executive, nor judicial, and wholly unknown to constitutional

government.1 It could not be necessary to forbid the judiciary

to render judgment without suffering the party to make defence;

because it is implied in judicial authority that there shall be a

hearing before condemnation.2 Taxation cannot be arbitrary, be-

cause its very definition includes apportionment, nor can it be for

a purpose not public, because that would be a contradiction in

terms.8 The right of local self-government cannot be taken away,

because all our constitutions assume its continuance as the un-

doubted right of the people, and as an inseparable incident to

republican government.4 The bills of rights in the American con-

stitutions forbid that parties shall be deprived of property except

by the law of the land; but if the prohibition had been omitted, a

legislative enactment to pass one man's property over to another

would nevertheless be void. If the act proceeded upon the assump-

tion that such other person was justly entitled to the estate, and

therefore it was transferred, it would be void, because judicial in its

nature ; and if it proceeded without reasons, it would be equally void,
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as neither legislative nor judicial, but a mere arbitrary fiat.6 There

is no difficulty in saying that any such act, which under pretence

of exercising one power is usurping another, is opposed to the con-

'Post, 410-413, and cases cited.

* Post, 353-4. On this subject in general, reference is made to those very

complete recent works, Bigelow on Estoppel and Freeman on Judgments.

* Post, ch. 14. And see Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350; Tyson p. School

Directors, 51 Penn. St. 9; Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 575; Opinions of

Judges, 58 Me. 590; People v. Bacheller, N.Y. Court of Appeals, Albany

Law Jour. vol. 8, p. 120; Lowell v. Boston, Sup. Court of Mass., not yet

reported.

4 People v. Mayor, &c. of Chicago, 51 111. 81; People v. Hurlbut, 24

Mich. 44.

* Bowman p. Middleton, 1 Bay, 252; Wilkinson p. Leland, 2 Pet. 657; Ter-

rett p. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 26G. It is now

considered an universal and fundamental proposition in every well-regulated

and properly administered government, whether embodied in a constitutional

form or not, that private property cannot be taken for a strictly private purpose

at all, nor for public without a just compensation; and that the obligation of

contracts cannot be abrogated or essentially impaired. These and other vested

rights of the citizen are held sacred and inviolable, even against the plenitude

of power in the legislative department." Nelson, J., in People p. Morris, 13

Wend. 328.

[192]

CH. VII.]

* 175

DECLARING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

stitution and void. It is assuming a power which the people, if they

have not granted it at all, have reserved to themselves. The max-

ims of Magna Charta and the common law are the interpreters of

constitutional grants of power, and those acts which by those max-

ims the several departments of government are forbidden to do

cannot be considered within any grant or apportionment of power

which the people in general terms have made to those departments.

The Parliament of Great Britain, indeed, as possessing the

sovereignty * of the country, has the power to disregard [* 176]

fundamental principles, and pass arbitrary and unjust en-

actments; but it cannot do this rightfully, and it has the power to

do so simply because there is no written constitution from which

its authority springs or on which it depends, and by which the

courts can test the validity of its declared will. The rules which

confine the discretion of Parliament within the ancient landmarks

are rules for the construction of the powers of the American legis-

latures; and however proper and prudent it may be expressly to

prohibit those things which are not understood to be within the
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proper attributes of legislative power, such prohibition can never

be regarded as essential, when the extent of the power apportioned

to the legislative department is found upon examination not to be

broad enough to cover the obnoxious authority. The absence of

such prohibition cannot, by implication, confer powep.

Nor, where fundamental rights are declared by the constitution,

is it necessary at the same time to prohibit the legislature, in ex-

press terms, from taking them away. The declaration is itself a

prohibition, and is inserted in the constitution for the express

purpose of operating as a restriction upon legislative powep.1

Many things, indeed, which are contained in the bills of rights to

be found in the American constitutions, are not, and from the very

nature of the case cannot be, so certain and definite in character as

to form rules for judicial decisions; and they are declared rather

as guides to the legislative judgment than as marking an absolute

limitation of power. The nature of the declaration will generally

enable us to determine without difficulty whether it is the one thing

or the othep. If it is declared that all men are free, and no man

can be slave to another, a definite and certain rule of action is

laid down, which the courts can administer; but if it be said that

1 Beobe v. State, 6 Ind. 518. This principle is very often acted upon when

not expressly declared.

13 [ 193 ]
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"the blessings of a free government can only be maintained bj-&

firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and

virtue," we should not be likely to commit the mistake of sup-

posing that this declaration would authorize the courts to substitute

their own view of justice for that which may have impelled the

legislature to pass a particular law, or to inquire into the modera-

tion, temperance, frugality, and virtue of its members, with a view

to set aside their action, if it should appear to have been

[* 177] influenced by the opposite qualities. It is plain that * what

in the one case is a rule, in the other is an admonition

addressed to the judgment and the conscience of all persons in

authority, as well as of the people themselves.

So the forms prescribed for legislative action are in the nature

of limitations upon its authority. The constitutional provisions

which establish them are equivalent to a declaration that the

legislative power shall be exercised under these forms, and shall

not be exercised under any othep. A statute which does not

observe them will plainly be ineffectual.1

Statutes unconstitutional in Part.

It will sometimes be found that an act of the legislature is
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opposed in some of its provisions to the constitution, while others,

standing by themselves, would be unobjectionable. So the forms

observed in passing it may be sufficient for some of the purposes

sought to be accomplished by it, but insufficient for others. In any

such case the portion which conflicts with the constitution, or in

regard to which the necessary conditions have not been observed,

must be treated as a nullity. Whether the other parts of the

statute must also be adjudged void because of the association must

depend upon a consideration of the object of the law, and in what

manner and to what extent the unconstitutional portion affects the

remaindep. A statute, it has been said, is judicially held to be

unconstitutional, because it is not within the scope of legislative

authority; it may either propose to accomplish something pro-

hibited by the constitution, or to accomplish some lawful, and even

laudable object, by means repugnant to the Constitution of the

United States or of the State.2 A statute may contain some such

1 See ante, p. 130 el seq.

* Commonwealth v. Clapp. 5 Gray, 100. "A law that is unconstitutional is
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provisions, and yet the same act, having received the sanction of

all branches of the legislature, and being in the form of law, may

contain other useful and salutary provisions, not obnoxious to any

just constitutional exception. It would be inconsistent with all

just principles of constitutional law to adjudge these enactments

void, because they are associated in the same act, but not connected

with or dependent on others which are unconstitutional.1

Where, therefore, a part of a * statute is unconstitutional, [* 178]

that fact does not authorize the courts to declare the re-

mainder void also, unless all the provisions are connected in

subject-matter, depending on each other, operating together for

the same purpose, or otherwise so connected together in meaning,

that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have passed the

one without the other.2 The constitutional and unconstitutional

provisions may even be contained in the same section, and yet be

perfectly distinct and separable, so that the first may stand though

the last fall. The point is not whether they are contained in the

same section; for the distribution into sections is purely artificial;

but whether they are essentially and inseparably connected in sub-
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so because it is either an assumption of power not legislative in its nature, or

because it is inconsistent with some provision of the federal or State Constitu-

tion.'' Woodtcorth, J., in Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 27 Penn. St. 456.

1 Commonwealth p. Clapp, 5 Gray, 100. See, to the same effect, Fisher p.

McGirr, 1 Gray, 1; Warren v. Mayor, &c., of Charlestown, 2 Gray, 84; Wel-

lington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 95; Commonwealth p. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 482;

Commonwealth p. Pomeroy, 5 Gray, 486; State v. Copeland, 8 R. I. 33; State

r. Snow, 3 R. I. 64; Armstrong p. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 374; Clark v. Ellis, 2 Blackf.

248; MeCulloch ». State, 11 Ind. 432; People p. Hill, 7 Cal. 97; Lathrop p.

Mills, 19 Cal. 513; Thomson p. Grand Gulf Railroad Co., 3 How. Miss. 240;

Campbell v. Union Bank, 6 How. Miss. 625; Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. p.

State, 29 Ala. 573; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; State v. Cox, 3 Eng. 436;

Mayor, &c, of Savannah p. State, 4 Geo. 26; Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio,

s. s. 1; Robinson p. Bank of Darien, 18 Geo. 65; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn.

290; People p. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 190; Williams p. Payson, 14 La. An. 7;

Ely t. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 70; Davis c. State, 7 Md. 151; State v. Com-

missioners of Baltimore, 29 Md. 521; Bank of Hamilton p. Dudley's Lessee, 2

Pet. 526. "To the extent of the collision and repugnancy, the law of the State

must yield; and to that extent, and no further, it is rendered by such repugnancy

inoperative and void." Commonwealth r. Kimball, 24 Pick. 361, per Shaw,

Ox. J.; Norris v. Boston, 4 Met. 288.

* Commonwealth p. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 485. See People v. Briggs, 50 N.Y.

666.

[195]

* 178

[CH. TO.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

stance.1 If, when the unconstitutional portion is stricken out,

that which remains is complete in itself, and capable of being ex-

ecuted in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, wholly

independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained. The

difficulty is in determining whether the good and bad parts of the

statute are capable of being separated within the meaning of this

rule. If a statute attempts to accomplish two or more objects, and

is void as to one, it may still be in every respect complete and valid

as to the other. But if its purpose is to accomplish a single object

only, and some of its provisions are void, the whole must fail

unless sufficient remains to effect the object without the aid of the

invalid portion.2 And if they are so mutually connected

[* 179] with and * dependent on each other, as conditions, con-

siderations, or compensations for each other, as to warrant

1 Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 485; Willard v. People, 4 Scam. 47";

Eells v. People, 4 Scam. 512; Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379; State v. Easter-

brook, 3 Nev. 173; Hagerstown v. Dechert, 32 Md. 369.

* Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165. But perhaps the doctrine of sustaining one

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

part of a statute when the other is void was carried to an extreme in this case.

A prohibitory liquor law had been passed which was not objectionable on consti-

tutional grounds, except that the last section provided that " the question of pro-

hibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquor" should be submitted to

the electors of the State, and if it should appear "that a majority of the votes

cast as aforesaid, upon said question of prohibition, shall be for the prohibitory

liquor law, then this act shall take effect on the first day of July, 1855." The

court held this to be an attempt by the legislature to shift the exercise of legis-

lative power from themselves to the people, and therefore void; but they also

held that the remainder of the act was complete without this section, and must

therefore be sustained on the rule above given. The reasoning of the court by

which they are brought to this conclusion is ingenious; but one cannot avoid

feeling, especially after reading the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Wright,

that by the decision the court gave effect to an act which the legislature did not

design should take effect unless the result of the unconstitutional submission to

the people was in its favor. For a similar ruling, see Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342;

overruled in Mcshmcier t>. State, 11 Ind. 482. And see State v. Dombaugb,

20 Ohio, n. 8. 173, where it was held competent to construe a part of an act held

to be valid by another part adjudged unconstitutional, though the court con-

sidered it " quite probable " that if the legislature had supposed they were without

power to adopt the void part of the act, they would have made an essen-

tially different provision by the other. See also People v. Bull, 46 N. 68>

where part of an act was sustained which probably would not have been adopted

by the legislature separately. It must be obvious in any case where part of a"

act is set aside as unconstitutional, that it is unsafe to indulge in the same extreme
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the belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and if all

could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the

residue independently, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all

the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected

must fall with them.1

It has accordingly been held where a statute submitted to the

voters of a county the question of the removal of their county seat,

and one section imposed the forfeiture of certain vested rights in

case the vote was against the removal, that this portion of the act

being void, the whole must fall, inasmuch as the whole was sub-

mitted to the electors collectively, and the threatened forfeiture

would naturally affect the result of the vote.2

And where a statute annexed to the city of Racine certain lands

previously in the township of Racine, but contained an express

provision that the lands so annexed should be taxed at a different

and less rate than other lauds in the city; the latter provision

being held unconstitutional, it was also held that the whole statute

presumptions in support of the remainder that are allowable in support of a com-

plete act when some cause of invalidity is suggested to the whole of it. In the
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latter case, we know the legislature designed the whole act to have effect, and we

should sustain it if possible; in the former, we do not know that the legislature

would have been willing that a part of the act should be sustained if the remainder

were held void, and there is generally a presumption more or less strong to the

contrary. While, therefore, in the one case the act should be sustained unless

the invalidity is clear, in the other the whole should fall unless it is manifest the

portion not opposed to the constitution can stand by itself, and that in the leg-

islative intent it was not to be controlled or modified in its construction and

effei-t by the part which was void.

The Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah a few years since, in considering

a statute which authorized the probate courts to grant divorces for specified

causes, held it void so far as it undertook to confer jurisdiction on the probate

courts, but good so far as it authorized divorces; and as the jurisdiction to grant

them could, under their conclusions, vest nowhere else, they held it might be

administered by themselves as district judges. This was not exactly sustaining

the half of a law by itself, but it was sustaining it by means of something sub-

stituted in the place of the other half.

1 Warren v. Mayor, <&c, of Charlestown, 2 Gray, 99; State v. Commissioners

of Perry County, 5 Ohio, n. s. 507; Slauson v. Racine, 18 Wis. 398; Allen

County Commissioners v. Silvers, 22 Ind. 491; Garrard Co. Court o. Navigation

Co., 10 Am. Law Reg. N. s. 160.

'State v. Commissioners of Perry County, 5 Ohio, N. s. 507. And see

Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 388.
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must fail, inasmuch as such provision was clearly intended as a

compensation for the annexation.1

And where a statute, in order to obtain a jury of six

[* 180] persons, * provided for the summoning of twelve jurors,

from whom six were to be chosen and sworn, and under

the constitution the jury must consist of twelve, it was held that

the provision for reducing the number to six could not be rejected

and the statute sustained, inasmuch as this would be giving to it a

construction and effect different from that the legislature designed;

and would deprive the parties of the means of obtaining impartial

jurors which the statute had intended to give.2

On the other hand, — to illustrate how intimately the valid and

invalid portions of a statute may be associated, — a section of the

criminal code of Illinois provided that " if any person shall harbor

or secrete any negro, mulatto, or person of color, the same being

a slave or servant, owing service or labor to any other persons,

whether they reside in this State or in any other State, or Territory,

or district, within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the
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United States, or shall in any wise hinder or prevent the lawful

owner or owners of such slaves or servants from retaking them in

a lawful manner, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty

of a misdemeanor," &c, and it was held that, although the latter

portion of the section was void within the decision in Prigg v.

Pennsylvania,3 yet that the first portion, being a police regulation

for the preservation of order in the State, and important to its well-

being, and capable of being enforced without reference to the rest,

was not affected by the invalidity of the rest.4

A legislative act may be entirely valid as to some classes of

cases, and clearly void as to others. A general law for the punish-

ment of offences, which Bhould endeavor to reach, by its retroactive

operation, acts before committed, as well as to prescribes rule of

conduct for the citizen in the future, would be void so far as it was

retrospective, but such invalidity would not affect the operation of

the law in regard to the cases which were within the legislative

control. A law might be void as violating the obligation of exist-

1 Slauson v. Racine, IS Wis. 398, followed in State v Dousman, 28 Wis. 547.

* Campau ». Detroit, 14 Mich. 272.

s 16 Pet. 539.

4 Willard v. People, 4 Scam. 470; Eells v. People, ib. 512. See Hagerstown

v. Dechert, 32 Md. 369.
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ing contracts, but valid as to all contracts which should be entered

into subsequent to its passage, and which therefore would have no

legal force except such as the law itself would allow.1 In any such

case the unconstitutional law must operate as far as it can,2

and it will not be held invalid on the objection * of a party [* 181]

whose interests are not affected by it in a manner which

the constitution forbids. If there are any exceptions to this rule,

they must be of cases only where it is evident, from a contempla-

tion of the statute and of the purpose to be accomplished by it, that

it would not have been passed at all, except as an entirety, and

that the general purpose of the legislature will be defeated if it

shall be held valid as to some cases and void as to others.

Waiving a Constitutional Objection.

There are cases where a law in its application to a particular

case must be sustained, because the party who makes objection

has, by prior action, precluded himself from being heard against

it. Where a constitutional provision is designed for the protection

solely of the property rights of the citizen, it is competent for him
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to waive the protection, and to consent to such action as would be

invalid if taken against his will. On this ground it has been held

that an act appropriating the private property of one person for the

private purposes of another, on compensation made, was valid if he

whose property was taken assented thereto; and that he did assent

and waive the constitutional privilege, if he received the compensa-

tion awarded, or' brought an action to recover it.8 So if an act

providing for the appropriation of property for a public use shall

authorize more to be taken than the use requires, although such act

would be void without the owner's assent, yet with it all objection

1 Mundy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 68; Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 369. In People

t. Rochester, 50 N. Y. 525, certain commissioners were appointed to take for a

city hall either lands belonging to the city or lands of individuals. The act made

no provision for compensation. The commissioners elected to take lands belong-

ing to the city. Held, that the act was not wholly void for the omission to pro-

vide compensation in case the lands of individuals had been selected.

! Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47. The case of Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 333,

appears to be opposed to this principle, but it also appears to us to be bated

upon cases -which are not applicable.

'Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47.
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on the ground of unconstitutionality is removed.1 And where

parties were authorized by statute to erect a dam across a river,

provided they should first execute a bond to the people conditioned

to pay such damages as each and every person might sustain in

consequence of the erection of the dam, the damages to be assessed

by a justice of the peace, and the dam was erected and damages as-

sessed as provided by tho statute, it was held, in an action on the

bond to recover those damages, that the party erecting the dam and

who had received the benefit of the statute, was precluded by his

action from contesting its validity, and could not insist upon his

right to a common-law trial by jury.2 In these and the like

[* 182] cases the statute must be read with * an implied proviso that

the party to be affected shall assent thereto; and such con-

sent removes all obstacle, and lets the statute in to operate the same

as if it had in terms contained the condition.3 In criminal cases,

however, the doctrine that a constitutional privilege may be waived

must be true to a very limited extent only. A party may consent

to waive rights of property, but the trial and punishment for public
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offences are not within the province of individual consent or

agreement.

Judicial Doubts on Constitutional Questions.

It has been said by an eminent jurist, that when courts are called

upon to pronounce the invalidity of an act of legislation, passed

witli all the forms and ceremonies requisite to give it the force of

law, they will approach the question with great caution, examine it

in every possible aspect, and ponder upon it as long as deliberation

and patient attention can throw any new light upon the subject,

and never declare a statute void, unless the nullity and invalidity

of the act are placed, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt.4

1 Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511. And see Heyward v. Mayor, &c, of

New York, 8 Barb. 489; Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 586;

Detmold v. Drake, 46 N. Y. 318.

s People w. Murray, 5 Hill, 468. See Lee v. Tillotson, 24 Wend. 339.

3 Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 518. And see Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend.

149; Chamberlain v. Lyell, 3 Mich. 448; Beeeher v. Baldy, 7 Mich. 488;

Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 586; Detmold v. Drake, 46

N. Y. 318.

1 Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 95, per Shaw, Ch. J. See Brown v.

Buzan, 24 Ind. 194. If an act may be valid or not according to the circum-

[ 200 ]

CH. VII.] DECLARING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL. * 182

A reasonable doubt must be solved in favor of the legislative action,

and the act be sustained.1

"The question whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the

constitution is at all times a question of much delicacy, which

ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative in a doubt-

ful case. The court when impelled by duty to render such a

judgment would be unworthy of its station could it be

unmindful *of the solemn obligation which that station [*183]

imposes; but it is not on slight implication and vague

conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have tran-

scended its powers, and its acts to be considered as void. The oppo-

sition between the constitution and the law should be such that

the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompati-

bility with each othep." 2 Mp. Justice Washington gives a reason

for this rule, whicli has been repeatedly recognized in other cases

which we have cited. After expressing the opinion that the partic-

ular question there presented, and which regarded the constitution-

ality of a State law, was involved iu difficulty and doubt, he says:

"But if I could rest my opinion in favor of the constitutionality of

the law on which the question arises, on no other ground than this
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doubt so felt and acknowledged, that alone would, in my estima-

tion, be a satisfactory vindication of it. It is but a decent respect

stances, a court would be bound to presume that such circumstances existed as

would render it valid. Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417.

1 Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 18; Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 16; Flint River

Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Geo. 194; Carey v. Giles, 9 Geo. 253; Macon and

Western Railroad Co. v. Davis, 13 Geo. 68; Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14

Geo. 80; Kendall v. Kingston, 5 Mass. 524; Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass.

245; Norwich e. County Commissioners of Hampshire, 13 Pick. 61; Hartford

Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 227; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. II. 312;

Eason v. State, 6 Eng. 481; Hedley p. Commissioners of Franklin Co., 4 Blackf.

116; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 327; La Fayette v. Jenners, 10 Ind. 79; Ex parte

McCollum, 1 Cow. 564; Coutant v. People, 11 Wend. 511; Clark v. People,

26 Wend. 606; Morris v. People, 3 Denio, 381; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md.

376: Cotton p. Commissioners of Leon Co., 6 Fla. 610; Lane v. Dorman, 3

Scam. 238; Newland v. Marsh, 19 1ll. 381; Farmers and Mechanics Bank v.

Smith, 3 S. & R. 63; Weister p. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 477; Sears v. Cottrell, 5

Mich. 251; People v. Tyler, 8 Mich. 820; Allen County Commissioners p. Sil-

vers, 22 Ind. 491; State v. Robinson, 1 Kansas, 17; Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Grat.

426; Gormley v. Taylor, 44 Geo. 76; State v. Cape Girardeau, &c, R.R. Co., 48

Mo. 468.

* Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128, per Marshall, Ch. J.
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due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legisla-

tive body by which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its

validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved beyoud all

reasonable doubt." 1

The constitutionality of a law, then, is to be presumed, because

the legislature, which was first required to pass upon the question,

acting, as they must be deemed to have acted, witli integrity, and

with a just desire to keep within the restrictions laid by the con-

stitution upon their action, have adjudged that it is so. They are

a co-ordinate department of the government with the judiciary,

invested with very high and responsible duties, as to some of

which their acts are not subject to judicial scrutiny, and they

legislate under the solemnity of an official oath, which it is not to

be supposed they will disregard. It must, therefore, be supposed

that their own doubts of the constitutionality of their action have

been deliberately solved in its favor, so that the courts may with

some confidence repose upon their conclusion as one based upon

their best judgment. For although it is plain, upon the au-

thorities, that the courts should sustain legislative action when

not clearly satisfied of its invalidity, it is equally plain in reason
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that the legislature should abstain from adopting such action if

not fully assured of their authority to do so. Respect for the

instrument under which they exercise their power should

[* 184] impel the * legislature in every case to solve their doubts

in its favor, and it is only because we are to presume

they do so, that courts are warranted in giving weight in any case

to their decision. If it were understood that legislators refrained

from exercising their judgment, or that, in cases of doubt, they

allowed themselves to lean in favor of the action they desired to

accomplish, the foundation for the cases we have cited would be

altogether taken away.

As to what the doubt shall be upon which the court is to act,

we conceive that it can make no difference whether it springs from

an endeavor to arrive at the true interpretation of the constitution,

or from a consideration of the law after the meaning of the con-

stitution has been judicially determined. It has sometimes been

supposed that it was the duty of the court, first, to interpret the

constitution, placing upon it a construction that .must remain un-

1 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 270.
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varying, and then test the law in question by it; and that any

other rule would lead to differing judicial decisions, if the legis-

lature should put one interpretation upon the constitution at one

time and a different one at another. But the decided cases do not

sanction this rule,1 and the difficulty suggested is rather imaginary

than real, since it is but reasonable to expect that, where a con-

struction has once been placed upon a constitutional provision, it

will be followed afterwards, even though its original adoption may

have sprung from deference to legislative action rather than from

settled convictions in the judicial mind.2

The duty of the court to uphold a statute when the conflict

between it and the constitution is not clear, and the implication

which must always exist that no violation has been intended by

the legislature, may require it in some cases, where the meaning

of the constitution is not in doubt, to lean in favor of such a con-

struction of the statute as might not at first view seem most

obvious and natural. For as a conflict between the statute and

the constitution is not to be implied, it would seem to follow, where

the meaning of the constitution is clear, that the court, if possible,
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mmt give the statute such a construction as will enable it to have

effect. This is only saying, in another form of words, that the

court must construe the statute in accordance with the

legislative * intent; since it is always to be presumed [* 185]

the legislature designed the statute to take effect, and

not to be a nullity.

The rule upon this subject is thus stated by the Supreme Court

of Illinois: "Whenever an act of the legislature can be so con-

strued and applied as to avoid conflict with the constitution and

give it the force of law, such construction will be adopted by the

courts. Therefore, acts of the legislature, in terms retrospective,

and which, literally interpreted, would invalidate and destroy

vested rights, are upheld by giving them prospective operation

only; for, applied to, and operating upon, future acts and trans-

actions only, they are rules of property under and subject to which

the citizen acquires property rights, and are obnoxious to no con-

stitutional limitation; but as retroactive laws, they reach to and

destroy existing rights, through force of the legislative will, with-

1 Sun Mutual Insurance Co. v. New York, 5 Sandf. 14; Clark v. People, 26

Wend. 606; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 457.

• People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 162.
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out a hearing or judgment of law. So will acts of the legislature,

having elements of limitation, and capable of being so applied and

administered, although the words are broad enough to, and do,

literally read, strike at the right itself, be construed to limit and

control the remedy; for as such they are valid, but as weapons

destructive of vested rights they are void; and such force only

will be given the acts as the legislature could impart to them."1

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, where a similar ques-

tion is involved, recognizing their obligation " so to construe every

act of the legislature as to make it consistent, if it be possible,

with the provisions of the constitution," proceed to the examina-

tion of a statute by the same rule, "without stopping to inquire

what construction might be warranted by the natural import of the

language used."2

And Harris, J., delivering the opinion of the majority of the

Court of Appeals of New York, says: "A legislative act is not

to be declared void upon a mere conflict of interpretation between

the legislative and the judicial power. Before proceeding to annul,
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by judicial sentence, what has been enacted by the law-making

power, it should clearly appear that the act cannot be supported

by any reasonable intendment or allowable presumption."3 And

the Supreme Court of New York consider this but

[* 186] * the application of the familiar rule, that in the expo-

sition of a statute it is the duty of the court to seek to

ascertain and carry out the intention of the legislature in its en-

actment, and to give full effect to such intention, and they are

bound so to construe the statute, if practicable, as to give it force

and validity, rather than to avoid it, or render it nugatory.4

The rule is not different when the question is whether any por-

tion of a statute is void, than when the whole is assailed. The

excess of power, if there is any, is the same in either case, and is

not to be applied in any instance.

And on this ground it has been held that where the repealing

clause in an unconstitutional statute repeals all inconsistent acts,

the repealing clause is to stand and have effect, notwithstanding

1 Newland t>. Marsh, 19 I1L 384. See, also, Bigelow v. West Wisconsin

Co., 27 Wis. 478.

s Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 17.

3 People v. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y. 241.

* Clarke v. Rochester, 24 Barb. 471. See Marshall v. Grimes, 41 Miss. 27.
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the invalidity of the rest.1 But other cases hold that such repeal-

ing clause is to be understood as designed to repeal all conflicting

provisions, in order that those of the new statute can have effect;

and that if the statute is invalid, nothing can conflict with it, and

therefore nothing is repealed.2 Great caution is necessary in

some cases, or the rule which was designed to ascertain and

effectuate the legislative intent will be pressed to the extreme of

giving effect to part of a statute exclusively, when the legislative

intent was that it should not stand except as a component part of

the whole.

Inquiry into Legislative Motives.

From what examination has been given to this subject, it ap-

pears that whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a

question of power; that is, whether the legislature in the partic-

ular case, in respect to the subject-matter of the act, the manner in

which its object is to be accomplished, and the mode of enacting it,

has kept within the constitutional limits and observed the constitu-

tional conditions. In any case in which this question is answered

in the affirmative, the courts are not at liberty to inquire into the

proper exercise of the power. They must assume that
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legislative discretion has been properly exercised.8 * If [* 187]

evidence was required, it must be supposed that it was

before the legislature when the act was passed ;4 and if any special

finding was required to warrant the passage of the particular act,

it would seem that the passage of the act itself might be held

equivalent to such finding.6 And although it has sometimes been

1 Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 489; Ely v. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 70.

1 Shepardson v. Milwaukee and Beloit Railroad Co., 6 Wis. 605; State v.

Judge of County Court, 11 Wis. 50; Tims v. State, 26 Ala. 165; Sullivan v.

Adams, 3 Gray, 470; Devoy v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 35 Barb. 264; Cam-

pau v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 276; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261; Harbeck v. New

York, 10 Bosw. 366.

1 People t>. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 193; People v. New York Central Railroad

Co., 34 Barb. 137; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh.

154.

* De Camp v. Eveland, 19 Barb. 81; Lusher v. Scites, 4 W. Va. 11.

'Johnson r. Joliet and Chicago Railroad Co., 23 111. 207. The constitution

of Illinois provided that "corporations not possessing banking powers or priv-

ileges may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special
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urged at the bar that the courts ought to inquire into the motives

of the legislature where fraud and corruption were alleged, and

annul their action if the allegation were established, the argu-

ment has in no case been acceded to by the judiciary, and they

have never allowed the inquiry to be entered upon.1 The reasons

are the same here as those which preclude an inquiry into the

motives of the governor in the exercise of a discretion vested in

acts, except for municipal purposes, and in cases where, in the judgment of the

General Assembly, the objects of the corporation cannot be attained under

general laws." A special charter being passed without any legislative declara-

tion that its object could not be attained under a general law, the Supreme Court

sustained it, but placed their decision mainly on the ground that the clause had

been wholly disregarded, "and it would now produce far-spread ruin to declare

such acts unconstitutional and void." It is very clearly intimated in the opinion,

that the legislative practice, and this decision sustaining it, did violence to tie

intent of the constitution. A provision in the constitution of Indiana that "no

act shall take effect until the same shall have been published and circulated in

the several counties of this State, by authority, except in case of emergency,'*
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adds the words, "which emergency shall be declared in the preamble, or in the

body of the law;" thus clearly making the legislative declaration necessary.

Carpenter v. Montgomery, 7 Blackf. 415; Mark v. State, 15 Ind. 98; Htndrick-

son v. Hendrickson, 7 Ind. 18.

1 Sunbury and Erie Railroad Co. v. Cooper, 33 Penn. St. 278; Ex parte New-

man, 9 Cal. 502; Baltimore v. State, 1.5 Md. 376; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met.

(Ky.) 566. "The courts cannot impute to the legislature any other but public

motives for their acts." People v. Draper, 16 N. Y. 645, per Denio, Ch. J.

"We are not made judges of the motives of the legislature, and the court will

not usurp the inquisitorial office of inquiry into the bona Jules of that body in

discharging its duties." Shankland, J., in the same case, p. 655. "The powers

of the three departments are not merely equal; they are exclusive in respect to

the duties assigned to each. They are absolutely independent of each other. It

is now proposed that one of the three powers shall institute an inquiry into the

conduct of another department, and form an issue to try by what motives the

legislature were governed in the enactment of a law. If this may be done, we

may also inquire by what motives the executive is induced to approve a bill or

withhold his approval, and in case of withholding it corruptly, by our mandate

compel its approval. To institute the proposed inquiry would be a direct attack

upon the independence of the legislature, and a usurpation of power subversive

of the constitution." Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind. 302, per Gookins, J. "We are

not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only ex-

amine into its power under the constitution." Per Chase, Ch. J., in Ex parie

McCardle, 7 Wall. 514. And see McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 431; Bradshaw

v. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16; Humboldt County v. Churchill County Comm'rs, 6 Nev. 30;

Flint, »&c., Plank Road Co. b. Woodhull, 25 Mich. 103; State v. Fagan, 22 La.

An. 645; State v. Hays, 49 Mo. 607.
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him exclusively. He is responsible for his acts in such a case

not to the courts, but to the people.1

* Consequences if a Statute is Void. [* 188]

When a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if it

had never been. Rights cannot be built up under it; contracts

which depend upon it for their consideration are void; it consti-

tutes a protection to no one who has acted under it, and no one

can be punished for having refused obedience to it before the deci-

sion was made.2 And what is true of an act void in toto is true

also as to any part of an act which is found to be unconstitutional,

and which, consequently, is to be regarded as having never, at any

time, been possessed of any legal force.

1 Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 522; Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind. 302.

* Strong v. Daniel, 5 Ind. 348; Astrom v. Hammond, 3 McLean, 107;

Meagher v. Storey Co., 5 Nev. 244. But one acting as an officer under an un-

constitutional law was held in Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pcnn. St. 436, to

be an officer de facto. This could hardly be so, however, if the law creating

the office was unconstitutional. There can be no officer de facto when there is

no office. See Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 250. In People v. Salomon, 54 111.

46, a ministerial officer was severely censured for presuming to disregard a law
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as unconstitutional. The court found it to be valid, but if they had held the con-

trary, the officer certainly could not have been punished for anticipating their de-

cision in his own action. In Texas it is reported to have been recently held, in

an opinion which we have not seen, that an act held unconstitutional must be

deemed to have the force of law for the protection of officers acting under it up

to the time of the decision declaring it void. Sessurus v. Botts, 34 Tex. 335.

And in some States a disposition has been manifested to hold that contracts made

by municipal bodies under an unconstitutional law may be enforced where they

have found their way into the hands of bona fide purchasers before the invalidity

was judicially declared. Stcines v. Franklin County, 48 Mo. 167; State v. Saline

County Court, ib. 390; Columbia County o. King, 13 Fla. 45; Same v. Davidson,

it. 482.
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[*189] "CHAPTER VIII.

THE SEVERAL GRADES OP MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

In the examination of American constitutional law, we shall

not fail to notice the care taken and the means adopted to bring

the agencies by which power is to be exercised as near as possible

to the subjects upon which the power is to operate.

In contradistinction to those governments where power is con-

centrated in one man, or one or more bodies of men, whose

supervision and active control extend to all the objects of gov-

ernment within the territorial limits of the State, the American

system is one of complete decentralization, the primary and vital

idea of which is, that local affairs shall be managed by local

authorities, and general affairs only by the central authority. It

was under the control of this idea that a national Constitution

was formed, under which the States, while yielding to the national

government complete and exclusive jurisdiction over external

affairs, conferred upon it such powers only, in regard to matters

of internal regulation, as seemed to be essential to national union,
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strength, and harmony, and without which the purpose in organ-

izing the national authority might have been defeated. It is this,

also, that impels the several States, as if by common arrangement,

to subdivide their territory into counties, towns, road, and school

districts, and to confer upon each the powers of local legislation,

and also to incorporate cities, boroughs, and villages wherever a

dense population renders different rules important from those

which are needful for the rural districts.

The system is one which almost seems a part of the very nature

of the race to which we belong. A similar subdivision of the realm

for the purposes of municipal government has existed in England

from the earliest ages;1 and in America, the first settlers, as if

1 Crabbe's History of English Law, c. 2; 1 Bl. Com. 114; Hallam's Middle

Ages, c. 8, pt. 1; 2 Kent, 278; Vaughan's Revolutions in English History, b. i,

c. 8.
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instinctively, adopted it in their frame of government, and

* no other has ever supplanted it, or even found advocates. [* 190]

In most of the colonies the central power created and pro-

vided for the organization of the towns;1 in one at least the towns

preceded and created the central authority;2 but in all, the final

result was substantially the same, that towns, villages, boroughs,

cities, and counties exercised the powers of local government, and

the Colony or State the powers of a more general nature.3

1 For an interesting history of the legislation in Connecticut on this subject,

see Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131. In New Hampshire, see Bow v.

Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351. The learned note to Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 9

Gray, 503, will give similar information concerning the organization and authority

of towns in the Massachusetts provinces. And see People v. Hurlbut, 24

Mich. 98. Mr. Elliott well says: "The prime strength of New England and

of the whole republic was and is in the municipal governments and in the homes."

And be adds, that among the earliest things decided in Massachusetts was, " that

trivial things should be ended in towns." (1635.) Elliott's New England, Vol.

I. p. m.

* Rhode Island; see Arnold's History, c. 7. It is remarked by this author
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that, when the charter of Rhode Island was suspended to bring the Colony under

the dominion of Andros, "the American system of town governments, which

necessity had compelled Rhode Island to initiate fifty years before, became the

means of preserving the individual liberty of the citizen when that of the State or

Colony was crushed." Ib. Vol. I. p. 487.

2 "The townships," says De Tocqueville, " are only subordinate to the State

in those interests which I shall term social, as they are common to all of the

citizens. They are independent in all that concerns themselves, and among the

inhabitants of New England I believe that not a man is to be found who would

acknowledge that the State has any right to interfere in their local interests. The

towns of New England buy and sell, prosecute or are indicted; augment or

diminish their rates, without the slightest opposition on the part of the adminis-

trative authority of the State. They are bound, however, to comply with the

demands of the community. If a State is in need of money, a town can neither

give nor withhold the supplies. If a State projects a road, the township cannot

refuse to let it cross its territory; if a police regulation is made by the State it

must be enforced by the town. An uniform system of instruction is organized

all over the country, and every town is bound to establish the schools which the

law ordains. . . . Strict as this obligation is, the government of the State im-

poses it in principle only, and in its performance the township assumes all its

independent rights. Thus taxes are voted by the State, but they are assessed

and collected by the township; the existence of a school is obligatory, but the

township builds, pays, and superintends it. In France, the State collector re-

ceives the local imposts; in America, the town collector receives the taxes of the

State. Thus the French government lends its agents to the commune; in Amer-

ica, the township is the agent of the government. The fact alone shows the
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The several State constitutions have been framed with this

system in view, and the delegations of power which they make,

and the express and implied restraints which they impose there-

upon, can only be correctly understood and construed by keeping

in view its present existence and anticipated continuance. There

are few of the general rules of constitutional law that are not

more or less affected by the fact that the powers of government

are not concentrated in any one body of men, but are carefully

distributed, with a view to being exercised with intelli-

[* 191] gence,* economy, and facility, and as far as possible by

the persons most directly and immediately interested.

It has already been seen that the legislature cannot delegate its

power to make laws; but fundamental as this maxim is, it is so

qualified by the customs of our race, and by other maxims which

regard local government, that the right of the legislature, in the

entire absence of authorization or prohibition, to create towns and

other inferior municipal organizations, and to confer upon them

the powers of local government, and especially of local taxation

and police regulation usual with such corporations, would always
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pass unchallenged. The legislature in these cases is not regarded

as delegating its authority, because the regulation of such local

affairs as are commonly left to local boards and officers is not un-

derstood to belong properly to the State; and when it interferes,

as sometimes it must, to restrain and control the local action,

there should be reasons of State policy or dangers of local abuse

to warrant the interposition.1

extent of the differences which exist between the two nations." Democracy in

America, c. 5.

'"It seems to be generally conceded that powers of local legislation may be

granted to cities, towns, and other municipal corporations. And it would require

strong reasons to satisfy us that it could have been the design of the framers of

our constitution to take from the legislature a power which has been exercised in

Europe by governments of all classes from the earliest history, and the exercise

of which has probably done more to promote civilization than all other causeE

combined; which has been constantly exercised in every part of our country

from its earliest settlement, and which has raised up among us many of our most

valuable institutions." State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 292, per Bell, J. See also

Tanner v. Trustees of Albion, 5 Hill, 121; Dalby v. Wolf, 14 Iowa, 228; State

v. Simonds, 3 Mo. 414; McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Monr. 433; Smith t>. Levinus,

8 N. Y. 472; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Burgess t>. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; New

Orleans u.Turpin, 13 La. An. 56; Gilkeson v. The Frederick Justices, 13 Grat.

577; Mayor, Ac., of New York v. Ryan, 2 E. D. Smith, 868; St. Louis ».
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The people of the municipalities, however, do not define for

themselves their own rights, privileges, and powers, nor is there

any common law which draws any definite line of distinction be-

tween the powers which may be exercised by the State and those

which must be left to the local governments.1 The municipalities

must look to the State for such charters of government as the

legislature shall see fit to provide; and they cannot prescribe for

themselves the details, though they have a right to expect that

those charters will be granted with a recognition of the

general * principles with which we are familiar. The [* 192]

charter, or the general law under which they exercise

their powers, is their constitution, in which they must be able to

show authority for the acts they assume to perform. They have

no inherent jurisdiction to make laws or adopt regulations of gov-

ernment; they are governments of enumerated powers, acting by

a delegated authority; so that while the State legislature may

exercise such powers of government coming within a proper desig-

nation of legislative power as are not expressly or impliedly pro-

hibited, the local authorities can exercise those only which are

expressly or impliedly conferred, and subject to such regulations
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or restrictions as are annexed to the grant.2

The creation of municipal corporations, and the conferring

upon them of certain powers and subjecting them to correspond-

ing duties, does not deprive the legislature of the State of that

general control over their citizens which was before possessed.

It still has authority to amend their charters, enlarge or diminish

their powers, extend or limit their boundaries, consolidate two or

more into one, overrule their legislative action whenever it is

Russell, 9 Mo. 503; Bliss v. Eraus, 16 Ohio, n. 8. 65; Trigally ». Memphis,

6 Cold. 382; Duraeh's Appeal, 63 Penn. St. 491; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458;

Jones v. Richmond, 18 Grat. 517; State v. Neill, 24 Wis. 149; Bradley o.

M'Atee, 7 Bush, 667; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 309; Burckholter v. M'Connellsville,

20 Ohio, 308; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 108; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis.

415.

1 As to the common law affecting these corporate existences, and the effect

of usage, see 2 Kent, 278, 279.

1 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Willard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn. 254;

Abendrpth v. Greenwich, 29 Conn. 363; Baldwin v. North Branford, 32 Conn.

47; Webster r. Harwinton, ib. 131; Douglass v. Placerville, 18 Cal. 643; Lack-

land i>. Northern Missouri Railroad Co., 31 Mo. 180; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio,

s. a. 268; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152; Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23.
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deemed unwise, impolitic, or unjust, and even abolish them alto-

gether in the legislative discretion.1 The rights and franchises of

such a corporation, being granted for the purposes of the

[* 193] government, can never * become such vested rights as

against the State that they cannot be taken away; nor

does the charter constitute a contract in the sense of the constito-

tional provision which prohibits the obligation of contracts being

violated.2 Restraints on the legislative power of control must be

1 St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 400; Coles v. Madison Co., Breese, 115; Rich-

land County v. Lawrence County, 12 HI. 1; Trustees of Schools v. Tatman, 13

111. 27 ; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 111. 1; People v. Power, 25 IE. 187; St. Louis

v, Russell, 9 Mo. 503; State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330; McKim e. Odorn, 3 Bland,

407; Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 416; Harrison Justices v. Holland, 3 Grat.

247; Brighton v. Wilkinson, 2 Allen, 27; Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. 361; Mills

v. Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Langworthy v. Dubuque, 16 Iowa, 271; Weeks t.

Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; State t>. Branin, 3 Zab. 484; Patterson v. Society, &c,

4 Zab. 385; Atchison v. Bartholow, 4 Kansas, 124; City of St. Louis e. Caffe-

rata, 24 Mo. 94; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Aspinwall v. Commissioners,

&c, 22 How. 364; Howard v. McDiamid, 26 Ark. 100; Philadelphia v. Fox,

64 Penn. St. 169; Bradshaw v. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16; Kuhn v. Board of Educa-
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tion, 4 W. Va. 499; Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 580; Hess ». Pegg, 7 Nev. 23.

The legislature may in its discretion recall to itself and exercise so much of

such powers as it has conferred upon municipal corporations as is not secured to

them by the constitution. People v. Pinkney, 32 N. Y. 377. The creditors of a

county cannot prevent the legislature reducing its limits, notwithstanding their

security may be diminished thereby. Wade v. Richmond, 18 Grat. 583. This

power is not defeated or effected by the circumstance that the municipal corpo-

ration was by its charter made the trustee of a charity; and in such case, if the

corporation is abolished, the Court of Chancery may be empowered and directed

by the repealing act to appoint a new trustee to take charge of the property and

execute the trust. Montpelier r. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12. And see Harri-

son v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16; Montpelier Academy ». George, 14 La. An.

406; Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162; Police Jury v. Shreveport, 5 La. An.

665. But neither the identity of a corporation, nor its right to take property by

devise, is destroyed by a change in its name, or enlargement of its area, or an

increase in the number of its corporators. Girard r. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1.

Changing a borough into a city does not of itself abolish or affect the existing

borough ordinances. Trustees of Erie Academy v. City of Erie, 31 Penn. St. 51o.

Nor will it affect the indebtedness of the corporation, which will continue to be

its indebtedness under its new organization. Olney v. Harvey, 50 HI. 453. A

general statute, containing a clause repealing all statutes contrary to its provi-

sions, does not repeal a clause in a municipal charter on the same subject. State

v. Branin, 3 Zab. 484.

* This principle was recognized by the several judges in Dartmouth College

». Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518. And see People e. Morris, 13 Wend. 331; St.
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found in the constitution of the State, or they must rest alone in

the legislative discretion.1 If the legislative action in these cases

operates injuriously to the municipalities or to individuals, the

remedy is not with the courts. The courts have no power to inter-

fere, and the people must be looked to, to right through the ballot-

Louis p. Russell, 9 Mo. 507; Montpelier p. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12; Trustees

of Schools v. Tatman, 13 11l. 30; Brighton p. Wilkinson, 2 Allen, 27; Reynolds

p. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162; Police Jury p. Shreveport, 5 La. An. 665; Mt. Car-

mel p. Wabash County, 50 1ll. 69; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 24, 30, 37.

1 "Where a corporation is the mere creature of legislative will, established

for the general good and endowed by the State alone, the legislative may, at

pleasure, modify the law by which it was created. For in that case there would

be but one party affected, — the government itself, — and therefore not a con-

tract within the meaning of the constitution. The trustees of such a corporation

would be the mere mandatories of the State, having no personal interest involved,

and could not complain of any law that might abridge or destroy their agency."

Montpelier Academy v. George, 14 La. An. 406. In Trustees of Schools v.

Tatman, 13 1ll. 30, the court say: "Public corporations are but parts of the

machinery employed in carrying on the affairs of the State; and they are subject

to be changed, modified, or destroyed, as the exigencies of the public may
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demand. The State may exercise a general superintendence and control over

them and their rights and effects, so that their property is not diverted from the

uses and objects for which it was given or purchased." It is a lawful exercise

of legislative authority upon the division of counties, towns, &c, to confer a

part of the corporate property of the old carporation upon the new, and to

direct the old body to pay it over to the new. Harrison v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass.

16; Bristol p. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524; Milwaukee Town v. Milwaukee City,

12 Wis. 93; Marshall Co. Court v. Calloway Co. Court, 3 Bush, 93. But it

seems that this apportionment of property can only be made at the time of the

division. Windham v. Portland, 4 Mass. 390; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass.

76. See Richland p. Lawrence, 12 1ll. 8; Bowdoinham p. Richmond, 6 Greenl.

112. In the latter case, it was held that the apportionment of debts between an

old town and one created from it was in the nature of a contract; and it was not

in the power of the legislature afterwards to release the new township from pay-

ment of its share as thus determined. But the case of Layton p. New Orleans,

L2 La. An. 515, is contra. See also Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Penn. St.

374, which in principle seems to accord with the Louisiana case. In Burns p-

Clarion County, 62 Penn. St. 422, it was held the legislature had the power to

open a settlement made by county creditors with the county treasurer, and to

compel them to settle with him on principles of equity. See further Cambridge

p. Lexington, 17 Pick. 222; Attorney-General p. Cambridge, 16 Gray, 247;

Clark p. Cambridge, &c, Bridge Proprietors, 104 Mass. 236. The legislature

has power to lay out a road through several towns, and apportion the expense

between them. Waterville p. Kennebeck County, 59 Me. 80; Commonwealth

v. Newburyport, 103 Mass. 129.
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box all these wrongs.1 This is the general rule; and the excep-

tions to it are not numerous, and will be indicated hereafter.

The powers of these corporations are either express or implied.

The former are those which the legislative act under which they

exist confers in express terms; the latter are such as are neces-

sary in order to carry into effect those expressly granted, and

which must, therefore, be presumed to have been within the inten-

tion of the legislative grant.3 Certain powers are also incidental

to corporations, and will be possessed unless expressly or by

implication prohibited. Of these an English writer has said:

"A municipal corporation has at common law few powers beyond

those of electing, governing, and removing its members, and reg-

ulating its franchises and property. The power of its governing

1 "The correction of these abuses is as readily attained at the ballot-box

as it would be by subjecting it to judicial revision. A citizen or a number of

citizens may be subtracted from a county free from debt, having no taxation for

county purposes, and added to an adjacent one, whose debts are heavy, and

whose taxing powers are exercised to the utmost extent allowed by law, and this,
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too, without consulting their wishes. It is done every day. Perhaps a majority

of the people, thus annexed to an'adjacent or thrown into a new cqunty by the

division of an old one, may have petitioned the legislature for this change; but

this is no relief to the outvoted minority, or the individual who deems himself

oppressed and vexed by the change. Must we, then, to prevent such occasional

hardships, deny the power entirely?

"It must be borne in mind that these corporations, whether established over

cities, counties, or townships (where such incorporated subdivisions exist), are

never intrusted and can never be intrusted with any legislative power inconsist-

ent or conflicting with the general laws of the land, or derogatory to those rights

either of person or property which the constitution and the general laws guarantee.

They are strictly subordinate to the general laws, and merely created to carry

out the purposes of those laws with more certainty and efficiency. Tbey may

be and sometimes are intrusted with powers which properly appertain to private

corporations, and in such matters their power as mere municipal corporations

ceases." City of St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 414.

2 2 Kent, 278, note; Halstead v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 3 N. Y. 433;

Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 112; New London v. Brainerd, 22 Conn. 552; State

v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424; McMillan v. Lee County, 3 Iowa, 311; La Fayette

v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38; Clark ». Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 212; State v. Morristown,

33 N. J. 63; Beaty v. Knowler, 4 Pet. 162; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470. In

this last case, it was held that these corporations had implied power to borrow

[* 19-4]
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officers can only extend to the administration of the by-laws and

other ordinances by which the body is regulated." 1 But without

being expressly empowered so to do, they may sue and be sued;

may have a common seal; may purchase and hold lands

and other * property for corporate purposes, and convey [* 195]

the same; may make by-laws whenever necessary to

accomplish the design of the incorporation, and enforce the same

by penalties; and may enter into contracts to effectuate the cor-

porate purposes.2 Except as to these incidental powers, and which

need not be, though they usually are, mentioned in the charter, the

charter itself, or the general law under which they exist, is the

measure of the authority to be exercised.

And the general disposition of the courts in this country has

been to confine municipalities within the limits that a strict con-

struction of the grants of powers in their charters will assign to

them; thus applying substantially the same rule that is applied to

charters of private incorporation.8 The reasonable presumption is

1 Willcock on Municipal Corporations, tit. 769.

» Angell and Ames on Corp. §§ 111, 239; 2 Kyd on Corp. 102; State v.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Ferguson, 33 N. H. 430. See Dillon, Mun. Corp. for an examination in the

light of the authorities of the several powers here mentioned.

'Under a city charter which authorized the common council to appoint asses-

sors for the purpose of awarding damages to those through whose property a

street might be opened, and to assess such damages on the property benefited,

it was decided that the council were not empowered to levy a tax to pay for the

other expenses of opening the street. Reed v. Toledo, 18 Ohio, 161. So a

power to enact by-laws and ordinances to abate and remove nuisances will not

authorize the passing of an ordinance to prevent nuisances, or to impose penalties

for the creation thereof. Rochester v. Collins, 12 Barb. 559. A power to impose

penalties for obstructions to streets would not authorize the like penalties for

encroachments upon streets, where, under the general laws of the State, the

offences are recognized as dilFerent and distinct. Grand Rapids v. Hughes, 15

Mich. 54. Authority to levy a tax on real and personal estate would not warrant

an income tax, especially when such a tax is unusual in the State. Mayor of

Savannah t>. Hartridge, 8 Geo. 23. It will appear, therefore, that powers near

akin to those expressly conferred are not, for that reason, to be taken by impli-

cation. And see Commonwealth v. Erie and N. E. Railroad Co., 27 Penn. St.

839. This rule has often been applied where authority has been asserted on

behalf of a municipal corporation to loan its credit to corporations formed to

construct works of internal improvement. See La Fayette ». Cox, 5 Ind. 38.

A power to pass ordinances to prohibit the sale or giving away of intoxicating

liquors in certain special eases is an implied exclusion of the power to prohibit

the sale or giving away in other cases. State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424. In

Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. 465, it is said: "For all the purposes of juris-
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that the State has granted in clear and unmistakable terms all it

has designed to grant at all.

[* 196] * It must follow that, if in any case a party assumes to

deal with a corporation on the supposition that it possesses

powers which it does not, or to contract in any other manner than

is permitted by the charter, he will not be allowed, notwithstand-

ing he may have complied with the undertaking on his part, to

maintain a suit agaiust the corporation based upon its unauthorized

action. Even where a party is induced to enter upon work for a

corporation by the false representations of corporate officers, in

regard to the existence of facts on which by law the power of the

corporation to enter upon the work depends, these false representa-

tions cannot have the effect to give a power which in the particular

case was wanting, or to validate a contract otherwise void, and

therefore can afford no ground of action against the corporation;

but every party contracting with it must take notice of any want

of authority which the public records would show.1 This is the

i
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diction corporations are like the inferior courts, and must show the power given

them in every case. If this be wanting, their proceedings must be holden void

whenever they come in question, even collaterally; for they are not judicial and

subject to direct review on certiorari. 2 Kyd on Corp. 104-107." See also

Milhau t>. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435, 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611; Douglass v.

Placerville, 18 Cal. 643; Mount Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 899; Hooper r.

Emery, 14 Me. 375; Mayor, &c, of Macon v. Macon and Western R.R- Co.,

7 Geo. 224; Hopple v. Brown, 13 Ohio, M. s. 811; Lackland v. Northern Mis-

souri Railroad Co., 31 Mo. 180; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524; Bennett ». Borough

of Birmingham, 31 Penn. St. 15; Tucker r. Virginia City, 4 Nev. 20; Leaven-

worth v. Norton, 1 Kansas, 432; Kyle v. Malin, 8 Ind. 34; Johnson v. Pbitadel-

- phia, GO Penn. St. 451; Kniper r. Louisville, 7 Bush, 599; English t>. Chicot

County, 26 Ark. 454; Pullen v. Raleigh, 68 N. C. 451.

1 The common council of Williamsburg had power to open, regulate, grade,

and pave streets, but only upon petition signed by one third of the persons own-

ing lands within the assessment limits. A party entered into a contract with the

corporation for improving a street upon the false representations of the council

that such a petition had been presented. Held, that the provision of the la*

being public, and all the proceedings leading to a determination by the council

to make a particular improvement being matters of record, all persons were

chargeable with notice of the law and such proceedings; and that, notwithstand-

ing the false representations, no action would lie against the city for work done

under the contract. Swift t». Williamsburg, 24 Barb. 427. "If the plaintiff can

recover on the state of facts he has stated in his complaint, the restrictions and

limitations which the legislature sought to impose upon the powers of the com-

mon council will go for nothing. And yet these provisions are matters of
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general rule, and the cases of unauthorized action which may hind

the corporation are exceptional, and will be referred to further on.

substance, and were designed to be of some service to the constituents of the

common council. They were intended to protect the owners of lands and the

tax-payers of the city, as well against the frauds and impositions of the con-

tractors who might be employed to make local improvements, as against the

illegal acts of the common council themselves in employing the contractors.

But if the plaintiff can recover in this action, of what value or effect are all these

safeguards? If the common council desire to make a local improvement, which

the persons to be benefited thereby, and to be assessed therefor, are unwilling

to have made, the consent of the owners may be wholly dispensed with, accord-

ing to the plaintiff's theory. The common council have only to represent that

the proper petition has been presented and the proper proceedings have been

taken, to warrant the improvement. They then enter into the contract. The

improvement is made. Those other safeguards for an assessment of the ex-

penses and for reviewing the proceedings may or may not be taken. But when

the work is completed and is to be paid for, it is found that the common council

have no authority to lay any assessment or collect a dollar from the property

benefited by the improvement. The contractor then brings his action, and

recovers from the city the damages he has sustained by the failure of the city to
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pay him the contract price. The ground of his action is the falsity of the repre-

sentations made to him. But the truth or falsity of such representations might

have been ascertained by the party with the use of the most ordinary care and

diligence. The existence of the proper petition, and the taking of the necessary

initiatory steps to warrant the improvement, were doubtless referred to and

recited in the contract made with the plaintiff. And he thus became again directly

chargeable with notice of the contents of all these papers. It is obvious that the

restrictions and limitations imposed by the law cannot be thus evaded. The

consent of the parties interested in such improvements cannot be dispensed with;

the responsibility, which the conditions precedent created by the statute impose,

cannot be thrown off in this manner. For the effect of doing so is to shift entirely

the burden of making these local improvements, to relieve] those on whom the

law sought to impose the expense, and to throw it on others who are not liable

either in law or morals."

So where the charter of Detroit provided that no public work should be con-

tracted for or commenced until an assessment had been levied to defray the

expense, and that no such work should be paid or contracted to be paid for,

except out of the proceeds of the tax thus levied, it was held, that the city cor-

poration had no power to make itself responsible for the price of any public

work, and that such work could only be paid for by funds actually in the hands

of the city treasurer, provided for the specific purpose. Goodrich v. Detroit, 12

Mich. 279. But if the city receives the fund and misappropriates it, it will be

liable. Lansing v. Van Gorder, 24 Mich. 456.

Parties dealing with the agents or officers of municipal corporations must, at

their own peril, take notice of the limits of the powers both of the municipal

corporation, and of those assuming to act on its behalf. State e. Eirkley, 29
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[* 197] * Corporations by Prescription and Implication.

The origin of many of the corporate privileges asserted and

enjoyed in England is veiled in obscurity, and it is more than

probable that in some instances they had no better foundation than

an uninterrupted user for a considerable period. In other cases

the regal or baronial grant became lost in the lapse of time, and

the evidence that it had ever existed might rest exclusively upon

reputation, or upon the inference to be drawn from the exercise of

corporate functions. In all these cases it seems to be the law that

the corporate existence may be maintained on the ground of pre-

scription; that is to say, the exercise of corporate rights for a

time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary is

sufficient evidence that such rights were once granted by com-

petent authority, and are therefore now exercised by right and not

by usurpation.1 And this presumption concludes the crown, not-

withstanding tho maxim that the crown shall lose no rights by

lapse of time. If the right asserted is one of which a grant might

be predicated, a jury is bound to presume a grant from that pre-
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scription.2 In this particular the claim to a corporate franchise

stands on the same ground as any claim of private right which

requires a grant for its support, and is to be sustained under

the same circumstances of continuous assertion and enjoyment.3

And even the grant of a charter by the crown will not preclude

the claim to corporate rights by prescription; for a new charter

does not extinguish old privileges.*

A corporation may also be established upon presumptive evidence

that a charter has been granted within the time of memory. Such

evidence is addressed to a jury, and though not conclusive upon

Md. 85; Gould v. Sterling, 23 N. Y. 464; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 209;

Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 381.

1 Introduction to Willcock on Municipal Corporations; The King p. Mayor,

&c, of Stratford upon Avon, 14 East, 360; Robie v. Sedgwick, 35 Barb. 326.

See Londonderry v. Andover, 28 Vt. 416.

* Mayor of Hull v. Horner, Cowp. 108, per Lord Mansfield. Compare

People p. Maynard, 15 Mich. 470; State v. Bunker, 59 Me. 366.

* 2 Kent, 277; Angell and Ames on Corp. § 70; 1 Kyd on Corp. 14.

4 Hadduck's Case, T. Raym. 439 ; The King v. Mayor, &c, of Stratford upon

Avon, 14 East, 360 ; Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 366. See Jameson v. People,

16 11l. 259.
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them, yet if it reasonably satisfies their minds, it will justify them

in a verdict finding the corporate existence. "There is a great

difference," says Lord Mansfield, "between length of time which

operates as a bar to a claim, and that which is ionly used by way

of evidence. A jury is concluded by length of time which operates

as a bar; as where the statute of limitations is pleaded to a debt;

though the jury is satisfied that the debt is still due and unpaid, it

is still a bar, So in the case of presumption. If it be time out of

mind, a jury is bound to preclude the right from that prescription,

if there could be a legal commencement of the right. But any

written evidence, showing that there was a time when the prescrip-

tion did not exist, is an answer to a claim founded on prescription.

But length of time used merely by way of evidence may be left to

the consideration of the jury, to be credited or not, and to draw

their inference one way or the other according to circumstances." 1

The same ruling has been had in several cases in the courts of

this country, where corporate powers had been exercised, but no

charter could be produced. In one of these cases common reputa-

tion that a charter had once existed was allowed to be given to the
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jury; the court remarking upon the notorious fact that two great

fires in the capital of the colony had destroyed many of the public

records.2 In other cases there was evidence of various acts which

could only lawfully and properly be done by a corporation, cover-

ing a period of thirty, forty, or fifty years, and done with the

knowledge of the State and without question.3 The inference of

corporate powers, however, is not one of law; but is to be drawn

as, a fact by the jury.4

Wherever a corporation is found to exist by prescription, the

same rule as to construction of powers, we apprehend,

would apply as in other cases. * The presumption as to [* 198]

the powers granted would be limited by the proof of the

1 Mayor of Hull v. Horner, Cowp. 108, 109 ; citing, among other cases, Bedle

v. Beard, 12 Co. 6.

'Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 552. And see Bow p. Allenstown, 34 N. H.

351.

3 Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, 12 Mass. 400; New Boston p. Dunbarton,

13 N. H. 409, and 15 N. H. 201; Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351; Trott v.

Warren, 2 Fairf. 227.

* New Boston v. Dunbarton, 15 N. H. 201; Bowp. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351;

Mayor of Hull p. Horner, 14 East, 102.
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usage, and nothing could be taken by intendment which the usage

did not warrant.

Corporations are also said sometimes to exist by implication.

When that power in the State which can create corporations grants

to individuals such property, rights, or franchises, or imposes upon

them such burdens, as can only be properly held, enjoyed, con-

tinued, or borne, according to the terms of the grant, by a corporate

entity, the intention to create such corporate entity is to be pre-

sumed, and corporate capacity is held to be conferred so far as is

necessary to effectuate the purpose of the grant or burden. On

this subject it will be sufficient for our purpose to refer to authori-

ties named in the note.1 In these cases the rule of strict con-

struction of corporate powers applies with unusual force.

Municipal By-Laws.

The power of municipal corporations to make by-laws is limited

in various ways.

1. It is controlled by the Constitution of the United States and

of the State. The restrictions imposed by those instruments, and
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which directly limit the legislative power of the State, rest equally

upon all the instruments of government created by the State. If

a State cannot pass an ex post facto law, or law impairing the obli-

gation of contracts, neither can any agency do so which acts under

the State with delegated authority.2 By-laws, therefore, which

in their operation would be ex post facto, or violate contracts, are

1 Dyer, 400, cited by Lord Kenyon, in Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 672,

and in 2 Kent, 276; Viner's Abr. tit. "Corporation"; Conservators of River

Tone v. Ash, 10 B. & C. 349; 8. C. t&. 883, citing case of Sutton Hospital,

10 Co. 28; per Kent, Chancellor, in Denton t>. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 325;

Coburn v. Ellenwood, 4 N. H. 101; Atkinson v. Bemis, 11 N. H. 46; North

Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109; Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9; per

Shaw, Ch. J., in Stebbins v. Jennings, 10 Pick. 188; Mahony v. Bank of tie

State, 4 Ark. 620.

* Angell and Ames on Corporations, § 332; Stuyvesant v. Mayor, &c, of New

York, 7 Cow. 588; Brooklyn Central Railroad Co. v. Brooklyn City Railroad

Co., 32 Barb. 858; Illinois Conference Female College v. Cooper, 25 111. 148.

The last was a case where a by-law of an educational corporation was held void,

as violating the obligation of a contract previously entered into by the corpora-

tion in a certificate of scholarship which it had issued. See. also Davenport, &c-i

Co. v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 229; Saving Society o. Philadelphia, 81 Penn. St.

175; Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Geo. 404.
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not within the power of municipal corporations; and whatever the

people by the State constitution have prohibited the State govern-

ment from doing, it cannot do indirectly through the local govern-

ments.

2. Municipal by-laws must also be in harmony with the general

laws of the State, and with the provisions of the municipal charter.

Whenever they come in conflict with either, the by-law must give

way.1 The charter, however, may expressly or by necessary impli-

cation exclude the general laws of the State on any particular

subject, and allow the corporation to pass local laws at discretion,

which may differ from the rule in force elsewhere.2 But in these

cases the control of the State is not excluded if the legislature

afterward see fit to exercise it; nor will conferring a power

upon a * corporation to pass by-laws and impose penalties [* 199]

for the regulation of any specified subject necessarily super-

sede the State law on the same subject, but the State law and the

by-law may both stand together if not inconsistent.3 Indeed,

the same act may constitute an offence against both the State and

the municipal corporation, and may be punished under both with-

out violation of any constitutional principle.4
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'Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 428; Mayor, &c, of New York p. Nichols, 4

Hill, 209; Petersburg p. Metzker, 21 111. 205; Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn.

128; Andrews v. Insurance Co., 37 Me. 256; Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio, N. 8. 439;

Carr p. St. Louis, 9 Mo. 191; Commonwealth v. Erie and Northeast Railroad

Co., 27 Penn. St. 339; Burlington p. Rellar, 18 Iowa, 59; Conwell v. O'Brien,

11 Ind. 419; March v. Commonwealth, 12 B. Monr. 25. See Baldwin p. Green,

10 Mo. 410; Cowen p. West Troy, 43 Barb. 48; State p. Georgia Medical

Society, 38 Geo. 629; Pesterfield p. Vickers, 3 Cold. 205; Mays v. Cincinnati,

1 Ohio, n. s. 268; Wirth v. Wilmington, 68 N. C. 24.

'State v. Clarke, 1 Dutch. 54. Peculiar and exceptional regulations may

even be made applicable to particular portions of a city only, and yet not be

invalid. Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504; Commonwealth p. Patch, 97 Mass.

222, per Hoar, J.; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 647.

* City of St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; City of St. Louis v. CaOferata, 24

Mo. 97; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. 261; Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281; Mayor, &c,

of Mobile p. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400.

'Such is the clear weight of authority, though the decisions are not uniform.

In Rogers p. Jones, 1 Wend. 261, it is said: "But it is said that the by-law of

a town or corporation is void, if the legislature have regulated the subject by law.

If the legislature have passed a law regulating as to certain things in a city, I

apprehend the corporation are not thereby restricted from making further reg-

ulations. Cases of this kind have occurred and nevei been questioned on that

ground; it is only to notice a case or two out of many. The legislature have
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1

[* 200] * 3. Municipal by-laws must also be reasonable. When-

ever they appear not to be so, the court must, as a matter

imposed a penalty of one dollar for servile labor on Sunday; the corporation of

New York have passed a by-law imposing the penalty of five dollars for the same

offence. As to storing gunpowder in New York, the legislature and corporation

have each imposed the same penalty. Suits to recover the penalty have been

sustained under the_ corporation law. It is believed that the ground has never

been taken that there was a conflict with the State law. One of these cases is

reported in 12 Johns. 122. The question was open for discussion, but not noticed."

In Mayor, &c, of Mobile v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400, the validity of a municipal by-

law imposing a fine of fifty dollars, for an assault and battery committed within

the city, was brought in question. Collier, Ch. J., says, p. 403: "The object of

the power conferred by the charter, and the purpose of the ordinance itself wis

not to punish for an offence against the criminal justice of the country, but to

provide a mere police regulation, for the enforcement of good order and quiet

within the limits of the corporation. So far as an offence has been committed

against the public peace and morals, the corporate authorities have no power to'

inflict punishment, and we are not informed that they have attempted to arrogate

it. It is altogether immaterial whether the State tribunal has interfered and
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exercised its powers in bringing the defendant before it to answer for the assault

and battery; for whether he has there been punished or acquitted is alike unim-

portant. The offence against the corporation and the State we have seen are

distinguishable and wholly disconnected, and the prosecution at the suit of each

proceeds upon a different hypothesis ; the one contemplates the observance of the

peace and good order of the city j the other has a more enlarged object in view,

the maintenance of the peace and dignity of the State." See also Mayor, &c.,

of Mobile v. Rouse, 8 Ala. 515; Intendant, &c, of Greensboro p. Mullins, 13 Ala.

341; Mayor, &c, of New York v. Hyatt, 3 E. D. Smith, 156 ; People v. Stevens,

13 Wend. 341 j Blatchley v. Moser, 15 Wend. 215; Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281;

Ambrose v. State, ib. 351; Lawrenceburg v. Wuest, 16 Ind. 337; Amboy c.

Sleeper, 31 111. 499; St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24

Mo. 94; Shafer v. Momma, 17 Md. 331. On the other hand it was held in

State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330, that where a municipal corporation was authorized

to take cognizance of and punish an act as an offence against its ordinances

which was also an offence against the general laws of the State, and this power

was exercised and the party punished, he could not afterwards be proceeded

against under the State law. "The constitution," say the court, "forbids that

a person shall be twice punished for the same offence. To hold that a party can

be prosecuted for an act under the State laws, after he has been punished for the

same act by the municipal corporation within whose limits the act was done,

would be to overthrow the power of the General Assembly to create corporations

to aid in the management of the affairs of the State. For a power in the State to

punish, after a punishment had been inflicted by the corporate authorities, could

only find a support in the assumption that all the proceedings on the part of the

corporation were null and void. The circumstance that the municipal authorities

have not exclusive jurisdiction over the acts which constitute offences within their
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of law, declare them void.1 To render them reasonable, they

should tend in some degree to the accomplishment of the

objects for which the corporation * was created and its [* 201]

powers conferred. A by-law, that persons chosen annually

as stewards of the Society of Scriveners should furnish a dinner

on election day to the freemen of the society, — the freemen not

being the electors nor required to attend, and the office of steward

being for no other purpose but that of giving the dinner,— was

limits does not affect the question. It is enough that their jurisdiction is not

excluded. If it exists, — although it may be concurrent, — if it is exercised, it

is valid and binding so long as it is a constitutional principle that no man may be

punished twice for the same offence." This case seems to be supported by State

r. Welch, 36 Conn. 216, and the case of Slaughter v. People, cited below, goes

still further. Those which hold that the party may be punished under both the

State and the municipal law are within the principle of Fox v. State. 5 How. 410;

Moore v. People, 14 How. 13. And see Phillips v. People, 55 111. 429. In

Jefferson City v. Courtmire, 9 Mo. 092, it was held that authority to a municipal

corporation to " regulate the police of the city " gave it no power to pass an
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ordinance for the punishment of indictable offences. And in Slaughter v. People,

2 Doug. (Mich.) 334, it was held not competent to punish, under city by-laws,

an indictable offence.

Where an act is expressly or by implication permitted by the State law, it can-

not be forbidden by the corporation. Thus, the statutes of New York established

certain regulations for the putting up and marking of pressed hay. and provided

that such hay might be sold without deduction for tare, and by the weight as

marked, or any other standard weight that should be agreed upon. It was held

that the city of New York had no power to prohibit under a penalty the sale of

such hay without inspection; this being obviously inconsistent with the statute

which gave a right to sell if its regulations were complied with. Mayor, &c, of

New York v. Nichols, 4 Hill, 209.

1 2 Kyd on Corporations, 107 ; Davies v. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J. 587; Cham-

berlain of London v. Compton, 7 D. & R. 597 ; Clark v. Le Cren, 9 B. & C. 52;

Gosling p. Veley, 12 Q. B. 347; Dunham ». Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; Mayor, &c,

of Memphis v. Winfield, 8 Humph. 707; Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391; Waters

r. Leech, 3 Ark. 110; White v. Mayor, 2 Swan, 364 ; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala.

461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728; Austin t>. Murray, 16 Pick. 121; Godard,

Petitioner, ib. 504; Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 462; Commissioners

r. Gas Co., 12 Penn. St. 318; State v. Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 170; Gallatin v.

Bradford, 1 Bibb, 209; Carevv v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 15 Mich. 525;

State v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426; Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161; St. Louis v.

Weber, 44 Mo. 550. But where the question of the reasonableness of a by-law

depends upon evidence, and it relates to a subject within the jurisdiction of the

corporation, the court will presume it to be reasonable until the contrary is

shown. Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221. And see St. Louis v. Weber,
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held not connected with the business of the corporation, anTnot

tending to promote its objects, and therefore unreasonable and

void.1 And where a statute permitted a municipal corporation

to license the sale of intoxicating drinks and to charge a license

fee therefor, a by-law requiring the payment of a license fee of

one thousand dollars was held void as not advancing the purpose

of the law, but as being in its nature prohibitory.2 And if a cor-

poration has power to prohibit the carrying on of dangerous occu-

pations within its limits, a by-law which should permit one person

to carry on such an occupation and prohibit another, who had an

equal right, from pursuing the same business; or which should

allow the business to be carried on in existing buildings, but pro-

hibit the erection of others for it, would be unreasonable.3 And

a right to license an employment does not imply a right to charge

a license fee therefor with a view to revenue, unless such seems

to be the manifest purpose of the power; but the authority of the

corporation will be limited to such a charge for the license as will

cover the necessary expenses of issuing it, and the additional

labor of officers and other expenses thereby imposed. A license

is issued under the police power; but the exaction of a license
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fee with a view to revenue would be an exercise of the power of

taxation; and the charter must plainly show an intent to confer

that power, or the municipal corporation cannot assume it.4

1 Society of Scriveners v. Brooking, 3 Q. B. 95. See, on this general subject,

Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 251 to 264.

* Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728.

* Mayor, &c, of Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige, 261. A power to prevent and

regulate the carrying on of manufactures dangerous in causing or promoting fires

does not authorize an ordinance prohibiting the erection of wooden buildings

within the city, or to limit the size of buildings which individuals shall be per-

mitted to erect on their own premises. Ibid. An ordinance for the destruction

of property as a nuisance without a judicial hearing is void. Darst v. People,

51 1ll. 286. An ordinance for the arrest and imprisonment without warrant of

a person refusing to assist in extinguishing a fipe is void. Judson v. Reardon,

16 Minn. 431.

* State v. Roberts, 11 Gill & J. 506; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio, n. s. 268;

Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625; Freeholders v. Barber, 2 Halst. 64; Kip p.

Paterson, 2 Dutch. 298; Bennett p. Borough of Birmingham, 31 Penn. St. 15;

Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43; Mayor,

&c, of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 144; Johnson p. Philadelphia, 60 Penn. St. 451;

State p. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123; Mayor, &c, of New York p. Second Avenue

R.R. Co., 32 N. Y. 261. Nevertheless, the courts will not inquire very closely
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*A by-law to be reasonable should be certain. If it [*202]

affixes a penalty for its violation, it would seem that such

penalty should be a fixed and certain sum, and not left to the dis-

cretion of the officer or court which is to impose it on conviction;

though a by-law imposing a penalty not exceeding a certain sum

has been held not to be void for uncertainty.1

So a by-law to be reasonable should be in harmony with the

general principles of the common law. If it is in general re-

straint of trade, — like the by-law that no person shall exercise

the art of painter in the city of London, not being free of the com-

pany of painters, — it will be void on this ground.2 To take an

illustration from a private corporation: it has been held that a

by-law of a bank, that all payments made or received by the bank

must be examined at the time, and mistakes corrected before the

dealer leaves, was unreasonable and invalid, and that a recovery

might be had against the bank for an over-payment discovered

afterwards, notwithstanding the by-law.3 So a by-law of a town,

into the expense of a license with a view to adjudge it a tax, where it does not

appear to be unreasonable in amount in view of its purpose as a regulation. Ash
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b. People, 11 Mich. 347; Johnson ». Philadelphia, 60 Penn. St. 451; Burlington

t. Putnam Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 102. And in some cases it has been held that

license fees might be imposed under the police power with a view to operate as

a restriction upon the business or thing licensed. Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis. 299;

Tenney r. Lenz, ib. 567. But in such cases, where the right to impose such

license fees can be fairly deduced from the charter, it would perhaps be safer and

less liable to lead to confusion and difficulty to refer the corporate authority to

the taxing power, rather than exclusively to the power of regulation. See Dun-

ham o. Trustees of Rochester, 5 Cow. 462, upon the extent of the police power.

Fees which are imposed under the inspection laws of the State are akin to license

fees, and if exacted not for revenue, but to meet the expenses of regulation, are

to be referred to the police power. Cincinnati Gas Light Co. v. State, 18 Ohio,

N. 8. 243. On this subject in general, see Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 291 to 308.

1 Mayor, &c, of Huntsville v, Phelps, 27 Ala. 55, overruling Mayor, &c, of

Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 144. And see Piper v. Chappell, 14 M. & W. 624.

* Clark v. Le Cren, 9 B. & C. 52; Chamberlain of London b. Compton. 7 D.

& R. 597. Compare Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391; Willard v. Killingworth,

8 Conn. 247. But a by-law is not void, as in restraint of trade, which requires

loaves of bread baked for sale to be of specified weight and properly stamped,

or which requires bakers to be licensed. Mayor, &c, of Mobile v. Yuille, 3

Ala. 137.

'Mechanics and Farmers Bank v. Smith, 19 Johns. 115; Gallatin v. Brad-

ord, 1 Bibb, 209. Although these are cases of private corporations, they are

cited here because the rules governing the authority to make by-laws are the

same with both classes of corporations.
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which, under pretence of regulating the fishery of clams and

oysters within its limits, prohibits all persons except the inhabi-

tants of the town from taking shell-fish in a navigable

[*>203] river, is void as in contravention of common right.1 *And

for like reasons a by-law is void which abridges the rights

and privileges conferred by the general laws of the State, unless

express authority therefor can be pointed out in the corporate

charter.2 And a by-law which assumes to be a police regulation,

but deprives a party of the use of his property without regard to

the public good, under the pretence of the preservation of health,

when it is manifest that such is not the object and purpose of the

regulation, will be set aside as a clear and direct infringement of

the right of property without any compensating advantages.3

1 Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391. As it had been previously held that every

person has a common-law right to fish in a navigable river or arm of the sea,

until by some legal mode of appropriation this common right was extinguished,

— Peek v. Lockwood, 5 Day, 22, — the by-law in effect deprived every citizen,

except residents of the township, of rights which were vested, so far as from the
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nature of the case a right could be vested. See also Marietta v. Fearing, 4

Ohio, 427. That a right to regulate does not include a right to prohibit, see

also Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121. And see

Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435, 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611.

* Dunham v. Trustees of Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; Mayor, Ac, of New York

v. Nichols, 4 Hill, 209. See Strauss o. Pontiac, 40 111. 301.

3 By a by-law of the town of Charlestown all persons were prohibited, with-

out license from the selectmen, from burying any dead body brought into town

on any part of their own premises or elsewhere within the town. By the court,

Wilde, J.: "A by-law to be valid must be reasonable; it must be legi, fidei,

rationi cotuona. Now if this regulation or prohibition had been limited to the

populous part of the town, and were made in good faith for the purpose of pre-

serving the health of the inhabitants, which may be in some degree exposed to

danger by the allowance of interments in the midst of a dense population, it

would have been a very reasonable regulation. But it cannot be pretended that

this by-law was made for the preservation of the health of the inhabitants. Its

restraints extend many miles into the country, to the utmost limits of the town.

Now such an unnecessary-restraint upon the right of interring the dead we think

esseutially unreasonable. If Charlestown may lawfully make such a by-law as

this, all the towns adjoining Boston may impose similar restraints, and conse-

quently all those who die in Boston must of necessity be interred within the

precincts of the city. That this would be prejudicial to the health of the inhab-

itants, especially in the hot seasons of the year, and when epidemic disease!

prevail, seems to be a well-established opinion. Interments, therefore, in cities

and large populous towns, ought to be discountenanced, and no obstacles should

be permitted to the establishment of cemeteries at suitable places in the vicinity
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* Delegation of Municipal Powers. [* 204]

Another and very important limitation which rests upon mu-

nicipal powers is that they shall be executed by the municipality

The by-law in question is therefore an unreasonable restraint upon many of the

citizens of Boston, who are desirous of burying their dead without the city, and

for that reason void. And this by-law would seem to be void for another reason.

A by-law for the total restraint of one's right is void; as if a man be barred of

the use of his land. Com. Dig. By-Law, c. 4. The land where the bodies were

interred was the land of the Catholic Bishop of Boston, purchased by him in

1830, and then consecrated as a Catholic burying-ground, and has ever since

been used as such, for the interment of Catholics dying in Charlestown and

Boston. It is true the by-law does not operate to the total restraint or depriva-

tion of the bishop's right, but it is a total restraint of the right of the burying

the dead in Boston, for which a part of the burying-ground was appropriated.

The illegality of the by-law is the same, whether it may deprive one of the use

of a part or the whole of his property; no one can be so deprived, unless the

public good requires it. And the law will not allow the right of private property

to be invaded under the guise of a police regulation for the preservation of

health, when it is manifest that such is not the object and purpose of the regula-
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tion. Now we think this is manifest from the case stated in regard to the by-law

in question. It is a clear and direct infringement of the right of property,

without any compensating advantages, and not a police regulation made in good

faith for the preservation of health. It interdicts, or in its operation necessarily

intercepts, the sacred use to which the Catholic burying-ground was appropriated

and consecrated, according to the forms of the Catholic religion; and such an

interference, we are constrained to say, is wholly unauthorized and most unreason-

able." Austin o. Murray, 16 Pick. 125. So in Wreford v. People, 14 Mich. 41,

the common council of Detroit, under a power granted by statute to compel the

owners and occupants of slaughter-houses to cleanse and abate them whenever

necessary for the health of the inhabitants, assumed to pass an ordinance alto-

gether prohibiting the slaughtering of animals within certain limits in the city;

and it was held void. See further State r. Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 170. Upon

the whole subject of municipal by-laws, see Angell and Ames on Corp. c. 10;

Grant on Corp. 76 et seq. See also Redfield on Railways (3d ed.). Vol. I. p. 88;

Dillon, Mun. Corp. c. 12. The subject of the reasonableness of by-laws was

considered at some length in People v. Medical Society of Erie, 24 Barb. 570,

and Same v. Same, 32 N. Y. 187. In the first case it was held that a regulation

subjecting a member of the County Medical Society to expulsion, for charging

less than the established fees, was unreasonable and void. In the second, it was

decided that where a party had the prescribed qualifications for admission to the

society, he could not be refused admission, on the ground of his having previous

to that time failed to observe the code of medical ethics prescribed by the society

for its members. Municipal by-laws may impose penalties on parties guilty of a

violation thereof, but they cannot impose forfeiture of property or rights, with-
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itself, or by such agencies or officers as the statute has pointed

out. So far as its functions are legislative, they rest in the dis-

cretion and judgment of the municipal body intrusted with them,

and that body cannot refer the exercise of the power to the dis-

cretion and judgment of its subordinates or of any other author-

ity. So strictly is this rule applied, that when a city charter

authorized the common council of the city to make by-laws and

ordinances ordering and directing any of the streets to be pitched,

levelled, paved, flagged, &c, or for the altering or repair-

[* 205] ing the * same, " within such time and in such maimer as

they may prescribe under the superintendence and direc-

tion of the city superintendent," and the common council passed

an ordinance directing a certain street to be pitched, levelled, and

flagged, " in such manner as the city superintendent, under the

direction of the committee on roads of the common council, shall

direct and require," the ordinance was held void, because it left

to the city superintendent and the committee of the common coun-

cil the decision which, under the law, must be made by the council
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itself. The trust was an important and delicate one, as the ex-

penses of the improvement were, by the statute, to be paid by the

owners of the property in front of which it was made. It was in

effect a power of taxation; and taxation is the exercise of sover-

eign authority; and nothing short of the most positive and explicit

language could justify the court in holding that the legislature

intended to confer such a power, or permit it to be conferred, on a

city officer or committee. The statute in question not only con-

tained no such language, but, on the contrary, clearly expressed

the intention of confining the exercise of this power to the com-

mon council, the members of which were elected by and respon-

sible to those whose property they were thus allowed to tax.1

Tliis restriction, it will be perceived, is the same which rests

upon the legislative power of the State, and it springs from the

out express legislative authority. State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 430; Phillips t,

Allen, 41 Penn. St. 481. See also Kirk v. Nowell, 1 T. R. 124; White v. Tall-

man, 2 Dutch. 67; Hart v. Albany, 9 Wend. 588; Peoria v. Calhoun, 29 III.

817; St. Paul v. Coulter, 12 Minn. 41.

1 Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 92. See also Smith v. Morse, 2 Cat.

524; Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540; Whyte v. Nashville, 2 Swan, 864;

East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50 111. 28; Rogers v. Collier, 43 Mo. 359; State r.

Jersey City, 1 Dutch. 309; Hydes v. Joyes, 4 Bush, 464; Lyon v. Jerome,

26 Wend. 485; State v. Patterson, 34 N. J. 168; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 60.
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same reasous. The people in the one case in creating the legis-

lative department, and the legislature in the other in conferring

the corporate powers, have selected the depository of the power

which they have designed should be exercised, and in confiding it

to such depository have impliedly prohibited its being exercised

by any other agency. A trust created for any public purpose can-

not be assignable at the will.of the trustee.1

* Equally incumbent upon the State legislature and these [* 206]

municipal bodies is the restriction that they shall adopt no

irrepealable legislation. No legislative body can so part with its

powers by any proceeding as not to be able to continue the exer-

cise of them. It can and should exercise them again and again,

as often as the public interests require.2 Such a body has no

power, even by contract, to control and embarrass its legislative

powers and duties. On this ground it has been held, that a grant

1 The charter of Washington gave the corporation authority "to authorize

the drawing of lotteries, for effecting any important improvement in the city,

which the ordinary funds or revenue thereof will not accomplish; provided that

the amount raised in each year shall not exceed ten thousand dollars. And

provided also that the object for which the money is intended to be raised shall
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be first submitted to the President of the United States, and shall be approved

by him." Per Marshall, Ch. J., speaking of this authority: "There is great

weight in the argument that it is a trust, and an important trust, confided to

the corporation itself, for the purpose of effecting important improvements in the

city, and ought, therefore, to be executed under the immediate authority and

inspection of the corporation. It is reasonable to suppose that Congress, when

granting a power to authorize gaming, would feel some solicitude respecting the

fairness with which the power should be used, and would take as many precau-

tions against its abuse as was compatible with its beneficial exercise. Accordingly,

wc find a limitation upon the amount to be raised, and on the object for which

the lottery may be authorized. It is to be for any important improvement in the

city, which the ordinary funds or revenue thereof will not accomplish ; and it is

subjected to the judgment of the President of the United States. The power

thus cautiously granted is deposited with the corporation itself, without an indi-

cation that it is assignable. It is to be exercised like other corporate powers,

by the agents of the corporation under its control. While it remains where

Congress has placed it, the character of the corporation affords some security

against its abuse, — some security that no other mischief will result from it

than is inseparable from the thing itself. But if the management, control, and

responsibility may be transferred to any adventurer who will purchase, all the

security for fairness which is furnished by character and responsibility is lost."

Clark c. Washington, 12 Wheat. 64.

* East Hartford e. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 535; Dillon, Mun. Corp.

§ 61.
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of land by a municipal corporation, for the purposes of a cemetery,

with a covenant for quiet enjoyment by the grantee, could not

preclude the corporation, in the exercise of its police powers, from

prohibiting any further use of the land for cemetery purposes,

when the advance of population threatened to make such use a

public nuisance.1 So when " a lot is granted as a place of deposit

for gunpowder, or other purpose innocent in itself at the time;

it is devoted to that purpose till, in the progress of population,

it becomes dangerous to the property, the safety, or the lives of

hundreds; it cannot be that the mere form of the grant, because

the parties choose to make it particular instead of general and

absolute, should prevent the use to which it is limited being re-

garded and treated as a nuisance, when it becomes so in fact.

In this way the legislative powers essential to the comfort and

preservation of populous communities might be frittered

[*207] away into*perfect insignificance. To allow rights thus

to be parcelled out and secured beyond control would fix

a principle by which our cities and villages might be broken up.
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Nuisances might and undoubtedly would be multiplied to au in-

tolerable extent."2

And on the same ground it is held, that a municipal corporation,

having power to establish, make, grade, and improve streets, does

not, by once establishing the grade, preclude itself from changing

it as the public needs or interest may seem to require, notwith-

standing the incidental injury which must result to those individ-

uals who have erected buildings with reference to the first grade.3

1 Brick Presbyterian Church p. City of New York, 5 Cow. 540; New York

v. Second Avenue R.R. Co., 32 N. Y. 2G1. Compare Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Penn.

St. 411; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 377.

! Coats v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 7 Cow. 605. See also Davis t>. Mayor,

&c, of New York, 14 N. Y. 506; Attorney-General v. Mayor, &c, of New

York, 3 Duer, 119; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 51; Gozzle ». Georgetown, 6

Wheat. 597; Louisville City R.R. Co. v. Louisville, 8 Bush, 415.

3 Calendar v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 417; Griggs e. Foote, 4 Allen, 195; Radcliffe's

Executors v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195; Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; O'Connor v.

Pittsburg, 18 Penn. St. 187; Reading v. Keppleman, 61 Penn. St. 233; Shinner

v. Hartford Bridge Co., 29 Conn. 523; Snyder v. Rockport, 6 Ind. 237; La

Fayette v. Bush, 19 Ind. 326; La Fayette v. Fowler, 34 Ind. 140; Real ».

Keokuk, 4 Green (Iowa), 47; Cole v. Muscatine, 14 Iowa, 296; Russell o. Bur-

lington, 30 Iowa, 262; Roberts v. Chicago, 26 111. 249; Murphy p. Chicago, 29

111. 279; Rounds v. Mumford, 2 R. I. 154; Rome v. Omberg, 28 Geo. 46; Roll

d. Augusta, 34 Geo. 326; Reynolds t>. Shreveport, 13 La. An. 426; White p.
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So a corporation having power under the charter to establish and

regulate streets cannot under this authority, without explicit legis-

lative consent, permit individuals to lay down a railway in one of

its streets, and confer privileges exclusive in their character and

designed to be perpetual in duration. In a case where this was

attempted, it has been said by the court: "The corporation has

the exclusive right to control and regulate the use of the streets

of the city. In this respect, it is endowed with legislative sover-

eignty. The exercise of that sovereignty has no limit, so long as

it is within the objects and trusts for which the power is conferred.

An ordinance regulating a street is a legislative act, entirely be-

yond the control of the judicial power of the State. But the

resolution in question is not such an act. Though it relates to a

street, and very materially affects the mode in which that street is

to be used, yet in its essential features it is a contract. Privileges

exclusive in their nature and designed to be perpetual in their

duration are conferred. Instead of regulating the use of the

street, the use itself to the extent specified in the resolution is

granted to the associates. For what has been deemed an adequate
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consideration, the corporation has assumed to surrender a portion

of their municipal authority, and has in legal effect agreed with

the defendants that, so far as they may have occasion to use the

street for the purpose of constructing and operating their

railroad, the right to regulate * and control the use of that [* 208]

street shall not be exercised. ... It cannot be that powers

vested in the corporation as an important public trust can thus be

frittered away, or parcelled out to individuals or joint-stock asso-

ciations, and secured to them beyond control." 1

Yazoo City, 27 Miss. 357; Humes p. Mayor, &c, 1 Humph. 403; St. Louis v.

Gamo, 12 Mo. 414; Taylor v. St. Louis, 14 Mo. 20; Keasy v. Louisville, 4

Dana, 154; Smith p. Washington, 20 How. 135. Compare Louisville v. Rolling

Mill Co., 3 Bush, 416. The law would seem to be otherwise declared in Ohio.

See Rhodes v. Cincinnati, 10 Ohio, 159; McCombs v. Akron, 15 Ohio, 474;

s. p. 18 Ohio, 229; Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio, n. s. 459. Compare Alex-

ander p. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 256.

1 Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435; s. c. 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611.

See also Davis p. Mayor, &c, of New York, 14 N. Y. 506; State v. Mayor, &e.r

3 Duer, 119; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351. The consent of the legislature in

any such case would relieve it of all difficulty, except so far as questions might

arise concerning the right of individuals to compensation, as to which see post,

p. 15. In Milhau p. Sharp, supra, it was also held that a corporation, with author-

ity "from time to time to regulate the rates of fare to be charged for the
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So it has been held, that the city of Philadelphia exercised a

portion of the public right of eminent domain in respect to the

streets within its limits, subject only to the higher control of the

State and the use of the people; and therefore a written license

granted by the city, though upon a valuable consideration, author-

izing the holder to connect his property with the city railway by

a turnout and track, was not such a contract as would prevent

the city from abandoning or removing the railway wherever, in

the opinion of the city authorities, such action would tend to the

benefit of its police.1

Thus hedged in by the limitations which control the legislative

power of the State, these corporations are also entitled to the same

protection which surrounds the exercise of State legislative power.

One of these is, that no right of action shall arise in favor of au

individual for incidental injury suffered by him in consequence of

their adopting or failing to adopt legislative action.2 Another is,

that the same presumption that they have proceeded upon sufficient

information and with correct motives shall support their legisla-

tive action which supports the statutes of the State, and precludes

judicial inquiry on these points.3 These rules, however,
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[*209] must be confined to those cases where the corporation *is

exercising a discretionary power, and where the reasons

which are to determine whether it shall act or not, and if it does,

what the action shall be, are addressed to the municipal body

carriage of persons," could not by resolution divest itself thereof as to the

carriages employed on a street-railway.

1 Bryson p. Philadelphia, 47 Penn. St. 329. Compare Louisville City E.B.

Co. v. Louisville, 8 Bush, 415.

5 RadeliftVs Ex'rs v. Mayor, &c, of Brookyn, 4 N. Y. 195; Duke v. Mayor,

&c, of Rome, 20 Geo. 635; Larkin v. Saginaw County, 11 Mich. 88; St. Louis

v. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414; Griffin v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 9 N. Y. 456; Ben-

nett v. New Orleans, 14 La. An. 120; Weightman ». Washington, 1 Black, 39;

Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio, n. s. 375; Barton c. Syracuse, 37 Barb.

292; Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio, n. s. 19; 8. c. 2 Am. Rep. 368; Hewson

o. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475; Murtagh v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 480; Commission-

ers v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468; Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Penn. St. 324;

Grant ». Erie, 69 Penn. St. 420; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 272; Sparhawk v. Salem, 1

Allen, 30; Randall v. Eastern R. Corp., 106 Mass. 276; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 326;

Hughes v. Baltimore, Taney, 243.

3 Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. 193; New York and Harlaem Railroad Co. v.

Mayor, &c, of New York, 1 Hilton, 562; Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282; Freeport

t>. Marks, 59 Penn. St. 253. Compare State v. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 Ohio,

N. S. 262.
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exclusively. If the corporation is in the position of trustee of

property for other persons, it is subject to the same supervision

and control with other trustees, and where a specific act is required

by law to be done, exact performance may be compelled as in

other cases.

Among the implied powers of such an organization appears to

be the power to defend and indemnify its officers where they have

incurred liability in the bona fide discharge of their duty. It has

been decided in a case where irregularities had occurred iu the

assessment of a tax, in consequence of which the tax was void,

and the assessors had refunded to the persons taxed the moneys

which had been collected and paid into the town, county, and

State treasuries, that the town had authority to vote to raise a sum

of money in order to refund to the assessors what had been so

paid by them, and that such vote was a legal promise to pay, on

which the assessors might maintain action against the town. "The

general purpose of this vote," it was said, " was just and wise.

The inhabitants, finding that three of their townsmen, who had

been elected by themselves to an office, which they could not, with-

out incurring a penalty, refuse to accept, had innocently and inad-
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vertently committed an error which, in strictness of law, annulled

their proceedings, and exposed them to a loss perhaps to the whole

extent of their property, if all the inhabitants individually should

avail themselves of their strict legal rights, — finding also that the

treasury of the town had been supplied by the very money which

these unfortunate individuals were obliged to refund from their

own estates, and that, so far as the town tax went, the very per-

sons who had rigorously exacted it from the assessors, or who were

about to do it, had themselves shared in due proportion the benefits

and use of the money which had been paid into the treasury, in

the shape of schools, highways, and various other objects which

the necessities of a municipal institution call for,— concluded to

reassess the tax, and to provide for its assessment in a manner

which would have produced perfect justice to every individual of

the corporation, and would have protected the assessors from the

effects of their inadvertence in the assessment which was found to

be invalid. The inhabitants of the town had a perfect right to

make this reassessment, if they had a right to raise the money

originally. The necessary supplies to the treasury of a town can-

not be intercepted, because of an inequality in the mode of appor-
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tioning the sum upon the individuals. Debts must be

[* 210] incurred, duties must be performed, by every town; * the

safety of each individual depends upon the execution of

the corporate duties and trusts. There is and must be an inherent

power in every town to bring the money necessary for the purposes

of its creation into the treasury; and if its course is obstructed

by the ignorance or mistakes of its agents, they may proceed to

enforce the end and object by correcting the means; and whether

this be done by resorting to their original power of voting to raise

money a second time for the same purposes, or by directing to re-

assess the sum before raised by vote, is immaterial; perhaps the

latter mode is best, at least it is equally good." 1

It has also been held competent for a town to appropriate money

to indemnify the school committee for expenses incurred in defend-

ing an action for an alleged libel contained in a report made by

them in good faith, and in which action judgment had been ren-

dered in their favor.2 And although it should appear that the

officer had exceeded his legal right and authority, yet if he has
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acted in good faith in an attempt to perform his duty, the town lias

the right to adopt his act and to bind itself to indemnify

[* 211] him.3 *And perhaps the legislature may even have power

to compel the town, in such a case, to reimburse its officers

1 Per Parker, Ch. J., in Nelson e. Milford, 7 Pick. 23. See also Baker r.

Windham, 13 Me. 74; Fuller v. Groton, 11 Gray, 340.

A municipal corporation, it is said, may offer rewards for the detection of

offenders within its limits, but its promise to reward an officer for that which,

without such reward, it was his duty to do, is void. Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 91, and

cases cited. And see note, p. 212, supra.

'Fuller v. Inhabitants of Groton, 11 Gray, 340. See also Hadsell p. Inhab-

itants of Hancock, 3 Gray, 526; Pike ». Middleton, 12 N. H. 278.

* A surveyor of highways cut a drain for,the purpose of raising a legal ques-

tion as to the bounds of the highway, and the town appointed a committee to

defend an action brought against the surveyor therefor, and voted to defray the

expenses incurred by the committee. By the court: "It is the duty of a town

to repair all highways within its bounds, at the expense of the inhabitants, so that

the same may be safe and convenient for travellers; and we think it has the

power, as incident to this duty, to indemnify the surveyor or other agent against

any charge or liability he may incur in the bona fide discharge of this duty,

although it may turn out on investigation that he mistook his legal rights and

authority. The act by which the surveyor incurred a liability was the digging a

ditch, as a drain for the security of the highway; and if it was done for the pur-

pose of raising a legal question as to the bounds of the highway, as the defend-

ants offered to prove at the trial, the town had, nevertheless, a right to adopt
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the expenses incurred by them in the honest but mistaken dis-

charge of what they believed to be their duty, notwithstanding the

town, by vote, has refused to do so.1

Construction of Municipal Powers.

The powers conferred upon municipalities must be construed

with reference to the object of their creation, namely, as agencies

of the State in local government.2 The State can create them for

the act, for they were interested in the subject, being bound to keep the highway

in repair. They had, therefore, a right to determine whether they would defend

the surveyor or not; and having determined the question, and appointed the

plaintiffs a committee to carry on the defence, they cannot now be allowed to

deny their liability, after the committee have paid the charges incurred under

the authority of the town. The town had a right to act on the subject-matter

which was within their jurisdiction; and their votes are binding and create a

legal obligation, although they were under no previous obligation to indemnify the

surveyor. That towns have an authority to defend and indemnify their agents

who may incur a liability by an inadvertent error, or in the performance of their

duties imposed on them by law, is fully maintained by the case of Nelson v.

Milford, 7 Pick. 18." Bancroft v. Lynnfield, 18 Pick. 568. And see Briggs v.

Whipple, 6 Vt. 95.
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1 Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 13 N. Y. 143. See this case com-

mented upon by Lyon, J., in State v. Tappen, 29 Wis. 67-1, 680. On the page

last mentioned it is said, "We have seen no case except in the courts of New

York, which holds that such moral obligation gives the legislature power to com-

pel payment." Where officers make themselves liable to penalties for refusal

to perform duty, the corporation has no authority to indemnify them. Halstead

c. Mayor, &c, of New York, 3 N. Y. 430; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126.

See Frost t. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152; People v. Lawrence, 6 Hill, 244; Vincent

r. Nantucket, 12 Cush. 105.

■ A somewhat peculiar question was involved in the case of Jones v. Rich-

mond, 18 Grat. 517. In anticipation of the evacuation of the city of Richmond

by the Confederate authorities, and under the apprehension that scenes of disorder

might follow, which would be aggravated by the opportunity to obtain intoxicating

liquors, the common council ordered the seizure and destruction of all such liquors

within the city, and pledged the faith of the city to the payment of the value.

The Court of Appeals of Virginia afterwards decided that the city might be held

liable on the pledge in an action of assumpsit. Hives, J., says: "By its char-

ter the council is specially empowered to ' pass all by-laws, rules, and regula-

tions which they shall deem necessary for the peace, comfort, convenience, good

order, good morals, health, or safety of said city, or of the people or property

therein.' It is hard to conceive of larger terms for the grant of sovereign leg-

islative powers to the specified end than those thus employed in the charter; and

they must be taken by necessary and unavoidable intendment to comprise the
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no other purpose, and it can confer powers of government to no

other end, without at once coming in conflict with the constitu-

tional maxim, that legislative power cannot be delegated, or with

other maxims designed to confine all the agencies of government to

the exercise of their proper functions. And wherever the munici-

pality shall attempt to exercise powers not within the proper province

of local self-government, whether the right to do so be claimed under

express legislative grant, or by implication from the charter, the act

must be considered as altogether ultra vires, and therefore void.

A reference to a few of the adjudged cases will perhaps best

illustrate this principle. The common council of the city of

Buffalo undertook to provide an entertainment and ball for its

citizens and certain expected guests on the 4th of July, and for

that purpose entered into contract with a hotel keeper to provide

the entertainment at his house, at the expense of the city. The

entertainment was furnished and in part paid for, and suit was

brought to recover the balance due. The city had authority, under

its charter, to raise and expend moneys for various specified pur-
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poses, and also " to defray the contingent and other expenses of

the city." But providing an entertainment for its citizens is no

part of municipal self-government, and it has never been

[* 212] considered, * where the common law has prevailed, that

the power to do so pertained to the government in any of

its departments. The contract was therefore held void, as not

within the province of the city government.1

powers of eminent domain within these limits of prescribed jurisdiction. There

were two modes open to the council: first, to direct the destruction of these

stores, leaving the question of the city's liability therefor to be afterwards liti-

gated and determined; or, secondly, assuming their liability, to contract for the

values destroyed under their orders. Had they pursued the first mode, the cor-

poration would have been liable in an action of trespass for the damages ; but they

thought proper to adopt the latter mode, make it a matter of contract, and

approach their citizens, not as trespassers, but with the amicable proffer of a

formal receipt and the plighted faith of the city for the payment. In this they

seem to me to be well justified." Judge Dillon doubts the soundness of this

decision. Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 371, note. The case seems to us analogous

in principle to that of the destruction of buildings to stop the progress of a fire.

In each case private property is destroyed to anticipate and prevent an impend-

ing public calamity.

1 Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110. See also the case of New London v.

Brainard, 22 Conn. 552, which follows and approves this case. The cases differ

in this only, that in the first suit was brought to enforce the illegal contract,
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The supervisors of the city of New York refused to perform a

duty imposed upon them by law, and were prosecuted severally

for the penalty which the law imposed for such refusal, and judg-

ment recovered. The board of supervisors then assumed, on

behalf of the city and county, the payment of these judgments,

together with the costs of defending the suits, and caused drafts

to be drawn upon the treasurer of the city for these amounts.

It was held, that these drafts upon the public treasury to indem-

nify officers for disregard of duty were altogether unwarranted

and void, and that it made no difference that the officers had

acted conscientiously in refusing to perform their duty, and in

the honest belief that the law imposing the duty was unconstitu-

tional. The city had no interest in the suits against the super-

visors, and appropriating the public funds to satisfy the judgments

and costs was not within either the express or implied powers

conferred upon the board.1 It was in fact appropriating the pub-

lic money for private purposes, and a tax levied therefor must

consequently be invalid, on general principles controlling the right

of taxation, which will be considered in another place. In a recent
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case in Iowa it is said: "No instance occurs to us in which it

would be competent for [a municipal corporation] to loan its

credit or make its accommodation paper for the benefit of citizens

to enable them to execute private enterprises;"2 and where it

^tf.i'e in the second the city was enjoined from paying over moneys which it had

*j,ropriated for the purposes of the celebration. The cases of Tash v. Adams,

i 'Cush. 252, and Hood v. Lynn, 1 Allen, 103, are to the same effect. A town,

it has been held, cannot lawfully be assessed to pay a reward offered by a vote

of the town for the apprehension and conviction of a person supposed to have

committed murder therein. Gale v. South Berwick, 51 Me. 174. Nor under its

general authority to raise money for " necessary town charges," is a town author-

ized to raise and expend moneys to send lobbyists to the legislature. Frankfort

r. Winterport, 54 Me. 250. Or, under like authority, to furnish a uniform for a

?olunteer military company. Claflin v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502. Where a

municipal corporation enters into a contract ultra vires, no implied contract

irises to compensate the contractor for any thing he may have done under it,

notwithstanding the corporation may have reaped a benefit therefrom. McSpedon

v. New York, 7 Bosw. 601; Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96.

'Halstead v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 3 N. Y. 430. See a similar case in

People v. Lawrence, 6 Hill, 244. See also Carroll v. St. Louis, 12 Mo. 444;

Vincent v. Nantucket, 12 Cush. 103; Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 396; Merrill

e. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126.

* Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 224. See Tyson r. School Directors, 51
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cannot loan its credit to private undertakings, it is equally

[* 213] without * power to appropriate the moneys in its treasury,

or by the conduct of its officers to subject itself to implied

obligations.1

The powers 'conferred upon the municipal governments must

also be construed as confined in their exercise to the territorial

limits embraced within the municipality; and the fact that these

powers are conferred in general terms will not warrant their exer-

cise except within those limits. A general power " to purchase,

hold, and convey estate, real and personal, for the public use" of

the corporation, will not authorize a purchase outside the corpo-

rate limits for that purpose.2 Without some special provision they

cannot, as of course, possess any control or rights over lands lyiug

outside ;3 and the taxes they levy of their own authority, and the

moneys they expend, must be for local purposes only.4

But the question is a very different one how far the legislature

of the State may authorize the corporation to extend its action to

Penn. St 9; Freeland t>. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570; Thompson v. Pittston, 59
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Me. 545; Kelly o. Marshall, 69 Penn. St. 319; Allen v. Jay, Supreme Court of

Maine, Law Reg., Aug. 1873, with note by Judge Redfield.

1 "In determining whether the subject-matter is within the legitimate authority

of the town, one of the tests is to ascertain whether the expenses were incurred

in relation to a subject specially placed by law in other hands. ... It is a

decisive test against the validity of all grants of money by towns for objects

liable to that objection, but it does not settle questions arising upon expenditures

for objects not specially provided for. In such cases the question will still recur,

whether the expenditure was within the jurisdiction of the town. It may be

safely assumed that, if the subject of the expenditure be in furtherance of some

duty enjoined by statute, or in exoneration of the citizens of the town from a

liability to a common burden, a contract made in reference to it will be valid and

binding upon the town." Allen v. Taunton, 19 Pick. 487. See Tucker v. Vir-

ginia City, 4 Nev. 20. It is no objection to the validity of an act which author-

izes an expenditure for a town-hall, that rooms to be rented for stores are

contained in it. White v. Stamford, 37 Conn. 578.

* Riley v. Rochester, 9 N. Y. 64.

3 Per Kent, Chancellor, Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 836. And see

Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.) 171; Weaver v. Cherry, 8 Ohio, n. s. 664;

North Hempstead v. Hempstead, Hopk. 294; Concord v. Boscawen, 17 N. H.

465.

4 In Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 896, the action of a town appropriating

money in aid of the construction of a county road, was held void and no protec-

tion to the officers who had expended it See also Concord v. Boscawen, 17

N. H. 465.
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objects outside the city limits, and to engage in enterprises of a

public nature which may be expected to benefit the citizens of the

municipality in common with the people of the State at large, and

also in some special and peculiar manner, but which nevertheless

are not under the control of the corporation, and are so far aside

from the ordinary purposes of local governments that assistance by

the municipality in such enterprises would not be warranted under

auy general grant of power for municipal government. For a few

years past the sessions of the legislative bodies of the

several States have been prolific in * legislation which has [* 214]

resulted in flooding the country with municipal securities

issued in aid of works of public improvement, to be owned, con-

trolled, and operated by private parties, or by corporations created

for the purpose; the works themselves being designed for the con-

venience of the people of the State at large, but being nevertheless

supposed to be specially beneficial to certain localities because

running near or through them, and therefore justifying, it is sup-

posed, the imposition of a special burden by taxation upon such

localities to aid in their construction.1 We have elsewhere2 referred

to cases in which it has been held that the legislature may consti-
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tutionally authorize cities, townships, and counties to subscribe to

the stock of railroad companies, or to loan them their credit, and

to tax their citizens to pay these subscriptions, or the bonds or other

securities issued as loans, where a peculiar benefit to the munici-

pality was anticipated from the improvement. The rulings in

these cases, if sound, must rest upon the same right which allows

such-municipalities to impose burdens upon their citizens to con-

struct local streets or roads, and they can only be defended on the

ground that " the object to be accomplished is so obviously con-

nected with the [municipality] and its interests as to conduce

obviously and in a special manner to their prosperity and advance-

ment." 3 But there are authorities which dispute their soundness,

1 In Merrick v. Inhabitants of Amherst, 12 Allen, 500, it was held competent

for the legislature to authorize a town to raise money by taxation for a State

agricultural college, to be located therein. The case, however, we think, stands

on different reasons from those where aid has been voted by municipalities to

public improvements. See it explained in Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94.

And see Marks p. Trustees of Pardue University, 37 Ind. 155.

* Ante, p. 119.

* Talbot t. Dent, 9 B. Monp. 526. See Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 44.

[239]

* 214

[CH.J.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

and it cannot be denied that this species of legislation has been

exceedingly mischievous in its results, that it has created a great

It seems not inappropriate to remark in this place that the three authors who

have treated so ably of municipal constitutional law (Mr. Sedgwick, Slat. &

Const. Law, 464), of railway law (Judge Redfield), and of municipal corpora-

tions (Judge Dillon) have all united in condemning this legislation as unsound

and unwarranted by the principles of constitutional law. See the views of the

two writers last named in note to the case of People v. Township Board of Salem,

9 Am. Law Reg. 487. And Judge Dillon well remarks in his Treatise on Mu-

nicipal Corporations (§ 104) that, "regarded in the light of its effects, there

is little hesitation in affirming that this invention to aid private enterprises has

proved itself baneful in the last degree."

If we trace the beginning of this legislation, we shall find it originating at a

time when there had been little occasion to consider with care the limitations to

the functions of municipal government, because as yet those functions had been

employed with general caution and prudence, and no disposition had been mani-

fested to stretch their powers to make them embrace matters not usually recog-

nized as properly and legitimately falling within them, or to make use of the
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municipal machinery to further private ends. Nor did the earliest decisions

attract much attention, for they referred to matters somewhat local, and the spirit

of speculation was not as yet rife. When the construction of railways and canals

was first entered upon by an expenditure of public funds to any considerable

extent, the States themselves took them in charge, and for a time appropriated

large sums and incurred immense debts in enterprises, some of which were of

high importance and others of little value, the cost and management of which

threatened them at length with financial disaster, bankruptcy, and possible repu-

diation. No long experience was required to demonstrate that railways and

canals could not be profitably, prudently, or safely managed by the shifting

administrations of State government; and many of the States not only made pro-

vision for disposing of their interest in works of public improvement, but, in view

of a bitter experience of the evils already developed in undertaking to construct

and control them, they amended their constitutions so as to prohibit the State,

when again the fever of speculation should prevail, from engaging anew in such

undertakings.

All experience shows, however, that men are abundant who do not scruple to

evade a constitutional provision which they find opposed to their desires, if they can

possibly assign a plausible reason for doing so; and in the case of the provisions

before referred to, it was not long before persons began to question their phra-

seology very closely, not that they might arrive at the actual purpose, — which

indeed was obvious enough, — but to discover whether that purpose might not be

defeated without a violation of the express terms. The purpose clearly was to

remand all such undertakings to private enterprise, and to protect the citizens of

the State from being taxed to aid them; but while the State was forbidden to

engage in such works, it was unfortunately not expressly declared that the sev-

eral members of the State, in their corporate capacity, were also forbidden to do

so. The conclusion sought and reached was that the agencies of the State were
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burden of public debt for which in a large number of cases the

anticipated benefit was never received, and that, as is likely to be

at liberty to do what was forbidden to the State itself, and the burden of debt

which the State might not directly impose upon its citizens, it might indirectly

place upon their shoulders by the aid of municipal action.

The legislation adopted under this construction some of the courts felt com-

pelled to sustain, upon the accepted principle of constitutional law that no legis-

lative authority is forbidden to the legislature unless forbidden in terms; and the

voting of municipal aid to railroads became almost a matter of course wherever a

plausible scheme could be presented by interested parties to invite it. In some

localities, it is true, vigorous protest was made; but as the handling of a large

amount of public money was usually expected to make the fortune of the projectors,

whether the enterprise proved successful or not, means either fair or unfair were

generally found to overcome all opposition. Towns sometimes voted large sums

to railroads on the ground of local benefit where the actual and inevitable result

was local injur)', and the projectors of one scheme succeeded in obtaining and

negotiating the bonds of one municipality to the amount of a quarter of a million

dollars, which are now being enforced, though the work they were to aid was never

seriously begun. A very large percentage of all the aid voted was sacrificed in
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discounts to purchasers of bonds, expended in worthless undertakings, or otherwise

lost to the tax payers; and the cases might almost be said to be exceptional in which

municipalities, when afterwards they were called upon to meet their obligations,

could do so with a feeling of having received the expected consideration. Some

State and territorial governors did noble work in endeavoring to stay this reckless

legislative and municipal action, and some of the States at length rendered such

action impossible by constitutional provisions so plain and positive that the most

ingenious mind was unable to misunderstand or pervert them.

When the United States entered upon a scheme of internal improvement, the

Cumberland road was the first important project for which its revenues were

demanded. The promises of this enterprise were of continental magnificence

and importance, but they ended after heavy national expenditures in a road no

more national than a thousand others which the road-masters in the several

States have constructed with the local taxes; and it wa»finally abandoned to the

States as a common highway. When next a great national scheme was broached,

the aid of the general government was demanded by way of subsidies to private

corporations, who presented schemes of works of great public convenience and

utility, which were to open up the new territories to improvement and settlement

sooner than the business of the country would be likely to induce unaided private

capital to do it, and which consequently appealed to the imagination rather than

to facts to demonstrate their importance, and afforded abundant opportunity for

scheming operators to call to their assistance the national sentiment, then

peculiarly strong and active by reason of the attempt recently made to overthrow

the government, in favor of projects whose national, importance in many cases

the imagination alone could discover. The general result was the giving away of

immense bodies of land, and in some cases the granting of pecuniary aid, with

i recklessness*and often with an appearance of corruption that at length startled
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the case where municipal governments take part in projects foreign

to the purposes of their creation, it has furnished unusual facil-

the people, and aroused a public spirit before which the active spirits in Congress

who had promoted these grants, and sometimes even demanded them in the name

of the poor settler in the wilderness who was unable to get his crops to market,

were compelled to give way. The scandalous frauds connected with the Pacific

Railway, which disgraced the nation in the face of the world, and the great and

disastrous financial panic of 1873, were legitimate results of such subsidies; but

the pioneer in the wilderness had long before discovered that land grants were

not always sought or taken with a view to an immediate appropriation to the

roads for the construction of which they were nominally made, but that tLe result

in many cases was, that large tracts were thereby kept out of market and from

taxation which otherwise would have been purchased and occupied by settlers who

would have lessened his taxes by contributing their share to the public burdens.

The grants, therefore, in such cases, instead of being at once devoted to improve-

ments for the benefit of settlers, were in fact kept in a state of nature by the

speculators who had secured them, until the improvements of settlers in their

vicinity could make the grantees wealthy by the increase in value such improve-
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ments gave to the land near them. In saying this the admission is freely made

that in many cases the grants were promptly and honestly appropriated in accord-

ance with their nominal purpose; but the general verdict now is that the system

was necessarily corruptive and tended to invite fraud, and that some persons of

influence managed to accumulate great wealth by grants indirectly secured to

themselves under the unfounded pretence of a desire to aid and encourage the

pioneers in the wilderness.

Some States also have recently in their corporate capacity again engaged in

issuing bonds to subsidize private corporations, with the natural result of serious

State scandals, State insolvency, public discontent, and in some cases it would

seem almost inevitable repudiation. Their governments, amid the disorders of

the times, have fallen into the hands of strangers and novices, and the hobby of

public improvement has been ridden furiously to gratify the greed of individuals.

It has olten been well remarked that the abuse of a power furnishes no argu-

ment against its existence; but a system so open to abuses may well challenge

attention to its foundations. And when those foundations are examined, it is

denied that they have any sound support in the municipal constitutional law of

this country. The same reasons which justify subsidies to the business of com-

mon carriers by railway will support taxation in aid of any private business

whatsoever.

It is sometimes loosely said that railway companies are public corporations,

but the law does not so regard them. It is the settled doctrine of the law that,

like banks, mining companies, and manufacturing companies, they are mere pri-

vate corporations, supposed to be organized for the benefit of the individual

corporators, and subject to no other public supervision or control than any other

private association for business purposes to which corporate powers have been

granted. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 668; Buonaparte v.

Camden and Amboy R.R. Co., Baldw. 205; Eustis v. Parker, 1 N. H. 237;
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ities for fraud and public plunder, and led almost inevitably, at

last, to discontent; sometimes even to disorder and violence.

Ohio, &c, RR Co. v. Ridge, 5 Blackf. 78; Roanoke, &c, R.R. Co. v. Davis,

2 Dev. & Bat. 451; Dearborn v. Boston & M. RR. Co., 4 Fost, 179; Trus-

tees, &c, v. Auborn, &c, R.R. Co., 3 Hill, 570; Tinsman e. Belvidere, &c.,

RR. Co., 2 Dutch. 148; Thorpe v. Rutland, &c, RR. Co., 27 Vt. 155; Ala-

bama R.R. Co. i). Kidd, 29 Ala. 221; Turnpike Co. r. Wallace, 8 Watts, 816;

Seymour v. Turnpike Co., 10 Ohio, 476; Ten Eyck v. D. & R. Canal, 3 Harr.

200; A. & A. on Corp., § 30-36; Redf. on Railw. c. 3, § 1; Pierce on Rail-

roads, 19, 20. Taxation to subsidize them cannot therefore be justified on the

ground of any public character they possess, any more than to subsidize banks or

mining companies. It is truly said that it has long been the settled doctrine that

the right of eminent domain may be employed in their behalf, and it has some-

times been insisted with much earnestness that wherever the State may aid an

enterprise under the right of eminent domain, it may assist it by taxation also.

But the right of taxation and the right of eminent domain are by no means coex-

tensive, and do not rest wholly upon like reasons. The former compels the citizen

to contribute his proportion of the public burden; the latter compels him to part

with nothing for which he is not to receive pecuniary compensation. The tax in
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the one case is an exaction, the appropriation in the other is only a forced sale.

To take money for private purposes under pretence of taxation is, as has been

often said, but robbery and plunder; to appropriate under the right of eminent

domain for a private corporation robs no one, because the corporation pays for

what is taken, and in some cases, important to the welfare and prosperity of the

community, and where a public convenience is to be provided, — as in the case of

a grist mill, — it has long been' held competent to exercise the one power, while

the other was conceded to be inadmissible. Few persons would attempt to justify

a tax in aid of a mill-owner, on the ground that laws appropriating lands for his

benefit, but at his expense, have been supported.

The truth is, the right to tax in favor of private corporations of any descrip-

tion must rest upon the broad ground that the power of the legislature, subject

only to the express restrictions of the constitution, is supreme, and that, in the

language of some of the cases, "if there be the least possibility that making

the gift will be promotive in any degree of the public welfare, it becomes a

question of policy, and not of natural justice, and the determination of the

legislature is conclusive." (Pott, p. 489.) But nothing is better settled on

authority than that this strong language, though entirely true when it refers to

the making provision for those things which it falls within the province of govern-

ment to provide for its citizens, or to the payment of services performed for the

Slate, or the satisfaction of legal, equitable, or moral obligations resting upon

it, is wholly inadmissible when the purpose is to impose a burden upon one man

for the benefit of another. Many such cases might be suggested in which there

would not only be a "possibility," but even a strong probability, that a small

burden imposed upon the public to set an individual up in business, or to build

bin a house, or otherwise make him comfortable, would be promotive of the

public welfare; but in law the purpose of any such burden is deemed private
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[* 215] * Assuming that any such subscriptions or securities

may be authorized, the first requisite to their validity

and the incidental benefit to the public is not recognized as an admissible basis

of taxation.

In Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me., it became necessary to reaffirm a doc-

trine, often declared by the courts, that however great was the power to tax, it was

exceeded, and the legislature was attempting the exercise of a power not legislative

in its character, when it undertook to impose a burden on the public for a private

purpose. And it was also held that the raising of money by tax in order to loan

the same to private parties to enable them to erect mills and manufactories in

such town, was raising it for a private purpose, and therefore illegal. Appltton,

Ch. J., most truly remarks in that case, that "all security of private rights,

all protection of private property, is at an end, when one is compelled to raise

money to loan at the will of others for their own use and benefit, when the power

is given to a majority to lend or give away the property of an unwilling minority."

And yet how plain it is that the benefit of the local public might possibly have

been promoted by the proposed erections! This case was decided near the same

time with one in the United States Circuit Court of Kansas, in which Dillon,
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Circuit J., held a law authorizing the town of Iola to issue its bonds in aid of a

manufactory proposed to be established in its midst was void, as an attempt to

exercise the taxing power for private purposes.

These cases are not singular: they are representative cases; and they are

cited only because they are among the most recent expressions of judicial opin-

ion on the subject. With them may be placed Lowell r. Boston, also a very

recent case not yet reported, in which the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,

after the great fire of 1872 in Boston, denied the power of the Commonwealth

to permit taxation in order to loan the moneys out to the persons who had suf-

fered by the fire. These three decisions of eminent tribunals indicate a limit to

legislative power in the matter of taxation, and hold, what has been decided very

many times before, that it is not necessary the constitution should forbid expressly

the taxing for private purposes, since it is implied in the very idea of taxation

that the purpose must be public, and a taking for any other purpose is unlawful

confiscation.

One difference there undoubtedly is between the case of a railroad corpora-

tion and a manufacturing corporation; that there are precedents in favor of tax-

ing for the one and not for the other. But what we insist is, that the precedents

are a departure from sound principle, and that, as in every other case where

principle is departed from, evils have resulted. A catalogue of these would

include the squandering of the public domain; the enrichment of schemers

whose policy it has been, first to obtain all they can by fair promises, and then

avoid as far and as long as possible the fulfilment of the promises; the cor-

ruption of legislation; the loss of State credit; great public debts recklessly

contracted for moneys often recklessly expended; public discontent because the

enterprises fostered from the public treasury and on the pretence of public ben-

efit are not believed to be managed in the public interest; and, finally, great

financial panic, collapse, and disaster. At such a cost has the strong expression
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would seem, then, to be a special legislative authority to make or

issue them; an authority which does not reside in the general

words in which the powers of local self-government are usually

conferred,1 and one also which must be carefully followed by the

of dissent which all the while has accompanied these precedents been disregarded

and set aside.

Some most remarkable illustrations may be found in our legislative history of

the devices and shifts that will be resorted to for the plunder of the public when

the doctrine is once submitted to, that private corporations may be subsidized

from the public treasury. In this place we content ourselves with mentioning

one. The people of 11linois by constitutional provision have expressly forbidden

such subsidies. Unfortunately for the State, a number of towns and counties had

previously voted considerable sums to railroad companies, which still remain

unpaid. Some of these constituted such burdens upon the municipalities voting

them that the local authorities did not venture to impose the necessary taxes to

pay the interest, much less to provide for the principal. What should be done

under such circumstances? The holders of the debts wanted their pay: the munic-

ipalities wanted to get rid of their obligations. It would seem that nothing was

to be done but for the one party to pay or the other to resort to the proper
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legal remedy. With millions at stake, however, ingenious men were not want-

ing who could suggest some other plan, and the one suggested was, that these

local obligations should be saddled upon the State. It seems incredible, but it

is nevertheless true, that such influences were brought to bear as secured legisla-

tion which, covertly and by indirection, imposed upon the State the burden. So

gross and palpable a disregard of the constitutional principle which requires tax-

ation to be gathered from those upon whom the burden justly rests (post, p. 493-4)

is not often known.

As denying the right to tax in aid of railroad corporations, reference is made

to Stokes v. Scott County, 10 Iowa, 166; State v. Wapello County, 13 Iowa,

388; Myers v. Johnson County, 14 Iowa, 47; Smith v. Henry County, 15 Iowa,

385; Ten Eyck v. Keokuk, t'6. 486; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 212; McClure

r. Owen, 26 Iowa, 243; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28; People v. Township

Board of Salem, 21 Mich. 11; Bay City p. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499;

Whiting v. Sheboygan R.R. Co., 25 Wis. 167; Phillips v. Albany, 28 Wis. 357;

and to dissenting opinions in many of the cases where a majority of the Court

sustained the right, Compare also what is said by Church, Ch. J., in People p.

Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401.

1 Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.) 171. A general power to borrow money

or incur indebtedness to aid in the construction of" any road or bridge" must

be understood to have reference only to the roads or bridges within the munici-

pality. Stokes v. Scott County, 10 Iowa, 173; State v. Wapello County, 13

Iowa, 388; La Fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38. There are decisions in the Supreme

Court of the United States which appear to be to the contrary. The city charter

of Muscatine conferred in detail the usual powers, and then authorized the city

"to borrow money for any object in its discretion," after a vote of the city in

favor of the loan. In Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384, the court seem to have
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municipality in all essential particulars, or the subscription or

security will be void. And while mere irregularities of action, not

going to the essentials of the power, would not prevent parties who

had acted in reliance upon the securities enforcing them, yet aa

the doings of these corporations are matters of public record, and

they have no general power to issue negotiable securities, any one

who becomes holder of such securities, even though they be nego-

tiable in form, will take them with constructive notice of any want

of power in the corporation to issue them, and cannot enforce them

when their issue was unauthorized.1

construed this clause as authorizing a loan for any object whatever; though such

phrases are understood usually to be confined in their scope to the specific objects

before enumerated; or at least to those embraced within the ordinary functions

of municipal governments. See -Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38. The case in 1

Wallace was followed in Rogers v. Burlington, 8 Wall. 654, four justices dis-

senting. See also Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 270. A municipal corpora-

tion having power to borrow money, it is held, may make its obligations

payable wherever it shall agree. Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384. But some
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cases hold that such obligations can only be made payable at the corporation

treasury, unless there is express legislative authority to make them payable

elsewhere. People v. Tazewell County, 22 111. 147; Pekin v. Reynolds, 31 ILL

529. Such corporations cannot give their obligations all the qualities of nego-

tiable paper, without express legislative permission. Dively v. Cedar Falls, 21

Iowa, 565. See Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 349; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§

406. 407.

1 There is considerable confusion in the cases on this subject. If the corpo-

ration has no authority to issue negotiable paper, or if the officers who assume

to do so have no power under the charter for that purpose, there can be no doubt

that the defence of want of power may be made by the corporation in any suit

brought on the securities. Smith p. Cheshire, 13 Gray, 818; Gould v. Sterling,

23 N. Y. 458; Andover v. Grafton, 7 N. H. 298; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa,

209. And in any case, if the holder has received the securities with notice of

any valid defence, he takes them subject thereto. But where the corporation has

power to issue negotiable paper in some cases, and its officers have assumed to

do so in cases not within the charter, whether a bona fide holder would be charge-

able with notice of the want of authority in the particular case, or, on the other

hand, would be entitled to rely on the securities themselves as sufficient evidence

that they were properly issued when nothing appeared on their face to apprise

him of the contrary, is a question still open to some dispute.

In Stoncy v. American Life Insurance Co., 11 Paige, 635, it was held that a

negotiable security of a corporation which upon its face appears to have been

duly issued by such corporation, and in conformity with the provisions of its

charter, is valid in the hands of » bona fide holder thereof without notice,

although such security was in fact issued for a purpose, and at a place not author-

ized by the charter of the company, and in violation of the laws of the State

where it was actually issued. In Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 203, the law is
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* In some of the cases involving the validity of the sub- [* 216]

scriptions made or bonds issued by municipal corporations

rtated as follows: "Where a corporation has power, under any circumstances,

to issue negotiable securities, the bona fide holder has a right to presume they

were issued under the circumstances which give the requisite authority, and they

are no more liable to be impeached for any infirmity in the hands of such

holder than any other commercial papep." See also Commissioners of Knox

Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539; Russell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287; Thorn

v. Commissioners of Miami Co., 2 Black, 722; De Voss v. Richmond, 18 Grat.

338: San Antonio p. Lane, 32 Tex. 405. In Farmers and Mechanics Bank v.

The Butchers and Drovers Bank, 16 N. Y. 125, it is said: "A citizen who deals

directly with a corporation, or who takes its negotiable paper, is presumed to

know the extent of its corporate powers. But when the paper is, upon its face,

in all respects such as the corporation has authority to issue, and its only defect

consists in some extrinsic fact, — such as the purpose or object for which it was

issued, —to hold that the person taking the paper must inquire as to such extra-

neous fact, of the existence of which he is in no way apprised, would obviously

conflict with the whole policy of the law in regard to negotiable papep." In

Madison and Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. The Norwich Savings Society, 24 Ind.

461, this doctrine is approved, and a distinction made, in the earlier case of
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Smead v. Indianapolis, &c, Railroad Co., 11 Ind. 104, between paper executed

ultra tires and that executed within the power of the corporation, but, by an

abuse of the power in that particular instance, was repudiated. In Halstead

v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 5 Barb. 218, action was brought upon warrants

drawn by the corporation of New York upon its treasurer, not in the course of

its proper and legitimate business. It was held that the corporation under its

charter had no general power to issue negotiable paper, though, not being pro-

hibited by law, it might do so for any debt contracted in the course of its proper

legitimate business. We quote from the opinion of Edwards, J.: "It was con-

tended on the argument, that the rule of the law-merchant which protects the

bona fide holder of negotiable paper, without notice, was of universal applica-

tion; and that, if the defendants had a right to issue negotiable paper, it must

or necessitate be subject to the same rules as the negotiable paper of an individ-

ual. This view seems plausible, but will it bear the test of examination? In

the first place, the defendants have no general power, either express or implied,

to issue negotiable papep. They have only a special or conditional implied power

for that purpose; that it is necessary as a condition precedent to the validity of

such paper that the debt which forms the consideration should be contracted in

the proper legitimate business of the defendant. The act under which they

wepe incorporated is declared to be a public act Every person who takes their

negotiable paper is bound to know the extent of their powers, and is presumed

to receive it with a full knowledge that they have only a limited and conditional

power to issue it. He is thus put on his inquiry, and takes it at his peril. The

circumstances under which a bona fide holder, without notice, receives the nego-

tiable paper of a natural person, or of a corporation having the general express

power to issue negotiable paper, are very different. In both those instances, the
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[* 217] in aid of internal * improvements, there has been occasion

to consider clauses in the State constitutions designed to

power to issue such paper is general and unconditional; and hence the rules which

have been established by commercial policy, for the purpose of giving currency

to mercantile paper, are applicable. It results from the views which have been

expressed, that the drafts in question, not having been issued by the defendants

in their proper and legitimate business, are void in the hands of the plaintiff,

although received by him without actual notice of their consideration." This

decision was affirmed in 3 N. Y. 430. In Gould v. Town of Stirling, 23 N. T.

464, it was held that where a town had issued negotiable bonds, which could only

be issued when the written assent of two-thirds of the resident persons taxed

in the town had been obtained and filed in the county clerk's office, the bonds

issued without such assent were invalid, and that the purchaser of them could

not rely upon the recital in the bonds that such assent had been obtained, but

must ascertain for himself at his peril. Say the court: "One who takes a nego-

tiable promissory note or bill of exchange, purporting to be made by an agent,

is bound to inquire as to the power of the agent. Where the agent is appointed

and the power conferred, but the right to exercise the power has been made to
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depend upon the existence of facts of which the agent may be supposed to be in

an especial manner cognizant, the bona fide holder is protected; because he is

presumed to have taken the paper upon the faith of the representation as to those

facts. The mere fact of executing the note or bill amounts in itself, in such a

case, to a representation by the agent to every person who may take the paper

that the requisite facts exist. But the holder has no such protection in regard

to the existence of the power itself. In that respect the subsequent bona fide

holder is in no better situation than the payee, except in so far as the latter

would appear of necessity to have had cognizance of facts which the other can-

not [must?] be presumed to have known," And the case is distinguished from

that of the Farmers and Mechanics Bank r. Butchers and Drovers Bank, 16

N. Y. 125, where the extrinsic fact affecting the authority related to the state of

accounts between the bank and one of its customers, which could only be known

to the teller and other officers of the bank. See also Brady v. Mayor, &c, of

New York, 2 Bosw. 173; Hopple v. Brown Township, 13 Ohio, n. s. 311; Veeder

v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280. The subject is reviewed in Clark v. City of Des Moines,

19 Iowa, 209. The action was brought upon city warrants, negotiable in form,

and of which the plaintiff claimed to be bona fide assignee, without notice of any

defects. The city offered to show that the warrants were issued without any

authority from the city council, and without any vote of the council authorizing

the same. It was held that the evidence should have been admitted, and that it

would constitute a complete defence. See further Head v. Providence, &c,

Co., 2 Cranch, 169; Royal British Bank v. Turquand, 6 EI. & Bl. 327; Knox

County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 544; Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287; San-

born v. Deerfield, 2 N. H. 254; Alleghany City v. McClurkan, 14 Penn. St. 83;

Morris Canal and Banking Co. v. Fisher, 1 Stock. 667; Clapp v. Cedar Co.,

5 Iowa, 15; Commissioners, &c. v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403; Madison and Indianapolis

R.R. Co. v. Norwalk Savings Society, 24 Ind. 457; Bird t>. Daggett, 97 Mass.
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limit the power of the "legislature to incur indebtedness [*218]

on behalf of the State, and which clauses, it has been

urged, were equally imperative in restraining indebtedness on

behalf of the several political divisions of the State. The Consti-

tution of Kentucky prohibited any act of the legislature author-

izing any debt to be contracted on behalf of the Commonwealth,

except for certain specified purposes, unless provision should be

made in such act for an annual tax sufficient to pay such debt

within thirty years; and the act was not to have effect unless

approved by the people. It was contended that this provision was

not to apply to the Commonwealth as a mere ideal abstraction,

unconnected with her citizens and her soil, but to the Common-

wealth as composed of her people, and their territorial organiza-

tions of towns, cities, and counties, which make up the State, and

that it embraced in principle every legislative act which author-

ized a debt to be contracted by any of the local organizations of

which the Commonwealth was composed. The courts of that

State held otherwise. "The clause in question," they say, " ap-

plies in terms to a debt contracted on behalf of the Commonwealth

as a distinct corporate body; and the distinction between a debt
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on behalf of the Commonwealth, and a debt or debts on behalf of

one county, or of any number of counties, is too broad and palpa-

494. It is of course impossible to reconcile these authorities; but the doctrine

in the case of Gould v. Town of Stirling appears to us to be sound, and that,

■wherever a want of power exists, a purchaser of the securities is chargeable with

notice of it, if the defect is disclosed by the corporate records, or, as in that

case, by other records where the power is required to be shown. See Fish v.

Kenosha, 26 Wis. 24. That the powers of the agents of municipal corporations

are matters of record, and the corporation not liable for an unauthorized act, see

further Baltimore v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 276; Johnson ». Common Council, 16

Ind. 227. Those who deal with a corporation must take notice of the restrictions

in its charter, or in the general law, regarding the making of contracts. Brady

p. Mayor, &c, of New York, 2 Bosw. 173; 8. c. 20 N. Y. 312; Swift p. Wil-

liamsburg, 24 Barb. 427; Zabriskie v. Cleveland, &c, R.R. Co., 23 How. 381;

Hull v. Marshall County, 12 Iowa, 142; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199;

Marsh v. Supervisors of Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676. If they are not, no subse-

quent ratification by the corporation can make them valid. Leavenworth v.

Rankin, 2 Kansas, 357. The courts of Missouri and Florida have held that

purchasers of securities issued under unconstitutional laws will be protected,

and the securities enforced if they were purchased before the laws were declared

invalid. Steines p. Franklin County, 48 Mo. 167; Columbia County v. King,

13 Fla. 451.
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ble to admit of the supposition that the latter class of

[* 219] * debts was intended to be embraced by terms specifically

designating the former only." 1 The same view has been

taken by the courts of Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Kansas, of

the provisions in the constitutions of those States restricting the

power of the legislature to contract debts on behalf of the State in

aid of internal improvements ;2 but the decisions of the first-

named State have since been doubted,3 and those in Illinois, it

would seem, overruled.4 In Michigan it has been held that they

were inapplicable to a constitution adopted with a clear purpose to

preclude taxation for such enterprises.5

1 Slack v. Railroad Co., 18 B. Monr. 16.

* Dubuque County v. Railroad Co., 4 Greene (Iowa), 1; Clapp v. Cedar

County, 5 Iowa, 15; Clark v. Jancsville, 10 Wis. 136; Bushnell v. Beloit, ib.

195; Prettyman v. Supervisors, 19 111. 406; Robertson v. Rockford. 21 111. 451;

Johnson v. Stark County, 24 111. 75; Perkins ». Lewis, ib. 208; Butler v. Dun-

ham, 27 111. 474; Leavenworth Co. ts. Miller, 7 Kansas, 479.

a State v. Wapello County, 13 Iowa. 388. And see People v. Supervisor, &c,
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16 Mich. 254.

4 In People v. Mayor, &c, of Chicago, 51 111. 34, it is held expressly that

the provision of the State constitution prohibiting the State from creating a

debt exceeding fifty thousand dollars without the consent of the people manifested

at a general election, would preclude the State from creating a like debt against

a municipal corporation, except upon the like conditions. And it was pertinently

said: '* The protection of the whole implies necessarily the protection of all its

organized parts, and the whole cannot be secure while all or any of its parts are

exposed to danger. What is the real value of this provision of the constitution

if the legislature, inhibited from incurring a debt beyond fifty thousand dollars

on behalf of the State, may force a debt tenfold or one hundred-fold greater —

for there is no limit to the power — upon all the cities of the State? We can

perceive none." We do not see how this can be reconciled with the earlier

Illinois cases, and it is so manifestly right, it is hoped the learned court will never

make the attempt.

* The following extract from the opinion in Bay City v. State Treaurer, 23

Mich. 504, is upon this point: "Our State had had a bitter experience of the

evils of the government connecting itself with works of public improvement. In

a time of inflation and imagined prosperity, the State had contracted a large debt

for the construction of a system of railroads, and the people were oppressed with

heavy taxation in consequence. Moreover, for a portion of this debt they had

not received what they bargained for, and they did not recognize their legal or

moral obligation to pay for it. The good name and fame of the State suffered in

consequence. The result of it all was that a settled conviction fastened itself

upon the minds of our people, that works of internal improvement should be

private enterprises; that it was not in the proper province of government to

connect itself with their construction or management, and .that an imperative

[ 250 ]

CH. Tin.] THE GRADES OP MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

* 219

Another class of legislation, which has recently demanded the

attention of the courts, has been little less troublesome, from the

State policy demanded that no burdens should be imposed upon the people by

State authority, for any such purpose. Under this conviction they incorporated

in the constitution of 1850, under the significant title of 'Finance and Tax-

ation,' several provisions expressly prohibiting the State from being a party to,

or interested in, any work of internal improvement, or engaged in carrying on

any snch work, except in the expenditure of grants made to it; and also from

subscribing to, or being interested in, the stock of any company, association, or

corporation, or loaning its credit in aid of any person, association, or corpora-

tion. Art. XIV. § 9, 8, and 7.

"All these provisions were incorporated by the people on the constitution, as

precautions against injudicious action by themselves, if in another time of infla-

tion and excitement they should be tempted to incur the like burdensome tax-

ation in order to accomplish public improvements in cases where they were not

content to wait the result of private enterprise. The people meant to erect such

effectual barriers that if the temptation should return, the means of inflicting the

like injury upon the credit, reputation, and prosperity of the State, should not

be within the reach of the authorities. They believed these clauses of the con-
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stitution accomplished this purpose perfectly, and none of its provisions had

more influence in recommending that instrument to the hearty good-will of the

people.

"In process of time, however, a majority in the legislature were found willing,

against the solemn warning of the executive, to resort again to the power of

taxation in aid of internal improvement. It was discovered that though "the

State" was expressly inhibited from giving such aid in any form, except in the

disposition of grants made to it, the subdivisions of which the State was com-

posed were not under the like ban. Decisions in other States were found which

were supposed to sanction the doctrine that, under such circumstances, the State

might do indirectly through its subdivisions what directly it was forbidden to do.

Thus a way was opened by which the whole purpose of the constitutional pro-

visions quoted might be defeated. The State could not aid a private corporation

with its credit, but it might require each of its townships, cities, and villages to

do so. The State could not load down its people with taxes for the construction

of a public improvement, but it might compel the municipal authorities, which

were its mere creatures, and which held their whole authority and their life at its

will, to enforce such taxes, one by one, until the whole people were bent to the

burden.

"Now, whatever might be the just and proper construction of similar pro-

visions in the constitutions of States whose history has not been the same with

our own, the majority of this court thought when the previous case was before

us, and they still think, that these provisions in our constitution do preclude the

State from loaning the public credit to private corporations, and from imposing

taxation upon its citizens or any portion thereof in aid of the construction of

railroads. So the people supposed when the constitution was adopted. Consti-

tutions do not change with the varying tides of public opinion and desire; the

will of the people therein recorded is the same inflexible law until changed by their
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new, varied, and peculiar questions involved, than that in relation

to municipal subscriptions in aid of internal improvements. As

the power to declare war and to conduct warlike operations rests

in the national government, and that government is vested with

unlimited control of all the resources of the country for those

purposes, the duty of national defence, and, consequently, the duty

to defend all the citizens as well as all the property of all the

municipal organizations in the several States, rests upon the na-

tional authorities. This much is conceded, though in a qualified

degree, also, and, subordinate to the national government, a like

duty rests doubtless upon the State governments, which may

employ the means and services of their citizens for the purpose.

But it is no part of the duty of a township, city, or county, as

such, to raise men or money for warlike operations, nor have they

any authority, without express legislative sanction, to impose upon

their people any burden by way of taxation for any such purpose.1

Nevertheless, when a war arises which taxes all the energies of the

nation, which makes it necessary to put into the field a large pro-
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portion of all the able-bodied men of the country, and which rend-

ers imperative a resort to all available means for filling the ranks

of the army, recruiting the navy, and replenishing the

[* 220] national treasury, the question * becomes a momentous

one, whether the local organizations — those which are

managed most immediately by the people themselves — may not

be made important auxiliaries to the national and State govern-

ments in accomplishing the great object in which all alike are

interested so vitally; and if they are capable of rendering- impor-

own deliberative action; and it cannot be permissible to the courts that in order

to aid evasions and circumventions, they shall subject these instruments, which in

the main only undertake to lay down broad general principles, to a literal and

technical construction, as if they were great public enemies standing in the way

of progress, and the duty of every good citizen was to get around their pro-

visions whenever practicable, and give them a damaging thrust whenever con-

venient. They must construe them, as the people did in their adoption, if the

means of arriving at that construction are within their powep. In these cases we

thought we could arrive at it from the public history of the times"

1 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Gove p. Epping, 41 N. H. 545; Crowell

p. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Baldwin v. North Branford, 82 Conn. 47; Webster v.

Harwinton, t'6. 131. See also Claflin v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502; Cover p. Bay-

town, 12 Minn. 124; Fiske p. Hazzard, 7 R. I. 438; Alley v. Edgecomb, 53 Me.

446; People p. Supervisors of Columbia, 43 N. Y. 130; Walschlager v. Liberty,

23 Wis. 362.
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tant assistance, whether there is any constitutional principle which

would be violated by making use of these organizations in a case

where failure on the part of the central authority would precipi-

tate general dismay and ruin. Indeed, as the general government,

with a view to convenience, economy, and promptness of action,

will be very likely to adopt, for any purposes of conscription, the

existing municipal divisions of the States, and its demand for

men to recruit its armies will assume a form seeming to impose

on the people whose municipal organization embraces the territory

covered by the demand, the duty <^ meeting it, the question we

have stated may appear to be one rather of form than of substance,

inasmuch as it would be difficult to assign reasons why a duty

resting upon the citizens of a municipality may not be considered

as resting upon the corporation itself of which they are the con-

stituents, and if so, why it may not be assumed by the munici-

pality itself, and then be discharged in like manner as any other

municipal burden, if the legislature shall grant permission for that

purpose.

One difficulty that suggests itself in adopting any such doctrine
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is, that, by the existing law of the land, able-bodied men between

certain specified ages are alone liable to be summoned to the per-

formance of military duty; and if the obligation is assumed by

the municipal organizations of the State, and discharged by the

payment of money or the procurement of substitutes, the taxation

required for this purpose can be claimed, with some show of rea-

son, to be taxation of the whole community for the particular benefit

of that class upon whom by the statutes the obligation rests. When

the public funds are used for the purpose, it will be insisted that

they are appropriated to discharge the liabilities of private indi-

viduals. Those who are already past the legal age of service, and

who have stood their chance of being called into the field, or per-

haps have actually rendered the required service, will be able to

urge with considerable force that the State can no longer honorably

and justly require them to contribute to the public defence, but

ought to insist that those within the legal ages should perform

their legal duty; and if any upon whom that duty rests shall

actually have enrolled themselves in the army with a view to dis-

charge it, such persons may claim, with even greater rea-

son, that every consideration of * equality and justice [* 221]

demands that the property they leave behind them shall

not be taxed to relieve others from a duty equally imperative.
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Much may be said on both sides of this subject, but the judicial

decisions are clear, that the people of .any municipal corporation

or political division of a State have such a general interest in

relieving that portion of their fellow-citizens who are liable to the

performance of military duty, as will support taxation or render

valid indebtedness contracted for the purpose of supplying their

places, or of rilling any call of the national authorities for men,

with volunteers who shall be willing to enter the ranks for such

pecuniary inducements as may be offered them. The duty of

national defence, it is held, rears upon every person under the pro-

tection of the government who is able to contribute to it, and not

solely upon those who are within the legal ages. The statute

which has prescribed those ages has for its basis the presumption

that those between the limits fixed are best able to discharge the

burden of military service to. the public benefit, but others are

not absolved from being summoned to the duty, if at any time

the public exigency should seem to demand it. Exemption from

military duty is a privilege rather than a right, and, like other
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statutory privileges, may be recalled at any time when reasons of

public policy or necessity seem to demand the recall.1 Moreover,

there is no valid reason, in the nature of things, why those who

are incapable of performing military service, by reason of age,

physical infirmity, or other cause, should not contribute, in pro-

portion to their ability, to the public defence by such means as are

within their power; and it may well happen that taxation, for the

purpose of recruiting the armies of the nation, will distribute the

burden more equally and justly among all the citizens than any

other mode which could be devised. Whether it will be just and

proper to allow it in any instance must rest with the legislature

to determine; but it is unquestionably competent, with legislative

permission, for towns, cities, and counties to raise money by loans

or by taxation to pay bounty moneys to those who shall volunteer

to fill any call made upon such towns, cities, or counties to supply

men for the national armies.2

1 See post, p. 383, and cases cited in note.

* "The power to create a public debt, and liquidate it by taxation, is too clear

for dispute. The question is, therefore, narrowed to a single point: Is the purpose

in this instance a public oneP Does it concern the common welfare and interest

of the municipality? Let us see. Civil war was raging, and Congress provided

in the second section of the act of 24th February, 1864, that the quota of the

troops of each ward of a city, town, township, precinct, &c, should be as nearly
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* Relief of the community from an impending or pos- [* 222]

sible draft is not, however, the sole consideration which

will support taxation by the municipal corporations of the State to

raise money for the purpose of paying bounties to soldiers. Grat-

itude to those who have entered the military service, whether as

volunteers or drafted men, or as substitutes for others

who were drafted or were * liable to be, is a consideration [* 223]

which the State may well recognize, and it may compen-

as possible in proportion to the number of men resident therein liable to render

military service. Section three provided that all volunteers who may enlist after

a draft shall be ordered shall be deducted from the number ordered to be drafted

in such ward, town, &c Volunteers are therefore by law to be accepted in

relief of the municipality from a compulsory service to be determined by lot or

chance. Does the relief involve the public welfare or interest? The answer

rises spontaneously in the breast of every one in the community liable to the mil-

itary burden. It is given, not by the voice of him alone who owes the service,

but swells into a chorus from his whole family, relatives, and friends. Military

service is the highest duty and burden the citizen is called to obey or to bear. It

involves life, limb, and health, and is therefore a greater ' burden' than the tax-

ation of property. The loss or the injury is not confmed to the individual him-
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self, but extends to all the relations he sustains. It embraces those bound to him

in the ties of consanguinity, friendship, and interest; to the community which

must furnish support to his family, if he cannot, and which loses in him a member

whose labor, industry, and property contribute to its wealth and its resources;

who assists to bear its burdens, and whose knowledge, skill, and public spirit con-

tribute to the general good. Clearly the loss of that part of the population upon

whom the greatest number depend, and who contribute most to the public wel-

fare, by their industry, skill, and property, and good conduct, is a common loss,

and therefore a general injury. These are alike subject to the draft. The blind

and relentless lot respects no age, condition, or rank in life. It is, therefore,

clearly the interest of the community that those should serve who are willing,

whose loss wili sever the fewest ties, and produce the least injury.

"The bounty is not a private transaction in which the individual alone is ben-

efited. It benefits the public by inducing and enabling those to go who feel they

can best be spared. It is not voluntary in those who pay it. The community is

subject to the draft, and it is paid to relieve it from a burden of wap. It is not

a mere gift or reward, but a consideration for services. It is therefore not a

confiscation of one man's property for another's use, but it is a contribution from

the public treasury for a general good. In short, it is simply taxation to relieve

the municipality from the stern demands of war, and avert a public injury in the

loss of those who contribute most to the public welfare." Speer v. School Direc-

tors of Blairsville, 50 Penn. St. 159. See also Waldo v. Portland, 33 Conn.

363; Bartholomew p. Harwinton, ib. 408; Fowler v. Danvers, 8 Allen, 80;

Lowell p. Oliver, ib. 247; Washington County p. Berwick, 56 Penn. St. 466;

Trustees of Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio, N. s. 38; State p. Wilkesbarre, 20 Ohio, N. s.

292. Also Opinions of Justices, 52 Me. 595, in which the view is expressed

that towns cannot, under the power to raise money for " necessary town charges,"
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Bate the service either by the payment of bounty moneys directly

to such persons, or by provision for the support of those dependent

upon them while they shall be absent from their homes. Whether

we regard such persons as public benefactors, who, having taken

upon themselves the most severe and dangerous duty a citizen is

ever called upon to perform, have thereby entitled themselves to

public reward as an incentive to fidelity and courage, or as persons

who, having engaged in the public service for a compensation inad-

equate to the toil, privation, and danger incurred, are deserving of

the bounty as a further recognition on the part of the community

of the worth of their services, there seems in either case to be no

sufficient reason to question the right of the legislature to authorize

the municipal divisions of the State to raise moneys in any of the

usual modes, for the purpose of paying bounties to them

[* 224] or their families in recognition of such services.1 "And if

a municipal corporation shall have voted moneys for such

purpose without legislative authority, it is competent for

[* 225] the * legislature afterwards to legalize their action if it

shall so choose.3

raise and pay commutation moneys to relieve persons drafted into the military
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service of the United States.

1 The act under which the Pennsylvania case, cited in the preceding note, wis

decided, authorized the borough to contract a debt for the payment of three

hundred dollars to each non-commissioned officer and private who might there-

after volunteer and enter the service of the United States, and be credited upon

the quota of the borough under an impending draft. The whole purpcrse, there-

fore, was to relieve the community from the threatened conscription. But in the

case of Brodhead p. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 652, it was held constitutional, not only

to provide for the future by such municipal taxation, but also to raise moneys to

pay bounties to volunteers previously enlisted, and even to those who should

thereafter procure substitutes for themselves, and "have them credited on the

municipal quota.

* Booth v. Town of Woodbury, 82 Conn. 118; Bartholomew p. Harwinton,

83 Conn. 408; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Shackford p. Newington, 46

N. H. 415; Lowell p. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247; Ahl p. Gl. im, 52 Penn. St. 432;

Weister p. Hade, ib. 474; Coffman p. Keightley, 24 Ind. 509; Board of Com-

missioners v. Brearss, 25 Ind. 110; Connor p. Fulsom, 13 Minn. 219; State v.

Demorest, 32 N. J. 528; Taylor p. Thompson, 42 111. 9; Barbour p. Camden, 51

Me. 608; Hart p. Holden, 56 Me. 572; Burnham p. Chelsea, 43 Vt. 69; Butler

p. Pultney, ib. 481. In State p. Jackson, 33 N. J. 450, a statute authorizing a

town to raise money by tax to relieve its inhabitants from the burden of a draft

under a law of Congress, was held void as tending to defeat the purpose of such

law. The decision was made by a bare majority of a bench of eleven judges.

Compare O'Hara p. Carpenter, 23 Mich. 410, in which a contract of insurance

against a military draft was held void on grounds of public policy.
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*The cases to which we have referred in the notes [* 226]

assume that, if the purpose is one for which the State

might properly levy a tax upon its citizens at large, the legislature

would also have power to apportion and impose the duty, or confer

the power of assuming it upon the towns and other municipal or

political divisions. And the rule laid down is one which opens a

broad field to legislative discretion, allowing as it does the

raising and * appropriation of moneys, whenever, in the [* 227]

somewhat extravagant words of one of the cases, there is

"the least possibility that it will be promotive in any degree of the

public welfare."1 The same rule, substantially, has been recognized

by the Court of Appeals of New York. "The legislature is not

confined in its appropriation of the public moneys, or of the sums

to be raised by taxation in favor of individuals, to cases in which

a legal demand exists against the State. It can thus recognize

claims founded in equity and justice in the largest sense of these

terms, or in gratitude or charity. Independently of express con-

stitutional restrictions, it can make appropriations of money when-

ever the public well-being requires or will be promoted by it, and

it is the judge of what is for the public good. It can, moreover,
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under the power to levy taxes, apportion the public burdens among

all the tax-paying citizens of the State, or among those of a partic-

ular section or political division."2 And where citizens have vol-

untarily advanced moneys for the purpose of paying bounties to

recruits who fill the quota of a municipal corporation, on an under-

standing, based upon informal corporate action, that the moneys

should be refunded when a law should be passed permitting it, a

subsequent act of the legislature authorizing taxation for this pur-

pose is valid.3

However broad are the terms employed in describing the legis-

lative power over taxation in these cases, it is believed that no one

of them has gone so far as to sanction taxation or the appro-

1 Booth v. Woodbury, 82 Conn. 128, per Butler, J. "To make a tax law

unconstitutional on this ground, it must be apparent at first blush that the com-

munity taxed can have no possible interest in the purpose to which their money

is to be applied." Sharpless ». Mayor, &c, 21 Penn. St. 174, following Cheaney

r. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 845.

'Guilford r. Supervisors of Chenango, 13 N. Y. 149.

* Weister t>. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 474. And see People v. Sullivan, 43 111.

418; Johnson v. Campbell, 49 111. 816. Compare Susquehanna Depot o. Barry,

61 Penn. St. 817.
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priation of the public revenue in order to refund to individuals

moneys which they may have paid to relieve themselves from an

impending draft, or may have voluntarily contributed to any public

purpose, from motives purely personal to themselves, without any

reason to rely upon the credit of the State, or of any municipal

corporation, for reimbursement, and where the circumstances are

not such as fairly to challenge the public gratitude. Taxation in

such a case, where no obligation, honorary or otherwise, rests upon

the public, would be nothing else than a naked case of appropri-

ating the property of the tax-payer for private purposes, and that

without reference to anticipated public benefits.1

1 Tyson v. School Directors, &c, 51 Penn. St. 9. A meeting of persons liable

to draft under the law of the United States was called, and an association formed,

called the Halifax Bounty Association, which levied an assessment of thirty dol-

lars on each person liable to military duty in the township, and solicited contri-

butions from others. Afterwards, an act was passed by the legislature, with

a preamble reciting that certain citizens of Halifax township, associated as the

Halifax Bounty Association, for freeing the said township from the late drafts,
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advanced moneys, which were expended in paying bounties to volunteers to fill

the quota of the township. The act then authorized and required the school

directors to borrow such sums of money as would fully reimburse the said Hali-

fax Bounty Association for moneys advanced to free said township from the

draft, and then further authorized the school directors to levy and collect a tax

to repay the sums borrowed. The court say: "We are bound to regard the

statute as an authority to reimburse what was intended by the Association as

advances made to the township with the intent or understanding to be reimbursed

or returned to those contributing. This was the light in which the learned judge

below regarded the terms used; and unless this appears in support of the present

levy by the school directors, they are acting without authority. But the learned

judge, if I properly comprehend his meaning, did not give sufficient importance

to these terms, and hence, I apprehend, he fell into error. He does not seem to

have considereil it essential whether the Association paid its money voluntarily

in aid of its own members, or expressly to aid the township in saving its people

from a draft, with the understanding that it was advanced in the character of a

loan if the legislature chose to direct its repayment, and the school directors

chose to act on the authority conferred. This we cannot agree to. Such an

enactment would not be legislation at all. It would be in the nature of judicial

action, it is true; but wanting the justice of notice to the parties to be affected

by the hearing, trial, and all that gives sanction and force to regular judicial

proceedings, it would much more resemble an imperial rescript than constitutional

legislation: first, in declaring an obligation where none was created or previously

existed; and next, in decreeing payment by directing the money or property of

the people to be sequestered to make the payment. The legislature can exercise

no such despotic functions; and as it is not apparent in the act that they at-

tempted to do so, we are not to presume that they did. They evidently intended
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* But it has been held by the Supreme Court of Massa- [* 228]

chusetts that towns might be authorized by the legislature

to raise moneys by taxation for the purpose of refunding sums

contributed by individuals to a common fund, in order to fill the

quota of such towns under a call of the President, notwithstand-

ing such moneys might have been contributed without promise or

expectation of reimbursement. The court were of opinion

that such contributions * might well be considered as ad- [* 229]

vancements to a public object, and, being such, the leg-

islature might properly recognize the obligation and permit the

towns to provide for its discharge.1

* On a preceding page we have spoken in strong terms of [* 230]

the complete control.which is possessed by the legislative

authority of the State over the municipal corporations. There are

nevertheless some limits to its power in this regard, as there are in

various other directions limits to the legislative power of the State.

Some of these are expressly denned ; others spring from the usages,

customs, and maxims of our people; they are a part of its history,

a part of the system of local self-government in view of the con-
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tinuance and perpetuity of which all our constitutions are framed,

and of the right to which the people can never be deprived except

through express renunciation on their part. One undoubted right

of the people is to choose, directly or indirectly, under the forms

and restrictions prescribed by the legislature for reasons of general

State policy, the officers of local administration, and the board that

is to make the local laws. This is a right which of late has some-

the advancements to be reimbursed to be only such as were made on the faith that

they were to be returned." See also Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Miller

c. Grandy, 13 Mich. 540; Pease v. Chicago, 21 111. 508; Ferguson v. Landraw,

5 Bush, 230; Esty v. Westminster, 97 Mass. 324; Cole v. Bedford, ib. 326;

Usher v. Colchester, 33 Conn. 667; Perkins v. Milford, 59 Me. 315; Thompson

r. Pittston, ib. 545; Kelly v. Marshall, 69 Penn. St. 319. In Freeland v. Hast-

ings, 10 Allen, 570, it was held that the legislature could not empower towns to

raise money by taxation for the purpose of refunding what had been paid by

individuals for substitutes in military service. In Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio, n. s.

38, it was held that taxes to refund bounties previously and voluntarily paid

might be authorized. See also State v. Harris, 17 Ohio, N. 8. 608. The Supreme

Court of Wisconsin, in the well-reasoned case of State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664,

deny the power of the State to compel a municipal corporation to pay bounties

where it has not voted to do so.

1 Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 585. And see Hilbish v. Leatherman, 64

Penn. St. 154, and compare Tyson v. School Directors, 61 Penn. St. 9.
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times been encroached upon under various plausible pretences, but

almost always with the result which reasonable men should have

anticipated from the experiment of a body at a distance attempting

to govern a local community of whose affairs or needs they could

know but little, except as they should derive information from

sources likely to have interested reasons for misleading.1 Another

is the right of the local community to determine what pecuniary

burdens it shall take upon its shoulders. But here from the very

nature of the case there must be some limitations. The munici-

palities do not exist wholly for the benefit of their corporators, but

as a part of the machinery of State government, and they cannot

be permitted to decline a performance of their duties or a discharge

of their obligations as such. They cannot abolish local govern-

ment; they cannot refuse to provide the conveniences for its

administration; they cannot decline to raise the necessary taxes

for the purpose; they cannot repudiate pecuniary obligations that

justly rest upon them as a local government. Over these matters

the legislature of the State must have control, or confusion would
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inevitably be introduced into the whole system. But beyond this

it is not often legitimate for the State to go except in moulding and

shaping the local powers, and perhaps permitting the local authorities

to do certain things for the benefit of their citizens which under

the general grants of power would be inadmissible.

On this general subject we shall venture to lay down the follow-

ing propositions as the result of the authorities: —

1 On this subject reference is made to what is said by Campbell, Ch. J., in

People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 87 et seq. See also p. 97. Much has been said

concerning the necessity of legislative interference in some cases where bad men

were coming into power through universal suffrage in cities, but the recent expe-

rience of the country shows that this has oftener been said to pave the way for

bad men to obtain office or grants of unusual powers from the legislature than

with any purpose to effect local reforms. And the great municipal scandals and

frauds that have prevailed, like those which were so notorious in New York City,

have been made possible and then nursed and fostered by illegitimate interference

at the seat of State government. Some officers, usually of local appointment,

are undoubtedly to be regarded as state officers whose choice may be confided to

a state authority without any invasion of local right; such as militia officers,

officers of police, and those who have charge of the execution of the criminal

laws; but those who are to administer the corporate funds and have the control

of the corporate property, those who make the local laws and those who execute

them, cannot rightfully be chosen by the central authority. Dillon, Mun. Corp.

§ 83. See People v. Com. Council of Detroit, Sup. Court of Mich. Oct. Term, 1873.
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1. That the legislature has undoubted power to compel the

municipal bodies to perform their functions as local governments

under their charters, and to recognize, meet, and discharge the

duties and obligations properly resting upon them as such, whether

they be legal, or merely equitable or moral; and for this purpose

it may require them to exercise the power of taxation whenever

and wherever it may be deemed necessary or expedient.1

2. That in some cases, in view of the twofold character of such

bodies, as being on the one hand agencies of State government,

and on the other, corporations endowed with capacities and per-

mitted to hold property and enjoy peculiar privileges for the ben-

efit of their corporators exclusively, the legislature may permit the

incurring of expense, the contracting of obligations, and the levy of

taxes which are unusual, and which would not be admissible under

the powers usually conferred. Instances of the kind may be men-

tioned in the offer of military bounties, and the payment of a dis-

1 In support of this, we refer to the very strong case of Guilford v. Supervisors

of Chenango, 18 Barb. 615^ s. c. 13 N. Y. 143; where a town was compelled

by the legislative authority of the State to reimburse its officers the expenses
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incurred by them in the honest but mistaken endeavor to discharge what they

believed to be their duty; also to Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 530, in which it is

said by Crocket, J., that: "It is established by an overwhelming weight of au-

thority, and I believe is conceded on all sides, that the legislature has the consti-

tutional power to direct and control the affairs and property of a municipal

corporation for municipal purposes, provided it does not impair the obligation

of a contract, and by appropriate legislation may so control its affairs as ulti-

mately to compel it, out of the funds in its treasury, or by taxation to be imposed

for that purpose, to pay a demand when properly established, which in good

conscience it ought to pay, even though there be no legal liability to pay it"

(citing Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Beals v. Almador Co., 35 Cal. 624;

People v. Supervisors of San Francisco, 11 Cal. 206; Sharp v. Contra Costa

Co., 34 Cal. 284; People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432; People v. Alameda, 26 Cal.

641, and holding that a city might be compelled to pay the claim of persons who

bad acted as commissioners in the extension of certain of its streets); also to

Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Penn. St. 374, in which the legislature as-

sumed the right of apportioning the indebtedness of a town among the boroughs

carved out of it; supported by Layton p. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515; People

p. Alameda, 26 Cal. 641; and Burns v. Clarion County, 62 Penn. St. 423; also to

People p. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401, in which the legislative power to direct the con-

struction of a public road, and to compel the creation of a town debt for the pur-

pose, was fully sustained; to People v. Power, 25 1ll. 187; Waterville v. County

Commissioners, 59 Me. 80; and to numerous other cases cited ante, p. 193, note,

and which we will not occupy space by repeating here.
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proportionate share of a State burden in consideration of peculi

local benefits which are to spring from it.1

[* 231] * 3. But it is believed the legislature has no power, against

the will of a municipal corporation, to compel it to contract

debts for local purposes in which the State has no concern or to

assume obligations not within the ordinary functions of municipal

government. Such matters are to be disposed of in view of the in-

terests of the corporators exclusively, and they have the same right

to determine them for themselves which the associates in private

corporations have to determine for themselves the questions which

arise for their corporate action. The State in such cases may re-

move restrictions and permit action, but it cannot compel it.2

1 The subject of military bounties has been sufficiently referred to already.

As to the right to permit a municipal corporation to burden itself with a local

tax for a State object, we refer to Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen, 500; Marks t.

Trustees of Pardue University, 87 Ind. 155; Hasbrouck ». Milwaukee, 13 Wis.

37. The first was a case in which, in consideration of the local benefits ex-

pected from the location of the State agricultural college in a certain town, the
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town was permitted to levy a large local tax in addition to its proportion of the

State burden for the erection of the necessary buildings. The second case

was of a similar nature. The third was the case of permission to levy a city tax

to improve the city harbor; a work usually done by the general government.

There are cases which go further than these, and hold that the legislature may

compel a municipal corporation to do what it may thus permit. Thus, in Kirby

v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 258, it appeared that by an act of April 3, 1848, the com-

missioners of Bradford County were required to add $500 annually, until 1857,

to the usual county rates and levies of the borough of Towanda in said county,

for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the court house and jail, then in

process of erection in that borough. The act was held constitutional on the

principle of assessment of benefits. In Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 608, a law

was sustained which " authorized and required" the village of Brockport to levy

a tax for the erection of a State normal school building at that place. It is to

be said of this case, however, that there was to be in the building a grammar

school free to all the children of proper acquirements in the village; so that the

village was to receive a peculiar and direct benefit from it, besides those which

would be merely incidental to the location of the normal school in the place.

But for this circumstance it would be distinctly in conflict with State v. Haben,

22 Wis. 660, where it was held incompetent for the legislature to appropriate

the school moneys of a city to the purchase of a site for a State normal school;

and also with other cases yited in the next note. It must be conceded, however,

that there are other cases which support it

8 There are undoubtedly some cases which go to the extent of holding that

municipal corporations and organizations are so completely under the legislative

control, that whatever the legislature may permit them to do, it may compel them
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xalir * 4. And there is much good reason for assenting also [* 232]

to what several respectable authorities have held, that where

to do, whether the corporators are willing or not. A leading case is Thomas v.

Leland, 24 Wend. 67. In that case it appeared that certain citizens of Utica

had given their bond to the people of the State of New York, conditioned for

the payment into the canal fund of the sum of $38,615, the estimated difference

between the cost of connecting the Chenango Canal with the Erie at Utica,

instead of at Wbitesborough, as the canal commissioners bad contemplated;

and it was held within the constitutional powers of the legislature to require this

sum to be assessed upon the taxable property of the city of Utica, supposed to

be benefited by the canal connection. The court treat the case as "the ordinary

one of local taxation to make or improve a public highway," and dismiss it with

few words. If it could be considered as merely a case of the apportionment

between a number of municipalities of the expense of a public highway running

through them, it would have the support of Waterville v. County Commission-

ers, 59 Me. 80; Commonwealth r. Newburyport, 103 Mass. 129; and also what

is said in Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 503, where it is admitted that

over the matter of the construction of such a highway, as well as the apportion-

ment of expense, the State authority must necessarily be complete. • It has been
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considered in subsequent New York cases as a case of apportionment merely.

See People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 437; Howell v. Buffalo, 37 N. Y. 271. The

cases of Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 258, and Gordon ». Comes, 47 N. Y. 608,

referred to in the preceding note, it will be perceived, were also treated as cases

merely of apportionment. How that can be called a case of apportionment,

however, which singles out a particular town, and taxes it for benefits to be

expected from a highway running across the State, without doing the same by

any other town in the State, it is not easy to perceive. In Commissioners of

Revenue v. The State, 45 Ala. 399, it appeared that the legislature had created

a local board consisting of the president of the county commissioners of revenue

of Mobile County, the mayor of Mobile, the president of the Bank of Mobile,

the president of the Mobile Chamber of Commerce, and one citizen of Mobile

appointed by the governor, as a board for the improvement of the river, harbor,

and bay of Mobile, and required the commissioners of revenue of Mobile County

to issue to tbem for that purpose county bonds to the amount of $1,000,000,

and to levy a tax to pay them. Here was an appointment by the State of local

officers to make at the expense of the locality an improvement which it has been

customary for the general government to take in charge as one of national con-

cern; but the Supreme Court of the State sustained the act, going farther, as

we think, in doing so, than has been gone in any other case. In Hasbrouck v.

Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37, approved and defended in an able opinion in Mills

c. Charleton, 29 Wis. 413, the power of the legislature to compel the city of

Milwaukee to issue bonds or levy a tax for the improvement of its harbor was

distinctly denied, though it was conceded that permission might be given, which

the city could lawfully act upon. Compare also Knapp v. Grant, 27 Wis. 147;

State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664; Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226. In People v.

Bacbeller, recently decided in the Supreme Court of Appeals of New York, that
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a demand is asserted against a municipality, though of a nature I

that the legislature would have a right to require it to incur and

court, through an able and lucid opinion by Grover, J., denied the validity of a

mandatory statute compelling a town to take stock in a railroad corporation,'

and to issue its bonds in exchange therefor. The authority to permit the town

to do this was not discussed, but, taking that as admitted, it is declared that

municipal corporations, in the making or refusing to make arrangements of the

nature of that attempted to be forced upon the town in question, were entitled

to the same freedom of action precisely which individual citizens might claim.

This opinion reviews the prior decisions in the same State, and finds nothing

conflicting with the views expressed. In People v. Mayor, &c, of Chicago, 51

111. 17; 8. c. 2 Am. Rep. 278, it was denied, in an opinion of great force and

ability delivered by Chief Justice Breese, that the State could empower a board

of park commissioners of State appointment to contract a debt for the city of

Chicago for the purposes of a public park for that city, and without the consent

of its citizens. The learned judge says (p. 31): "Whilst it is conceded that

municipal corporations, which exist only for public purposes, are subject at all

times to the control of the legislature creating them, and have in their franchises

no vested rights, and whose powers and privileges the creating power may alter,
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modify, or abolish at pleasure, as they are but parts of the machinery employed

to carry on the affairs of the State, over which and their rights and effects the

State may exercise a general superintendence and control, — Richland County c.

Lawrence County, 12 III. 8; Trustees of Schools v. Talman, 13 to. 30,—we

are not of the opinion that that power, vast as it is, can be so used as to compel

any one of our many cities to issue its bonds against its will to erect a park, or

for any other improvement, to force it to create a debt of millions; in effect,

to compel every property-owner in the city to give his bond to pay a debt thus

forced upon the city. It will hardly be contended that the legislature can com-

pel a holder of property in Chicago to execute his individual bond as security

for the payment of a debt so ordered to be contracted. A city is made up of

individuals owning property within its limits, the lots and blocks which compose

it, and the structures which adorn them. What would be the universal judg-

ment, should the legislature, sua sponte, project magnificent and costly structures

within one of our cities, — triumphal arches, splendid columns, and perpetual

fountains, — and require in the act creating them that every owner of property

within the city limits should give his individual obligation for his proportion of

the cost, and impose such cost as a lien upon his property for ever. What

would be the public judgment of such an act, and wherein would it differ from

the act under consideration?" And again: "Here, then, is a case where taxes

may be assessed, not by any corporate authority of the city, but by commission-

ers, to whom is entrusted the erection, embellishment, and control of this park,

and this without consent of the property-owners.

"We do not think it within the constitutional competency of the legislature to

delegate this power to these commissioners. If the principle be admitted that

the legislature can, uninvited, of their mere will, impose such a burden as this

upon the city of Chicago, then one much heavier and more onerous can be
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* discharge, yet if its legal and equitable obligation is dis- [• 233]

puted, the corporation has the right to have the dispute

settled by the courts, and cannot be bound by a legislative allow-

ance of the claim.1

imposed; in short, no limit can be assigned to legislative power in this regard.

If this power is possessed, then it must be conceded that the property of every

citizen within it is held at the pleasure and will of the legislature. Can it be that

the General Assembly of the State, just and honest as its members may be, is

the depository of the rights of property of the citizens? Would there be any

sufficient security for property if such a power was conceded? No well-regu-

lated mind can entertain the idea that it is within the constitutional competency

of the legislature to subject the earnings of any portion of our people to the

hazards of any such legislation."

This case should be read in connection with the following in the same State,

and all in the same direction. People ». Common Council of Chicago, 51 111. 58;

Lovingston v. Wider, 53 111. 302; People v. Canty, 55 111. 33; Wider v. East

St. Louis, ib. 133. Also People v. Common Council of Detroit, Sup. Court of

Michigan, Oct. Term, 1873.
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We are constrained to think the recent case of People v. Bacheller above

referred to is inconsistent with the previous case of Thomas v. Lcland in the

same State, and therefore overrules it. And putting that case aside, as well as a

few other cases which were decided on the ground of an apportionment of local

benefits, we think the case in Alabama will stand substantially alone. Before

that decision the Supreme Court of Illinois were able to say, in a case calling for

a careful and thorough examination of the authorities, that counsel had "failed

to find a case wherein it has been held that the legislature can compel a city

against its will to incur a debt by the issue of its bonds for a local improvement."

People v. Mayor, &c, 51 El. 33.

1 It was held in People v. Hawes, 37 Barb. 440, that the legislature had no

right to direct a municipal corporation to satisfy a claim made against it for dam-

ages for breach of contract, out of the funds or property of such corporation.

In citing the cases of Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 13 N. Y. 143,

and People o. Supervisors of New York, 11 Abb. 114, a distinction is drawn

by which the cases are supposed to be reconciled with the one then under

decision. "Those cases and many others," say the court, p. 455, "related not

to the right or power of the legislature to compel an individual or corporation to

pay a debt or claim, but to the power of the legislature to raise money by tax,

and apply such money, when so raised, to the payment thereof. We could not,

under the decisions of the courts on this point, made in these and other cases,

now hold that the legislature had not authority to impose a tax to pay any claim,

or to pay it out of the State treasury; and for this purpose to impose a tax upon

the property of the State, or upon any portion of the State. This was fully set-

tled in People v. Mayor, &c.,"of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; but neither that case nor

the case in 13 N. Y. 143, in any manner gave a warrant for the opinion, that the

legislature had a right to direct a municipal corporation to pay a claim for dam-

ages for breach of a contract, out of the funds or property of the corporation,
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Having concisely stated these general views, we r

[• 234] merely, that "those cases which hold that the S&i/i may

raise bounty moneys by taxation, to be paid to persons in

the military service, we think stand by themselves, and are sup-

ported by different principles from any which can fairly be sum-

moned to the aid of some of the other cases which we have cited.

The burden of the public defence unquestionably rests upon the

whole community; and the legislature may properly pro-

[* 235] vide for its apportionment and * discharge in such manner

as its wisdom may prescribe. But those cases which hold

it competent for the legislature to give its consent to a municipal

corporation engaging in works of public improvement outside its

territorial limits, and becoming a stockholder in a private corpora-

tion, must be conceded on all hands to have gone to the very lim-

without a submission of such claim to a judicial tribunal." If by this is meant

that the legislature has power to compel a corporation to tax its citizens for the

payment of a demand, but has not the authority to make it a charge against the

corporation in any other mode, the distinction seems to be one of form rather
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than of substance. It is no protection to the rights or property of a municipal

corporation to hold that the legislature cannot determine upon a claim against it,

if at the same time the corporation may be compelled by statute to assume and

discharge the obligation through the levy of a tax for its satisfaction. But if it is

only meant to declare that the legislature cannot adjudicate upon disputed claims,

there can be no good reason to find fault with the decision. It is one thing to

determine that the nature of a claim is such as to make it proper to satisfy it by

taxation, and another to adjudge how much is justly due upon it. The one is

the exercise or legislative power, the other of judicial. See Sanborn v. Rice, 9

Minn. 273; Commonwealth p. Pittsburgh, 34 Penn. St. 496; Plimpton v. Som-

erset, 33 Vt. 283. But the power to decide upon the breach of a contract by a

corporation, and the extent of the damages which have resulted, is less objec-

tionable and less likely to lead to oppression, than the power to impose through

taxation a claim upon a corporation which it never was concerned in creating,

against which it protests, and which is unconnected with the ordinary functions

and purposes of municipal government. In Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52

Penn. St. 374, a decision was made which seems to conflict with that in People

v. Hawes, supra; and with the subsequent case of Baldwin v. Mayor, &c, of

New York, 42 Barb. 549. The Pennsylvania court decided that the constitu-

tional guaranty of the right to jury trial had no application to municipal corpora-

tions, and a commission might be created by the legislature to adjust the demands

between them. See, also, Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515. In People

p. Power, 25 111. 187, it was held competent for the legislature to apportion the

taxes collected in a county between a city therein and the remainder of the

county, and that the county revenues " must necessarily be within the control of

the legislature for political purposes."
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its of constitutional power in this direction; and to hold that the

legislature may go even further, and, under its power to control

the taxation of the political divisions and organizations of the

State, may compel them, without the consent of their citizens, to

raise money for such or any other unusual purposes, or to contract

debts therefor, seems to us to be introducing new principles into

our system of local self-government, and to be sanctioning a cen-

tralization of power not within the contemplation of the makers of

the American constitutions. We think where any such forced tax-

ation is resisted by the municipal organization, it will be very diffi-

cult to defend it as a proper exercise of legislative authority in a

government where power is distributed on the principles which

prevail here.

Legislative Control of Corporate Property.

The legislative power of the State controls and disposes of the

property of the State. How far it may also control and dispose

of the property of those agencies of government which it has cre-

ated and endowed with corporate powers is a question which hap-

pily there has been very little occasion to discuss in the courts.

Being created as an agency of government, it is evident that the
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municipality cannot in itself have that complete and absolute con-

trol and power of disposition of its property which is possessed by

natural persons and private corporations in respect to their several

possessions. For it can hold and own property only for corporate

purposes, and its powers are liable at any time to be so modified

by legislation as to render the property no longer available. More-

over, the charter rights may Ire altogether taken away; and in that

case the legislature has deprived the corporation of its property

by depriving it of corporate capacity to hold it. And in many

ways, while the corporation holds and enjoys property, the legislat-

ure must possess power to interfere with its control, at least inci-

dentally; for the mere fact that the corporation possesses property

cannot deprive the State of its complete authority to mould

and change* the corporate organization, and enlarge or [* 236]

diminish its powers, which it possessed before. But whether

the State can directly intervene and take away the corporate prop-

erty, or convert it to other uses than those for which it was pro-

cured, or whether, on repealing a charter of incorporation, it can
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take to itself the corporate property, and dispose of it at its dis- A

cretion, are different questions from any raised by the indirect and m

incidental interference referred to.

In the leading case, in which it was decided by the Supreme I

Court of the United States that a private charter of incorpora-

tion, granted by a State, was a contract between the State and

the corporators, not subject to modification or repeal, except in

pursuance of a right expressly reserved, but that the charter of a

municipal corporation was not such a contract, it was at the same

time declared, as the opinion of the judges, that the legislature

could not deprive such municipal corporations of their vested

rights in property. "It may be admitted," says one of the judges,

"that corporations for mere public government, such as towns,

cities, and counties, may in many respects be subject to legisla-

tive control. But it will hardly be contended, that even in respect

to such corporations the legislative power is so transcendent that

it may, at its will, take away the private property of the corpo-

ration, or change the uses of its private funds acquired under the
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public faith. Can the legislature confiscate to its own use the pri-

vate funds which a municipal corporation holds under its charter,

without any default or consent of the corporators? If a mu-

nicipal corporation be capable of holding devises and legacies

to charitable uses, as many municipal corporations are, does the

legislature, under our forms of limited government, possess the

authority to seize upon those funds and appropriate them to other

uses, at its own arbitrary pleasure, against the will of the donors

and donees? From the very nature of our government, the pub-

lic faith is pledged the other way, and that pledge constitutes

a valid compact; and that compact is subject only to judicial

inquiry, construction, and abrogation." 1 "The government lias

no power to revoke a grant, even of its own funds, when given to

a private person or corporation for special uses. It cannot recall

its own endowments, granted to any hospital or college, or

[* 237] city or town', for the use of such corporations. * The only

authority remaining to the government is judicial, to ascer-

tain the validity of the grant, to enforce its proper uses, to sup-

press frauds, and, if the uses are charitable, to secure their regular

1 Story, J., in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 694, 695.

[ 268 ]

CH. TBI.] THE GRADES OP MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. * 237

administration through the means of equitable tribunals, in cases

where there would otherwise be a failure of justice." 1

"In respect to public corporations," says another judge,

"which exist only for public purposes, such as towns, cities, &c, .

the legislature may, under proper limitations, change, modify,

enlarge, or restrain them, securing, however, the property for the

use of those for whom and at whose expense it was purchased."2

These views had been acted upon by the same court in preceding

cases.3 They draw a distinction between the political rights and

privileges conferred on corporations, and which are not vested

rights in any sense implying constitutional permanency, and

such rights in property as the corporation acquires, and which

in the view of these decisions are protected by the same reasons

which shield similar rights in individuals.4

When the municipal divisions of the territory of the State are

changed in their boundaries, two or more consolidated in one,

or one subdivided, it is conceded that the legislature possesses

the power to make such disposition of the corporate property as

natural equity would require in view of the altered condition of

things. The fact that a portion of the citizens, before entitled to
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the benefits springing from the use of specific property for public

purposes, will now be deprived of that benefit, cannot affect the

validity of the legislative act, which is supposed in some other

1 Story, J., in Dartmouth College r. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 698.

* Washington, J., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 663.

* Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Town of Pawlet v. Clark, ib. 292. See

also State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 660, referred to, ante, 230-31 note. In People v.

Common Council of Detroit, Sup. Court of Michigan, Oct. Term, 1873, this sub-

ject was largely considered, and the court denied the right of the State to compel

a municipal corporation to contract a debt for a mere local object; for example,

a city park.

4 " It is an unsound and even absurd proposition that political power conferred

by the legislature can become a vested right, as against the government, in any

individual or body of men. It is repugnant to the genius of our institutions,

and the spirit and meaning of the Constitution; for by that fundamental law, all

political rights not there defined and taken out of the exercise of legislative dis-

cretion were intended to be left subject to its regulation. If corporations can

set up a vested right as against the government to the exercise of this species of

power, because it has been conferred upon them by the bounty of the legislature,

w may any and every officer under the government do the same." Nelson, J., in

People c. Morris, 13 Wend. 331. And see Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 532;

Benson v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 10 Barb. 244.
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way to compensate them for the incidental loss.1 And ir

[* 238] many * other cases the legislature properly exercises

similar power of control in respect to the corpora/f^rop-

erty, and may direct its partition and appropriation, in order to

accommodate most justly and effectually, in view of new circum-

stances, the purposes for which it was acquired.

The rule upon the subject we take to be this: when corporate

powers are conferred, there is an implied compact between the

State and the corporators that the property which they are

given the capacity to acquire for corporate purposes under their

charter shall not be taken from them and appropriated to other

uses.2 If the State grants property to the corporation, the grant

is an executed contract, which cannot be revoked. The rights

acquired, either by such grants or by any other legitimate mode

in which such a corporation cau acquire property, are vested

rights, and cannot be taken away. Nevertheless if the corporate

powers should be repealed, the corporate ownership would neces-

sarily cease, and even when not repealed, a modification of those

powers, or a change in corporate bounds, might seriously affect, if
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not altogether divest, the rights of individual corporators, so far

as they can be said to have any rights in public property. And

in other ways, incidentally as well as by direct intervention, the

State may exercise authority and control over the disposition

and use of corporate property, according to the legislative view of

what is proper for tlie public interest and just to the corporators,

subject only — as we think — to this restriction, that the purpose

for which the property was originally acquired shall be kept in

view, so far as the circumstances will admit, in any disposition

that may be made of it.3

1 Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 533. And see ante, 232-234, notes.

1 If land is dedicated as a public square, and accepted as such, a law devoting

it to other uses is void, because violating the obligation of contracts. Warren

v. Lyons City, 22 Iowa, 351. As there was no attempt in that case to appro-

priate the land to such other uses under the right of eminent domain, the ques-

tion of the power to do so was not considered.

* "That the State may make a contract with, or a grant to, a public municipal

corporation, which it could not subsequently impair or resume, is not denied; but

in such a case the corporation is to be regarded as a private company. A grant

may be made to a public corporation for purposes of private advantage; and

although the public may also derive a common benefit therefrom, yet the corpora-

tion stands on the same footing, as respects such grant, as would any body of per-

[ 270 ]

jr. Vm.] THE GRADES OP MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. * 239

TV

* This restriction is not the less applicable where corpo- [* 239]

rate powers are abolished than it is in other cases; and

=ons upon whom like privileges were conferred. Public or municipal corporations,

however, which exist only for public purposes, and possess no powers except such

as are bestowed upon them for public political purposes, are subject at all times to

the control of the legislature, which may alter, modify, or abolish them at pleas-

ure." Trumbull, J., in Richland County v. Lawrence County, 12 1ll. 8. "Pub-

lic corporations are but parts of the machinery employed in carrying on the

affairs of the State; and they are subject to be changed, modified, or destroyed,

as the exigencies of the public may demand. The State may exercise a general

superintendence and control over them and their rights and effects, so that their

property is not diverted from the uses and objects for which it was given or pur-

chased/1 Trustees of Schools v. Tatman, 13 1ll. 30, per Treat, Ch. J. And see

Harrison p. Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 27 Vt. 704;

Same v. Same, 29 Vt. 19; Benson v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 10 Barb. 223. See

also City of Louisville v. University, 15 B. Monp. 642. In State v. St. Louis County

Court, 34 Mo. 572, the following remarks are made by the court, in considering

the cause shown by the county in answer to an application to compel it to meet

a requisition for the police board of St. Louis: "As to the second cause shown'
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in the return, it is understood to mean, not that there is in fact no money in the

treasury to pay this requisition, but that as a matter of law all the money which

is in the treasury was collected for specific purposes from which it cannot be

diverted. The specific purposes for which the money was collected were those

heretofore directed by the legislature; and this act, being a later expression of the

will of the legislature, controls the subject, and so far as it conflicts with previous

acts repeals them. The county is not a private corporation, but an agency of

the State government; and though as a public corporation it holds property, such

holding is subject to a large extent to the will of the legislature. Whilst the

legislature cannot take away from a county its property, it has full power to

direct the mode in which the property shall be used for the benefit of the county."

Compare People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 433. In Darlington v. New York, 31

N. Y. 1134, the complete control of the legislature over the corporate property

of cities was asserted, and it was held competent to subject the city to liability for

property destroyed by a riot. It will be observed that the strong expression of

legislative power is generally to be found in cases where the thing actually done

was dearly and unquestionably competent. In Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 233,

this language is used: "The agents of the corporation can sell or dispose of the

properiy of the corporation only in the way and according to the order of the

legislature; and therefore the legislature may by law operating immediately upon

the subject dispose of this property, or give effect to any previous disposition or

attempted disposition. The property itself is a trust, and the legislature is the

prime and controlling power, managing and directing the use, disposition, and

direction of it." Quoted and approved in San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal.

558. These strong and general expressions should be compared with what is said

in Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590, in which the right of municipal corpo-

rations to constitutional protection in their property is asserted fully. The same
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whatever might be the nature of the public property •which tl^

corporation had acquired, and whatever the purpose of the acqui-

sition, the legislature, when by taking away the corporate authority

it became vested with the control of the property, would be under

obligation to dispose of it in such manner as to give the original

corporators the benefit thereof, by putting it to the use designed,

if still practicable, or to some kindred or equally beneficial use

having reference to the altered condition of things. The obliga-

tion is one which, from the very nature of the case, must rest for

its enforcement in great measure upon the legislative good faith

and sense of justice; and it could only be in those cases where

there had been a clear disregard of the rights of the original cor-

porators, in the use attempted to be made of the property, that

relief could be had through judicial action.

No such restriction, however, can rest upon the legislature in

regard to the rights and privileges which the State grants to

municipal corporations in the nature of franchises, and which are

granted only as aids or conveniences to the municipality in effect-

ing the purposes of its incorporation. These, like the corporate

powers, must be understood to be granted during pleasure.1
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right is asserted in People v. Baclieller, lately decided in the Court of Appeals

of New York; People v. Major, &c., of Chicago, 51 111. 17; People v. Tappan,

29 Wis. 664; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, and very many others. See

Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 39 et seq., and cases referred to in notes. And see Hewison

v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 483, as to the distinction between the public or govern-

mental character of municipal corporations, and their private character as re-

spects the ownership and management of their own property.

1 East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 635. On this subject, see

c. 9, post. The case of Trustees of Aberdeen Academy r. Mayor, &c, of Aber-

deen, 13 S. & M. 645, appears to be contra. By the charter of the town of

Aberdeen in 1837, the legislature granted to it the sole power to grant licenses

to sell vinous and spirituous liquors withiu the corporate limits thereof, and to

appropriate the money arising therefrom to city purposes. In 1848 an act was

passed giving these moneys to the Aberdeen Female. Academy. The act was

held void, on the ground that the original grant was of a franchise which consti-

tuted property, and it could not be transferred to another, though it might be

repealed. The case cites Bailey v. Mayor, &c, 3 Hill, 541, and St. Louis e. Rus-

sell, 9 Mo. 507, which seem to have little relevancy. Also, 4 Wheat. 663, 698,

699; and 2 Kent, 305, note, for the general rule protecting municipal corpora-

tions in their vested rights to property. The case of Benson v. Mayor, &c, of

New York, 10 Barb. 223, also holds the grant of a ferry franchise to a municipal

corporation to be irrevocable, but the authorities generally will not sustain this

view. See post, p. 283, and note,
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• Toivns and Counties. [* 240]

•

Thus far we have been considering general rules, applicable

to all classes of municipal organizations possessed of corporate

powers, and by which these powers may be measured, or the

duties which they impose defined. In regard to some of these

organizations, however, there are other and peculiar rules which

require separate mention. Some of them are so feebly endowed

with corporate life, and so much hampered, controlled, and directed

in the exercise of the functions which are conferred upon them,

that they are sometimes spoken of as nondescript in character, and

as occupying a position somewhere between that of a corporation

and a mere voluntary association of citizens. Counties, townships,

school districts, and road districts do not usually possess corporate

powers under special charters; but they exist under general laws

of the State, which apportion the territory of the State into polit-

ical divisions for convenience of government, and require of the

people residing within those divisions the performance of certain

public duties as a part of the machinery of the State; and, in

order that they may be able to perform these duties, vest them
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with certain corporate powers. Whether they shall assume those

duties or exercise those powers, the people of the political divisions

are not allowed the privilege of choice; the legislature assumes this

division of the State to be essential in republican government, and

the duties are imposed as a part of the proper and necessary burden

which the citizens must bear in maintaining and perpetuating

constitutional liberty.1 Usually their functions are wholly of a

public nature, and there is no room to imply any contract between

them and the State, in their organization as corporate bodies, ex-

cept that which springs from the ordinary rules of good faith, and

which requires that the property they shall acquire, by local taxation

or otherwise, for the purposes of their organization, shall

not be seized by the State, and appropriated * in other [* 241]

ways. They are, therefore, sometimes called quasi corpo-

rations,2 to distinguish them from the corporations in general,

1 Granger ». Pulaski County, 26 Ark. 37; Scales v. Chatahoochee County,

« Geo. 225.

! Riddle v. Proprietors, &c, 7 Mass. 186, 187; School District v. Wood, 13

Mas«. 192; Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Greenl. 361; Denton v. Jackson, 2
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1

which possess more completely the functions of an artificici' entity.

Chief Justice Parker, of Massachusetts, in speaking of school dis-

tricts, has said: "That they are not bodies politic and corporate,

with the general powers of corporations, must be admitted; and

the reasoning advanced to show their defect of power is conclusive.

The same may be said of towns and other municipal societies;

which although recognized by various statutes, and by immemo-

rial usage, as persons or aggregate corporations, with precise duties

which may be enforced, and privileges which may be maintained

by suits at law, yet are deficient in many of the powers incident to

the general character of corporations. They may be considered,

under our institutions, as quasi corporations, witli limited powers,

co-extensive with the duties imposed upon them by statute or usage,

but restrained from the general use of authority which belougs to

these metaphysical persons by the common law. The same may

be said of all the numerous corporations which have been from time

to time created by various acts of the legislature; all of them

enjoying the power which is expressly bestowed upon them, and

perhaps, in all instances where the act is silent, possessing, by
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necessary implication, the authority which is requisite to execute

the purposes of their creation." "It will not do to apply the strict

principles of law respecting corporations in all cases to these

aggregate bodies which are created by statute in this Common-

wealth. By the several statutes which have been passed respecting

school districts, it is manifest that the legislature has supposed

that a division of towns, for the purpose of maintaining schools, will

promote the important object of general education ; and this valua-

ble object of legislative care seems to require, in construing their

acts, that a liberal view should be had to the end to be effected." 1

Following out this view, the courts of the New England States have

held, that when judgments are recovered against towns, parishes,

and school districts, any of the property of private owners

[* 242] within * the municipal division is liable to be taken for

their discharge. The reasons for this doctrine, and the

custom upon which it is founded, are thus stated by the Supreme

Court of Connecticut: —

Johns. Ch. 325; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 367; Eastman v. Meredith, 36

N. H. 296; Hopple v. Brown, 13 Ohio, n. s. 311; Commissioners of Hamilton

Co. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio, N. s. 109; Ray County v. Bentley, 49 Mo. 236.

1 School District p. Wood, 13 Mass. 192.
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V

"We know that the relation in which the members of munic-

ipal corporations in this State have been supposed to stand, in

respect to the corporation itself, as well as to its creditors, has

elsewhere been considered in some respects peculiar. We have

treated them, for some purposes, as parties to corporate proceed-

ings, and their individuality has not been considered as merged in

their corporate connection. Though corporators, they have been

holden to be parties to suits by or against the corporation, and

individually liable for its debts. Heretofore this has not been

doubted as to the inhabitants of towns, located ecclesiastical

societies, and school districts.

"From a recurrence to a history of the law on this subject, we

are persuaded that the principle and usage here recognized and

followed, in regard to the liability of the inhabitants of towns and

communities, were very early adopted by our ancestors. And

whether they were considered as a part of the common law of

England, or originated here, as necessary to our state of society,

it is not very material to inquire. We think, however, that the

principle is not of domestic origin, but to some extent was
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operative and applied in the mother country, especially in cases

where a statute fixed a liability upon a municipality which had

no corporate funds. The same reason and necessity for the appli-

cation of such a principle and practice existed in both countries.

Such corporations are of a public and political character; they

exercise a portion of the governing power of the State. Statutes

impose upon them important public duties. In the performance

of these, they must contract debts and liabilities, which can only

be discharged by a resort to individuals, either by taxation or

execution. Taxation, in most cases, can only be the result of the

voluntary action of the corporation, dependent upon the contingent

will of the majority of the corporators, and upon their tardy and

uncertain action. It affords no security to creditors, because they

have no power over it. Such reasons as these probably operated

with our ancestors in adopting the more efficient and certain rem-

edy by execution, which has been resorted to in the present case,

and which they had seen to some extent in operation in the country

whose laws were their inheritance.

*" The plaintiff would apply to these municipal or [* 243]

qumi corporations the close principles applicable to private

corporations. But inasmuch as they are not, strictly speaking,
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corporations, but only municipal bodies, without pecuniary funds,

it will not do to apply to them literally, and in all cases, the law of

corporations.1

"The individual liability of the members of quasi corporations,

though not expressly adjudged, was very distinctly recognized in

the case of Russell v. The Men of Devon.2 It was alluded to as a

known principle in the case of the Attorney-General v. The City of

Exeter,3 applicable as well to cities as to hundreds and parishes.

That the rated inhabitants of an English parish are considered as

the real parties to suits against the parish is now supposed to be

well settled ; and so it was decided in the case of The Kiug v. The

Inhabitants of Woburn,4 and The King v. The Inhabitants of Hard-

wick.5 And, in support of this principle, reference was made to

the form of the proceedings; as that they are entitled ' against the

inhabitants,' etc.

"In the State of Massachusetts, from whose early institutions

we have borrowed many valuable specimens, the individual re-

sponsibility of the inhabitants of towns for town debts has long

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

been established. Distinguished counsel in the case of the Mer-

chants Bank v. Cook,6 referring to municipal bodies, say: 'For a

century past the practical construction of the bar has been that, in

an action by or against a corporation, a member of the corpo-

ration is a party in the suit.' In several other cases in that State

the same principle is repeated. In the case of Riddle v. The Pro-

prietors of the. Locks and Canals en Merrimack River,7 Parsons,

Ch. J., in an allusion to this private responsibility of corporators,

remarks: 'And the sound reason is, that having no corporate

fund, and no legal means of obtaining one, each corporator is

liable to satisfy any judgment obtained against the corporation.'

So in Brewer v. Inhabitants of New Gloucester,3 the court say:

'As the law provides that, when judgment is recovered against the

inhabitants of a town, execution may be levied upon the property

of any inhabitant, each inhabitant must be considered as a party.'

In the case before referred to of the Merchants Bank v.

[* 241] Cook, "Parker, Ch. J., expresses the opinion of the court

upon this point thus: 'Towns, parishes, precincts, lfec,

1 School District p. Wood, 13 Mass. 192.

3 2 Russ. 45. 4 10 East, 395.

• 4 Pick. 405. • 7 7 Mass. 187.

* 2 Term Rep. 660.

• 11 East, 577.

"14 Mass. 216.
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are but a collection of individuals, witli certain corporate powers

for political and civil purposes, without any corporate fund, from

which a judgment can be satisfied; but each member of the com-

munity is liable, in his person and estate, to the execution which

may issue against the body ; each individual, therefore, may be

well thought to be a party to a suit brought against them by their

collective name. In regard to banks, turnpikes, and other corpo-

rations, the case is different.' The counsel concerned in the case

of Mower v. Leicester,1 without contradiction, speak of this prac-

tice of subjecting individuals as one of daily occurrence. The law

on this subject was very much considered in the case of Chase v.

The Merrimack Bank,2 and was applied and enforced against the

members of a territorial parish. 'The question is,' say the court,

'whether, on an execution against a town or parish, the body or

estate of any inhabitant may bo lawfully taken to satisfy it. This

question seems to have been settled in the affirmative by a series

of decisions, and ought no longer to be considered as an open

question.' The State of Maine, when separated from Massachu-

setts, retained most of its laws and usages, as they had been

recognized in the parent State; and, among others, the one in
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question. In Adams v. Wiscasset Bank,3 Mellen, Ch. J., says:

'It is well known that all judgments against quasi corporations

may be satisfied out of the property of any individual inhabitant.'

"The courts of this State, from a time beyond the memory of

any living lawyer, have sanctioned and carried out this usage, as

one of common-law obligation; and it has been applied, not to

towns only, but also, by legal analogy, to territorial ecclesiastical

societies and school districts. The forms of our process against

these communities have always corresponded with this view of the

law. The writs have issued against the inhabitants of towns,

societies, and districts as parties. As early in the history of our

jurisprudence as 1805, a statute was enacted authorizing com-

munities, such as towns, societies, &c, to prosecute and defend

suits, and for this purpose to appear, either by themselves, agents,

or attorneys. If the inhabitants were not then considered as

parties individually, and liable to the consequences of judgments

against such communities as parties, there would have

been a glaring * impropriety in permitting them to appear [* 245J

1 9 Mass. 247. * 19 Pick. 564.' 5 1 Greenl. 361.
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and defend by themselves; but, if parties, such a right was neces-

sary and indispensable. Of course this privilege has been and

may be exercised.1

"Our statute providing for the collection of taxes enacts that

the treasurer of the State shall direct his warrant to the collectors

of the State tax in the several towns. If neither this nor the fur-

ther proceedings against the collectors and the selectmen authorized

by the statute shall enforce the collection of the tax, the law directs

that then the treasurer shall issue Iris execution against the inhab-

itants of such town. Such an execution may be levied upon the

estate of the inhabitants; and this provision of the law was not

considered as introducing a new principle, or enforcing a novel

remedy, but as being only in conformity with the well-known usage

in other cases. The levy of an execution under this statute pro-

duced the case of Beers v. Botsford.2 There the execution, which

had been issued against the town of Newtown by the treasurer of

the State, had been levied upon the property of the plaintiff, an

inhabitant of that town, and he had thus been compelled to pay the
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balance of a State tax due from the town. He sued the town of

Newtown for the recovery of the money so paid by him. The most

distinguished professional gentlemen in the State were engaged as

counsel in that case ; and it did not occur, either to them or to the

court, that the plaintiff's property had been taken without right:

on the contrary, the case proceeded throughout on the conceded

principle of our common law, that the levy was properly made

upon the estate of the plaintiff. And without this the plaintiff

could not have recovered of the town, but must have resorted to

his action against the officer for his illegal and void levy. In Ful-

ler v. Hampton,3 Peters, J., remarked that, if costs are recovered

against a town, the writ of execution to collect them must have

been issued against the property of the inhabitants of the town ; and

this is the invariable practice. The case of Atwater v. Woodbridge 4

also grew out of this ancient usage. The ecclesiastical society of

Bethany had been taxed by the town of Woodbridge for its mon-

eys at interest, and the warrant for the collection of the tax had

been levied upon the property of the plaintiff, and the tax had

thus been collected of him, who was an inhabitant of the located

1 1 Swift's System, 227.

3 5 Conn. 417.

a 8 Day, 159.

4 6 Conn. 223.
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society of Bethany. Brainerd, J., who drew up the * opin- [* 246]

ion of the court, referring to this proceeding, said: 'This

practice, with regard to towns, has prevailed in New England, so

far as I have been able to investigate the subject, from an early

period, — from its first settlement, — a practice brought by our

forefathers from England, which had there obtained in corporations

similar to the towns incorporated in New England.' It will here

be seen that the principle is considered as applicable to territorial

societies as to towns, because the object to be obtained was the

same in both, —' that the town or society should be brought to a

sense of- duty, and make provision for payment and indemnity ;'

a very good reason, and very applicable to the case we are consid-

ering.

"The law on this subject was more distinctly brought out and

considered by this court in the late case of McCloud v. Selby,1 in

which this well-known practice, as it had been applied to towns

and ecclesiastical societies, was extended and sanctioned as to

school districts; 'else it would be breaking in upon the analogies

of the law.' 'They are communities for different purposes, but

essentially of the same character.' And no doubt can remain,
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since the decision of this case, but that the real principle, in all of

the cases on this subject, has been, and is, that the inhabitants of

quasi corporations are parties individually, as well as in their cor-

porate capacities, to all the actions in which the corporation is a

party. And to the same effect is the language of the elementary

writers." 2

So far as this rule rests upon the reason that these organizations

have no common fund, and that no other mode exists by which

demands against them can be enforced, it cannot be considered

applicable in those States where express provision is made by law

for compulsory taxation to satisfy any judgment recovered against

the corporate body, — the duty of levying the tax being imposed

upon some officer, who may be compelled by mandamus to perform

1 10 Conn. 390-395.

* Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 375, citing 2 Kent, 221 ; Angell and Ames on

Corp. 374; 1 Swift's Dig. 72, 794; 5 Dane's Abr. 158. And see Dillon, Mun.

Corp. c. 1. It was held competent in the above case to extend the same principle

to incorporated cities; and an act of the legislature permitting the enforcement of

city debts in the same mode was sustained. For a more recent case in Massa-

chusetts than these cited, see Gaskill v. Dudley, 6 Met. 551.
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it. Nor has any usage, so far as we are aware, grown up in any

of the newer States, like that which had so early an origin

[*247] in New England. * More just, convenient, and inexpen-

sive modes of enforcing such demands have been estab-

lished by statute, and the rules concerning them are conformed

more closely to those which are established for other corporations.

On the other hand, it is settled that these corporations are not

liable to a private action, at the suit of a party injured by a neglect

of its officers to perform a corporate duty, unless such action is

given by statute. This doctrine has been frequently applied where

suits have been brought against towns, or the highway officers of

towns, to recover for damages sustained in consequence of defects

in the public ways. The common law gives no such action, and it

is therefore not sustainable at all, unless given by statute. A dis-

tinction is made between those corporations which are created as

exceptions, and receive special grants of power for the peculiar

convenience and benefit of the corporators, on the one hand, and

the incorporated inhabitants of a district, who are by statute
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invested with particular powers, without their consent, on the other.

In the latter case, the State may impose corporate duties, and com-

pel their performance, under penalties; but the corporators, who

are made such whether they will or no, cannot be considered in

the light of persons who have voluntarily, and for a consideration,

assumed obligations, so as to owe a duty to every person interested

in the performance.1

1 Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 250; Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 439;

Farnura v. Concord, 2 N. H. 392; Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Greenl. 361;

Baxter v. Winooski Turnpike, 22 Vt. 123; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 375;

Chidsey ». Canton, 17 Conn. 475; Young c. Commissioners, &c., 2 N. & McC.

637; Commissioners of Highways v. Martin, 4 Mich. 557; Morey v. Newfane,

8 Barb. 645; Lorillard t>. Monroe, 11 N. Y. 392; Galen v. Clyde and Rose

Plank Road Co., 27 Barb. 543; Reardon v. St. Louis, 86 Mo. 555; Sherburne

v. Yuba Co., 21 Cal. 113; State v. County of Hudson, 1 Vroom, 187; Hedges

v. Madison Co., 1 Gilm. 567; Granger v. Pulaski Co., 26 Ark. 87; Weightman t>.

Washington, 1 Black, 39; Ball v. Winchester, 32 N. H. 448; Eastman v. Mere-

dith, 36 N. H. 284; Waltham v. Kemper, 55 111. 346; Sutton v. Board, 41 Miss.

236; Cooley v. Freeholders, 3 Dutch. 415. These cases follow the leading Eng-

lish case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667. In the very carefully con-

sidered case of Eastman v. Meredith, 86 N. H. 284, it was decided, on the

principle above stated, that if a building erected by a town for a town-house is

so imperfectly constructed that the flooring gives way at the annual town-meeting,

and an inhabitant and legal voter, in attendance on the meeting, receives thereby
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* 247

The reason which exempts these public bodies from liability to

private actions, based upon neglect to perform public obligations,

does not apply to villages, boroughs, and cities, which

accept special * charters from the State. The grant of the [* 248]

corporate franchise, in these cases, is usually made only at

the request of the citizens to be incorporated, and it is justly

assumed that it confers what to them is a valuable privilege. This

privilege is a consideration for the duties which the charter imposes.

Larger powers of self-government are given than are confided to

towns or counties; larger privileges in the acquisition and control

of corporate property; and special authority is conferred to make

use of the public highways for the special and peculiar convenience

of the citizens of the municipality in various modes not permissible

elsewhere. The grant by the State to the municipality of a portion

of its sovereign powers, and their acceptance for these beneficial

purposes, is regarded as raising an implied promise, on the part of

the corporation, to perform the corporate duties; and this implied

contract, made with the sovereign power, enures to the benefit of

every individual interested in its performance.1 In this respect
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a bodily injury, he cannot maintain an action against the town to recover dam-

ages for this injury. The case is carefully distinguished from those where cor-

porations have been held liable for the negligent use of their own property by

means of which others are injured. The familiar maxim that one shall so use

his own as not to injure that which belongs to another is of general application.

1 Selden, J., in Weet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161, note. See also Mayor of

Lyme v. Turner, Cowp. 86; Henley v. Lyme Regis, 5 Bing. 91; Same case in

error, 8 B. & Adol. 77, and 1 Bing. N. C. 222; Mayor, &c, of New York v.

Furze, 8 Hill, 612; Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 464; Hut-

son c. Mayor, &c, of New York, 9 N. Y. 163; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158;

Mills r. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489; Barton v. Syracuse, 36 N. Y. 54; Lee v. Sandy

Hill, 40 N. Y. 442; Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat. 40; Riddle v. Proprietors

of Locks, &c, 7 Mass. 183; Bigelow v. Inhabitants of Randolph, 14 Gray, 541;

Mears v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 9 Ired. 73; Browning v. Springfield, 17

111. 143; Bloomington ». Bay, 42 111. 503; Springfield v. LeClaire, 49 111. 476;

Peru v. French, 55 111. 818; Pittsburg v. Grier, 22 Penn. St. 54; Jones v. New

Haven, 34 Conn. 1; Stackhouse v. Lafayette, 26 Ind. 17; Brinkmeyer r. Evans-

vine, 29 Ind. 187; Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Grat. 241; Richmond v. Long, ib. 375;

Blake v. St. Louis, 40 Mo. 569; Scott v. Mayor, &c, of Manchester, 37 Eng.

L. & Eq. 495; Smoot v. Wetumpka, 24 Ala. 112; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich.

165; Rusch ». Davenport, 6 Iowa, 443; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md.

468; Covington v. Bryant, 7 Bush, 248; Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black,

41; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Nebraska v. Campbell, ib. 590. In the

recent case of Detroit v. Blackeby, 21 Mich. 84, this whole subject is considered
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these corporations are looked upon as occupying the same position

as private corporations, which, having accepted a valuable franchise,

on condition of the performance of certain public duties, are held

to contract by the acceptance for the performance of these duties.

In the case of public corpprations, however, the liability is contin-

gent on the law affording the means of performing the duty, which,

in some cases, by reason of restrictions upon the power of taxation,

they might not possess. But assuming the corporation to be clothed

with sufficient power by the charter to that end, the liability of a

city or village, vested with control of its streets, for any neglect to

keep them in repair, or for any improper construction, has been

determined in many cases.1 And a similar liability would exist in

other cases where the same reasons would be applicable.

at length; and the court (one judge dissenting) deny the soundness of the prin-

ciple stated in the text, and hold that municipal corporations existing under spe-

cial charters are not liable to individuals for injuries caused by neglect to perform

corporate duties, unless expressly made so by statute. This case is referred to

and dissented from in Waltham v. Kemper, 55 111. 347. In Murtaugh v. St.
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Louis, 44 Mo. 480, Currier, J., says: "The general result of the adjudications

seems to be this: When the officer or servant of a municipal corporation is in

the exercise of a power conferred upon the corporation for its private benefit,

and injury ensues from the negligence or misfeasance of such officer or servant,

the corporation is liable, as in the case of private corporations or parties; but

when the acts or omissions complained of were done or omitted in the exercise

of a corporate franchise conferred upon the corporation for the public good, and

not for the private corporate advantage, then the corporation is not liable for

the consequences of such acts or omissions." Citing Bailey v. New York,

3 Hill, 531; Martin v. Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 550; Richmond v. Long's Adm'r, 17

Grat. 375; Sherburne v. Yuba Co., 21 Cal. 113; Dargan v. Mobile, 31 Ala.

469; Stewart v. New Orleans, 9 La. An. 461; Prother v. Lexington, 13 B.

Monr. 559. And as to exemption from liability in the exercise or failure to

exercise legislative authority, see ante, p. 208, and note.

1 Weet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161, note; Hickok p. Plattsburg, ib. 158;

Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645; Browning v. Springfield, 17 111. 143; Hyatt t.

Rondout, 44 Barb. 385; Lloyd v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 5 N. Y. 369;

Rusch v. Davenport, 6 Iowa, 443. And see Dillon, Mun. Corp. c. 18, and the

cases cited in the preceding note. The cases of Weet v. Brockport, and Hickok

Plattsburg, were criticised by Mr. Justice Marvin, in the case of Peck v.

Batavia, 32 Barb. 634, where, as well as in Cole v. Medina, 27 Barb. 218, he

held that a village merely authorized to make and repair sidewalks, but not in

terms absolutely and imperatively required to do so, had a discretion conferred

upon it in respect to such walks, and was not responsible for a refusal to enact

ordinances or by-laws in relation thereto; nor, if it enacted such ordinances or

by-laws, was it liable for damages arising from a neglect to enforce them. The
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* But if the ground of the action is the omission by the [* 249]

corporation to repair a defect, it would seem that notice of

the defect should be brought home to the corporation, or to officers

charged with some duty respecting the streets, or that facts should

appear sufficient to show that, by proper vigilance, it must have

been known.1

In regard to all those powers which are conferred upon the

corporation, not for tlie benefit of the general public, but of the

corporators, — as to construct works to supply a city with water, or

gas-works, or sewers, and the like, — the corporation is held to a

still more strict liability, and is made to respond in damages to the

parties injured by the negligent manner in which the work is con-

structed, or guarded, even though, under its charter, the agents for

the construction are not chosen or controlled by the corporation,

and even where the work is required by law be let to the lowest

responsible bidder.

In Bailey v. Mayor, <fec, of New York,2 an action was brought

against the city by one who had been injured in his property by the

careless construction of the Croton dam for the purpose of supply-

ing the city with water. The work was constructed under the
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control of water commissioners, in whose appointment the city had

no voice; and upon this ground, among others, and also on the

ground that the city officers were acting in a public capacity, and,

like other public agents, not responsible for the misconduct

of * those necessarily appointed by them, it was insisted [* 250]

the city could not be held liable. Nelson, Ch. J., examin-

ing the position that, "admitting the water commissioners to be

the appointed agents of the defendants, still the latter are not

liable, inasmuch as they were acting solely for the State in

doctrine that a power thus conferred is discretionary does not seem consistent

with the ruling in some of the other cases cited, and is criticised in Hyatt v.

Rondout, 44 Barb, 392. Calling public meetings for political or philanthropic

purposes is no part of the business of a municipal corporation, and it is not liable

to one who, in lawfully passing by where the meeting is held, is injured by the

discharge of a cannon fired by persons concerned in the meeting. Boyland v.

Mayor, &c, of New York, 1 Sandf. 27.

1 Hart v. Brooklyn, 36 Barb. 226; Dewey v. City of Detroit, 15 Mich. 309;

Garrison v. New York, 5 Bosw. 497; McGinity v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 5

Duer, 674; Decatur v. Fisher, 53 HI. 407; Requa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129;

Hume r. New York, 47 N. Y. 639.

• 3 Hill, 531; 2 Denio, 433.
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prosecuting the work in question, and therefore are not responsible

for the conduct of those necessarily employed by them for that

purpose," says: " We admit, if the defendants are to be regarded

as occupying this relation, and are not chargeable with any want

of diligence in the selection of agents, the conclusion contended

for would seem to follow. They would then be entitled to all the

immunities of public officers charged with a duty which, from its

nature, could not be executed, without availing themselves of the

services of others ; and the doctrine of respondeat superior does not

apply to such cases. If a public officer authorize the doing of an

act not within the scope of his authority, or if he be guilty of

negligence in the discharge of duties to be performed by himself,

he will be held responsible; but not for the misconduct or

malfeasance of such persons as he is obliged to employ. But this

view cannot be maintained on the facts before us. The powers

conferred by the several acts of the legislature, authorizing the

execution of this great work, are not, strictly and legally speaking,

conferred for the benefit of the public; the grant is a special,
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private franchise, made as well for the private emolument and ad-

vantage of the city as for public good. The State, in its sovereign

character, has no interest in it. It owns no part of the work. The

whole investment, under the law, and the revenue and profits to be

derived therefrom, are a part of the private property of the city, as

much so as the lands and houses belonging to it situate within its

corporate limits.

"The argument of the defendants' counsel confounds the powers

in question with those belonging to the defendants in their charac-

ter as a municipal or public body, — such as are granted exclusively

for public purposes to counties, cities, towns, and villages, where

the corporations have, if I may so speak, no private estate or in-

terest in the grant.

"As the powers in question have been conferred upon one of

these public corporations, thus blending, in a measure, those con-

ferred for private advantage and emolument with those already

possessed for public purposes, there is some difficulty, I

[* 251] * admit, in separating them in the mind, and properly dis-

tinguishing the one class from the other, so as to distribute

the responsibility attaching to the exercise of each.

"But the distinction is quite clear and well settled, and the pro-

cess of separation practicable. To this end, regard should be had,
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not so much to the nature and character of the various powers con-

ferred, as to the object and purpose of the legislature in conferring

them. If granted for public purposes exclusively, they belong

to the corporate body in its public, political, or municipal character.

But, if the grant was for purposes of private advantage and emolu-

ment, though the public may derive a common benefit therefrom, the

corporation quo ad hoc is to be regarded as a private company. It

stands on the same footing as would any individual or body of

persons upon whom the like special franchises had been con-

ferred.1

"Suppose the legislature, instead of the franchise in question,

had conferred upon the defendants' banking powers, or a charter

for a railroad leading into the city, in the usual manner in which

such powers are conferred upon private companies, could it be

doubted that they would hold them in the same character, and be

subject to the same duties and liabilities? It cannot be doubted but

they would. These powers, in the eye of the law, would be entirely

distinct and separate from those appertaining to the defendants as

a municipal body. So far as related to the charter thus conferred,

they would be regarded as a private company, and be subject to
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the responsibilities attaching to that class of institutions. The

distinction is well stated by the Master of the Rolls, in Moodalay

v. East India Co.,2 in answer to an objection made by counsel.

There the plaintiff had taken a lease from the company, granting

him permission to supply the inhabitants of Madras with tobacco

for ten years. Before the expiration of that period, the company

dispossessed him, and granted the privilege to another. The plain-

tiff, preparatory to bringing an action against the company,

filed a bill of discovery. One of the objections * taken by [* 252]

the defendant was, that the removal of the plaintiff was .

incident to their character as a sovereign power, the exercise of

which could not be questioned in a bill or suit at law. The Master

of the Rolls admitted that no suit would lie against a sovereign

power for any thing done in that capacity; but he denied that the

1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat 668, 672; Phillips v. Bury, 1

Ld. Raym. 8; 2 T. R. 362, s. c.; Allen v. McKeen, 1 Sumn. 297; People v.

Morris, 13 Wend. 381-338; 2 Kent's Com. 275 (4th ed.); United States Bank

e. Planters Bank, 9 Wheat. 907; Clark v. Corp. of Washington, 12 ib. 40;

Moodalay v. East India Co., 1 Brown's Ch. R. 469.

1 1 Brown's Ch. R. 469.
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defendants came within the rule. 'They have rights,' he observed,

'as a sovereign power; they have also duties as individuals; if

they enter into bonds in India, the sums secured may be recovered

here. So in this case, as a private company, they have entered into

a private contract, to which they must be liable.' It is upon the

like distinction that municipal corporations, in their private char-

acter as owners and occupiers of lands and houses, arc regarded

in the same light as individual owners and occupiers, and dealt

with accordingly. As such, they are bound to repair bridges, high-

ways, and churches; are liable to poor rates; and, in a word, to

the discharge of any other duty or obligation to which an individ-

ual owner would be subject." 1

la Stoors v. City of Utica,2 it was held that a city, owing to the

public the duty of keeping its streets in a safe condition for travel,

was liable to persons receiving injury from the neglect to keep

proper lights and guards at night around an excavation which had

been made for the construction of a sewer, notwithstanding it had

contracted for all proper precautions with the persons executing
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the work. And in the City of Detroit v. Corey8 the corporation

was held liable in a similar case, notwithstanding the work was

required by the charter to be let to the lowest bidder. Manning,

J., in speaking to the point whether the contractors were to be con-

sidered as the agents of the city, so that the maxim respondeat

superior should apply, says: "It is to be observed that

[* 253] the * power under which they acted, and which made that

lawful which would otherwise have been unlawful, was not

1 2 Inst. 703 ; Thursfield v. Jones, Sir T. Jones, 187; Rex v. Gardner, Cowp.

79; Mayor of Lyme v. Turner, ib. 87; Henley e. Mayor of Lyme, 5 Bing. 91;

1 Bing. N. C. 222, s. c. in House of Lords. See, also, Lloyd v. Mayor, &c., of

New York, 5 N. Y. 369; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468. "The cor-

poration of the city of New York possesses two kinds of powers, —one govern-

mental and public, and, to the extent they are held and exercised, is clothed with

sovereignty; the other private, and, to the extent they are held and exercised,

is a legal individual. The former are given and used for public puqioses, the

latter for private purposes. While in the exercise of the former, the corporation

is a municipal government, and while in the exercise of the latter is a corporate,

legal individual." Ibid, per Foot, J. See upon this point also, Western Fund

Savings Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Penn. St. 175; Louisville v. Commonwealth,

1 Duvall, 295; People v. Common Council of Detroit, 27 Mich, ante 230 and note.

• 17 N. Y. 104.

3 9 Mich. 165. Compare Mills t>. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489; Jones v. New

Haven, 34 Conn. 1.
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a power given to the city for governmental purposes, or a public

municipal duty imposed on the city, as to keep its streets in repair,

or the like, but a special legislative grant to the city for private

purposes. The sewers of the city, like its works for supplying the

city with water, are the private property of the city; they belong

to the city. The corporation and its corporators, the citizens, are

alone interested in them; the outside public or people of the State

at large have no interest in them, as they have in the streets of the

city, which are public highways.

"The donee of such a power, whether the donee be an individ-

ual or a corporation, takes it with the understanding—for such

are the requirements of the law in the execution of the power —

that it shall be so executed as not unnecessarily to interfere with

the rights of the public, and that all needful and proper measures

will be taken, in the execution of it, to guard against accidents to

persons lawfully using the highway at the time. He is individ-

ually bound for the performance of these obligations; he cannot

accept the power divested of them, or rid himself of their perform-

ance by executing them through a third person as his agent. He

may stipulate with the contractor for their performance, as was
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done by the city in the present case, but he cannot thereby relieve

himself of his personal liability, or compel an injured party to look

to his agent, instead of himself, for damages." And in answer

to the objection that the contract was let to the lowest bidder, as

the law required, it is shown that the provision of law to that

effect was introduced for the benefit of the city, to protect it

against frauds, and that it should not, therefore, relieve it from

any liability.1

1 See, also, Rochester White Lead Co. v. City of Rochester, 8 N. Y. 463;

Grant v. City of Brooklyn, 41 Barb. 381; City of Buffalo v. Holloway, 14 Barb.

101, and 7 N. Y. 493; Lloyd v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 6 N. Y. 369; Del-

monico r. Mayor, &c, of New York, 1 Sandf. 222; Barton r. Syracuse, 37

Barb. 292; Storrs p. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104; Springfield v. LeClaire, 49 111. 476;

Blake v. St. Louis, 40 Mo. 569; Baltimore v. Pendleton, 15 Md. 12; St. Paul

r. Leitz, 3 Minn. 297. For further illustration of the rules of liability to which

municipal corporations are subject for the negligent discharge of corporate duties,

or the improper construction of corporate works, see Wallace p. Muscatine,

4 Greene (Iowa), 373; Creal v. Keokuk, ib. 47; Cotes v. Davenport, 9 Iowa,

227; Mayor v. Sheffield, 4 Wal. 189; Child v. Boston, 4 Allen, 41; Walcott v.

Swampscott, 1 Allen, 101; Buttrick v. Lowell, ib. 172; Munn v. Pittsburgh, 40

Penn. St. 364; Pekin v. Newell, 26 111. 320; Weightman v. Washington, 1
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[* 254] * We have not deemed it important, in considering the

subject embraced within this chapter, to discuss the various

questions which might be suggested in regard to the validity of the

proceedings by which it is assumed in any case that a municipal

corporation has become constituted. These questions are gener-

ally questions between the corporators and the State, with which

private individuals are regarded as having no concern. In pro-

ceedings where the question whether a corporation exists or not

arises collaterally, the courts will not permit its corporate charac-

ter to be questioned, if it appear to be acting under color of law,

and recognized by the State as such. Such a question should be

raised by the State itself, by quo warranto or other direct proceeding.1

And the rule, we apprehend, would be no different, if the constitu-

tion itself prescribed the manner of incorporation. Even in such

a case, proof that the corporation was acting as such, under legis-

lative action, would be sufficient evidence of right, except as against

the State ; and private parties could not enter upon any question

of regularity. And the State itself may justly be precluded, on the
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principle of estoppel, from raising such an objection, where there

has been long acquiescence and recognition.2

Black, 39; Kavanaugh v. Brooklyn, 38 Barb. 232; Wendell r. Troy, SO Barb.

329; Mills r. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489; Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130; City of

Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161; Champaign v. Patterson, 50 111. 62; Ros3 f.

Madison, 1 Ind. 281; Mayor, &c, of New York t>. Bailey, 2 Denio, 433; Roch-

ester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 8 N. Y. 463; Wheeler v. City of Worcester,

10 Allen, 591; Burnham v. Boston, ib. 290; Boon v. City of Utica, 2 Barb. 104;

Martin v. Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 545; Howell v. Buffalo, 15 N. Y.

512; Lacour v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 3 Duer, 406; Pittsburgh v. Grier,

22 Penn. St. 54; Erie City v. Schwingle, t'6. 384; and the numerous cases col-

lected and classified in Dillon on Municipal Corporations. A municipal corpo-

poration is not liable for neglect to devise and construct a proper system of

drainage. Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Penn. St. 324. See ante, 208, and

note. Cities are not liable for the careless conduct of officials in the discharge of

duty. Dillon, §§ 774 to 778, and cases cited.

1 State r. Carr, 6 N. H. 367; President, &c, of Mendota v. Thompson, 20

111. 200; Hamilton t>. President, &c, of Carthage, 24 HI. 22. These were

prosecutions by municipal corporations for recovery of penalties imposed by

by-laws, and where the plea of nul tiel corporation was interposed and over-

ruled. See, also, Kayser v. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88; Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50

ni. so.

8 In People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 470, where the invalidity of an act organ-

izing a county, passed several years before, was suggested on constitutional

grounds, Campbell, J., says: "If this question had been raised immediately, we
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are not prepared to say that it would have been altogether free from difficulty.

But inasmuch as the arrangement there indicated had been acted upon for ten

years before the recent legislation, and had been recognized as valid by all

parties interested, it cannot now be disturbed. Even in private associations the

acts of parties interested may often estop them from relying on legal objec-

tions, which might have availed them if not waived. But in public affairs, where

the people have organized themselves under color of law into the ordinary

municipal bodies, and have gone on year after year raising taxes, making im-

provements, and exercising their usual franchises, their rights are properly

regarded as depending quite as much on the acquiescence as on the regularity

of their origin, and no ex post facto inquiry can be permitted to undo their

corporate existence. Whatever may be the rights of individuals before such

general acquiescence, the corporate standing of the community can no longer be

open to question. See Rumsey v. People, 19 N. Y. 41; and Lanning o. Car-

penter, 20 N. Y. 474, where the efl'ect of the invalidity of an original county

organization is very well considered in its public and private bearings. There

have been direct legislative recognitions of the new division on several occasions.

The exercise of jurisdiction being notorious and open in all such cases, the State

as well as county and town taxes being all levied under it, there is no principle

which could justify any court, at this late day, in going back to inquire into the
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regularity of the law of 1857." A similar doctrine has been applied in support

of the official character of persons who, without authority of law, have bee"n

named for municipal offices by State authority, and whose action in such offices

has been acquiesced in by the citizens or authorities of the municipality. See

People v. Salomon, 54 111. 51; People v. Lothrop, 24 Mich. 235. Compare Kim-

ball v. Alcorn, 45 Miss. 151. But such acquiescence could not make them local

officers and representatives of the people for new and enlarged powers subse-

quently attempted to be given by the legislature. People v. Common Council of

Detroit, 27 Mich. Nor in respect to powers not purely local. People v. Spring-

wells, 25 Mich. 163.

19
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[*256] * CHAPTER IX.

PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF

THE UNITED STATES.

As the government of the United States was one of enumerated

powers, it was not deemed important by the framers of its Consti-

tution that a bill of rights should be incorporated among its pro-

visions. If, among the powers conferred, there was none which

would authorize or empower the government to deprive the citizen

of any of those fundamental rights which it is the object and the

duty of government to protect and defend, and to insure which is

the sole purpose of bills of rights, it was thought to be at least

unimportant to insert negative clauses in that instrument, inhibit-

ing the government from assuming any such powers, since the

mere failure to confer them would leave all such powers beyond

the sphere of its constitutional authority. And, as Mr. Hamilton

argued, it might seem even dangerous to do so. "For why declare

that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why,

for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall

not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions

may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would
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confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish,

to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that

power. They might urge, with a semblance of reason, that the

Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of pro-

viding against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and

that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press

afforded a clear implication that a right to prescribe proper reg-

ulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the national

government. This may serve as a specimen of t"he numerous

handles which would be given to the doctrine of constructive

powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of

rights." 1

1 Federalist, No. 84.
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It was also thought that bills of rights, however impor-

tant * under a monarchical government, were of no [* 257]

moment in a constitution of government framed by the

people for themselves, and under which public affairs were to be

managed by means of agencies selected by the popular choice, and

subject to frequent change by popular action. "It has been sev-

eral times truly remarked, that bills of rights are, in their origin,

stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgments of pre-

rogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered

to the prince. Such was Magna Charta, obtained by the barons,

sword in hand, from King John. Such were the subsequent con-

firmations of that charter by succeeding princes. Such was the

Petition of Right, assented to by Charles the First, in the beginning

of his reign. Such also was the Declaration of Right presented by

the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, and

afterwards thrown into the form of an act of Parliament, called

the Bill of Rights. It is evident, therefore, that, according to

their primitive signification, they have no application to constitu-

tions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and exe-

cuted by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in
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strictness, the people surrender nothing; and, as they retain every

thing, they have no need of particular reservations. 'We, the

people of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to

ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitu-

tion for the United States of America.' This is a better recog-

nition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which

make the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights,

and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than

in a constitution of government."1

Reasoning like this was specious, but it was not satisfactory to

many of the leading statesmen of that day, who believed that " the

purposes of society do not require a surrender of all our rights

to our ordinary governors; that there are certain portions of right

not necessary to enable them to carry on an effective government,

and which experience has nevertheless proved they will be con-

stantly encroaching on, if submitted to them; that there are also

certain fences which experience has proved peculiarly efficacious

against wrong, and rarely obstructive of right, which yet the

1 Federalist, No. 84, bv Hamilton.

[ 291 ]

* 257 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IX.

\

governing powers have ever shown a disposition to weaken and

remove." 1 And these governing powers will be no less

[* 258] disposed * to be aggressive when chosen by majorities than

when selected by the accident of birth, or at the will of

privileged classes. Indeed if, during the long struggle for consti-

tutional liberty in England, covering the whole of the seventeenth

century, importance was justly attached to a distinct declaration

and enumeration of individual rights on the part of the govern-

ment, when it was still in the power of the governing authorities

to infringe upon or to abrogate them at any time, and when, con-

sequently, the declaration could possess only a moral force, a similar

declaration would appear to be of even more value in the Consti-

tution of the United States, where it would constitute authoritative

law, and be subject to no modification or repeal, except by the

people themselves whose rights it was designed to protect, nor even

by them except in the manner by the Constitution provided.2

1 Jefferson's Works, Vol. III. 201.

* Mr. Jefferson sums up the objections to a bill of rights !n the Constitution

of the United Status, and answers them as follows: "1. That the rights in
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question are reserved by the manner in which the Federal powers are granted.

Answer: A constitutive act may certainly be so formed as to need no declara-

tion of rights. The act itself has the force of a declaration, as far as it goes;

and if it goes to all material points, nothing more is wanting. In the draft of

a constitution which I had once a thought of proposing in Virginia, and printed

afterwards, I endeavored to reach all the great objects of public liberty, and did

not mean to add a declaration of rights. Probably the object was imperfectly

executed; but the deficiencies would have been supplied by others in the course

of discussion. But in a constitutive act which leaves some precious articles un-

noticed, and raises implications against others, a declaration of rights becomes

necessary by way of supplement. This is the case of our new Federal Consti-

tution. This instrument forms us into one State, as to certain objects, and gives

us a legislative and executive body for those objects. It should therefore guard

us against their abuses of power, within the field submitted to them. 2. A positive

declaration of some essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude.

Answer: Half a loaf is better than no bread. If we cannot secure all our rights,

let us secure what we can. 3. The limited powers of the Federal government,

and jealousy of the subordinate governments, afford a security, which exists in

no other instance. Answer: The first member of this seems resolvable into the

first objection before stated. The jealousy of the subordinate governments is a

precious reliance. But observe that those governments are only agents. They

must have principles furnished them whereon to found their opposition. The

declaration of rights will be the text whereby they will try all the acts of the

Federal government. In this view it is necessary to the Federal government

also; as by the same text they may try the opposition of the subordinate govern-
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* The want of a bill of rights was, therefore, made the [* 259]

ground of a decided, earnest, and formidable opposition to

the confirmation of the national Constitution by the people; and its

adoption was only secured in some of the leading States in con-

nection with the recommendation of amendments which should

cover the ground.1

The clauses inserted in the original instrument, for the protection

of person and property, had reference mainly to the action of the

State governments, and were made limitations upon their power.

The exceptions embraced a few cases only, in respect to which the

experience of both English and American history had forcibly

demonstrated the tendency of power to abuse, not when wielded by

a prince only, but also when administered by the agencies of the

people themselves.

Bills of attainder were prohibited to be passed, either by the Con-

gress2 or by the legislatures of the several States.3 Attainder,

in a strict sense, means an extinction of civil and political rights

and capacities; and at the common law it followed, as of course,

on conviction and sentence to death for treason; and, in greater

or less degree, on conviction and sentence for the different classes
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of felony.

A bill of attainder was a legislative conviction for alleged crime,

ments. 4. Experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights. True. But

though it is not absolutely efficacious, under all circumstances, it is of great

potency always, and rarely inefficacious. A brace the more will often keep up

the building which would have fallen with that brace the less. There is a re-

markable difference between the characters of the inconveniences which attend a

declaration of rights, and those which attend the want of it. The inconveniences

of the declaration are, that it may cramp government in its useful exertions. But

the evil of this is short-lived, moderate, and reparable. The inconveniences of the

want of a declaration are permanent, afflictive, and irreparable. They are in con-

stant progression from bad to worse. The executive, in our governments, is not V1

the sole, it is scarcely the principal, object of my jealousy. The tyranny of the «-

legislatures is the most formidable dread at present, and will be for many years.;

TJEaFoT the executive will come in its turn; but it will be at a remote period.

Letter to Madison, March 15, 1789, 3 Jefferson's Works, p. 4. See also same

volume, pp. 13 and 101; Vol. II. pp. 329, 358.

1 For the various recommendations by Massachusetts, South Carolina, New

Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, see 1 Elliott1*

Debates, 322-334.

* Constitution of United States, art. 1, § 9.

1 Constitution of United States, art. 1, § 10.
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with judgment of death. Such convictions have not been uncom-

mon under other governments, and the power to pass these bills has

been exercised by the Parliament of England at some periods in

its history, under the most oppressive and unjustifiable

[* 260] * circumstances, greatly aggravated by an arbitrary course

of procedure, which had few of the incidents of a judicial

investigation into alleged crime. Of late years in England no one

had attempted to defend it as a legitimate exercise of power; and

if it would be unjustifiable anywhere, there were many reasons why

it would be specially obnoxious under a free government, and why

consequently its prohibition, under the existing circumstances of

our country, would be a matter of more than ordinary importance.

Every one must concede that a legislative body, from its numbers

and organization, and from the very intimate dependence of its

members upon the people, which renders them liable to be pecul-

iarly susceptible to popular clamor, is not properly constituted to

try with coolness, caution, and impartiality a criminal charge,

especially in those cases in which the popular feeling is strongly

excited, — the very class of cases most likely to be prosecuted
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by this mode. And although it would be conceded that, if such

bills were allowable, they should properly be presented only for

offences against the general laws of the land, and be proceeded

with on the same full opportunity for investigation and defence

which is afforded in the courts of the common law, yet it was

remembered that in practice they were often resorted to because an

obnoxious person was not subject to punishment under the gen-

eral law,1 or because, in proceeding against him by this mode, some

rule of the common law requiring a particular species or degree of

evidence might be evaded, and a conviction secured on proofs that

1 Cases of this description were most numerous during the reign of Henry VIII.,

and among the victims was Cromwell, who is said to have first advised that mon-

arch to resort to this objectionable proceeding. Even the dead were attainted,

as in the case of Richard III., and later, of the heroes of the Commonwealth.

The most atrocious instance in history, however, only relieved by its weakness

and futility, was the great act of attainder passed in 1688 by the Parliament

of James II., assembled in Dublin, by which between two and three thousand

persons were attainted, their property confiscated, and themselves sentenced to

death if they failed to appear at a time named. And, to render the whole pro-

ceeding as horrible in barbarity as possible, the list o the proscribed was care-

fully kept secret until after the time fixed for their appearance! Macaulay's

History of England, c. 12.
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a jury would not be suffered to accept as overcoming the legal

presumption of innocence. Whether the accused should neces-

sarily be served with process; what degree or species of evidence

Bhould be required; whether the rules of law should be

* followed, either in determining what constituted a crime, [* 261]

or in. dealing with the accused after conviction, — were all

questions which would necessarily address themselves to the legis-

lative discretion and sense of justice; and the very qualities which

are essential in a court to protect individuals on trial before them

against popular clamor, or the hate of those in power, were pre-

cisely those which were likely to prove weak or wanting in the

legislative body at such a time.1 And what could be more obnox-

ious in a free government than the exercise of such a power by

a popular body, controlled by a mere majority, fresh from the

contests of exciting elections, and quite too apt, under the most

favorable circumstances, to suspect the motives of their adversa-

ries, and to resort to measures of doubtful propriety to secure

party ends 1

Legislative punishments of this severe character, however, were

not the only ones known to parliamentary history; but there were
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others of a milder form, which were only less obnoxious in that

the consequences were less terrible. Those legislative convictions

which imposed punishments less than that of death were called

bills of pains and penalties, as distinguished from bills of attainder;

but the constitutional provisions we have referred to were undoubt-

edly aimed at any and every species of legislative punishment for

criminal or supposed criminal offences; and the term "bill of

attainder" is used in a generic sense, which would include bills

of pains and penalties also.2

1 This was equally true, whether the attainder was at the command of the

king, as in the case of Cardinal Pole's mother, or at the instigation of the popu-

lace, as in the case of Wentworth, Earl of Strafford. The last infliction of capi-

tal punishment in England, under a bill of attainder, was upon Sir John Fenwick,

in the reign of William and Mary. It is worthy of note that in the preceding

reign Sir John had been prominent in the attainder of the unhappy Monmouth.

Macaulay's History of England, c. 5.

* Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 138; Story on Constitution, § 1344; Cummings

v. Missouri, 4 Wal. 277; Ex parte Garland, ». 333; Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Wal.

601. "I think it will be found that the following comprise those essential ele-

ments of bills of attainder, in addition to those I have already mentioned [which

were that they declared certain persons attainted and their blood corrupted, so
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[* 262] * The thoughtful reader will not fail to discover, in the

acts of the American States during the Revolutionary

period, sufficient reason for this constitutional provision, even if

the still more monitory history of the English attainders had not

been so freshly remembered. Some of these acts provided for the

forfeiture of the estates, within the Commonwealth, of those British

subjects who had withdrawn from the jurisdiction because not sat-

isfied that grievances existed sufficiently serious to justify the last

resort of an oppressed people, or because of other reasons not

satisfactory to the existing authorities; and the only investigation

provided for was an inquiry into the desertion. Others mentioned

particular persons by name, adjudged them guilty of adhering to

the enemies of the State, and proceeded to inflict punishment upon

them, so far as the presence of property within the Commonwealth

would enable the government to do so.1 These were the resorts

of a time of extreme peril; and if possible to justify them in a

period of revolution, when every thing was staked on success, and

when the public safety would not permit too much weight to scru-

ples concerning the private rights of those who were not aiding the

popular cause, the power to repeat such acts under any possible
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circumstances in which the country could be placed again was felt

to be too dangerous to be left in the legislative hands. So far as

proceedings had been completed under those acts, before the treaty

of 1783, by the actual transfer of property, they remained valid

that it had lost all heritable property], which distinguish them from other legisla-

tion, and which made them so obnoxious to the statesmen who organized our

government: 1. They were convictions and sentences pronounced by the legis-

lative department of the government, instead of the judicial. 2. The sentence

pronounced and the punishment inflicted were determined by no previous law or

fixed rule. S. The investigation into the guilt of the accused, if any such were

made, was not necessarily or generally conducted in his presence or that of his

counsel, and no recognized rule of evidence governed the inquiry." Per Miller,

J., in Ex parte Garland, 4 WaL 388.

1 See Belknap's History of New Hampshire, c. 26; 2 Ramsay's History of

South Carolina, 351; 8 Rhode Island Colonial Records, 609; 2 Arnold's History

of Rhode Island, 360, 449; Thompson r. Carr, 5 N. H. 510; Sleght v. Kane, 2

Johns. Cas. 236; Story on Const. 4th ed. § 1344 note. On the general subject

of bills of attainder, one would do well to consult, in addition to the cases in 4

Wallace, those of Blair v. Ridgeley, 41 Mo. 63 (where it was very elaborately

examined by able counsel); State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 248; Randolph v. Good, 3

W. Va. 551; Ex parte Law, decided by Mr. Justice Erskine, in the United States
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and effectual afterwards; but so far as they were then incomplete,

they were put an end to by that treaty.1

The conviction of the propriety of this constitutional provision

has been so universal, that it has never been questioned, either in

legislative bodies or elsewhere. Nevertheless, cases have recently

arisen, growing out of the attempt to break up and destroy the

government of the United States, in which the Supreme

Court of * the United States has adjudged certain action [* 263]

of Congress to be in violation of this provision and con-

sequently void.2 The action referred to was designed to exclude

District Court of Georgia, May term, 18C6 ; State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570; Beirne

v. Brown, 4 W. Va. 72; Peerce v. Carskadon, ib. 284.

1 Jackson v. Munson, 3 Caines, 137.

s On the 2d of July, 1862, Congress, by "an act to prescribe an oath of

office, and for other purposes," enacted that "hereafter every person elected or

appointed to any office of honor or profit under the government of the United

States, either in the civil, military, or naval departments of the public service,

excepting the President of the United States, shall, before entering upon the du-

ties of such office, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: I, A B,

do solemnly swear or affirm that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the
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United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given

no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hos-

tility thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted, nor attempted to exercise,

the functions of any office whatever, under any authority or pretended authority

in hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to

any pretended government, authority, power, or constitution within the United

States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear or affirm that, to the

best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of

the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true

faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any

mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully dis-

charge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, so help me God."

On the 24th of January, 1865, Congress passed a supplementary act as follows:

"No person after the date of this act shall be admitted to the bar of the Supreme

Court of the United States, or at any time alter the 4th of March next shall

be admitted to the bar of any Circuit or District Court of the United States, or

of the Court of Claims, as an attorney or counsellor of such court, or shall be

allowed to appear and to be beard in any such court, by virtue of any previous

admission, or any special power of attorney, unless he shall have first taken and

subscribed the oath " aforesaid. False swearing, under each of the acts, was made

perjury. See 12 Statutes at Large, 502; 13 ib. 424. In Ex parte Garland, 4

Wal. 333, a majority of the court held the second of these acts void, as partaking

of the nature of a bill of pains and penalties, and also as being an ex post facto

law. The act was looked upon as inflicting a punishment for1 past conduct; the

exaction of the oath being the mode provided for ascertaining the parties upon

[ 297 ]

* 263

[CH. IX.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

from practice in the United States courts all persons who had

taken up arras against the government during the recent rebellion,

or who had voluntarily given aid and encouragement to its ene-

mies; and the mode adopted to effect the exclusion was to require

of all persons, before they should be admitted to the bar or allowed

to practise, an oath negativing any such disloyal action. This

decision was not at first universally accepted as sound; and the

Supreme Courts of West Virginia and of the District of Columbia

declined to follow it, insisting that permission to practise in the

courts is not a right, but a privilege, and that the with-

[* 264] holding * it for any reason of State policy or personal

unfitness could not be regarded as the infliction of crim-

inal punishment.1

The Supreme Court of the United States have also, upon the

same reasoning, held a clause in the Constitution of Missouri,

which, among other things, excluded all priests and clergymen

from practising or teaching unless they should first take a similar

oath of loyalty, to be void, overruling in so doing a decision of the
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Supreme Court of that State.2

whom the act was intended to operate. See Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Wal. 597.

The conclusion declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ex parte

Garland had been previously reached by Mr. Justice Trigg, of the United States

Circuit Court, in Matter of Baxter; by Mr. Justice Busteed, of the District

Court of Alabama, in Matter of Shorter et al.; and by Mr. Justice Erskine, of

the District Court of Georgia, in Ex parte Law. An elector cannot be ex-

cluded from the right to vote on the ground of being a deserter who has never

been tried and convicted as such. Huber v. Reily, 53 Penn. St. 112; McCafferty

v. Guyer, 59 Penn. St. 109; State v. Sytnonds, 57 Me. 148. See ante, 64, note3.

1 See the cases of Ex parte Magruder, American Law Register, Vol. VI. N. s.

p. 292; and Ex parte Hunter, ib. 410, 2 W. Va. 122; Ex parte Quarrier, 4 W.

Va. 210. See also Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293; Ex parte Yale, 24*Cal. 241.

* Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277. See also the case of State v. Adams,

44 Mo. 570, in which it was held that a legislative act declaring that the board

of curators of St. Charles College had forfeited their office, was of the nature

of a bill of attainder and void. The Missouri oath of loyalty was a very strin-

gent one, and applied to electors, State, county, city, and town officers, officers

in any corporation, public or private, professors and teachers in educational in-

stitutions, attorneys and counsellors, bishops, priests, deacons, ministers, elders,

or other clergymen of any denomination. The Supreme Court of Missouri had

held this provision valid in the following cases: State v. Garesche, 36 Mo. 256,

case of an attorney; State ». Cummings, 36 Mo. 263, case of a minister, reversed

as above stated; State v. Bernoudy, 36 Mo. 279, case of the recorder of St.

Louis; State c. McAdoo, 36 Mo. 452, where it is held that a certificate of elec-
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The same provisions of the national Constitution which we have

cited1 also forbid the passage either by the States or by Congress

of any ex post facto law.

At an early day it was settled by authoritative decision, in oppo-

sition to what might seem the more natural and obvious meaning

of the term ex post facto, that in their scope and purpose these

provisions were confined to laws respecting criminal punishments,

and had no relation whatever to retrospective legislation of any

other description. And it has, therefore, been repeatedly held,

that retrospective laws, when not of a criminal nature, do not

come in conflict with the national Constitution, unless obnoxious

to its provisions on other grounds than their retrospective char-

acter.

"The prohibition in the letter," says Chase, J., in the leading

case,* "is not to pass any law concerning or after the fact; but

the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibition is

this: that the legislatures of the several States shall not pass laws

after a fact done by a subject or citizen, which shall have relation

to such fact, and punish him for having done it. The pro-

hibition, * considered in this light, is an additional bulwark [* 265]
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in favor of the personal security of the subject, to protect

his person from punishment by legislative acts having a retro-

spective operation. I do not think it was inserted to secure the

citizen in his private rights of either property or contracts. The

prohibitions not to make any thing but gold and silver coin a

tender in payment of debts, and not to pass any law impairing

the obligation of contracts, were inserted to secure private rights;

but the restriction not to pass any ex post facto law was to

secure the person of the subject from injury or punishment, in

consequence of such law. If the prohibition against making ex

post facto laws was intended to secure personal rights from being

affected or injured by such law, and the prohibition is suffi-

tion issued to one who failed to take the oath as required by the constitution was

void. In Beirne v. Brown, 4 W. Va. 72, and Peerce p. Carskadon, ib. 234, an

act excluding persons from the privilege of sustaining suits in the courts of the

State, or from proceedings for a rehearing, except upon their taking an oath that

they had never been engaged in hostile measures against the government, was

sustained. And see State v. Neal, 42 Mo. 119.

1 Constitution of United States, art. 1, §§ 9 and 10.

* Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 390.

[ 299 ]

* 265

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

ciently extensive for that object, the other restraints I have enu-

merated were unnecessary, and therefore improper, for both of

them are retrospective.

"I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within

the words and the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that

makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which

was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action.

2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than

it was when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punish-

ment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to

the crime when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal

rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than

the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in

order to convict the offender. All these and similar laws are

manifestly unjust and oppressive. In my opinion, the true dis-

tinction is between ex post facto laws and retrospective laws.

Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective, but

every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law; the former

only are prohibited. Every law that takes away or impairs rights
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vested, agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective and is generally

unjust, and may be oppressive; and there is a good general rule,

that a law should have no retrospect; but there are cases in

which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community, and

also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commence-

ment; as statutes of oblivion or of pardon. They are certainly

retrospective, and literally both concerning and after the facta

committed. But I do not consider any law ex post facto, within

the prohibition that mollifies the rigor of the criminal

[* 266] law; but * only those that create or aggravate the crime,

or increase the punishment, or change the rules of evi-

dence for the purpose of conviction. Every law that is to have an

operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antece-

dent time, or to save time from the statute of limitations, or to

excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed, and the

like, is retrospective. But such acts may be proper and necessary,

as the case may be. There is a great and apparent difference

between making an unlawful act lawful, and the making an inno-

cent act criminal, and punishing it as a crime. The expressions

ex post facto are technical; they had been in use long before the
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Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by legis-

lators, lawyers, and authors." 1

Assuming this construction of the constitutional provision to be

correct, — and it has been accepted and followed as correct by the

courts ever since, — it would seem that little need be said relative

to the first, second, and fourth classes of ex post facto laws, as

enumerated in the opinion quoted. It is not essential, howevor, in

order to render a law invalid on these grounds, that it should

expressly assume the action to which it relates to be criminal, or

provide for its punishment on that ground. If it shall subject an

individual to a pecuniary penalty for an act which, when done,

involved no responsibility,2 or if it deprives a party of any valuable

right — like the right to follow a lawful calling — for acts which

were innocent, or at least not punishable by law when committed,3

the law will be ex post facto in the constitutional sense, notwith-

standing it does not in terms declare the acts to which the penalty

is attached criminal.4 But how far a law may change the punishment

for a criminal offence, and make the change applicable to

past offences, is certainly a question of great * difficulty, [* 267]

which has been increased by the decisions made concern-
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ing it. As the constitutional provision is enacted for the protection

and security of accused parties against arbitrary and oppressive

legislative action, it is evident that any change in the law which

1 See, also, Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat.

266; Satterlee v. Mathewson, 2 Pet. 380; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110;

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet 421; Carpenter v. Pennsyl-

vania, 17 How. 463; Camming* v. Missouri, 4 Wal. 277; Ex parte Garland,

ib. 333; Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299; Woart r. Winnick, 3 N. H. 475;

Locke v. Dane, 9 Mass. 363; Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns, 497; Evans v.

Montgomery, 4 W. & S. 218; Tucker v. Harris, 13 Geo. 1; Perry's Case, 8

Grat 632; Municipality No. 1 r. Wheeler, 10 La. An. 745; New Orleans v.

Poutz, 14 La, An. 853. Huber v. Reily, 53 Penn. St. 115.

1 Falconer v. Campbell, 2 McLean, 212.

'Cnmmings v. Missouri, 4 Wal. 277; Ex parte Garland, ib. 333. But a

divorce is not a punishment, and it may therefore be authorized for causes hap-

pening previous to the passage of the divorce act. Carson v. Carson, 40 Miss.

349.

4 The repeal of an amnesty law by a constitutional convention was held to be

a post facto as to the cases covered by the law in State v. Keith, 63 N. C. 140.

An act to validate an invalid conviction would be ex post facto. In re Murphy,

1 Woolw. 141.
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goes in mitigation of the punishment is not liable to this objection.1

But what does go in mitigation of the punishment? If the law

makes a fine less in amount, or imprisonment shorter in point of

duration, or relieves it from some oppressive incident, or if it

dispenses with some severable portion of the legal penalty, no

embarrassment would be experienced in reaching a conclusion that

the law was favorable to the accused, and therefore not ex post facto.

But who shall say, when the nature of the punishment is altogether

changed, and a fine is substituted for the pillory, or imprisonment

for whipping, or imprisonment at hard labor for life for the death

penalty, that the punishment is diminished, or at least not increased

by the change made? What test of severity does the law or reason

furnish in these cases? and must the judge decide upon his own

view of the pain, loss, ignominy, and collateral consequences usually

attending the punishment? or may he take into view the peculiar

condition of the accused, and upon that determine whether, in his

particular case, the punishment prescribed by the new law is more

severe than that under the old or not?

In State v. Arlin,2 the respondent was charged with a robbery,
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which, under the law as it existed at the time it was committed,

was subject to be punished by solitary imprisonment not exceeding

six months, and confinement for life at hard labor in the State

prison. As incident to this severe punishment, he was entitled by

the same law to have counsel assigned him by the government, to

process to compel the attendance of witnesses, to a copy of his

indictment, a list of the jurors who were to try him, &c. Before

he was brought to trial, the punishment for the offence was reduced

to solitary imprisonment not exceeding six months, and confine-

ment at hard labor in the State prison for not less than seven

nor more than thirty years. By the new act, the court, if they

thought proper, were to assign the respondent counsel, and

[* 268] * furnish him with process to compel the attendance of

witnesses in his behalf; and, acting under this discretion,

the court assigned the respondent counsel, but declined to do more;

while the respondent insisted that he was entitled to all the priv-

ileges to which he would have been entitled had the law remained

1 Strong b. State, 1 Blackf. 193; Keen v. State, 3 Chand. 109; Boston v.

Cummins, 16 Geo. 102; Woart e. Winnick, 3 N. H. 473; State v. Arlin, 39

N. H. 180; Clarke r. State, 23 Miss. 261; Maul v. State, 25 Texas, 166.

• 39 N. H. 179.
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unchanged. The court held this claim to be unfounded in the law.

"It is contended," they say, " that, notwithstanding the severity of

the respondent's punishment was mitigated by the alteration of the

statute, he is entitled to the privileges demanded, as incidents to

the offence with which he is charged, at the date of its commission;

in other words, it seems to be claimed, that, by committing the

alleged offence, the respondent acquired a vested right to have

couusel assigned him, to be furnished with process to procure the

attendance of witnesses, and to enjoy all the other privileges to

which he would have been entitled if tried under laws subjecting

him to imprisonment for life upon conviction. This position

appears to us wholly untenable. We have no doubt the privileges

the respondent claims were designed and created solely as inci-

dents of the severe punishment to which his offence formerly

subjected him, and not as incidents of the offence. When the pun-

ishment was abolished, its incidents fell with it; and he might as

well claim the right to be punished under the former law as to be

entitled to the privileges connected with a trial under it." 1

In Strong v. State,2 the plaintiff in error was indicted

and convicted * of perjury, which, under the law as it [* 269]
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existed at the time it was committed, was punishable by

not exceeding one hundred stripes. Before the trial, this punish-

ment was changed to imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceed-

ing seven years. The court held this amendatory law not to be ex

1 With great deference it may be suggested whether this case does not over-

look the important circumstance, that the new law, by taking from the accused

that absolute right to defence by counsel, and to the other privileges by which

the old law surrounded the trial, — all of which were designed as securities

•gainst unjust convictions, — was directly calculated to increase the party's peril,

and was in consequence brought within the reason of the rule which holds a law

or post facto which changes the rules of evidence after the fact, so as to make a

less amount or degree sufficient. Could a law be void as ex post facto which

made a party liable to conviction for perjury in a previous oath on the testimony

pf a single witness, and another law unobjectionable on this score which deprived

a party, when put on trial for a previous act, of all the usual opportunities of

exhibiting the facts and establishing his innocence? Undoubtedly, if the party

accused was always guilty, and certain to be convicted, the new law must be

regarded as mitigating the offence; but, assuming every man to be innocent until

he is proved to be guilty, could such a law be looked upon as "mollifying the

rigor" of the prior law, or as favorable to the accused, when its mollifying cir-

cumstance is more than counterbalanced by others of a contrary character?

'1 Blackf. 193.

[ 303 ]

* 269 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IX.

post facto, as applied to the case. "The words ex post facto have a

definite, technical signification. The plain and obvious meaning of

this prohibition is, that the legislature shall not pass any law, after

a fact done by any citizen, which shall have relation to that fact, so

as to punish that which was innocent when done, or to add to the

punishment of that which was criminal, or to increase the malig-

nity of a crime, or to retrench the rules of evidence so as to make

conviction more easy." "Apply this definition to the act uuder

consideration. Does this statute make a new offence? It does not.

Does it increase the malignity of that which was au offence before?

It does not. Does it so change the rules of evidence as to make

conviction more easy? This cannot be alleged. Does it then

increase the punishment of that which was criminal before its

enactment? We think not." 1

So in Texas it has been held that the infliction of stripes, from

the peculiarly degrading character of the punishment, was worse

than the death penalty. "Among all nations of civilized mau,

from the earliest ages, the infliction of stripes has been considered

more degrading than death itself." 2 While, on the other hand, iu

South Carolina, where, at the time of the commission of a forgery,
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the punishment was death, but it was changed before final judg-

ment to fine, whipping, and imprisonment, the new law was

applied to the case in passing the sentence.8 These cases illus-

1 Mr. Bishop says of this decision: "But certainly the court went far in this

case." 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, § 219 (108).

* Herber v. State, 7 Texas, 69.

8 State v. Williams, 2 Rich. 418. In Clark v. State, 23 Miss. 261, defendant

was convicted of a mayhem. Between the commission of the act and bis convic-

tion, a statute had been passed, changing the punishment for this offence from

the pillory and a fine to imprisonment in the penitentiary, but providing further,

that " no offence committed, and no penalty and forfeiture incurred previous to

the time when this act shall take effect shall be affected by this act, except that

when any punishment, forfeiture, or penalty should have been mitigated by it,

its provisions should be applied to the judgment to be pronounced for offencei

committed before its adoption." In regard to this statute the court say: "We

think that in every case of offence committed before the adoption of the peni-

tentiary code, the prisoner has the option of selecting the punishment prescribed

in that code in lieu of that to which he was liable before its enactment." Bnt

inasmuch as the record did not show that the defendant claimed a commutation

of his punishment, the court confirmed a sentence imposed according to the terms

of the old law. On this subject, see further the cases of Holt v. State, 2 Texas,

363; Dawson v. State, 6 Texas, 347.
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trate * the difficulty of laying down any rule which will [* 270]

be readily and universally accepted as to what is a mitiga-

tion of punishment, where its character is changed, and when from

the very nature of the case there can be no common standard, by

which all minds, however educated, can measure the relative

severity and ignominy.

In Hartung v. People,1 the law providing for the infliction of

capital punishment had been so changed as to require the party

liable to this penalty to be sentenced to confinement at hard labor

in the State prison until the punishment of death should bo

inflicted; and it further provided that such punishment should

not be inflicted under one year, nor until the governor should

issue his warrant for the purpose. The act was evidently designed

for the benefit of parties convicted, and, among other things, to

enable advantage to be taken, for their benefit, of any circumstances

subsequently coming to light which might show the injustice of the

judgment, or throw any more favorable light on the action of the

accused. Nevertheless, the court held the act inoperative as to

offences before committed. "In my opinion," says Denio, J., " it

would be perfectly competent for the legislature, by a general law,
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to remit any separable portion of the prescribed punishment. For

instance, if the punishment were fine and imprisonment, a law

which should dispense with either the fine or the imprisonment

might, I think, be lawfully applied to existing offences; and so, in

my opinion, the term of imprisonment might be reduced, or the

number of stripes diminished, in cases punishable in that manner.

Any thing which, if applied to an individual sentence, would fairly

fall within the idea of a remission of a part of the sentence, would

not be liable to objection. And any change which should be refer-

able to prison discipline or penal administration as its primary

object might also be made to take effect upon past as well as future

offences; as changes in the manner or kind of employment of con-

victs sentenced to hard labor, the system of supervision,

the means of restraint, or the like. Changes of this * sort [* 271]

might operate to increase or mitigate the severity of the

punishment of the convict, but would not raise any question under

the constitutional provision we are considering. The change

wrought by the act of 1860, in the punishment of existing offences

1 22 N. Y. 105.
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of murder, does not fall within either of these exceptions. If it

is to be construed to vest in the governor a discretion to deter

mine whether the convict should be executed or remain a perpet-

ual prisoner at hard labor, this would only be equivalent to what he

might do under the authority to commute a sentence. But he can,

under the Constitution, only do this once for all. If he refuses

the pardon, the convict is executed according to sentence. If be

grants it, his jurisdiction of the case ends. The act in question

places the convict at the mercy of the governor in office at the

expiration of one year from the time of the conviction, and of all

of his successors during the lifetime of the convict. He may be

ordered to execution at any time, upon any notice, or without

notice. Under one of the repealed sections of the Revised Stat-

utes, it was required that a period should intervene between the

sentence and execution of not less than four, nor more than

eight weeks. If we stop here, the change effected by the statute is

between an execution within a limited time, to be prescribed by the

court, or a pardon or commutation of the sentence during that

period, on the one hand, and the placing the convict at the mercy

of the executive magistrate for the time, and his successors, to be
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executed at his pleasure at any time after one year, on the other.

The sword is indefinitely suspended over his head, ready to fall at

any time. It is not enough to say, if even that can be said, that

most persons would probably prefer such a fate to the former cap-

ital sentence. It is enough to bring the law within the condem-

nation of the Constitution, that it changes the punishment after

the commission of the offence, by substituting for the prescribed

penalty a different one. We have no means of saying whether

one or the other would be the most severe in a given case. That

would depend upon the disposition and temperament of the con-

vict. The legislature cannot thus experiment upon the criminal

law. The law, moreover, prescribes one year's imprisonment, at

hard labor in the Slate prison, in addition to the punishment of

death. In every case of the execution of a capital sentence, it

must be preceded by the year's imprisonment at hard labop. True,

the concluding part of the punishment cannot be executed

[* 272] * unless the governor concurs by ordering the execution.

But as both parts may, in any given case, be inflicted,

and as the convict is consequently, under this law, exposed to the

double infliction, it is, within both the definitions which have been
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mentioned, an ex post facto law. It changes tlie punishment, and

inflicts a greater punishment than that which the law annexed to

the crime when committed. It is enough, in my opinion, that it

changes it in any manner except by dispensing with divisible por-

tions of it; but upon the other definition announced by Judge

Chase, where it is implied that the change must be from a less to

a greater punishment, this act cannot be sustained." This decision

has since been several times followed in the State of New York,1

and it must now be regarded as the settled law of that State, that

"a law changing the punishment for offences committed before its

passage is ex post facto and void, under the Constitution, unless the

change consists in the remission of some separable part of the pun-

ishment before prescribed, or is referable to prison discipline or

penal administration as its primary object."2 And this rule seems

to U3 a sound and sensible one, with perhaps this single qualifica-

tion, — that the substitution of any other punishment for that of

death must be regarded as a mitigation of the penalty.8

But so far as mere modes of procedure are concerned, a party

has no more right, in a criminal than in a civil action, to insist

that his case shall be disposed of under the law in force when the
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act to be investigated is charged to have taken place. Remedies

must always be under the control of the legislature, and it would

create endless confusion in legal proceedings if every case was to

be conducted only in accordance with the rules of practice, and

heard only by the courts, in existence when its facts arose. The

legislature may abolish courts and create new ones, and it may

prescribe altogether different modes of procedure in its discretion,

though it cannot lawfully, we think, in so doing, dispense with

any of those substantial protections with which the existing law

surrounds the person accused of crime. A law giving the govern-

ment additional challenges,4 and another which authorized

* the amendment of indictments,6 have both been sus- [* 273]

1 Shepherd v. People, 25 N.Y. 406; Ratzky v. People, 29 N. Y. 124; Kuck-

ler v. People, 6 Park. Cr. Rep. 212.

'Per Davia, J., in Ratzky v. People, 29 N. Y. 124.

'See 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, § 219 (108).

'Walston v. Commonwealth, 16 B. Monr. 15; State e. Ryan, 13 Minn. 370;

State c. Wilson, 48 N. H. 398; Commonwealth e. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412.

1 State v. Manning, 14 Texas, 402; Lasure v. State, 19 Ohio, n. s. 43. See

State v. Corson, 59 Me. 137. The defendant in any case must be proceeded
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tained as applicable to past transactions, as any similar law.

tending only to improve the remedy, but working no injustice to

the defendant, and depriving him of no substantial right, doubt-

less would be.

And a-law is not objectionable as ex'post facto which, in provid-

ing for the punishment of future offences, authorizes the offender's

conduct in the past to be taken into the account, and the punish-

ment to be graduated accordingly. Heavier penalties are often

provided by law for a second or any subsequent offence than for

the first; and it has not been deemed objectionable that, in pro-

viding for such heavier penalties, the prior conviction authorized

to be taken into the account may have taken place before the law

was passed.1 In such case, it is the second or subsequent offence

that is punished, not the first;2 and the act would be void if the

offence to be actually punished had been committed before it had

taken effect, even though it was after its passage.3

Lawn impairing the Obligation of Contracts.

The Constitution of the United States also forbids the Statea
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passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts.4 It is

remarkable that this very important clause was passed over

against and punished under the law in force when the proceeding is had. State

c. Williams, 2 Rich. 418; Keene v. State, 2 Chand. 109; People v. 'Phelps, 5

Wend. 9; Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Grat. 738. A law is not unconstitutional

which precludes a defendant in a criminal case from taking advantage of vari-

ances which do not prejudice him. Commonwealth v. Hall, 97 Mass. 570. Nor

one which, though passed after the commission of the offence, authorizes a

change of venue to another county of the judicial district. Gut v. State, 9

Wal. 35- Nor one which gives the government a right to additional challenges.

Walston v. Commonwealth, 16 B. Monr. 15; State r. Ryan, 13 Minn. 870; State

v. Wilson, 48 N. H. 398; Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 108 Mass. 412. Nor one,

it seems, which requires an oath of past loyalty of voters. Blain r. Ridgeley,

41 Mo. 63; State v. Neal, 42 Mo. 119: Contra, Green v. Shumway, 39 N. Y.

418. And see cases cited, ante, 64, note 3. But a statute providing that the

rule of law precluding a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accom-

plice should not apply to cases of misdemeanor, it was held could not have

retrospective operation. Hart v. State, 40 Ala. 32.

1 Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Grat. 788; Ross's Case, 2 Pick. 165; People r.

Butler, 3 Cow. 847.

* Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Grat. 788.

■ Riley's Case, 2 Pick. 172.

4 Const, art 1, § 10.
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almost without comment during the discussions preceding the

adoption of that instrument, though since its adoption no clause

which the Constitution contains has been more prolific of litiga-

tion, or given rise to more animated and at times angry contro-

versy. It is but twice alluded to in the papers of the Federalist;1

and though its great importance is assumed, it is evident that the

writer had no conception of the prominence it was afterwards to

hold in constitutional discussions, or of the very numerous cases

to which it was to be applied in practice.

The first question that arises under this provision is,

What is a * contract in the sense in which the word is [* 274]

here employed? In the leading case upon this subject,

it appeared that the legislature of Georgia had made a grant of

land, but afterwards, on an allegation that the grant had been

obtained by fraud, a subsequent legislature had passed another

act annulling and rescinding the first conveyance, and asserting

the right of the State to the laud it covered. "A contract," says

Ch. J. Marshall, " is a compact between two or more parties, and

is either executory or executed. An executory contract is one in

which a party binds himself to do or not to do a particular thing.
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Such was the law under which the conveyance was made by the

governor. A contract executed is one in which the object of

the contract is performed; and this, says Blackstone, diners in

nothing from a grant. The contract between Georgia and the

purchasers was executed by the grant. A contract executed,

as well as one which is executory, contains obligations binding

on the parties. A grant, in its own nature, amounts to an extin-

guishment of the right of the grantor, and implies a contract not

to reassert that right. A party is, therefore, always estopped by

his own grant. Since then, in fact, a grant is a contract exe-

cuted, the obligation of which still continues, and since the Con-

stitution uses the general term 'contract,' without distinguishing

between those which are executory and those which are executed,

it must be construed to comprehend the latter as well as the

former. A law annulling conveyances between individuals, and

declaring that the grantors should stand seized of their former

estates, notwithstanding those grants, would be as repugnant to

the Constitution as a law discharging the vendors of property from

1 Federalist, Nos. 7 and 44.
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the obligation of executing their contracts by conveyances. It

would be strange if a contract to convey was secured by the Con-

stitution, while an absolute conveyance remained unprotected.

If, under a fair construction of the Constitution, grants are com-

prehended under the term 'contracts,' is a grant from the State

excluded from the operation of the provision? Is the clause to

be considered as inhibiting the State from impairing the obligation

of contracts between two individuals, but as excluding from that

inhibition contracts made with itself? The words themselves con-

tain no such distinction. They are general, and are applicable to

contracts of every description. If contracts made with the State

are to be exempted from their operations, the exception

[* 275] must arise from the character of * the contracting party,

not from the words which are employed." And the court

proceed to give reasons for their decision, that violence should not

"be done to the natural meaning of words, for the purpose of leav-

ing to the legislature the power of seizing, for public use, the estate

of an individual, in the form of a law annulling the title by which
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he holds that estate."1

It will be seen that this leading decision settles two important

points: first, that an executed contract is within the provision,

and second, that it protects from violation the contracts of States

equally with those entered into between private individuals.2 And

1 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 183.

* This decision has been repeatedly followed. In the founding of the Colony

of Virginia, the religious establishment of England was adopted, and before the

Revolution the churches of that denomination had become vested, by grants of

the crown or Colony, with large properties, which continued in their possession

after the constitution of the State had forbidden the creation or continuance of

any religious establishment, possessed of exclusive rights or privileges, or the

compelling the citizens to worship under a stipulated form or discipline, or to pay

taxes to those whose creed they could not conscientiously believe. By statute in

1801, the legislature asserted their right to all the property of the Episcopal

churches in the respective parishes of the State; and, among other things,

directed and authorized the overseers of the poor and their successors in each

parish, wherein any glebe land was vacant or should become so, to sell the same

and appropriate the proceeds to the use of the poor of the parish. By this act,

it will be seen, the State sought in effect to resume grants made by the sover-

eignty, — a practice which had been common enough in English history, and of

which precedents were not wanting in the history of the American Colonies.

The Supreme Court of the United States held the grant not revocable, and that

the legislative act was therefore unconstitutional and void. Terrett v. Taylor, 9
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it has since been held that compacts between two States are in

like manner protected.1 These decisions, however, do not

fully * determine what under all circumstances is to be [* 276]

regarded as a contract. A grant of land by a State is a

contract, because in making it the State deals with the purchaser

precisely as any other vendor might; and if its mode of convey-

ance is any different, it is only because by virtue of its sover-

eignty, it has power to convey by other modes than those which

the general law opens to private individuals. But many things

done by the State may seem to hold out promises to individuals,

which after all cannot be treated as contracts without hampering

the legislative power of the State in a manner that would soon

leave it without the means of performing its essential functions.

The State creates offices, and appoints persons to fill them; it

establishes municipal corporations, with large and valuable privi-

leges for its citizens; by its general laws it holds out inducements

to immigration; it passes exemption laws, and laws for the en-

couragement of trade and agriculture; and under all these laws

a greater or less number of citizens expect to derive profit and

emolument. But can these laws be regarded as contracts between
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the State and the officers and corporations who are, or the cit-

Cranch, 43. See also Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 335; People v.

Piatt, 17 Johns. 195; Montgomery v. Kasson, 16 Cal. 189; Grogan v. San

Francisco, 18 Cal. 590; Rehobotb p. Hunt, 1 Pick. 224; Lowry v. Francis,

2 Yerg. 534; University of North Carolina t>. Foy, 2 Havw. 810; State v.

Barker, 4 Kansas, 379 and 435. The lien of a bondholder, who has loaned

money to the State on a pledge of property by legislative act, cannot be divested

or postponed by a subsequent legislative act. Wabash, &c, Co. v. Beers, 2

Black, 448.

1 On the separation of Kentucky from Virginia, a compact was entered into

between the proposed new and the old State, by which it was agreed "that all

private grants and interests of lands, within the said district, derived from the

laws of Virginia, shall remain valid and secure under the laws of the proposed

State, and shall be determined by the laws now existing in this State." After

the admission of the new State to the Union, " occupying claimant" laws were

passed by its legislature, such as were not in existence in Virginia, and by the

force of which, under certain circumstances, the owner might be deprived of his

title to land, unless he would pay the value of lasting improvements made upon

it by an adverse claimant. These acts were also held void; the compact was

held inviolable under the Constitution, and it was deemed no objection to its

binding character, that its effect was to restrict, in some directions, the legislative

power of the State entering into it. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1. See also

Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457.
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izens of the State who expect to be, benefited by their passage, so

as to preclude their being repealed?

On these points it would seem that there could be no difficulty.

When the State employs officers or creates municipal corporations

as the mere agencies of government, it must have the power

to discontinue the agency whenever it comes to be regarded as

no longer important. "The framers of the Constitution did not

intend to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil

institutions, adopted for internal government." 1 They may,

therefore, discontinue offices and abolish or change the organi-

zation of municipal corporations at any time, according to the

existing legislative view of state policy, unless forbidden

[*277 ] by their own constitutions from doing so.2 And * although

municipal corporations, as respects the property which

1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 629, per Marshall, Ch. J.

'Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Warner v. People, 2 Denio, 272;

Commonwealth 8. Bacon, 6 S. & R. 322; Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 W. & S.

418; Conner v. New York, 2 Sandf. 355, and 5 N. Y. 285; Wilcox v. Rodman,
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46 Mo. 323; State v. Douglass, 26 Wis. 428; Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala. 103;

Robinson t>. White, 26 Ark. 139; Alexander v. McKenzie, 2 S. C. (n. s.) 81.

Compare People v. Bull, 46 N. Y. 57; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 302. "Where an

office is created by statute, it is wholly within the control of the legislature. The

term, the mode of appointment, and the compensation may be altered at pleasure,

and the latter may be even taken away without abolishing the office. Such

extreme legislation is not to be deemed probable in any case. But we are now

discussing the legislative power, not its expediency or propriety. Having the

power, the legislature will exercise it for the public good, and it is the sole judge

of the exigency which demands its interference." Per Sandford, J., 2 Sandf. 369.

"The selection of officers who are nothing more than public agents for the effect-

uating of public purposes is matter of public convenience or necessity, and so,

too, are the periods for the appointment of such agents; but neither the one nor

the other of these arrangements can constitute any obligation to continue such

agents, or to reappoint them, after the measures which brought them into being

shall have been found useless, shall have been fulfilled, or shall have been abrogated

as even detrimental to the well-being of the public. The promised compensation

for services actually performed and accepted, during the continuance of the par-

ticular agency, may undoubtedly be claimed, both upon principles of compact and

of equity; but to insist beyond this upon the perpetuation of a public policy

either useless or detrimental, and upon a reward for acts neither desired nor per-

formed, would appear to be reconcilable with neither common justice nor common

sense." Daniel, J., in 10 How. 416. See also Barker v. Pittsburgh, 4 Penn.

St. 49; Standiford v. Wingate, 2 Duv. 443; Taft v. Adams, 3 Gray, 126;

Walker v. Peellc, 18 Ind. 264; People v. Haskell, 5 Cal. 357 ; Territory v. Pyle,

1 Oregon, 149; Bryan v. Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538. But if the term of an office is
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they hold, control, and manage for the benefit of their citizens,

are governed by the same rules and subject to the same liabilities

as individuals, yet this property, so far as it has been derived from

the State, or obtained by the exercise of the ordinary powers of

government, must be held subject to control by the State, but

under the restriction only, that it is not to be appropriated to uses

foreign to those for which it has been acquired. And the fran-

chises conferred upon such a corporation, for the benefit of its

citizens, must be liable to be resumed at any time by that author-

ity which may mould the corporate powers at its will, or even

revoke them altogethep. The greater power will comprehend the

less.1 If, however, a grant is made to a municipal corpo-

ration * charged with a trust in favor of an individual, [* 278]

fixed by the Constitution, the legislature cannot remove the officer— except as

that instrument may allow — either directly, or indirectly by abolishing the

office. People v. Dubois, 23 1ll. 547; State v. Messmore, 14 Wis. 163; Com-

monwealth v. Gamble, 62 Penn. St. 343; s. c. 1 Am. Rep. 422; Lowe v. Com-

monwealth, 3 Met. Ky. 240. Compare Christy p. Commissioners, 39 Cal. 3.

Nor can the legislature take from a constitutional officer a portion of the charac-

teristic duties belonging to the office and devolve them upon an office of its own
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creation. State v. Brunst, 26 Wis. 413; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 84, disapproving State

p. Dews, R. M. Charl. 397. Compare People v. Raymond, 37 N. Y. 428;

King v. Hunder, 65 N. C. 603; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 754. As to control of munic-

ipal corporations, see further, Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427; Bradford v.

Cary, 5 Greenl. 339; Bush p. Shipman, 4 Scam. 186; Trustees, &p. p. Tatman,

13 1ll. 27; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325; Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. 558;

People v. Banvard, 27 Cal. 470; ante, p. 8.

1 In East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 533, Mp. Justice Wood-

bury, in speaking of the grant of a ferry franchise to a municipal corporation,

says: "Our opinion is. . . . that the parties to this grant did not by their

charter stand in the attitude towards each other of making a contract by it, such

as is contemplated by the Constitution, and as could not be modified by subse-

quent legislation. The legislature was acting here on the one part, and public

municipal and political corporations on the othep. They were acting, too, in

relation to a public object, being virtually a highway across the river, over

another highway up and down the rivep. From this standing and relation of

these parties, and from the subject-matter of their action, we think that the

doings of the legislature as to this ferry must be considered rather as public laws

than as contracts. They related to public interests. They changed as those

interests demanded. The grantees, likewise, the towns, being mere organizations

for public purposes, were liable to have their public powers, rights, and duties

modified or abolished at any moment by the legislature. They are incorporated

for public, and not private objects. They are allowed to hold privileges or prop-

erty only for public purposes. The members are not shareholders nor joint part-
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[* 279] private corporation, * or charity, the interest which the

cestui que trust has under the grant may sustain it

ners in any corporate estate, which they can sell or devise to others, or which

can be attached and levied on for their debts. Hence, generally, the doings

between them and the legislature are in the nature of legislation rather than com-

pact, and subject to all the legislative conditions just named, and therefore to be

considered not violated by subsequent legislative changes. It is hardly possible

to conceive the grounds on which a different result could be vindicated, without

destroying all legislative sovereignty, and checking most legislative improvements,

as well as supervision over its subordinate public bodies." A different doctrine

was advanced by Mr. Justice Sarculo, in Benson v. Mayor, &c, of New York,

10 Barb. 234, who cites in support of his opinion, that ferry grants to the city of

New York could not be taken away by the legislature, what is said by Chancellor

Kent (2 Kent's Com. 275), that " public corporations. . . . may be empowered

to take and hold private property for municipal uses; and such property is

invested with the security of other private rights. So corporate franchises,

attached to public corporations, are legal estates, coupled with an interest, and

are protected as private property." This is true in a general sense, and it is also
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true that, in respect to such property and franchises, the same rules of responsi-

bility are to be applied as in the case of individuals. Bailey v. Mayor, &c, of

New York, 3 Hill, 531. But it does not follow that the legislature, under its

power to administer the government, of which these agencies are a part, and for

the purposes of which the grant has been made, may not at any time modify the

municipal powers and privileges, by transferring the grant to some other agency,

or revoking it when it seems to have become unimportant. In People v. Power,

25 111. 190, Breese, J., in speaking of a law which provided that three-fourths of

the taxes collected in the county of Sangamon, with certain deductions, should

be paid over to the city of Springfield, which is situated therein, says: "While

private corporations are regarded as contracts, which the legislature cannot con-

stitutionally impair, as the trustee of the public interests it has the exclusive and

unrestrained control over public corporations; and as it may create, so it may

modify or destroy, as public exigency requires or the public interests demand.

Coles v. Madison County, Breese, 115. Their whole capacities, powers, and

duties are derived from the legislature, and subordinate to that power. If, then,

the legislature can destroy a county, they can destroy any of its parts, and take

from it any one of its powers. The revenues of a county are not the property

of the county, in the sense in which revenue of a private person or corporation

is regarded. The whole State has an interest in the revenue of a county, and

for the public good the legislature must have the power to direct its application.

The power conferred upon a county to raise a revenue by taxation is a political

power, and its application when collected must necessarily be within the control

of the legislature for political purposes. The act of the legislature nowhere pro-

poses to take from the county of Sangamon, and give to the city of Springfield,

any property belonging to the county, or revenues collected for the use of the

county. But if it did, it would not be objectionable. But, on the contrary, it

proposes alone to appropriate the revenue which may be collected by the county,

by taxes levied on property both in the city and county, in certain proportions
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against legislative revocation, a vested equitable interest being

property in the same sense and entitled to the same protection as

a legal.1

Those charters of incorporation, however, which are granted, not

as a part of the machinery of the government, but for the private

benefit or purposes of the corporators, stand upon a different foot-

ing, and are held to be contracts between the legislature and the

corporators, having for their consideration the liabilities and duties

which the corporators assume by accepting them; and the grant

of the franchise can no more be resumed by the legislature, or its

benefits diminished or impaired without the consent of the grantees,

than any other grant of property or valuable thing, unless the right

to do so is reserved in the charter itself.2

ratably to the city and county." And see Bush v. Shipman, 4 Scam. 190; Rich-

land County v. Lawrence County, 12 1ll. 1; Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52

Penn. St. 374; Guilford p. Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb. 615, and 13 N. Y.

143; ante, 235-239, and cases cited.

1 See Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292, and Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch,

43. The municipal corporation holding property or rights in trust might even

be abolished without affecting the grant; but the Court of Chancery might be
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empowered to appoint a new trustee to take charge of the property, and to exe-

cute the trust. Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12.

* Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 519; Trustees of Vincennes

University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268; Planters Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301; Piqua

Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Binghampton Bridge Case, 3 Wal. 51; Norris v.

Trustees of Abingdon Academy, 7 G. & J. 7; Grammar School v. Burt, 11 Vt.

632; Brown p. Hummel, 6 Penn. St. 86 ; State v. Heyward, 3 Rich. 389; People

r. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. 351; Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 Penn. St. 133;

Commercial Bank of Natchez v. State, 14 Miss. 599; Backus v. Lebanon, 11

X.H. 19; Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 225; Bridge Co.

v. Hoboken Co., 2 Beas. 81; Miners Bank p. United States, 1 Greene (Iowa),

553; Edwards p. Jagers, 19 Ind. 407; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Bruffet v.

G. W. R.R. Co., 25 1ll. 353; People v. Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co.,

9 Mich. 285; Bank of the State p. Bank of Cape Fear, 13 Ired. 75; Mills p.

Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wal. 10; Wales p. Stetson, 2

Mass. 146; Nichols v. Bertram, 3 Pick. 342; King v. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass.

447; State v. Tombeckbee Bank, 2 Stew. 30; Central Bridge v. Lowell, 15 Gray,

106; Bank of the Dominion v. McVeigh, 20 Grat. 457. The mere passage of an

act of incorporation, however, does not make the contract; and it may be repealed

prior to a full acceptance by the corporators. Mississippi Society v. Musgrove,

44 Miss. 820; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 723. It is under the protection of the decision I

in the Dartmouth College Case that the most enormous and threatening powers in 1

our country have been created; some of the great and wealthy corporations

actually having greater influence in the country at large and upon the legislation

of the country than the States to which they owe their corporate existence. I
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[* 280] * Perhaps the most interesting question which arises in

this discussion is, whether it is competent for the legislat-

ure to so bind up its-own hands by a grant as topreclude it from

exercising for the future any of the essential attributes of sover-

eignty in regard to any of the subjects within its jurisdiction;

whether, for instance, it can agree that it will not exercise the

power of taxation, or the police power of the State, or the right

of eminent domain, as to certain specified property or persons;

and whether if it shall undertake to do so, the agreement is not

void on the general principle that the legislature cannot diminish

the power of its successors by irrepealable legislation, and that any

other rule might cripple and eventually destroy the government

itself. If the legislature has power to do this, it is certainly a very

dangerous power, exceedingly liable to abuse, and may possibly

come in time to make the constitutional provision in question as

prolific of evil as it ever has been, or is likely to be, of good.

So far as the power of taxation is concerned, it has been so often

Every privilege granted or right conferred — no matter by what means or on

what pretence — being made inviolable by the Constitution, the government

is frequently found stripped of its authority in very important particulars, by
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unwise, careless, or corrupt legislation; and a clause of the Federal Constitu-

tion, whose purpose was to preclude the repudiation of debts and just contracts,

protects and perpetuates the evil. To guard against such calamities in the fut-

ure, it is customary now for the people in framing their constitutions to forbid

the granting of corporate powers except subject to amendment and repeal; but

the improvident grants of an early day are beyond their reach.

In Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. 561, Pearson, J., states the difference between

the acts of incorporation of public and private corporations as follows: "The

substantial distinction is this. Some corporations are created by the mere will

of the legislature, there being no other party interested or concerned. To this

party a portion of the power of the legislature is delegated, to be exercised for

the general good, and subject at all times to be modified, changed, or annulled.

Other corporations are the result of contract. The legislature is not the only

party interested; for, although it has a public purpose ta be accomplished, it

chooses to <lo it by the instrumentality of a second party. These two parties

make a contract. The legislature, for and in consideration of certain labor and

outlay of money, confers upon the party of the second part the privilege of being

a corporation, with certain power and capacities. The expectation of benefit to

the public is the moving consideration on one side, that of expected remuneration

for the outlay is the consideration on the other. It is a contract, and therefore

cannot be modified, changed, or annulled, without the consent of both parties."

An incorporated academy, whose endowment comes exclusively from the public,

is a public corporation. Dart v. Houston, 22 Geo. 506. Compare State v.

Adams, 44 Mo. 570.
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decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, though not

without remonstrance on the part of State courts,1 that an agree-

ment by a State, for a consideration received or supposed to be

received, that certain property, rights, or franchises shall be

exempt from taxation, or be taxed only at a certain * agreed [* 281]

rate, is a contract protected by the Constitution, that the

question can no longer be considered an open one.2 In any case,

however, there must be a consideration, so that the State can be

supposed to have received a beneficial equivalent; for it is con-

ceded on all sides that if the exemption is made as a privilege

only, it may be revoked at any time.8

'Mechanics and Traders Bank v. Debolt, 1 Ohio, N. 8. 691; Toledo Bank v.

Bond, ib. 622; Knoop v. Piqua Bank, ib. 603; Milan and R. Plank Road Co. v.

Husted, 3 Ohio, n. s. 578; Piscataqua Bridge v. N. H. Bridge, 7 N. H. C9;

Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 143; Backus o. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 24; Thorpe v.

R. & B. R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140; Brainard v. Colchester, 31 Conn. 410; Mott

v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 30 Penn. St. 9; East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v.

East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259. See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice

Miller in Washington University ». Rouse, 8 Wal. 441, in which the Chief Jus-

tice and Justice Field concurred. Also Raleigh, &c, R.R. Co. v. Reid, 64
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N. C. 155.

* New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court,

3 How. 133; Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Ohio Life and Trust Co. v.

Debolt, ib. 416; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Mechanics and Traders

Bank r. Debolt, 18 How. 380; Mechanics and Traders Bank v. Thomas, ib.

384; McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wal. 143; Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wal.

430; Washington University v. Rouse, t'6. 431; Wilmington R.R. Co. v. Reid,

13 Wal. 264; Raleigh and Gaston R.R. Co. v. Reid, ib. 269. See also Atwater

». Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223; Osborne v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 335; Parker v.

Redfield, 10 Conn. 495; Landon v. Litchfield, 11 Conn. 251; Herrick c. Ran-

dolph, 13 Vt. 525; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt. 751; O'Donnell v. Bailey, 24

Miss. 386; St. Paul, &c, R.R. Co. v. Parcher, 14 Minn. 297.

a Christ's Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; Brainard v. Colchester, 31

Conn. 410. See also Commonwealth v. Bird, 12 Mass. 442; Dole t>. The

Governor, 3 Stew. 387. If an exemption from taxation exists in any case, it

must be the result of a deliberate intention to relinquish this prerogative of

sovereignty, distinctly manifested. Easton Bank v. Commonwealth, 10 Penn.

St. 460; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 561; Christ Church r. Philadel-

phia, 24 How. 302; Oilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 513; Herrick v. Randolph,

13 Vt. 531; East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259;

s. c. 13 Wal. 373; People e. Roper, 25 N. Y. 629; People v. Commissioners of

Taxes, 47 N. Y. 501; Lord t. Litchfield, 36 Conn. 116; s. C. 4 Am. Rep. 41;

Erie Railway Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Penn. St. 84; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 351;

Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush, 667; 8. c. 3 Am. Rep. 809; North Missouri R.R.

Co. v. Maguire, 49 Mo. 490; 8. c. 8 Am. Rep. 141.

* 281 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IX.

\

The power of the legislature to preclude itself in any case from

exercising the power of eminent domain is not so plainly decided.

It must be conceded, under the authorities, that the State may

grant exclusive franchises, — like the right to construct the only

railroad which shall be built between certain termini; or the only

bridge which shall be permitted over a river between specified

limits; or to own the only ferry which shall be allowed at a cer-

tain point,1 — but the grant of an exclusive privilege will not pre-

vent the legislature from exercising the power of eminent domain

in respect thereto. Franchises, like every other thing of value,

and in the nature of property, within the State, are subject to this

power, and any of their incidents may be taken away, or them-

selves altogether annihilated by means of its exercise.2 And it is

believed that an express agreement in the charter, that the power

of eminent domain should not be so exercised as to impair or affect

the franchise granted, if not void as an agreement beyond the

power of the legislature to make, must be considered as only a

valuable portion of the privilege secured by the grant, and as such

liable to be appropriated under the power of emiuent
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[* 282] domain. The exclusiveness * of the grant, and the agree-

ment against interference with it, if valid, constitute

elements in its value to be taken into account in assessing com-

pensation; but appropriating the franchise in such a case no more

violates the obligation of the contract than does the appropriation

of land which the State has granted under an express or implied

agreement for quiet enjoyment by the grantee, but which never-

theless may be taken when the public need requires. All grants

are subject to this implied condition; and it may well be worthy

of inquiry, whether the agreement that a franchise granted shall

not afterwards be appropriated can have any other or greater

force than words which would make it an exclusive franchise, but

which, notwithstanding, would not preclude a subsequent grant

1 West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 16 Vt. 446, and 6 How. 507; Binghampton

Bridge Case, 8 Wal. 51; Shorter v. Smith, 9 Geo. 529; Piscataqua Bridge c.

N. H. Bridge, 7 N. H. 85; Boston Water Power Co. o. Boston and Worcester

R.R. Co., 23 Pick. 360; Boston and Lowell R.R. v. Salem and Lowell R.R.,

2 Gray, 9; Costar r. Brash, 25 Wend. 628; California Telegraph Co. v. Alta

Telegraph Co., 22 Cal. 398.

* Matter of Kerr, 42 Barb. 119; Endfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford and

N. H. R.R. Co., 17 Conn. 40, 454; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 16 Vt. 446,

and 6 How. 607.
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on making compensation.1 The words of the grant are as much

in the way of the grant of a conflicting franchise in the one case

as in the other.

It has also been intimated in a very able opinion that

the * police power of the State could not be alienated even [* 283]

by express grant.2 And this opinion is supported by those

1 Mr. Greenleaf, in a note to his edition of Cruise on Real Property, Vol. II.

p. 67, says upon this subject: "In regard to the position that the grant of the

franchise of a ferry, bridge, turnpike, or railroad, is in its nature exclusive, so

that the State cannot interfere with it by the creation of another similar franchise,

tending materially to impair its value, it is with great deference submitted that

an important distinction should be observed between those powers of government

which are essential attributes of sovereignty, indispensable to be always pre-

served in full vigor, such as the power to create revenues for the public purposes,

to provide for the common defence, to provide safe and convenient ways for the

public necessity and convenience, and to take private property for public uses,

and the like, and those powers which are not thus essential, such as the power

to alienate the lands and other property of the State, and to make contracts of

service, and &f purchase and sale, or the like. Powers of the former class are

essential to the constitution of society, as without them no political community

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

can well exist; and necessity requires that they should continue unimpaired.

They are intrusted to the legislature to be exercised, not to be bartered away;

anil it is indispensable that each legislature should assemble with the same

measure of sovereign power which was held by its predecessors. Any act of the

legislature disabling itself from the future exercise of powers intrusted to it for

the public good must be void, being in effect a covenant to desert its paramount

duty to the whole people. It is therefore deemed not competent for a legislat-

ure to covenant that it will not, under any circumstances, open another avenue

for the public travel within certain limits, or in a certain term of time; such

covenant being an alienation of sovereign powers, and a violation of public duty."

See also Redfield on Railways (3d ed.), Vol. I. p. 258. That the intention to

relinquish the right of eminent domain is not to be presumed in any legislative

grant, see People v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 32 Barb. 113; Illinois and

Michigan Canal v. Chicago and Rock Island Railroad Co., 14 111. 321.

!" We think the power of the legislature to control existing railways in this

respect may be found in the general control over the police of the country, which

resides in the law-making power in all free States, and which is, by the fifth arti-

cle of the Bill of Rights in this State, expressly declared to reside perpetually

and inalienably in the legislature, which is, perhaps, no more than the enuncia-

tion of a general principle applicable to all free states, and which cannot there-

fore be violated so as to deprive the legislature of the power, even by express

grant, to any mere public or private corporation. And when the regulation of

the police of a city or town, by general ordinances, is given to such cities or

towns, and the regulation of their own internal police is given to railroads, to be

carried into effect by their by-laws and other regulations, it is, of course, always,

is all such cases, subject to the superior control of the legislature. That is a

[819]
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cases where it has been held that licenses to make use of property

in certain modes may be revoked by the State, notwithstanding

they may be connected with grants and based upon a considera-

tion.1 But this subject we shall recur to hereafter.

It would seem, therefore, to be the prevailing opinion, and one

based upon sound reason, that the State could not barter away,

or in any manner abridge or weaken, any of those essential

powers which are inherent in all governments, and the existence

of which in full vigor is important to the well-being of organized

society; and that any contracts to that end, being without author-

ity, cannot be enforced under the provision of the national Con-

stitution now under consideration. If the tax cases are to be

regarded as an exception to this statement, the exception is per-

haps to be considered a nominal rather than a real one, since

taxation is for the purpose of providing the State a revenue, and

the State laws which have been enforced as contracts in these

case have been supposed to be based upon consideration,

[* 284] * by which the State receives the benefit which would have
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accrued from an exercise of the relinquished power in the

ordinary mode.

responsibility which legislatures cannot divest themselves of, if they would.''

Thorpe r. R. & B. R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 149, per Redfiehl, Ch. J. See also Indian-

apolis, &c, R.R. Co. v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84; Ohio, &c., R.R. Co. v. M'Clel-

land, 25 111. 140. See State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189, on the same subject. In

Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush, 367; s. C. 3 Am. Rep. 309, it was decided that a

provision in a city charter that, after the first improvement of a street, repairs

should be made at the expense of the city, was not a contract; and on its repeal

a lot owner, who had paid for the improvement, might have his lot assessed for

the repairs. Compare Hamraett o. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St. 146; s. c. 3 Am.

Rep. 615.

1 See, upon this subject, Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &c, of New

York, 5 Cow. 538; Vanderbilt r. Adams, 7 Cow. 349; State t>. Sterling. 8 Mo.

697; Him v. State, 1 Ohio, N. s. 15; Calder v. Kurby, 6 Gray, 597; Brimmer

o. Boston, 102 Mass. 19. Whether a State, after granting licenses to sell liquors

for which a fee is received, can revoke them by a general law forbidding sales, is

in dispute upon the authorities. See Freleigh v. State, 8 Mo. 606; State v.

Sterling, ib. 697; Calder ». Kurby, 5 Gray, 59*; Metropolitan Board of Ex-

cise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; and Commonwealth v. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70,

which hold that it may: and State v. Phalen, 3 Harr. 441; Adams v. Hackett, 7

Fost. 294; and Boyd r. State, 46 Ala., which are contra. See also State t\

Hawthorn, 9 Mo. 389. If it has the power, it would seem an act of bad faith to

exercise it, without refunding the money received for the license. Hirn v. State,

1 Ohio, n. s. 21.

[ 320 ]

CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION OF PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 284

We have said in another place that citizens have no vested right

in the existing general laws of the State which can preclude their

amendment or repeal, and that there is no implied promise on the

part of the State to protect its citizens against incidental injury

occasioned by changes in the law. Nevertheless there may be

laws which amount to propositions on the part of the State, which,

if accepted by individuals, will become binding contracts. Of this

class are perhaps to be considered bounty laws, by which the State

promises the payment of a gratuity to any one who will do any

particular act supposed to be for the State interest. Unquestion-

ably the State may repeal such an act at any time;1 but when

the proposition has been accepted by the performance of the act

before the law is repealed, the contract would seem to be com-

plete, and the promised gratuity becomes a legal debt.2 And

where a State was owner of the stock of a bank, and by the law

its bills and notes were to be received in payment of all debts

due to the State, it was properly held that this law constituted a

contract with those who should receive the bills before its repeal,

and that a repeal of the law could not deprive these holders of the

right which it assured. Such a law, with the acceptance of the
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bills under it, " comes within the definition of a contract. It is

a contract founded upon a good and valuable consideration,—

a consideration beneficial to the State, as its profits are increased

by sustaining the credit, and consequently extending the circula-

tion of the paper of the bank."3

That laws permitting the dissolution of the contract of mar-

riage are not within the intention of the clause of the Constitution

under discussion seems to be the prevailing opinion.4 It has been

intimated, however, that, so far as property rights are concerned,

the contract must stand on the same footing as any other, and that

a law passed after the marriage, vesting the property in the wife for

1 Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co.

r. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 82, and 13 Wall. 373.

* People p. Auditor-General, 9 Mich. 327. See Montgomery v. Kasson, 16

Cal. 189; Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480.

'Woodruff o. Trapnall, 10 How. 190. See Winter v. Jones, 10 Geo. 190;

Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44; Antoni v. Wright, 22 Grat. 833.

4 Per Marshall, Ch. J., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 629;

Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 183; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 385; Cronise v.

Cronise, 54 Penn. St. 255; Carson v. Carson, 40 Miss. 349; Adams v. Palmer,

51 Me. 480.
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her sole use, would be void, as impairing the obligation of

[* 285] contracts.1 * But certainly there is no such contract em-

braced in the marriage as would prevent the legislature

changing the law, and vesting in the wife solely all property

which she should acquire thereafter; and if the property had

already become vested in the husband, it would be protected in

him, against legislative transfer to the wife, on other grounds than

the one here indicated.

"The obligation of a contract" it is said, " consists in its bind-

ing force on the party who makes it. This depends upon the laws

in existence when it is made; these are necessarily referred to

in all contracts, and forming a part of them as the measure of

the obligation to perform them by the one party, and the right

acquired by the other. There can be no other standard by which

to ascertain the extent of either, than that which the terms of the

contract indicate, according to their settled legal meaning; when

it becomes consummated, the law defines the duty and the right,

compels one party to perform the thing contracted for, and gives

the other a right to enforce the performance by the remedies then

in force. If any subsequent law affect to diminish the duty, or to
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impair the right, it necessarily bears on the obligation of the con-

tract, in favor of one party, to the injury of the other; hence any

law which, in its operations, amounts to a denial or obstruction of

the rights accruing by a contract, though professing to act only on

the remedy, is directly obnoxious to the prohibition of the Consti-

tution." 2 "It is the civil obligation of contracts which [the Con-

1 Holmes ». Holmes, 4 Barb. 295.

'McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 612. "The obligation of a contract. . .

is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement. The law, then,

which has this binding obligation, must govern and control the contract, in every

shape in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affects its validity, con-

struction, or discharge. It is, then, the municipal law of the State, whether that

be written or unwritten, which is emphatically the law of the contract made

within the State, and must govern it throughout, whenever its performance is

sought to be enforced." Washington, J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 259.

"As I understand it, the law of the contract forms its obligation." Thompson,

J., ib. 802. "The obligation of the contract consists in the power and efficacy

of the law which applies to, and enforces performance of, the contract, or the

payment of an equivalent for non-performance. The obligation does Dot inhere

and subsist in the contract itself, proprio vigore, but in the law applicable to the

contract. This is the sense, I think, in which the Constitution uses the term

'obligation.1" Trimble, J., ib. 318. And see Van Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wia.
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stitution] is designed to reach; that is, the obligation

which is recognized * by, and results from, the law of the [* 286]

State in# which it is made. If, therefore, a contract when

made is by the law of the place declared to be illegal, or deemed

to be a nullity, or a nude pact, it has no civil obligation, because

the law, in such cases, forbids its having any binding efficacy or

force. It confers no legal right on the one party and no corre-

spondent legal duty on the other. There is no means allowed or

recognized to enforce it; for the maxim is ex nudo pacto non oritur

actio. But when it does not fall within the predicament of being

either illegal or void, its obligatory force is coextensive with its

stipulations." 1

Such being the obligation of a contract, it is obvious that the

rights of the parties in respect to it are liable to be affected in

many ways by changes in the laws, which it could not have been

the intention of the constitutional provision to preclude. "There

are few laws which concern the general police of a State, or the

government of its citizens, in their intercourse with each other or

witli strangers, which may not in some way or other affect the

contracts which they have entered into or may thereafter form.
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For what are laws of evidence, or which concern remedies, frauds,

and perjuries, laws of registration, and those which affect landlord

and tenant, sales at auction, acts of limitation, and those which

limit the fees of professional men, and the charges of tavern-

keepers, and a multitude of others which crowd the codes of every

State, but laws which affect the validity, construction, or duration,

or discharge of contracts ?" 2 But the changes in these laws are

577; Johnson r. Higgins, 8 Met. (Ky.) 566. A law giving interest on debts

which bore none when contracted, was held void in Goggans v. Turnispeed, 1

S. C. x. s. 40; 8. c. 7 Am. Rep. 278. The legislature cannot authorize the

compulsory extinction of ground rents on payment of a sum in gross. Falairet's

Appeal, 67 Penn. St. 479; 8. c. 5 Am. Rep. 450.

1 Story on Const. § 1880. Slave contracts which were legal when made, are

not rendered invalid by the abolition of slavery, nor can the States make them

void by their constitutions, or deny remedies for their enforcement. White v.

Hart, 13 Wall. 649; Osborn t>. Nicholson, t'6. 653. An act of indemnity held

not to relieve a Sheriff from his obligation on his official bond to account for

moneys which had been paid away under military compulsion. State v. Gatz-

weiler, 89 Mo. 17 ; 8. c. 8 Am. Rep. 119.

* Washington, J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 259. As to the indirect

modification of contracts by the operation of police laws, see post, 674-584.
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not regarded as necessarily affecting the obligation of contracts.

Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered accord-

ing to the will of the State, provided the alteration does not

impair the obligation of the contract;1 and it does not impair it,

provided it leaves the parties a substantial remedy, according to

the course of justice as it existed at the time the contract was

made.2

[* 287] * It has accordingly been held that laws changing

remedies for the enforcement of legal contracts will be

valid, even though the new remedy be less convenient than the

old, or less prompt and speedy.8

"Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy

may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall

direct."4 To take a strong instance; although the law at the

The taxing power conferred upon a municipal corporation is not a contract

between it and the State. Richmond v. Richmond, &e., R. R. Co., 21 Grat. 611.

1 Bronson v. Kirizie, 1 How. 316, per Taney, Ch. J.

* Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274; Van Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 578;
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Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 316; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Butler r.

Palmer, 1 Hill, 824; Van Renselaer v. Snyder, 9 Barb. 302, and 13 N. Y. 299;

Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22; Guild ». Rogers, 8 Barb. 502; Story v. Ftirman,

25 N. Y. 214; Coriell v. Ham, 4 Greene (Iowa), 455; Heyward v. Juild, 1

Minn. 483; Swift v. Fletcher, 6 Minn. 550; Maynes v. Moor, 16 Ind. 116 ; Smith

v. Packard, 12 Wis. 371; Grosvenor v. Chesley, 48 Me. 369; Van Renselaer r.

Ball, 19 N. Y. 100; Van Renselaer v. Hays, ib. 68; Litchfield v. McComber,

42 Barb. 288; Paschal v. Perez, 7 Texas, 365; Auld v. Butcher, 2 Kansas, 155;

Kenyon v. Stewart, 44 Penn. St. 179; Clark v. Martin, 49 Penn. St. 299; Rison

v. Farr, 24 Ark., 161; Sanders v. Hillsborough Insurance Co., 44 N. H. 238;

Huntzinger v. Brock, 3 Grant's Cases, 243; Mechanics, &c, Bank Appeal, 31

Conn. 63.

3 Odgen v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 270; Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 359; Bum-

gardner v. Circuit Court, 4 Mo. 50; Trapley v. Hauler, 17 Miss. 310; Quack-

enbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128, 3 Denio 594, and 1 N. Y. 129; Bronson r.

Newberry, 2 Doug. Mich. 38; Rockwell v. Hubbell's Adm'rs, ib. 197; Evans r.

Montgomery, 4 W. & S. 218; Holloway v. Sherman, 12 Iowa, 282; Sprecker

v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432; Smith v. Packard, 12 Wis. 371; Porter v. Mariner, 50

Mo. 364; Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281; Penrose p. Erie Canal Co., 56 Penn.

St. 46; Smith v. Van Gilder, 26 Ark. 527.

* Sturges e. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, per Marshall, Ch. J. A statute

allowing the defence of want of consideration in a sealed instrument previously

given does not violate the obligation of contracts. Williams v. Haines, 27 Iowa,

251. See, further, Parsons v. Casey, 28 Iowa, 436; Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall.

68; Cook v. Gregg, 46 N. Y. 439. A statutory judgment lien may be taken

away. Watson v. N. Y. Central R.R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157; Woodbury v. Grimes,
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time the contract is made permits the creditor to take the body of

his debtor in execution, there can be no doubt of the right

to abolish all laws for this purpose, leaving the creditor to his

remedy against property alone. "Confinement of the debtor may

be a punishment for not performing his contract, or may be al-

lowed as a means of inducing him to perforin it. But the State

may refuse to inflict this punishment, or may withhold this means,

and leave the contract in full force. Imprisonment is no part of

the contract, and simply to release the prisoner does not impair

the obligation."1 Nor is there any constitutional objection to

such a modification of those laws which exempt certain portions

of a debtor's property from execution as shall increase the

exemptions, nor to the modifications being made applicable to

contracts previously entered into. The State "may, if it thinks

proper, direct that the necessary implements of agriculture, or the

tools of the mechanic, or articles of necessity in household fur-

niture, shall, like wearing apparel, not be liable to execution on

judgments. Regulations of this description have always been con-

sidered, in every civilized community, as properly belonging to the

remedy, to be exercised or not, by every sovereignty, ac-
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cording to its own views of policy and humanity. It *must [* 288]

reside in every State to enable it to secure its citizens from

unjust and harrassing litigation, and to protect them in those pur-

suits which are necessary to the existence and well-being of every

community." 2

1 Col. 100. Or extended before it has expired. Ellis r. Jones, 51 Mo. 180.

The obligation of the contract is not impaired if a substantial remedy remains.

Richmond v. Richmond, &c, R.K. Co., 21 Grat. 611.

1 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, per Marshall, Ch. J.; Mason r.

Hailc, 12 Wheat. 370; Bronson v. Newberry, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 38; Maxey v.

Loyal, 38 Geo. 540. A special act admitting a party imprisoned on a judgment for

tort to take the poor debtors' oath was sustained in Matter of Nichols, 8 R. 1.60.

1 Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, per Taney, Ch. J.; Rockwell v. Hubbell's

Adm'rs, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 197; Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128, 3 Denio,

594, and 1 N.Y. 129; Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281; Sprecker v. Wakeley, 11

Wis. 432; Cusic c. Douglas, 3 Kansas, 123; Maxey v. Loyal, 38 Geo. 531;

Hardiman v. Downer, 3i) Geo. 425; Hill v. Kessler, 63 N. C. 437; Farley v.

Dowe, 45 Ala. 324; Sneider e. Heidelberger, t'6. 126; In re Kennedy, 2 S. C.

s. s. 216; Gunn v. Barry, 44 Geo. 351. The case of Kibbey ». Jones, 7 Bush,

243, seems to be contra. The increase in exemptions, however, must not go to

the extent to render the remedy nugatory or impracticable. Stephenson v.

Osborne, 41 Miss. 119. It has been decided that a homestead exemption may
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And laws which change the rules of evidence relate to the

remedy only; and while, as we have elsewhere shown, such laws

may, on general principles, be applied to existing causes of action,

so, too, it is plain that they are not precluded from such application

by the constitutional clause we are considering.1 And it has

been held that the legislature may even take away a common-

law remedy altogether, without substituting any in its place,

if another and efficient remedy remains. Thus, a law abolishing

distress for rent has been sustained as applicable to leases in force

at its passage;2 and it was also held that an express stipulation

in the lease, that the lessor should have this remedy, would not

prevent the legislature from abolishing it, because this was a

subject concerning which it was not competent for the parties to

contract in such manner as to bind the hands of the State. In

the language of the court: "If this is a subject on which parties

can contract, and if their contracts when made become by virtue

of the Constitution of the United States superior to the power of

the legislature, then it follows that whatever at any time exists as

part of the machinery for the administration of justice may be
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perpetuated, if parties choose so to agree. That this can scarcely

have been within the contemplation of the makers of the Consti-

tution, and that if it prevail as law it will give rise to grave

inconveniences, is quite obvious. Every such stipulation is in its

own nature conditional upon the lawful continuance of the

[* 289] process. The State is no party to * their contract. It is

bound to afford adequate process for the enforcement of

rights; but it has not tied its own hands as to the modes by

which it will administer justice. Those from necessity belong to

the supreme power to prescribe; and their continuance is not the

be made applicable to previously existing contracts. Hill v. Kessler, 68 N. C.

437; Hardiman v. Downer, 39 Geo. 425; Ladd v. Adams, 66 N. C. 164. Contra,

Homestead Cases, 22 Grat 266. "Statutes pertaining to the remedy are merely

such as relate to the course and form of proceedings, but do not affect the sub-

stance of a judgment when pronounced." Per Merrick, Ch. J., in Morton v.

Valentine, 15 La. An. 153. See Watson v. N. Y. CentralR.R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157.

1 Neass v. Mercer, 15 Barb. 318. On this subject see the discussions in the

Federal courts, Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Ogden r. Saunders,

12 Wheat. 213; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hay-ward, 2 How.

608; Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68.

8 Van Renselaer v. Synder, 9 Barb. 302, and 13 N. Y. 299; Guild v. Rogers,

8 Barb. 502; Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22.
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subject of contract between private parties. In truth, it is not at

all probable that the parties made their agreement with reference

to the possible abolition of distress for rent. The first clause of

this special provision is, that the lessor may distrain, sue, re-enter,

or resort to any other legal remedy, and the second is, that in

cases of distress the lessee waives the exemption of certain

property from the process, which by law was exempted. This

waiver of exemption was undoubtedly the substantial thing which

the parties had in view; but yet perhaps their language cannot be

confined to this object, and it may therefore be proper to consider

the contract as if it had been their clear purpose to preserve their

legal remedy, even if the legislature should think fit to abolish it.

Iu that aspect of it the contract was a subject over which they had

no control." 1

But a law which deprives a party of all legal remedy must

necessarily be void. "If the legislature of the State were to

undertake to make a law preventing the legal remedy upon a

contract lawfully made, and binding on the party to it, there is no

question that such legislature would, by such act, exceed its legiti-

mate powers. Such an act must necessarily impair the obligation
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of the contract within the meaning of the Constitution." 2 This

has beeu held in regard to those cases in which it was sought to

deprive certain classes of persons of the right to maintain suits,

because of their having participated in rebellion against the

government.3 And where a statute does not leave a party a

1 Conkey ». Hart. 14 N. Y. 30; citing Handy v. Chatfield, 23 Wend. 35;

Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370; Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274; and Van Ren-

selaer v. Snyder, 13 N. Y. 299.

* Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430. Osborne r. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 662; U. S.

s. Conway, Hempst. 313; Johnson v. Bond, ib. 533; West v. Sansom, 44 Geo.

295. See Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; Penrose v. Erie Canal Co., 56 Penn. St.

46. In Jackoway o. Denton, 25 Ark. 641, a clause in the Constitution of Ar-

kansas declaring all contracts for the sale or purchase of slaves void, was held

invalid. Affirmed in White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 649. An act withdrawing all the

property of a debtor from the operation of legal process, leaving only a barren

right to sue, is void. State ». Bank of South Carolina, 1 S. C. n. s. 63.

* Rieon t>. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; McFarland v. Butler, 8 Minn. 116; Jackson

r. Same, ib. 117. The case of Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Wall. 599, should be consid-

ered in connection with these. A remedy may, however, be denied to a party

until he has performed his duty to the State in respect to the demand in suit:

t. g. paid the tax upon the debt sued for. Walker v. Whitehead, 43 Geo. 538;

Garrett v. Cordell, ib. 366; Welborn v. Akin, 44 Geo. 420.
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substantial remedy according to the course of justice as it existed

at the time the contract was made, but shows upon its face an

intention to clog, hamper, or embarrass the proceedings to euforce

the remedy, so as to destroy it entirely, and thus impair

[* 290] the contract so far as it is in the * power of the legislat-

ure to do it, such statute cannot be regarded as a mere

regulation of the remedy, but is void, because a substantial denial

of right.1

And where a statute dividing a town and incorporating a new

one enacted that the new town should pay its proportion towards

the support of paupers then constituting a charge against the old

town, it was held that a subsequent statute exonerating the new

town from this liability was void as impairing the contract created

by the first-rnentioned statute.2 And in any case the lawful repeal

of a statute cannot constitutionally be made to destroy contracts

which have been entered into under it, but being legal when made,

they remain valid notwithstanding the repeal.8

So where, by its terms, a contract provides for the payment of

money by one party to another, and, by the law then in force,
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property would be liable to be seized, and sold on execution to the

highest bidder, to satisfy any judgment recovered on such contract,

a subsequent law, forbidding property from being sold on execution

for less than two thirds the valuation made by appraisers, pursuant

to the directions contained in the law, though professing to act

only on the remedy, amounts to a denial or obstruction of the

rights accruing by the contract, and is directly obnoxious to the

prohibition of the Constitution.4 So a law which takes away from

1 Oatraan v. Bond, 15 Wis. 28. As to control of remedies, see post, 361.

* Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Greenl. 12.

3 Tuolumne Redemption Co. ». Sedgwick, 15 Cal. 515; McCauley v. Brooks,

16 Cal. 11; Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339; State r.

Phalen, 3 Harr. 441; State v. Hawthorn, 9 Mo. 389.

4 McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Willard v. Longstreet, 2 Doug. (Mich.)

172; Rawley v. Hooker, 21 Ind. 144. So a law which, as to existing mortgages

foreelosable by sale, prohibits the sale for less than half the appraised value of

the land, is void for the same reason. Gantley's Lessee t>. Ewing, 3 How. 707;

Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311. And a law authorizing property to be turned

out in satisfaction of a contract is void. Abercrombie o. Baxter, 44 Geo. 36.

The "scaling laws," so called, under which contracts made-while Confederate

notes were the only currency, are allowed to be satisfied on payment of a sum

equal to what the sum called for by them in Confederate notes was worth when
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mortgagees the right to possession under their mortgages until

after foreclosure is void, because depriving them of the right to the

rents and profits, which was a valuable portion of the right secured

by the contract. "By this act the mortgagee is required to incur

the additional expense of foreclosure, before obtaining possession,

and is deprived of the right to add to his security, by the percep-

tion of the rents and profits of the premises, during the time

required to accomplish this and the time of redemption, and during

that time the rents and profits are given to another, who may or

may not appropriate them to the payment of the debt, as

he chooses, and the mortgagee in the * mean time is sub- [* 291]

jected to the risk, often considerable, of the depreciation in

the value of the security."1 So a law is void which extends the

time for the redemption of lands sold on execution, or for delin-

quent taxes, after the sales have been made; for in such a case the

contract with the purchaser, and for which he has paid his money,

is, that he shall have title at the time then provided by the law;

and to extend the time for redemption is to alter the substance of

the contract, as much as would be the extension of the time for

payment of a promissory note.2 So a law which shortens the time
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for redemption from a mortgage, after a foreclosure sale has taken

place, is void; the rights of the party being fixed by the foreclosure

and the law then in force, and the mortgagor being entitled, under

they were made, have been sustained, but this is on the assumption that the con-

tracts are enforced as near as possible according to the actual intent. Harmon v.

Wallace, 2 S. C. N. 8. 208; Robeson v. Brown, 63 N. C. 554; Hillard v.

Moore, 65 N. C. 540; Pharis v. Dice, 21 Grat. 303; Thornington v. Smith,

8 Wall. 1.

1 Mundy p. Monroe, 1 Mich. 76 ; Blackwood v. Vanvleet, 11 Mich. 252. Com-

pare Dikeman v. Dikeman, 11 Paige, 484; James v. Stull, 9 Barb. 482; Cook v.

Gray, 2 Houston, 455. In the last case it was held that a statute shortening the

notice to be given on foreclosure of a mortgage under the power of sale, from

twenty-four to twelve weeks, was valid as affecting the remedy only; and that a

stipulation in a mortgage that on default being made in payment the mortgagee

aiight sell "according to law," meant according to the law as it should be when

sale was made. See also Bathold v. Fox, 13 Minn. 501, in wliieh it was decided

that in the case of a mortgage given while the law allowed the mortgagee posses-

sion during the period allowed for redemption after foreclosure, such law might

he so changed as to take away this right.

* Robinson c. Howe, 13 Wis. 341; Dikeman o. Dikeman, 11 Paige, 484; Goe-

aen p. Schroeder, 8 Minn. 387. But see Stone v. Basset, 4 Minn. 298; Hey ward

t. Judd, to. 483; Freeborn v. Pettibone, 6 Minn. 277.
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the law, to possession of the land until the time of redemptjn

expires.1 And where by statute a purchaser of lands from the

State had the right, upon the forfeiture of his contract of purchase

for the non-payment of the sum due upon it, to revive it at any

time before a public sale of the lands, by the payment of all sums

due upon the contract, with a penalty of five per cent, it was held

that this right could not be taken away by a subsequent change

in the law which subjected the forfeited lands to private

[* 292] entry and sale.2 And a statute which * authorizes stay of

execution, for an unreasonable or indefinite period, on

judgments rendered on pre-existing contracts, is void, as postpon-

ing payment, and taking away all remedy during the continuance

of the stay.3 And a law is void on this ground which declares a

1 Cargill o. Power, 1 Mich. 369. The contrary ruling was made in Butler v.

Palmer, 1 Hill, 324, by analogy to the statute of limitations. The statute, it was

said, was no more in effect than saying: "Unless you redeem within the shorter

time prescribed, you shall have no action for a recovery of the land, nor shall

your defence against an action be allowed, provided you get possession." And
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in Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 346, the court, speaking of a similar right in a

party, say: " So far as his right of redemption was concerned, it was not derived

from any contract, but was given by the law only; and the time within which he

might exercise it might be shortened by the legislature, provided a reasonable

time was left in which to exercise it, without impairing the obligation of any con-

tract." And see Smith v. Packard, 12 Wis. 371, to the same effect.

* State v. Commissioners of School and University lands, 4 Wis. 414.

3 Chadwick o. Moore, 8 W. & S. 49; Bunn v. Gorgas, 41 Penn. St. 441;

Stevens v. Andrews, 31 Mo. 205; Hasbrouck o. Shipman, 16 Wis. 296. In Brei-

tenbach v. Bush, 44 Penn. St. 313, and Coxe v. Martin, ib. 322, it was held that

an act staying all civil process against volunteers who had enlisted in the national

service for three years or during the war was valid, — " during the war" being

construed to mean unless the war should sooner terminate. See also State ».

Carew, 13 Rich. 498. A general law that all suits pending should be continued

until peace between the Confederate States and the United States, was held void

in Burt v. Williams, 24 Ark. 94. See also Taylor v. Stearns, 18 Grat. 244;

Hudspeth v. Davis, 41 Ala. 389; Aycock v. Martin, 37 Geo. 124; Coffman v.

Bank of Kentucky, 40 Miss. 29; Jacobs v. Smallwood, 63 N. C. 112; Cutts v.

Hardee, 38 Geo. 350; Sequestration Cases, 30 Texas, 688. A law permitting a

year's stay upon judgments where security is given, is valid. Farnsworth e.

Vance, 2 Cold. 108. But a statute was held void which stayed all proceedings

against volunteers who had enlisted '' during the war," this period being indefinite,

Clark v. Martin, 3 Grant's Cas. 393. In Johnson v. Higgins, 8 Met. (Ky.) 566,

it was held that the act of the Kentucky legislature of May 24, 1861, which for-

bade the rendition in all the courts of the State, of any judgment from date till

January 1st, 1862, was valid. It related, it was said, not to the remedy for
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forfeiture of the charter of a corporation for acts or omissions

which constituted no cause of forfeiture at the time they occurred.1

And it has been held that where a statute authorized a municipal

corporation to issue bouds, and to exercise the power of local tax-

ation in order to pay them, and persons bought and paid value for

bonds issued accordingly, this power of taxation is part of the con-

tract, and cannot be withdrawn until the bonds are satisfied; that

an attempt to repeal or restrict it by statute is void; and that

unless the corporation imposes and collects the tax in all respects

as if the subsequent statute had not been passed, it will be com-

pelled to do so by mandamus.2 And it has also been held that a

statute repealing a former statute, which made the stock of stock-

holders in a corporation liable for its debts, was, in respect to

creditors existing at the time of the repeal, a law impairing the

obligation of contracts.3 In each of these cases it is

evident that substantial rights * were affected; and so [* 293]

far as the laws which were held void operated upon the

remedy, they either had an effect equivalent to importing some

new stipulation into the contract, or they failed to leave the party a

substantial remedy such as was assured to him by the law in force
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when the contract was made. In Pennsylvania it has been held

that a statute authorizing a stay of execution on contracts in which

the debtor had waived the right was unconstitutional;4 but it seems

to us that an agreement to waive a legal privilege which the law

gives as a matter of State policy cannot be binding upon a party,

unless the law itself provides for the waiver.6

enforcing a contract, but to the courts which administer the remedy; and those

courts, in a legal sense, constitute no part of the remedy. A law exempting

soldiers' from civil process until thirty days after their discharge from military

service was held valid as to all contracts subsequently entered into, in Bruns v.

Crawford, 84 Mo. 330. And see McCormick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127. A statute

suspending limitation laws during the existence of civil war, and until the State

was restored to her proper relations to the Union, was sustained in Bender v. Craw-

ford, 33 Texas, 745. Compare Bradford v. Shine, 13 Fla. 393.

'People v. Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co., 9 Mich. 285, per Chris-

tiancy, J.; State r. Tombeckbee Bank, 2 Stew. 80. See Ireland o. Turnpike Co.,

19 Ohio, K. 8. 873.

'Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535. See also Soutter v. Madison, 15 Wis.

30; Smith r. Appleton, 19 Wis. 468.

1 Hawthorne t>. Calef, 2 Wall. 10.

4 Billmeyer r. Evans, 40 Penn. St. 324; Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Penn. St. 127.

'See Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 30; Handy v. Chatfield, 28 Wend. 35.
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Where, however, by the operation of existing laws, a i&ntract

cannot be enforced without some new action of a party to fix his

liability, it is as competent to prescribe by statute the requisites to

the legal validity of such act as it would be in any case to prescribe

the legal requisites of a contract to be thereafter made. Thus,

though a verbal promise is sufficient to revive a debt barred by

the statute of limitations or by bankruptcy, yet this rule may be

changed by a statute making all such future promises void unless

in writing.1 It is also equally true that where a legal impediment

exists to the enforcement of a contract which parties have entered

into, the constitutional provision in question will not preclude the

legislature from removing such impediment and validating the

contract. A statute of that description would not impair the obli-

gation of contracts, but would perfect and enforce it.2 And for

similar reasons the obligation of contracts is not impaired by con-

tinuing the charter of a corporation for a certain period, in order

to the proper closing its business.3

One other topic remains to be mentioned in this connection, and
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that relates to the power of the States to pass insolvent laws, and

the classes of contracts to which they may be made to apply. As

this whole subject has been gone over very often and very fully by

the Supreme Court of the United States, and the important ques-

tions seem at last to be finally set at rest, and moreover as it is

comparatively unimportant while a federal bankrupt law

[* 294] exists, we shall * content ourselves with giving what we

understand to be the conclusions of the court.

1. The several States have power to legislate on the subject of

bankrupt and insolvent laws, subject, however, to tlie authority

conferred upon Congress by the Constitution to adopt a uuiform

system of bankruptcy, which authority, when exercised, is para-

mount, and State enactments in conflict with those in Congress

upon the subject must give way.4

1 Joy v. Thompson, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 373; Kingsley v. Cousins, 47 Me. 91.

* As whero the defence of usury to a contract is taken away by statute.

Welsh v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9. And see

Wood v. Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68, and the cases cited, post, pp. 375, 376.

* Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245.

4 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Farmers'and Mechanics'Bank v.

Smith, 6 Wheat. 131; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Baldwin v. Hale,

1 Wall. 229.
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2. Such State laws, however, discharging the person or the prop-

erty of the debtor, and thereby terminating the legal obligation of

the debts, cannot constitutionally be made to apply to contracts

entered into before they were passed, but they may be made appli-

cable to such future contracts as can be considered as having been

made in reference to them.1

3. Contracts made within a State where an insolvent law exists,

between citizens of that State, are to be considered as made in

reference to the law, and are subject to its provisions. But the law

cannot apply to a contract made in one State between a citizen

thereof and a citizen of another State,2 nor to contracts not made

within the State, even though made between citizens of the same

State,3 except, perhaps, where they are citizens of the State pass-

ing the law.4 And where the contract is made between a citizen

of one State and a citizen of another, the circumstance that the

contract is made payable in the State where the insolvent law

exists will not render such contract subject to be discharged under

the law.6 If, however, the creditor in any of these cases makes

himself a party to proceedings under the insolvent law, he will be

bound thereby like any other party to judicial proceedings, and is
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not to be heard afterwards to object that his debt was excluded by

the Constitution from being affected by the law.6

New provisions for personal liberty, and for the protection of the

right to life, liberty, and property, are made by the thirteenth and

fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States;

and these will be referred to in the two succeeding chapters.7 The

most important clause in the fourteenth amendment is that part of

section 1 which declares that all persons born or naturalized in the

United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens

1 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213.

'Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Springer v. Foster, 2 Story, 387;

Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 348; Woodhull v. Wagner, Baldw. 300; Suydham v.

Broadnax, 14 Pet. 75; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 310; Baldwin p. Hale, 1 Wall.

231.

* McMillan v. McNeill, 4 Wheat. 209.

4 Marsh v. Putnam, 3 Gray, 551.

6 Baldwin p. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Baldwin v. Bank of Newberry, to, 234;

Gilman p. Lockwood, 4 Wall. 409.

'Clay p. Smith, 3 Pet. 411; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Gilman v. Lock-

wood, 4 Wall. 409.

'See ante, p. 11; post, pp. 299, 897.
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of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.1 This

provision very properly puts an end to any question of the title of

the freedmen and others of their race to the rights of citizenship;

but it may be doubtful whether the further provisions of the same

section surround the citizen with any protections additional to

those before possessed under the State constitutions; though, as a

principle of State constitutional law has now been made a part of

the Constitution of the United States, the effect will be to make the

Supreme Court of the United States the final arbiter of cases in

which a violation of this principle by State laws is complained of,

inasmuch as the decisions of the State courts upon laws which are

supposed to violate it will be subject to review in that court on

appeal.2

1 The complete text of this section is as follows: " Section 1. All persons born

or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State

shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities

of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
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liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

'See ante, pp. 12-14. Notwithstanding this section, the protection of all

citizens in their privileges and immunities, and in their right to an impartial

administration of the laws, is just as much the business of the individual States

as it was before. This amendment of the Constitution does not concentrate power

in the general government for any purpose of police government within the

States; its object is to preclude legislation by any State which shall "abridge

the privileges or immunites of citizens of the United States," or "deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," or " deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws "; and Congress is

empowered to pass all laws necessary to render such unconstitutional State legis-

lation ineffectual. This amendment received a very careful examination at the

hands of the Supreme Court of the United States in the recent case of the Live

Stock Dealers and Butchers Association v. The Crescent City, &c, Co., not yet

reported. See Story on Const. 4th ed. App. to vol. 2.

[ 334 ]

CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 295

•CHAPTER X. *295

OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY.

Although the people from whom we derive our laws now possess

a larger share of civil and political liberty than any other in Europe,

there was a period in their history when a considerable proportion

were in a condition of servitude. Of the servile classes one portion

were villeins regardant, or serfs attached to the soil, and transfer-

able with it, but not otherwise,1 while the other portion were vil-

lein* in gross, whose condition resembled that of the slaves known

to modern law in America.2 How these people became reduced to

this unhappy condition, it may not be possible to determine at

this distance of time with entire accuracy; but in regard to the

first class, we may suppose that when a conqueror seized the terri-

tory upon which he found them living, he seized also the people as

a part of the lawful prize of war, granting them life on condition

of their cultivating the soil for his use; and that the second were

often persons whose lives had been spared on the field of battle,

and whose ownership, in accordance with the custom of barbar-

ous times, would pertain to the persons of their captors. Many

other causes also contributed to reduce persons to this condition.3
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1 Litt. § 181; 2 Bl. Com. 92. "They originally held lands of their lords on

condition of agricultural service, which in a certain sense was servile, but in

reality was not so, as the actual work was done by the theows, or slaves. . . .

They did not pay rent, and were not removable at pleasure; they went with the

land and rendered services, uncertain in their nature, and therefore opposed to

rent. They were the originals of copyholders." Note to Reeves, History of

English Law, Pt. I. c 1.

1 Litt. § 181; 2 Bl. Com. 92. "These are the persons who are described

by Sir William Temple as ' a sort of people who were in a condition of down-

right servitude, used and employed in the most servile works; and belonging,

they and their children and effects, to the lord of the soil, like the rest of the

stock or cattle upon it.'" Reeves, History of English Law, Pt. L c. 1.

'For a view of the condition of the servile classes, see Wright, Domestic

Manners and Sentiments, 101, 102; Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of

1829), pp. 8, 78, 365; Hallam, Middle Ages, Pt. H. c. 2; Vaughan, Revolutions

in English History, Book 2, c. 8; Broom, Const. Law, 74 et seq.
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At the beginning of the reign of John it has been estimated that

one half of the Anglo-Saxons were in a condition of servitude, and

if we go back to the time of the Conquest, we find a still larger

proportion of the people held as the property of their lords, and

incapable of acquiring and holding any property as their own.1

Their treatment was such as might have been expected from

masters trained to war and violence, accustomed to think lightly

of human life and human suffering, and who knew little of and

cared less for any doctrine of human rights which embraced within

its scope others besides the governing classes.

It would be idle to attempt to follow the imperceptible

[* 296] steps by * which involuntary servitude at length came to

an end in England. It was never abolished by statute,1

and the time when slavery ceased altogether cannot be accurately

determined.3 The causes were at work silently for centuries; the

historian did not at the time note them; the statesman did not

observe them; they were not the subject of agitation or contro-

versy; but the time arrived when the philanthropist could examine

the laws and institutions of his country, and declare that slavery
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had ceased to be recognized, though at what precise point in legal

history the condition became unlawful he might not be able to

1 Hume, History of England, Vol. I., App. 1.

4 Barrington on the Statutes (3d ed.), 272.

'Mr. Hargrave says, at the commencement of the seventeenth century. 20

State Trials, 40; May, Const. Hist. c. 11. And Mr. Barrington (On Stat.

3d ed. p. 278) cites from Rymer a commission from Queen Elizabeth in the

year 1574, directed to Lord Burghley and Sir Walter Mildmay, for inquiring

into the lands, tenements, and other goods of all her bondmen and bondwomen

in the counties of Cornwall, Devonshire, Somerset, and Gloucester, such as

were by blood in a slavish condition, by being born in any of her manors, and

to compound with any or all of such bondmen or bondwomen for their manu-

mission and freedom. And this commission, he says, in connection with other

circumstances, explains why we hear no more of this kind of servitude. And

see Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of 1829), 674. This author says that

villeinage had disappeared by the time of Charles II. Hurd says in 1661. Law

of Freedom and Bondage, Vol. I. p. 136. And see 2 Bl. Com. 96. Macaulay

says there were traces of slavery under the Stuarts. History of England, c. 1.

Hume (History of England, c. 23) thinks there was no law recognizing it after

the time of Henry VII., and that it had ceased before the death of Elizabeth.

Froude (History of England, c. 1) says in the reign of Henry VIII. it had

practically ceased. Mr. Christian says the last claim of villeinage which we

find recorded in our courts was in 15th James I. Noy, 27; 11 State Trials, 842.

Note to Blackstone, Book 2, p. 96.
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determine. Among the causes of its abrogation lie might be able

to enumerate: 1. That the slaves were of the same race with their

masters. There was therefore not only an absence of that antip-

athy which is often found existing when the ruling and the ruled

are of different races, and especially of different color, but instead,

thereof an active sympathy might often be supposed to exist, which

would lead to frequent emancipations. 2. The common law pre-

sumed every man to be free until proved to be otherwise; and this

presumption, when the slave was of the same race as his master,

and had no natural badge of servitude, must often have rendered it

extremely difficult to recover the fugitive who denied his thraldom.

3. A residence for a year and a day in a corporate town rendered

the villein legally free ;1 so that to him the towns consti-

tuted cities of * refuge. 4. The lord treating him as a [* 297]

freeman, — as by receiving homage from him as tenant, or

entering into a contract with him under seal, — thereby emancipated

him, by recognizing in him a capacity to perform those acts which

only a freeman could perform. 5. Even the lax morals of the times

were favorable to liberty, since the condition of the child followed

that of the father;2 and in law the illegitimate child was nullius
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filius, — had no father. And, 6. The influence of the priesthood

was generally against slavery, and must often have shielded the

fugitive and influenced emancipations by appeals to the con-

science, especially when the master was near the close of life, and

the conscience naturally most sensitive.3 And with all these influ-

1 Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of 1829), p. 79. But this was only

as to third persons. The claim of the lord might be made within three years.

Ibid. And see Mackintosh, History of England, c. 4.

* Barrington on Statutes (3d ed.), 276, note; 2 Bl. Com. 93. But in the

very quaint account of "Villeinage and Niefty," in Mirror of Justices, § 28, it

is said, among other things, that " those are villeins who are begotten of a free-

man and a nief, and born out of "matrimony." The ancient rule appears to have

been that the condition of the child followed that of the mother; but this was

changed in the time of Henry I. Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of 1829),

p. 78; Hallam, Middle Ages, Pt. II. c. 2.

* In 1514, Henry VHI. manumitted two of his villeins in the following words:

"Whereas God created all men free, but afterwards the laws and customs of

nations subjected some under the yoke of servitude, we think it pious and merito-

rious with God to manumit Henry Knight, a tailor, and John Herle, a husband-

man, our natives, as being born within the manor of Stoke Clymercysland, in

our county of Cornwall, together with all their issue born or to be born, and all

their goods, lands, and chattels acquired, so as the said persons and their issue
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ences there should be noted the further circumstance, that a class

of freemen was always near to the slaves in condition and suffering,

with whom they were in association, and between whom and them-

selves there were frequent intermarriages,1 and that from these to

the highest order in the State there were successive grades; the

children of the highest gradually finding their way into those below

them, and ways being open by which the children of the lowest

might advance themselves, by intelligence, energy, or thrift, through

the successive grades above them, until the descendants of dukes

and earls were found cultivating the soil, and the man of obscure

descent winning a place among the aristocracy of the realm,

through his successful exertions at the bar, or his services to the

State. Inevitably these influences must at length over-

[* 298] throw the * slavery of white men which existed in Eng-

land,2 and no other ever became established within the

realm. Slavery was permitted, and indeed fostered, in the colo-

nies; in part because a profit was made of the trade, and in part

also because it was supposed that the peculiar products of some of

them could not be profitably cultivated with free labor ;3 and at
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times masters brought their slaves with them to England and re-

moved them again without question, until in Sommersett's Case,

in 1771, it was ruled by Lord Mansfield that slavery was repug-

nant to the common law, and to bring a slave into England was to

emancipate him.4

shall from henceforth by us be free and of free condition." Barrington on Stat-

utes (3d ed.), 275. See Mackintosh, History of England, c. 4. Compare this

with a deed of manumission in Massachusetts, to be found in Sumner's Speeches,

II. 289; Memoir of Chief Justice Parsons, by his son, 176, note.

1 Wright, Domestic Manners and Sentiments, p. 112.

8 Macaulay (History of England, c. 1 ) says the thief instrument of emanci-

pation was the Christian religion. Mackintosh (History of England, c. 4) also

attributes to the priesthood great influence iri this reform, not only by their

direct appeals to the conscience, but by the judges, who were ecclesiastics, mul-

tiplying presumptions and rules of evidence consonant to the equal and humane

spirit which breathes throughout the morality of the Gospel. Hume (History of

England, c. 23) seems to think emancipation was brought about by selfish con-

siderations on the part of the barons, and from a conviction that the returns

from their lands would be increased by changing villeinage into socage tenures.

* Robertson, America, Book 9; Bancroft, United States, Vol. L c. 5.

* Lofft, 18; 20 Howell, State Trials, 1; Life of Granville Sharp, by Hoare,

c. 4; Hurd, Law of Freedom and Bondage, Vol. I. p. 189. The judgment of

Lord Mansfield is said to have been delivered w th evident reluctance. 20 State
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The same opinion had been previously expressed by Lord Holt,

but without authoritative decision.1

In Scotland a condition of servitude continued to a later period.

The holding of negroes in slavery was indeed held to be

illegal * soon after the Sommersett Case; but the salters [* 299]

and colliers did not acquire their freedom until 1799,

nor without an act of Parliament.2 A previous statute for their

enfranchisement through judicial proceedings had proved . in-

effectual.*

The history of slavery in this country pertains rather to general

history than to a work upon State constitutional law. Through-

out the land involuntary servitude is abolished by constitutional

amendment, except as it may be imposed in the punishment of

crime.4 Nor do we suppose the exception will permit the convict to

be subjected to other servitude than such as is under the control

and direction of the public authorities, in the manner heretofore

Trials, 79; per Lord Stovodl, 2 Hagg. Adm. 105, 110; Broom, Const. Law,

105. Of the practice prior to the decision Lord Stowell said: "The personal

traffic in slaves resident in England had been as public and as authorized in

London as in any of our West India Islands. They were sold on the Exchange,
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and other places of public resort, by parties themselves resident in London,

and with as little reserve as they would have been in any of our West India

possessions. Such a state oP things continued without impeachment from a

very early period up to nearly the end of the last century." The Slave Grace,

2 Hagg. Adm. 105. In this case it was decided that if a slave, carried by his

master into a free country, voluntarily returned with him to a country where

slavery was allowed by the local law, the status of slave would still attach to

bim, and the master's right to his service be resumed. Mr. Broom collects the

authorities on this subject in general, in the notes to Sommersett's Case, Const.

Law, 105.

1 "As soon as a slave comes into England, he becomes free; one may be a

villein in England, but not a slave." Holt, Ch. J., in Smith v. Brown, 2 Salk.

666. See also Smith v. Gould, Ld. Raym. 1274; 8. c. Salk. 666. There is a

learned note in Quincy's Rep. p. 94, collecting the English authorities on the

subject of slavery.

• 39 Geo. III. c. 56.

5 May's Const. Hist. c. 11.

4 Amendments to Const, of U. S. art. 13. See Cooley's Story on the Consti-

tution, c. 46, for the history of this article, and the decisions bearing upon it.

The Maryland act for the apprenticing of colored children, which made impor-

tant and invidious distinctions between them and white children, and gave the

master property rights in their services not given in other cases, was held void

under this article. Matter of Turner, 1 Abb. U. S. 84.
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customary. The laws of the several States allow the letting of the

services of the convicts, either singly or in numbers, to contractors

who are to employ them in mechanical trades in or near the prison,

and under the surveillance of its officers; but it might well be

doubted if a regulation which should suffer the convict to be placed

upon the auction block and sold to the highest bidder, either for

life or for a term of years, would be in harmony with the constitu-

tional prohibition. It is certain that it would be open to very grave

abuses, and it is so inconsistent with the general sentiment iu

countries where slavery does not exist, that it may well be believed

not to have been within the understanding of the people in incor-

porating the exception with the prohibitory amendment.1

The common law of England permits the impressment of sea-

faring men to man the royal navy;2 but this species of servitude

was never recognized in the law of America.3 The citizen may

doubtless be compelled to serve his country in her wars; but the

common law as adopted by us has never allowed arbitrary dis-

criminations for this purpose between persons of different avo-
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cations.

Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.

Near in importance to exemption from any arbitrary control of

the person is that maxim of the common law which secures to the

citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the govern-

ment, and protection in person, property, and papers, against even

the process of the law, except in a few specified cases. The

maxim that "every man's house is his castle,"4 is made

[* 300] a * part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibit-

1 The State has no power to imprison a child in a house of correction who has

committed no crime, on a mere allegation that he is "destitute of proper parental

care, and is growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness, and vice." People

v. Turner, 55 1ll. 280; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 645. Compare Prescott v. State, 19

Ohio, N. s. 184; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 388.

'Broadfoot's Case, 18 State Trials, 1323; Fost. Cp. Law, 178; Rex v. Tubbs,

Cowp. 512; Ex parte Fox, 5 State Trials, 276; 1 Bl. Com. 419; Broom, Const.

Law, 116.

3 There were cases of impressment in America before the Revolution, but

they were never peaceably acquiesced in by the people. See Life and Times of

Warren, 55.

4 Broom, Maxims, 321. The eloquent passage in Chatham's speech on Gen-

eral Warrants is familiar: "The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to
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ing unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been

looked upon as of high value to the citizen.

If in English history we inquire into the original occasion for

these constitutional provisions, we shall probably find it in the

abuse of executive authority, and in the unwarrantable intrusion

of executive agents into the houses and among the private papers

of individuals, in order to obtain evidence of political offences

either committed or designed. The final overthrow of this practice

is so clearly and succinctly stated in a recent work on the constitu-

tional history of England that we cannot refrain from copying the

account in the note below.1

all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake ; the wind may

blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the king of

England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined

tenement." And see Lieber on Civil Liberty and Self-Government, c. 6.

1 "Among the remnants of a jurisprudence which had favored prerogative at

the expense of liberty was that of the arrest of persons under general warrants,

without previous evidence of their guilt or identification of their persons. This

practice survived the Revolution, and was continued without question, on the

ground of usage, until the reign of George III., when it received its death-blow
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from the boldness of Wilkes and the wisdom of Lord Camden. This question

was brought to an issue by No. 45 of the 'North Briton,' already so often men-

tioned. There was a libel, but who was the libeller? Ministers knew not, nor

waited to inquire, after the accustomed forms of law; but forthwith Lord Hal-

ifax, one of the secretaries of state, issued a warrant, directing four messengers,

taking with them a constable, to search for the authors, printers, and publishers;

•and to apprehend and seize them, together with their papers, and bring them in

safe custody before him. No one having been charged or even suspected, — no

evidence of crime having been offered, — no one was named in this dread instru-

ment. The offence only was pointed at, not the offender. The magistrate who

should have sought proofs of crime deputed this office to his messengers. Armed

with their roving commission, they set forth in quest of unknown offenders; and,

unable to take evidence, listened to rumors, idle tales, and curious guesses.

They held in their hands the liberty of every man whom they were pleased to

suspect. Nor were they triflers in their work. In three days they arrested no

less than forty-nine persons on suspicion, — many as innocent as Lord Halifax

himself. Among the number was Dryden Leach, a printer, whom they took from

his bed at night. They seized his papers, and even apprehended his journeymen

and servants. He had printed one number of the ' North Briton,' and was then

reprinting some other numbers; but as he happened not to have printed No. 45,

he was released without being brought before Lord Halii'ax. They succeeded,

however, in arresting Kearsley the publisher, and Balfe the printer, of the obnox-

ious number, with all their workmen. From them it was discovered that Wilkes

was the culprit of whom they were in search; but the evidence was not on oath;

and the messengers received verbal directions to apprehend Wilkes under the
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[* 301] * The history of this controversy should be read in

connection with that in America immediately previous to

general warrant. Wilkes, far keener than the crown lawyers, not seeing his oim

name there, declared it ' a ridiculous warrant against the whole English nation,'

and refused to obey it. But after being in custody of the messengers for some

hours, in his own house, he was taken away in a chair, to appear before the sec-

retaries of state. No sooner had he been removed than the messengers, return-

ing to his house, proceeded to ransack his drawers; and carried off all his private

papers, including even his will and his pocket-book. When brought into the

presence of Lord Halifax and Lord Egremont, questions were put to Wilkes

which he refused to answer; whereupon he was committed close prisoner to the

Tower, denied the use of pen and paper, and interdicted from receiving the vis-

its of his friends or even of his professional advisers. From this imprisonment,

however, he was shortly released on a writ of habeas corpus, by reason of his

privilege as a member of the House of Commons.

"Wilkes and the printers, supported by Lord Temple's liberality, soon ques-

tioned the legality of the general warrant. First, several journeymen printers

brought action against the messengers. On the first trial, Lord Chief Justice

Pratt — not allowing bad precedents to set aside the sound principles of English
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law — held that the general warrant was illegal; that it was illegally executed;

and that the messengers were not indemnified by statute. The journeymen re-

covered three hundred pounds damages; and the other plaintiffs also obtained

verdicts. In all these cases however, bills of exceptions were tendered and

allowed. Mr. Wilkes himself brought an action against Mr. Wood, under-sec-

rctary of state, who had personally superintended the execution of the warrant.

At this trial it was proved that Mr. Wood and the messengers, after Wilkes's

removal in custody, had taken entire possession of his house, refusing admission

to his friends; had sent for a blacksmith, who opened the drawers of his bureau;*

and having taken out the papers, had carried them away in a sack, without taking

any list or inventory. All his private manuscripts were seized, and his pocket-

book filled up the mouth of the sack. Lord Halifax was examined, and admitted

that the warrant had been made out three days before he had received evidence

that Wilkes was the author of the 'North Briton.' Lord Chief Justice Pratt

thus spoke of the warrant: 'The defendant claimed a right, under precedents,

to force persons' houses, break open escritoires, and seize their papers upon a

general warrant, where no inventory is made of the things thus taken away,

and where no offenders' names are specified in the warrant, and therefore a

discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions

may chance to fall. If such a power is truly invested in a secretary of state,

and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and property

of every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the

subject.' The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff with one thousand pounds

damages.

"Four days after Wilkes had obtained his verdict against Mr. Wood, Dryden

Leach, the printer, gained another verdict, with four hundred pounds damages,

against the messengers. A bill of exceptions, however, was tendered and re-
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the American Revolution, * in regard to writs of assistance [* 302]

issued by the courts to the revenue officers, empowering

ceived in this as in other cases, and came on for hearing before the Court of

King's Bench in 1765. After much argument, and the citing of precedents show-

ing the practice of the secretary of state's office ever since the Revolution, Lord

Mansfield pronounced the warrant illegal, saying: 'It is not fit that the judging

of the information should be left to the discretion of the officer. The magistrate

should judge, and give certain directions to the officer.' The other three judges

agreed that the warrant was illegal and bad, 'believing that no degree of an-

tiquity can give sanction to an usage bad in itself.' The judgment was therefore

affirmed.

"Wilkes had also brought actions for false imprisonment against both the

secretaries of state. Lord Egreinont's death put an end to the action against

him; and Lord Halifax, by pleading privilege, and interposing other delays

unworthy of his position and character, contrived to put off his appearance until

after Wilkes had been outlawed, when he appeared and pleaded the outlawry.

But at length, in 1769, no further postponement could be contrived; the action

was tried, and Wilkes obtained no less than four thousand pounds damages.

Not only in this action, but throughout the proceedings, in which persons ag-

grieved by the general warrant had sought redress, the government offered an
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ob tinate and vexatious resistance. The defendants were harrassed by every

obstacle which the law permitted, and subjected to ruinous costs. The expenses

which government itself incurred in these various actions were said to have

amounted to one hundred thousand pounds. •

"The liberty of the subject was further assured at this period by another

remarkable judgment of Lord Camden. In November, 1762, the Earl of Hali-

fax, as secretary of state, had issued a warrant directing certain messengers,

taking a constable to their assistance, to search for John Entinck, clerk, the

author or one concerned in the writing of several numbers of the 'Monitor, or

British Freeholder,' and to seize him, together with his books and papers, and

bring him in safe custody before the secretary of state. In execution of this

warrant, the messengers apprehended Mr. Entinck in his house, and seized the

books and papers in his bureau, writing-desk, and drawers. This case differed

from that of Wilkes, as the warrant specified the name of the person against

whom it was directed. In respect of the person, it was not a general warrant;

but as regards the papers, it was a general search-warrant, — not specifying any

particular papers to be seized, but giving authority to the messengers to take all

his books and papers according to their discretion.

"Mr. Entinck brought an action of trespass against the messengers for the

seizure of his papers, upon which a jury found a special verdict, with three hun-

dred pounds damages. This special verdict was twice learnedly argued before

the Court of Common Pleas, where, at length, in 1765, Lord Camden pronounced

an elaborate judgment. He even doubted the right of the secretary of state to

commit persons at all, except for high treason; but in deference to prior deci-

sions, the court felt bound to acknowledge the right. The main question, how-

ever, was the legality of a search-warrant for papers. 'If this point should be
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[* 303] them, in their discretion, to search * suspected places for

smuggled goods, and which Otis pronounced "the worst

instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English

liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that, ever was found

in an English law book ; " since they placed "the liberty of every

man in the hands of every petty officer."1 All these matters are

now a long way in the past; but it has not been deemed unwi8e to

repeat in the State constitutions, as well as in the Constitution of

the United States,2 the principles already settled in the common

law upon this vital point in civil liberty.

determined in favor of the jurisdiction,' said Lord Camden, 'the secret cabinets

and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the search

and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall see fit to

charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a

seditious libel.' 'This power, so assumed by the secretary of state, is an execu-

tion upon all the party's papers in the first instance. His house is rifled; his most

valuable papers are taken out of his possession, before the paper, for which he is

charged, is found to be criminal by any competent jurisdiction, and before he

is convicted either of writing, publishing, or being concerned in the paper.' It

had been found by the special verdict that many such warrants had been issued
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since the Revolution; but he wholly denied their legality. He referred the origin

of the practice to the Star Chamber, which in pursuit of libels had given search-

warrants to their messenger of the press; a practice which, after the abolition

of the Star Chamber, had been revived and authorized by the licensing act of

Charles II., in the person of the secretary of state. And he conjectured that

this practice had been continued after the expiration of that act, — a conjecture

shared by Lord Mansfield and the Court of King's Bench. With the unanimous

concurrence of the other judges of his court, this eminent magistrate now finally

condemned this dangerous and unconstitutional practice." May's Constitutional

History of England, c. 11. See also Semayne's Case, 5 Coke, 91; 1 Smith's

Lead. Cas. 183; Entinck v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, and 19 State Trials, 1030;

Note to same case in Broom, Const. Law, 613; Money p. Leach, Burr. 1742;

Wilkes's Case, 2 Wils. 151, and 19 State Trials, 1405. For' debates in Parlia-

ment on the same subject, see Hansard's Debates, Vol. XV. p. 1393 to 1418,

Vol. XVI. pp. 6 and 209. In further illustration of the same subject, see

De Lolme on the English Constitution, c. 18; Story on Const. §§ 1901, 1902;

Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263; Sailly v. Smith, 11 Johns. 500.

1 Works of John Adams, Vol. II. pp. 523, 524; 2 Hildreth's U. S. 499; 4

Bancroft's U. S. 414; Quincy, Mass. Reports, 51. See also the appendix to

these reports, p. 395, for a history of writs of assistance.

* U. S. Const. 4th Amendment. The scope of this work does not call for any dis-

cussion of the searches of private premises, and seizures of books and papers, which

are made under the authority, or claim of authority, of the revenue laws of the

United States. Perhaps, under no other laws are such liberties taken by minis-

terial officers; and it would be surprising to find oppressive action on their part so
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For the service of criminal process, the houses of private par-

ties are subject to be broken and entered under circumstances

which are fully explained in the works on criminal law, and need

not be enumerated here. And there are also cases where search-

warrants are allowed to be issued, under which an officer may be

protected in the like action. But as search-warrants are a species

of process exceedingly arbitrary in character, and which ought not

to be resorted to except for very urgent and satisfactory reasons,

the rules of law which pertain to them are of more than ordinary

strictness; and if the party acting under them expects legal pro-

tection, it is essential that these rules be carefully observed.

* In the first place they are only to be granted in the [* 304]

cases expressly authorized by law; and not generally in

such cases until after a showing made before a judicial officer,

under oath, that a crime has been committed, and that the party

complaining has reasonable cause to suspect that the offender, or

the property which was the subject or the instrument of the crime,

is concealed in some specified house or place.1 And the law, in

requiring a showing of reasonable cause for suspicion, intends that

evidence shall be given of such facts as shall satisfy the magistrate
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that the suspicion is well founded; for the suspicion itself is no

ground for the warrant except as the facts justify it.2

In the next place, the warrant which the magistrate issues must

particularly specify the place to be searched, and the object for

which the search is to be made. If a building is to be searched,

the name of the owner or occupant should be given;3 or, if not

occupied, it should be particularly described, so that the officer will

be left to no discretion in respect to the place; and a misdescrip-

tion in regard to the ownership,4 or a description so general that it

applies equally well to several buildings or places, would render

often submitted to without legal contest, if the facilities they possess to embarass,

annoy, and obstruct the merchant in his business, were not borne in mind. The

federal decisions, however, go very far to establish the doctrine that, in matters

of revenue, the regulations Congress sees fit to establish, however unreasonable

they may seem, must prevail. For a very striking case, see Henderson's Dis-

tilled Spirits, 14 Wall. 44.

1 2 Hale, P. C. 142; Bishop, Cp. Pro. §§ 716-719; Archbold, Cp. Law, 147.

'Commonwealth v. Lottery Tickets, 5 Cush. 369; Else v. Smith, 1 D. &

B. 97.

3 Stone v. Dana, 5 Met. 98.

4 Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286; Allen v. Staples, 6 Gray, 491.
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the warrant void in law.1 Search-warrants are always obnoxious

to very serious objections; and very great particularity is justly

required in these cases, before the privacy of a man's premises is

allowed to be invaded by the minister of the law.2 And therefore

a designation of goods to be searched for as " goods, wares, and

merchandises," without more particular description, has been

regarded as insufficient, even in the case of goods supposed to be

smuggled,8 where there is usually greater difficulty in giving

description, and where consequently more latitude should be

permitted than in the case of property stolen.

[* 305] * Lord Hale says," It is fit that such warrants to search

do express that search be made in the day-time ; and though

I do not say they are unlawful without such restriction, yet they

are very inconvenient without it; for many times, under pretence

of searches made in the night, robberies and burglaries have been

committed, and at best it creates great disturbance." 4 And the

statutes upon this subject will generally be found to provide for

searches in the day-time only, except in very special cases.

The warrant should also be directed to the sheriff or other
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proper officer, and not to private persons; though the party com-

plainant may be present for the purposes of identification,6 and

other assistance can lawfully be called in by the officer if necessary.

The warrant must also command that the goods or other articles

to be searched for, if found, together with the party in whose cus-

tody they are found, be brought before the magistrate, to the end

that, upon further examination into the facts, the goods, and the

party in whose custody they were, may be disposed of according

to law.6 And it is a fatal objection to such a warrant, that it

1 Thus, a warrant to search the "houses and buildings of Hiram Ide and

Henry Ide," is too general. Humes v. Tabor, 1 R. I. 464. See McGlinchy v.

Barrows, 41 Me. 74; Ashley v. Peterson, 25 Wis. 621. So a warrant for tie

arrest of an unknown person under the designation of John Doe, without further

description, is void. Commonwealth v. Crotty, 10 Allen, 403.

'A warrant for searching a dwelling-house will not justify a forcible entry into

a barn adjoining the dwelling-house. Jones v. Fletcher, 41 Me. 254; Downing

v. Porter, 8 Gray, 539; Bishop, Cr. Pro. §§ 716-719.

« Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286; Archbold, Cr. Law, 143.

• 2 Hale, P. C. 150. See Archbold, Cr. Law (7th ed.), 145.

5 2 Hale, P. C. 150; Archbold, Cr. Law (7th ed.), 145.

6 2 Hale, P. C. 150; Bell & Clapp, 10 Johns. 263; Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich.

126; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1.
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leaves the disposition of the goods searched for to the ministerial

officer, instead of requiring them to be brought before the magis-

trate, that he may pass his judgment upon the truth of the com-

plaint made; and it would also be a fatal objection to a statute

authorizing such a warrant, if it permitted a condemnation or

other final disposition of the goods, without notice to the claim-

ant, and without an opportunity for a hearing being afforded him.1

The warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evidence

of an intended crime; but only after lawful evidence of an offence

actually committed.2 Nor even then is it allowable to invade one's

privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence against

him,3 * except in a few special cases where that which is [* 306]

the subject of the crime is supposed to be concealed, and

the public or the complainant has an interest in it or in its destruc-

tion. Those special cases are familiar and well understood in the

law. Search-warrants have heretofore been allowed to search for

stolen goods, for goods supposed to have been smuggled into the

country in violation of the revenue laws, for implements of gaming

or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or prohibited liquors kept for

sale contrary to law, for obscene books and papers kept for sale or
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circulation, and for powder or other dangerous or explosive mate-

rial so kept as to endanger the public safety.4 A statute which

should permit the breaking and entering a man's house, and the

1 The "Search and Seizure" clause in some of the prohibitory liquor laws was

held void on this ground. Fisher p. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1; Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curtis,

311; Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 126. See also Matter of Morton, 10 Mich.

208, for a somewhat similar principle.

■ We do not say that it would be incompetent to authorize, by statute, the

issue of search-warrants for the prevention of offences in some cases; but it is

difficult to state any case in which it might be proper, except in such cases of

attempts, or of preparations to commit crime, as are in themselves criminal.

3 The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, found also

in many State constitutions, would clearly preclude the seizure of one's papers

in order to obtain evidence against him; and the spirit of the fifth amendment —

that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against him-

self— would also forbid such seizure.

4 These are the most common cases, but in the following search-warrants are

also sometimes provided for by statute: books and papers of a public character,

retained from their proper custody; females supposed to be concealed in houses

of ill-fame; children enticed or kept away from parents or guardians; concealed

weapons; counterfeit money, and forged bills or papers. See cases under English

statutes specified in 4 Broom and Hadley's Commentaries, 332.
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examination of books and papers with a view to discover the evi-

dence of crime, might possibly not be void on constitutional grounds

in some other cases; but the power of the legislature to authorize

a resort to this process is one which can properly be exercised only

in extreme cases, and it is better oftentimes that crime should go

unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to have his prem-

ises invaded, his desks broken open, his private books, letters, and

papers exposed to prying curiosity, and to the misconstructions of

ignorant and suspicious persons; and all this under the direction

of a mere ministerial officer, who brings with him such assistants

as he pleases, and who will select them more often with reference

to physical strength and courage than to their sensitive regard to

the rights and feelings of others. To incline against the enact-

ment of such laws, is to incline to the side of safety.1 In

[* 307] principle they are * objectionable; in the mode of execu-

tion they are necessarily odious; and they tend to invite

1 Instances sometimes occur in which ministerial officers take such liberties,

in endeavoring to detect and punish offenders, as are even more criminal than

the offences tbey seek to punish. The employment of spies and decoys to lead
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men on to the commission of crime, on the pretence of bringing criminals to

justice, cannot be too often or too strongly condemned; and that prying into

private correspondence by officers, which has sometimes been permitted by

postmasters, is directly in the face of the law, and cannot be excused. The

importance of public confidence in the inviolability of correspondence through

the post-office cannot well be overrated; and the proposition to permit letters to

be opened, at the discretion of a ministerial officer, would excite general indig-

nation. In Maine it has been decided that a telegraph operator may be com-

pelled to disclose the contents of a message sent by him for another party, and

that no rule of public policy would forbid. State v. Litchfield, 58 Me. 267. The

case is treated as if no other considerations were involved than those which arise

in the ordinary case of a voluntary disclosure by one private person to another,

without necessity. Such, however, is not the nature of the communication made

to the operator of the telegraph. That instrument is used as a means of cor-

respondence, and as a valuable, and in many cases an indispensable, substitute for

the postal facilities; and the communication is made, not because the party desires

to put the operator in possession of facts, but because transmission without it is

impossible. It is not voluntary in any other sense than this, that the party makes

it rather than deprive himself of the benefits of this great invention and improve-

ment The reasons of a public nature for maintaining the secrecy of telegraphic

communication are the same with those which protect correspondence by mail;

and though the operator is not a publie officer, that circumstance appears to us

immaterial. He fulfils an important public function, and the propriety of his pre-

serving inviolable secrecy in regard to communications is so obvious, that it is

common to provide statutory penalties for disclosures. If on grounds of public
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abuse and to cover the commission of crime. We thiik it would

generally be safe for the legislature to regard all those searches

and seizures " unreasonable" which have hitherto been unknown

to the law, and on that account to abstain from authorizing them;

leaving parties and the public to the accustomed remedies.1

We have said that if the officer follows the command of his war-

rant he is protected ; and this is so even when the complaint proves

policy the operator should not voluntarily disclose, why do not the same con-

siderations forbid the courts compelling him to do so? Or if it be proper to

make him testify to the correspondence by telegraph, what good reason can be

given why the postmaster should not be made subject to the process of subpoena

for a like purpose, and compelled to bring the correspondence which passes

through his hands into court, and open it for the purposes of evidence?

We must maintain the opinion, notwithstanding the decision of so eminent a

tribunal, that, the public are not entitled to a man's private correspondence,

whether obtainable by seizing it in the mails, or by compelling the operator of

the telegraph to testify to it, or by requiring his servants to take from his desks

his private letters and journals, and bring them into court on subpcena duces

tecum. Any such compulsory process to obtain it would be nothing short of a

most arbitrary and unjustifiable seizure of private papers; such an "unreason-
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able seizure" as is directly condemned by the Constitution. In England, the

secretary of state sometimes issues his warrant for opening a particular letter,

where he is possessed of such facts as he is satisfied would justify him with

the public; but no American officer or body possesses such authority, and its

usurpation should not be tolerated. For an account of the former and present

English practice on this subject, see May, Constitutional History, c. 11; Todd,

Parliamentary Government, Vol. I. p. 272; Broom, Const. Law, 615.

1 A search-warrant for libels and other papers of a suspected party was illegal

at the common law. See 11 State Trials, 313, 321; Archbold, Cr. Law (7th ed.),

HI; Wilkes v. Wood, 19 State Trials, 1153. "Search-warrants were never

recognized by the common law as processes which might bo availed of by indi-

viduals in the course of civil proceedings, or for the maintenance of any mere

private right; but their use was confined to the case of public prosecutions

instituted and pursued for the suppression of crime, and the detection and pun-

ishment of criminals. Even in those cases, if we may rely on the authority of

Lord Coke, their legality was formerly doubted; and Lord Camden said that

they crept into the law by imperceptible practice. But their legality has long

been considered to be established, on the ground of public necessity; because

without them felons and other malefactors would escape detection." Merrick, J.,

in Robinson v. Richardson, 13 Gray, 456. "To enter a man's house," said Lord

Camden, " by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse

than the Spanish Inquisition ; a law under which no Englishman would wish to live

an hour." See his opinion in Entinck v. Carrington, 19 State Trials, 1029; S. c.

2 Wils. 275; and .Broom, Const. Law, 658; Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205;

Leach v. Money, 19 State Trials, 1001; 8. o. 3 Burr. 1692; and 1 W. Bl. 555;

Note to Entinck v. Carrington, Broom, Const. Law. 613.
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to have been unfounded.1 But if he exceed the command

[* 308] by * searching in places not described therein, or by seiz-

ing persons or articles not commanded, he is not protected

by the warrant, and can only justify himself as in other cases where

he assumes to act without process.2 Obeying strictly the command

of his warrant, he may break open outer or inner doors, and his

justification does not depend upon his discovering that for which

he is to make search.8

In other cases than those to which we have referred, and sub-

ject to the general police power of the State, the law favors the

complete and undisturbed dominion of every man over his own

premises, and protects him therein with such jealousy that he

may defend his possession against intruders, in person or by his

servants or guests, even to the extent of taking the life of the

intruder, if that seem essential to the defence.4

Quartering Soldiers in Private Houtes.

A provision is found incorporated in the constitution of nearly

every State, that " no soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in
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any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war

1 Barnard v. Bartlett, 10 Cush. 501.

■ Crozier v. Cudney, 9 D. & R. 224; Same case, 6 B. & C. 232; State v.

Brennan's Liquors, 25 Conn. 278.

* 2 Hale, P. C. 151; Barnard v. Bartlett, 10 Cush. 501.

4 That in defence of himself, any member of his family or his dwelling, a man

has a right to employ all necessary violence, even to the taking of life, see

Shorter v. People, 2 N. Y. 193; Yates v. People, 32 N. Y. 509; Logue v. Com-

monwealth, 88 Penn. St. 265; Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150; Maher v. People,

24 111. 241; Bohannan v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush, 481; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 474.

But except where a forcible felony is attempted against person or property, he

should avoid such consequences if possible, and cannot justify standing up and

resisting to the death, when the assailant might have been avoided by retreat.

People v. Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 396. But a man assaulted in his dwelling is under

no obligation to retreat; his house is his castle, which he may defend to any

extremity. And this means not simply the dwelling-house proper, but includes

whatever is within the curtilage as understood at the common law. Pond t?.

People, 8 Mich. 150. And in deciding what force it is necessary to employ in

resisting the assault, a person must act upon the circumstances as they appear to

him at the time; and he is not to be held criminal because on a calm survey of

the facts afterwards it appears that the force employed in defence was-excessive.

See the cases above cited. Also Schiner v. People, 23 111. 17; Patten v. People,

18 Mich. 314; Henton o. State, 24 Texas, 454.
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but in a manner to be prescribed by law." To us, after four-fifths

of a century have passed away since occasion has existed for com-

plaint of the action of the government in this particular, the repe-

tition of this declaration seems to savor of idle form and ceremony;

but "a frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the

Constitution" can never be unimportant, and indeed may well be

regarded as "absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of

liberty, and to maintain a free government."1 It is difficult to

imagine a more terrible engine of oppression than the power in the

executive to fill the house of an obnoxious person with a company

of soldiers, who are to be fed and warmed at his expense, under

the direction of an officer accustomed to the exercise of arbitrary

power, and in whose presence the ordinary laws of courtesy, not

less than the civil restraints which protect person and property,

must give way to unbridled will; who is sent as an instru-

ment of * punishment, and with whom insult and outrage [* 309]

may appear quite in the line of his duty. However con-

trary to the spirit of the age such a proceeding may be, it may

always be assumed as possible that it may be resorted to in times
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of great excitement, when party action is generally violent; and

"the dragonadea of Louis XIV. in France, of James II. in Scot-

land, and those of more recent and present date in certain countries,

furnish sufficient justification of this specific guaranty."2 The

clause, as we find it in the national and State constitutions, has

come down to us through the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights

of 1688, and the Declaration of Independence; and it is but a

branch of the constitutional principle, that the military shall in

time of peace be in strict subordination to the civil power.3

1 Constitutions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Florida, Illinois,

and North Carolina. See also Constitutions of Virginia, Nebraska, and Wiscon-

sin, for a similar declaration.

'Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government, c. 11.

* Story on the Constitution, §§ 1899, 1900; Rawle on Constitution, 126. In

exceptional cases, however, martial law may be declared and enforced, whenever

the ordinary legal authorities are unable to maintain the public peace, and sup-

press violence and outrage. Todd, Parliamentary Government in England, Vol.

I. p. 342; 1 Bl. Com. 413-415. As to martial law in general, see Ex parte

Milligan, 4 Wall. 129.
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Criminal Accusations.

Perhaps the most important of the protections to personal liberty

consists in the mode of trial which is secured to every person ac-

cused of crime. At the common law, accusations of felony were

made in the form of an indictment by a grand jury; and this

process is still retained in many of the States,1 while others have

substituted in its stead an information filed by the prosecuting

officer of the State or county. The mode of investigating the facts,

however, is the same in all; and this is through atrial by jury,

surrounded by certain safeguards which are a well understood part

of the system, and which the government cannot dispense with.

First, we may mention that the humanity of our law always

presumes an accused party innocent until he is proved to be guilty.

This is a presumption which attends all the proceedings against

him, from their initiation until they result in a verdict, which

either finds the party guilty or converts the presumption of inno-

cence into an adjudged fact.2

If there were any mode short of confinement which would, with

reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused to

answer the accusation, it would not be justifiable to inflict upon
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him that indignity, when the effect is to subject him, in a greater

or less degree, Do the punishment of a guilty person, while as yet

1 The indictment, to accomplish the purpose of the constitutional require-

ment, should set out the material facts charged against the accused. State t>.

O'Flaherty, 7 Nev. 153. This, however, would not preclude the legislature from

establishing forms, provided they furnished such reasonable information as would

apprize the accused of the charge he was to meet.

2 It is sometimes claimed that where insanity is set up as a defence in a crim-

inal case, the defendant takes upon himself the burden of proof to establish it,

and that he must make it out beyond a reasonable doubt. For recent cases

taking this view, see State v. Felton, 32 Iowa, 49; McKenzie v. State. 42 Geo.

334; Boswell v. Commonwealth, 20 Grat. 860. Other well-considered cases do

not support this view. The burden of proof, it is held, rests throughout upon the

prosecution to establish all the conditions of guilt; and the presumption of inno-

cence that all the while attends the prisoner entitles him to an acquittal, if the

jury arc not reasonably satisfied of his guilt. A reasonable doubt of his capacity

to commit the crime as justly entitles him to an acquittal, as a reasonable doubt

on any other branch of the case. See State v. Marler, 2 Ala. 43; People t'.

McCann, 16 N. Y. 68; Commonwealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 373; Commonwealth

v. Dana, 2 Met. 340; Hopps v. People, 31 111. 885; People o. Garbutt, 17 Mich.

23; State v. Klinger, 43 Mo. 127; State v. Hundley, 46 Mo. 414.
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it is not determined that he has committed any crime. If

the punishment on conviction cannot exceed in severity the for-

feiture of a large sum of money, then it is reasonable to suppose

that such a sum of money, or an agreement by responsible

* parties to pay it to the government in case the accused [* 310]

should fail to appear, would be sufficient security for his

attendance; and therefore, at the common law, it was customary

to take security of this character in all cases of misdemeanor; one

or more friends of the accused undertaking for his appearance for

trial, and agreeing that a certain sum of money should be levied of

their goods and chattels, lands and tenements, if he made default.

But in the case of felonies, the privilege of giving bail before trial

was not a matter of right; and in this country, although the crim-

inal code is much more merciful than it formerly was in England,

and in some cases the allowance of bail is almost a matter of

course, there are others in which it is discretionary with the mag-

istrate to allow it or not, and where it will sometimes be refused if

the evidence of guilt is strong or the presumption great. Capital

offences are not generally regarded as bailable; at least, after in-

dictment, or when the party is charged by the finding of a coroner's
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jury;1 and this upon the supposition that one who may be sub-

jected to the terrible punishment that would follow a conviction,

would not for any mere pecuniary considerations remain to abide

the judgment.2 And where the deatli penalty is abolished and

imprisonment for life substituted, it is believed that the rule would

be the same notwithstanding this change, and bail would still be

denied in the case of the highest offences, except under very pecu-

liar circumstances.3 In the case of other felonies it is not usual

to refuse bail, and in some of the State constitutions it has been

deemed important to make it a matter of right in all cases except

on capital charges "when the proof is evident or the presumption

great."4

1 Matter of Barronet, 1 El. & Bl. 1; Ex parte Tayloe, 5 Cow. 39.

* State v. Summons, 19 Ohio, 139.

'The courts have power to bail, even in capital cases. United States r.

Hamilton, 3 Dall. 18; United States v. Jones, 3 Wash. 224; State v. Rockafel-

low, 1 Halst. 332; Commonwealth v. Semmes, 11 Leigh, 665; Commonwealth v.

Archer, 6 Grat. 705; People v. Smith, 1 Cal. 9; People v. Van Home, 8 Barb.

158. In England, when all felonies were capital, it was discretionary with the

courts to allow bail before trial. 4 Bl. Com. 297, and note.

4 The Constitutions of a majority of the States now contain provisions to
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When bail is allowed, unreasonable bail is not to be re-

[* 311] quired; * but the constitutional principle that demands

this is one which, from the very nature of the case, ad-

dresses itself exclusively to the judicial discretion and sense of

justice of the court or magistrate empowered to fix upon the

amount. That bail is reasonable which, in view of the nature of

the offence, the penalty which the law attaches to it, and the proba-

bilities that guilt will be established on the trial, seems no more

than sufficient to secure the party's attendance. In determining

this, some regard should be had to the prisoner's pecuniary cir-

cumstances; that which is reasonable bail to a man of wealth,

being equivalent to a denial of right if exacted of a poor man

charged with the like offence. When the court or magistrate re-

quires greater security than in his judgment is needful to secure

attendance, and keeps the prisoner in confinement for failure to

give it, it is plain that the right to bail which the constitution

attempts so carefully to secure lias been disregarded; and though

the wrong is one for which, in the nature of the case, no remedy

exists, the violation of constitutional privilege is aggravated, in-

stead of being diminished, by that circumstance.1
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The presumption of innocence is an absolute protection against

conviction and punishment, except either, first, on confession in

open court; or, second, on proof which places the guilt beyond any

reasonable doubt. Formerly, if a prisoner arraigned for felony

stood mute wilfully, and refused to plead, a terrible mode was

resorted to f r the purpose of compelling him to do so; and this

might even end in his death :2 but a more merciful proceeding is

this effect. And see Foley v. People, Breese, 31; Ullery c. Commonwealth,

8 B. Monr. 3; Shore ». State, 6 Mo. 640; State v. Summons, 19 Ohio, 139;

Ex parte Wray, 30 Miss. 673; Moore v. State, 36 Miss. 137; Ex parte Banks,

28 Ala. 89.

1 The magistrate in taking bail exercises an authority essentially judicial.

Regina v. Badger, 4 Q. B. 468; Linford v. Fitzroy, 13 Q. B. 240. As to his

duty to look into the nature of the charge and the evidence to sustain it, see

Barronet's Case, 1 El. & Bl. 1.

* 4 Bl. Com. 324. In treason, petit felony, and misdemeanors, wilfully

standing mute was equivalent to a conviction, and the same punishment might be

imposed; but in other cases there could be no trial or judgment without plea;

and an accused party might therefore sometimes stand mute and suffer himself

to be pressed to death, in order to save his property from forfeiture. Poor Giles

Corey, .accused of witchcraft, was perhaps the only person ever pressed to death

[364]
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now substituted; the court entering a plea of not guilty for a

party who, for any reason, fails to plead for himself.

Again, it is required that the trial be speedy; and here also the

injunction is addressed to the sense of justice and sound judgment

of the court. In this country, where officers are specially appointed

or elected to represent the people in these prosecutions, their posi-

tion gives them an immense power for oppression; and it is to be

feared they do not always sufficiently appreciate the responsibility,

and wield the power with due regard to the legal rights and priv-

ileges of the accused.1 When a person charged with crime is

willing to proceed at once to trial, no delay on the part of the

prosecution is reasonable, except only that which is necessary

for proper preparation and to secure the attendance of

* witnesses.2 Very much, however, must be left to the [* 312]

judgment of the prosecuting officer in these cases; and

the court would not compel the government to proceed to trial at

the first term after indictment found or information filed, if the

officer who represents it should state, under the responsibility of

his official oath, that he was not and could not be ready at that

time.3 But further delay would not generally be allowed without a
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more specific showing of the causes which prevent the State proceed-

ing to trial, including the names of the witnesses, the steps taken to

procure them, and the facts expected to be proved by them, in order

that the court might judge of the reasonableness of the applica-

tion, and that the prisoner might, if he saw fit to take that course,

for refusal to plead in America. 3 Bancroft's U. S. 93; 2 Hildreth'a U. S. 160.

For English cases, see Cooley's Bl. Com. 325, note. Now in England the court

enters a plea of not guilty for a prisoner refusing to plead, and the trial proceeds

as in other cases.

1 It is the duty of the prosecuting attorney to treat the accused with judicial

fairness; and to inflict injury at the expense of justice is no part of the purpose

for which he is chosen. Unfortunately, however, we sometimes meet with cases

in which these officers appear to regard themselves as the counsel for the com-

plaining party rather than the impartial representative of public justice. Bu

we trust it is not often that cases occur like a recent one in Tennessee, in which

the Supreme Court felt called upon to set aside a verdict in a criminal case,

where by the artifice of the prosecuting officer the prisoner had been induced to

go to trial under the belief that certain witnesses for the State were absent, when

in fact they were present and kept in concealment by this functionary. Curtis v.

State, 6 Cold. 9.

s See this discussed in Ex parte Stanley, 4 Nev. 113.

'Watts v. State, 26 Geo. 231.
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secure an immediate trial by admitting that the witnesses, if pres-

ent, would testify to the facts which the prosecution have claimed

could be proved by them.1

It is also requisite that the trial be public. By this is not meant

that every person who sees fit shall in all cases be permitted to

attend criminal trials; because there are many cases where, from

the character of the charge, and the nature of the evidence by

which it is to be supported, the motives to attend the trial on the

part of portions of the community would be of the worst char-

acter, and where a regard to public morals and public decency

would require that at least the young be excluded from hearing

and witnessing the evidences of human depravity which the trial

must necessarily bring to light. The requirement of a public trial

is for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly

dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of

interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of

their responsibility and to the importance of their functions; and

the requirement is fairly met with, if, without partiality or favorit-

ism, a reasonable proportion of the public is suffered to attend,
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notwithstanding that those persons whose' presence could be of no

service to the accused, and who would only be drawn thither by a

prurient curiosity, are excluded altogether.

[* 313] * But a far more important requirement is that the pro-

ceeding to establish guilt shall not be inquisitorial. A

peculiar excellence of the common-law system of trial over that

which has prevailed in other civilized countries, consists in the fact

that the accused is never compelled to give evidence against him-

self. Much as there was in that system that was heartless and

cruel, it recognized fully the dangerous and utterly untrustworthy

character of extorted confessions, and was never subject to the

reproach that it gave judgment upon them.2

1 The Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Ch. II. c. 2, § 1, required a prisoner charged

with crime to be released on bail, if not indicted the first term after the commit-

ment, unless the king's witnesses could not be obtained; and that he should be

brought to trial as early as the second term after the commitment. The prin-

ciples of this statute are considered as having been adopted into the American

common law: post, 345.

8 See Lieber's paper on Inquisitorial Trials, Appendix to Civil Liberty and

Self-Government. Also the article on Criminal Procedure in Scotland and Eng-

land, Edinb. Review, Oct. 1858. And for an illustration of inquisitorial trials in

our owu day, see Trials of Troppman and Prince Pierre Bonaparte, Am. Law
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It is the law in some of the States, when a person is charged

witli crime, and is brought before an examining magistrate, and

the witnesses in support of the charge have been heard, that the

prisoner may also make a statement concerning the transaction

charged against him, and that this may be used against him on the

trial if supposed to have a tendency to establish guilt. But the

prisoner is to be first cautioned that he is under no obligation to

answer any question put to him unless he chooses, and that what-

ever he says and does must be entirely voluntary.1 He is also to be

allowed the presence and advice of counsel; and if that privilege

is denied him it may be sufficient reason for discrediting any dam

aging statements he may have made.2 When, however, the statute

lias been complied with, and no species of coercion appears to

have been employed, the statement the prisoner may have made is

evidence which can be used against him on his trial, and is gen-

erally entitled to great weight.8 And in any other case

•except treason4 the confession of the accused may be [*314]

Review, Vol. V. p. 14. Judge Foster relates from Whitelocke, that the bishop

of London having said to Felton, who had assassinated the Duke of Bucking-

ham, "If you will not confess, you must go to the rack," the man replied, "If it
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must be so, I know not whom I may accuse in the extremity of my torture, —

Bishop Laud, perhaps, or any lord of this board." "Sound sense," adds Foster,

"in the mouth of an enthusiast and ruffian." Laud having proposed the rack, the

matter was shortly debated at the board, and it ended in a reference to the judges,

who unanimously resolved that the rack could not be legally used. De Lolme on

Constitution of England (ed. of 1807), p. 181, note; 4 Bl. Com. 325; Broom,

Const. Law, 148; Trial of Felton, 3 State Trials, 368, 371; Brodie, Const. Hist,

c. 8. A legislative body has no more right than a court to make its examination

of parties or witnesses inquisitorial. Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172.

1 See Rev. Stat of New York, Pt. 4, c. 2, tit. 2, §§ 14-16.

* Rex v. Ellis, Ry. & Mood. 432. However, there is no absolute right to the

presence of counsel, or to publicity in these preliminary examinations, unless

given by statute. Cox ». Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37.

1 It should not, however, be taken on oath, and if it is, that will be sufficient

reason for rejecting it. Rex v. Smith, 1 Stark. 242; Rex o. Webb, 4 C. & P.

664; Rex v. Lewis, 6 C. & P. 161; Rex v. Rivers, 7 C. & P. 177; Regina t>.

Pikesley, 9 C. &. P. 124; People v. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 384. "The view of

the English judges, that an oath, even where a party is informed be need answer

no questions unless he pleases, would, with most persons, overcome that caution,

is, I think, founded on good reason and experience. I think there is no country

— certainly there is none from which any of our legal notions are borrowed —

where a prisoner is ever examined on oath." People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 318,

per Campbell, J.

4 In treason there can be no conviction unless on the testimony of two wit-
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received in evidence to establish his guilt, provided no circum-

stance accompanies the making of it which should detract from

ts weight in producing conviction.

But to make it admissible in any case it ought to appear that it

was made voluntarily, and that no motives of hope or fear were

employed to induce the accused to confess. The evidence ought

to be clear and satisfactory that the prisoner was neither threat-

ened nor cajoled into admitting what very possibly was untrue.

Under the excitement of a charge of crime, coolness and self-pos-

session are to be looked for in very few persons; and however

strongly we may reason with ourselves that no one will confess a

heinous offence of which he is not guilty, the records of criminal

courts bear abundant testimony to the contrary. If confessions

could prove a crime beyond doubt, no act which was ever punished

criminally would be better established than witchcraft;1 and the

judicial executions which have been justified by such confessions

ought to constitute a solemn warning against the too ready reli-

ance upon confessions as proof of guilt in any case. As "Mr.
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Justice Parke several times observed " while holding one of his

•circuits, " too great weight ought not to be attached to evidence of

what a party has been supposed to have said, as it very frequently

happens, not only that the witness has misunderstood what the

party has said, but that by unintentionally altering a few of the

expressions really used, he gives an effect to the statement com-

pletely at variance with what the party really did say."2 And

when the admission is full and positive, it perhaps quite as often

happens that it has been made under the influence of the terrible

fear excited by the charge, and in the hope that confession may

nesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. Const, of United

States, art. 3, § 8.

1 See Mary Smith's Case, 2 Howell's State Trials, 1049; Case of Essex

Witches, 4 t'6. 817; Case of Suffolk Witches, 6 16. 647; Case of Devon Witches,

8 ih. 1017. It is true that torture was employed freely in cases of alleged witch-

craft, but the delusion was one which often seized upon the victims as well as their

accusers, and led the former to freely confess the most monstrous and impossible

actions. Much curious and valuable information on this subject may be found in

"Superstition and Force," by Lea; "A Physician's Problems," by Elam; and

Leckey, History of Rationalism.

'Note to Earle v. Picken, 5 C. & P. 542. See also 1 Greenl Ev. § 214,

and note; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 97 Mass. 574; Derby v. Derby, 21 N. J

Eq. 36.
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ward * off some of the consequences likely to follow if guilt [* 315]

were persistently denied.

A confession alone ought not to be sufficient evidence of the

corpus delicti. There should be other proof that a crime has actu-

ally been committed; and the confession should only bo allowed

for the purpose of connecting the defendant with the offence.1 And

if the party's hopes or fears are operated upon to induce him to

make it, this fact will be sufficient to preclude the confession being

received; the rule upon this subject being so strict that even say-

ing to the prisoner it will be better for him to confess, has been

decided to be a holding out of such inducements to confession,

especially when said by a person having a prisoner in custody, as

should render the statement obtained by means of it inad-

missible.2 If, however, * statements have been made [* 316]

before the confession, which were likely to do away with

1 In Stringfellow p. State, 26 Miss. 157, a confession of murder was held not

sufficient to warrant conviction, unless the death of the person alleged to have

been murdered was shown by other evidence. In People e. Hennessey, 1.0 Wend.

147, it was decided that a confession of embezzlement by a clerk would not war-

rant a conviction where that constituted the sole evidence that an embezzlement
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bad been committed. So on an indictment for blasphemy, the admission by the

defendant that he spoke the blasphemous charge, is not sufficient evidence of the

uttering. People r. Porter, 2 Park. Cr. R. 14. And see State t>. Guild, 5 Halst.

163; Long's Case, 1 Hayw. 524; People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349; Ruloff v.

State, 18 N. Y. 179.

2 Rex r. Enoch, 5 C. & P. 539; State v. Bostick, 4 Harr. 563; Boyd v. State,

2 Humph. 390; Morehead v. State, 9 Humph. 635; Commonwealth v. Taylor,

5 Cush. 605; Rex v. Partridge, 7 C. & P. 551; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 97

Mass. 574; State v. Staley, 14 Minn. 105; Frain t». State, 40 Geo. 529; Austine

v. State, 51 111. 236; People v. Phillips, 42 N. Y. 200; State v. Brockman, 46

Mo. 566. Mr. Phillips states the rule thus: "A promise of benefit or favor, or

threat or intimation of disfavor, connected with the subject of the charge, held oi t

by a person having authority in the matter, will be sufficient to exclude a con-

fession made in consequence of such inducements, either of hope or fear. The

prosecutor, or prosecutor's wife or attorney, or the prisoner's master or mistress,

or a constable, or a person assisting him in the apprehension or custody, or a

magistrate acting in the business, or other magistrate, has been respectively looked

upon as having authority in the matter; and the same principle applies if the prin-

ciple has been held out by a person without authority, in the presence of a

person who has such authority, and with his sanction, either express or implied."

1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 544, and cases cited. But we think

the better reason is in favor of excluding confessions where inducements have been

held out by any person, whether acting by authority or not. Rex v. Simpson, 1

Mood. C. C. 410; State v. Guild, 5 Halst. 163; Spears v. State, 2 Ohio, H. s.
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the effect of the inducements, so that the accused cannot be sup-

posed to have acted under their influence, the confession may be

583; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 496; Rex v. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221; Rex

v. Kingston, ib. 887; Rex t>. Dunn, ib. 543; Rex v. Walkley, 6 C. & P. 175; Rex

v. Thomas, ib. 353. "The reason is, that in the agitation of mind in which the

party charged is supposed to be, he is liable to be influenced by the hope of

advantage or fear of injury to state things which are not true." Per Morion, J.,

in Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 496; People v. McMahon, 15 N. T. 387.

There are not wanting many opposing authorities, which proceed upon the idea,

that "a promise made by an indifferent person, who interfered officiously without

any kind of authority, and promised without the means of performance, can scarcely

be deemed sufficient to produce any effect, even on the weakest mind, as an

inducement to confess.". 1 Greenl. Ev. § 223. No supposition could be more

fallacious; and in point of fact a case can scarcely occur in which some one, from

age, superior wisdom or experience, or from his relations to the accused or to

the prosecutor, would not be likely to exercise more influence upon his mind

than some of the persons who are regarded as " in authority " under the rule as

stated by Mr. Phillips. Mr. Greenleaf thinks that, while as a rule of law all
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confessions made to persons in authority should be rejected, " promises and threats

by private persons, not being found so uniform in their operation, perhaps may,

with more propriety, be treated as mixed questions of law and fact; the prin-

ciple of law, that a confession must be voluntary, being strictly adhered to, and

the question, whether the promises or threats of the private individuals who

employed them were sufficient to overcome the mind of the prisoner, being left

to the discretion of the judge under all the circumstances of the case." 1 Greenl.

Ev. § 223. This is a more reasonable rule than that which admits such confessions

under all circumstances; but it is impossible for a judge to say whether induce-

ments, in a particular case, have influenced the mind or not; if their nature were

such that they were calculated to have that effect, it is safer, and more in accord-

ance with the human principles of our criminal law, to presume, in favor of life

and liberty, that the confessions were "forced from the mind by the flattery of

hope, or by the torture of fear" (per Eyre, C. B., Warickshall's Case, 1 Leach,

C. C. 299), and exclude them altogether. This whole subject is very fully con-

sidered in note to 2 Leading Criminal Cases, 182. And see Whart. Cr. Law,

§ 686 et seq. The cases of People v. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 385, and Common-

wealth v. Curtis, 97 Mass. 574, have carefully considered the general subject.

In the second of these, the prisoner had asked the officer who made the arrest,

whether he had better plead guilty, and the officer had replied that "as a general

thing it was better for a man who was guilty to plead guilty, for he got a lighter

sentence." After this he made statements which were relied upon to prove

guilt. These statements were not allowed to be given in evidence. Per Foster, J.:

"There is no doubt that any inducement of temporal fear or favor coming from

one in authority, which preceded and may have influenced a confession, will cause

it to be rejected, unless the confession is made under such circumstances as to

show that the influence of the inducement had passed away. No cases require

more careful scrutiny than those of disclosures made by the party under arrest to
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received in evidence;1 but the showing ought to be very satisfac-

tory on this point before the court should presume that the pris-

oner's hopes did not still cling to, or his fears dwell upon, the first

inducements.2

Before prisoners were allowed the benefit of assistance from

counsel on trials for high crimes, it was customary for them to

make such statements as they saw fit concerning the charge against

them, during the progress of the trial, or after the evidence for the

prosecution was put in; and upon these statements the prose-

cuting officer or the court would sometimes ask questions, which

the accused might answer or not at his option. And although this

practice has now become obsolete, yet if the accused in any case

should manage or assist in his own defence, and should claim the

right of addressing the jury, it would be difficult to confine him

to " the record " as the counsel may be confined in his

* argument. A disposition has been manifested of late to [* 317]

allow the accused to give evidence in his own behalf; and

statutes to that effect are in existence in some of the States, the

operation of which is believed to have been generally satisfactory.3

These statutes, however, cannot be so construed as to authorize
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compulsory process against an accused to compel him to disclose

more than he chooses; they do not so far change the old system

the officer who has him in custody, and in none will slighter threats or promises

of favor exclude the subsequent confessions. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 5 Cush.

610; Commonwealth p. Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 193; Commonwealth v. Morey,

1 Gray, 461. 'Saying to the prisoner that it will be the worse for him if he does

not confess, or that it will be the better for him if he does, is sufficient to exclude

the confession, according to constant experience.' 2 Hale, P. C. 659; 1 Greenl.

Ev. § 219; 2 Bennett and Heard's Lead. Cp. Cas. 164. Each case depends

largely on its own special circumstances. But we have before us an instance in

which the officer actually held out to the defendant the hope and inducement of

a lighter sentence if he pleaded guilty. And a determination to plead guilty at

the trial, thus induced, would naturally lead to an immediate disclosure of guilt."

And the court held it an unimportant circumstance that the advice of the officer

was given at the request of the prisoner, instead of being volunteered.

1 State p. Guild, 5 Halst. 163; Commonwealth v. Harman, 4 Penn. St. 269;

State v. Vaigneur, 5 Rich. 391; Rex v. Cooper, 5 C. & P. 535; Rex v. Howes,

6 C. & P. 404; Rex v. Richards, 5 C. & P. 318; Thompson v. Commonwealth,

20 Grat. 724.

1 See State p. Roberts, 1 Dev. 259; Rex v. Cooper, 5 C. & P. 535; Thomp-

son v. Commonwealth, 20 Grat. 724; State v. Lowhorne, 66 N. C. 538.

J See American Law Register, Vol. V. (n. s.) pp. 129, 705.
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as to establish an inquisitorial process for obtaining evidat;

they confer a privilege, which the defendant may use at Ins option;

If he does not choose to avail himself of it, unfavorable inferences

are not to be drawn to his prejudice from that circumstance;1 and

if he does testify, he is at liberty to stop at any point he chooses,

and it must be left to the jury to give a statement, which he declines

to make a full one, such weight as, under the circumstances, they

think it entitled to;2 otherwise the statute must have set aside

and overruled the constitutional maxim which protects an accused

1 People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522; State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555. For a case

resting upon an analogous principle, see Carne v. Litchfield, 2 Mich. 340. A

different view would seem to be taken in Maine. See State v. Bartlett, 5o Me.

200. And see the next note. In Devries v. Phillips, 63 N. C. 53, the Supreme

Court of North Carolina held it not admissible for counsel to comment to the

jury on the fact that the opposite party did not come forward to be sworn is i

witness as the statute permitted. See also Crandall v. People, 2 Lansing, 309.

In Michigan the wife of an accused party may be sworn as a witness with his

assent; but it has been held that his failure to call her was not to subject him

to inferences of guilt, even though the case was such that if his defence was

true, his wife must have been cognizant of the facts. Knowles r. People, lo
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Mich. 408.

* By a recent case this paragraph appears to have led to some misapprehension

of our views, and consequently we must regard it as unfortunately worded.

Nevertheless, after full consideration, it has been concluded to leave it as it

stands. What we intend to affirm by it is, that the privilege to testify in his

own behalf is one the accused may waive without justly subjecting himself to un-

favorable comments; and that if he avails himself of it, and stops short of a full

disclosure, no compulsory process can be made use of to compel him to testily

further. It was not designed to be understood that, in the latter case, his failure

to answer any proper question would not be the subject of comment and criticism

by counsel; but, on the contrary, it was supposed that this was implied in the

remark, that " it must be left to the jury to give a statement which he declines to

make a full one such weight as, under the circumstances, they think it entitled

to." All circumstances which it is proper for the jury to consider, it is proper

for counsel to comment upon.

The case referred to is that of State v. Ober, just decided in the Supreme

Court of New Hampshire. The defendant was put on trial for an illegal sale

of liquors; and, having offered himself as a witness, was asked on cross-examin-

ation a question directly relating to the sale. He declined to answer, on the

ground that it might tend to criminate him. Being convicted, it was alleged for

error that the court suffered the prosecuting officer to comment on this refusal

to the jury. The Supreme Court held this no error. We not only approve of

this ruling, but we should be at a loss for reasons which could furnish plausible

support for any other. It is in entire accord with the practice which has pre-

vailed without question in Michigan, and which has always assumed that the
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party against being compelled to testify against himself, and the

statutory privilege becomes a snare and a danger.1

* The testimony for the people in criminal cases can [* 318]

only, as a general rule, be given by witnesses who are

present in court.2 The defendant is entitled to be confronted

right of comment, where the party makes himself his own witness and then

refuses to answer proper questions, was as clear as the right to exemption from

unfavorable comment when he abstains from asserting his statutory privilege.

The case of Connors v. People, 50 N. Y. 240, is different. There the

defendant, having taken the stand as a witness, objected to answer a question;

but was directed by the court to do so, and obeyed the direction. This was held

no error, because he had waived his pr vilege. If the defendant had persisted in

refusing, we are not advised what action the court would have deemed it proper

to take, and it is easy to conceive of serious embarrassments in such a case.

Under the Michigan practice, when the court had decided the question to be a

proper one, it would have been left to the defendant to answer or not at his

option, but if he failed to answer what seemed to the jury a proper inquiry,

it would be thought surprising if they gave his imperfect statement much cre-

dence.

1 The statute of Michigan of 1861, p. 169, removed the common-law disabili-
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ties of parties to testify, and added, "Notbin r in this act shall be construed as

giving the right to compel a defendant in criminal cases to testify; but any such

defendant shall be at liberty to make a statement to the court or jury, and may

be cross-examined on any such statement. It has been held that this statement

should not be under oath. People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 814. That its purpose

was to give every person on trial for crime an opportunity to make full explana-

tion to the jury, in respect to the circumstances given in evidence which are sup-

posed to have a bearing against him. Annis v. People, 13 Mich. 511. That the

statement is evidence in the case, to which the jury can attach such weight as

they think it entitled to. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212. That the court has

no right to instruct the jury that, when it conflicts with the testimony of an un-

impeached witness, they must believe the latter in preference. Durant v. People,

13 Mich, 351. And that the prisoner, while on the stand, is entitled to the

assistance of counsel in directing his attention to any branch of the charge, that

he may make explanations concerning it if he desires. Annis v. People, 13 Mich.

511. The prisoner does not cease to be a defendant by becoming a witness, nor

forfeit righ s by accepting a privilege. In People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 321,

Campbell, J., in speaking of the right which the statute gives to cross-examine a

defendant who has made his statement, says: "And while his constitutional right

of decli ing to answer questions cannot be removed, yet a refusal by a party

to answer any fair question, not going outside of what he has offered to explain,

would have its proper weight with the jury." See Commonwealth v. Mullen, 97

Mass. 547; Commonwealth v. Curtis, t&. 574; Commonwealth v. Morgan, 107

Mass. 199.

1 State p. Thomas, 64 N. C. 74; Goodman ». State, Meigs, 197; Jackson v.

Commonwealth, 19 Grat. 656. By the old common law, a party accused of felony
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with the witnesses against him; and if any of them be absent

from the Commonwealth, so that their attendance cannot be com-

pelled, or if they be dead, or have become incapacitated to give

evidence, there is no mode by which their statements against the

prisoner can be used for his conviction. The exceptions to this

rule are of cases which are excluded from its reasons by their

peculiar circumstances; but they are far from numerous. If the

witness was sworn before the examining magistrate, or before a

coroner, and the accused had an opportunity then to cross-examiue

him, or if there were a former trial on which he was sworn, it

seems allowable to make use of his deposition, or of the minutes

of his examination, if the witness has since deceased, or is insane,

or sick and unable to testify, or has been summoned but appears

to have been kept away by the opposite party.1 So, also, if a per-

son is on trial for homicide, the declarations of the party whom he

is charged with having killed, if made under the solemnity of a con-

viction that he was at the point of death, and relating to matters

of fact concerning the homicide, which passed under his own obser-

vation, may be given in evidence against the accused ; the condition
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of the party who made them being such that every motive to false-

hood must be supposed to have been silenced, and the mind to be

impelled by the most powerful considerations to tell the truth.2

was not allowed to call witnesses to contradict the evidence for the Crown; and

this seems to have been on some idea that it would be derogatory to the royal

dignity to permit it. Afterwards, when they were permitted to be called, they

made their statements without oath; and it was not uncommon for both the

prosecution and the court to comment upon their testimony as of little weight

because unsworn. It was not until Queen Anne's time that they were put under

oath.

The rule that the prisoner shall be confronted with the witnesses against him

does not preclude such documentary evidence to establish collateral facts as

would be admissible under the rules of the common law in other cases. U. S. v.

Benner, Baldw. 240; U. S. v. Little, 2 Wash. C. C. 205; U. S. v. Ortega, i

Wash. C. C. 631. But the corpus delicti — e.g. the fact of marriage in an in-

dictment for bigamy — cannot be proved by certificates. People v. Lambert,

5 Mich. 349.

1 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 163-166; Bishop, Cr. Pro. §§ 520-527; Whart. Cr. Law,

§ 667; 2 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 217, 229. Whether evidence

that the witness cannot be found after diligent inquiry, or is out of the jurisdic-

tion, would be sufficient to let in proof of his former testimony, see Bui. N. P.

239, 242; Rex v. Hagan, 8 C. & P. 167; Sills v. Brown, 9 C. & P. 601.

• 1 Greenl. Ev. § 156; 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 285-289;
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Not that such evidence is of very conclusive character: it is not

always easy for the hearer to determine how much of the declara-

tion related to what was seen and positively known, and

how much was surmise * and suspicion only; but it is [* 319]

admissible from the necessity of the case, and the jury

must judge of the weight to be attached to it.

In cases of felony, where the prisoner's life or liberty is in peril,

he has the right to be present, and must be present, during the

whole of the trial, and until the final judgment. If he be absent,

either in prison or by escape, there is a want of jurisdiction over

the person, and the court cannot proceed with the trial, or receive

the verdict, or pronounce the final judgment.1 But misdemeanors

may be tried in the absence of the accused.

The Traverse Jury.

Accusations of criminal conduct are tried at the common law by

jury;2 and wherever the right to this trial is guaranteed by the

constitution without qualification or restriction, it must be under-

stood as retained in all those cases which were triable by jury at

Whart. Cp. Law, §§ 689-682; Donnelly v. State, 2 Dutch. 463; Hill's Case, 2

Grat. 594;. State p. Freeman, 1 Speers, 57; State v. Brunetto, 13 La An. 45;

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Dunn v. State, 2 Pike, 229; Mose v. State, 35 Ala. 421; Brown v. State, 32 Miss.

433; Whitley v. State, 38 Geo. 70; State v. Quick, 15 Rich. 158; Jackson v

Commonwealth, 19 Grat. 656; State v. Oliver, 2 Houston, 585. This whole

subject was largely considered in Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 193.

1 See Andrews v. State, 2 Sneed, 550 ; Jacobs v. Cone, 5 S. & R. 835; Witt

v. State, 5 Cold. 11; State p. Alman, 64 N. C. 364; Gladden v. State, 12 Fla.

577; Maurer v. People, 43 N. Y. 1; Note to Winchell v. State, 7 Cow. 525. In

capital cases the accused stands upon all his rights, and waives nothing. Demp-

aey v. People, 47 1ll. 325; People v. McKay, 18 Johns. 217; Burley v. State, 1

Neb. 385. The court cannot make an order changing the venue in a criminal

case in the absence of and without notice to the defendant. Ex parte Bryan,

44 Ala. 404. Nor in the course of the trial allow evidence to be given to the

jury in his absence, even though it be that of a witness which had been previously

reduced to writing. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 19 Grat. 656; Wade v. State,

12 Geo. 25. And in a capital case the record must affirmatively show the pres-

ence of the accused at the trial, and when the verdict is received and sentence

pronounced. Dougherty v. Commonwealth, 69 Penn. St. 286.

'It is worthy of note that all that is extant of the legislation of the Plymouth

Colony for the first five years, consists of the single regulation, "that all criminal

facts, and also all manner of trespasses and debts between man and man, shall

be tried by the verdict of twelve honest men, to be impanelled by authority, in

form of a jury, upon their oath." 1 Palfrey's New England, 340.
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the common law, and with all the common-law incidents to a jury

trial, so far, at least, as they can be regarded as tending to the

protection of the accused.1

A petit, petty, or traverse jury is a body of twelve men, who are

sworn to try the facts of a case, as they are presented in the

evidence placed before them. Any less than this number of

twelve would not be a common-law jury, and not such a jury as

the Constitution guarantees to accused parties, when a less number

is not allowed in express terms; and the necessity of a full panel

could not be waived — at least, in case of felony—even by

consent.2 The infirmity in case of a trial by a jury of less than

twelve, by consent, would be that the tribunal would be one

unknown to the law, created by mere voluntary act of the parties;

and it would in effect be an attempt to submit to a species of

arbitration the question whether the accused has been guilty of au

offence against the State. But in those cases which formerly were

not triable by jury, if the legislature provide for such a trial now,

they may doubtless create for the purpose a statutory tribunal,

composed of any number of persons, and no question of constitu-
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tional power or right could arise.

1 See note to p. 410, post. A citizen not in the land or naval service, or in

the militia in actual service, cannot be tried by court-martial or military commis-

sion, on a charge of discouraging volunteer enlistments or resisting a military

conscription. In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.

The constitutional right of trial by jury extends to newly created offences.

Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283; State v. Peterson, 41 Vt. 504. But not to

offences against city by-laws. McGenr v. Woodruff, 4 Vroom, 213.

* Work v. State, 2 Ohio, n. s. 290; Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128;

Brown v. State, 8 Blackf. 561; 2 Lead. Cr. Can. 337; Hill t>. People, 16 Mich.

351. And see State o. Everett, 14 Minn. 447. In Commonwealth o. Dailey, 12

Cush. 80, it was held that, in a case of misdemeanor, the consent of the deft-nd-

ant that a verdict might be received from eleven jurors was binding upon him,

and the verdict was valid. See also State v. Cox, 3 Eng. 436; Murphy r. Com-

monwealth, 1 Met. (Ky.) 365; Tyzee v. Commonwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) 1; State

v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470; Brown v. State, 16 Ind. 496; Opinions of Judges, 41

N. H. 550. In Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 356, it was decided that if one of the

jurors called was an alien, the defendant did not waive the objection by faib'ng to

challenge him, if he was not aware of the disqualification; and if the court refused

to set aside the verdict on affidavits showing these facts, the judgment upon it

would be reversed on error. The case of State r. Quarrel, 2 Bay, 150, is contra.

The case of Stone v. State, 2 Scam. 326, in which it was held competent for the

court, even in a capital case, to strike off a juryman after he was sworn, because

of alienage, affords some support for' Hill v. People.

[ 366 ]
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Many of the incidents of a common-law trial by jury are essen-

tial elements of the right. The jury must be indifferent between

the prisoner and the commonwealth; and to secure impartiality

challenges are allowed, both for cause, and also peremptory with-

out assigning cause. Th s jury must also be summoned

*from the vicinage where the crime is supposed to have [* 320]

been committed ;1 and the accused will thus have the

benefit on his trial of his own good character and standing with

his neighbors, if these he has preserved; and also of such

knowledge as the jury may possess of the witnesses who may give

evidence against him. He will also be able with more certainty to

secure the attendance of his own witnesses. The jury must unani-

mously concur in the verdict. This is a very old requirement in

1 Offences against the United States are to be tried in the'district, and those

against the State in the county in which they are charged to have been committed;

but courts are generally empowered, on the application of an accused party, to

order a change of venue, where for any reason a fair and impartial trial cannot

be had in the locality. It has been held incompetent to order such a change of

renue on the application of the prosecution. Kirk v. State, 1 Cold. 344. See also

Wheeler d. State, 24 Wis. 52; Osborn v. State, 24 Ark. 629. And in another
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case in Tennessee it was decided that a statute which permitted offences com-

mitted near the boundary line of two counties to be tried in either was an invasion

of the constitutional principle stated in the text. Armstrong v. State, 1 Cold.

338. See also State v. Denton, 6 Cold. 539. But see State r. Robinson, 14

Minn. 447.

A most extraordinary attempt to deprive a party of the benefit of trial by a

jury of the vicinage was recently frustrated by the ecision of Judge Blatchford,

U.S. District Judge for the southern district of New York. The "New York Sun,"

of which Mr. Charles A. Dana was editor-in-chief, published an article reflecting

upon the public conduct of an official at Washington. This article was claimed

to be a libel. The actual offence, if any, was committed in New York; but a

technical publication also took place in Washington, by the sale of papers there.

The offended party chose to have his complaint tried summarily by a police justice

of the latter city, instead of submitting it to a jury required to be indifferent

between the parties. A U. S. Commissioner, well read rather in the arbitrary

lessons of civil war than in the principles of civil liberty, had no hesitation in

issuing a warrant for Mr. Dana's arrest in New York for transportation to Wash-

ington for trial; but Judge Blatchford treated the proceeding with little respect,

and ordered Mr. Dana's discharge. It would have been a singular result of a

revolution where one of the grievances complained of was the assertion of a right

to send parties abroad for trial, if it should have been found that an editor might

be seized any where in the Union and transported by a federal officer to every

territory in which his paper might find its way, I o be tr d in ch in succession

for offences which consisted in a single act not actually done in any of them.

[ 367 ]
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the English common law, and it has been adhered to, notwithstand-

ing very eminent men have assailed it as unwise and inexpedient.1

And the jurors must be left free to act in accordance with the

dictates of their judgment. The final decision upon the facts is to

rest with them, and interference by the court with a view to coerce

them into a verdict against their convictions, is unwarrantable and

irregular. A judge is not justified in expressing his opinion to

the jury that the defendant is guilty upon the evidence adduced.2

Still less would he be justified in refusing to receive and record the

verdict of the jury, because of its being, in his opinion, rendered

in favor of the prisoner when it ought not to have been.

1 For the origin of this principle, see Forsyth, Trial by Jury, c. 11. The

requirement of unanimity does not prevail in Scotland, or on the Continent.

Among the eminent men who have not approved it may be mentioned Locke and

Jeremy Bentham. See Forsyth, supra; Lieber, Civil Liberty and Sell-Govern-

ment, c. 20.

* A judge who urges his opinion upon the facts to the jury decides the cause,

while avoiding the responsibility. How often would a jury be found bold enough

to declare their opinion in opposition to that of the judge upon the bench, whose

words would fall upon their ears with all the weight which experience, learning,
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and commanding position must always carry with them? What lawyer would

care to sum up his case, if he knew that the judge, whose words would be so

much more influential, was to declare in his favor, or would be bold enough to

argue the facts to the jury, if he knew the judge was to declare against hira?

Blackstone has justly remarked that "in settling and adjusting a question of fact,

where intrusted to any single magistrate, partiality and injustice have an ample

field to range in; either by boldly asserting that to be proved which is not so, or

by more artfully distinguishing away the remainder." 8 Bl. Com. 380. These

are evils which jury trial is designed to prevent; but the effort must be vain if

the judge is to control by his opinion where the law has given him no power to

command. In Lord Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors, c. 181, the author

justly condemns the practice with some judges in libel cases, of expressing to the

jury their belief in the defendant's guilt. On the trial of parties, charged with

a libel on the Empress of Russia, Lord Kenyan, sneering at the late Libel Act,

said: "I am bound by my oath to declare my own opinion, and I should forget

my duty were I not to say to you that it is a gross libel." Upon this Lord

Campbell remarks: "Mr. Fox's act only requires the judges to give their opinion

on matters of law in libel cases as in other cases. But did any judge ever say,

'Gentlemen, I am of opinion that this is a wilful, malicious, and atrocious mur-

der '? For a considerable time after the act passed, against the unanimous oppo-

sition of the judges, they almost all spitefully followed this course. I myself

h ard one judge say: * As the legislature requires me to give my own opinion in

the present case, I am of opinion that this is a diabolically atrocious libel."

Upon this subject, see McGuffie v. State, 17 Geo. 497; State v. McGinnis, 5

Nev. 337; Pittock v. O'Niell, 63 Penn. St. 253; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 544.

[ 368 J
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* He discharges his duty of giving instructions to the [* 321]

jury when he informs them what in his view the law is

which is applicable to the case before them, and what is essential

to constitute the offence charged; and the jury should be left free

and unbiassed by his opinion to determine for themselves whether

the facts in evidence are such as, in the light of the instructions of

the judge, make out beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused

party is guilty as alleged.1

How far the jury are to judge of the law as well as of the facts,

is a question, a discussion of which we do not propose to enter upon.

If it be their choice to do so, they may return specially what facts

they find established by the evidence, and allow the court to apply

the law to those facts, and thereby to determine whether the party

is guilty or not. But they are not obliged in any case to find a

special verdict; they have a right to apply for themselves the law

to the facts, and to express their own opinion, upon the whole evi-

dence, of the defendant's guilt. Where a general verdict is thus

given, the jury necessarily determine in their own mind what the

law of the case is;2 and if their determination is favorable to the

prisoner, no mode is known to the law in which it can be reviewed
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or reversed. A writ of error does not lie on behalf of the Com-

monwealth to reverse an acquittal, unless expressly given

by statute;3 nor can a new * trial be granted in such a [* 322]

1 The independence of the jury, so far as regards the matters of fact in issue

before them, was settled by Penn's Case, 6 Howell's State Trials, 951, and by

Bushel's Case, which grew out of it, and is reported in Vaughan's Reports, 135.

A very full account of these cases is also found in Forsyth on Trial by Jury,

397. See Bushel's Case also in Broom's Const. Law, 120, and the valuable note

thereto. Bushel was foreman of the jury which refused to find a verdict of guilty

at the dictation of the court, and he was punished as for contempt of court for

his refusal, but was released on habeas corpus.

* "As the main object of the institution of the trial by a jury is to guard

accused persons against all decisions whatsoever by men intrusted with any per-

manent official authority, it is not only a settled principle that the opinion which

the judge delivers has no weight but such as the jury choose to give it, but their

verdict must besides [unless they see fit to return a special finding] comprehend

the whole matter in trial, and decide as well upon the fact as upon the point of

law which may arise out of it; in other words, they must pronounce both on the

commission of a certain fact, and on the reason which makes such fact to be con-

trary to law." DeLolme on the Constitution of England, c. 13.

1 See State ». Reynolds, 4 Hayw. 110; United States v. More, 3 Cranch, 174;

People v. Dill, 1 Scam. 257; People v. Royal, »*6. 557; Commonwealth v. Cum-

24 [ 369 ]
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case;1 but neither a writ of error nor a motion for a new trial

could reach an erroneous determination by the jury, because,

as they do not give reasons for their verdict, the precise grounds

for it can never be legally known, and it is always presumable that

it was given in favor of the accused because the evidence was not

sufficient in degree or satisfactory in character; and no one is at

liberty to allege or suppose that they have disregarded the law.

Nevertheless, as it is the duty of the court to charge the jury

upon the law applicable to the case, it is still an important question

whether it is the duty of the jury to receive and act upon the law

as given to them by the court, or whether on the other hand, his

opinion is advisory only, so that they are at liberty either to follow

it if it accords with their own convictions, or to disregard it if it

does not.

In one class of cases, that is to say, in criminal prosecutions for

libels, it is now very generally provided by the State constitutions,

or by statute, that the jury shall determine the law and the facts.2

mings, 3 Cush. 212; People v. Corning, 2 N. Y. 9; State v. Kemp, 17 Wis. 669.
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A constitutional provision, saving "to the defendant the right of appeal" in

criminal cases, does not, by implication, preclude the legislature from giving to

the prosecution the same right. State v. Tait, 22 Iowa, 143.

1 People v. Comstock, 8 Wend. 549; State v. Brown, 16 Conn. 54; State r.

Eanouse, 1 Spencer, 115; State v. Burns, 3 Texas, 118; State r. Taylor, 1

Hawks, 462.

* See Constitutions of Alabama, Connecticut, California, Delaware, Georgia,

Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, South

Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. That of Maryland makes the jury judges of the

law in all criminal cases; and the same rule is established by constitution or statute

in some other States. In Holder v. State, 5 Geo. 444, the following view was taken

of such a Btatute: "Our penal code declares, 'On every trial of a crime or

offence contained in this code, or for any crime or offence, the jury shall be judges

of the law and the fact, and shall in every case give a general verdict of guilty or

not guilty, and on the acquittal of any defendant or prisoner, no new trial shall oc

any account be granted by the court.' Juries were, at common law, in some sense

judges of the law. Having the right of rendering a general verdict, that right

involved a judgment on the law as well as the facts, yet not such a judgment ai

necessarily to control the court. The early commentators on the common law,

notwithstanding they concede this right, yet hold that it is the duty of the jury

to receive the law from the court. Thus Blackstone equivocally writes: • And

such public or open verdict may be either general, guilty or not guilty, or special,

setting forth all the circumstances of the case, and praying the judgment of the

court whether, for instance, on the facts stated, it be murder or manslaughter, or

no crime at all. This is where they doubt the matter of law, and therefore c/tooie

[ 370 ]
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How great a change is made in the common law by these

* provisions it is difficult to say, because the rule of the [* 323]

common law was not very clear upon the authorities; but

for that very reason, and because the law of libel was sometimes

administered with great harshness, it was certainly proper, and

highly desirable, that a definite and liberal rule should be thus

established.1

In all other cases the jury have the clear legal right to return a

simple verdict of guilty or not guilty, and in so doing they necessa-

rily decide such questions of law as well as of fact as are involved

in the general question of guilt. If their view conduce to an

acquittal, their verdict to that effect can neither be reviewed nor

Bet aside. In such a case, therefore, it appears that they pass upon

the law as well as the facts, and that their finding is conclusive. If,

on the other hand, their view leads them to a verdict of guilty, and

it is the opinion of the court that such verdict is against law, the

verdict will be set aside and a new trial granted. In such a case,

although they have judged of the law, the court sets aside their

conclusion as improper and unwarranted. But it is clear that the

jury are no more the judges of the law when they acquit than
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to 'leave it to the determination of the court, though they have an unquestionable

right of determining upon all the circumstances, and of finding a general verdict

if they think proper so to hazard a breach of their oath,' &c. i Bl. Com. 361;

Co. Lit 228 a; 2 Hale, P. C. 313. Our legislature have left no doubt about

this matter. The juries in Georgia can find no special verdict at law. They are

declared to be judges of the law and the facts, and are required in every case to

give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty; so jealous and rightfully jealous

were our ancestors of the influence of the State upon the trial of a citizen charged

with crime. We are not called upon in this case to determine the relative strength

of the judgment of the court and the jury, upon the law in criminal cases, and

shall express no opinion thereon. We only say it is the right and duty of the

court to declare the law in criminal cases as well as civil, and that it is at the

same time the right of the jury to judge of the law as well as of the facts in crimi-

nal cases. I would not be understood as holding that it is not the province of

the court to give the law of the case distinctly in charge to the jury; it is unques-

tionably its privilege and its duty to instruct them as to what the law is, and

officially to direct their finding as to the law, yet at the same time in such way as

not to limit the range of their judgment." See also McGutfie v. State, 17 Geo.

497; Clem v. State, 31 Ind. 480.

1 For a condensed history of the struggle in England on this subject, see

May's Constitutional History, c. 9. See also Lord Campbell's Lives of the

Chancellors, c 178; Introduction to Speeches of Lord Erskine, edited by James

L. High; Forsyth's Trial by Jury, c. 12.

[371]
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when they condemn, and the different result in the two cases comes

from the merciful maxim of the common law, which will not suffer

an accused party to be twice put in jeopardy for the same cause,

however erroneous may have been the first acquittal. In theory,

therefore, the rule of law would seem to be, that it is the

[* 324] duty of the 'jury to receive and follow the law as delivered

to them by the court; and such is the clear weight of

authority.1

There are, however, opposing decisions,2 and it is evident that

the judicial prerogative to direct conclusively upon the law cannot

be carried very far or insisted upon with much pertinacity, when

the jury have such complete power to disregard it, without the

'United States r. Battiste, 2 Sum. 240; Stittinus v. United States, 5 Cranch,

C. C. 578; United States v. Morris, 1 Curt. 53; United States v. Riley, 5 BlatcL

206; Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio, 427; Robbing v. State, 8 Ohio, n. s. 131;

Commonwealth v. Porter, 10 Met. 263; Commonwealth v. Anthes, 5 Gray, 185;

Commonwealth v. Rock, 10 Gray, 4; State v. Peace, 1 Jones, 251; Handy r.

State, 7 Mo. 607; Nels v. State, 2 Texas, 280; People v. Pine, 2 Barb. 566;

Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb. 603; People v. Finnigan, 1 Park. C. R. 147; Safford

v. People, ib. 474; McGowan i>. State, 9 Yerg. 184; Pleasant p. State, 13 Ark.
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360; Montee v. Commonwealth, 3 J.J. Marsh. 132; Commonwealth v. Van

Tuyl, 1 Met. (Ky.) 1; Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 536; People v. Stewart, 7 Cal.

40; Batre p. State, 18 Ala. 119, reviewing previous cases in the same State. "Ai

the jury have the right, and if required by the prisoner are bound to return •

general verdict of guilty or not guilty, they must necessarily, in the discharge of

their duty, decide such questions of law as well as of fact as are involved in the

general question, and there is no mode in which their opinions on questions of

law can be reviewed by this court or any other tribunal. But this does not

diminish the obligation of the court to explain the law. The instructions of the

court in matters of law may safely guide the consciences of the jury, unless they

know them to be wrong; and when the jury undertake to decide the law (as they

undoubtedly have the power to do) in opposition to the advice of the court,

they assume a high responsibility, and should be very careful to see clearly that

they are right." Commonwealth p. Knapp, 10 Pick. 496, cited with approval in

McGowan v. State, 9 Yerg. 195, and Bale v. State, 10 Yerg. 555.

* See especially State p. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14, where will be found a very full

and carefully considered opinion, holding that at the common law the jury are

the judges of the law in criminal cases. See also State p. Wilkinson, 2 Vt. 280;

Doss v. Commonwealth, 1 Grat. 557; State v. Jones, 5 Ala. 666; State c. Snow,

6 Shep. 346; State v. Allen, 1 McCord, 525; Armstrong v. State, 4 Blackf. 247;

Warren v. State, ib. 150; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326; Lynch p. State, 9 Ind.

641; Nelson p. State, 2 Swan, 482; People v. Thayers, 1 Park. C. R. 596; People

p. Videto, ib. 603; McPherson v. State, 22 Geo. 478. The subject was largely

discussed in People p. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337.

[ 372]
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action degenerating into something like mere scolding. Upon tins

subject the remarks of Mr. Justice Baldwin, of the Supreme Court

of the United States, to a jury assisting him in the trial of a crim-

inal charge, and which are given in the note, seem peculiarly dig-

nified and appropriate, and at the same time to embrace about all

that can properly be said to a jury on this subject.1

1 "In repeating to you what was said on a former occasion to another jury,

that you have the power to decide on the law, as well as the facts of this case,

and are not bound to 6nd according'to our opinion of the law, we feel ourselves

constrained to make some explanations not then deemed necessary, but now

called for from the course of the defence. You may find a general verdict of

guilty or not guilty, as you think proper, or you may find the facts specially, and

leave the guilt or innocence of the prisoner to the judgment of the court. If

your verdict acquit the prisoner, we cannot grant a new trial, however much we

may differ with you as to the law which governs the case; and in this respect a

jury are the judges of the law, if they choose to become so. Their judgment is

final, not because they settle the law, but because they think it not applicable, or

do not choose to apply it to the case.

"But if a jury find a prisoner guilty against the opinion of the court on the

law of the case, a new trial will be granted. No court will pronounce a judg-
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ment on a prisoner against what they believe to be the law. On an acquittal

there is no judgment; and the court do not act, and cannot judge, there remain-

ing nothing to act upon.

"This, then, you will understand to be what is meant by your power to decide

on the law, but you will still bear in mind that it is a very old, sound, and valuable

maxim in law, that the court answers to questions of law, and the jury to facts.

Every day's experience evinces the wisdom of this rule." United States v. Wil-

son, Baldw. 108. We quote also from an Alabama case: "When the power of

juries to find a general verdict, and consequently their right to determine without

appeal both law and fact, is admitted, the abstract question whether it is or is not

their duty to receive the law from the court becomes rather a question of casuistry

or conscience than one of law; nor can we think that any thing is gained in the

administration of criminal justice by urging the jury to disregard the opinion of

the court upon the law of the case. It must, we think, be admitted, that the

judge is better qualified to expound the law, from his previous training, than the

jury; and in practice, unless he manifests a wanton disregard of the rights of

the prisoner. — a circumstance which rarely happens in this age of the world

and in this country, — his opinion of the law will be received by the jury as an

authoritative exposition, from their conviction of his superior knowledge of the

subject. The right of the jury is doubtless one of inestimable value, especially

in those cases where it may be supposed that the government has an interest in

the conviction of the criminal; but in this country where the government in all

its branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, is created by the people, and is

in fact their servant, we are unable to perceive why the jury should be invited

or urged to exercise this right contrary to their own convictions of their capacity

to do so, without danger of mistake. It appears to us that it is sufficient that it

[ 373 ]
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[* 325] * One thing more is essential to a proper protection of

accused parties, and that is, that one shall not be subject to

is admitted that it is their peculiar province to-determine facts, intents, and pur-

poses; that it is their right to find a general verdict, and consequently that thej

must determine the law; and whether in the exercise of this right they will dis-

trust the court as expounders of the law, or whether they will receive the kw

from the court, must be left to their own discretion under the sanction of the oath

they have taken." State v. Jones, 5 Ala. 672. But as to this case, see Batre t.

State, 18 Ala. 119.

It cannot be denied that discredit is sometimes brought upon the administra-

tion of justice by juries acquitting parties who are sufficiently shown to be guilty,

and where, had the trial been by the court, a conviction would have been sure to

follow. In such cases it must be supposed that the jury have been controlled br

their prejudices or their sympathies. However that may be, it by no means fol-

lows that because the machinery of jury trial does not work satisfactorily in

every case, we must therefore condemn and abolish the system, or, what is still

worse, tolerate it, and yet denounce it as being unworthy of public confidence.

Jury trial, when considered in all its aspects, — as an instrument in the admin-
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istration of justice; as an educator of the people in law and politics; and as a

means of making them feel their responsibility in the government, and the

important part they bear in its administration,—is by far the best system of

trial yet devised; and we must take it with all its concomitants, among which is

a due sense of independence in the jurors. The institution loses its value when

the jury becomes a mere instrument for receiving and echoing back the opinions

of the judge on the case in trial. Concede its defects, and the truth still

remains, that its benefits are indispensable. The remarks of Lord Erskine, the

most distinguished jury lawyer known to English history, may be quoted as

peculiarly appropriate in this connection: "It is of the nature of every thing

that is great and useful, both in the animate and inanimate world, to be wild and

irregular, and we must be content to take them with the alloys which belong to

them, or live without them. . . . Liberty herself, the last and best gift of God

to his creatures, must be taken just as she is. You might pare her down into

bashful regularity, shape her into a perfect model of severe, scrupulous law; but

she would then be Liberty no longer; and you must be content to die under

the lash of this inexorable justice which you have exchanged for the banners of

freedom."

The province of the jury is sometimes invaded by instructions requiring them

to adopt, as absolute conclusions of law, those deductions which they are at

liberty to draw from a particular state of facts, if they regard them as reason-

able: such as that a homicide must be presumed malicious, unless the defendant

proves the contrary; which is a rule contradictory of the results of common

observation; or that evidence of a previous good character in the defendant

ought to be disregarded, unless the other proof presents a doubtful case; which

would deprive an accused party of his chief protection in many cases of false

accusations and conspiracies. See People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9; People r.

Lamb, 2 Keyes, 360; State v. Henry, 5 Jones, N. C. 66; Harrington r. State,

[374]
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be twice put in jeopardy * upon the same charge. One [* 326]

trial and verdict must, as a general rule, protect him

against any subsequent accusation of the same offence, whether

the verdict be for or against him, and whether the courts are satis-

fied with the verdict or not. We shall not attempt in this place to

collect together the great number of judicial decisions bearing

upon the question of legal jeopardy, and the exceptions to the gen-

eral rule above stated: for these the reader must be referred to

the treatises on criminal law, where the subject will be found to be

extensively treated. It will be sufficient for our present purpose

to indicate very briefly some general principles.

A person is in legal jeopardy when he is put upon trial, before a

court of competent jurisdiction, upon indictment or infor-

mation * which is sufficient in form and substance to sus- [* 327]

tain a conviction, and a jury has been charged with his

deliverance.1 And a jury is said to bo thus charged when they

have been impanelled and sworn.2 The defendant then becomes

19 Ohio, n. 8. 269; Remsen v. People, 43 N. Y. 6. Upon the presumption of

malice in homicide, the reader is referred to the Review of the Trial of Professor

Webster, by Hon. Joel Parker, in te Korth American Review, No. 72, p. 178.
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See also upon the functions of judge and jury respectively, the cases of Common-

wealth c.Wood, 11 Gray, 86; Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212; Commonwealth

c. Billings, 97 Mass. 405; State r. Patterson, 63 N. C. 520; State o. Newton, 4

Nev. 410.

1 Commonwealth v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 586; State v. Norvell, 2 Yerg. 24;

Williams v. Commonwealth, 2 Grat. 568; People v. McGowan, 17 Wend. 386;

Mounts v. State, 14 Ohio, 295; Price o. State, 19 Ohio, 423; Wright v. State,

6 Ind. 292; State r. Nelson", 26 Ind. 366; State v. Spier, 1 Dev. 491; State c.

Ephraim, 2 Dev. & Bat. 162; Commonwealth ». Tuck, 20 Pick. 356; People v.

Webb, 28 Cal. 467; People v. Cook, 10 Mich. 164; State v. Ned, 7 Port. 217;

State c. Callendine, 8 Iowa, 288. It cannot be said, however, that a party is in

legal jeopardy in a prosecution brought about by his own procurement; and a

former conviction or acquittal is consequently no bar to a second indictment, if

the former trial was brought about by the procurement of the defendant, and the

conviction or acquittal was the result of fraud or collusion on his part. Common-

wealth v. Alderman, 4 Mass. 477; State v. Little, 1 N. H. 257 ; State v. Green,

16 Iowa, 239. See also State o. Reed, 26 Conn. 202. And if a jury is called

and sworn, and then discharged for the reason that it is discovered the defendant

has not been arraigned, this will not constitute a bar. United States t>. Riley, 5

Blatch. 205.

'McFadden v. Commonwealth, 23 Penn. St.. 12; Lee o. State, 26 Ark. 260;

8. c. 7 Am. Rep. 611. A different view is taken in O'Brian v. Commonwealth, 6

Bush, 563.
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entitled to a verdict which shall constitute a bar to a new pros-

ecution; and he cannot be deprived of this bar by a nolle prosequi

entered by the prosecuting officer against his will, or by a discharge

of the jury and continuance of the cause.1

If, however, the court had no jurisdiction of the cause,2 or if the

indictment was so far defective that no valid judgment could be

rendered upon it,3 or if by any overruling necessity the jury are

discharged without a verdict,4 which might happen from the sick-

ness or death of the judge holding the court,5 or of a juror,6 or tbe

inability of the jury to agree upon a verdict after reasonable time

for deliberation and effort;7 or if the term of the court as fixed by

law comes to an end before the trial is finished;8 or the jury are

discharged with the consent of the defendant expressed or implied;9

or if, after verdict against the accused, it has been set aside on

1 People v. Barrett, 2 Caines, 804; Commonwealth v. Tuck, 20 Pick. 365;

Mounts d. State, 14 Ohio, 295; State v. Connor, 5 Cold. 311; State p. Callen-

dine, 8 Iowa, 288; Baker v. State, 12 Ohio, n. s. 214; Grogan v. State, 44 Ala.

9; State v. Alman, 64 N. C. 864 ; contra, Swindel v. State, 32 Texas, 102.
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! Commonwealth v. Goddard, 13 Mass. 455; People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161.

* Gerard c. People, 3 Scam. 363; Pritchett v. State, 2 Sneed, 285; People

v. Cook, 10 Mich. 164; Mount v. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 93; People v.

McNealy, 17 Cal. 333; Kohlheimer v. State, 39 Miss. 548; State v. Kason, 20

La. An. 48; Black v. State, 36 Geo. 447; Commonwealth v. Bakeman, 105

Mass. 53.

4 United States t>. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579; State ». Ephraim, 2 Dev. & Bat.

166; Commonwealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh, 620; People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 205;

Commonwealth v. Bowden, 9 Mass. 194; Hoffman v. State, 20 Md. 42.5; Price

v. State, 36 Miss. 533. In State v. Wiseman, 68 N. C. 203, the officer in charge

of the jury was found to have been conversing with them in a way calculated to

influence them unfavorably towards the evidence of the prosecution, and it was

held that this was such a case of necessity as authorized the judge to permit a

juror to be withdrawn, and that it did not operate as an acquittal.

5 Nugent v. State, 4 Stew. & Port. 72.

• Hec tor v. State, 2 Mo. 166; State v. Curtis, 5 Humph. 601; Mahala v.

State, 10 Yerg. 532; Commonwealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh, 613.

7 People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187; Commonwealth v. Olds, 5 Lit. 140;

Dobbins v. State, 14 Ohio, N. 8. 493; Miller o. State, 8 Ind. 325; State v.

Walker, 26 Ind. 346; Commonwealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh, 613; Winsor v. The

Queen, L. R. 1 Q. B. 289; State v. Prince, 63 N. C. 529; Moseley v. State, 33

Texas, 671 ; Lester v. State, 33 Geo. 329.

8 State v. Brooks, 3 Humph. 70; State v. Battle, 7 Ala. 259; Mahala v. State,

10 Yerg. 632; State v. Spier, 1 Dev. 491 ; Wright o. State, 5 Ind. 290.

9 State v. Slack, 6 Ala. 676 ; Elijah v. State, 1 Humph. 103; Commonwealth

v. Stowell, 9 Met. 572.
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* his motion for a new trial or on writ of error,1 or the [* 328]

judgment thereon been arrested,2 — in any of these cases

the accused may again be put upon trial upon the same facts before

charged against him, and the proceedings had will constitute no

protection. But where the legal bar has once attached, the gov-

ernment cannot avoid it by varying the form of the charge in a

new accusation: if the first indictment or information were such

that the accused might have been convicted under it on proof of

the facts by which the second is sought to be sustained, then the

jeopardy which attached on the first must constitute a protection

against a trial on the second.3 And if a prisoner is acquitted on

some of the counts in an indictment, and convicted on others, and

a new trial is obtained on his motion, he can be put upon trial a

second time on those counts only on which he was before convicted,

and is for ever discharged from the others.4

Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishments.

It is also a constitutional requirement that excessive bail shall

not be required, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

1 And it seems, if the verdict is so defective that no judgment can be rendered

upon it, it may be set aside even against the defendant's objection, and a new
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trial had. State v. Redman, 17 Iowa, 329.

* Casborus v. People, 13 Johns. 351. But where the indictment was good,

and the judgment was erroneously arrested, the verdict was held to be a bap.

State v. Norvell, 2 Yerg. 24. See People v. Webb, 28 Cal. 467. So if the error

was in the judgment and not in the prior proceedings, if the judgment is reversed,

the prisoner must be discharged. See post, p. 330. But it is competent for the

legislature to provide that on reversing the erroneous judgment in such case, the

court, if the prior proceedings are regular, shall remand the case for the proper

sentence. McKee v. People, 32 N. Y. 239. It is also competent, we suppose,

in the absence of express constitutional prohibition, to allow an appeal or writ

of error to the prosecution, in criminal cases. See State v. Tait, 22 Iowa, 141.

Compare People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467.

3 State p. Cooper, 1 Green, 360; Commonwealth p. Roby, 12 Pick. 504;

People v. McGowan, 17 Wend. 386; Price v. State, 19 Ohio, 423; Leslie v. State,

18 Ohio, n. s. 395; State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414.

* Campbell v. State, 9 Yerg. 333; State v. Kettle, 2 Tyler, 475; Morris p.

State, 8 S. & M. 762; Esmon v. State, 1 Swan, 14; Guenther v. People, 24

N. Y. 100; State v. Kattleman, 35 Mo. 105; State p. Ross, 29 Mo. 39; State v.

Martin, 30 Wis. 219; Barnett v. People, 54 1ll. 331. Contra. State v. Behimer,

20 Ohio, x. s. 572. A nolle prosequi on one count of an indictment after a jury

is called and sworn, is a bar to a new indictment for the oflfence charged therein.

Baker p. State, 12 Ohio, if. s. 214.
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Within such bounds as may be prescribed by law, the question

what fine shall be imposed is one addressed to the discretion of the

court. But it is a discretion to be judicially exercised; and there

may be cases in which a punishment, though not beyond any limit

fixed by statute, is nevertheless so clearly excessive as to be erro-

neous in law.1 A fine should have some reference to the

[* 329] party's ability to pay it. * By Magna Charta a freeman

was not to be amerced for a small fault, but according to

the degree of the fault, and for a great crime in proportion to the

heinousuess of it, saving to him his contenement; and after the

same manner a merchant, saving to him his merchandise. And a

villein was to be amerced after the same manner, saving to him his

wainage. The merciful spirit of these provisions addresses itself

to the criminal courts of the American States through the provi-

sions of their constitutions.

It has been decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut that it

was not competent in the punishment of a common-law offence to

inflict fine and imprisonment without limitation. The precedent,
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it was said, cited by counsel contending for the opposite doctrine,

of the punishment for a libel upon Lord Chancellor Bacon, was

deprived of all force of authority by the circumstances attending

it; the extravagance of the punishment being clearly referable to

the temper of the times. "The common law can never require a

fine to the extent of the offender's goods and chattels, or sentence

of imprisonment for life. The punishment is both uncertain and

unnecessary. It is no more difficult to limit the imprisonment of

an atrocious offender to an adequate number of years than to pre-

scribe a limited punishment for minor offences. And when there

exists no firmly established practice, and public necessity or con-

venience does not imperiously demand the principle contended for,

it cannot be justified by the common law, as it wants the main

ingredients on which that law is founded. Indefinite punishments

1 The subject of cruel and unusual punishments was somewhat considered in

Barker v. People, 8 Cow. 686, in which case the opinion was expressed by Chan-

cellor Stanford that a forfeiture of fundamental rights — «. g., the right to jury

trial — could not be imposed as a punishment for crime, but that a forfeiture of

the right to hold office might be. In Done v. People, 5 Park. 364, the cruel

punishments of colonial times, such as burning alive and breaking on the wheel,

were enumerated by W. W. Campbell, J., who was of opinion that they must be

regarded as "cruel" if not "unusual," and therefore as being now forbidden

by the Constitution.

[ 378 ]
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are fraught with danger, and ought not to be admitted unless the

written law should authorize them." 1

It is certainly difficult to determine precisely what is meant by

cruel and unusual punishments. Probably any punishment declared

by statute for an offence which was punishable in the same way at

the common law, could not be regarded as cruel or unusual in the

constitutional sense. And probably any new statutory offence may

be punished to the extent and in the mode permitted by the com-

mon law for offences of similar nature. But those degrading pun-

ishments which in any State had become obsolete before its existing

constitution was adopted, we think may well be held forbidden by

it as cruel and unusual. We may well doubt the right to

establish the whipping-post and the pillory in * States [* 330]

where they were never recognized as instruments of pun-

ishment, or in States whose constitutions, revised since public

opinion had banished them, have forbidden cruel and unusual pun-

ishments. In such States the public sentiment must be regarded

as having condemned them as " cruel," and any punishment which,

if ever employed at Nall, has become altogether obsolete, must cer-

tainly be looked upon as " unusual."
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A defendant, however, in any case is entitled to have the precise

punishment meted out to him which the law provides, and no

other. A different punishment cannot be substituted on the ground

of its being less in severity. Sentence to transportation for a

capital offence would be void; and as the error in such a case

would be in the judgment itself, the prisoner would be entitled to

his discharge, and could not be tried again.2 If, however, the legal

punishment consists of two distinct and severable things, — as fine,

and imprisonment, — the imposition of either is legal, and the

defendant cannot be heard to complain that the other was not

imposed also.3

1 Per Homier, Ch. J., in State v. Danforth, 3 Conn. 115. Peters, J., in the

same case, pp. 122-124, collects a number of cases in which perpetual imprison-

ment was awarded at the common law, but, as his associates believed, unwar-

rantably.

1 Bourne v. The King, 7 Ad. & El. 68; Lowenberg v. People, 27 N. Y. 336.

See also Whitebread v. The f^ueen, 7 Q. B. 582; Rex v. Fletcher, Russ. & Ry.

58. In this last case the court was equally divided on the question whether the

omission, in a sentence of death, of the subsequent directions which the law pro-

vided for, rendered the sentence void. See further, Hartung v. People, 26 N.Y,

167; Elliott v. People, 13 Mich. 365; Ex parte Page, 49 Mo. 291.

* See Kane v. People, 8 Wend. 203.
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The Right to Counsel.

Perhaps the privilege most important to the person accused of

crime, connected with his trial, is that to be defended by counsel.

From very early days a class of men, who have made the laws of

their country their special study, and who have been accepted for

the confidence of the court in their learning and integrity, have

been set apart as officers of the court, whose special duty it should

be to render aid to the parties and the court1 in the application of

the law to legal controversies. These persons, before entering upon

their employment, were to take an oath of fidelity to the courts

whose officers they were, and to their clients ;2 and it was

[* 331] their special * duty to see that no wrong was done their

clients by means of false or prejudiced witnesses, or

through the perversion or misapplication of the law by the court.

Strangely enough, however, the aid of this profession was denied

in the'very cases in which it was needed most, and it has cost a

long struggle, continuing even into the present century, to rid the

English law of one of its most horrible features. In civil causes
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1 In Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 498, the court denied the application

of the defendant that Mr. Kantoul should be assigned as his counsel, because,

though admitted to the Common Pleas, he was not yet an attorney of the Supreme

Court, and that court, consequently, had not the usual control over him; and,

besides, counsel was to give aid to the court as well as to the prisoner, and there-

fore it was proper that a person of more legal experience should be assigned.

* "Every countor is chargeable by the oath that he shall do no wrong nor

falsity, contrary to his knowledge, but shall plead for his client the best he can,

according to his understanding." Mirror of Justices, c. 2, § 5. The oath in

Pennsylvania, on the admission of an attorney to the bar, "to behave himself

in the office of an attorney, according to the best of his learning and ability, and

with all good fidelity, as well to the court as to the client; that he will use no

falsehood, nor delay any man's cause, for lucre or malice," is said, by Mr. Shars-

wood, to present a comprehensive summary of his duties as a practitioner.

Sharswood's Legal Ethics, p. 3. The advocate's oath, in Geneva, was as follows:

"I solemnly swear, before Almighty God, to be faithful to the Republic, and to

the canton of Geneva; never to depart from the respect due to the tribunals and

authorities; never to counsel or maintain a cause which does not appear to be

just or equitable, unless it be the defence of an accused person; never to em-

ploy, knowingly, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me, any

means contrary to truth, and never seek to mislead the judges by any artifioe or

false statement of facts or law; to abstain from all offensive personality, and to

advance no fact contrary to the honor and reputation of the parties, if it be not

indispensable to the cause with which I may be charged; not to encourage either

[ 380 ]
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and on the trial of charges of misdemeanor, the parties were

entitled to the aid of counsel in eliciting the facts, and in present-

ing both the facts and the law to the court and jury ; but when the

government charged a person with treason or felony, he

was denied this privilege.1 Only such * legal questions as [* 332]

he could suggest was counsel allowed to argue for him;

and this was but a poor privilege to one who was himself unlearned

in the law, and who, as he could not fail to perceive the monstrous

injustice of the whole proceeding, would be quite likely to accept any

perversion of the law that might occur in the course of it as reg-

ular and proper, because quite in the spirit that denied him a

defence. Only after the Revolution of 1688 was a full defence

the commencement or continuance of a suit from any motives of passion or inter-

est; nor to reject, for any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the

weak, the stranger, or the oppressed." In "The Lawyer's Oath, its Obligations,

and some of the Duties springing out of them," by U. Betbune Duflield, Esq.,

a masterly analysis is given of this oath; and he well says of it: "Here you

have the creed of an upright and honorable lawyer. The clear, terse, and lofty

language in which it is expressed needs no argument to elucidate its principles,

no eloquence to enforce its obligations. It has in it the sacred savor of divine
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inspiration, and sounds almost like a restored reading from Sinai's original, but

broken tablets."

1 When an ignorant person, unaccustomed to public assemblies, and perhaps

feeble in body or in intellect, was put upon trial on a charge which, whether true

or false, might speedily consign him to an ignominious death, with able counsel

arrayed against him, and all the machinery of the law ready to be employed in

bringing forward the evidence of circumstances indicating guilt, it is painful to

contemplate the barbarity which could deny him professional aid. Especially

when in most cases he would be imprisoned immediately on being apprehended,

and would thereby be prevented from making even the feeble preparations which

might otherwise have been within his power. A "trial" under such circum-

stances would be only a judicial murder in very many cases. The spirit in which

the old law was administered may be judged of from the case of Sir William

Parkins, tried for high treason before Lord Holt and bis associates in 1095, after

the statute 7 William III. c. 3, allowing counsel to prisoners indicted for treason,

had been passed, but one day before it was to take effect. He prayed to be allowed

counsel, and quoted the preamble to the statute that such allowance was just and

reasonable. His prayer was denied, Lord Holt declaring that he must administer

the law as he found it, and could not anticipate the operation of an act of Parlia-

ment, even by a single day. The accused was convicted and executed. See

Lieber's Hermeneutics, c. 4, § 15; Sedgwick on Stat. & Const. Law, 81. In

proceedings by the Inquisition against suspected heretics the aid of counsel was

expressly prohibited. Lea's Superstition and Force, S77.

[381]
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allowed on trials for treason,1 and not until 1836 was

[* 333] * the same privilege extended to persons accused of other

felonies.2

1 See an account of the final passage of this bill in Macaulay's "England,"

Vol. IV. c. 21. It is surprising, that the effort to extend the same right to all

persons accused of felony was so strenuously resisted afterwards, and that, too,

notwithstanding the best lawyers in the realm admitted its importance and jus-

tice. "I have myself," said Mr. Scarlett, " often seen persons I thought inno-

cent convicted, and the guilty escape, for want of some acute and intelligent

counsel to show the bearings of the different circumstances on the conduct and

situation of the prisoner." House of Commons Debates, April 25, 1826. "It

has lately been my lot," said Mr. Denman, on the same occasion, "to try two

prisoners who were deaf and dumb, and who could only be made to understand

what was passing by the signs of their friends. The cases were clear and sim-

ple; but if they had been circumstantial cases, in what a situation would the

judge and jury be placed, when the prisoner could have no counsel to plead for

him." The cases looked clear and simple, to Mr. Denman; but how could he

know they would not have looked otherwise, had the coloring of the prosecution

been relieved by a counter-presentation for the defence? See Sydney Smith's
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article on Counsel for Prisoners, 45 Edinb. Rev. p. 74; Works, Vol. II. p. 3o8.

The plausible objection to extending the right was, that the judge would be coun-

sel for the prisoner, — a pure fallacy at the best, and, with some judges, a fright-

ful mockery. Baron Oarroio, in a charge to a grand jury, said: "It has been

truly said that, in criminal cases, judges were counsel for the prisoners. So,

undoubtedly, they were, as far as they could be, to prevent undue prejudice, to

guard against improper influence being excited against prisoners; but it was im-

possible for them to go further than this, for they could not suggest the course of

defence prisoners ought to pursue; for judges only saw the deposition so short

a time before the accused appeared at the bar of their country, that it was quite

impossible for them to act fully in that capacity."

If one would see how easily, and yet in what a shocking manner, a judge might

pervert the law and the evidence, and act the part of both prosecutor and king's

counsel, while assuming to be counsel for the prisoner, he need not go further

back than the early trials in our own country, and he is referred for a specimen

to the trials of Robert Tucker and others for piracy, before Chief Justice Troti,

at Charleston, S. C, in 1718, as reported in 6 Hargrave's State Trials, 156 d

aeq. Especially may he there see how the statement of prisoners in one case,

to which no credit was given for their exculpation, was used as hearsay evidence

to condemn a prisoner in another case. All these abuses would have been

checked, perhaps altogether prevented, had the prisoners had able and fearless

counsel. But without counsel for the defence, and under such a judge, the

witnesses were not free to testify, the prisoners could not safely make even

the most honest explanation, and the jury, when they retired, could only feel

• By statute 6 & 7 William IV. c. 114; 4 Cooley's Bl. Com. 355; May's

Const. Hist, c 18.
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* With us it is a universal principle of constitutional law, [* 334]

that the prisoner shall be allowed a defence by counsel.

And generally it will be found that the humanity of the law has

provided that, if the prisoner is unable to employ counsel, the

court may designate some one to defend him who shall bo paid by

the government; but when no such provision is made, it is a duty

which counsel so designated owes to his profession, to the court

engaged in the trial, and to the cause of humanity and justice, not

to withhold his assistance nor spare his best exertions, in the

defence of one who has the double misfortune to be stricken by

poverty and accused of crime. No one is at liberty to decline such

an appointment,1 and few, it is to be hoped, would be disposed to

do so.

In guaranteeing to parties accused of crime the right to {lie aid

that returning a verdict in accordance with the opinion of the judge was only

matter of form. Sydney Smith's lecture on "The judge that smites contrary to

the law " is worthy of being carefully pondered in this connection. "If ever a

nation was happy, if ever a nation was visibly blessed by God, if ever a nation

was honored abroad, and left at home under a government (which we can now

conscientiously call a liberal government) to the full career of talent, industry,
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and vigor, we are at this moment that people, and this is our happy lot. First,

the Gospel has done it, and then justice has done it; and he who thinks it his

duty that this happy condition of existence may remain, must guard the piety of

these times, and he must watch over the spirit of justice which exists in these

times. First, he must take care that the altars- of God are not polluted, that the

Christian faith is retained in purity and in perfection; and then, turning to

human affairs, let him strive for spotless, incorruptible justice; praising, hon-

oring, and loving the just judge, and abhorring as the worst enemy of mankind

him who is placed there to 'judge after the law, and who smites contrary to the

law."'

1 Vise v. Hamilton County, 19 111. 18. It has been held that, in the absence

of express statutory provisions, counties are not obliged to compensate counsel

assigned by the court to defend poor prisoners. Bacon v. Wayne County, I Mich.

461. But there are several cases to the contrary. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13;

Hall r. Washington County, 2 Greene (Iowa), 473; Carpenter o. Dane County,

9 Wis. 277. But we think a court has a right to require the service whether com-

pensation is to be made or not; and that counsel who should decline to perform

it, for no other reason than that the law does not provide pecuniary compensation,

is unworthy to hold his responsible office in the administration of justice. Said

Chief Justice Hale in one case: "Although sergeants have a monopoly of prac-

tice in the Common Pleas, they have a right to practise, and do practise, at this

bar; and if we were to assign one of them as counsel, and he was to refuse to

act, we should make bold to commit him to prison." Life of Chief Justice Hale

in Campbell's Lives of the Chief Justices, Vol. IL
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of counsel, the Constitution secures it, with all its accustomed

incidents. Among these is that shield of protection which is thrown

around the confidence the relation of counsel and client requires,

and which does not permit the disclosure by the former, even in the

courts of justice, of communications which may have been made to

him by the latter witli a view to pending or anticipated litigation.

This is the client's privilege; the counsel cannot waive it; and the

court would not permit the disclosure even if the client were not

present to take the objection.1

[* 335] * Having once engaged in a cause, the counsel is not

afterwards at liberty to withdraw from it without the

consent of his client and of the court; and even though he may

be impressed with a belief in his client's guilt, it will nevertheless

be his duty to see that a conviction is not secured contrary to the

law.2 The worst criminal is entitled to be judged by the laws;

and if his conviction is secured by means of a perversion of the

law, the injury to the cause of public justice will be more serious

and lasting in its results than his being allowed to escape
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altogether.8

1 The history and reason of the rule which exempts counsel from disclosing

professional communications are well stated in Whiting v. Barney, 30 N. Y. 330.

And see 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 130 et seq. The privilege

would not cover communications made, not with a view to professional assist-

ance, but in order to induce the attorney to aid in a criminal act. People r.

Blakely, 4 Park. Cr. R. 176; Bank of Uticac. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 398. And

see the analogous case of Hewitt v. Prince, 21 Wend. 79. Communications

extraneous or impertinent to the subject-matter of the professional consultation

are not privileged. Dixon v. Parmelee, 2 Vt. 185. See Brandon t>. Gowing,

7 Rich. 459.

It has been intimated in New York that the statute making parties witnesses

has done away with the rule which protects professional communications. Mitch-

ell's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. R. 249; Note to 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards,

p. 159 (marg.). Supposing this to be so in civil cases, the protection would

still be the same in the case of persons charged with crime, for such persons can-

not be compelled to give evidence against themselves, so that the reason for

protecting professional confidence is the same as formerly.

* If one would consider this duty and the limitations upon it fully, he should

read the criticisms upon the conduct of Mr. Charles Phillips on the trial of Cour-

voisier for the murder of Lord William Russell. See Sharswood, Legal Ethics,

46; Littell, Living Age, Vol. XXIV. pp. 179, 230; Vol. XXV. pp. 289, 306;

West. Rev. Vol. XXXV. p. 1.

3 There may be cases in which it will become the duty of counsel to interpose

between the court and the accused, and fearlessly to brave all consequences
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But how persistent counsel may be in pressing for the acquittal

of his client, and to what extent he may be justified in throwing

his own personal character as a weight in the scale of justice, are

questions of ethics rather than of law. No counsel is justifiable

who defends even a just cause with the weapons of fraud and

falsehood, and no man on the other hand can excuse himself for

accepting the confidence of the accused, and then betraying it

by a feeble and heartless defence. And in criminal cases we

think the court may sometimes have a duty to perform in seeing

personal to himself, where it appears to him that in no other mode can the law

be vindicated and justice done to his client; but these cases are so rare, that

doubtless they will stand out in judicial history as notable exceptions to the

ready obedience which the bar should yield to the authority of the court. The

famous scene between Mp. Justice Boiler and Mp. Erskine, on the trial of the

Dean of St. Asaphs for libel, — 5 Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors, p. 158;

Erskine's Speeches, by Jas. L. High, Vol. I. p. 242, — will readily occur to the

reader as one of the exceptional cases. Lord Campbell says of Erskine's con-

duet: "This noble stand for the independence of the bar would alone have

entitled Erskine to the statue which the profession affectionately erected to his

memory in Lincoln's Inn Hall. We are to admire the decency and propriety of
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his demeanor during the struggle, no less than its spirit, and the felicitous pre-

cision with which he meted out the requisite and justifiable portion of defiance.

His example has had a salutary effect in illustrating and establishing the relative

duties of judge and advocate in England." And elsewhere, in speaking of Mp.

Fox's Libel Act, he makes the following somewhat extravagant remark: "I

have said; and I still think, that this great constitutional triumph is mainly to be

ascribed to Lord Camden, who had been fighting in the cause for half a century,

and uttered his last words in the House of Lords in its support; but had he not

received the invaluble assistance of Erskine, as counsel for the Dean of St.

Asaphs, the Star Chamber might have been re-established in this country.'" And

Lord Brougham says of Erskine: "He was an undaunted man; he was an

undaunted advocate. To no court did he ever truckle, neither to the Court of

the King, neither to the Court of the King's Judges. Their smiles and their

frowns he disregarded alike in the fearless discharge of his duty. He upheld the

liberty of the peers against the one; he defended the rights of the people against

both combined to destroy them. If there be yet amongst us the power of freely

discussing the acts of our rulers; if there be yet the privilege of meeting for the

promotion of needful reforms; if he who desires wholesome changes in our Con-

stitution be still recognized as a patriot, and not doomed to die the death of a

traitor, — let us acknowledge with gratitude that to this great man, under

Heaven, we owe this felicity of the times." Sketches of Statesmen of the Time

of George III. A similar instance of the independence of counsel is narrated

of that eminent advocate, Mp. Samuel Dexter, in the reminiscences of his life by

"Sigma," published at Boston, 1857, p. 61. See Story on Const. (4th ed.)

§ 1064, note.

25 [ 385 ]
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[* 336] that the prisoner suffers nothing * from inattention or haste

on the part of his counsel, or impatience on the part of

the prosecuting officer or of the court itself. Time may be precious

to the court, but it is infinitely more so to him whose life or whose

liberty may depend upon the careful and patient consideration of

the evidence, when the counsel for the defence is endeavoring to

sift the truth from the falsehood, and to subject the whole to logical

analysis, so as to show that how suspicious soever the facts may be,

they are nevertheless consistent with innocence. Often indeed it

must happen that the impression of the prisoner's guilt, which the

judge and the jury unavoidably receive when the case is opened to

them by the prosecuting officer, will, insensibly to themselves, color

all the evidence in the case, so that only a sense of duty will induce

a due attention to the summing up for the prisoner, which after all

may prove unexpectedly convincing. Doubtless the privilege of

counsel is sometimes abused in these cases; we cannot think an

advocate of high standing and character has a right to endeavor to

rob the jury of their opinion by asseverating his own belief in the
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innocence of his client; and cases may arise in which the court

will feel compelled to impose some reasonable restraints upon the

address to the jury,1 but it is better in these cases to err on the

side of liberality; and restrictions which do not leave to counsel,

who are apparently acting in good faith, such reasonable time aud

opportunity as they may deem necessary for presenting their cli-

ent's case fully, may possibly in some cases be so far erroneous in

law as to warrant setting aside a verdict of guilty.2

Whether counsel are to address the jury on questions of law in

criminal cases, generally, is a point which is still in dispute. If

the jury in the particular case, by the constitution or statutes of

the State, are judges of the law, it would seem that counsel should

be allowed to address them fully upon it,3 though the contrary

seems to have been held in Maryland:4 while in Massachusetts,

1 Thus it has heen held, that, even though the jury are the judges of the law

in criminal cases, the court may refuse to allow counsel to read law books to the

jury. Murphy p. State, 6 Ind. 490. And see Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 541; Phoe-

nix Insurance Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501.

* In People v. Eeenan, I3 Cal. 581, a verdict in a capital case was set aside

on this ground.

* Lynch p. State, 9 Ind. 541; Murphy v. State, 6 Ind. 490.

* Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236. What was held in that case was, that counsel

should not be allowed to argue the constitutionality of a statute to the jury; and
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where it is * expected that the jury will receive the [* 337]

law from the court, it is nevertheless held that counsel

has a right to address them upon the law.1 It is unquestionably

more decorous and more respectful to the bench that argument

upon the law should always be addressed to the court; and such,

we believe, is the general practice. The jury hear the argument,

and they have a right to give it such weight as it seems to them

properly to be entitled to.

For misconduct in their practice the members of the legal

profession may be summarily dealt with by the courts, who will not

fail, in all proper cases, to use their power to protect clients or the

public, as well as to preserve the profession from the contamination

and disgrace of a vicious associate.2 A man of bad reputation may

that tbe Constitution, in making the jury judges of the law as well as of the facts,

did not empower them to decide a statute invalid. This ruling corresponds to

that of Judge Chase in the United States v. Callendar, Whart. State Trials, 688,

710. But see remarks of Perkins, J., in Lynch p. State, 9 Ind. 542.

1 Commonwealth v. Porter, 10 Met. 263; Commonwealth v. Austin, 7 Gray,

51.

J "As a class, attorneys are supposed to be, and in fact have always been,
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the vindicators of individual rights, and the fearless assertors of the principles

of civil liberty, existing, where alone they can exist, in a government, not of par-

ties nor of men, but of laws. On the other hand, to declare them irresponsible

to any power but public opinion and their consciences, would be incompatible with

free government. Individuals of the class may, and sometimes do, forfeit their

professional franchise by abusing it; and a power to exact the forfeiture must be

lodged somewhere. Such a power is indispensable to protect the court, the

administration of justice, and themselves. Abuses must necessarily creep in;

and having a deep stake in the character of their profession, they are vitally

concerned in preventing it from being sullied by the misconduct of unworthy

members of it. No class of community is more dependent on its reputation for

honor and integrity. It is indispensable to the purposes of its creation to assign

it a high and honorable standing; but to put it above the judiciary, whose official

tenure is good behavior, and whose members are removable from office by the

legislature, would render it intractable; and it is therefore necessary to assign it

bat an equal share of independence. In the absence of specific provision to the

contrary, the power of removal is, from its nature, commensurate with the power

of appointment, and it is consequently the business of the judges to deal with

delinquent members of the bar, and withdraw their faculties when they are incor-

rigible." Oibson, Ch. J., In re Austin et al., 5 Rawle, 203. See State v. Kirke,

12 Fla. 278; Rice's Case, 18 B. Monp. 472; Walker p. State, 4 W. Va. 749.

An attorney may be disbarred for a personal attack upon the judge for his

conduct as such; but the attorney is entitled to notice, and an opportunity to be

heard in defence. Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149. See In re Wallace, L. R
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be expelled for that alone ;1 and counsel who has once taken part

in litigation, and been the adviser or become intrusted with the

secrets of one party, will not afterwards be suffered to engage for

an opposing party, notwithstanding the original employment has

ceased, and there i3 no imputation upon his motives.2 And,

[* 338] on the * other hand the court will not allow counsel to lie

made the instrument of injustice, nor permit the client to

exact of him services which are inconsistent with the obligation he

owes to the court and to public justice; a higher and more sacred

obligation than any which can rest upon him to gratify a client's

whims, or to assist in his revenge.3

1 P. C. 283; Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364; Withers v. State, 35 Ala. 252;

Matter of Moore el al., 63 N. C. 397; Biggs. Ex parte, 64 N. C. 202; Bradley

v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335; Dickens's Case, 67 Penn. St. 169.

1 For example, one whose reputation for truth and veracity is such that his

neighbors would not believe him when under oath. Matter of Mills, 1 Mich.

393. See In re Percy, 36 N. Y. 651; People p. Ford, 54 1ll. 520. An attprney

convicted and punished for perjury, and disbarred, was refused restoration, not-

withstanding his subsequent behavior had been unexceptionable. Ex park Gar-
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bett, 18 C. B. 403.

'In Gaulden v. State, 11 Geo. 47, the late solicitor-general was not suffered

to assist in the defence of a criminal case, because he had, in the course of hu

official duty instituted the prosecution, though he was no longer connected with

it. And See Wilson v. State, 16 Ind. 392.

'Upon this subject the remarks of* Chief Justice Oibson in Rush v. Cavanaugh,

2 Penn. St. 189, are worthy of being repeated in this connection. The prose-

cutor in a criminal case had refused to pay the charges of the counsel employed

by him to prosecute in the place of the attorney-general, because the counsel,

after a part of the evidence had been put in, had consented that the charge might

be withdrawn. In considering whether this was sufficient reason for the refusal,

the learned judge said: "The material question is, did the plaintiff violate hu

professional duty to bis client in consenting to withdraw his charge . . . instead

of lending himself to the prosecution of one whom he then and has since believed

to be an innocent man?

"It is a popular but gross mistake to suppose that a lawyer owes no fidelity

to any one except his client, and that the latter is the keeper of his professional

conscience. He is expressly bound by bis official oath to behave himself in hi*

office of attorney with all due fidelity to the court as well as to the client; and

he violates it when he consciously presses for an unjust judgment; much more so

when he presses for the conviction of an innocent man. But the prosecution was

depending before an alderman, to whom, it may be said, the plaintiff was bound

to no such fidelity. Still he was bound by those obligations which, without oaths,

rest upon all men. The high and honorable office of a counsel would be degraded

to that of a mercenary, were he compellable to do the bidding of bis client against

the dictates of his conscience. The origin of the name proves the client to be
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The Writ of Habeas Corpus.

It still remains to mention one of the principal safe-

guards to personal liberty, * and the means by which ille- [* 339]

gal restraints upon it are most speedily and effectually

remedied. To understand this guaranty, and the instances in which

the citizen is entitled to appeal to the law for its enforcement,

we must first have a correct idea of what is understood by personal

liberty in the law, and inquire what restraints, if any, must exist to

its enjoyment.

Sir William Blackstone says, personal liberty consists in the

power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person

to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without im-

prisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.1 It appears,

therefore, that this power of locomotion is not entirely unrestricted,

but that by due course of law certain qualifications and limitations

may be imposed upon it without infringing upon constitutional

liberty. Indeed, in organized society, liberty is the creature of law,

and every man will possess it in proportion as the laws, while

subordinate to the counsel as his patron. Besides, had the plaintiff succeeded

in having Crean held to answer, it would have been his duty to abandon the
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prosecution at the return of the recognizance. As the office of attorney-general

is a public trust which involves, in the discharge of it, the exercise of ari almost

boundless discretion by an officer who stands as impartial as a judge, it might

be doubted whether counsel retained by a private prosecutor can be allowed to

perform any part of his duty; certainly not unless in subservience to his will and

instructions. With that restriction usage has sanctioned the practice of employ-

ing professional assistants, to whom the attorney-general or his regular substitute

may, if he please, confide the direction of the particular prosecution; and it has

been beneficial to do so where the prosecuting officer has been overmatched or

overborne by numbers. In that predicament the ends of justice may require him

to accept assistance. But the professional assistant, like the regular deputy,

exercises not his own discretion, but that of the attorney-general, whose locum

tenens at sufferance he is; and he consequently does so under the obligation of

the official oath."

1 Bl. Com. 134. Montesquieu says: "In governments, that is, in societies

directed by laws, liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought

to will, and in riot being constrained to do what we ought not to will. We must

have continually present to our minds the difference between independence and

liberty. Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen

could do what they forbid, he would no longer be possessed of liberty, because

all his fellow-citizens would enjoy the same power." Spirit of the Laws, Book

11, c. 3.

[ 389 ]
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imposing no unnecessary restraints, surround him and every other

citizen with protections against the lawless acts of others.1

If we examine the qualifications and restrictions which the law

imposes upon personal liberty, we shall find that they range them-

selves in two classes; first, those of a public, and, second, those of

a private nature.

The first class are those which spring from the relative duties

and obligations of the citizen to society and to his fellow-citizen.

These may be arranged into sub-classes as follows; 1. Those

imposed to prevent the commission of crime which is threatened;

2. Those in punishment of crime committed; 3. Those in pun-

ishment of contempts of court or legislative bodies, or to render

their jurisdiction effectual; 4. Those necessary to enforce the

duty citizens owe in defence of the State;2 5. Those which may

become important to protect the community against the acts of

those who, by reason of mental infirmity, are incapable of self-

control. All these limitations are well recognized and generally

understood, but a particular discussion of them does not belong to
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our subject. The second class are those which spring from the

helpless or dependent condition of individuals in the various rela-

tions of life.

1. The husband, at the common law, is recognized .as having

legal custody of and power of control over the wife, with the right

to direct as to her labor, and to insist upon its performance. The

precise nature of the restraints which may be imposed by the hus-

band upon the wife's actions, it is not easy, from the nature of the

case, to point out and define; but at most they can only be such

1 "Liberty," says Mr. Webster, "is the creature of law, essentially differ-

ent from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and

a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never under-

stood and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome

restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we

have. It is an error to suppose that liberty consists in a paucity of laws. If

one wants few laws, let him go to Turkey. The Turk enjoys that blessing. The

working of our complex system, full of checks and restraints on legislative, execu-

tive, and judicial power, is favorable to liberty and justice. Those checks and

restraints are so many safeguards set around individual rights and interests.

That man is free who is protected from injury." Works, Vol. II. p. 893.

* In Judson v. Reardon, 16 Minn. 431, a statute authorizing the members of

a municipal council to arrest and imprison without warrant persons refusing to

obey the orders of fire wardens at a fire was held unwarranted and void.
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gentle restraints upon her liberty as improper conduct on her part

may appear to render necessary ;1 and the general tendency of

public sentiment, as well as of the modern decisions, has been in the

direction of doing away with the arbitrary power which the husband

was formerly supposed to possess, and of placing the two

sexes in the marriage relation upon * a footing nearer [* 340]

equality. It is believed that the right of the husband to

chastise the wife, under any circumstances, would not be recog-

nized in this country; and such right of control as the law gives

him would in any case be forfeited by such conduct towards the

wife as was not warranted by the relation, and which should ren-

der it improper for her to live and cohabit with him, or by such

conduct as, under the laws of the State, would entitle her to a

divorce.2 And he surrenders his right of control also, when he

consents to her living apart under articles of separation.3

2. The father of an infant, being obliged by law to support his

child, has a corresponding right to control his actions and to em-

ploy his services during the continuance of legal infancy. The

child may be emancipated from this control before coming of age,

either by the express assent of the father, or by being turned away
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from his father's house and left to care for himself;4 though in

neither case would the father be released from an obligation which

the law imposes upon him to prevent the child becoming a public

charge, and which the State may enforce whenever necessary. The

mother, during the father's life, has a power of control subordinate

to his; but on his death5 or conviction and sentence to imprison-

1.2 Kent, 181. See Cochran's Case, 8 Dowl. P. C. 630. The husband, how-

ever, is under no obligation to support his wife except at his own home; and it is

only when he wrongfully sends her away, or so conducts himself as to justify her

in leaving him, that he is bound to support her elsewhere. Rumney v. Keyes,

7 N. H. 570; Allen v. Aldrieh, 9 Fost. 63; Shaw v. Thompson, 16 Pick. 198;

Clement v. Mattison, 3 Rich. 93. In such a case his liability to supply her with

necessaries cannot be restricted by giving notice to particular persons not to trust

her. Bolton v. Prentice, 2 Strange, 1214; Harris v. Morris, 4 Esp. 41.

* Hutcheson v. Peck, 5 Johns. 196; Love v. Moynahan, 16 111. 277.

1 Saunders v. Rodway, 16 Jur. 1005, 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 463.

♦ Whiting v. Earle, 3 Pick. 201; McCoy v. Huffman, 8 Cow. 841; State e.

Barrett, 45 N. H. 15; Wolcott v. Rickey, 22 Iowa, 171; Fairhurst v. Lewis,

23 Ark. 435; Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320.

• Dedham v. Natick, 16 Mass. 135. See p. 348.
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ment for felony,1 she succeeds to the relative rights which

father possessed before.

3. The guardian has a power of control over his ward, corre-

sponding in the main to that which the father has over his child,

though in some respects more restricted, while in others it is

broader. The appointment of guardian when made by the courts

is of local force only, being confined to the State in which it is

made, and the guardian would have no authority to change the

domicile of the ward to another State or country. But the appoint-

ment commonly has reference to the possession of property by the

ward, and over this property the guardian possesses a power of

control which is not possessed by the father, as such, over the

property owned by his child.2

4. The relation of master and apprentice is founded on a con-

tract between the two, generally with the. consent of the parent

or party standing in loco parentis to the latter, by which

[* 341] the * master is to teach the apprentice some specified trade

or means of living, and the apprentice, either wholly or

in part in consideration of the instruction, is to perform services
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for the master while receiving it. This relation is also statutory

and local, and the power to control the apprentice is assimilated

to that of the parent by the statute law.8

5. The power of the master to impose restraints upon the action

of the servant he employs, is of so limited a nature that practically

it may be said to rest upon continuous voluntary assent. If the

servant misconducts himself, or refuses to submit to proper control,

the master may discharge him, but cannot resort to confinement

or personal chastisement.

6. The relation of teacher and scholar places the former more

nearly in the place of the parent than either of the two preceding

relations places the master. While the pupil is under his care, he

has a right to enforce obedience to his commands lawfully given in

1 Bailey's Case, 6 Dowl. P. C. 811. If, however, there be a guardian ap-

pointed for the child by the proper court, his right to the custody of the child is

superior to that of the parent. Macready u. Wolcott, 33 Conn. 321.

* 1 Cooley's Bl. Com. 462, and cases cited.

3 The relation is one founded on personal trust and confidence, and the master

cannot assign the articles of apprenticeship except by consent of the apprentice

and of his proper guardian. Haley v. Taylor, 3 Dana, 222; Nickerson v. How-

ard, 19 Johns. 113; Tucker v. Magee, 18 Ala. 99.
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his capacity of teacher, even to the extent of bodily chastisement

or confinement. And in deciding questions of discipline he acts

judicially, and is not to be made liable, either civilly or criminally,

unless he has acted with express malice, or been guilty of such

excess in punishment that malice may fairly be implied. All pre-

sumptions favor the correctness and justice of his action.1

7. Where parties bail another, in legal proceedings, they are

regarded in law as his jailers, selected by himself, and with the right

to his legal custody for the purpose of seizing and delivering him

up to the officers of the law at any time before the liability of the

bail has become fixed by a forfeiture being judicially declared on

his failure to comply with the condition of the bond.2 This is a

right which the bail may exercise in person or by agent, and with-

out resort to judicial process.3

8. The control of the creditor over the person of his debtor,

through the process which the law gives for the enforcement of his

demand, is now very nearly abolished, thanks to the humane pro-
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visions which have been made of late by statute or by constitution.

In cases of torts and where debts were fraudulently contracted, or

where there is an attempt at a fraudulent disposition of property

with intent to delay the creditor, or to deprive him of payment,

the body of the debtor is allowed to be seized and confined ; but the

reader must be referred to the constitution and statutes of his State

for specific information on this subject.

* These, then, are the legal restraints upon personal [* 342]

liberty. For any other restraint, or for any abuse of the

legal rights which have been specified, the party restrained is enti-

tled to immediate process from the courts, and to speedy relief.

The right to personal liberty did not depend in England on any

statute, but it was the birthright of every freeman. As slavery

ceased it became universal, and the judges were bound to protect it

by proper writ when infringed. But in those times when the power

1 State p. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. & Bat. 365; Cooper p. McJunkin, 4 Ind.

290; Commonwealth p. Randall, 4 Gray, 38.

• Harp p. Osgood, 2 Hill, 216; Commonwealth p. Brickett, 8 Pick. 188.

The principle may be followed, if necessary, out of the jurisdiction of the court

in which the bail was taken, and arrested there. Parker p. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 84.

Even though it be out of the State. Harp p. Osgood, supra. And doors, if

necessary, may be broken in order to make the arrest. Read's case, 4 Conn.

166; Nicolls p. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145.

s Parker v. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 84; Nicolls p. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145.
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of parliament was undefined and in dispute, and the judges held

their offices only during the king's pleasure, it was almost a matter

of course that rights should be violated, and that legal jsuress

should be impracticable, however clear those rights might be. But

in many cases it was not very clear what the legal rights of parties

were. The courts which proceeded according to the course of the

common law, as well as the courts of chancery, had limits to their

authority which could be understood, and a definite course of pro-

ceeding was marked out for them by statute or by custom; and if

they exceeded their jurisdiction and invaded the just liberty of the

subject, the illegality of the process would generally appear in the

proceedings. But there were two tribunals unknown to the com-

mon law, but exercising a most fearful authority, against whose

abuses it was not easy for the most upright and conscientious

judge in all cases to afford relief. These were, 1. The Court of

Star Chamber, which became fully recognized and established in

the time of Henry VII., though originating long before. Its juris-

diction extended to all sorts of offences, contempts of authority
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and disorders, the punishment of which was not supposed to be

adequately provided for by the common law; such as slanders of

persons in authority, the propagation of seditious news, refusal to

lend money to the king, disregard of executive proclamations, &c

It imposed fines without limit, and inflicted any punishment in the

discretion of its judges short of death. Even jurors were punished

in this court for verdicts in State trials not satisfactory to the

authorities. Although the king's chancellor and judges were enti-

tled to seats in this court, the actual exercise of its powers appears

to have fallen into the hands of the king's privy council, which sat

as a species of inquisition, and exercised almost any authority it

saw fit to assume.1 The court was abolished by the Long Par-

liament in 1641. 2. The Court of High Commission,

[* 343] established *in the time of Elizabeth, and which exer-

cised a power in ecclesiastical matters corresponding to

that which the Star Chamber assumed in other cases, and in an

equally absolute and arbitrary manner. This court was also abol-

1 See Hallam, Constitutional History, c. 1 and 8; Todd, Parliamentary Gov-

ernment in England, Vol. II. c. 1. The rise and extension of authority of this

court, and its arbitrary character, are very fully set forth in Brodie's Constitu-

tional History of the British Empire, to which the reader is referred for more

particular information.
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ished in 1641,- but was afterwards revived for a short time in the

reign of James II.

It is evident that while these tribunals existed there could be no

effectual security to liberty. A brief reference to the remarkable

struggle which took place during the reign of Charles I. will per-

haps the better enable us to understand the importance of those

common-law protections to personal liberty to which we shall have

occasion to refer, and also of those statutory securities which have

since been added.

When the king attempted to rule without the parliament, and in

1625 dissolved that body, and resorted to forced loans, the grant of

monopolies, and the levy of ship moneys, as the means of replenish-

ing a treasury that could only lawfully be supplied by taxes granted

by the commons, the privy council was his convenient means of

enforcing compliance with his will. Those who refused to contribute

to the loans demanded were committed to prison. When they

petitioned the Court of the King's Bench for their discharge, the

warden of the fleet made return to the writ of habeas corpus, that

they were detained by warrant of the privy council, informing him of

no particular cause of imprisonment, but that they were committed
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by the special command of his majesty. Such a return presented

for the decision of the court the question, "Is such a warrant,

which does not specify the cause of detention, valid by the laws of

England?" The court held that it was, justifying their decision

upon supposed precedents, although, as Mr. Hallam says, " it was

evidently the consequence of this decision that every statute from

the time of Magna Charta, designed to protect the personal lib-

erties of Englishmen, became a dead letter, since the insertion of

four words in a warrant (per gpeciale mandatum regis), which

might become matter of form, would control their remedial effi-

cacy. And this wound was the more deadly in that the notorious

cause of these gentlemen's imprisonment was their withstanding an

illegal exaction of money. Every thing that distinguished our

constitutional laws, all that rendered the name of England valuable,

was at stake in this issue." 1 This decision, among other violent

acts, led to the Petition of Right, one of the principal charters of

English liberty, but which was not assented to by the

king until the judges had * intimated that if he saw [* 344]

1 Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 7. See also Brodie, Const. Hist. Vol. n. o. 1.
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fit to violate it by arbitrary commitments, they would take care

that it should not be enforced by their aid against his will. And

four years later, when the king committed members of parliament

for words spoken in debate, offensive to the royal prerogative, the

judges evaded the performance of their duty on habeas corpus, and

the members were only discharged when the king gave his consent

to that course.1

The Habeas Corpus Act was passed in 1679, mainly to prevent

such abuses and other evasions of duty by judges and ministerial

officers, and to compel prompt action in any case in which illegal

imprisonment was alleged. That act gave no new right to the

subject, but it furnished the means of enforcing those which

existed before.2 The preamble recited that " whereas great delays

have been used by sheriffs, jailers, and other officers, to whose

custody any of the king's subjects have been committed for

criminal or supposed criminal matters, in making returns of writs

of habeas corpus, to them directed, by standing out ou alias or

pluries habeas corpus, and sometimes more, and by other shifts, to
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avoid their yielding obedience to such writs, contrary to their duty

and the known laws of the land, whereby many of the king's sub-

jects have been and hereafter may be long detained in prison in

such cases, where by law they are bailable, to their great charge

and vexation. For the prevention whereof, and the more speedy

relief of all persons imprisoned for any such criminal or supposed

criminal matters," the act proceeded to make elaborate and care-

ful provisions for the future. The important provisions of the act

may be summed up as follows: That the writ of habeas corpus

might be issued by any court of record or judge thereof, either in

term-time or vacation, on the application of any person confined,

or of any person for him; the application to be in writing and on

oath, and with a copy of the warrant of commitment attached, if

procurable; the writ to be returnable either in court or at cham-

bers; the person detaining the applicant to make return to the

writ by bringing up the prisoner with the cause of his detention,

and the court or judge to discharge him unless the imprisonment

appeared to be legal, and in that case to take bail if the case

was bailable; and performance of all these duties was made

1 Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 8; Brodie, Const. Hist. Vol. I. c. 8.

5 Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 13; Beeching's Case, 4 B. & C. 136; Matter of

Jackson, 15 Mich. 436.
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compulsory, under heavy penalties. * Thus the duty which [* 345]

the judge or other officer might evade with impunity before,

he must now perform or suffer punishment. The act also provided

for punishing severely a second commitment for the same cause,

after a party had once been discharged on habeas corpus, and also

made the sending of inhabitants of England, Wales, and Berwick-

upon-Tweed abroad for imprisonment illegal, and subject to penalty.

Important as this act was1 it was less broad in its scope than the

remedy had been before, being confined to cases of imprisonment

for criminal or supposed criminal matters;2 but the attempt in

parliament nearly a century later to extend its provisions to other

cases was defeated by the opposition of Lord Mansfield, on the

express ground that it was unnecessary, inasmuch as the common-

law remedy was sufficient;3 as perhaps might have been, had

officers been always disposed to perform their duty. Another

attempt in 1816 was successful.4

The Habeas Corpus Act was not made, in express terms, to

extend to the American colonies, but it was in some expressly, and

in others by silent acquiescence, adopted and acted upon, and all

the subsequent legislation in the American States has been based
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upon it, and lias consisted in little more than a re-enactment of its

essential provisions.

What Courts issue the Writ.

The protection of personal liberty is for the most part confided

to the State authorities, and to the State courts the party must

apply for relief on habeas corpus when illegally restrained. There

are only a few cases in which the federal courts can interfere; and

those are cases in which either the illegal imprisonment is under

pretence of national authority, or in which this process becomes

important or convenient in order to enforce or vindicate some right,

or authority under the Constitution or laws of the United States.

1 Mi. Hurd, in the appendix to his excellent treatise on the Writ of Habeas

Corpus, gives a complete copy of the act. See also appendix to Lieber, Civil

Liberty and Self-Government; Broom, Const. Law, 218.

'See Mayor of London's Case, 3 Wils. 198; Wilson's Case, 7 Q. B. 984.

3 Life of Mansfield by Lord Campbell, 2 Lives of Chief Justices, p. 35; 15

Hansard's Debates, 897 et seq.

4 By Stat. 56 Geo. III. p. 100. See Broom, Const. Law. 224.
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The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that each of the several

federal courts should have power to issue writs of scire fam»,

habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided forbj

statute, which might be necessary for the exercise of their respective

jurisdictions and agreeable to the principles and usages of law;

and that either of the justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the

district judges, should have power to grant writs of habeas corpus

for the purposes of au inquiry into the cause of commitment:

provided that in no case should such writs extend to

[* 346] * prisoners in jail, unless where they were in custody

under or by color of the authority of the United States,

or were committed to trial before some court of the same, or were

necessary to be brought into court to testify.1 Under this statute

no court of the United States or judge thereof could issue a habeas

corpus to bring up a prisoner in custody under a sentence or exe-

cution of a State court, for any other purpose than to be used as

a witness. And this was so whether the imprisonment was under

civil or criminal process.2
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During what were known as the nullification troubles in South

Carolina, the defect of federal jurisdiction in respect to this writ

became apparent, and another act was passed, having for its object,

among other things, the protection of persons who might be prose-

cuted under assumed State authority for acts done under the laws

of the United States. This act provided that either of the justices

of the Supreme Court, or a judge of any District Court of the

United States, in addition to the authority already conferred by

law, should have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases

of a prisoner or prisoners in jail or confinement, where he or they

shall bo committed or confined on or by any authority of law, for

any act done or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the

United States, or any order, process, or decree of any judge or

court thereof.8

In 1842 further legislation seemed to have become a necessity,

1 1 Statutes at Large, 81.

• Ex parte Dorr, 3 How. 103.

a 4 Stat, at Large, 634. See Ex parte Robinson, 6 McLean, 355; 8. C. 1

Bond, 39 ; U. S. v. Jailer of Fayette Co., 2 Abb. U. S. 265. Robinson w«a

United States marshal, and was imprisoned under a warrant issued by a State

court for executing process under the Fugitive Slave Law, and was discharged

by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States under this act.
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in order to give to the federal judiciary jurisdiction upon this writ

of cases in which questions of international law were involved, and

which, consequently, could only properly be disposedof by the juris-

diction to which international concerns were by the Constitution

committed. The immediate occasion for this legislation was the

arrest of a subject of Great Britain by the authorities of the State

of New York, for an act which his government avowed and took

the responsibility of, and which was the subject of diplomatic cor-

respondence between the two nations. An act of Congress was

consequently passed, which provides that either of the justices of

the Supreme Court, or any judge of any District Court of the

United States in which a prisoner is confined, in addition to the

authority previously conferred by law, shall have power to grant

writs of habeas corpus in all cases of any prisoner or prisoners

in jail or confinement, where he, she, or they, being subjects or

citizens of a foreign State, and domiciled therein, shall be commit-

ted, or confined, or in custody, under or by any authority, or law,

or process founded thereon, of the United States or of any one of

them, for or on account of any act done or omitted under any

alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption,
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set up or claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of

any foreign State or sovereignty, the validity or effect whereof

depends upon the law of .nations, or under color thereof.1

In 1867 a further act was passed, which provided that the several

courts of the United States, and the several justices and judges of

such courts, within their respective jurisdictions, in addition to the

authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs

of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained

of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any

treaty or law of the United States.2

These are the cases in which the national courts and judges

have jurisdiction of this writ: in other cases the party must

seek his remedy in the proper State tribunal.3 And although

1 5 Stat, at Large, 539. McLeod's Case, which was the immediate occasion

of the passage of this act, will be found reported in 25 Wend. 482. It was re-

viewed by Judge Talmadge in 26 Wend. 663, and a reply to the review appears

in 3 Hill, 635.

* 14 Stat, at Large, 385.

* Ex parte Dorr, 3 How. 103; Barry ». Mercein, 5 How. 103; Dekraft v.

Barney, 2 Black, 704. See United States c. French, 1 Gall. 1; Ex parte Barry,

2 How. 65.
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[*347] the State courts formerly * claimed and exercised the

right to inquire into the lawfulness of restraint under

the national authority,1 it is now settled by the decision of the

Supreme Court of the United States, that the question of the

legality of the detention in such cases is one for the determination,

exclusively, of the federal judiciary, so that although a State court

or judge may issue this process in any case where illegal restraint

upon liberty is alleged, yet when it is served upon any officer or

person who detains another in custody under the national author-

ity, it is his duty, by proper return, to make known to the State

court or judge the authority by which he holds such person, but

not further to obey the process; and that as the State judiciary

have no authority within the limits of the sovereignty assigned by

the Constitution to the United States, the State court or judge can

proceed no further with the case.2

The State constitutions recognize the writ of habeas corpus as

an existing remedy in the cases to which it is properly applicable,

and designate the courts or officers which may issue it; but they
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do not point out the cases in which it may be employed. Upon

this subject the common law and the statutes must be our guide;

and although the statutes will be found to make specific provision

for particular cases, it is believed that in no instance which lias

fallen under our observation bas there been any intention to

restrict tbe remedy, and make it less broad and effectual than it

was at the common law.3

1 See the cases collected in Hurd on Habeas Corpus, B. 2, c. 1, § 5, and in

Abb. Nat. Dig. 609, note.

* Ablcman v. Booth, 21 How. 506. See Norris v. Newton, 5 McLean, 92;

United States v. Rector, 5 McLean, 174; Spangler's Case, 11 Mich. 298; In rt

Hopson, 40 Barb. 34; Ex parte Hill, 5 Nev. 154. Notwithstanding the decision

of Ableman v. Booth, the State courts have frequently since assumed to pa-«s

definitely upon cases of alleged illegal restraint under federal authority, and

this, too, by the acquiescence of the federal officers. As the remedy in the State

courts is generally more expeditious and easy than can be afforded in the. national

tribunals, it is possible that the federal authorities may still continue to acquiesce

in such action of the State courts, in cases where there can be no reason to fear

that they will take different views of the questions involved from those likely to

be held by the federal courts. Nevertheless, while the case of Ableman v. Booth

stands unreversed, the law must be held to be as there declared. It has recently

been approved in Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, Chief Justice Chase dissenting.

* See Matter of Jackson, 15 Mich. 417, where this whole subject is fully con-

sidered. The application for the writ is not necessarily made by the party in
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We have elsewhere referred to certain rules regarding the

validity of judicial proceedings.1 In the great anxiety on the

part of our legislators to make the most ample provision for

speedy relief from unlawful confinement, authority to issue the

writ of habeas corpus has been conferred upon inferior judicial

officers, who make use of it sometimes as if it were a writ of error,

under which they might correct the errors and irregularities of

other judges and courts, whatever their relative jurisdiction and

dignity. Any such employment of the writ is an abuse.2

Where a * party who is in confinement under judicial [* 348]

process is brought up on habeas corpus, the court or

judge before whom he is returned will inquire: 1. Whether the

court or officer issuing the process under which he is detained had

jurisdiction of the case, and has acted within that jurisdiction in

issuing such process.3 If so, mere irregularities or errors of judg-

ment in the exercise of that jurisdiction must be disregarded on

this writ, and must be corrected either by the court issuing the

person, but may be made by any other person on his behalf, if a sufficient reason

is stated for its not being made by him personally. The Hottentot Venus Case,

13 East, 195; Child's Case, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 259. A wife may have the writ
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to release her husband from unlawful imprisonment, and may herself be heard

on the application. Cobbett's Case, 15 Q. B. 181, note; Cobbett V. Hudson,

10 Eng. L. & Eq. 318; s. c. 15 Q. B. 988. Lord Campbell in this case cites

the case of the wife of John Bunyan, who was heard on his behalf when in

prison.

1 See post, p. 397 et seq.

* It is worthy of serious consideration whether, in those States where the

whole judicial power is by the constitution vested in certain specified courts, it

is competent by law to give to judicial officers not holding such courts authority

to review, even indirectly, the decisions of the courts, and to discharge persons

committed under their judgments. Such officers could exercise only a special

statutory authority. Yet its exercise in such cases is not only judicial, but it is

in the nature of appellate judicial powep. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

of the United States to issue the writ in cases of confinement under the order of

the District Courts, was sustained in Ex parte Bolhnan and Swartwout, 4 Cranch,

75, and Matter of Metzger, 5 How. 190, on the ground that it was appellate.

See also Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38; Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 568; Ex

parte Milburn, 9 Pet. 704; Matter of Kaine, 14 How. 103; Rowe v. Rowe, 27

Jlich.

3 The validity of the appointment or election of an officer de facto cannot be

inquired into on habeas corpus. Ex parte Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369; Russell v.

Whiting, 1 Wins. (N. C.) 463. Otherwise if a mere usurper issues process for

the imprisonment of a citizen. Ex parte Strahl, supra.
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process, or on regular appellate proceedings.1 2. If the process is

not void for want of jurisdiction, the further inquiry will be made,

whether, by law, the case is bailable, and if so, bail will be taken

if the party offers it; otherwise he will be remanded to the proper

custody.2

This writ is also sometimes employed to enable a party to enforce

a right of control which by law he may have, springing from some

one of the domestic relations; especially to enable a parent to

obtain the custody and control of his child, where it is detained

from him by some other person. The courts, however, do not

generally go farther in these cases than to determine what is for

the best interest of the child; and they do not feel compelled to

remand him to any custody where it appears not to be for the

child's interest. The theory of the writ is, that it relieves from

improper restraint; and if the child is of an age to render it proper

to consult his feelings and wishes, this may be done in any case;'

and it is especially proper in many cases where the parents are

living m separation and both desire his custody. The right of the

father, in these cases, is generally recognized as best; but this
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'1 People v. Cassels, 5 Hill, 164; Buslinell's Case, 9 Ohio, n. s. 183 ; Ex parte

Watkins, 7 Pet. 568; Matter of Metzger, 5 How. 191; Petition of Smith, 2 Nev.

338; Ex parte Gibson, 31 Cal. 619; Hammond v. People, 32 111. 472, per

Breese, J. In State v. Shattuck, 45 N. H. 211, Bellows, J., states the rule very

correctly, as follows: "If the court had jurisdiction of the matter embraced in

these causes, this court will not, on habeas corpus, revise the judgment. State t.

Towlc, 42 N. H. 541; Ross and Riley's Case, 2 Pick. 166, and Riley's Case, ib.

171; Adams v. Vose, 1 Gray, 51. If in such case the proceedings arc irregular

or erroneous, the judgment is voidable and not void, and stands good until

revised or annulled in a proper proceeding instituted for that purpose; but when

it appears that the magistrate had no jurisdiction, the proceedings are void, and

the respondent may be discharged on habeas corpus. State v. Towle, before

cited; Kellogg, Ex parte, 6 Vt. 509. See also State r. Richmond, 6 N. H. 232;

Burnham v. Stevens, 33 N. H. 247; Hurst v. Smith, 1 Gray, 49."

1 It is not a matter of course that the party is to be discharged even where

the authority under which he is held is adjudged illegal. For it may appear that

he should be lawfully confined in different custody; in which case, the proper

order may be made for the transfer. Matter of Mason, 8 Mich. 70; Matter of

Ring, 28 Cal. 247; Ex paiie Gibson, 31 Cal. 619. And where he is detained for

trial on an imperfect charge of crime, the court, if possessing power to commit

de novo, instead of discharging him, should proceed to inquire whether there is

probable cause lor holding him for trial, and if so, should order accordingly.

Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 416.

* Commonwealth v. Aves, 18 Pick. 193.
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must depend very much upon circumstances, and the tender age of

the child may often be a controlling consideration against his

claim. The courts have large discretionary power in these cases,

and the tendency of modern decisions has been to extend, rather

than restrict it.1

There is no common-law right to a trial by jury of the issues of

fact joined on habeas corpus; but the issues both of fact and of law

are tried by the court or judge before whom the proceeding is had ;2

though without doubt a jury trial might be provided for by statute,

and perhaps even ordered by the court in some cases.3

* Right of Discussion and Petition. [* 349]

The right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the

government for a redress of grievances, is one which " would seem

unnecessary to be expressly provided for in a republican govern-

ment, since it results from the very nature and structure of its

institutions. It is impossible that it could be practically denied

until the spirit of liberty had wholly disappeared, and the people

had become so servile and debased as to be unfit to exercise any of

the privileges of freemen."4 But it has not been thought unim-

portant to protect this right by statutory enactments in England;
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and indeed it will be remembered that one of the most notable

attempts to crush the liberties of the kingdom made the right of

petition the point of attack, and selected for its contemplated vic-

tims the chief officers in the episcopal hierarchy. The trial and

acquittal of the seven bishops in the reign of James II. constituted

one of the decisive battles in English constitutional history ;5 and

1 Barry's Case mar almost be said to exhaust all the law on this subject. We

refer to the various judicial decisions made in it, so far as they are reported in

the regular reports. 8 Paige, 47; 25 Wend. 64; People v. Mercein, 3 Hill, 399;

2 How. 65; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 105. See also the recent case of Adams

v. Adams, 1 Duv. 167. For the former rule, see The King v. De Manneville,

5 East, 221; Ex parte Skinner, 9 J. B. Moore, 278. Where the court is satis-

fied that the interest of the child would be subserved by refusing the custody to

either of the parents, it may be confided to a third party. Chetwynd v. Chet-

wynd, L. R. 1 P. & D. 39; In re Goodenough, 19 Wis. 274.

'See Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 297-302, and cases cited; Baker v. Gordon,

23 Ind. 209.

'See Matter of Hakewell, 22 Eng. L. & Eq. 395; 8. c. 12 C. B. 223.

4 Story on the Constitution, § 1894.

'See this case in 12 Howell's State Trials, 183; 8 Mod. 212. Also in Broom,
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the right which was then vindicated is " a sacred right which in

difficult times shows itself in its full magnitude, frequently serves

as a safety-valve if judiciously treated by the recipients, and may

give to the representatives or other bodies the most valuable infor-

mation. It may right many a wrong, and the deprivation of it

would at once be felt by every freeman as a degradation. The

right of petitioning is indeed a necessary consequence of the right

of free speech and deliberation, — a simple, primitive, and natural

right. As a privilege it is not even denied the creature in address-

ing the Deity."1 Happily the occasions for discussing and defending

it have not been numerous in this country, and have been confined

to an exciting subject now disposed of.2

[* 350] * Right to hear Arms.

Among the other safeguards to liberty should be mentioned the

right of the people to keep and bear arms.3 A standing army is

peculiarly obnoxious in any free government, and the jealousy of

such an army has at times been so strongly demonstrated in

England as to lead to the belief that even though recruited from

among themselves, it w*as more dreaded by the people as an in-

strument of oppression than a tyrannical monarch or any foreign
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power. So impatient did the English people become of the very

army that liberated them from the tyranny of James II. that they

demanded its reduction even before the liberation became complete;

and to this day the British Parliament render a standing army

practically impossible by only passing a mutiny act from session to

session. The alternative to a standing army is " a well-regulated

militia;" but this cannot exist unless the people are trained to

bearing arms. The federal and State constitutions therefore pro-

vide that the right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed;

Const. Law, 408. See also the valuable note appended by Mr. Broom, p. 493,

in which the historical events bearing on the right of petition are noted. Also,

May, Const. Hist. c. 7; 1 Bl. Com. 148.

1 Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government, c. 12.

* For the discussions on the right of petition in Congress, particularly with

reference to slavery, see 1 Benton's Abridgement of Debates, 397; 2 ib. 57-60,

182-188, 209, 436-444;' 12 ib. 660-679, 705-743; 13 ib. 5-28, 266-290, 557-

562. Also Benton's Thirty Years' View, Vol. I. c. 135, Vol. II. c. 32, 33, 36,

37. Also the current political histories and biographies.

3 1 Bl. Com. 143.
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but how far it may be in the power of the legislature to regulate

the right we shall not undertake to say, as happily there neither has

been, nor perhaps is likely to be, much occasion for a discussion of

that question by the courts.1

1 In Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Lit. 90, the statute " to prevent persons wear-

ing concealed arms" was held unconstitutional, as infringing on the right of the

people to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State. But see Nunn ».

State, 1 Kelly, 243; State v. Jumel, 13 La An. 399; Owen v. State, 31 Ala. 387;

Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394; Andrews v. State, 3 Heis. 165; 8. c. 8 Am.

Rep. 8, and note. A statute prohibiting the open wearing of arms upon the

person was held unconstitutional in Stockdale t>. State, 32 Geo. 225. And one

forbidding carrying either publicly or privately, a dirk, sword-cane, Spanish

stiletto, belt or pocket pistol, or revolver, was sustained, except as to the last-

mentioned weapon; and as to that it was held that, if the weapon was suitable for

the equipment of a soldier, the right of carrying it could not be taken away. As

hearing also upon the right of self-defence, see Ely v. Thompson 3 A. K. Marsh.

73, where it was held that the statute subjecting free persons of color to corporal

punishment for " lifting their hands in opposition " to a white person was uncon-

stitutional. And see in general, Bishop on Stat. Crimes, Chap. 36, and cases

cited.
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[*351] * CHAPTER XI.

OP THE PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY "THE LAW OP THE LAND."

The protection of the subject in the free enjoyment of his life,

his liberty, and his property, except as they might be declared

by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land to be forfeited,

was guaranteed by the twenty-ninth chapter of Magna Charta,

"which alone," says Sir William Blackstone, " would have mer-

ited the title that it bears of the Great Charter." 1 The people of

the American States, holding the sovereignty in their own hands,

have no occasion to exact pledges from any one for a due observ-

ance of individual rights; but the aggressive tendency of power is

such, that they have deemed it of no small importance, that, in

framing the instruments under which their governments are to be

administered by their agents, they should repeat and re-enact this

guaranty, and thereby adopt it as a principle of constitutional

protection. In some form of words, it is to be found in each of

1 4 Bl. Com. 424. The chapter, as it stood in the original charter of John,

was: "Ne corpus liberi hominis capiatur nec imprisonetur nec disseisietur nec

utlagetur nec exuletur, nec aliquo modo destruatur, nec rex eat vel mittat super
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eum vi, nisi per judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terra?." No freeman shall

be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or banished, , or any ways

destroyed, nor will the king pass upon him, or commit him to prison, unless by

the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land. In the charter of Henry III.

it was varied slightly, as follows: "Nullus liber homo capiatur vel imprisonetur,

aut disseisietur de libero tenemento suo vel libertatibus vel liberis consuetudini-

bus suis, aut utlagetur aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nec super eum

ibiinus, nec super eum mittemus, nisi per legale" judicium parium suorum, vel per

legem terra:." See Blackstone's Charters. The Petition of Right — 1 Car. I.

c. 1 —prayed, among other things, " that no man be compelled to make oryield

any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such like charge, without common consent,

by act of Parliament; that none be called upon to make answer for refusal so to

do; that freemen be imprisoned or detained only by the law of the land, or b*y

due process of law, and not by the king's special command, without any charge."

The Bill of Rights — 1 Wm. and Mary, § 2, c. 2—was confined to an enu-

meration and condemnation of the illegal acts of the preceding reign; but the

Great Charter of Henry HI. was then, and is still, in force.
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I

the State constitutions ;1 and, though verbal differences

* appear in the different provisions, no change in language, [* 352]

1 The following are the constitutional provisions in the several States: —

Alabama: "that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be

compelled to give evidence against himself, or be deprived of his life, liberty, or

property, but by due process of law." Art. 1, § 8. —Arkansas: " That no per-

son shall ... be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, without due process

of law." Art. 1, § 9. —California: Like that of Alabama. Art. 1, § 8.—

Connecticut: Same as Alabama, substituting "course of law" for "process of

law." Art. 1, § 9. — Delaware: Like that of Alabama, substituting for " process

of law," "the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." Art. 1, § 7. —

Florida: Like that of Alabama. Art. 1, § 9. — Georgia: "No person shall be

deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law." Art. 1, § 3.

— Illinois: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law." Art. 1, § 2. —Iowa, the same. Art. 1, § 9. —Kentucky:

"Nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment

of his peers, or the law of the land." Art. 13, § 12. — Maine: " Nor be deprived

of his life, liberty, property, or privileges, but by the judgment of his peers, or

the law of the land." Art. 1, § 6. — Maryland: "That no man ought to be
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taken or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or out-

lawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or

property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." Decla-

ration of Rights, § 23. — Massachusetts: "No subject shall be arrested, impris-

oned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of

the protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by

the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." Declaration of Rights, Art.

12. — Michigan: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-

erty, without due process of law." Art. 6, § 32. — Minnesota: Like that of

Michigan. Art. 1, § 7.— Mississippi: The same. Art. 1, § 2. — Missouri:

Same as Delaware. Art. 1, § 18. — Nevada: "Nor be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law." Art. 1, § 8.—Neiv Hampshire:

Same as Massachusetts. Bill of Rights, Art. 15, — New York: Same as Nevada.

Art. 1, § 6. — North Carolina: "That no person ought to be taken, imprisoned,

or disseised of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in

any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the

law of the land." Declaration of Rights, § 17. — Pennsylvania: Like Delaware.

Art. 9, § 9. — Rhode Island: Like Delaware. Art. 1, § 10. — South Carolina:

Like that of Massachusetts, substituting " person" for " subject." Art. 1, § 14.

— Tennessee: "That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised of bis

freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner

destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of

his peers, or the law of the land." Art. 1, § 8. — Texas: "No citizen of this

State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, or privileges, outlawed, exiled,

or in any manner disfranchised, except by due course of the law of the land."

Art. 1, § 16. —West Virginia: "No person, in time of peace, shall be deprived

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Art. 2, § 6. Under
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\1

it is thought, has in any case been made with a view to

[* 353] essential * change in legal effect; and the differences in

phraseology will not, therefore, be of importance in our

discussion. Indeed, the language employed is generally nearly

identical, except that the phrase " due process [or course] of law"

is sometimes used, sometimes " the law of the land," and in some

cases both; but the meaning is the same in every case.1 And, by

the fourteenth amendment, the guaranty is now incorporated iu the

Constitution of the United States.2

If now we shall ascertain the sense in which the phrases "due

process of law" and "the law of the land" are employed in the

several constitutional provisions which we have referred to, when

the protection of rights in property is had in view, we shall be

able, perhaps, to indicate the rule, by which the proper conclusion

may be reached in those cases in which legislative action is objected

to, as not being "the law of the land;" or judicial or ministerial

action is contested as not being "due process of law," within the

meaning of these terms as the Constitution employs them.

If we examine such definitions of these terms as are met with
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in the reported cases, we shall find them so various, that some

difficulty must arise in fixing upon one which shall be accurate,

complete in itself, and at the same time appropriate in all the

cases. The diversity of definition is certainly not surprising, when

we consider the .diversity of cases for the purposes of which it has

been attempted, and reflect that a definition that is sufficient for

one case and applicable to its facts may be altogether insufficient

or entirely inapplicable in another.

Perhaps no definition is more often quoted than that given by

Mr. Webster in the Dartmouth College Case: "By the law of the

land is most clearly intended the general law; a law which hears

before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders

each of the remaining constitutions, equivalent protection to that which these

provisions give, is believed to be afforded by fundamental principles recognized

and enforced by the courts.

1 2 Inst. 60; Bouv. Law. Die. " Due process of Law," "Law of the land;"

State v. Simons, 2 Spears, 767; Vanzant ». Waddell, 2 Yerg. 260; Wally's Heirs

v. Kennedy, ib. 554; Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt. 311; Murray's Lessee v. Hobo-

ken Land Co., 18 How. 276, per Curtis J.; Parsons v. Russell, 11 Mich. 129,

per Manning, J.; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 256; Banning v. Taylor, 24

Penn. St. 292; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 244; Huber v. Reiley, 53 Penn. St. 112.

s See ante, p. 11.
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judgment only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall

bold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the

protection of the * general rules which govern society. [* 354]

Every thing which may pass under the form of an enact-

ment is not therefore to be considered the law of the land." 1

The definition here given is apt and suitable as applied to

judicial proceedings, which cannot be valid unless they "proceed

upon inquiry" and "render judgment only after trial." It is

entirely correct, also, in assuming that a legislative enactment is

not necessarily the law of the land. "The words ' by the law of the

land,' as used in the Constitution, do not mean a statute passed

for the purpose of working the wrong. That construction would

render the restriction absolutely nugatory, and turn this part of

the Constitution into mere nonsense. The people would be made

to say to the two houses : ' You shall be vested with the legislative

power of the State, but no one shall be disfranchised or deprived

of any of the rights or privileges of a citizen, unless you pass a

statute for that purpose. In other words, you shall not do the

wrong unless you choose to do it.' "2 But there are many cases in

1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 519; Works of Webster, Vol.
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V. p. 487. And he proceeds: "If this were so, acts of attainder, bills of pains

and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly

transferring one man's estate to another, legislative judgments, decrees and for-

feitures in all possible forms, would be the law of the land. ' Such a strange

construction would render constitutional provisions of the highest importance

completely inoperative and void. It would tend directly to establish the union

of all powers in the legislature. There would be no general permanent law for

courts to administer or men to live under. The administration of justice would

be an empty form, an idle ceremony. Judges would sit to execute legislative

judgments and decrees, not to declare the law or administer the justice of the

country."

'Per Bronson, J., in Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140. See also Jones v. Perry,

10 Yerg. 59; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 256; Arrowsmith v. Burlingim, 4

McLean, 498 ; Lane v. Dorman, 8 Scam. 238 ; Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene (Iowa),

15; Woodcock v. Bennett, 1 Cow. 740; Kinney v. Beverley, 2 H. & M. 536;

Commonwealth v. Byrne, 20 Grat. 165. "Those terms, 'law of the land,' do not

mean merely an act of the general assembly. If they did, every restriction upon

the legislative authority would be at once abrogated. For what more can the cit-

izen suffer than to be taken, imprisoned, disseised of his freehold, liberties, and

privileges; be outlawed, exiled, and destroyed, and be deprived of his property,

his liberty, and his life, without crime? Yet all this he may suffer if an act of

the assembly simply denouncing those penalties upon particular persons, or a

particular class of persons, be in itself a law of the land within the sense of the
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which the title to property may pass from one person to another,

without the intervention of judicial proceedings, properly so called;

and we have already seen that special legislative acts designed

to accomplish the like end have also been held valid in

[* 355] * some cases. The necessity for "general rules," there-

fore, does not preclude the legislature from establishing

special rules for particular cases, provided the particular cases

range themselves under some general rule of legislative power;

nor is there any requirement of judicial action which demauds

that, in every case, the parties interested shall have a hearing in

court.1

On the other hand we shall find that general rules may some-

times be as obnoxious as special, if they operate to deprive indi-

vidual citizens of vested rights. While every man has a right to

require that his own controversies shall be judged by the same

rules which are applied in the controversies of his neighbors, the

Constitution; for what is in that sense the law of the land must be duly observed

by all, and upheld and enforced by the courts. In reference to the inflictioDof
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punishment and devesting the rights of property, it has been repeatedly held in

this State, and it is believed in every other of the Union, that there are limitations

upon the legislative power, notwithstanding these words; and that the clause

itself means that such legislative acts as profess in themselves directly to punish

persons, or to deprive the citizen of his property, without trial before the judicial

tribunals, and a decision upon the matter of right, as determined by the law>

under which it vested, according to the course, mode, and usages of the com-

mon law, as derived from our forefathers, are not effectually ' laws of the land'

for those purposes." Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. 15. Mr. Broom says: "It is

indeed an essential principle of the law of England, 'that the subject hath an

undoubted property in his goods and possessions; otherwise there shall remain no

more industry, no more justice, no more valor; for who will labor? who will haz-

ard his person in the day of battle for that which is not his own?' The Bankers

Case, by Tumor, 10. And therefore our customary law is not more solicitous

about any thing than ' to preserve the property pf the subject from the inundation

of the prerogative.' Ibid.'" Broom's Const. Law, p. 228.

1 See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 432, per Selden, J. In James r.

Reynolds, 2 Texas, 251, Chief Justice Hemphill says: "The terms ' law of the

land' . . . are now, in their most usual acceptation, regarded as general public

laws, binding upon all the members of the community, under all circumstances,

and not partial or private laws, affecting the rights of private individuals oi

classes of individuals." And see Vanzant v. Waddell, 2 Yerg. 269, per Peek,

J.; Hard v. Nearing, 44 Barb. 472. Nevertheless there are many cases, as we

have shown, ante, pp. 97, 109, in which private laws may be passed in entire

accord with the general public rules which govern the State; and we shall refer

to more cases further on.
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whole community is also entitled, at all times, to demand the pro-

tection of the ancient principles which shield private rights against

arbitrary interference, even though such interference may be under

a rule impartial in its operation. It is not the partial nature of

the rule, so much as its arbitrary and unusual character, which

condemns it as unknown to the law of the land. Mp. Justice

Edwards has said in one case: "Due process of law undoubtedly

means, in the due course of legal proceedings, according to those

rules and forms which have been established for the protection of

private rights."1 And we have met in no judicial decision a state-

ment that embodies more tersely and accurately the correct view

of the principle we are considering, than the following, from an

opinion by Mp. Justice Johnson of the Supreme Court of the

United States: "As to the words from Magna Charta incorporated

in the Constitution of Maryland, after volumes spoken and written

with a view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at

length settled down to this, — that they were intended to secure

the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of govern-

ment, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights

and distributive justice." 2
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* The principles, then, upon which the process is based [* 356]

are to determine whether it is "due process" or not, and

not any considerations of mere form. Administrative and remedial

process may change from time to time, but only with due regard to

the landmarks established for the protection of the citizen. When

the government through its established agencies interferes with the

title to one's property, or with his independent enjoyment of it,

1 Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 209. See also State v. Staten, 6 Cold.

238.

* Bank of Columbia p. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235. "What is meant by 'the

law of the land'? In this State, taking as our guide Zylstra's Case, 1 Bay

384; White v. Kendrick, 1 Brev. 471; State v. Coleman and Maxy, 1 McMull.

502, there can be no hesitation in saying that these words mean the common

law and the statute law existing in this State at the adoption of our constitution.

Altogether they constitute a body of law prescribing the course of justice to

which a free man is to be considered amenable for all time to come." Per

O" Still, J., in State v. Simons, 2 Speers, 767. See also State p. Doherty, 60

Me. 509. It must not be understood from this, however, that it would not be

competent to change either the common law or the statute law, so long as the

principles therein embodied, and which protected private rights, were not departed

from.

[411]
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[CH. XL

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

and its action is called in question as not in accordance with the

law of the land, we are to test its validity by those principles of

civil liberty and constitutional protection which have become es-

tablished in our system of laws, and not generally by rules that

pertain to forms of procedure merely. In judicial proceedings the

law of the land requires a hearing before condemnation, and judg-

ment before dispossession ;1 but when property is appropriated by

tlie government to public uses, or the legislature interferes to give

direction to its title through remedial statutes, different considera-

tions from those which regard the controversies between man and

man must prevail, different proceedings are required, and we have

only to see whether the interference can be justified by the estab-

lished rules applicable to the special case. Due process of law in

each particular case means, such an exertion of the powers of gov-

ernment as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and

under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as

those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in

question belongs.2
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Private rights may be interfered with by either the legislative, ex-

ecutive, or judicial department of the government. The executive

department in every instance must show authority of law

[* 357] for its action, and occasion does not often arise * for an

examination of the limits which circumscribe its powers.

The legislative department may in some cases constitutionally au-

thorize interference, and in others may interpose by direct action.

Elsewhere we shall consider the police power of the State, and

endeavor to show how completely all the property, as well as all

the people within the State, are subject to control under it, within

certain limits, and for the purposes for which that power is exer-

cised. The right of eminent domain and the right of taxation will

also be discussed separately, and it will appear that under each

the law of the land sanctions devesting individuals of their prop-

1 Vanzant v. Waddell, 2 Yerg. 260; Lenz v. Charlton, 28 Wis. 478.

8 See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 432, per Selden, J. In State e. Allen,

2 Mt:Cord, 56, the court, in speaking of process for the collection of taxes, say:

"We think that any legal process which was originally founded in necessity, has

been consecrated by time, and approved and acquiesced in by universal consent,

must be considered an exception to the right of trial by jury, and is embraced in

the alternative ' law of the land.'" And see Hard v. Nearing, 44 Barb. 472;

Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 302.
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erty against their will, and by somewhat summary proceedings. In

every government there is inherent authority to appropriate the

property of the citizen for the necessities of the State, and consti-

tutional provisions do not confer the power, though they generally

surround it with safeguards to prevent abuse. The restraints are,

that when specific property is taken, a pecuniary compensation,

agreed upon or determined by judicial inquiry, must be paid; and

in other cases property can only be taken for the support of the

government, and each citizen can only be required to contribute

his proportion to that end. But there is no rule or principle

known to our system under which private property can be taken

from one person and transferred to another, for the private use

and benefit of such other person, whether by general law or by

special enactment. The purpose must be public, and must have

reference to the needs or convenience of the public. No reason of

general public policy will be sufficient, it seems, to validate such

transfers when they operate upon existing vested rights.1

Nevertheless, in many cases and many ways remedial legislation

may affect the control and disposition of property, and in some

cases may change the nature of rights, give remedies where none
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existed before, and even devest legal titles in favor of substantial

equities where the legal and equitable rights do not chance to con-

cur in the same persons.

The chief restriction upon this class of legislation is,

that vested rights must not be disturbed; * but in its appli- [* 358]

cation as a shield of protection, the term "vested rights"

is not used in any narrow or technical sense, or as importing a

power of legal control merely, but rather as implying a vested

interest which it is right and equitable that the government should

recognize and protect, and of which the individual could not be

deprived arbitrarily without injustice. The right to private prop-

1 Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, HO; Osborn v. Hart, 24 Wis. 91; 8. c. 1 Am.

Rep. 161. In matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend. 149, it is intimated that the

clause in the Constitution of New York, withholding private property from pub-

lic use except upon compensation made, of itself implies that it is not to be

taken in invitum for individual use. And see matter of John and Cherry Streets,

19 Wend. 676. A different opinion- seems to have been held by the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania, when they decided in Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63,

that the legislature might authorize the laying out of private ways over the lands

of unwilling parties, to connect the coal-beds with the works of public improve-

ment, the constitution not in terms prohibiting it. See note to p. 531, post.

[413]

* 358 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. fJCH. XI

1

erty is a sacred right; not, as has been justly said, " introduce as

the result of princes' edicts, concessions and charters, but it was

the old fundamental law, springing from the original frame and

constitution of the realm." 1

But as it is a right which rests upon equities, it has its reason-

able limits and restrictions; it must have some regard to the

general welfare and public policy; it cannot be a right which is to

be examined, settled, and defended on a distinct and separate con-

sideration of the individual case, but rather on broad and general

grounds, which embrace the welfare of the whole community, and

which seek the equal and impartial protection of the interests of all.2

And it may be well at this point to examine in the light of the

reported cases the question, What is a vested right in the constitu-

tional sense? and when we have solved that question, we may be

the better able to judge under what circumstances one may be jus-

tified in resisting a change in the general laws of the State affecting

his interests, and how far special legislation may control his rights

without coming under legal condemnation. In organized society

every man holds all he possesses, and looks forward to all he hopes
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for, through the aid and under the protection of the laws; but as

changes of circumstances and of public opinion, as well as other

reasons affecting the public policy, are all the while calling for

changes in the laws, and as these changes must influence more or

less the value and stability of private possessions, and strengthen

or destroy well-founded hopes, and as the power to make very

many of them could not bo disputed without denying the right of

the political community to prosper and advance, it is obvious that

many rights, privileges, and exemptions which usually pertain to

ownership under a particular state of the law, and many reason-

able expectations, cannot be regarded as vested rights in any legal

sense. In many cases the courts, in the exercise of their ordinary

jurisdiction, cause the property vested in one person to be trans-

1 Arg. Nightingale t>. Bridges, Show. 138. See also Case of Alton Woodi,

1 Rep. 45 a; Alcock v. Cook, 5 Bing. 340; Bowman r. Middleton, 1 Bay, 282;

ante, p. 37 and note, p. 175 and note.

8 The evidences of a man's rights — the deeds, bills of sale, promissory notes,

and the like — are protected equally with his lands and chattels, or rights and

franchises of any kind; and the certiScate of registration and right to vote maj

be properly included in the category. State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 243. See Daviw

v. McKeeby, 6 Nev. 369.
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ferred to another, either through the exercise of a statutory power,

or by the direct force of their judgments or decrees, or by means

of compulsory 'conveyances. If in these cases the courts have

jurisdiction, they proceed in accordance with "the law of the

land ;" and the right of one man is devested by way of enforcing a

higher and better right in another. Of these cases we do not pro-

pose to speak: constitutional questions cannot well arise concern-

ing them, unless they are attended by circumstances of irregularity

which are supposed to take them out of the general rule. All

vested rights are held subject to the laws for the enforcement

of public duties and private contracts, and for the punishment of

wrongs; and if they become devested through the operation of

those laws, it is only by way of enforcing the obligations of justice

and good order. What we desire to reach in this connection is

the true meaning of the term " vested rights" when employed for

the purpose of indicating the interests of which one cannot be

deprived by the mere force of legislative enactment, or by

any other than the * recognized modes of transferring title [* 359]

against the consent of the owner, to which we have
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alluded.

Interests in Expectancy.

And it would seem that a right cannot be regarded as a vested

right, unless it is something more than such a mere expectation

as may be based upon an anticipated continuance of the present

general laws: it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to

the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present or

future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from a de-

mand made by another. Acts of the legislature, as has been well

said by Mr. Justice Woodbury, cannot be regarded as opposed to

fundamental axioms of legislation, "unless they impair rights

which are vested; because most civil rights are derived from pub-

lic laws; and if, before the rights become vested in particular indi-

viduals, the convenience of the State procures amendments or

repeals of those laws, those individuals have no cause of com-

plaint. The power that authorizes or proposes to give, may always

revoke before an interest is perfected in the donee." 1 And Chan-

cellor Kent, in speaking of retrospective statutes, says that while

1 Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 213. See Ride v. Flanders, 89 N. H. 304.
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such a statute, "affecting and changing vested rights, is very

generally regarded in this country as founded on unconstitutional

principles, and consequently inoperative and void," yet that " this

doctrine is not understood to apply to remedial statutes, which

may be of a retrospective nature, provided they do not impair con-

tracts, or disturb absolute vested rights, and only go to confirm

rights already existing, and in furtherance of the remedy by curing

defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations.

Such statutes have been held valid when clearly just and reason-

able, and conducive to the general welfare, even though they might

operate in a degree upon vested rights." 1

And it is because a mere expectation of property in the future

is not considered a vested right, that the rules of descent are held

subject to change in their application to all estates not already

passed to the heir by the death of the owner. No one is heir to

the living; and the heir presumptive has no other reason to rely

upon succeeding to the property than the promise held out

[* 360] by the statute of descents. But this promise is no * more

than a declaration of the legislature as to its present view

of public policy as regards the proper order of succession, — a view
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which may at any time change, and then the promise may properly

be withdrawn, and a new course of descent be declared. The

expectation is not property; it cannot be sold or mortgaged; it is

not subject to debts; and it is not in any manner taken notice of by

the law until the moment of the ancestor's death, when the statute

of descents comes in, and for reasons of general public policy

transfers the estate to persons occupying particular relations to the

deceased in preference to all others. It is not until that moment

that there is any vested right in the person who becomes heir, to

be protected by the Constitution. An anticipated interest in prop-

erty cannot be said to be vested in any person so long as the owner

of the interest in possession has full power, by virtue of his own-

ership, to cut off the expectant right by grant or devise.2

If this be so, the nature of estates must, to a certain extent, be

1 1 Kent, Com. 455. See Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Vt. 91; Bridgeport r.

Housatonic R. R. Co., 15 Com. 492; Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299; Gilman f.

Cutts,- 23 N. H. 382.

* In re Lawrence, 1 Redfield, Sur. Rep. 310. But after property has once

vested under the laws of descent, it cannot be divested by any change in those

laws. Norman v. Heist, 6 M. & S. 171, See post, 379, and notes.
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subject to legislative control and modification.1 In this country

estates tail have been very generally changed into estates in fee-

simple, by statutes the validity of which is not disputed.2 Such

statutes operate to increase and render more valuable the interest

which the tenant in tail possesses, and are not therefore open to

objection by him.3 But no other person in these cases has any

vested right, either in possession or expectancy, to be affected by

such change; and the expectation of the heir presumptive must be

subject to the same control as in other cases.4

The cases of rights in property to result from the marriage

relation must be referred to the seme principle. At the common

law the husband immediately on the marriage succeeded to certain

rights in the real and personal estate which the wife then pos-

sessed. These rights became vested rights at once, and any sub-

sequent alteration in the law could not take them away.6

But other interests * were merely in expectancy. He [*361]

could have a right as tenant by the courtesy initiate in the

wife's estates of inheritance the moment a child was born of the

marriage, who might by possibility become heir to such estates.

This right would be property, subject to conveyance and to be
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taken for debts; and must therefore be regarded as a vested right,

no more subject to legislative interference than other expectant

interests which have ceased to be mere contingencies and become

fixed. But while this interest remains in expectancy merely,—

that is to say, until it becomes initiate, — the legislature must have

1 Smith on Stat, and Const. Construction, 412.

* De Mill v. Lockwood, 3 Blatch. 56.

* On the same ground it has been held in Massachusetts that statutes convert-

ing existing estates in joint tenancy into estates in common were unobjectionable.

They did not impair vested rights, but rendered the tenure more beneficial.

Holbrook v. Finney, 4 Mass. 567; Miller v. Miller, 16 Mass. 59; Anable ».

Patch, 3 Pick. 363; Burghardt v. Turner, 12 Pick. 534. Moreover, such stat-

utes do no more tbati either tenant at the common law has a right to do, by con-

veying his interest to a stranger. See Bombaugh v. Bombaugh, 11 S. & R. 192;

Wildes v. Vanvoorhis, 16 Gray, 147.

4 See 1 Washb. Real Pr. 81-84 and notes. The exception to this statement,

if any, must be the case of tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct; where

the estate of the. tenant has ceased to be an inheritance, and a reversionary right

has become vested.

* Weatervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 208.
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full right to modify or even to abolish it.1 And the same rule will

apply to the case of dower; though the difference in the requisites

of the two estates are such that the inchoate right to dower does

not become property, or any thing more than a mere expectancy at

any time before it is consummated by the husband's death.2 In

neither of these cases does the marriage alone give a vested right.

It gives only a capacity to acquire a right. The same remark

may be made regarding the husband's expectant interest in the

after-acquired personalty of the wife: it is subject to any changes

in the law made before his right becomes vested by the acqui-

sition.3

Change of Remedies.

Again : the right to a particular remedy is not a vested right. This

is the general rule; and the exceptions are of those peculiar cases

in which the remedy is part of the right itself.4 As a general rule

every State has complete control over the remedies which it offers

to suitors in its courts.6 It may abolish one class of courts and

create another. It may give a new and additional remedy for a
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1 Hathorn v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 93; Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60. And see the

cases cited in the next note.

* Barbour v. Barbour, 46 Me. 9; Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 517; Noel e.

Ewing, 9 Ind. 57; Moore v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 4 Sandf. 456, and 8

N. Y. 110; Pratt v. Teflt, 14 Mich. 191; Reeve, Dom. ReL 103, note. A

doubt as to this doctrine is intimated in Dunn v. Sargeant, 101 Mass. 340.

3 Westervelt e. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 208; Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y. 273; Kelly

v. McCarthy, 3 Bradf. 7. And see Plumb v. Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351; Clark r.

McCreary, 12 S. & M. 347; Jackson t>. Lyon, 9 Cow. 664; ante, 287-292. If,

however, the wife has a right to personal property subject to a contingency, the

husband's contingent interest therein cannot be taken away by subsequent legis-

lation. Dunn v. Sargeant, 101 Mass. 336. In Sutton v. Asker, 66 N. C. 172, it

was decided that where by the statute the woman's right of dower was subject to

be defeated by the husband's conveyance, a subsequent statute restoring her

common-law rights was inoperative as to all existing marriages.

* See ante, p. 290, and cases cited. The giving of a lien by statute does not

confer a vested right, and it may be taken away by a repeal of the statute.

Watson v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157; Woodbury v. Grimes, 1

Col. 100.

4 Rosier v. Hale, 10 Iowa, 470; Smith v. Bryan, 34 Bl. 377; Lord v. Chad-

bourne, 42 Me. 429; Rockwell v. Hubbell's Adm'rs, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 197;

Cusic v. Douglas, 3 Kansas, 123; Holloway v. Sherman, 12 Iowa, 282; McCor-

mick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127.
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right already in existence.1 And it may abolish old reme-

dies and * substitute new. If a statute providing a remedy [* 362]

is repealed while proceedings are pending, such proceed-

ings will be thereby determined, unless the legislature shall other-

wise provide ;2 and if it be amended instead of repealed, the

judgment pronounced in such proceedings must be according to

the law as it then stands.3 And any rule or regulation in regard

to the remedy which does not, under pretence of modifying or regu-

lating it, take away or impair the right itself, cannot be regarded

as beyond the proper province of legislation.4

But a vested right of action is property in the same sense in

which tangible things are property, and is equally protected against

arbitrary interference. Where it springs from contract, or from

the principles of the common law, it is not competent for the leg-

islature to take it away.5 And every man is entitled to a certain

1 Hope v. Jackson, 2 Yerg. 125.; Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245; Pas-

cball v. Whitsett, 11 Ala. 472; Commonwealth v. Commissioners, &p., 6 Pick.

508; Whipple v. Farrar, 3 Mich. 436; United States v. Samperyac, 1 Hemp.

118; Sutherland v. De Leon, 1 Texas, 250; Anonymous, 2 Stew. 228. See

also Lewis e. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347; Trustees, &p. v. McCaughey, 2 Ohio,
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s. s. 152; Hepburn v. Curts, 7 Watts, 300; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36

Penn. St. 29; Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass. 303; Brackett p. Norcross, 1 Greenl.

92; Ralston p. Lothain, 18 Ind. 303; White School House v. Post, 31 Conn.

241.

1 Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley, 2 Pet. 492; Ludlow v. Jackson, 3 Ohio, 553;

Eaton v. United States, 5 Cranch, 281; Schooner Rachel v. United States, 6

Cranch, 329.

3 See cases cited in last note. Also, Commonwealth v. Duane, 1 Binney,

601; United States v. Passmore, 4 Dall. 372; Patterson p. Philbrook, 9 Mass.

151; Commonwealth v. Marshall, 11 Pick. 350; Commonwealth v. Kimball,

21 Pick. 373; Hartung v. People, 21 N. Y. 99; State v. Daley, 29 Conn. 272;

Rathbun p. Wheeler, 29 Ind. 601; State p. Norwood, 12 Md. 195; Bristol v.

Supervisors, &c, 20 Mich. 95; Sumner v. Miller, 64 N. C. 688.

4 See anie, pp. 287-292.

* Dash p. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477; Streubel v. Milwaukee and M. R. R. Co.,

12 Wis. 67; Clark p. Clark, 10 N. H. 386; Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 211;

Thornton v. Turner, 11 Minn. 339; Ward v. Brainerd, 1 Aik. -121; Keith v.

Ware, 2 Vt. 174; Lyman v. Mower, ib. 517; Kendall v. Dodge, 3 Vt. 360;

State p. Auditor, &c, 33 Mo. 287; Griffin p. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; Norris v.

Doniphan, 4 Met. (Ky.) 385; Terrill v. Rankin, 3 Bush, 453. An equitable

title to lands, of which the legal title is in the State, is under the same constitu-

tional protection that the legal title would be. Wright v. Hawkins, 28 Texas,

452. Where an individual is allowed to recover a sum as a penalty, the right

may be taken away at any time before judgment. Oriental Bank v. Freeze,
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remedy in the law for all wrongs against his person or his property,

and cannot be compelled to buy justice, or to submit to conditions

not imposed upon his fellows as a means of obtaining it.1 Nor can

a party by his misconduct so forfeit aright that it may be taken

from him without judicial proceedings in which the forfeiture shall

be declared in due form. Forfeitures of rights and property can-

not be adjudged by legislative act, and confiscations without a

judicial hearing after due notice would be void as not being due

process of law.2 Even Congress, it has been held, has no power to

protect parties assuming to act under the authority of the general

government, during the existence of a civil war, by depriving

persons illegally arrested by them of all redress in the

[* 363] courts.3 * And if the legislature cannot confiscate property

or rights, neither can it authorize individuals to assume at

6 Shep. 109; Engle r. Sehurtz, 1 Mich. 150; Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454;

Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb. 599; Welch v. Wads worth, 30 Conn. 149;

O'Kelly ». Athens Manuf. Co., 86 Geo. 51 ; United States ». Tyuen, 11 Wall.

88; Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Adler, 56 111. 350; post, 383. See also

Curtis v. Leavitt, 17 Barb. 309, and 15 N. Y. 9; Coles », Madison County,
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Breese, 115; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48 111. 881; post, 375-376.

1 Thus, a person cannot be precluded by test oaths from maintaining suits.

McFarland v. Butler, 8 Minn. 116; ante, 289,.note. See post, 368, 369, note.

* Griffin v. Mixon, 38 Miss. 434. See next note. Also Rison v. Farr, 24

Ark. 161; Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant's Cas. 406. But no constitutional

principle is violated- by a statute which allows judgment to be entered up against

a defendant who has been served with process, unless within a certain number of

days he files an affidavit of merits. Hunt v. Lucas, 97 Mass. 404.

8 Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370. In this case the act of Congress of March

3, 1863, which provided "that any order of the president or under his authority,

made at any time during the existence of the present rebellion, shall be a defence

in all courts, to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal, pending or to be

commenced, for any search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment, made, done, or

committed, or acts omitted to be done, under and by virtue of such order, or

under color of any law of Congress,"-was held to be unconstitutional. The same

decision was made in Johnson v, Jones, 44 III. 142. It was said in the first of

these cases that " this act was passed to deprive the citizens of all redress for

illegal arrests and imprisonments; it was not needed as a protection for making

such as are legal, because the common law gives ample protection for making

legal arrests and imprisonments." And it may be added that those acts which

are justified by military or martial law are equally legal with those justified by

the common law. So in Hubbard v. Brainerd, 35 Conn. 563, it was decided that

Congress could not take away a vested right to sue for and recover back an

illegal tax which had been paid under protest to a collector of the national

revenue. See also Bryan v. Walker, 64 N. C. 146. Nor can the right to have
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their option powers of police, which they may exercise in the con-

demnation and sale of property offending against their regulations,

or for the satisfaction of their charges and expenses in its manage-

ment and control, rendered or incurred without the con-

sent of its owners.1 And a statute * which authorizes a [* 364]

party to seize the property of another, without process or

a void tax sale set aside be made conditional on the payment of the illegal tax.

Wilson v. McKenna, 52 111. 44; and other cases cited, post, 368, 369, note.

The case of Norris v. Doniphan, 4 Met. (Ky.) 385, may properly be cited

in this connection. It was there held that the act of Congress of July 17.

1862, "to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize

and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes," in so far as

it undertook to authorize the confiscation of the property of citizens as a pun-

ishment for treason and other crimes, by proceedings in rem in any district in

which the property might be, without presentment and indictment by a grand

jury, without arrest or summons of the owner, and upon such evidence of his

guilt only as would be proof of any fact in admiralty or revenue cases, was

unconstitutional and void, and therefore that Congress had no power to prohibit

the State Courts from giving the owners of property seized the relief they would

he entitled to under the State laws. A statute which makes a constitutional
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right to vote depend upon an impossible condition is void. Davies v. McKeeby,

5 Nev. 369. See further State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 243; Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark.

161; Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 406. Where no express power of removal

is conferred on the executive, he cannot declare an office forfeited for mis-

behavior; but the forfeiture must be declared in judicial proceedings. Page v.

Hardin, 8 B. Monr. 648; State t>. Pritchard, Law Reg. Aug. 1873, p. 514.

1 The log-driving and booming corporations, which were authorized to be

formed under a general law in Michigan, were empowered, whenever logs or lum-

ber were put into navigable streams without adequate force and means provided

for preventing obstructions, to take charge of the same, and cause it to be run,

driven, boomed, &c, at the owner's expense ; and it gave them a lien on the same

to satisfy all just and reasonable charges, with power to sell the property for

those charges and for the expenses of sale, on notice, either served personally on

the owner, or posted as therein provided. In Ames v. Port Huron Log-Driving

and Booming Co., 11 Mich. 147, it was held that the power which this law

assumed to confer was in the nature of a public office; and Campbell, J., says:

"It is difficult to perceive by what process a public office can be obtained or

exercised without either election or appointment. The powers of government are

parcelled out by the Constitution, which certainly contemplates some official

responsibility. Every officer not expressly exempted is required to take an oath

of office as a preliminary to discharging his duties. It is absurd to suppose that

any official power can exist in any person by his own assumption, or by the

employment of some other private person; and still more so to recognize in such

an assumption a power of depriving individuals of their property. And it is

plain that the exercise of such a power is an act in its nature public, and not

private. The case, however, involves more than the assumption of control. The
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warrant, and to sell it without notification to the owner, for the

punishment of a private trespass, and in order to enforce a penalty

against the owner, can find no justification in the Constitution.1

corporation, or rather its various agents, must of necessity determine when the

case arises justifying interference; and having assumed possession, it assesses its

own charges; and having assessed them, proceeds to sell the property seized to

pay them, with the added expense of such sale. These proceedings are all ex

parte, and are all proceedings in invitum. Their validity must therefore be

determined by the rules applicable to such cases. Except in those cases where

proceedings to collect the public revenue may stand upon a peculiar footing of

their own, it is an inflexible principle of constitutional right that no person can

legally be devested of his property without remuneration, or against his will,

unless he is allowed a hearing before an impartial tribunal, where he may contest

the claim set up against him, and be allowed to meet it on the law and the facts.

When his property is wanted in specie, for public purposes, there are methods

assured to him whereby its value can be ascertained. Where a debt or penalty

or forfeiture may be eet up against him, the determination of his liability becomes

a judicial question; and all judicial functions are required by the Constitution to
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be exercised by courts of justice, or judicial officers regularly chosen. He can

only be reached through the forms of law upon a regular hearing, unless he has

by contract referred the matter to another mode of determination."

1 A statute of New York authorized any person to take into his custody and

possession any animal which might be trespassing upon his lands, and give notice

of the seizure to a justice or commissioner of highways of the town, who should

proceed to sell the animal after posting notice. From the proceeds of the sale,

the officer was to retain his fees, pay the person taking up the animal fifty cents,

and also compensation for keeping it, and the balance to the owner, if he should

claim it within a year. In Rockwell t>. Nearing, 35 N. Y. 807, 308, Porter, J.,

says of this statute: "The legislature has no authority either to deprive the cit-

izen of his property for other than public purposes, or to authorize its seizure

without process or warrant, by persons other than the owner, for the mere pun-

ishment of a private trespass. So far as the act in question relates to animals

trespassing on the premises of the captor, the proceedings it authorizes have not

even the mocking semblance of due process of law. The seizure may be pri-

vately made; the party making it is permitted to conceal the property on his own

premises; he is protected, though the trespass was due to his own connivance or

neglect; he is permitted to take what does not belong to him without notice to

the owner, though that owner is near and known; he is allowed to sell, throngh

the intervention of an officer, and without even the form of judicial proceedings,

an animal in which he has no interest by way either of title, mortgage, pledge, or

lien; and all to the end that he may receive compensation for detaining it with-

out the consent of the owner, and a fee of fifty cents for his services as an

informer. He levies without process, condemns without proof, and sells without

execution." And he distinguishes these proceedings from those in distraining

cattle, damage feasant, which are always remedial, and under which the party was

authorized to detain the property in pledge for the payment of his damages. See
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Limitation Laws.

Notwithstanding the protection which the law gives to vested

rights, it is possible for a party to debar himself of the right to

assert the same in the courts, by his own negligence or

laches. * If one who is dispossessed " be negligent for a [* 365]

long and unreasonable time, the law refuses afterwards to

lend him any assistance to recover the possession merely, both to

punish his neglect (nam leges vigilantibus, non dormientibus sub-

veniunf), and also because it is presumed that the supposed

wrong-doer has in such a length of time procured a legal title,

otherwise he would sooner have been sued."1 Statutes of limita-

tion are passed which fix upon a reasonable time within which a

party is permitted to bring suit for the recovery of his rights, and

which, on failure to do so, establish a legal presumption against

him that he has no rights in the premises. Such a statute is a

statute of repose.2 Every government is under obligation to its

citizens to afford them all needful legal remedies ;3 but it is not

bound to keep its courts open indefinitely for one who neglects or

refuses to apply for redress until it may fairly be presumed that

the means by which the other party might disprove his claim are
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lost in the lapse of time.*

When the period prescribed by statute has once run, so as to cut

also opinion by Morgan, J., in the same case, pp. 814-317, and the opinions of

the several judges in Wynehamer v. People, 18 N. Y. 895, 419, 484, and 468.

Compare Campbell v. Evans, 45 N. Y. 356; Cook v. Gregg, 46 N. Y. 439.

1 3 Bl. Com. 188; Broom, Legal Maxims, 857.

* Such a statute was formerly construed with strictness, and the defence under

it was looked upon as unconscionable, and not favored; but Mr. Justice Story

has well said, it has often been matter of regret in modern times that the deci-

sions had not proceeded upon principles better adapted to carry into effect the

real objects of the statute; that instead of being viewed in an unfavorable light

as an unjust and discreditable defence, it had not received such support as would

have made it what it was intended to be, emphatically a statute of repose. It is

a wise and beneficial law, not designed merely to raise a presumption of pay-

ment of a just debt from lapse of time, but to afford security against State

demands after the true state of the transaction may have been forgotten, or be

incapable of explanation by reason of the death or removal of witnesses. Bell

v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 360. See Leffingwell v. Warren,^ Black, 599.

3 Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430.

* Beal v. Nason, 2 Shep. 344; Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 860; Stearns e. Git-

tings, 23 111. 387; State r. Jones, 21 Md. 437.
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[ch. n.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

off the remedy which one might have had for the recovery of

property in the possession of another, the title to the property,

irrespective of the original right, is regarded in the law as vested

in the possessor, who is entitled to the same protection in respect

to it which the owner is entitled to in other cases. A subsequent

repeal of the limitation law could not be given a retroactive effect,

so as to disturb this title.1 It is vested as completely and per-

fectly, and is as safe from legislative interference as it would have

been if it had been perfected in the owner by grant, or any species

of assurance.2

All limitation laws, however, must proceed on the theory that

the party, by lapse of time and omissions on his part, has forfeited

his right to assert his title in the law.3 Where they relate

[* 366] to * property, it seems not to be essential that the adverse

claimant should be in actual possession;4 but one who is

himself in the legal enjoyment of his property cannot have his

rights therein forfeited to another, for failure to bring suit against

that other within a time specified to test the validity of a claim
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which the latter asserts, but takes no steps to enforce. It has

consequently been held that a statute which, after a lapse of five

years, makes a recorded deed purporting to be executed under a

statutory power conclusive evidence of a good title, could not be

1 Brent v. Chapman, 5 Cranch, 358; Newby's Adm'rs v. Blakey, 3 H. & M.

57; Parish v. Eager, 15 Wis. 582; Baggs's Appeal, 43 Penn. St. 512; Leffing-

well v. Warren, 2 Black, 599. See cases cited in next note.

• See Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 249; Sprecker v. Wakelee, 11 Wis. 432;

Pleasants v. Rohrer, 17 Wis. 657; Moor v. Lisce, 29 Penn. St. 262; Morton t.

Sharkey, MeCabon (Kan.), 113; McKinney v. Springer, 8Blackf. 506; Stippr.

Brown, 2 Ind. 647; Wires ». Farr, 25 Vt. 41; Davis v. Minor, 1 How. (Miss.)

183; Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396; Lewis v. Webb, 3 Greenl. 326; Woartr.

Winnick, 3 N. H. 473; Martin v. Martin, 35 Ala. 560; Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Vt.

86; Thompson v. Caldwell, 3 Lit. 137; Wright v. Oakley, 5 Met. 400; Couch e.

McKee, 1 Eng. 495; Atkinson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. Ill; Girdner v. Stephens, 1

Heis. 280; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 700; Bradford r. Shine's Adm'r, 13 Fla. 393; s. c.

7 Am. Rep. 239. But the statute of limitations may be suspended for a period

as to demands not already barred. Wardlaw v. Buzzard, 15 Rich. 158; Caper-

ton o. Martin, 4 W. Va. 138; 8. c. 6 Am. Rep. 270; Bender v. Crawford, 83

Tex. 745; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 27Ch

'Stearns v. Gittings, 23 111. 389; per Walker, J., Sturgis v. Crowninshiekl,

4 Wheat. 207, per Marshall, Ch. J.; Pearce ». Patton, 7 B. Monr. 162; Griffin

v. McKenzie, 7 Geo. 163; Coleman v. Holmes, 44 Ala. 125.

* Stearns v. Gittings, 23 111. 389; Hill v. Kricke, 11 Wis. 442.
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valid as a limitation law against the original owner in possession of

the land. Limitation laws cannot compel a resort to legal pro-

ceedings by one who is already in the complete enjoyment of all

he claims.1

All statutes of limitation, also, must proceed on the idea that

the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the

courts. A statute could not bar the existing right of claimants

without affording this opportunity: if it should attempt to do so, it

would be not a statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to

extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its

provisions. It is essential that such statutes allow a reasonable

time after they take effect for the commencement of suits upon

existing causes of action ;2 though what shall be considered a

1 Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329. In Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12, it was

held that this statute could not be enforced as a limitation law in favor of the

party in possession, inasmuch as it did not proceed on the idea of limiting the

time for bringing suit, but by a conclusive rule of evidence sought to pass over

the property to the claimant under the statutory sale in all cases, irrespective

of possession. See also Baker v. Kelly, 11 Minn. 480. The case of Leffingwell

r. Warren, 2 Black, 599, is contra. That case follows Wisconsin decisions. In the
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leading case of Hill v. Kricke, 11 Wis. 442, the holder of the original title was not

in possession; and what was decided was that it was not necessary for the holder

of the tax title to be in possession in order to claim the benefit of the statute;

ejectment against a claimant being permitted by law when the lands were unoc-

cupied. This circumstance of possession or want of possession in the person

whose right is to be extinguished seems to us of vital importance. How can a

man justly be held guilty of laches in not asserting claims to property, when he

already possesses and enjoys the property? The old maxim is, " That which was

originally void cannot by mere lapse of time be made valid;" and if a void claim

by force of an act of limitation can ripen into a conclusive title as against the

owner in possession, the policy underlying that species of legislation must be

something beyond what has been generally supposed.

* So held of a statute which took effect some months after its passage, and

which, in its operation upon certain classes of cases, would have extinguished

adverse claims unless asserted by suit before the act took effect. Price v. Hop-

kin, 13 Mich. 318. See also Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 423; Proprietors, &c. v.

Laboree, 2 Greenl. 294; Society, &c. v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 141; Blackford v.

Peltier, 1 Blackf. 36; Thornton v. Turner, 11 Minn. 839; Osborn v. Jaines, 17

Wis. 573; Morton v. Sharkey, McCahon (Kan.), 113; Berry v. Ramsdell, 4

Met. (Ky.) 296. In the last case cited it was held that a statute which only

allowed thirty days in which to bring action on an existing demand was unreason-

able and void. And see what is said in Auld v. Butcher, 2 Kansas, 135. But a

statute giving a new remedy against a railroad company for an injury, may limit

to a short time, e.g., six months, the time for bringing suit. O'Bannon v. Louis-

ville, &c., R. R. Co., 8 Bush, 318.
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reasonable time must be settled by the judgment of the

[* 367] legislature, into the wisdom of * whose decision in estab-

lishing the period of legal bar it does not pertain to the

jurisdiction of the courts to inquire.1

Alterations in the Rules of Evidence.

It must also be evident that a right to have one's controversia

determined by existing rules of evidence is not a vested right. These

rules pertain to the remedies which the State provides for its

citizens; and generally in legal contemplation they neither enter

into and constitute a part of any contract, nor can be regarded as

being of the essence of any right which a party may seek to

enforce. Like other rules affecting the remedy, they must there-

fore at all times be subject to modification and control by the

legislature;2 and the changes which are enacted may lawfully be

made applicable to existing causes of action, even in those States

in which retrospective laws are forbidden. For the law as changed

would only prescribe rules for presenting the evidence in legal

controversies in the future; and it could not therefore be called

retrospective even though some of the controversies upon which it
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may act were in progress before. It has accordingly been held in

New Hampshire that a statute which removed the disqualification

of interest, and allowed parties to suits to testify, might lawfully

apply to existing causes of action.3 So may a statute which mod-

1 Stearns v. Gittings, 23 HI. 387 ; Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430; Smith v.

Morrison, 22 Pick. 430 ; Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318 ; De Moss v. Newton,

31 Ind. 219. But see Berry v. Ramsdell, cited in preceding note.

It may be remarked here, that statutes of limitation do not apply to the State

unless they so provide expressly. Gibson c. Choteau, 13 Wall. 92. And State

limitation laws do not apply to the United States. United States v. Hoar, 2

Mas. 311 ; People v. Gilbert, 18 Johns. 228. And it has been held that the

right to maintain a nuisance cannot be acquired under the statute. State v.

Franklin Falls Co., 49 N. H. 240.

* Kendall v. Kingston, 5 Mass. 533 ; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 319, per

Marshall, Ch. J.; Fales v. Wadsworth, 23 Me. 533; Karney v. Paisley, 13 Iowa,

89 ; Commonwealth i>. Williams, 6 Gray, 1 ; Hickox v. Tallman, 38 Barb. 608;

Webb v. Den, 17 How. 576; Pratt v. Jones, 25 Vt. 303. See ante, p. 288 and

note.

3 Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 323. A very full and satisfactory examination of

the whole subject will be found in this case. To the same effect is Southwick v.

Southwick, 49 N. Y. 510.
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ifies the common-law rule excluding parol evidence to vary the

terms of a written contract;1 and a statute making the protest of

a promissory note evidence of the facts therein stated.2 These and

the like cases will sufficiently illustrate the general rule, that the

whole subject is under the control of the legislature, which pre-

scribes such rules for the trial and determination as well of exist-

ing as of future rights and controversies as in its judgment will

most completely subserve the ends of justice.8

* A strong instance in illustration of legislative control [* 368]

over evidence will be found in the laws of some of the States

in regard to conveyances of lauds upon sales to satisfy delinquent

taxes. Independent of special statutory rule on the subject, such

conveyances would not be evidence of title. They are executed

under a statutory power; and it devolves upon the claimant under

them to show that the successive steps which under the statute lead

to such conveyance have been taken. But it cannot be doubted that

this rule may be so changed as to make a tax deed prima facie

evidence that all the proceedings have been regular, and that the

purchaser has acquired under them a complete title.4 The burden

of proof is thereby changed from one party to the other; the legal
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presumption which the statute creates in favor of the purchaser

being sufficient, in connection with the deed, to establish his case,

unless it is overcome by countervailing testimony. Statutes making

defective records evidence of valid conveyances are of a similar

nature; and these usually, perhaps always, have reference to

records before made, and provide for making them competent

evidence where before they were merely void.6 But they devest no

title, and are not even retrospective in character. They merely

establish what the legislature regards as a reasonable and just rule

1 Gibbs v. Gale, 7 Md. 76.

* Fales v. Wadsworth, 23 Me. 553.

* Per Marshall, Cb. J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 249; Webb v.

Den, 17 How. 577; Delaplaine v. Cook, 7 Wis. 54 ; Kendall v. Kingston, 5

Mass. 534 ; Fowler v. Chatterton, 6 Bing. 258.

* Hand «. Ballou, 12 N. Y. 543; Forbes v. Halsey, 26 N. Y. 53; Delaplaine

t>. Cook, 7 Wis. 54; Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508; Adams ». Beale, 19

Iowa, 61; Amberg v. Rogers, 9 Mich. 332; Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 289;

Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; Wright r. Dunham, 13 Michigan, 414; Abbott ».

Lindenbower, 42 Mo. 162; e.c. 46 Mo. 291. The rule once established may be

abolished, even as to existing deeds. Hickox r. Tallman, 38 Barb. 608.

5 See Webb v. Den, 17 How. 577.

[427]

* 368 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XL

\

for the presentation by the parties of their rights before the courts

in the future.

But there are fixed bounds to the power of the legislature over

this subject which cannot be exceeded. As to what shall be evi-

dence, and which party shall assume the burden of proof in civil

cases, its authority is practically unrestricted, so long as its regu-

lations are impartial and uniform; but it has no power to establish

rules which, under pretence of regulating the presentation of evi-

dence, go so far as altogether to preclude a party from exhibiting

his rights. Except in those cases which fall within the familiar

doctrine of estoppel at the common law, or other cases resting

upon the like reasons, it would not, we apprehend, be in the power

of the legislature to declare that a particular item of evidence

should preclude a party from establishing his rights in opposition

to it. In judicial investigations the law of the laud

[* 369J requires an opportunity for a trial;1 and there * can be no

trial if only one party is suffered to produce his proofs.

The most formal conveyance may be a fraud or a forgery; public

officers may connive with rogues to rob the citizen of his property:

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

witnesses may testify or officers certify falsely, and records may be

collusively manufactured for dishonest purposes; and that legisla-

tion which would preclude the fraud or wrong being shown, aud

deprive the party wronged of all remedy, has no justification in

the principles of natural justice or of constitutional law. A statute,

therefore, which should make a tax-deed conclusive evidence of a

complete title, and preclude the owner of the original title from

showing its invalidity, would be void, because being not a law reg-

ulating evidence, but an unconstitutional confiscation of property.2

1 Tift r. Griffin, 5 Geo. 185; Lenz v. Charlton, 23 Wis 482; Conway t.

Cable, 37 111. 89; ante, 362, note; post, 382-83 and notes.

* Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329 j Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 13; White r.

Flynn, 23 Ind. 46; Corbin v. Hill, 21 Iowa, 70; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo.

102; s. c. 46 Mo. 291. And see the well-reasoned case of McCready v. Sexton,

29 Iowa, 356. Also, Wright ». Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev. 349. As to how far the

legislature may make the tax deed conclusive evidence that mere irregularities

have not intervened in the proceedings, see Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis. 556;

Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508. Undoubtedly the legislature may dispense

with mere matters of form in the proceedings as well after they have taken place

as before; but this is quite a different thing from making tax deeds conclusive

on points material to the interest of the property owner. See, further, Wantlan

r. White, 19 Ind. 470; People v. Mitchell, 45 Barb. 212; McCready v. Sexton,
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And a statute which should make the certificate or opinion of an

officer conclusive evidence of the illegality of an existing contract

would be equally nugatory ;1 though perhaps if parties should

enter into a contract in view of such a statute then existing, its

provisions might properly be regarded as assented to and incorpo-

rated in their contract, and therefore binding upon them.2

Retrospective Laws.

Regarding the circumstances under which a man may be said to

hare a vested right to a defence against a demand made by another,

it is somewhat difficult to lay down a comprehensive rule which

the authorities wiH justify. It is certain that he who lias satisfied

a demand cannot have it revived against him, and he who has

become released from a demand by the operation of the statute,

of limitations is equally protected.3 In botli cases the demand is

mpra. It is not competent for the legislature to compel an owner of land to

redeem it from a void tax sale as a condition on which he shall be allowed to

assert his title against it. Conway v. Cable, 37 111. 82; Hart v. Henderson, 17

Mich. 218; Wilson v. McKenna, 52 111. 44; Reed v. Tyler, 56 111. 292; Dean v.

Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 236. But it seems that if the tax purchaser has paid taxes

and made improvements, the payment for these may be made a condition prece-
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dent to a suit in ejectment against him. Pope v. Macon, 23 Ark. C44. The case

of Wright p. Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev. 349, is valuable in this connection. "We

apprehend," says Beatty, Ch. J., " that it is beyond the power of the legislature

to restrain a defendant in any suit from setting up a good defence to an action

against him. The legislature could not directly take the property of A. to pay

the taxes of B. Neither can it indirectly do so by depriving A. of the right of

setting up in his answer that his separate property has been jointly assessed with

that of B., and asserting his right to pay his own taxes without being encumbered

with those of B. . . . Due process of law not only requires that a party shall

be properly brought into court, but that he shall have the opportunity when in

court to establish any fact which, according to the usages of the common law

or the provisions of the Constitution, would be a protection to him or his prop-

erty." See Taylor v. Miles, 5 Kansas, 498; S.c. 7 Am. Rep. 558.

1 Young v. Beardsley, 11 Paige, 93. An act to authorize persons whose sheep

are killed by dogs, to present their claim to the selectmen of the town for allowance

and payment by the town, and giving the town after payment an action against

the owner of the dog for the amount so paid, is void, as taking away trial by

jury, and as authorizing the selectmen to pass upon one's rights without giving

him an opportunity to be heard. East Kingston t>. Towle, 48 N. H. 57; 8. c.

2 Am. Rep. 174.

* See post, p. 408, note.

'Ante, p. 865, note 5, and cases cited.
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gone, and to restore it would be to create a new contract for the

parties, — a thing quite beyond the power of legislation. So he

who was never bound, either legally or equitably, cannot have a

demand created against him by mere legislative enactment.1 But

there are many cases in which, by existing laws, defences based

upon mere informalities are allowed in suits upon contracts, or in

respect to legal proceedings, in some of which a regard to sub-

stantial justice would warrant the legislature in interfering to lake

away the defence if it possesses the power to do so.

[* 370] * In regard to these cases, we think investigation of the

authorities will show that a party has no vested right

in a defence based upon an informality not affecting his substantial

equities. And this brings us to a particular examination of a class

of statutes which is constantly coming under the consideration of

the courts, and which are known as retrospective laws, by reason

of their reaching back to and giving some different legal effect to

some previous transaction to that which it had under the law when

it took place.

There are numerous cases which hold that retrospective laws are

not obnoxious to constitutional objection, while in others they have
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been held to be void. The different decisions have been based

upon diversities in the facts which make different principles appli-

cable. There is no doubt of the right of the legislature to pass

statutes which reach back to and change or modify the effect of

prior transactions, provided retrospective laws are not forbidden,

eo nomine by the State constitution, and provided further that no

other objection exists to them than their retrospective character.'

Nevertheless legislation of this character is exceedingly liable to

abuse; and it is a sound rule of construction that a statute should

have a prospective operation only, unless its terms show clearly a

legislative intention that it should operate retrospectively.3 And

1 In Medford v. Learned, 16 Mass. 215, it was held that where a pauper had

received support from the parish, to which by law he was entitled, a subsequent

legislative act could not make him liable by suit to refund the cost of the sup-

port. This case was approved and followed in People v. Supervisors of Columbia,

43 N. Y. 135. See ante, p. 362, and note.

• Thornton p. McGrath, 1 Duvall, 849; State p. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; Beach

v. Walker, 6 Conn. 197; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St. 57.

1 Dash v. Vankleek, 7 Johns. 477; Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y. 273; Plumb v.

Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351; Whitman v. Hapgood, 13 Mass. 464; Medford v. Learned,

16 Mass. 215; Bay v. Gage, 86 Barb. 447; Watkin* v. Haight, 18 John*. 138;
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some of the States have deemed it just and wise to forbid such

laws altogether by their constitutions.1

* A retrospective statute curing defects in legal pro- [* 371]

ceedings where they are in their nature irregularities only,

and do not extend to matters of jurisdiction, is not void on consti-

tutional grounds, unless expressly forbidden. Of this class are

the statutes to cure irregularities in the assessment of property

for taxation and the levy of taxes thereon;2 irregularities in the

Garrett p. Beaumont, 24 Miss. 377; Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Vt. 86; Perkins v.

Perkins, 7 Conn. 558; Hastings v. Lane, 3 Shep. 134; Guard p. Rowan, 2 Scam.

499; Sayre p. Wisner, 8 Wend. 661; Quackenbos p. Danks, 1 Denio, 128; Gar-

rett p. Doe, 1 Scam. 335; Thompson p. Alexander, 11 111. 64; State p. Barbee,

3 Ind. 258; Allbyer v. State, 10 Ohio, n. s. 588; State p. Atwood, 11 Wis. 422;

Bartruff v. Remey, 15 Iowa, 257; Tyson p. School Directors, 61 Penn. St. 9;

Colony v. Dublin, 32 N. H. 432; Torrey p. Corliss, 32 Me. 33; Atkinson v. Dun-

lop, 50 Me. Ill; Ex parte Graham, 13 Rich. 277; Hubbard p. Brainerd, 35

Conn. 576; Conway v. Cable, 37 111. 82; Clark v. Baltimore, 29 Md. 277;

Williams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 500; State p. The Auditor, 41 Mo. 25; Merwin p.

Bullard, 66 N. C. 398; Haley p. Philadelphia, 68 Penn. St. 137; s. c. 8 Am.

Rep. 163; Bennett v. Fisher, 26 Iowa, 497.
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1 See the provision in the Constitution of New Hampshire, considered in

Woart v. Winnick, 3 N. H. 481; Clark p. Clark, 10 N. H. 386; Willard v. Har-

vey, 24 N. H. 351; and Rich p. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304; and that in the Consti-

tution of Texas, in De Cordova p. Galveston, 4 Texas, 470. The Constitution

of Ohio provides that "the General Assembly shall have no power to pass retro-

active laws, or laws impairing the obligation of contracts; provided, however,

that the General Assembly may, by general laws, authorize the courts to carry

into effect the manifest intention of parties and officers, by curing omissions,

defects, and errors in instruments and proceedings, arising out of their want of

conformity with the laws of this State, and upon such terms as shall be just and

equitable." Under this clause it was held competent for the General Assembly

to pass an act authorizing the courts to correct mistakes in deeds of married

women previously executed, whereby they were rendered ineffectual. Goshorn

t. Purcell, 11 Ohio, N. 8. 641. Under a provision in the Constitution of Ten-

nessee that no retrospective law shall be passed, it has been held that a law

authorizing a bill to be filed by slaves, by their next friend, to emancipate them,

although it applied to cases which arose before its passage, was not a retrospective

law within the meaning of this clause. Fisher's Negroes p. Dobbs, 6 Yerg. 119.

An act for the payment of bounties for past services was held not retrospective in

State v. Richland, 20 Ohio, N. s. 369. See further, Society p. Wheeler, 2 Gall.

105; Officer p. Young, 5 Yerg. 320.

That the legislature cannot retrospectively construe statutes and bind parties

thereby, see ante p. 93 et seq.

• Butler p. Toledo, 5 Ohio, n. 8. 225; Strauch p. Shoemaker, 1 W. & S. 175;

McCoy p. Michew, 7 W. & S. 390; Montgomery p. Meredith, 17 Penn. St. 42;
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organization or elections of corporations;1 irregularities in the

votes or other action by municipal corporations, or the like, where

a statutory power has failed of due and regular execution through

the carelessness of officers, or other cause ;2 irregular proceedings

in courts, &c.

The rule applicable to cases of this description is substantially

the following: If the thing wanting, or which failed to be done,

and which constitutes the defect in the proceedings, is something

the necessity for which the legislature might have dispensed with

by prior statute, then it is not beyond the power of the legislature

to dispense with it by subsequent statute. And if the irregularity

consists in doing some act, or in the mode or manner of doing

some act which the legislature might have made immaterial by

prior law, it is equally competent to make the same immaterial by

a subsequent law.

A few of the decided cases will illustrate this principle. In

Kearney v. Taylor3 a sale of real estate belonging to infant tenants

in common had been made by order of court in a partition suit,
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and the land bid off by a company of persons, who proposed subdi-

viding and selling it in parcels. The sale was confirmed in their

names, but by mutual arrangement the deed was made to one only,

for convenience in selling and conveying. This deed failed to

convey the title, because not following the sale. The legislature

afterwards passed an act providing that, on proof being made to

the satisfaction of the court or jury before which such deed was

offered in evidence that the land was sold fairly and with-

in* 372] out fraud, *and the deed executed in good faith and for

a sufficient consideration, and with the consent of the

Dunden v. Snodgrass, 18 Penn. St. 151; Williston v. Colkett, 9 Penn. St. 38;

Boardman v. Beckwith, 18 Iowa, 292. And see Walter v. Bacon, 8 Mass. 472;

Locke r. Dane, 9 Mass. 360; Patterson v. Philbrook, 9 Mass. 153; Trustees r.

McCaughy, 2 Ohio, n. s. 152. The right to provide for a reassessment of taxes

irregularly levied is undoubted. See Brevoot v. Detroit, 23 Mich. 322; State

v. Newark, 34 N. J. 237; Musselraan v. Logansport, 29 Ind. 533. But, of course,

if the vice is in the nature of the tax itself, it will continue and be fatal, however

often the process of assessment may be repeated. See post, 382.

1 Syracuse Bank o. Davis, 16 Barb. 188; Mitchell v. Deeds, 49 111. 416.

• See Menges v. Wertman, 1 Penn. St. 218; Yost's Report, 17 Penn. St. 524;

Bennett v. Fisher, 26 Iowa, 497; Allen e. Archer, 49 Me. 346; Commonwealth

v. Marshall, 69 Penn. St. 328; State v. Union, 4 Vroom, 250.

* 15 How. 494. And see Boyce v. Siuclair, 3 Bush, 261.
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persons reported as purchasers, the deed should have the same

effect as though it had been made to the purchasers. That this

act was unobjectionable in principle was not denied; and it cannot

be doubted that a prior statute, authorizing the deed to be made to

one for the benefit of all and with their assent, would have been

open to no valid objection.1

In certain Connecticut cases it was insisted that sales made of

real estate on execution were void, because the officer had included

in the amount due several small items of fees not allowed by law.

It appeared, however, that, after the sales were made, the legislat-

ure had passed an act providing that no levy should be deemed

void by reason of the officer having included greater fees than

were by law allowable, but that all such levies, not in other respects

defective, should be valid and effectual to transmit the title of the

real estate levied upon. The liability of the officer for receiving

more than his legal fees was at ,the same time left unaffected. In

the leading case the court say: "The law, undoubtedly, is retro-

spective; but is it unjust? All the charges of the officer on the

execution in question are perfectly reasonable, and for necessary

services in the performance of his duty; of consequence they

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

are eminently just; and so is the act confirming the levies. A

law, although it be retrospective, if conformable to entire jus-

tice, this court has repeatedly decided is to be recognized and

enforced." 2

In another Connecticut case it appeared that certain marriages

had been celebrated by persons in the ministry who were not

empowered to perform that ceremony by the State law, and that

the marriages were therefore invalid. The legislature had after-

wards passed an act declaring all such marriages valid, and the

court sustained the act. It was assailed as an exercise of the

1 See Davis r. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316, and Lucas v. Tucker, 17 Ind. 41, for

decisions under statutes curing irregular sales by guardians and executors. In

many of the States general laws will be found providing that such sales shall not

be defeated by certain specified defects and irregularities.

* Beach v. Walker, 6 Conn. 197; Booth v. Booth, 7 Conn. 850. And see

Mather v. Chapman, 6 Conn. 54; Norton v. Pettibone, 7 Conn. 319; Welch v.

Wadaworth, 30 Conn. 149; Smith o. Merchand's Ex'rs, 7 S. & R. 260; Under-

wood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R. 97; Bleakney v. Bank of Greencastle, 17 S. & R. 64;

Menges v. Wertman, 1 Penn. St. 218; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penu. St. 474; Ahl

r. Gleim, 52 Penn. St. 432; Selsby v. Redlon, 19 Wis. 17; Parmelee v. Law-

rence, 48 111. 331.
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\

judicial power; but this it clearly was not, as it purported to settle

no controversies, and merely sought to give effect to the desire of

the parties, which they had ineffectually attempted to carry out by

means of the ceremony which proved insufficient. And while it

was not claimed that the act was void in so far as it made

[* 373] effectual the legal relation * of matrimony between the par-

ties, it was nevertheless insisted that rights of property

dependent upon that relation could not be affected by it, inasmuch

as, in order to give such rights, it must operate retrospectively.

The court in disposing of the case are understood to express the

opinion that, if the legislature possesses the power to validate an

imperfect marriage, still more clearly does it have power to affect

incidental rights. "The man and the woman were unmarried,

notwithstanding the formal ceremony which passed between them,

and free in point of law to live in celibacy, or contract marriage

with any other persons at pleasure. It is a strong exercise of

power to compel two persons to marry without their consent, and

a palpable perversion of strict legal right. At the same time the

retrospective law thus far directly operating on vested rights is
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admitted to be unquestionably valid, because manifestly just."1

It is not to be inferred from this language that the court under-

stood the legislature to possess power to select individual mem-

bers of the community, and force them into a relation of marriage

with each other against their will. That complete control which

the legislature is supposed to possess over the domestic relations

can hardly extend so far. The legislature may perhaps divorce

parties, with or without cause, according to its own view of jus-

tice or public policy; but for the legislature to marry parties

against their consent, we conceive to be decidedly against "the

law of the land." The learned court must be understood as

speaking here with exclusive reference to the case at bar, in which

the legislature, by the retrospective act, were merely removing a

formal impediment to that marriage which the parties had assented

to, and which they had attempted to form. Such an act, unless

special circumstances conspired to make it otherwise, would cer-

tainly be "manifestly just," and therefore might well be held

1 Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 224, per Hosmer, J. The power to validate

void marriages held not to exist in the legislature where, by the constitution, the

whole subject was referred to the courts. White v. White, 105 Mass. 325.
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"unquestionably valid." And if the marriage was rendered valid,

the legal incidents would follow of course. In a Pennsylvania

case the validity of certain grading and paving assessments was

involved, and it was argued that they were invalid for the reason

that the city ordinance under which they had been made was inop-

erative, because not recorded as required by law. But the legislat-

ure had passed an act to validate this ordinance, and had declared

therein that the omission to record the ordinance should not affect

or impair the lien of the assessments against the lot owners. In

passing upon the validity of this act, the court express the following

views: "Whenever there is a right, though imperfect, the consti-

tution does not prohibit the legislature from giving a remedy. In

Hepburn v. Curts,1 it was said, ' The legislature, provided it does

not violate the constitutional provisions, may pass retro-

spective laws, * such as in their operation may affect suits [* 374]

pending, and give to a party a remedy which he did not

previously possess, or modify an existing remedy, or remove an

impediment in the way of legal proceedings.' What more has

been done in this case? . . . While (the ordinance) was in force,

contracts to do the work were made in pursuance of it, and the
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liability of the city was incurred. But it was suffered to become

of no effect by the failure to record it. Notwithstanding this, the

grading and paving were done, and the lots of the defendants

received the benefit at the public expense. Now can the omission

to record the ordinance diminish the equitable right of the public

to reimbursement? It is at most but a formal defect in the remedy

provided, — an oversight. That such defects may be cured by

retroactive legislation need not be argued." 2

On the same principle legislative acts validating invalid contracts

have been sustained. When these acts go no farther than to bind

a party by a contract which he has attempted to enter into, but

which was invalid by reason of some personal inability on his part

to make it, or through neglect of some legal formality, or in con-

1 7 Watts, 300.

* Schenley p. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St. 29, 57. See also State v. Newark,

8 Dutch. 185; Den v. Downam, 1 Green (N. J.), 185; People v. Seymour, 16

Cal. 332; Grim v. Weisenburg School District, 57 Penn. St. 433; State v. Union,

33 N. J. 355. The legislature has the same power to ratify and confirm an ille-

gally appointed corporate body that it has to create a new one. Mitchell v.

Deeds, 49 111. 416.
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sequence of some ingredient in the contract forbidden by law, the

question which they suggest is one of policy, and not of constitu-

tional power.

By statute of Ohio, all bonds, notes, bills, or contracts negotiable

or payable at any unauthorized bank, or made for the purpose of

being discounted at any such bank, were declared to be void.

While this statute was in force a note was made for the purpose of

being discounted atone of these institutions, and was actually dis-

counted by it. Afterwards the legislature passed an act, reciting

that many persons were indebted to such bank, by bonds, bills,

notes, <fec, and that owing, among other things, to doubts of its

right to recover its debts, it was unable to meet its own obligations,

and had ceased business, and for the purpose of winding up its

affairs had made an assignment to a trustee; therefore the said act

authorized the said trustee to bring suits on the said bonds, bills,

notes, &c, and declared it should not be lawful for the defendants

in such suits " to plead, set up, or insist upon, in defence, that the

notes, bonds, bills, or other written evidences of such indebtedness
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are void on account of being contracts against or in viola-

[* 375] tion of any statute * law of this State, or on account of

their being contrary to public policy." This law was sus-

tained as a law " that contracts may be enforced," and as in further-

ance of equity and good morals.1 The original invalidity was only

becauso of the statute, and that statute was founded upon reasons

of public policy which had either ceased to be of force, or which

the legislature regarded as overborne by countervailing reasons.

Under these circumstances it was reasonable and just that the

makers of such paper should be precluded from relying upon such

invalidity.2

1 Lewis v. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347.

* Trustees v. McCaughy, 2 Ohio, n. s. 155; Johnson r. Bentley, 16 Ohio, 97.

See also Syracuse Bank v. Davis, 16 Barb. 188. By statute, notes issued by

unincorporated banking associations were declared void. This statute was after-

wards repealed, and action was brought against bankers on notes previously

issued. Objection being taken that the legislature could not validate the void

contracts, the judge says: "I will consider this case on the broad ground of the

contract having been void when made, and of no new contract having arisen since

the repealing act. But by rendering the contract void it was not annihilated.

The object of the [original] act was not to vest any right in any unlawful banking

association, but directly the reverse. The motive was not to create a privilege,

or shield them from the payment of their just debts, but to restrain them from

CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 375

By a statute of Connecticut, where loans of money were made,

and a bonus was paid by the borrower over and beyond the interest

and bonus permitted by law, the demand was subject to a deduc-

tion from the principal of all the interest and bonus paid. A

construction appears to have been put upon this statute by business

men which was different from that afterwards given by the courts;

and a large number of contracts of loan were in consequence

subject to the deduction. The legislature then passed a " healing

act," which provided that such loans theretofore made should not

be held, by reason of the taking of such bonus, to be usurious,

illegal, or in any respect void; but that, if otherwise legal, they

were thereby confirmed, and declared to be valid, as to

principal, interest, and * bonus. The case of Goshen v. [* 376]

Stonington1 was regarded as sufficient authority in sup-

port of this act; and the principle to be derived from that case

was stated to be "that where a statute is expressly retroactive,

and the object and effect of it is to correct an innocent mistake,

remedy a mischief, execute the intention of the parties, and pro-

mote justice, then, both as a matter of right and of public policy

affecting the peace and welfare of the community, the law should
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be sustained." 2

violating the law by destroying the credit of their paper, and punishing those

who received it. How then can the defendants complain? As unauthorized

bankers they were violators of the law, and objects not of protection but of pun-

ishment. The repealing act was a statutory pardon of the crime committed by

the receivers of this illegal medium. Might not the legislature pardon the crime,

without consulting those who committed it? . . . How can the defendants say

there was no contract, when the plaintiff produces their written engagement for

the performance of a duty, binding in conscience if not in law P Although the

contract, for reasons of policy, was so far void that an action could not be sus-

tained on it, yet a moral obligation to perform it, whenever those reasons ceased,

remained; and it would be going very far to say that the legislature may not add

a legal sanction to that obligation, on account of some fancied constitutional

restriction." Hess v. Werts, 4 S. & R. 361. See also Bleakney v. Bank of

Greencastle, 17 S. & R. 64; Menges v. Wertman, 1 Penn. St. 218; Boyce v.

Sinclair, 3 Bush, 264.

1 4 Conn. 224. See ante, p. 272-3.

s Savings Bank v. Allen, 28 Conn. 97. See also Savings Bank v. Bates,

8 Conn. 505; Andrews t>. Russell, 7 Blackf. 474; Grimes v. Doe, 8 Blackf. 371;

Thompson v. Morgan, 6 Minn. 292; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48 111. 331. In

Curtis v. Leavitt, 17 Barb. 309, and 15 N. Y. 9, a statute forbidding the inter-

position of the defence of usury was treated as a statute repealing a penalty.

See, further, Wilson v. Hardesty, 1 Md. Ch. 66; Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn.
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After the courts of the State of Pennsylvania had decided ttut

the relation of landlord and tenant could not exist in that State

under a Connecticut title, a statute was passed which provided that

the relation of landlord and tenant "shall exist and be held as

fully and effectually between Connecticut settlers and Pennsylva-

nia claimants as between other citizens of this commonwealth, on

the trial of any case now pending or hereafter to be brought within

this commonwealth, any law or usage to the contrary notwithstand-

ing." In a suit which was pending and had been once tried before

the statute was passed, the statute was sustained by the Supreme

Court of that State, and afterwards by the Supreme Court of the

United States, into which last-mentioned court it had been removed

on the allegation that it violated the obligation of contracts. As its

purpose and effect was to remove from contracts which the parties

had made a legal impediment to their enforcement, there would

seem to be no doubt, in the light of the other authorities we have

referred to, that the conclusion reached was the only just and proper

one.1

In the State of Ohio, certain deeds made by married women were

ineffectual for the purposes of record and evidence, by reason of
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the omission on the part of the officer taking the acknowledgment

to state in his certificate that, before and at the time of the grantor

making the acknowledgment, he made the contents known to her

by reading or otherwise. An act was afterwards passed which

provided that " any deed heretofore executed pursuant to

[* 377] * law, by husband and wife, shall be received in evidence

in any of the courts of this State, as conveying the estate

of the wife, although the magistrate taking the acknowledgment of

such deed shall not have certified that he read or made known the

contents of such deed before or at the time she acknowledged the

execution thereof." This statute, though with some hesitation at

first, was held to be unobjectionable. The deeds with the defective

acknowledgments were regarded by the legislature and by the court

149; Wood v. Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68; Washburn t>. Franklin, 35 Barb. 599; Par-

melee v. Lawrence, 48 111. 331. The case of Gilliland v. Phillips, 1 S. C. n. s.

152, is contra; but it discusses the point but little, and makes no reference to

these cases.

1 Satterlee v. Mathewson, 16 S. & R. 169, and 2 Pet. 380. And see Watson

v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Lessee of Dulany v. Tilghman, 6 G. & J. 461; Payne r.

Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220; Maxey v. Wise, 25 Ind. 1.
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as being sufficient for the purpose of conveying at least the grantor's

equitable estate; and if sufficient for this purpose, no vested rights

would be disturbed, or wrong be done, by making them receivable

in evidence as conveyances.1

Other cases go much farther than this, and hold that, although

the deed was originally ineffectual for the purpose of conveying the

title, the healing statute may accomplish the intent of the parties by

giving it effect.2 At first sight these cases might seem to go beyond

the mere confirmation of a contract, and to be at least techni-

cally objectionable, as depriving a party of property * with- [* 378]

out an opportunity for trial, inasmuch as they proceeded

upon the assumption that the title still remained in the grantor, and

that the healing act was required for the purpose of divesting him of

1 Chestnut p. Shane's Lessee, 16 Ohio, 599, overruling Connell v. Connell,

6 Ohio, 358; Good e. Zercher, 12 Ohio, 364; Meddock v. Williams, 12 Ohio,

377; and Silliman p. Cummins, 13 Ohio, 116. Of the dissenting opinion in the

last case, which the court approve in 16 Ohio, 609-10, they say: "That opinion

stands upon the ground that the act operates only upon that class of deeds where

enough bad been done to show that a court of chancery ought, in each case, to

render a decree for a conveyance, assuming that the certificate was not such as
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the law required. And where the title in equity was such that a court of chan-

cery ought to interfere and decree a good legal title, it was within the power of

the legislature to confirm the deed, without subjecting an indefinite number to

the useless expense of unnecessary litigation." See also Lessee of Dulany v.

Tilghman, 6 G. & J. 461; Journeay p. Gibson, 56 Penn. St. 57. But the legis-

lature, it has been declared, has no power to legalize and make valid the deed of

an insane person. Routsong v. Wolf, 35 Mo. 174.

* Lessee of Walton v. Bailey, 1 Binn. 477; Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R.

101; Barnet v. Barnet, 15 S. & R. 72; Tate p. Stooltzfoos, 16 S. & R. 35;

Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; Davis

v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316; Dentzel o. Waldie, 30 Cal. 138; Estate of Stick-

noth, 7 Nev. 227; Goshorn v. Purcell, 11 Ohio, n. a. 641. In the last case the

court say: '' The act of the married woman may, under the law, have been void

and inoperative; but in justice and equity it did not leave her right to the prop-

erty untouched. She bad capacity to do the act in a form prescribed by law for

her protection. She intended to do the act in the prescribed form. She at-

tempted to do it, and her attempt was received and acted on in good faith. A

mistake subsequently discovered invalidates the act; justice and equity require

that she should not take advantage of the mistake; and she has therefore no just

right to the property. She has no right to complain if the law which prescribed

forms for her protection shall interfere to prevent her reliance upon them to

resist the demands of justice." Similar language is employed in the Pennsyl-

vania cases. See, further, Dentzel p. Waldie, 30 Cal. 138.

[ 439 ]
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it, and passing it over to the grantee.1 Apparently, therefore, there

would seem to be some force to the objection that such a statute

deprives a party of vested rights. But the objection is more specious

than sound. If all that is wanting to a valid contract or convey-

ance is the observance of some legal formality, the party may have

a legal right to avoid it: but this right is coupled with no equity,

even though the case be sucli that no remedy could be afforded the

other party in the courts. The right which the healing act takes

away in such a case is the right in the party to avoid his contract, —

a naked legal right which it is usually unjust to insist upon, and

which no constitutional provision was ever designed to protect.1

As the point is put by Chief Justice Parker of Massachusetts, a

party cannot have a vested right to do wrong;8 or, as stated by

the Supreme Court of New Jersey, " Laws curing defects which

would otherwise operate to frustrate what must be presumed to be

the desire of the party affected, cannot be considered as taking

away vested rights. Courts do not regard rights as vested contrary

to the justice and equity of the case."4

The operation of these cases, however, must be carefully restricted
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to the parties to the original contract, and to such other persons

as may have succeeded to their rights with no greater equities.

A subsequent bona fide purchaser cannot be deprived of the prop-

erty which he has acquired, by an act which retrospectively deprives

his grantor of the title which he had when the purchase was made.

Conceding that the invalid deed may be made good as between the

parties, yet if, while it remained invalid, and the grantor still

retained the legal title to the land, a third person has purchased

and received a conveyance, witli no notice of any fact

[*879] which should * preclude his acquiring an equitable as

1 This view has been taken in some similar cases. See Russell v. Rumsey,

85 111. 362; Alabama, &c, Ins. Co. v. Boykin, 38 Ala. 510; Orton v. Noonan,

23 Wis. 102; Dade r. Medcalf, 9 Penn. St. 108.

* In Gibson v. Hibbard, 13 Mich. 215, a check, void at the time it was given,

for want of a revenue stamp, was held valid after being stamped as permitted by

a subsequent act of Congress. A similar ruling was made in Harris v. Rutledge,

19 Iowa, 389. The case of State v. Norwood, 12 Md. 195, is still stronger.

The curative statute was passed after judgment had been rendered against the

right claimed under the defective instrument, and it was held that it must be

applied by the appellate court. See post, 881.

2 Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245.

4 State v. Newark, 3 Dutch. 197.
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well as a legal title thereby, it would not be in the power of the

legislature to so confirm the original deed as to divest him of the

title he has acquired. The position of the case is altogether

changed by this purchase. The legal title is no longer separated

from equities, but in the hands of the second purchaser is united

with an equity as strong as that which exists in favor of him who

purchased first. Under such circumstances even the courts of

equity must recognize the right of the second purchaser as best,

and as entitled to the usual protection which the law accords to

vested interests.1

If, however, a grantor undertakes to convey more than he pos-

sesses, or contrary to the conditions or qualifications which, for the

benefit of others, are imposed upon his title, or in fraud of

the rights of others whose representative or agent he is, so that the

defect in his conveyance consists not in any want of due formality,

nor in any disability imposed by law, it is not in the power of the

legislature to validate it retrospectively; and we may add, also, that

it would not have been competent to authorize it in advance. In

such case the rights of others intervene, and they are entitled to

protection on the same grounds, though for still stronger rea-
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sons, which exist in the case of the bona fide purchasers above re-

ferred to.2

1 Brinton p. Seevers, 12 Iowa, 389; Southard v. Central R.R. Co., 2 Dutch.

22; Thompson p. Morgan, 6 Minn. 292; Meighen v. Strong, 6 Minn. 177; Nor-

man v. Heist, 5 W. & S. 171; Greenough p. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494;

Le Bois p. Bramel, 4 How. 449; McCarthy v. Hoffman, 23 Penn. St 508.

Sherwood p. Fleming, 25 Texas, 408; Wright v. Hawkins, 28 Texas, 452. The

legislature cannot validate an invalid trust in a will, by act passed after the death

of the testator, and after title vested in the heirs. Hilliard v. Miller, 10 Penn.

St. 338. See Snyder v. Bull, 17 Penn. St. 58; McCarthy p. Hoffman, 23 Penn.

St. 507; Bolton p. Johns, 5 Penn. St. 145; State v. Warren, 28 Md. 338. The

cases here cited must not be understood as establishing any different principle

from that laid down in Goshen p. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, where it was held

competent to validate a marriage, notwithstanding the rights of third parties

would be incidentally affected. Rights of third parties are liable to be incident-

ally affected more or less in any case in which a defective contract is made good;

but this is no more than might happen in enforcing a contract or decreeing a

divorce. See post, p. 384. Also, Tallman p. Janesville, 17 Wis. 71.

'In Shouk p. Brown, 61 Penn. St. 327, the facts were that a married woman

held property under a devise, with an express restraint upon her power to

alienate. She nevertheless gave a deed of the same, and a legislative act was

afterwards obtained to validate this deed. Held void. Agnew, J.: "Many

cases have been cited to prove that this legislation is merely confirmatory and
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We have already referred to the case of contracts by municipal

corporations which, when made, were in excess of their authority,

but subsequently have been confirmed by legislative action. If the

contract is one which the legislature might originally have author-

ized, the case falls within the principle above laid down, and the

right of the legislature to confirm it must be recognized.1 This

valid, beginning with Barnet v. Barnet, 15 S. & R. 72, and ending with Journeay

v. Gibson, 56 Penn. St. 57. The most of them are cases of the defective ac-

knowledgments of deeds of married women. But there is a marked difference

between them and this. In all of them there was a power to convey, and only

a defect in the mode of its exercise. Here there is an absolute want of power to

convey in any mode. In ordinary cases a married woman has both the title and

the power to convey or to mortgage her estate, but is restricted merely in the

manner of its exercise. This is a restriction it is competent for the legislature

to remove, for the defect arises merely in the form of the proceeding, and not in

any want of authority. Those to whom her estate descends, because of the

omission of a prescribed form, are really not injured by the validation. It wss

in her power to cut them off, and in truth and conscience she did so, though sbe
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failed at law. They cannot complain, therefore, that the legislature interferes

to do justice. But the case before us is different. [The grantor] had neither

the right nor the power during coverture to cut off" her heirs. She was for-

bidden by the law of the gift, which the donor imposed upon it to suit his own

purposes. Her title was qualified to this extent. Having done an act she had

no right to do, there was no moral obligation for the legislature to enforce. Her

heirs have a right to say . . . 'the legislature cannot take our estate and vest it

in another who bought it with notice on the face of his title that our mother

could not convey to him.' The true principle on which retrospective laws are

supported was stated long ago by Duncan, J., in Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & B.

101; to wit, where they impair no contract, or disturb no vested right, but only

vary remedies, cure defects in proceedings otherwise fair, which do not vary

existing obligations contrary to their situation when entered into and when pros-

ecuted." In White Mountains R.R. Co. p. White Mountains R.R. Co. of N. H.,

50 N. H. 50, it was decided that the legislature had no power, as against non-

assenting parties, to validate a fraudulent sale of corporate property. In Alter's

Appeal, 67 Penn. St. 341; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 433; the Supreme Court of Penn-

sylvania declared it incompetent for the legislature, after the death of a party, to

empower the courts to correct a mistake in his will which rendered it inoperative —

the title having already passed to his heirs. But where it was not known that

the decedent left heirs, it was held competent, as against the State, to cure

defects in a will after the death, and thus prevent an escheat. Estate of

Sticknoth, 7 Nev. 229.

1 See Shaw v. Norfolk R.R. Corp., 5 Gray, 179, in which it was held that the

legislature might validate an unauthorized assignment of a franchise. Also, May

v. Holdridge, 23 Wis. 93, and cases cited, in which statutes authorizing the

reassessment of irregular taxes were sustained. In this case, Paine, J., says:

"This rule must of course be understood with its proper restrictions. The work
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principle is one which has very often been acted upon in the case

of municipal subscriptions to works of internal improvement,

where the original undertaking was without authority of law, and

the authority given was conferred by statute retrospectively.1

It has not usually been regarded as a circumstance of importance

in these cases, whether the enabling act was before or after the cor-

poration had entered into the contract in question; and if the leg-

islature possesses that complete control over the subject of taxation

by municipal corporations which has been declared in many cases,

it is difficult to perceive how such a corporation can successfully

contest the validity of a special statute, which only sanc-

tions a contract previously made by the * corporation, and [* 380]

which, though at the time ultra vires, was nevertheless

for a public and local object, and compels its performance through

an exercise of the power of taxation.2

for which the tax is sought to be assessed must be of such a character that the

legislature is authorized to provide for it by taxation. The method adopted must

be one liable to no constitutional objection. It must be such as the legislature

might originally have authorized had it seen fit. With these restrictions, where

work of this character has been done, I think it competent for the legislature to
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supply a defect of authority in the original proceedings, to adopt and ratify the

improvement and provide for a reassessment of the tax to pay for it." And see

Brewster p. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Kunkle v. Franklin, 13 Minn. 127; Boyce

p. Sinclair, 3 Bush, 264; Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 236; Stuart v. Warren,

37 Conn. 225.

1 See, among other cases, McMillan v. Boyles, 6 Iowa, 330; Gould v. Ster-

ling, 23 N. Y. 457; Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; Bridgeport p. Hou-

satonic R.R. Co., 15 Conn. 475; Board of Commissioners v. Bright, 18 Ind. 93;

Gibbons v. Mobile, &c, R.R. Co., 36 Ala. 410.

• In Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37, it appeared that the city of Mil-

waukee had been authorized to contract for the construction of a harbor, at an

expense not to exceed $100,000. A contract was entered into by the city pro-

viding for a larger expenditure; and a special legislative act was afterwards

obtained to ratify it. The court held that the subsequent legislative ratification

was not sufficient, proprio vigore, and without evidence that such ratification was

procured with the assent of the city, or had been subsequently acted upon or

confirmed by it, to make the contract obligatory upon the city. The court say,

per Dixon, Ch. J.: "The question is, can the legislature, by recognizing the

existence of a previously void contract, and authorizing its discharge by the city,

or in any other way, coerce the city against its will into a performance of it, or

does the law require the assent of the city, as well as of the legislature, in order to

make the obligation binding and efficacious? I must say that, in my opinion, the

latter act, as well as the former, is necessary for that purpose, and that without

it the obligation cannot be enforced. A contract void for want of capacity in one
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[* 381] * Nor is it important in any of the cases to which we

have referred, that the legislative act which cures the

or both of the contracting parties to enter into it is as no contract; it is as if

no attempt at an agreement had ever been made. And to admit that the legis-

lature, of its own choice, and against the wishes of either or both of the contract-

ing parties, can give it life and vigor, is to admit that it is within the scope of

legislative authority to devest settled rights of property, and to take the property

of one individual or corporation and transfer it to another." This reasoning is of

course to be understood in the light of the particular case before the court; that

is to say, a case in which the contract was to do something not within the ordi-

nary functions of local government. See the case explained and defended by the

same eminent judge in Mills v. Charlton, 29 Wis. 413. The cases of Guilford v.

Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb. 615, and 13 N. Y. 143; Brewster v. Syracuse,

19 N. Y. 116; and Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65, especially go much further

than is necessary to sustain the text. See also Bartholomew v. Harwinton, 39

Conn. 408; People v. Mitchell, 35 N. Y. 551; Barbour v. Camden, 51 Me. 608;

Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 474; State c. Sullivan, 43 111. 413; Johnson r.

Campbell, 49 111. 316. In Brewster v. Syracuse, parties had constructed a sewer
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for the city at a stipulated price, which had been fully paid to them. The charter

of the city forbade the payment of extra compensation to contractors in any case.

The legislature afterwards passed an act empowering the Common Council of

Syracuse to assess, collect, and pay over the further sum of $600 in addition to

the contract price; and this act was held constitutional. In Thomas v. Leland,

certain parties had given bond to the State, conditioned to pay into the treasury

a certain sum of money as an inducement to the State to connect the Chenango

Canal with the Erie at Utica, instead of at Whitcstown as originally contem-

plated, — the sum mentioned being the increased expense in consequence of the

change. Afterwards the legislature, deeming the debt thus contracted by indi-

viduals unreasonably partial and onerous, passed an act, the object of which was

to levy the amount on the owners of real estate in Utica. This act seemed to

the court unobjectionable. "The general purpose of raising the money by tax

was to construct a canal, a public highway, which the legislature believed would

be a benefit to the city of Utica as such; and independently of the bond, the case

is the ordinary one of local taxation to make or improve a highway. If such an

act be otherwise constitutional, we do not see how the circumstance that a bond

had before been given securing the same money can detract from its validity.

Should an individual volunteer to secure a sum of money, in itself properly

leviable by way of tax on a town or county, there would be nothing in the nature

of such an arrangement which would preclude the legislature from resorting, by

way of tax, to those who are primarily and more justly liable. Even should he

pay the money, what is there in the constitution to preclude his being reimbursed

by a tax?" Here, it will be perceived, the corporation was compelled to assume

an obligation which it had not even attempted to incur, but which private persons,

for considerations which seemed to them sufficient, had taken upon their own

shoulders. We have expressed doubts of the correctness of this decision, ante,

230-31, note, where a number of cases are cited, bearing upon the point
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irregularity, defect, or want of original authority, was passed after

suit brought, in which such irregularity or defect became matter of

importance. The bringing of suit vests in a party no right to a

particular decision ;1 and his case must be determined on the law

as it stands, not when the suit was brought, but when the judgment

is rendered.2 It has been held that a statute allowing amendments

to indictments in criminal cases might constitutionally be applied

to pending suits;3 and even in those States in which retrospective

laws are forbidden, a cause must be tried under the rules of evi-

dence existing at the time of the trial, though different from those

in force when the suit was commenced.4 And if a case is appealed,

and pending the appeal the law is changed, the appellate court

must dispose of the case under the law in force when their deci-

sion is rendered.5

1 Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass. 309; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Cowgill v.

Long, 15 111. 203; Miller v. Graham, 17 Ohio, n. s. 1; State e. Squires, 26 Iowa,

340; Patterson r. Philbrook, 9 Mass. 151.

* Watson ». Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Mather v. Chapman, 6 Conn. 54; Bristol v.

Supervisors, &c, 20 Mich. 93; Satterlee v. Mathewson, 16 S. & R. 169, and

2 Pet. 380.
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3 State v. Manning, 11 Texas, 402.

4 Rich o. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304.

6 State v. Norwood, 12 Md. 195. In Eaton v. United States, 5 Cranch,

281, a vessel had been condemned in admiralty, and pending an appeal the act

under which the condemnation was declared was repealed. The court held that

the cause must be considered as if no sentence had been pronounced; and if no

sentence had been pronounced, then, after the expiration or repeal of the law,

no penalty could be enforced or punishment inflicted for a violation of the law

committed while it-was in force, unless some special provision of statute was

made for that purpose. See also Schooner Rachel v. United States, 6 Cranch,

329; Commonwealth v. Duane, 1 Binney, 601; United States v. Passmore, 4

Dall. 372; Commonwealth D.Marshall, 11 Pick. 350; Commonwealth v. Kim-

ball, 21 Pick. 373; Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 100; Norris v. Crocker, 13

How. 129; Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541; Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall.

506; United States v. Tyner, 11 Wall. 88; Engle v. Shurtz, 1 Mich. 150. In

the McCardle case the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court

in certain cases was taken away while a case was pending. Per Chase, Ch. J.:

"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law; and when it ceases to exist, the only

function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing

the cause. This is not less clear upon authority than upon principle." But where

a State has jurisdiction of a subject, e. g. pilotage, until Congress establishes

regulations, and penalties are incurred under a State act, and afterwards Congress

legislates on the subject, this does not repeal, but only suspends the State law;
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But the healing statute must in all cases be confined to validating

acts which the legislature might previously have author

[*382] ized. *It cannot make good retrospectively acts or con-

tracts which it had no power to permit or sanction in

advance.1 There lies before us at this time a volume of statutes

of one of the States, in which are contained acts declaring certaiu

tax-rolls valid and effectual, notwithstanding the following irregu-

larities and imperfections: a failure in the supervisor to carry out

separately, opposite each parcel of land on the roll, the taxes

charged upon such parcel, as required by law; a failure ia the

supervisor to sign the certificate attached to the roll; a failure in

the voters of the township to designate, as required by law, in a

certain vote by which they had assumed the payment of bounty

moneys, whether they should be raised by tax or loan; corrections

made in the roll by the supervisor after it had been delivered to

the collector ; the including by the supervisor of a sum to be raised

for township purposes without the previous vote of the township,

as required by law; adding to the roll a sum to be raised which
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could not lawfully be levied by taxation without legislative author-

ity; the failure of the supervisor to make out the roll within the

time required by law; and the accidental omission of a parcel of

land which should have been embraced by the roll. In each of

these cases, except the last, the act required by law, and which

failed to be performed, might by previous legislation have been

dispensed with.; and peiliaps in the last case there might be ques-

tion whether the roll was rendered invalid by the omission referred

to, and, if it was, whether the subsequent act could.legalize it.2 But

if township officers should assume to do acts under the power of

taxation which could not lawfully be justified as an exercise of that

power, no subsequent legislation could make them good. If, for

instance, a part of the property in a taxing district should be assessed

at one rate, and a part at another, for a burden resting equally upon

all, there would be no such apportionment as is essential to tax-

ation, and the roll would be beyond the reach of curative legisla-

and a penalty previously incurred may still be collected. Sturgis v. Spofford, 45

N. Y. 446.

1 See ante, 379, and note 1.

* See Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; Dean v. Gleason, 16 Wis. 1; post

515, note.
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tion.1 And if persons or property should be assessed for

taxation * in a district which did not include them, the [* 383]

assessment would not only be invalid, but a healing stat-

ute would be ineffectual to charge them with the burden. In such

a case there would be a fatal want of jurisdiction; and even in

judicial proceedings, if there was originally a failure of jurisdiction,

no subsequent law can confer it.3

Statutory Privileges and Exemptions.

The citizen has no vested right in statutory privileges and exemp-

tions. Among these may be mentioned, — exemptions from the per-

formance of public duty upon juries, or in the militia, and the

like; exemptions of property or person from assessment for the

'1 See Billings v. Detten, 15 111. 218; Conway v. Cable, 37111^82; and Thames

Manufacturing Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn. 550, for eases where curative statutes

were held not effectual to reach defects in tax proceedings. As to what defects

may or may not be cured by subsequent legislation, see Allen r. Armstrong,

16 Iowa, 508, Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis. 556, and Abbott v. Lindenbower,

42 Mo. 162. In Tallman v. Janesville, 17 Wis. 71, the constitutional authority

of the legislature to cause an irregular tax to be reassessed in a subsequent year,

where the rights of bona fide purchasers had intervened, was disputed; but the
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court sustained the authority as " a salutary and highly beneficial feature of our

systems of taxation," and "not to be abandoned because in some instances it

produces individual hardships." Certainly bona fide purchasers, as between

themselves and the State, must take their purchases subject to all public burdens

justly resting upon them. The case of Conway v. Cable is instructive. It

was there held among other things, — and very justly as we think,—that the

legislature could not make good a tax sale effected by fraudulent combination

between the officers and the purchasers. In Miller v. Graham, 17 Ohio, n. 8. 1,

a statute validating certain ditch assessments was sustained, notwithstanding the

defects covered by it were not mere irregularities; but that statute gave the par-

ties an opportunity to be heard as to these defects.

4 See Wells ». Weston, 22 Mo. 385; People v. Supervisors of Chenango,

11 N. Y. 563; Hughey's Lessee ». Howell, 2 Ohio, 231; Covington v. South-

gate, 15 B. Monr. 491; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; post, 499, 500.

'So held in McDaniel v. Correll, 19 111. 228, where a statute came under

consideration which assumed to make valid certain proceedings in court which

were void for want of jurisdiction of the persons concerned. See also Denny v.

Mattoon, 2 Allen, 361; Nelson v. Rountree, 23 Wis. 367; Griffin's Ex'r r.

Cunningham, 20 Grat. 109, per Joynes, J.; Richards v. Rote, 68 Penn. St.

248; State v. Doherty, 60 Me. 504. Walpole v. Elliott, 18 Ind. 259, is distin-

guishable from these cases. In that case there was not a failure of jurisdiction,

but an irregular exercise of it.

[ 447 ]

* 383 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XI.

\

purposes of taxation; exemptions of property from being seized

on attachment, or execution, or for the payment of taxes; exemp-

tion from highway labor, and the like. All these Test upon reasons

of public policy, and the laws are changed as the varying circum-

stances seem to require. The State demands the performance of

military duty by those persons only who are within certain speci-

fied ages; but if, in the opinion of the legislature, the public exi-

gencies should demand military service from all other persons

capable of bearing arms, the privilege of exemption might be

recalled, without violation of any constitutional principle. The

fact that a party had passed the legal age under an existing law,

and performed the service demanded by it, could not protect him

against further calls, when public policy or public necessity was

thought to require them.1 In like manner, exemptions from tax-

ation are always subject to recall, when they have been granted

merely as a privilege, and not for a consideration received by the

public; as iu the case of exemption of buildings for religious or

educational purposes, and the like.2 So, also, are exemptions of

property from execution.3 So, a license to carry Dn a particular
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trade for a specified period, may be recalled before the period has

elapsed.4 So, as before stated, a penalty given by statute may be

taken away by statute at any time before judgment is recovered.5

1 Commonwealth v. Bird, 12 Mass. 443; Swindle v. Brooks, 34 Geo. 67;

Mayer, Ex parte, 27 Texas, 715. And see Dale v. The Governor, 3 Stew. 387.

* See ante, 280, 281, and notes. All the cases concede the right in the legis-

lature to recall an exemption from taxation, when not resting upon contract.

The subject was considered in People c. Roper, 35 N. Y. 629, in which it was

decided that a limited immunity from taxation, tendered to the members of

voluntary military companies, might be recalled at any time. It was held not to

be a contract, but "only an expression of the legislative will for the time being,

in a matter of mere municipal regulation." And s.ee Christ Church v. Philadel-

phia, 24 How. 300; Lord v. Litchfield, 86 Conn. 116.

'Bull v. Conroe, .13 Wis. 238.

4 Of this there can be no question unless a fee was paid for the license; and

well-considered cases hold that it may be even then. See Adams v. Hackett,

5 Gray, b'J7; Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; ante,

p. 283, note.

5 Oriental Bank o. Freeze, 6 Shep. 109. The statute authorized the plaintiflf,

suing for a breach of a prison bond, to recover the amount of his judgment and

costs. This was regarded by the court as in the nature of the penalty; and it

was therefore held competent for the legislature, even after breach, to so modify

the law as to limit the plaintiff's recovery to his actual damages. See ante,

p. 3C2, note 5, and cases cited.

[448]

CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 383

So an offered bounty may be recalled, except as to so much as

was actually earned while the offer was a continuing one;

•and the fact that a party has purchased property or [* 384]

incurred expenses in preparation for earning the bounty

cannot preclude the recall.1 A franchise granted by the Slate with

a reservation of a right of repeal must be regarded as a mere priv-

ilege while it is suffered to continue, but the legislature may take

it away at any time, and the grantees must rely for the perpetuity

and integrity of the franchises granted to them solely upon the

faith of the sovereign grantor.2 A statutory right to have cases

reviewed on appeal may be taken away, by a repeal of the statute,

even as to causes which had been previously appealed.3 A mill-

dam act which confers upon the person erecting a dam the right

to maintain it, and flow the lands of private owners on paying such

compensation as should be assessed for the injury done, may be

repealed even as to dams previously erected.4 These illustrations

must suffice under the present head.

Consequential Injuries.

It is a general rule that no one has a vested right to be pro-

tected against consequential injuries arising from a proper exercise
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of rights by others.6 This rule is peculiarly applicable to injuries

resulting from the exercise of public powers. Under the police

power the State sometimes destroys, for the time being, and per-

haps permanently, the value to the owner of his property, without

affording him any redress. The construction of a new way or

the discontinuance of an old one may very seriously affect the

1 East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v. East Saginaw City, 19 Mich. 271; s. C.

2 Am. Rep. 82, and 13 Wall. 873. But as to so much of the bounty as was

actually earned before the change in the law, the party earning it has a vested

right which cannot be taken away. People r. State Auditors, 9 Mich. 827. And

it has been held competent in changing a county seat to provide by law for com-

pensation, through taxation to the residents of the old site. Wilkinson v.

Cheatham, 43 Geo. 258.

'Per Smith, J., in Pratt v. Brown, 8 Wis. 611.

1 Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. :506.

4 Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 603. But if the party maintaining the dam had

paid to the other party a compensation assessed under the statute, it might be

otherwise.

• For the doctrine damnum absque injuria, see Broom's Maxims, 185; Sedg-

wick on Damages, 30, 112.
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value of adjacent property; the removal of a county or State cap-

ital will often reduce very largely the value of all the real estate of

the place from whence it was removed: but in neither case can the

parties, whose interests would be injuriously affected, enjoin the

act, or claim compensation from the public.1 The general laws of

the State may be so changed as to transfer, from one town to

another, the obligation to support certain individuals, who may

become entitled to support as paupers, and the Constitution will

present no impediment.2 The granting of a charter to a new

corporation may sometimes render valueless the franchise of an

existing corporation; but unless the State by contract has pre-

cluded itself from such new grant, the incidental injury

[* 385] * can constitute no obstacle.3 But indeed it seems idle to

specify instances, inasmuch as all changes in the laws of

the State are liable to inflict incidental injury upon individuals,

and, if every citizen was entitled to remuneration for such injury,

the most beneficial and necessary changes in the law might be

found impracticable of accomplishment.

We have now endeavored to indicate what are and what are not

to be regarded as vested rights, and to classify the cases in which
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individual interests, in possession or expectancy, are protected

1 See ante, p. 208, and cases cited in note 2. Also, Wilkinson v. Cheatham,

43 Geo. 258.

* Goshen V.Richmond, 4 Allen, 460; Bridgewater p. Plymouth, 97 Mass.

890.

3 The State of Massachusetts granted to a corporation the right to construct

a toll-bridge across the Charles River, under a charter which was to continue for

forty years, afterwards extended to seventy, at the end of which period the bridge

was to become the property of the commonwealth. During the term the cor-

poration was to pay 200?. annually to Harvard College. Forty-two years after

the bridge was opened for passengers, the State incorporated a company for the

purpose of erecting another bridge over the same river, a short distance only

from the first, and which would accommodate the same passengers. The neces-

sary effect would be to decrease greatly the value of the first franchise, if not to

render it altogether worthless. But the first charter was not exclusive in its

terms; no contract was violated in granting the second; the resulting injury was

incidental to the exercise of an undoubted right by the State, and as all the

vested rights of the first corporation still remained, though reduced in value by

the new grant, the case was one of damage without legal injury. Charles River

Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 344, and 11 Pet. 420. See also Turnpike Co.

v. State, 3 Wall. 210; Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35;

English v. New Haven, &c, Co. 82 Conn. 240; Binghampton Bridge Case, 27

N.Y. 87, and 3 Wall. 51.
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against being devested by the direct interposition of legislative

authority. Some other cases may now be considered, in which

legislation has endeavored to control parties as to the manner in

which they should make use of their property, or has permitted

claims to be created against it through the action of other parties

against the will of the owners. We do not allude now to the

control which the State may possess through an exercise of the

police power, — a power which is merely one of regulation with a

view to the best interests and the most complete enjoyment of

rights by all, — but to that which, under a claim of State policy,

and without any reference to wrongful act or omission by the owner,

would exercise a supervision over his enjoyment of undoubted

rights, or which, in some cases, would compel him to recognize and

satisfy demands upon his property which have been created without

his assent.

In former times sumptuary laws were sometimes passed, and

they were even deemed essential in republics to restrain the lux-

ury so fatal to that species of government.1 But the ideas which

suggested such laws are now exploded utterly, and no one would

seriously attempt to justify them in the present age. The right of
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every man to do what he will with his own, not interfering with the

reciprocal right of others, is accepted among the fundamentals of

our law. The instances of attempt to interfere witli it have not

been numerous since the early colonial days. A notable instance

of au attempt to substitute the legislative judgment for that of the

proprietor, regarding the manner in which he should use and

employ his property, may be mentioned. In the State of Kentucky

an act was at one time passed to compel the owners of wild lands

to make certain improvements upon them within a specified time,

and declared them forfeited to the State in case the statute was not

1 Montesq. Sp. of the Laws, B. 7. Such Laws, though common in some coun-

tries, have never been numerous in England. See references to the legislation

of this character, 4 Bl. Com. 170. Some of these statutes prescribed the num-

ber of courses permissable at dinner or other meal, while others were directed to

restraining extravagance in dress. See Hallam, Mid. Ages, e. 9, pt. II.; and as

to Roman sumptuary laws, Encyc. Metrop. Vol. X. p. 110. Adam Smith said of

such laws, "It is the highest impertinence and presumption in kings and min-

isters to pretend to watch over the economy of private people, and to restrain

their expense, either by sumptuary laws, or by prohibiting the importation of

foreign luxuries." Wealth of Nations, B. 2, c. 3. As to prohibitory liquor laws,

see post, 681-584.
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complied with. It would be difficult to frame, consistently with

the general principles of free government, a plausible argument in

support of such a statute. It was not an exercise of the right of

eminent domain, for that appropriates property to some speciBc

public use on making compensation. It was not taxation, for that

is simply an apportionment of the burden of supporting the govern-

ment. It was not a police regulation, for that could not go beyond

preventing an improper use of the land with reference to

[* 386] * the due exercise of rights and enjoyment of legal priv-

ileges by others. It was purely and simply a law to forfeit

a man's property, if he failed to improve it according to a stand-

ard which the legislature had prescribed. To such a power, if

possessed by the government, there could be no limit but the legis-

lative discretion; and if defensible on principle, then a law which

should authorize the officer to enter a man's dwelling and seize

and confiscate his furniture if it fell below, or his food if it ex-

ceeded, an established legal standard, would be equally so. But

in a free country such laws when mentioned are condemned

instinctively.1

But cases may sometimes present themselves in which improve-
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ments actually made by one man upon the land of another, even

though against the will of the owner, ought on grounds of strict

equity to constitute a charge upon the land improved. If they

have been made in good faith, and under a reasonable expectation

on the part of the person making them, that he was to reap the

benefit of them, and if the owner has stood by and suffered them

to be made, but afterwards has recovered the land and appropriated

the improvements, it would seem that there must exist against him

at least a strong equitable claim for reimbursement of the expend-

itures made, and perhaps no sufficient reason why provision should

not be made by law for their recovery.

Accordingly in the several States statutes will be found which

undertake to provide for these equitable claims. These statutes are

commonly known as betterment laws; and as an illustration of the

whole class, we give the substance of that adopted in Vermont. It

provided that after recovery in ejectment, where he or those through

whom he claimed had purchased or taken a lease of the land, sup-

1 The Kentucky statute referred to was declared unconstitutional in Gaines r.

Buford, 1 Dana, 499. See also Violett v. Violett, 2 Dana, 826.
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posing at the time that the title purchased was good, or the lease

valid to convey and secure the title and interest therein expressed,

the defendant should be entitled to recover of the plaintiff the full

value of the improvements made by him or by those through whom

he claimed, to be assessed by jury, and to be enforced against the

land, and not otherwise. The value was ascertained by estimating

the increased value of the land in consequence of the improve-

ments but the plaintiff at his election might have the value of the

land without the improvements assessed, and the defendant should

purchase the same at that price within four years, or lose the ben-

efit of his claim for improvements. But the benefit of the

law was not given to one who had entered on land * by [* 387]

virtue of a contract with the owner, unless it should

appear that the owner had failed to fulfil such contract on his

part.1

This statute, and similar ones which preceded it, have been

adjudged constitutional by the Supreme Court of Vermont, and

have frequently been enforced. In an early case the court explained

the principle of these statutes as follows: "The action for better-

ments, as they are now termed in the statute, is given on the
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supposition that the legal title is found to be in the plaintiff in

ejectment, and is intended to secure to the defendant the fruit of

his labor, and to the plaintiff all that he is justly entitled to, which

is his land in as good a situation as it would have been had no

labor been bestowed thereon. The statute is highly equitable in

all its provisions, and would do exact justice if the value either of

the improvements or of the land was always correctly estimated.

The principles upon which it is founded are taken from the civil

law, where ample provision was made for reimbursing the bona fide

possessor the expense of his improvements, if he was removed from

his possession by the legal owner. It gives to the possessor not

the expense which he has laid out on the land, but the amount

which he has increased the value of the land by his betterments

thereon; or, in other words, the difference between the value of the

land as it is when the owner recovers it, and the value if no improve-

ment had been made. If the owner takes the land together with

the improvements, at the advanced value which it has from the

labor of the possessor, what can be more just than that he should

1 Revised Statutes of Vermont of 1839, p. 216.
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pay the difference? But if he is unwilling to pay this difference,

by giving a deed as the statue provides, he receives the value as it

would have been if nothing had been done thereon. The only

objection which can be made is, that it is sometimes compelling

the owner to sell when he may have been content with the property

in its natural state. But this, when weighed against the loss to

the bona fide possessor, and against the injustice of depriving him

of the fruits of his labor, and giving it to another, who, by his

negligence in not sooner enforcing his claim, has in some measure

contributed to the mistake under which he has labored, is not

entitled to very great consideration."1

[* 388] * The last circumstance stated in this opinion — the

negligence of the owner in asserting his claim—is evi-

dently deemed important in some States, whose statutes only allow

a recovery for improvements by one who has been in possession a

certain number of years. But a later Vermont case dismisses it

from consideration as a necessary ground on which to base the

right of recovery. "The right of the occupant to recover the value

of his improvements," say the court, " does not depend upon the

question whether the real owner has been vigilant or negligent in
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the assertion of his rights. It stands upon a principle of natural

justice and equity; viz., that the occupant in good faith, believing

himself to be the owner, has added to the permanent value of the

land by his labor and his money; is in equity entitled to such

added value; and that it would be unjust that the owner of the land

should be enriched by acquiring the value of such improvements,

without compensation to him who made them. This principle of

natural justice has been very widely, we may say universally rec-

ognized." 2

'Brown v. Storm, 4 Vt. 37. This class of legislation was also elaborately

examined and defended by Trumbull, J., in Ross v. Irving, 14 1ll. 171, and in

some of the other cases referred to in the succeeding note. See also Bright p.

Boyd, 1 Story, 478; s. c. 2 Story, 607.

s Whitney v. Richardson, 31 Vt. 306. For other cases in which similar laws

have been held constitutional, see Armstrong v. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 374; Fowler

v. Halbert, 4 Bibb, 54; Withington v. Corey, 2 N. H. 115; Bacon p. Callender,

6 Mass. 303; Pacquette v. Pickness, 19 Wis. 219; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa,

261; Scott v. Mather, 14 Texas, 235; Saunders v. Wilson, 19 Texas, 194;

Brackett v. Norcross, 1 Greenl. 92; Hunt's Lessee v. McMahan, 5 Ohio, 132;

Longworth v Worthington, 6 Ohio, 10. See further, Jones v. Carter, 12 Mass.

314; Dothage v. Stuart, 35 Mo. 251; Fenwiek v. Gill, 38 Mo. 510; Howard v.
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* Betterment laws, then, recognize the existence of an [* 389]

equitable right, and give a remedy for its enforcement where

none had existed before. It is true that they make a man pay for

improvements which he has not directed to be made; but this leg-

islation presents no feature of officious interference by the govern-

ment with private property. The improvements have been made

by one person in good faith, and are now to be appropriated by

anothep. The parties cannot be placed in statu quo, and the stat-

ute accomplishes justice as near as the circumstances of the case

will admit, when it compels the owner of the land, who, if he

declines to sell, must necessarily appropriate the betterments made

by another, to pay the value to the person at whose expense they

have been made. The case is peculiar; but a statute cannot be

void as an unconstitutional interference with private property which

adjusts the equities of the parties as near as possible according to

natural justice.1

Zeyer, 18 La. An. 407; Pope v. Macon, 23 Ark. 644; Marlow p. Adams, 24 Ark.

109; Crmond v. Martin, 37 Ala. 598; Love v. Shartzer, 31 Cal. 487. For a

contrary ruling, see Nelson v. Allen, 1 Yerg. 376. Mp. Justice Stonj held in

Society, &p. v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105, that such a law could not constitutionally
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be made to apply to improvements made before its passage; but this decision

was made under the New Hampshire Constitution, which forbade retrospective

laws. The principles of equity upon which such legislation is sustained would

seem not to depend upon the time when the improvements were made. See

Davis's Lessee v. Powell, 13 Ohio, 308. In Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261, it

was held that the legislature could not constitutionally make the value of the

improvements a personal charge against the owner of the land, and authorize a

personal judgment against him. The same ruling was had in McCoy p. Grandy,

3 Ohio, x. s. 463. A statute had been passed authorizing the occupying claimant

at his option, after judgment rendered against him for the recovery of the land,

to demand payment from the successful claimant of the full value of his lasting

and valuable improvements, or to pay to the successful claimant the value of the

land without the improvements, and retain it. The court say: "The occupying

claimant act, in securing to the occupant a compensation for his improvements

as a condition precedent to the restitution of the lands to the owner, goes to the

utmost stretch of the legislative power touching this subject. And the statute

. . . providing for the transfer of the fee in the land to the occupying claimant,

without the consent of the owner, is a palpable invasion of the right of private

property, and clearly in conflict with the Constitution."

1 In Harris v. Inhabitants of Marblehead, 10 Gray, 44, it was held that the

betterment law did not apply to a town which had appropriated private property

for the purposes of a school-house, and erected the house thereon. The law, it

was said, did not apply "where a party is taking land by force of the statute,
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\

Unequal and Partial Legislation.

In the course of our discussion of this subject it has been seen

that some statutes are void though general in their scope, while

others are valid though establishing rules for single cases only.

An enactment may therefore be the law of the land without being

a general law. And this being so, it may be important to consider

in what cases constitutional principles will require a statute to be

general in its operation, and in what cases, on the other hand, it

may be valid without being general. We speak now in reference

to general constitutional principles, and not to any peculiar rules

which may have become established by special provisions iu the

constitutions of individual States.

The cases relating to municipal corporations stand upon pecul-

iar grounds from the fact that those corporations are agencies of

government, and as such are subject to complete legislative control.

Statutes authorizing the sale of property of minors and other per-

sons under disability are also exceptional, in that they are applied

for by the parties representing the interests of the owners, and are

remedial in their character. Such statutes are supported by the
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presumption that the parties in interest would consent if capable of

doing so; and in law they are to be considered as assenting

[* 390] in * the person of the guardians or trustees of their rights.

And perhaps in any other case, if a party petitions for

legislation and avails himself of it, he may justly be held estopped

from disputing its validity;1 so that the great bulk of private

legislation which is adopted from year to year, may at once be

dismissed from this discussion.

Laws public in their objects may, unless express constitutional

provision forbids,2 be either general or local in their application;

and is bound to see that all the steps are regular. If it did, the party taking

the land might in fact compel a sale of the land, or compel the party to buy the

school-house, or any other building erected upon it." But as a matter of con-

stitutional authority, we see no reason to doubt that the legislature might extend

such a law even to the cases of this description.

1 This doctrine was applied in Ferguson v. Landram, 5 Bush, 230, to parties

who had obtained a statute for the levy of a tax to refund bounty moneys, which

statute was held void as to other persons.

* See ante, p. 128, note 1, and cases cited. To make a statute a public law

of general obligation, it is not necessary that it should be equally applicable to
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they may embrace many subjects or one, and they may extend to

all citizens, or be confined to particular classes, as minors or mar-

ried women, bankers or traders, and the like. The authority that

legislates for the State at large must determine whether particular

rules shall extend to the whole State and all its citizens, or, on the

other hand, to a subdivision of the State or a single class of its

citizens only. The circumstances of a particular locality, or the

prevailing public sentiment in that section of the State, may

require or make acceptable different police regulations from those

demanded in another, or call for different taxation, and a differ-

ent application of the public moneys. The legislature may there-

fore prescribe or authorize different laws of police, allow the right

of eminent domain to be exercised in different cases and through

different agencies, and prescribe peculiar restrictions upon taxation

in each distinct municipality, provided the State constitution does _

not forbid. These discriminations are made constantly; and the

fact that the laws are of local or special operation only is not

supposed to render them obnoxious in principle. The legislature

may also deem it desirable to prescribe peculiar rules for the

several occupations, and to establish distinctions in the rights,
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obligations, duties, and capacities of citizens. The business of

common carriers, for instance, or of bankers, may require special

statutory regulations for the general benefit, and it may be matter

of public policy to give laborers in one business a specific lien for

their wages, when it would be impracticable or impolitic to do

the same by persons engaged in some other employments. If

the laws be otherwise unobjectionable, all that can be required

in these cases is, that they be general in their application to the

class or locality to which they apply; and they are then public in

character, and of their propriety and policy the legislature must

judge.

But a statute would not be constitutional which should proscribe

a class or a party for opinion's sake,1 or which should select

particular * individuals from a class or locality, and sub- [• 391]

ject them to peculiar rules, or impose upon them special

all parts of the State; all that is required is that it shall apply equally to all

persons within the territorial limits described in the act. State v. County Com-

missioners of Baltimore, 29 Md. 516.

1 The sixth section of the Metropolitan Police Law of Baltimore (1859) pro-

vided that "no Black Republican, or indorser or supporter of the Helper book,
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obligations or burdens from which others in the same locality or

class are exempt.1

The legislature may suspend the operation of the general laws

of the State; but when it does so the suspension must be general,

and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities.2

shall be appointed to any office" under the Board of Police which it established.

This was claimed to be unconstitutional, as introducing into legislation the prin-

ciple of proscription for the sake of political opinion, which was directly opposed

to the cardinal principles on which the Constitution was founded. The court

dismissed the objection in the following words: "That portion of the sixth sec-

tion which relates to Black Republicans, &c, is obnoxious to the objection urged

against it, if we are to consider that class of persons as proscribed on account of

their political or religfous opinions. But we cannot understand, officially, who

are meant to be affected by the proviso, and therefore cannot express a judicial

opinion on the question." Baltimore ». State, 15 Md. 468. See also p. 484.

This does not seem to be a very satisfactory disposition of so grave a constitu-

tional objection to a legislative act. That courts may take judicial notice of the

fact that the electors of the country are divided into parties with well-known

designations cannot be doubted; and when one of these is proscribed by a name

familiarly applied to it by its opponents, the inference that it is done because of
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political opinion seems to be too conclusive to need further support than that

which is found in the act itself. And we know no reason why courts should

decline to take notice of those facts of general notoriety, which, like the names

of political parties, are a part of the public history of the times.

It has been decided that State laws forbidding the intermarriage of whites and

blacks are such police regulations as are entirely within the power of the States,

notwithstanding the provisions of the new amendments to the federal Constitu-

tion. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389. Compare State v. Hairston, 63 N. C. 451;

Ellis v. State, 42 Ala. 525. It is also said colored children may be required to

attend separate schools, if impartial provision is made for their instruction. State

v. Duffy, 7 Nov. 342; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 713. But some States forbid this. People

v. Board of Education, 18 Mich. 400. And when separate schools are not estab-

lished for colored children, they are entitled to admission to the other public

schools. State v. Duffy, supra.

1 Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534. There is no reason, however, why

the law should not take notice of peculiar views held by some classes of people,

which unfit them for certain public duties, and excuse them from the performance

of such duties; as Quakers are excused from military duty, and persons denying

the right to inflict capital punishment are excluded from juries in capital cases.

These, however, are in the nature of exemptions, and they rest upon considera-

tions of obvious necessity.

2 The statute of limitations cannot be suspended in particular cases while

allowed to remain in force generally. Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396; Davison

v. Johonnot, 7 Met. 393. See ante, 365, note. The general exemption laws

cannot be varied for particular cases or localities. Bull v. Conroe, 13 Wis. 238,

244. The legislature, when forbidden to grant divorces, cannot pass special acts
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Privileges may be granted to particular individuals when by so

doing the rights of others are not interfered with; disabilities may

be removed; the legislature as parens patriae, when not forbidden,

may grant authority to the guardians or trustees of incompetent

persons to exercise a statutory control over their estates for their

assistance,, comfort, or support, or for the discharge of legal or

equitable liens upon their property; but every one has a right to

demand that he be governed by general rules, and a special statute

which, without his consent, singles his case out as one to be

regulated by a different law from that which is applied

*in all similar cases, would not be legitimate legislation, [*392]

but would be such an arbitrary mandate as is-not within

the province of free governments. Those who make the laws

"are to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied

in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the

favorite at court and the countryman at plough."1 This is a

maxim in constitutional law, and by it we may test the authority

and binding force of legislative enactments.2

authorizing the courts to grant divorces in particular cases for causes not recog-

nized in the general law. Teft v. Teft, 3 Mich. 671; Simonds v. Simonds, 103
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Mass. 572. See, for the same principle, Alter's Appeal, 67 Penn. St. 341. The

authority in emergencies to suspend the civil laws in a part of the State only, hy

a declaration of martial law, we do not call in question by any thing here stated.

Nor in what we have here said do we have any reference to suspensions of tbe

laws generally, or of any particular law, under the extraordinary circumstances

of rebellion or war.

1 Locke on Civil Government, § 142; State v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 349.

'In Lewis v. Webb, 3 Greenl. 326, the validity of a statute granting an

appeal from a decree of the Probate Court in a particular case came under

review. The court say: "On principle it can never be within the bounds of

legitimate legislation to enact a special law, or pass a resolve dispensing with the

general law in a particular case, and granting a privilege and indulgence to one

man, by way of exemption from the operation and effect of such general law,

leaving all other persons under its operation. Such a law is neither just nor

reasonable in its consequences. It is our boast that we live under a government

of laws, and not of men; but this can hardly be deemed a blessing, unless those

laws have for their immovable basis the great principles of constitutional equality.

Can it be supposed for a moment that, if the legislature should pass a general

law, and add a section by way of proviso, that it never should be construed to

have any operation or effect upon the persons, rights, or property of Archelaus

Lewis or John Gordon, such a proviso would receive the sanction or even the

countenance of a court of law? And how does the supposed case differ from

the present? A resolve passed after the general law can produce only the same
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Special courts cannot be created for the trial of the rights

and obligations of particular parties;1 and those cases in which

legislative acts granting new trials or other special relief in judi-

cial proceedings, while they have been regarded as usurpations of

judicial authority, have also been considered obnoxious to the

objection that they undertook to suspend general laws in

[* 393] special * cases. The doubt might also arise whether a

regulation made for any one class of citizens, entirely

arbitrary in its character, and restricting their rights, privileges,

or legal capacities in a manner before unknown to the law, could

be sustained, notwithstanding its generality. Distinctions in these

respects must rest upon some reason upon which they can be

defended, — like the want of capacity in infants and insane per-

sons; and if the legislature should undertake to provide that per-

sons following some specified lawful trade or employment should not

have capacity to make contracts, or to receive conveyances, or to

build such houses as others were allowed to erect, or in any other

way to make such use of their property as was permissible to others,
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it can scarcely be doubted that the act would transcend the due

bounds of legislative power, even though no express constitutional

provision could be pointed out with which it would come in conflict.

To forbid to an individual or a class the right to the acquisition or

enjoyment of property in such manner as should be permitted to

the community at large, would bo to deprive them of liberty in

effect as such proviso. In fact, neither can have any legal operation." See also

Durham p. Lewiston, 4 Greenl. 140; Holden p. James, 11 Mass. 396; Piquet,

Appellant, 5 Pick. 64; Budd v. State, 3 Humph. 483; Wally's Heirs p. Kennedy,

2 Yerg. 554. In the last case it is said: "The rights of every individual must

stand or fall by the same rule or law that governs every other member of the

body politic, or land, under similar circumstances; and every partial or private

law, which directly proposes to destroy or affect individual rights, or does the

same thing by affording remedies leading to similar consequences, is unconstitu-

tional and void. Were it otherwise, odious individuals and corporations would

be governed by one law; the mass of the community and those who made the

law by another; whereas the like general law affecting the whole community

equally could not have been passed." See further, Officer p. Young, 5 Yerg. 320;

Griffin p. Cunningham, 20 Grat. 31 (an instructive case); Arnold v. Kelley, 5 W.

Va. 446.

1 As, for instance, the debtors of a particular bank. Bank of the State p.

Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599. Compare Durkee p. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, in which it

was declared that a special exemption of the city of Janesville from the payment

of costs in anv proceeding against it to set aside a tax or tax sale was void.
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particulars of primary importance to their " pursuit of happiness ;"1

and those who should claim a right do so ought to be able to

show a specific authority therefor, instead of calling upon others

to show how and where the authority is negatived.

Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably

should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted,

or special burdens or restrictions imposed in any case, it must be

presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible

from this fundamental maxim of government.2 The State, it is

to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict

no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always

obnoxious, and discriminations against persons or classes are still

more so, and, as a rule of construction, are always to be leaned

against as probably not contemplated or designed. It has been

held that a statute requiring attorneys to render services in suits

for poor persons without fee or reward, was to be confined strictly

to the cases therein prescribed; and if by its terms it

* expressly covered civil cases only, it could not be ex- [* 394]

1 Burlamaqui (Politic Law, p. 3, § 15) defines natural liberty as the right which

nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and property after the
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manner they judge most consonant to their happiness, on condition of their acting

within the limits of the law of nature, and so as not to interfere with an equal exer-

cise of the same rights by other men. See 1 Bl. Com. 125. Lieber says: "Lib-

erty of social man consists in the protection of unrestrained action in as high a

degree as the same claim of protection of each individual admits of, or in the most

efficient protection of his rights, claims, interests, as a man or citizen, or of his

humanity manifested as a social being." Civil Liberty and Self-Government.

* In the Case of Monopolies, Darcy v. Allain, 11 Rep. 84, the grant of an

exclusive privilege of making playing cards was adjudged void, inasmuch as " the

sole trade of any mechanical artifice, or any other monopoly, is not only a dam-

age and prejudice to those who exercise the same trade, but also to all other sub-

jects ; for the end of all these monopolies is for the private gain of the patentees."

And see Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19; State v.

Cincinnati, &c, Gas Co., 18 Ohio, N. s. 262. Compare with these, State v.

Milwaukie Gas Light Co. 29 Wis. 454. On this ground it has been denied that

that the State can exercise the power of taxation on behalf of corporations who

undertake to make or to improve the thoroughfares of trade and travel for their

own benefit. The State, it is said, can no more tax the community to set one class

of men up in business than another; can no more subsidize one occupation than

another; can no more make donations to the men who build and own railroads in

consideration of expected incidental benefits, than it can make them to the men

who build stores or manufactories in consideration of similar expected benefits.

People v. Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich. 452.
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tended to embrace defences of criminal prosecutions.1 So where

a constitutional provision confined the elective franchise to " white

male citizens," and it appeared that the legislation of the State

had always treated of negroes, mulattoes, and other colored

persons in contradistinction to white, it was held that although

quadroons, being a recognized class of colored persons, must be

excluded, yet that the rule of exclusion would not be carried

further.2 So a statute making parties witnesses against themselves

cannot be construed to compel them to disclose facts which would

subject them to criminal punishment.3 And a statute which author-

izes summary process in favor of a bank against debtors who have

by express contract made their obligations payable at such bank,

being in derogation of the ordinary principles of private right,

must be subject to strict construction.4 These cases are only illus-

trations of a rule of general acceptance.6

There are unquestionably cases in which the State may grant

privileges to specified individuals without violating any constitu-

tional principle, because, from the nature of the case, it is impos-
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sible they should be possessed and enjoyed by all; and if it is

important that they should exist, the proper State authority must

be left to select the grantees. Of this class are grants of the

franchise to be a corporation. Such grants, however, which con-

fer upon a few persons what cannot be shared by the many, and

which, though supposed to.be made on public grounds, are never-

theless frequently of great value to the corporators, and therefore

sought with avidity, are never to be extended by construction

beyond the plain terms in which they are conferred. No rule is

1 Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13.

* People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406. See Bailey p. Fiske, 34 Me. 77; Monroe

v. Collins, 17 Ohio, n. s. 665. The decisions in Ohio were still more liberal, and

ranked as white persons all who had a preponderance of white blood. Gray v.

State, 4 Ohio, 354; Jeffres v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio, 372; Thacker p. Hawk, ib. 376;

Anderson r. Millikin, 9 Ohio, n. s. 406. But see Van Camp p. Board of Educa-

tion, 9 Ohio, n. s. 406. Happily all such questions are now disposed of by con-

stitutional amendments. It seems, however, in the opinion of the Supreme

Court of California, that these amendments do not preclude a State denying to a

race, e. g., the Chinese, the right to testify against other persons. People p.

Brady, 40 Cal. 198; 8. c. 6 Am. Rep. 604.

3 Broadbent v. State, 7 Md. 416. See Knowles p. People, 15 Mich. 408.

4 Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 241.

6 See 1 Bl. Com. 89, and note.

[ 462 ]

CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 394

better settled than that charters of incorporation are to be con-

strued strictly against the corporators.1 The just pre-

sumption in * every such case is, that the State has [*395]

granted in express terms all that it designed to grant

at all. "When a State," says the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

"means to clothe a corporate body with a portion of her own

sovereignty, and to disarm herself to that extent of the power

that belongs to her, it is so easy to say so, that we will never

believe it to be meant when it is not said. ... In the construction

of a charter, to be in doubt is to be resolved; and every resolution

which springs from doubt is against the corporation. If the useful-

ness of the company would be increased by extending [its privi-

leges], let the legislature see to it, but remember that nothing but

plain English words will do it."2

1 Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Charles River Bridge v. Warren

Bridge, 11 Pet. 544; Perrine v. Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Co, 9 How. 172;

Richmond, &c, R.R. Co. v. Louisa R.R. Co., 13 How. 71; Bradley v. N. Y. &

N. H. R.R. Co., 21 Conn. 294; Parker p. Sunbury & Erie R.R. Co., 19 Penn.

St. 211; Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143; Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghampton

Bridge Co., 27 N. Y. 87, and 3 Wall. 51; State v. Krebs, 64 N. C. 6Oi.
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* Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Canal Commissioners, 21 Penn. St. 22. And see

Commonwealth v. Pittsburg, &c, R.R. Co., 24 Penn. St. 159; Chenango Bridge

Co. p. Binghampton Bridge Co., 27 N. Y. 93, per Wright, J.; Baltimore v. Bal-

timore, &p., R.R. Co., 21 Md. 50; Richmond v. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co.,

21 Grat. 614. We quote from the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Bradley v.

N. Y. & N. H. R.R. Co., 21 Conn. 306: "The rules of construction which

apply to general legislation, in regard to those subjects in which the public at

large are interested, are essentially different from those which apply to private

grants to individuals, of powers or privileges designed to be exercised with

special reference to their own advantage, although involving in their exercise

incidental benefits to the community generally. The former are to be expounded

largely and beneficially for the purposes for which they were enacted; the latter

liberally, in favor of the public, and strictly as against the grantees. The power

in the one case is original and inherent in the State or sovereign power, and is

exercised solely for the general good of the community; in the other it is merely

derivative, is special if not exclusive in its character, and is in derogation of

common right, in the sense that it confers privileges to which the members of the

community at large are not entitled. Acts of the former kind, being dictated

solely by a regard to the benefit of the public generally, attract none of that

prejudice or jealousy towards them which naturally would arise towards those of

the other description, from the consideration that the latter were obtained with a

view to the benefit of particular individuals, and the apprehension that their inter-

ests might be promoted at the sacrifice or to the injury of those of others whose

interests should be equally regarded. It is universally understood' to be one of
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[* 396] * And this rule is not confined to the grant of a corpo-

rate franchise, but it extends to all grants of franchises or

privileges by the State to individuals, in the benefits of which

the people at large cannot participate. "Private statutes," says

Parsons, Ch. J., "made for the accommodation of particular

citizens or corporations, ought not to be construed to affect the

rights or privileges of others, unless such construction results

from express words or from necessary implication." 1 And the

grant of ferry rights, or the right to erect a toll-bridge, and the

the implied and necessary conditions upon, which men enter into society and form

governments, that sacrifices must sometimes be required of individuals for the

general benefit of the community, for which they have no rightful claim to spe-

cific compensation; but, as between the several individuals composing the com-

munity, it is the duty of the State to protect them in the enjoyment of just and

equal rights. A law, therefore, enacted for the common good, and which there

would ordinarily be no inducement to pervert from that purpose, is entitled to be

viewed with less jealousy and distrust than one enacted to promote the interests

of particular persons, and which would constantly present a motive for encroach-

ing on the rights of others."

1 Coolidge v. Williams, 4 Mass. 140. See also Dyer o. Tuscaloosa Bridge
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Co., 2 Port. (Ala.) 296; Grant v. Leach, 20 La. An. 329. In Sprague v. Bird-

sail, 2 Cow. 419, it was held that one embarking upon the Cayuga Lake six miles

from the bridge of the Cayuga Bridge Co., and crossing the lake in an oblique

direction so as to land within sixty rods of the bridge, was not liable to pay toll

under a provision in the charter of said company which made it unlawful for any

person to cross within three miles of the bridge without paying toll. In another

case arising under the same charter, which authorized the company to build a

bridge across the lake or the outlet thereof, and to rebuild in case it should be

destroyed or carried away by the ice, and prohibited all other persons from erect-

ing a bridge within three miles of the place where a bridge should be erected by

the company, it was held, after the company had erected a bridge across the lake

and it had been carried away by the ice, that they had no authority afterwards to

rebuild across the outlet of the lake, two miles from the place where the first

bridge was built, and that the restricted limits were to be measured from the

place where the first bridge was erected. Cayuga Bridge Co. v. Magee, 2 Paige,

116; s. c. 6 Wend. 85. In Chapin v. The Paper Works, 30 Conn. 461, it was

held that statutes giving a preference to certain creditors over others should be

construed with reasonable strictness, as the law favored equality. In People v.

Lambier, 5 Denio, 9, it appeared that an act of the legislature had authorized a

proprietor of lands lying in the East River, which is an arm of the sea, to con-

struct wharves and bulkheads in the river, in front of his land, and there was at

the time a public highway through the land, terminating at the river. Held, that

the proprietor could not, by filling up the land between the shore and the bulk-

head, obstruct the public right of passage from the land to the water, but that

the street wac, by operation of law, extended from the former terminus over the
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like, is not only to be construed strictly against the grantees, but

it will not be held to exclude the grant of a similar and competing

privilege to others, unless the terms of the grant render such con-

struction imperative.1

* The Constitution of the United States contains pro- [* 397]

visions which are important in this connection. One of

these is, that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the

privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States,2 and

all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject

to its jurisdiction, are declared to be citizens thereof, and of

the State wherein they reside.3 The States are also forbidden

to make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of the citizens of the United States, or to deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,

or to deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.4 Although the precise meaning of " privi-

leges and immunities" is not very definitely settled as yet, it

appears to be conceded that the Constitution secures in each State

to the citizens of all other States the right to remove to, and carry

on business therein; the right by the usual modes to acquire and

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

hold property, and to protect and defend the same in the law;

the right to the usual remedies for the collection of debts and the

enforcement of other personal rights, and the right to be exempt,

in property and person, from taxes or burdens which the property,

or persons, of citizens of the same State are not subject to.5 To

this extent, at least, discriminations could not be made by State

laws against them. But it is unquestionable that many other

rights and privileges may be made — as they usually are — to

depend upon actual residence: such as the right to vote, to have

the benefit of exemption laws, to take fish in the waters of the

State, and the like. And the constitutional provisions are not

newly made land to the water. Compare Commissioners of Inland Fisheries v.

Holyoke Water Power Co., 104 Mass. 446; 8. c. 6 Am. Rep. 247.

1 Mills ». St. Clair County, 8 How. 569; Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica & S.

R.R. Co., 6 Paige, 554; Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co., 27

N. Y.87; s. c. 8 Wall. 51.

* Const, of United States, art 4, § 2. See ante, pp. 15, 16.

* Const, of United States, 14th Amendment.

4 Const, of United States, 14th Amendment.

* Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. 380; Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 554;

Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 343; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 281.
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violated by a statute which allows process by attachment against

a debtor not a resident of the State, notwithstanding such process

is not admissiblo against a resident.1 The protection by due

process of law has already been considered. It was not within

the power of the States before the adoption of the fourteenth

amendment, to deprive citizens of the equal protection of the laws;

but there were servile classes not thus shielded, and when these

were made freemen, there were some who disputed their claim to

citizenship, and some State laws were in force which established

discriminations against them.' To settle doubts and preclude all

such laws, the fourteenth amendment was adopted; aud the same

securities which one citizen may demand, all others are now

entitled to.

Judicial Proceedings.

Individual citizens require protection against judicial action as

well as against legislative; and perhaps the question, what consti-

tutes due process of law, is as often made in regard to judicial

proceedings as in any other cases. But it is not so difficult here to

arrive at satisfactory conclusions, since the bounds of the judicial
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authority are much better defined than those of the legislative, and

each case can generally be brought to a definite and well-settled

test.

The proceedings in any court are void if it wants jurisdiction of

the case in which it has assumed to act. Jurisdiction is,

[* 398] first, of * the subject-matter; aud, second, of the persous

whose rights are to be passed upon.2

A court has jurisdiction of any subject-matter, if, by the law of

its organization, it has authority to take cognizance of, try, and

determine cases of that description. If it assumes to act in a

case over which the law does not give it authority, the proceeding

and judgment will be altogether void, and rights of property can-

not be devested by means of them.

1 Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 554; State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. HI.

And see generally the cases cited, ante, p. 16, note.

'Bouvier defines jurisdiction thus: "Jurisdiction is a power constitutionally

conferred upon a court, a single judge, or a magistrate, to take cognizance and

decide causes according to law, and to carry their sentence into execution. The

tract of land within which a court, judge, or magistrate has jurisdiction is called

his territory; and his power in relation to his territory is called his territorial

jurisdiction.'1' 3 Bouv. Inst. 71.
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Aud on this point there is an important maxim of the law, that

is to say, that consent will not confer jurisdiction:1 by which is

meant that the consent of parties cannot empower a court to act

upon subjects which are not submitted to its judgment by the Jaw-

The law creates courts, and with reference to considerations of

general public policy defines and limits their jurisdiction; and

this can neither be enlarged nor restricted by the act of the

parties.

Accordingly, where a court by law has no jurisdiction of the

subject-matter of a controversy, a party whose rights are sought

to be affected by it is at liberty to repudiate its proceedings and

refuse to be bound by them, notwithstanding he may once have

consented to its action, either by voluntarily commencing the pro-

ceeding as plaintiff, or as defendant by appearing and pleading to

the merits, or by any other formal or informal action. This right

he may avail himself of at any stage of the case; and the maxim

that requires one to move promptly who would take advantage of

an.irregularity does not apply here, since this is not mere irregu-

lar action, but a total want of power to act at all. Consent is

sometimes implied from failure to object; but there can
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be no * waiver of rights by laches in a case where consent [* 399]

would be altogether nugatory.2

In regard to private controversies, the law always encourages

arrangements;3 and the settlements which the parties may make

for themselves, it allows to be made for them by arbitrators mutu-

ally chosen. But the courts of a country cannot have those con-

troversies referred to them by the parties which the law-making

power has seen fit to exclude from their cognizance. If the judges

1 Coffin v. Tracy, 3 Caines, 129; Blin v. Campbell, 14 Johns. 432; Cuylere.

Rochester, 12 Wend. 165; Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9; Preston v. Boston,

12 Pick. 7; Chapman v. Morgan, 2 Greene (Iowa), 374; Thompson v. Steam-

boat Morton, 2 Ohio, n. s. 26; Gilliland v. Administrator of Sellers, t'i. 223;

Dicks c. Hatch, 10 Iowa, 380; Overstreet v. Brown, 4 McCord, 79; Green r.

Collins, 6 Ired. 139; Bostwick v. Perkins, 4 Geo. 47; Georgia R.R. &c. v. Har-

ris, 5 Geo. 527; State v. Bonney, 34 Me. 223; Little v. Fitts, 33 Ala. 343; Ginn

v. Rogers, 4 Gilm. 131; Neill v. Reese, 5 Texas, 23; Ames o. Boland, 1 Minn.

365; Brady v. Richardson, 18 Ind. 1; White v. Buchanan, 6 Cold. 32.

'Bostwick o. Perkins, 4 Geo. 47; Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351; White v.

Buchanan, 6 Cold. 32.

% Moore r. Detroit Locomotive Works, 14 Mich. 266; Coyner v. Lynde,

10 Ind. 282.
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should sit to hear such controversies, they would not sit as a court;

at the most they would be arbitrators only, and their action could

not be sustained on that theory, unless it appeared that the parties

had designed to make the judges their arbitrators, instead of

expecting from them valid judicial action as an organized court.

Even then the decision could not be binding as a judgment, but

only as an award; and a mere neglect by either party to object the

want of jurisdiction could not make the decision binding upon him

either as a judgment or as an award. Still less could consent in a

criminal case bind the defendant; since criminal charges are not

the subject of arbitration, and any infliction of criminal punish-

ment upon an individual, except in pursuance of the law of the

land, is a wrong done to the State, whether the individual assented

or not. Those cases in which it has been held that the constitu-

tional right of trial by jury cannot be waived are strongly illustrative

of the legal view of this subject.1

If the parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court by consent,

neither can they by consent empower any individual other than the
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judge of the court to exercise its powers. Judges are chosen in

such manner as shall be provided by law; and a stipulation by

parties that any other person than the judge shall exercise his

functions in their case would be nugatory, even though the judge

should vacate his seat for the purposes of the hearing.2

Sometimes jurisdiction of the subject-matter will depend upon

considerations of locality, either of the thing in dispute or of the

parties. At law certain actions are local, and others are

["MOO] transitory. * The first can only be tried where the prop-

erty is which is the subject of the controversy, or in re-

spect to which the controversy has arisen. The United States

courts take cognizance of certain causes by reason only of the fact

that the parties are residents of different States or countries.'

1 Brown v. State, 8 Blackf. 561; Work v. Ohio, 2 Ohio, K. 8. 296; Cancemi

v. People, 18 N. Y. 128; Smith t>. People, 9 Mich. 193; Hill v. People, 16 Mich.

351. See abo State v. Turner, 1 Wright, 20.

• Winchester v. Ayres, 4 Greene (Iowa), 104.

3 See a case where a judgment of a United States court was treated as of no

force, because the court had not jurisdiction in respect to the plaintiff. Vose r.

Morton, 4 Cush. 27. As to third persons, a judgment against an individual may

sometimes be treated as void, when he was not suable in that court or in that

manner, notwithstanding he may have so submitted himself to the jurisdiction as
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The question of jurisdiction in these cases is sometimes deter-

mined by the common law, and sometimes is matter of statutory

regulation. But there is a class of cases in respect to which the

courts of the several States of the Union are constantly being

called upon to exercise authority, and in which, while the jurisdic-

tion is conceded to rest on considerations of locality, there has not,

unfortunately, at all times been entire harmony of decision as to

what shall confer jurisdiction. We refer now to suits for divorce

from the bonds of matrimony.

The courts of one State or country have no general authority to

grant divorce, unless for some reason they have control over the

particular marriage contract which is sought to be annulled. But

what circumstance gives such control? Is it the fact that the

marriage was entered into in such country or State? Or that the

alleged breach of the marriage bond was within that jurisdiction?

Or that the parties resided within it either at the time of the

marriage or at the time of the offence? Or that the parties now

reside in such State or country, though both marriage and offence

may have taken place elsewhere? Or must marriage, offence, and

residence, all or any two of them, combine to confer the authority?
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These are questions which have frequently demanded the thought-

ful attention of the courts, who have sought to establish a rule

at once sound in principle, and that shall protect as far as possible

the rights of the parties, one or the other of whom, unfortunately,

under the operation of any rule which can be established, it will

frequently be found has been the victim of gross injustice.

We conceive the true rule to be that the actual, bona fide res-

idence of either husband or wife within a State will give

to that * State authority to determine the status of such [* 401]

party, and to pass upon any questions affecting his or her

continuance in the marriage relation, irrespective of the locality of

the marriage, or of any alleged offence; and that any such court

in that State as the legislature may have authorized to take cogni-

zance of the subject may lawfully pass upon such questions, and

annul the marriage for any cause allowed by the local law. But

if a party goes to a jurisdiction other than that of his domicile for

the purpose of procuring a divorce, and has residence there for

to be personally bound. See Georgia R.R. &c. v. Harris, 5 Geo. 527; Hinch-

man v. Town, 10 Mich. 508.
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that purpose only, such residence is not bona fide, and does not

confer upon the courts of that State or country jurisdiction over

the marriage relation, and any decree they may assume to make

would be void as to the other party.1

1 There are a number of cases in which this subject has been considered. In

Inhabitants of Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227, instructions to a jury were

sustained, that if they were satisfied the husband, who had been a ciiizen o!

Massachusetts, removed to Vermont merely for the purpose of procuring a

divorce, and that the pretended cause for divorce arose, if it ever did arise,

in Massachusetts, and that the wife was never within the jurisdiction of the court

of Vermont, then and in such case the decree of divorce which the husband had

obtained in Vermont must be considered as fraudulently obtained, and that it

could not operate so as to dissolve the marriage between the parties. See also

Vischerf. Vischer, 12 Barb. 640; and McGitTert v. McGiffert, 31 Barb. 69. In

Chase v. Chase, 6 Gray, 157, the same ruling was had as to a foreign divorce,

notwithstanding the wife appeared in and defended the foreign suit. In Clark

v. Clark, 8 N. H. 21, the court refused a divorce on the ground that the alleged

cause of divorce (adultery), though committed within the State, was so commit-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ted while the parties had their domicile abroad. This decision was followed in

Greenlaw v. Greenlaw, 12 N. H. 200. The court say: "If the defendant never

had any domicile in this State, the libellant could not come here, bringing with

her a cause of divorce over which this court had jurisdiction. If at the time

of the [alleged offence] the domicile of the parties was in Maine, and> the farts

furnished no cause for a divorce there, she could not come here and allege those

matters which had already occurred, as a ground for a divorce under the laws of

this State. Should she under such circumstances obtain a decree of divorce

here, it must be regarded as a mere nullity elsewhere." In Frary r. FrarT.

10 N. H. 61, importance was attached to the fact that the marriage took place

in New Hampshire; and it was held that the court had jurisdiction of the wife's

application for a divorce, notwithstanding the offence was committed in Vermont,

but during the time of the wife's residence in New Hampshire. See also Kimball

v. Kimball, 13 N. H. 225; Bachelder v. Bachelder, 14 N. H. 380; Payson r.

Payson, 34 N. H. 518; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 35 N. H. 474. In Wilcox r. Wil-

cox, 10 Ind. 436, it was held that the residence of the libellant at the time of

the application for a divorce was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, and a decree

dismissing the bill because the cause for divorce arose out of the State was re-

versed. And see Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 407. See also Jackson v. Jackson.

1 Johns. 424; Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 263; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121;

Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407. In any of these cases the question of actual

residence will be open to inquiry wherever it becomes important, notwithstanding

the record of proceedings is in due form, and contains the affidavit of residence

required by the practice. L,eith v. Leith, 39 N. H. 20. And see McGiffert r.

McGiffert, 31 Barb. 69; Todd r. Kerr, 42 Barb. 317; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46

N. Y. 30; People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247. The Pennsylvania cases agree with

those of New Hampshire, in holding that a divorce should not be granted unless

the cause alleged occurred while the complainant had domicile within the State.
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* But to render the jurisdiction of a court effectual in [* 402]

any case, it is necessary that the thing in controversy, or

Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts, 349; Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Penn. St. 449;

McDermott's Appeal, 8 W. & S. 251. And they hold also that the injured party

in the marriage relation must seek redress in the forum of the defendant, unless

where such defendant has removed from what was before the common domicile of

both. Calvin v. Heed, 35 Penn. St. 376; Elder v. Reel, 02 Pt nn. St. 308; s. c.

1 Am. Rep. 414. For cases supporting to a greater or less extent the doctrine

stated in the text, see Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140; Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I.

87; Pawling v. Bird's ExYs, 13 Johns. 192; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272;

Harrison v. Harrison, 19 Ala. 499; Thompson v. State, 28 Ala. 12; Cooper v.

Cooper, 7 Ohio, 594; Mansfield v. Mclntyre, 10 Ohio, 28; Smith v. Smith, 4

Greene (Iowa), 266; Yates v. Yates, 2 Beasley, 280; Maguire v. Maguire,

7 Dana, 181 ; Waltz p. Waltz, 18 Ind. 449; Hull v. Hull, 2 Strob. Eq. 174;

Manley v. Manley, 4 Chand. 97; Hubbell v. Hubbell, 3 Wis. 662; Gleason p.

Gleason, 4 Wis. 64; Hare p. Hare, 15 Texas, 35.5. And see Story, Confl.

Laws, § 230 a; Bishop on Mar. and Div. 727 el seg.; ib. (4th ed.) Vol. II. § 155

el seq. The recent cases of Hoffman e. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30; s. c. 7 Am. Rep.

299; Elder p. Reel, 62 Penn. St. 308; s. c. 1 Am. Rep. 414; and People v.

Dawell, 25 Mich. 247, are very explicit in declaring that where neither party is

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

domiciled within a particular State, its courts can have no jurisdic tion in respect

to their marital status, and any decree of divorce made therein must he nugatory.

A number of the cases cited hold that the wife may have a domicile separate from

the husband, and may therefore be entitled to a divorce, though the husband

never resided in the State. These cases proceed upon the theory that, although

in general the domicile of the husband is the domicile of the wife, yet that if he

be guilty of such act or dereliction of duty in the relation as entitles her to have

it partially or wholly dissolved, she is at liberty to establish a separate jurisdic-

tional domicile of her own. Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87; Harding p. Alden,

9 Greenl. 140; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181; Hollister o. Hollister, 6 Penn.

St. 449. The doctrine in New York seems to be, that a divorce obtained in

another State, without personal service of process or appearance of the defend-

ant, is absolutely void. Vischer v. Vischer, 12 Barb. 640; McGiffort v. Mc-

Giffert, 31 Barb. 69; Todd p. Kerr, 42 Barb. 317. See Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio,

n. s. 502; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 415. An appearance by defendant afterwards for

the purposes of a motion to set aside the decree, which motion was defeated on

technical grounds, will not affect the question. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y.

30; 8. c. 7 Am. Rep. 299.

Upon the whole subject of jurisdiction in divorce suits, no case in the books

is more full and satisfactory than that of Ditson v. Ditson, supra, which reviews

and comments upon a number of the cases cited, and particularly upon the

Massachusetts cases of Barber B. Root, 10 Mass. 265; Inhabitants of Hanover

r. Turner, 14 Mass. 227; Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181; and Lyon r. Lyon,

2 Gray, 867. The divorce of one party divorces both. Cooper v. Cooper,

7 Ohio, 594. And will leave both at liberty to enter into new marriage relations,

unless the local statute expressly forbids the guilty party from contracting a

[471]
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the parties interested, be subjected to the process of the court.

Certain cases are said to proceed in rem, because they take notice

rather of the thing in controversy than of the persons concerned;

and the process is served upon that which is the object of

[* 403] the suit, without * specially noticing the interested parties;

while in other cases the parties themselves are brought

before the court by process. Of the first class admiralty proceed-

ings are an illustration ; the court acquiring jurisdiction by seizing

the vessel or other thing to which the controversy relates. In cases

within this class, notice to all concerned is required to be given,

either personally or by some species of publication or proclamation;

and if not given,'the court which had jurisdiction of the property

will have none to render judgment.1 Suits at the common law,

however, proceed against the parties whose interests are sought to

be affected; and only those persons are concluded by the adjudica-

tion who are served with process, or who voluntarily appear.2 Some

cases also partake of the nature both of proceedings in rem and of

personal actions, since, although they proceed by seizing property,
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they also contemplate the service of process on defendant parties.

Of this class are the proceedings by foreign attachment, in which

the property of a non-resident or concealed debtor is seized and

retained by the officer as security for the satisfaction of any judg-

ment that may be recovered against him, but at the same time pro-

second marriage. See Commonwealth v. Putnam, 1 Pick. 136; Baker v. People,

2 Hill, 325.

1 Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 594. See Matter of Empire City Bank, 18 N. Y.

199; Nations v. Johnson, 2i How. 204, 205; Blackwell on Tax Titles, 213.

* Jac k v. Thompson, 41 Miss. 49. As to the right of an attorney to notice of

proceedings to disbar him, see notes to pp. 337 and 404. "Notice of some kind

is the vital breath that animates judicial jurisdiction over the person. It is the

primary element of the application of the judicatory power. It is of the essence

of a cause. Without it there cannot be parties, and without parties there may

be the form of a sentence, but no judgment obligating the person." See Little-

ton v. Richardson, 34 N. H. 179; Black v. Black, 4 Bradf. Sur. Rep. 205.

Where, however, a statute provides for the taking of a certain security, and

authorizes judgment to be rendered upon it on motion, without process, the party

entering into the security must be understood to assent to the condition, and to

waive process and consent to judgment. Lewis v. Garrett's Adm'r, 6 Miss. 434;

People v. Van Eps, 4 Wend. 390; Chappee v. Thomas, 5 Mich. 53 ; Gildersleeve

v. People, 10 Barb. 35; People v. Lott, 21 Barb. 130; Pratt v. Donovan, 10

Wis. 378; Murray v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272; Philadelphia v. Com-

monwealth, 52 Penn. St. 451; Whitehurst v. Coleen, 53 111. 247.
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cess is issued to be served upon the defendant, and which must be

served, or some substitute for service had before judgment can be

rendered.

In such cases, as well as in divorce suits, it will often happen

that the party proceeded against cannot be found in the State, and

personal service upon him is therefore .impossible, unless it is

allowable to make it wherever he may be found abroad. But any

such service would be ineffectual. No State has authority to

invade the jurisdiction of another, and by service of process com-

pel parties there resident or being to submit their controversies to

the determination of its courts ; and those courts will consequently

be sometimes unable to enforce a jurisdiction which the State

possesses in respect to the subjects within its limits, unless

* a substituted service is admissible. A substituted service [* 404]

is provided by statute for many such cases; generally in

the form of a notice, published in the public journals, or posted, as

the statute may direct; the mode being chosen with a view to bring

it home, if possible, to the knowledge of the party to be affected,

and to give him an opportunity to appear and defend. The right

of the legislature to prescribe such notice, and to give it effect as
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process, rests upon the necessity of the case, and has been long

recognized and acted upon.1

But such notice is restricted in its legal effect, and cannot be

made available for all purposes. It will enable the court to give

effect to the proceeding so far as it is one in rem, but when the res

is disposed of, the authority of the court ceases. The statute may

give it effect so as far as the subject-matter of the proceeding is within

the limits, and therefore under the control, of the State; but the

notice cannot be made to stand in the place of process, so as to

1 " It may be admitted that a statute which authorized any debt or damages to

be adjudged against a person upon purely ex parte proceedings, without pretence

of notice, or any provision for defending, would be a violation of the constitu-

tion, and void; but when the legislature has provided a kind of notice by which

it is reasonably probable that the party proceeded against will be apprised of

what is going on against him, and an opportunity is afforded him«to defend, I

am of opinion that the courts have not the power to pronounce the proceedings

illegal." Denio, J., in Matter of Empire City Bank, 18 N. Y. 200. See, also,

per Morgan, J., in Rockwell v. Nearing, 35 N. Y. 314; Nations v. Johnson,

24 How. 195; Beard o. Beard, 21 Ind. 32-1; Mason v. Messenger, 17 Iowa, 261;

Cupp v. Commissioners of Seneca Co., 19 Ohio, n. s. 173; Campbell v. Evans,

45 N. Y. 356; Happy v. Mosher, 48 N. Y. 317.
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subject the defendant to a valid judgment against him person

In attachment proceedings, the published notice may be sufficiei

to enable the plaintiff to obtain a judgment which he can enf«

by sale of the property attached, but for any other purpose such

judgment would be ineffectual. The defendant could not be

followed into another State or country, and there have recovery

against him upon the judgment as an established demand. The

fact that process was not personally served is a conclusive objection

to the judgment as a personal claim, unless the defendant caused his

appearance to be entered in the attachment proceedings.1

[* 405] Where a party has property in a State, and * resides else-

where, his property is justly subject to all valid claims that

may exist against him there; but beyond this, due process of law

would require appearance or personal service before the defendant

could be personally bound by any judgment rendered.

The same rule applies in divorce cases. The courts of the State

where the complaining party resides have jurisdiction of the subject-

matter; and if the other party is a non-resident, they must be
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authorized to proceed without personal service of process. The

publication which is permitted by the statute is sufficient to justify

a decree in these cases changing the status of the complaining

party, and thereby terminating the marriage;2 and it might be

1 Pawling v. Willson, 13 Johns. 192; Heirs of Holman v. Bank of Norfolk,

12 Ala. 869; Curtis v. Gibbs, 1 Penn. 899; Miller's Ex'r v. Miller, 1 Bailey,

242; Cone v. Cotton, 2 Blaekf. 82; Kilburn v. Woodwortli, 5 Johns. 37; Rob-

inson v. Ward's Ex'r, 8 Johns. 86; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Bartlet r.

Knight, 1 Mass. 401; St. Albans v. Bush, 4 Vt. 58; Fenton v. Garlick, 8 Johns.

194; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Denison v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 508; Aldriuh v.

Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Hoxie v. Wright, 2 Vt. 263; Newell v. Newton, 10 Pick.

470; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 161; Armstrong v. Harshaw, 1 Dev. 188;

Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Bates v. Delavan, 5 Paige, 299; Webster

v. Reid. 11 How. 460; Gleason v. Uodd, 4 Met. 333; Green v. Custard, 23 How.

486. In Ex parte Heyfron, 7 How. (Miss.) 127, it was held that an attorney

could not be stricken from the rolls without notice of the proceeding, and oppor-

tunity to be heard. And see ante, p. 337 n. Leaving notice with one's family u

not equivalent to personal service. Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 829. And see

Bimeler v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 586.

* Hull v. Hull, 2 Strob. Eq. 174; Manley v. Manley, 4 Chand. 97; Hubbell

v. Hubbell, 8 Wis. 662; Mansfield v. Mclntyre, 10 Ohio, 28; Ditson v. Ditson,

4 R. I. 97; Harrison v. Harrison, 19 Ala. 499; Thompson v State, 28 Ala. 12;

Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181; Todd r.

Kerr, 42 Barb. 317. It is immaterial in these cases whether notice was actually
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sufficient also to empower the court to pass upon the question of

the custody and control of the children of the marriage, if they were

then within its jurisdiction. But a decree on this subject could

only be absolutely binding on the parties while the children remained

within the jurisdiction; if they acquire a domicile in another State

or country, the judicial tribunals of that State or country would

have authority to determine the question of their guardianship

there.1

* But in divorce cases, no more than in any other, can [* 406]

the court make a decree for the payment of money by a

defendant not served with process, and not appearing in the case,

which shall be binding upon him personally. It must follow, in

such a case, that the wife, when complainant, cannot obtain a valid

decree for alimony, nor a valid judgment for costs. If the defend-

ant had property within the State, it would be competent to provide

by law for the seizure and appropriation of such property, under

the decree of the court, to the use of the complainant; but the legal

tribunals elsewhere would not recognize a decree for alimony or for

costs not based on personal service or appearance. The remedy of

the complainant must generally, in these cases, be confined to a
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dissolution of the marriage, with the incidental benefits springing

therefrom, and to an order for the custody of the children, if within

the State.2

When the question is raised whether the proceedings of a court

may not be void for want of jurisdiction, it will sometimes be

brought home to the defendant or not. And see heirs of Holman v. Bank of

Norfolk, 12 Ala. 369.

1 This must be so on general principles, as the appointment of guardian for

minors is of local force only. See Monell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch. lo6; Wood-

worth p. Spring, 4 Allen, 821; Potter v. Hiscox, 30 Conn. 508 ; Kraft v. Wickpy,

4 G. & J. 322. The case of Townsend v. Kendall, 4 Minn. 412, appears to be

contra, but some reliance is placed by the court on the statute of the State which

allows the foreign appointment to be recognized for the purposes of a sale of the

real estate of a ward.

a See Jackson p. Jackson, 1 Johns. 424; Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140;

Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295; Crane v. Meginnis, 1 Gill & J. 463; Maguire

p. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181; Townsend p. Griffin, 4 Hair. 440. In Beard v. Beard,

21 Ind. 321, Perkins, J., after a learned and somewhat elaborate examination of

the subject, expresses the opinion that the State may permit a personal judgment

for alimony in the case of a resident defendant, on service by publication

only, though he conceded that there would be no such power in the case of non-

residents.
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important to note the grade of the court and the extent of its

authority. Some courts are of- general jurisdiction, by which is

meant that their authority extends to a great variety of matter?

while others are only of special and limited jurisdiction, by which

it is understood that they have authority extending only to certain

specified cases. The want of jurisdiction is equally fatal in the

proceedings of each; but different rules prevail in showing it. It

is not to be assumed that a court of general jurisdiction has in

any case proceeded to adjudge upon matters over which it had no

authority; and its jurisdiction is to be presumed, whether there

are recitals in its records to show it or not. On the other hand,

no such intendment is made in favor of the judgment of a court of

limited jurisdiction, but the recitals contained in the minutes of pro-

ceedings must be sufficient to show that the case was one which the

law permitted the court to take cognizance of, and that the par-

ties were subjected to its jurisdiction by proper process.1

[*407] "There is also another difference between these two

classes of tribunals in this, that the jurisdiction of the one
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may be disproved under circumstances where it would not be

allowed in the case of the other. A record is not commonly suf-

fered to be contradicted by parol evidence; but wherever a fact

showing want of jurisdiction in a court of general jurisdiction can

be proved without contradicting its recitals, it is allowable to do 90,

and thus defeat its effect.2 But in the case of a court of special

and limited authority, it is permitted to go still further, and to show

a want of jurisdiction even in opposition to the recitals contained

in the record.3 This we conceive to be the general rule, though

1 See Dakin v. Hudson, 6 Cow. 221; Cleveland v. Rogers, 6 Wend. 4:58;

People v. Koeber, 7 Hill, 39; Sheldon v. Wright, 1 Seld. 511; Clark o. Holmes,

1 Doug. (Mich.) 390; Cooper u. Sunderland, 3 Iowa, 114; Wall v. Trumbull,

16 Mich. 228; Denning v. Corwin, 11 Wend. 647; Bridge v. Ford, 6 Mass. 641;

Smith v. Rice, 11 Mass. 511; Barrett o. Crane, 16 Vt. 246; Teft v. Griffin,

5 Geo. 185; Jennings v. Stafford, 1 Ired. 404; Hershaw v. Taylor, 3 Jones, 513;

Perrine u. Fair, 2 Zab. 356; State v. Metzger, 26 Mo. 65.

5 See this subject considered at some length in Wilcox v. Kassick, 2 Mich.

165. And see Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 329; Bimelar v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 556;

Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 487.

3 Sheldon v. Wright, 5 N. Y. 497 ; Dyckman v. Mayor, &c, of N. Y., 5 N. Y.

434; Clark v. Holmes, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 390; Cooper v. Sunderland, 8 low*,

114; Sears v. Terry, 26 Conn. 273; Brown t>. Foster, 6 R. I. 564; Fawcett v.

Fowliss, 1 Man. & R. 102. But see Facey v. Fuller, 13 Mich. 527, where itwM
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there are apparent exceptions of those cases where the jurisdiction

may be said to depend upon the existence of a certain state of

facts, which must be passed upon by the courts themselves, and in

respect to which the decision of the court once rendered, if there

was any evidence whatever on which to base it, must be held final

and conclusive in all collateral inquiries, notwithstanding it may

have erred in its conclusions.1

held that the entry in the docket of a justice that the parties appeared and pro-

ceeded to trial was conclusive. And see Selin t>. Snyder, 7 S. & R. 72.

1 Britain p. Kinnard, 1 B. & B. 432. Conviction under the Bumboat Act.

The record was fair on its face, but it was insisted that the vessel in question was

not a "boat" within the intent of the act. Dallas, Ch. J.: "The general prin-

ciple applicable to cases of this description is perfectly clear: it is established by

all the ancient, and recognized by all the modern decisions; and the principle is,

that a conviction by a magistrate, who has jurisdiction over the subject-matter,

is, if no defects appear on the face of it, conclusive evidence of the facts stated

in it. Such being the principle, what are the facts of the present case? If the

subject-matter in the present case were a boat, it is agreed that the boat would be

forfeited; and the conviction stated it to be a boat. But it is said that, in order

to give the magistrate jurisdiction, the subject-matter of his conviction must be a
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boat; and that it is competent to the party to impeach the conviction by showing

that it was not a boat. I agree, that if he had not jurisdiction, the conviction

signifies nothing. Had he then jurisdiction in this case? By the act of Par-

liament he is empowered to search for and seize gunpowder in any boat on the

river Thames. Now, allowing, for the sake of argument, that ' boat' is a word

of technical meaning, and somewhat different from a vessel, still, it was a matter

of fact to be made out before the magistrate, and on which he was to draw his

own conclusion. But it is said that a jurisdiction limited as to person, place,

and subject-matter is stinted in its nature, and cannot be lawfully exceeded. I

agree: but upon the inquiry before the magistrate, does not the person form a

question to be decided upon the evidence? Does not the place, does not the

subject-matter, form such a question? The possession of a boat, therefore, with

gunpowder on board, is part of the offence charged; and how could the magis-

trate decide, but by examining evidence in proof of what was alleged? The

magistrate, it is urged, could not give himself jurisdiction by finding that to be a

fact which did not exist. But he is bound to inquire as to the fact, and when he

has inquired his conviction is conclusive of it. The magistrates have inquired in

the present instance, and they find the subject of conviction to be a boat. Much

has been said about the danger of magistrates giving themselves jurisdiction; and

extreme cases have been put, as of a magistrate seizing a ship of seventy-four

guns, and calling it a boat. Suppose such a thing done, the conviction is still

conclusive, and we cannot look out of it. It is urged that the party is without

remedy; and so he is, without civil remedy, in this and many other cases; his

remedy is by proceeding criminally; and if the decision were so gross as to call

a ship of seventy-four guns a boat, it would be good ground for a criminal pro-
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[* 408] * When it is once made to appear that a court has juris-

diction both of the subject-matter and of the parties, the

[* 409] judgment which * it pronounces must be held conclusive

and binding upon the parties thereto and their privies, not-

withstanding the court may have proceeded irregularly, or erred in

its application of the law to the case before it. It is a general rule

that irregularities in the course of judicial proceedings do not

render them void.1 An irregularity may be denned as the failure

to observe that particular course of proceeding which, conformably

with the practice of the court, ought to have been observed in the

case ;2 and if a party claims to be aggrieved by this, he must apply

ceeding. Formerly the rule was to intend every thing against a stinted jurisdic-

tion: that is not the rule now; and nothing is to be intended but what is fair

and reasonable, and it is reasonable to intend that magistrates will do what is

right." Richardson, J., in the same case, states the real point very clearly:

"Whether the vessel in question were a boat or no was a fact on which the

magistrate was to decide; and the fallacy lies in assuming that the fact which the

magistrate lias to decide is that which constitutes his jurisdiction. If a fact

decided as this has been might be questioned in a civil suit, the magistrate would
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never be safe in his jurisdiction. Suppose the case for a conviction under the

game laws of having partridges in possession: could the magistrate, in au action

of trespass, be called on to show that the bird in question was really a partridge?

and yet it might as well be urged, in that case, that the magistrate had no juris-

diction unless the bird were a partridge, as it may be urged in the present case

that he has none unless the machine be a boat. So in the case of a conviction for

keeping dogs for the destruction of game without being duly qualified to do so:

after the conviction had found that the offender kept a dog of that description,

could he, in a civil action, be allowed to dispute the truth of the conviction? In

a question like the present we are not to look at the inconvenience, but at the

law; but surely if the magistrate acts bona fide, and comes to his conclusion as

to matters of fact according to the best of his judgment, it would be highly

unjust if he were to have to defend himself in a civil action; and the more so, as

he might have been compelled by a mandamus to proceed on the investigation.

Upon the general principle, therefore, that where the magistrate has jurisdiction

his conviction is conclusive evidence of the facts stated in it, I think this rule

must be discharged.'' See also Mather v. Hodd, 8 Johns. 44; Mackaboy c.

Commonwealth, 2 Virg. Cas. 208; Ex parte Kellogg, 6 Vt. 509; State r. Scott,

1 Bailey, 294; Faeey v. Fuller, 13 Mich. 527; Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228;

Sheldon r. Wright, 5 N. Y. 512; Freeman on Judgments, § 523, and cases cited.

1 Ex parte Kellogg, 6 Vt. 509; Edgerton v. Hart, 8 Vt. 208; Carter e.

Walker, 2 Ohio, n. s. 339; Freeman on Judgments, § 135.

* "The doing or not doing that in the conduct of a suit at law, which, con-

formably to the practice of the court, ought or ought not to be done." Bouv.

Law Die. See Dick v. McLaurin, C3 N. C. 185.
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to the court in which the suit is pending to set aside the pro-

ceedings, or to give him such other redress as he thinks himself

entitled to; or he must take steps to have the judgment reversed

by removing the case for review to an appellate court, if any such

there be. Wherever the question of the validity of the proceedings

arises in any collateral suit, he will be held bound by them to the

same extent as if in all respects the court had proceeded according

to law. An irregularity cannot be taken advantage of collaterally;

that is to say, in any other suit than that in which the irregularity

occurs, or on appeal or process in error therefrom. And even in

the same proceeding an irregularity may be waived, and will com-

monly be held to be waived if the party entitled to complain of it

shall take any subsequent step in the case inconsistent with an

intent on his part to take advantage of it.1

We have thus briefly indicated the cases in which judicial action

may be treated as void because not in accordance with the

* law of the land. The design of the present work does [* 410]

not permit an enlarged discussion of the topics which sug-

gest themselves in this connection, and which, however interesting

and important, do not specially pertain to the subject of constitu-
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tional law.

But a party in any case has a right to demand that the judg-

ment of the court be given upon his suit, and he cannot be bound

by a delegated exercise of judicial power, whether the delegation

be by the courts or by legislative act devolving judicial duties on

ministerial officers.2 Proceedings in any such case would be void;

but they must be carefully distinguished from those cases in which

the court has itself acted, though irregularly. Even the denial of

1 Robinson v. West, 1 Sandf. 19; Malone v. Clark, 2 Hill, 657; Wood v.

Randall, 5 Hill, 285; Baker v. Kerr, 13 Iowa, 384; Loomis v. Wadhams, 8 Gray,

557; Warren v. Glynn, 37 N. U. 340. A strong instance of waiver is where,

on appeal from a court having no jurisdiction of the subject-matter to a court

having general jurisdiction, the parties going to trial without objection are held

bound by the judgment. Randolph Co. v. Ralls, 18 111. 29; Wells v, Scott,

4 Mich. 347; Tower v. Lamb, 6 Mich. 362. In Hoffman v. Locke, 19 Penn. St.

57, objection was taken on constitutional grounds to a statute which allowed

judgment to be entered up for the plaintiff in certain cases, if the defendant

failed to make and file an affidavit of merits; but the court sustained it.

* Hall v. Marks, 34 111. 363; Chandler v. Nash, 5 Mich. 409. For the dis-

tinction between judicial and ministerial acta, see Flournoy v. Jeffersonville, 17

Ind. 173.
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jury trial, in cases where that privilege is reserved by the Consti-

tution, does not render the proceedings void, but only makes them

liable to be reversed for the errop.1

There is also a maxim of law regarding judicial action which

may have an important bearing upon the constitutional validity of

judgments in some cases. No one ought to be a judge in his own

cause; and so inflexible and so manifestly just is this rule, that

Lord Coke has laid it down that "even an act of Parliament made

against natural equity, as to make a man a judge in his own case,

is void in itself; for jura naturce sunt immutabilia, and they are

leges legum."2

1 The several State constitutions preserve the right of trial by jury, with per-

mission in some for the parties to waive the right in civil cases. Those cases

which before the constitution were not triable by jury need not be made so now.

Dane Co. v. Dunning, 20 Wis. 210; Crandall v. James, 6 R. I. 104; Lake

Erie, &p., R. R. Co. p. Heath, 9 Ind. 558; Backus p. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19;

Opinions of Judges, 41 N. H. 551; Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322; Stilwell p.

Kellogg, 14 Wis. 461; Mead v. Walker, 17 Wis. 189; Byers v. Commonwealth,
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42 Penn. St. 89; State v. Peterson, 41 Vt. 504; Buffalo, &c. R.R. Co. p.

Burket, 26 Texas, 588; Sands v. Kimbark, 27 N. Y. 147; Howell v. Fry, 19

Ohio, n. s. 556; Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co., 102 Mass. 45; Guile

v. Brown, 38 Conn. 243. And where a new tribunal is created without commoo-

law powers, jury trial need not be given. Rhines v. Clark, 51 Penn. St. 96 ; Haines

v. Levin, ib. 412. But the legislature cannot deprive a party of a common-law

right, — e. g., a right of navigation, — and compel him to abide the estimate

of commissioners upon his damages. Haines v. Levin, 51 Penn. St. 412. Where

the constitution gives the right, it cannot be made by statute to depend upon

any condition. Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt. C. C. 311; Lincoln p. Smith, 27 Vl

328; Norristown, &c, Co. v. Burket, 26 Ind. 53. Though it has been held that,

if a trial is given in one court without a jury, with a right to appeal and to have

a trial by jury in the appellate court, that is sufficient. Beers p. Beers, 4 Conn.

535; Stewart v. Mayor, &c, 7 Md. 500; Morford v. Barnes, 8 Yerg. 444;

Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329. But we concur in the views of Judge Blatch-

ford, declared by him in the recent unreported case of Matter of Dana, that an

unconditional guaranty of jury trial cannot be satisfied, at least in criminal cases,

with the mere privilege to have a trial by jury on condition of first submitting to

a trial without it, and then, in case of conviction, taking an appeal. The guaranty

clearly intends a trial by jury in the first instance.

In Randall v. Kehlor, 60 Me. 37, objection was taken that the requirement of

the payment of a jury fee was in violation of the right of jury trial, but the

court held otherwise.

* Co. Lit. § 212. See Day v. Savadge, Hobart, 85. We should not venture

to predict, however, that even in a case of this kind, if one could be imagined to

exist, the courts would declare the act of Parliament void; though they would
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•This maxim applies in all cases where judicial functions [*411]

are to be exercised, and excludes all who are interested,

however remotely, from taking part in their exercise. It is not

left to the discretion of a judge, or to his sense of decency, to

decide whether he shall act or not; all his powers are subject to

this absolute limitation; and when his own rights are in question,

he has no authority to determine the cause.1 Nor is it essential

that the judge be a party named in the record; if the suit is

brought or defended in his interest, or if he is a corporator in a

corporation which is a party, or which will be benefited or damni-

fied by the judgment, he is equally excluded as if he were the party

named.2 Accordingly, where the Lord Chancellor, who was a

shareholder in a company in whose favor the Vice-Chancellor had

rendered a decree, affirmed this decree, the House of Lords re-

versed the decree on this ground, Lord Campbell observing: "It

is of the last importance that the maxim that 'no man is to be a

judge in his own cause' should be held sacred. And that is not

to be confined to a cause in which he is a party, but applies to a

cause in which he lias an interest." "We have again and again

set aside proceedings in inferior tribunals, because an individual
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who had an interest in a cause took a part in the decision. And

it will have a most salutory effect on these tribunals, when it is

known that this high court of last resort, in a case in which the

Lord Chancellor of England had an interest, considered that his

decree was on that account a decree not according to law, and

should be set aside. This will be a lesson to all inferior tribunals

to take care, not only that in their decrees they are not influenced

by their personal interest, but to avoid the appearance of laboring

under such an influence." 8

It is matter of some interest to know whether the legislatures

of the American States can set aside this maxim of the common

never find such an intent in the statute, if any other could possibly be made

consistent with the words.

1 Washington Insurance Co. v. Price, Ilopk. Ch. 2; Sigourney v. Sibley, 21

Pick. 191; Freeman on Judgments, § 144.

* Washington Insurance Co. v. Price, Hopk. Ch. 2; Dimes v. Proprietors of

Grand Junction Canal, 3 House of Lords Cases, 759; Pearce v. Atwood, 13

Mass. 340; Peck v. Freeholders of Essex, Spencer, 457; Commonwealth v.

McLane, 4 Gray, 427; Dively v. Cedar Rapids, 21 Iowa, 565.

3 Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal, 3 House of Lords Cases,

759.
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1

law, and by express enactment permit one to act judicially

[* 412] when * interested in the controversy. The maxim itself,

it is said, in some cases, does not apply where, from neces-

sity, the judge must proceed in the case, there being no other

tribunal authorized to act;1 but we prefer the opinion of Chan-

cellor Sandford of New York, that in such a case it belongs to the

power which created such a court to provide another in which this

judge may be a party; and whether another tribunal is established

or not, he at least is not intrusted with authority to determine his

own rights, or his own wrongs.2

It has been held that where the interest was that of corporator

in a municipal corporation, the legislature might provide that it

should constitute no disqualification where the corporation was a

party. But the ground of this ruling appears to be, that the

interest is so remote, trifling, and insignificant, that it may fairly

be supposed to be incapable of affecting the judgment or of influ-

encing the conduct of an individual.3 And where penalties are

imposed, to be recovered only in a municipal court, the judges or

iurors in which would be interested as corporators in the recovery,
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the law providing for such recovery must be regarded as preclud-

ing the objection of interest.4 And it is very common, in a certain

class of cases, for the law to provide that certain township and

county officers shall audit their own accounts for services rendered

the public; but in such case there is no adversary party, unless the

State, which passes the law, or the municipalities which are its

component parts and subject to its control, can be regarded as

such.

But except in cases resting upon such reasons, we do not see

how the legislature can have any power to abolish a maxim which

is among the fundamentals of judicial authority. The people,

indeed, when framing their constitution, may establish so great an

1 Ranger v. Great Western R., 5 House of Lords Cases, 88; Stewart t.

Mechanics and Fanners Bank, 19 Johns. 501.

1 Washington Insurance Co. v. Trice, Hopk. Ch. 2. This subject was con-

sidered in Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 221, and an appointment by a judge of pro-

bate of his wife's brother as administrator of an estate of which her father was

a principal creditor was held void. And see Feople v. Gies, 25 Mich. 83.

* Commonwealth v. Reed, 1 Gray, 475.

* Commonwealth v. Ryan, 5 Mass. 90; Hill v. Wells, 6 Pick. 104; Common-

wealth v. Emery, 11 Cash. 406.
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anomaly, if they see fit;1 but if the legislature is intrusted with

apportioning and providing for the exercise of the judicial power,

we cannot understand it to be authorized, in the execution of

this trust, to do that which has never been recognized

as * being within the province of the judicial authority. [* 413]

To empower one party to a controversy to decide it for

himself is not within the legislative authority, because it is not the

establishment of any rule of action or decision, but is a placing of

the other party, so far as that controversy is concerned, out of the

protection of the law, and submitting him to the control of one

whose interest it will be to decide arbitrarily and unjustly.2

Nor do we see how the objection of interest can be waived by

the other party. If not taken before the decision is rendered, it

will avail in an appellate court; and the suit may there be dis-

missed on that ground.3 The judge acting in such a case is not

simply proceeding irregularly, but he is acting without jurisdic-

tion. And if one of the judges constituting a court is disquali-

fied on this ground, the judgment will be void, even though the

proper number may have concurred in the result, not reckoning

the interested party.4
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Mere formal acts necessary to enable the case to be brought

before a proper tribunal for adjudication, an interested judge may

do;5 but that is the extent of his power.

1 Matter of Leefe, 2 Barb. Ch. 39.

* See Ames v. Port Huron Log-Driving and Booming Co., 11 Mich. 139;

Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 325.

3 Richardson v. Welcome, 6 Cush. 332; Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand

Junction Canal, 3 House of Lords Cases, 787. And see Sigourney v. Sibley, 21

Pick. 106; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547.

4 In Queen t>. Justices of Hertfordshire, 6 Queen's Bench, 753, it was decided

that, if any one of the magistrates hearing a case at sessions was interested, the

court was improperly constituted, and an order made in the case should be

quashed. It was also decided that it was no answer to the objection, that there

was a majority in favor of the decision without reckoning the interested party,

nor that the interested party withdrew before the decision, if he appeared to have

joined in discussing the matter with the other magistrates. See also the Queen

v. Justices of Suffolk, 18 Q. B. 416; The Queen v. Justices of London, to. 421;

Peninsula R.R. Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich. 26.

1 Richardson r. Boston, 1 Curtis, C. C. 251; Washington Insurance Co. v.

Price, Hopk. Ch. 1; Buckingham v. Davis, 9 Md. 324; Heydenfeldt v. Towns,

27 Ala. 430. If the judge who renders judgment in a cause had previously been

attorney in it, the judgment is a nullity. Reams v. Kearns, 5 Cold. 217.
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[*414] *CHAPTER XII.

LIBERTY OP SPEECH AND OP THE PRESS.

The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States

provides, among other things, that Congress shall make no law

abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. With jealous

care of what is almost universally regarded a sacred right, essen-

tial to the existence and perpetuity of free government, a provisioa

of similar import has been embodied in each of the State constitu-

tions, and a constitutional principle is thereby established which is

supposed to form a shield of protection to the free expression of

opinion in every part of our land.1

1 The following are the constitutional provisions: Maine: Every citizen mar

freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on any subject, being responsible

for the abuse of this liberty. No law shall be passed regulating or restraining

the freedom of the press; and, in prosecutions for any publication respecting

the official conduct of men in public capacity, or the qualifications of those who

are candidates for the suffrages of the people, or where the matter published is

proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and
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in all indictments for libel, the jury, after having received the direction of the

court, shall have a right to determine, at their discretion, the law and the fact.

Declaration of Rights, § 4,—New Hampshire: The liberty of the press is

essential to the security of freedom in a State; it ought, therefore, to be inviola-

bly preserved. Bill of Rights, § 22.— Vermont: That the people have aright

to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments concerning

the transactions of government; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to

be restrained. Declaration of Rights, Art. 13.—Massachusetts: The liberty

of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a State; it ought not,

therefore, to be restrained in this Commonwealth. Declaration of Rights, Art.

16. — Rhode Island: The liberty of the press being essential to the security of

freedom in a State, any person may publish his sentiments on any subject, being

responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for libel, both civil and

criminal, the truth, unless published from malicious motives, shall be sufficient

defence to the person charged. Art. 1, § 20, — Connecticut: No law shall ever

be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press. In all

prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in evidence, and the

jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction

of the court. Art. 1, §§ 6 and 7.—New York: Every person may freely speak,
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* It is to be observed of these several provisions, that [*415]

they recognize certain rights as now existing, and seek to

write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse

of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of

speech or the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for libels, the

truth may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jury that

the matter charged as libellous is true, and was published with good motives and

for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted, and the jury shall have the right

to determine the law and the fact. Art. 1, § 8. — New Jersey: Every person

may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being respon-

sible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge

the liberty of speech or of the press. In all prosecutions or indictments for

libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to

the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and was published with

good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the

jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact. Art. 1, § 5. —

Peniuiylvania: That the printing-presses shall be free to every person who

undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch of gov-

ernment, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The free
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communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man,

and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being re-

sponsible for the abuse of the liberty. In prosecutions for the publication of

papers, investigating the official conduct of officers or men in public capacity,

or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof

may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a

right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in

other cases. Art. 9, § 7, — Delaware: The press shall be free to every citizen

who undertakes to examine the official conduct of men acting in public capacity,

and any citizen may print on any such subject, being responsible for the abuse of

that liberty. In prosecutions for publications investigating the proceedings of

officers, or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth

thereof may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the jury may

determine the facts and the law, as in other cases. Art. 1, § 5. — Maryland:

That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen

of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write, and publish his sentiments on

all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege. Declaration of

Rights, Art. 40. — West Virginia: No law abridging the freedom of speech or

of the press shall be passed; but the legislature may provide for the restraint

and punishment of the publishing and vending of obscene books, papers, and

pictures, and of libel and defamation of character, and for the recovery in civil

action, by the aggrieved party, of suitable damages for such libel or defamation.

Attempts to justify and uphold an armed invasion of the State, or an organized

insurrection therein during the continuance of such invasion or insurrection, by

publicly speaking, writing, or printing, or by publishing or circulating such

writing or printing, may be by law declared a misdemeanor, and punished

accordingly. In prosecutions and civil suits for libel, the truth may be given in
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[• 416] protect and perpetuate * them, by declaring that they shall

not be abridged, or that they shall remain inviolate. They

evidence; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous

is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the verdict

shall be for the defendant. Art. 2, §§4 and 5. — Kentucky: That printing-

presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings

of the General Assembly, or any branch of the government, and no law shall

ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The free communication of thoughts

and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freelv

speak, write, and print, on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that

liberty. In all prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the offi-

cial conduct of officers or men in a public capacity, or where the matter pub-

lished is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence;

and in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a right to determine the

law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other cases. Art. 13, §§ 9

and 10. — Tennessee: Nearly the same as Pennsylvania. Art. 1, § 19. — Ohio:

Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all sub-

jects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed
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to restrain or abridge liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal pros-

ecutions for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it

shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and was

published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted.

Art. 1, § 11. —Iowa, Art. 1, § 7, and Nevada, Art. 1, § 9. Substantially same as

Ohio. — Illinois: Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all sub-

jects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for libel,

both civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good motives and for

justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defence. Art. 2, § 4. — Indiana: No law

shall be passed restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restrict-

ing the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but for

the abuse of that right every person shall be responsible. In all prosecutions

for libel, the truth of the matters alleged to be libellous may be given in jus-

tification. Art. 1, §§ 9 and 10. — Michigan: In all prosecutions for libels, the

truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury

that the matter charged as libellous is true, and was published with good motives

and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted. The jury shall have the

right to determine the law and the fact. Art. 6, § 25. — Wisconsin: Same as

New York. Art. 1, § 3. — Minnesota: The liberty of the press shall for ever

remain inviolate, and all persons may freely speak, write, and publish their sen-

timents on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right. Art. 1,

§ 3. — Oregon: No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opin-

ion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject what-

ever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right. Art. 1,

§ 8. — California: Same as New York. Art. 1, § 9. — Kansas: The liberty of

the press shall be inviolate, and all persons may freely speak, write, or publish

their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right;

and in all civil or criminal actions for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to
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do not assume to create new rights, but * their purpose is [* 417]

to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of those already

the jury; and if it 6hall appear that the alleged libellous matter was published

for justifiable ends, the accused party shall be acquitted. Bill of Rights, § 11.

— Missouri: That the free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the

invaluable rights of man; and that every person may freely speak, write, and

print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; that in all

prosecutions for libel, the truth thereof may be given in evidence, and the jury

may determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court. Art. 1,

§27. — Nebraska: Same as New York. Art. 1, § 3. — Arkansas: The liberty

of the press shall for ever remain inviolate. The free communication of thoughts

and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and all persons may freely

speak, write, and publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for

the abuse of such right. In all criminal prosecutions for libel, the truth may be

given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter

charged as libellous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifi-

able ends, the party shall be acquitted. Art. 1, § 2.—Florida: Every person

may freely speak and write his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for

the abuse of that right, and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the

liberty of speech or the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for
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libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it appear that the

matter charged as libellous is true, and was published with good motives, the

party shall be acquitted or exonerated. Declaration of Rights, § 10. — Georgia:

Freedom of speech, and freedom of the press, are inherent elements of political

liberty. But while every citizen may freely speak or write or print on any

subject, he shall be responsible for the abuse of the liberty. Art. 1, § 9.—

Louisiana: The press shall be free; every citizen may freely speak, write, and

publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this

liberty. Title 1, Art. 4. — North Carolina: The freedom of the press is one of

the great bulwarks of liberty, and therefore ought never to be restrained; but

every individual shall be held responsible for the abuse of the same. Declaration

of Rights, § 20. — South Carolina: All persons may freely speak, write, and

publish their sentiments on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that

right; and no laws shall be enacted to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech

or of the press. In prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the

official conduct of officers or men in public capacity, or when the matter pub-

lished is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evi-

dence; and in all indictments for libel the jury shall be judges of the law and the

facts. Art. 1, §§ 7 and 8. — Alabama: That any citizen may speak, write, and

publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that

liberty. That in prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the

official conduct of officers or men in public capacity, or when the matter published

is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence;

and that in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have the right to determine

the law and the facts, under the direction of the court. Art. 1, §§ 6 and 13. —

Mississippi: The freedom of speech and of the press shall be held sacred; and
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possessed. Wo are at once, therefore, turned back from these pro-

visions to the pre-existing law, in order that we may ascertain what

the rights are which are thus protected, and what is the extent of

the privileges they undertake to assure.

At the common law, however, it will be found that liberty of the

press was neither well protected nor well denned. The art of print-

ing, in the hands of private persons, has, until within a compar-

atively recent period, been regarded rather as an instrument of

mischief, which required the restraining hand of the government,

than as a power for good, to be fostered and encouraged. Like a

vicious beast it might be made useful if properly harnessed and

restrained. The government assumed to itself the right to deter-

mine what might or might not be published; and censors

[* 418] were appointed * without whose permission it was criminal

to publish a book or paper upon any subject. Through all

the changes of government, this censorship was continued until

after the Revolution of 1688, and there are no instances in English

history of more cruel and relentless persecution than for the pub-
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lication of books which now would pass unnoticed by the author-

ities. To a much later day the press was not free to publish even

the current news of the day where the government could suppose

itself to be interested in its suppression. Many matters, the pub-

lication of which now seems important to the just, discreet, and

harmonious working of free institutions, and to the proper obser-

vation of public officers by those interested in the discharge of

their duties, were treated by the public authorities as offences

against good order, and contempts of their authority. By a fiction

not very far removed from the truth, the Parliament was supposed

in all indictments for libel, the jury shall determine the law and the facts, under

the direction of the court. Art. 1, §4. — Texas: Every citizen shall be at lib-

erty to speak, write, or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for

the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the lib-

erty of speech or of the press. In prosecutions for the publication of papers,

investigating the official conduct of officers or men in a public capacity, or when

the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be

given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have the

right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in

other cases. Art. 1, §§ 5 and 6. — Virginia: That the freedom of the press is

one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic

governments, and any citizen may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all

subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. Art. 1, § 14.
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to sit with closed doors. No official publication of its debates was

provided for, and no other was allowed.1 The brief sketches which

found their way into print were usually disguised under the garb

of discussions in a fictitious parliament, held in a foreign country.

Several times the Parliament resolved that any such publication,

or any intermeddling by letter-writers, was a breach of their priv-

ileges, and should be punished accordingly on discovery of the

offenders. For such a publication in 1747 the editor of the " Gen-

tleman's Magazine" was brought to the bar of the House of

Commons for reprimand, and only discharged on expressing his

contrition. The general publication of Parliamentary debates

dates only from the American Revolution, and even then was still

considered a technical breach of privilege.2

The American Colonies followed the practice of the. parent coun-

try.3 Even the laws were not at first published for general circu-

lation, and it seemed to be thought desirable by the magistrates

to keep the people in ignorance of the precise boundary

* between that which was lawful and that which was pro- [* 419]

hibited, as more likely to make them avoid all doubtful
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actions. The magistrates of Massachusetts, when compelled by

public opinion to suffer the publication of general laws in 1649,

1 In 1641, Sir Edward Deering was expelled and imprisoned for publishing a

collection of his own speeches, and the book was ordered to be burned by the

common hangman. See May's Const. Hist. p. 7.

* See May's Constitutional History, p. 7, 9, and 10, for a complete account

of the struggle between the government and the press, resulting at last in the

complete enfranchisement and protection of the latter in the publication of all

matters of public interest, and in the discussion of public affairs. Freedom to

report proceedings and debates was due at last to Wilkes, who, worthless as he

was, proved a great public benefactor in his obstinate defence of liberty of the

press and security from arbitrary search and arrest. A fair publication of a

debate is now held to be privileged; and comments on public legislative proceed-

ings are not actionable, so long as a jury shall think them honest and made in a

fair spirit, and such as are justified by the circumstances. Wason v. Walter,

Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 73.

'The General Court of Massachusetts "appointed two persons, in October,

1662, licensers of the press, and prohibited the publishing any books or papers

which should not be supervised by them, and in 1668 the supervisors having

allowed of the printing 1 Thomas a Kempis de imitatione Christi,' the court inter-

posed, ' it being wrote by a popish minister, and containing some things less safe

to be infused among the people,' and therefore they commended to the licensers

a more full revisal, and ordered the press to stop in the mean time." 1 Hutchin-

son's Mass. 257, 2d ed.
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permitted it under protest, as a hazardous experiment. For pub-

lishing the laws of one session in Virginia, in 1682, the printer

was arrested and put under bonds until the king's pleasure could

be known, and the king's pleasure was declared that no printing

should be allowed in the Colony.1 There were not wanting in-

stances of the public burning of books, as offenders against good

order. Such was the fate of Elliot's book in defence of unmixed

principles of popular freedom,2 and Calef's book against Cotton

Mather, which was given to the flames at Cambridge.3 A single

printing-press was introduced into the Colony so early as 1640;

but the publication even of State documents did not become free

until 1719, when, after a quarrel between Governor Shute and the

House, he directed that body not to print one of their remon-

strances, and, on their disobeying, sought in vain to procure the

punishment of their printer.4 When Dongan was sent out as

Governor of New York in 1683, he was expressly instructed to

suffer no printing,5 and that Colony obtained its first press in 1692,

through a Philadelphia printer being driven thence for publishing

an address from a Quaker, in which he accused his brethren in

office of being inconsistent with their principles in exercising polit-
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ical authority.6 So late as 1671, Governor Berkley of Virginia

expressed his thankfulness that neither free schools nor printing

were introduced in the Colony, and his trust that these breeders

of disobedience, heresy, and sects, would long be unknown.'

The public bodies of the united nation did not at once invite

publicity to their deliberations. The Constitutional Convention of

1787 sat with closed doors, and although imperfect reports of the

debates have since been published, the injunction of secrecy upon

its members was never removed.

The Senate for a time followed this example, and the

[*420] first open * debate was had in 1793, on the occasion of the

controversy over the right of Mr. Gallatin to a seat in that

1 1 Hildreth, History of the United States, 561.

• 1 Hutchinson's Mass. (2d ed.) 211; 2 Bancroft, 73; 1 Hildreth, 452; 2

Palfrey's New England, 511, 512.

'1 Bancroft, 97; 2 Hildreth, 166.

4 2 Hildreth, 298.

'2 Hildreth, 77.

6 2 Hildreth, 171.

7 1 Hildreth, 626; 2 Hen. Stat. 517; Wise's Seven Decades of the Union,

310.
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body.1 The House of Representatives sat with open doors from

the first, tolerating the presence of reporters, — over whose admis-

sion, however, the Speaker assumed control, — and refusing iu

1796 the pittance of two thousand dollars for full publication of

debates.

It must be evident from these brief references that liberty of the

press, as now understood and enjoyed, is of very recent origin;a

and commentators seem to be agreed in the opinion that the term

itself means only that liberty of publication without the previous

permission of the government, which was obtained by the abolition

of the censorship. In a strict sense, Mr. Hallam says, it consists

merely in exemption from a licenser.3 A similar view is expressed

by De Lolme. "Liberty of the press," he says, " consists in this:

that neither courts of justice, nor any other judges whatever, are

authorized to take notice of writings intended for the press, but

are confined to those which are actually printed."4 Blackstone

also adopts the same opinion,6 and it has been followed by Ameri-

can commentators of standard authority as embodying correctly

the idea incorporated in the constitutional law of the country by

the provisions in the American Bills of Rights.0
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It is conceded on all sides that the common-law rules that sub-

jected the libeller to responsibility for the private injury, or the

public scandal or disorder occasioned by his conduct, are not

abolished by the protection extended to the press in our constitu-

tions. The words of Ch. J. Parker of Massachusetts on this sub-

ject have been frequently quoted, generally recognized as sound

1 "This broke the spell of deliberations in secret conclave; and a few days

afterwards, on the 20th of the same month, a general resolution was adopted by

the Senate, that, after the end of the present annual session, its proceedings in

its legislative capacity should be with open doors, unless in special cases which,

in the judgment of the body, should require secrecy." Life of Madison, by

Rives, Vol. 3, p. 371.

The first legislative body in America to throw open its debates to the publio

was the General Court of Massachusetts, in 1766, on the motion of Otis. Tudor's

Life of Otis, 252.

* It is mentioned neither in the English Petition of Rights nor in the Bill of

Rights; of so little importance did it seem to those who were seeking to redress

grievances in those days.

3 Hallam's Const. Hist, of England, c. 15.

* De Lolme, Const, of England, 254.

* 4 Bl. Com. 151.

'Story on Const. § 1889; 2 Kent, 17 et seq.; Rawle on Const, c. 10.
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in principle, and accepted as authority. "Nor does our constitu-

tion or declaration of rights," he says, speaking of his own State,

"abrogate the common law in this respect, as some have insisted.

The sixteenth article declares that' liberty of the press is essential

to the security of freedom in a State; it ought not therefore to be

restrained in this Commonwealth.' The liberty of the

[* 421] press, not its licentiousness: * this is the construction

which a just regard to the other parts of that instrument,

and to the wisdom of those who founded it, requires. In the

eleventh article it is declared that every subject of the Common-

wealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the

laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person,

property, or character; and thus the general declaration in the

sixteenth article is qualified. Besides, it is well understood and

received as a commentary on this provision for the liberty of the

press, that it was intended to' prevent all such previous restraint!

upon publications as had been practised by other governments, and

in early times here, to stifle the efforts of patriots towards enlight-
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ening their fellow-subjects upon their rights and the duties of

rulers. The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he

who used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse; like the

right to keep fire-arms, which does not protect him who uses them

for annoyance or destruction." 1

But while we concede that liberty of speech and of the press does

not imply complete exemption from responsibility for every thing

a citizen may say or publish, and complete immunity to ruin the

reputation or business of others so far as falsehood and detraction

may be able to accomplish that end, it is nevertheless believed that

the mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is

secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words to

be uttered orally there can be no previous censorship, and the

liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery and a delusion,

and the phrase itself a byword if, while every man was at liberty

to publish what he pleased, the public authorities might neverthe-

less punish him for harmless publications.

An examination of the controversies which have grown out of

1 Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 313. See charge of Chief Justice

McKean of Penn., 5 Hililreth, 166 ; Wharton's State Trials, 323; State r. Letire,

2 Rep. Const. Court, 809; Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates, 267.
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the repressive measures resorted to for the purpose of restraining

the free expression of opinion will sufficiently indicate the purpose

of the guaranties which have since been secured against such

restraints in the future. Except so far as those guaranties relate

to the mode of trial, and are designed to secure to every accused

person the right to be judged by the opinion of a jury upon the

criminality of his act, their purpose has evidently been to protect

parties in the free publication of matters of public con-

cern, to * secure their right to a free discussion of public [* 422]

events and public measures, and to enable every citizen at

any time to bring the government and any person in authority to

the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct

in the exercise of the authority which the people have conferred

upon them. To guard against repressive measures by the several

departments of the government, by means of which persons in

power might secure themselves and their favorites from just scru-

tiny and condemnation, was the general purpose; and there was

no design or desire to modify the rules of the common law which
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protected private character from detraction and abuse, except so

far as seemed necessary to secure to accused parties a fair trial.

The evils to be guarded against were not the censorship of the

press merely, but any action of the government by means of which

it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters

as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelli-

gent exercise of their rights as citizens.

The constitutional liberty of speech and of the press, as we un-

derstand it, implies a right to freely utter and publish whatever

the citizen may please, and to be protected against any respon-

sibility for so doing, except so far as such publications, from their

blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public

offence, or as by their falsehood and malice they may injuriously

affect the standing, reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals.

Or, to state the same thing in somewhat different words, we under-

stand liberty of speech and of the press to imply not only liberty to

publish, but complete immunity from legal censure and punishment

for the publication, so long as it is not harmful in its character,

when tested by such standards as the law affords. For these stand-

ards we must look to the common-law rules which were in force

when the constitutional guaranties were established, and in refer-

ence to which they have been adopted.

[ 493 ]

* 422 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XII.

At i he common law an action would lie against any person pub-

lishing a false and malicious communication tending to disgrace or

injure anothep. Falsehood, malice, and injury were the elements

of the action; but as the law presumed innocence of crime or mis-

conduct until the contrary was proved, the falsity of an injurious

publication was presumed until its truth was averred and substan-

tiated by the defendant; and if false, malice in the publication was

also presumed unless the publication was privileged under rules to

be hereafter stated. There were many cases, also, where

[* 423] the law presumed injury, and did not call upon the * com-

plaining party to make any other showing that he was

damnified than such implication as arose from the character of the

communication itself. If it accused him of a criminal offence,

involving moral turpitude, and such as would subject a party

proved guilty of it to punishment by imprisonment;1 if it charged

him with an infectious disease, the effect of the charge, if believed,

being to exclude him from the society of his fellows;2 if the charge

affected the party in his business, office, or means of livelihood, like

1 Alexander v. Alexander, 9 Wend. 141; Wagaman p. Byers, 17 Md. 183;

Castlebcry v. Kelly, 26 Geo. 606; Redway v. Gray, 31 Vt. 292; Hoag p. Hatch,
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23 Conn. 585; Burton v. Burton, 3 Greene (Iowa), 316; Wright v. Paige, 36

Barb. 438 ; Simmons v. Holster, 13 Minn. 219. But the charge must be unequiv-

ocal. Van Rensselaer v. Dole, 1 Johns. Cas. 279; Dexter v. Taber, 12 Jobn».

239; Hopkins p. Beedle, 1 Caines, 347; Butterfield v. Buffam, 9 N. H. 156;

Holt v. Scolefield, 6 T. R. 691; Jacobs v. Fyler, 3 Hill, 572; Crone v. Angell,

14 Mich. 340; Bonner v. McPhail, 31 Barb. 106; Mower v. Watson, 11 Vt.536;

Wilson v. Noonan, 23 Wis. 105; Simmons p. Holster, 13 Min. 249. Though it

is not necessary that technical words be employed; if the necessary inference,

taking the words together, is a charge of crime, it is sufficient. Morgan v. Liv-

ingston, 2 Rich. 573; True v. Plumley, 36 Me. 466; Curtis v. Curtis, 10 Bing.

477. It is not essential that the charge should be such as, if true, to subject the

party novo to punishment. It is the disgrace attending the charge that gives the

right of action, and therefore to say that the person is a returned convict is

actionable. Baum v. Clause, 5 Hill, 196; Smith v. Stewart, 5 Penn. St. 372;

Utley p. Campbell, 5 T. B. Monp. 396; Holley p. Burgess, 9 Ala. 728. Or to

accuse him of a crime for which prosecution would be barred by statute of limi-

tations would be actionable. Van Ankin v. Westfall, 14 Johns. 233; Poe c.

Grever, 3 Sneed, 664; Stewart v. Howe, 17 1ll. 71. It has been held that to

charge a man with a purely military offence, v. g., desertion, is not actionable

per se. Hollingsworth p. Shaw, 19 Ohio, N. s. 480; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 411.

'Carlslake v. Mapledorum, 2 T. R. 473; Bloodworth p. Gray, 7 M. & G. 334;

Nichols v. Guy, 2 Iud. 82; Watson v. McCarthy, 2 Kelly, 57.
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charging a trader with insolvency, and the like ;1 or if any injuri-

ous charge holding a party up to public contempt, scorn, or ridicule

was propagated by printing, writing, signs, burlesques, &c.,2— the

law presumed injury, and the charge was said to be actionable per

se. And although it was formerly held that to charge a female

verbally witli want of chastity was not actionable without proof of

special damage,3 yet of late a disposition has been exhibited

to * break away from this rule in favor of one more just [*424]

and sensible,4 and the statutes of several of the States

have either made adultery and incontinence punishable as crimes,

whereby to charge them becomes actionable per se under the com-

mon-law rule, or else in express terms have declared such a charge

actionable without proof of special damage.6

1 Lindsey v. Smith, 7 Johns. 360; Thomas p. Croswell, 7 Johns. 264; Riggs

v. Denniston, 8 Johns. Cas. 198; Fonvard p. Adams, 7 Wend. 204; Sanderson

e. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 398; 8. c. 6 Am. Rep. 105.

• Janson v. Stuart, 1 T. R. 748; Van Ness v. Hamilton, 19 Johns. 367; Clegg

r. Laffer, 10 Bing. 250; Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 214.

3 Gascoign v. Ambler, 2 Ld. Raym. 1004; Graves v. Blanchet, 2 Salk. 696;

Wilby v. Elston, 8 C. B. 142; Buys v. Gillespie, 2 Johns. 115; Brooker v. Coffin,
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5 Johns. 188; Bradt v. Towsley, 13 Wend. 253; Dyer v. Morris, 4 Mo. 214;

Stanfield v. Boyer, 6 H. & J. 248; Woodbury v. Thompson, 3 N. H. 194; Berry

v. Carter, 4 Stew. & Port. 387; Elliot v. Ailsbury, 2 Bibb, 473; Linney v.

Malton, 13 Texas, 449; Underbill v. Welton, 32 Vt. 40.

* See the cases of Sexton p. Todd, Wright, 317; Wilson p. Runyan, ib. 671; ■

Malone v. Stewart, 15 Ohio, 319; Moberly p. Preston, 8 Mo. 402; Sidgreaves

v. Myatt, 22 Ala. 617; Terry v. Bright, 4 Md. 430; Spencer p. McMasters,

16 111. 405.

5 See Frisbie v. Fowler, 2 Conn. 707; Miller p. Parish, 8 Pick. 384; Robbins

v. Fletcher, 101 Mass. 115; Pledger v. Hitchcock, 1 Kelley, 550; Smally v.

Anderson, 2 T. B. Monr. 56; Williams v. Bryant, 4 Ala. 44; Dailey v. Reynolds,

4 Greene (Iowa), 354; Symonds p. Carter, 32 N. H. 458; McBrayer v. Hill,

4Ired. 136; Morris v. Barkley, 1 Lit 64; Phi lips r. Wiley, 2 Lit. 153; Watts

t. Greenlee, 2 Dev. 115; Drummond p. Leslie, 5 Blackf. 453; Worth v. Butler,

7 Blackf. 251; Richardson p. Roberts, 23 Geo. 215; Buford p. Wible, 32 Perm.

St. 95; Freeman v. Price, 2 Bailey, 115; Regnier p. Cabot, 2 Gil. 34; Ranger

». Goodrich, 17 Wis. 78; Adams p. Rankin, 1 Duvall, 58; Downing p. Wilson,

86 Ala. 717; Cox v. Bunker, Morris, 269; Smith p. Silence, 4 Iowa, 321; Tru-

man p. Taylor, ib. 424; Beardsley v. Bridgeman, 17 Iowa, 242; Patterson p.

Wilkinson, 55 Me. 45. The injustice of the common-law rule is made prominent

'n those cases where it has been held that an allegation that, in conseiuence of

the charge, the plaintiff had fallen into disgrace, contempt, and infamy, and lost

her credit, reputation, and peace of mind (Woodbury v. Thompson, 3 N. H.

194), and that she is shunned by her neighbors (Beach p. Ranney, 2 Hill, 310),

was not a sufficient allegation of special damage to support the action.
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But in any other case a party complaining of a false, malicious,

and disparaging communication might maintain an action therefor,

on averment and proof of special damage;1 though the truth of the

charge, if pleaded and established, was generally a complete de-

fence.2

In those cases in which the injurious charge was propagated by

printing, writing, signs, burlesques, &c, there might also be a

criminal prosecution, as well as a suit for private damages. The

criminal prosecution was based upon the idea that the tendency of

such publications was to excite to a breach of the public peace;3

and it might be supported in cases where the injurious publication

related to whole classes or communities of people, without singling

out any single individual so as to entitle him to a private remedy.4

1 Kelley v. Partington, 3 Nev. & M. 116; Steele ». Southwick, 9 Johns. 214;

Hallock v. Miller, 2 Barb. 630; Powers v. Dubois, 17 Wend. 63; Weed v. Foster,

11 Barb. 203; Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio, 347; Stone r. Cooper, 2 Denio, 293.

The damage, however, must be of a pecuniary character. Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill,

309. But very slight damage has been held sufficient to support considerable

recoveries. Williams t>. Hill, 19 Wend. 305; Bradt p. Towsley, 13 Wend. 253;

Olmsted o. Miller, 1 Wend. 506; Moore v. Meagher, 1 Taunt. 39; Knight t>.
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Gibbs, 1 Ad. & El. 43.

* See 1 Hilliard on Torts, 410; Heard on Libel and Slander, § 151; Towns-

end on Libel and Slander, § 73.

• Commonwealth r. Clap, 4 Mass. 168.

4 In Palmer v. Concord, 48 N. H. 214, suit was brought against a town for

the destruction of a printing press by a mob. The defence was, that plaintiff

had caused the mob by libellous articles published in his paper reflecting upon the

army. Smith, J., says: "The first of these articles charges the United States'

forces in Virginia with cowardice, and holds them up as objects of ridicule there-

for. The fourth article calls the army a ' mob ;1 and although the charges of mur-

der and robbery may perhaps be considered as limited in their application, the

charge of cowardice against the whole army is repeated. The fifth article in

effect charges those bodies of soldiers who passed through, or occupied, Hampton,

Martinsburg, Fairfax, or Germantown, with improper treatment of persons of all

ages and sexes, in each of those places. If such charges had been made against

a single soldier named in the articles, they would prima facie have constituted a

libel. The tendency to expose him to contempt or ridicule could not be doubted,

and the tendency to injure his professional reputation would be equally apparent.

A soldier's character for courage or discipline is as essential to his good stand-

ing as a merchant's reputation for honesty, or a physician's reputation as to pro-

fessional learning or skill, would be in their respective callings. And by military

law, to which the soldier is amenable, we suppose cowardice would be regarded

a crime punishable by severe penalties. As these charges were made against a

body of men, without specifying individuals, it may be that no individual soldier
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On similar grounds to publish injurious charges against a

foreign * prince or ruler was also held punishable as a pub- [* 425]

could have maintained a private action therefor. But the question whether the

publication might not afford ground for a public prosecution is entirely different.

Civil suits for libel are maintainable only on the ground that the plaintiff has indi-

vidually suffered damage. Indictments for libel are sustained principally because

the publication of a libel tends to a breach of the peace, and thus to the disturb-

ance of society at large. It is obvious that a libellous attack on a body of men,

though no individuals be pointed out, may tend as much, or more, to create public

disturbances as an attack on one individual; and a doubt has been suggested

whether ' the fact of numbers defamed does not add to the enormity of the act.'

See 2 Bishop on Criminal Law, 3d ed. § 922; Holt on Libel, 216-47; Russell on

Crimes, 1st Am. ed. 305-332. In Sumner v. Buel, 12 Johns. 47.r>, where a

majority of the court held that a civil action could not be maintained by an

officer of a regiment, for a publication reflecting on the officers generally, unless

there was an averment of special damage, Thompson, Ch. J., said, p. 478: 'The

offender, in such case, does not go without punishment. The law has provided

a fit and proper remedy, by indictment; and the generality and extent of such

libels make them more peculiarly public offences.' In Ryckman v. Di lavan, 25
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Wend. 180, Walworth, Chancellor, — who held, in opposition to the majority of

the Court of Errors, that the plaintiff could not maintain a civil suit, because the

publication reflected upon a class of individuals, and not upon the plaintiff per-

sonally, — said, pp. 195-90: 'There are many cases in the books where the writers

and publishers of defamatory charges, reflecting upon the conduct of particular

classes or bodies of individuals, have been proceeded against by indictment or

information, although no particular one was named or designated therein to whom

the charge had a personal application. All those causes, however, whi ther the libel

is upon an organized body of men, a legislature, a court of justice, a church, or a

company of soldiers, or upon a particular class of individuals, proceed upon the

ground that the charge is a misdemeanor, although it has no particular personal

application to the individual of the body or class libelled; because it tends to

excite the angry passions of the community either in favor of or against the body

or class in reference to the conduct of which the charge is made, or because it

tends to impair the confidence of the people in their government or in the admin-

istration of its laws.' In the course of his opinion, the Chancellor mentions a

Scotch case (Shearlock p. Beardsworth, 1 Murray's Report of Jury Cases) where

a civil suit was maintained, which was ' brought by a lieutenant-colonel, in behalf

of his whole regiment, for defamation, in calling them a regiment of cowards and

blackguards.' In Rex v. Hector Campbell, King's Bench, Hil. Term, 1808

(cited in Holt on Libel, 249, 250), an information was granted for a libel on the

college of physicians; and the respondent was convicted and sentenced. Cases

may be supposed where publications, though of a defamatory nature, have such

a wide and general application that, in all probability, a breach of the peace would

not be caused thereby; but it does not seem to us that the present publication

belongs to that class.

'* Our conclusion is that the jury should have been instructed that the first,
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lie offence, because tending to embroil the two nations, and to di'

turb tbe peace of the world.1 These common-law rules are wible-

some, and are still in force.

We are not so much concerned, however, with the general rules

pertaining to the punishment of injurious publications, as with

those special cases where, for some reason of general public policy,

the publication is claimed to be privileged, and where, consequently,

it may be supposed to be within the constitutional protection. It

has alway been held, notwithstanding the general rule that malice

is to be inferred from a false and injurious publication, that there

were some cases to which the presumption would not apply, and

where a private action could not be maintained without proof of

express malice. These are the cases which are said to be privi-

leged. The term " privileged," as applied to a communication

alleged to be libellous, means generally that the circumstances

under which it was made were such as to rebut the legal inference

of malice, and to throw upon the plaintiff the burden of offering

some evidence of its existence beyond the mere falsity of the
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charge.2 The cases falling within this classification are those in

which a party has a duty to discharge which requires that he should

be allowed to speak freely and fully that which he believes; where

he is himself directly interested in the subject-matter of the

communication, and makes it with a view to the protection or

advancement of his own interest, or where he is communicating

confidentially with a person interested in the communication, and

by way of advice or admonition.3 Many such cases suggest tliein-

fourth, and fifth, articles •were prima facie libellous; and that the publication of

those articles must be regarded as ' illegal conduct,' unless justified or excused

by facts sufficient to constitute a defence to an indictment for libel."

1 27 State Trials, 627; 2 May, Const. History of England, c. 9.

* Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 373, per Selden, J.; Townsend on Libel and

Slander, § 20!>.

3 "When a communication is made in confidence, either by or to a person

interested in the communication, supposing it to be true, or by way of admoni-

tion or advice, it seems to be a general rule that malice (t. e., express malice) is

essential to the maintenance of an action." 1 Starkie on Slander, 321. See

Harrison v. Bush, 5 El. & Bl. 344; Somerville v. Hawkins, 10 C. B. 589; Wright

c. Woodgate, 2 Cr. M. & R. 573; Whiteley v. Adams, 15 C. B. n. s. 392. A

paper signed by a number of parties agreeing to join in the expense of prosecut-

ing others, who were stated therein to have "robbed and swindled " them, is

privileged. Klinck v. Colby, 46 N. Y. 427; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 360.
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1 selves which are purely of private concern: such as answers to

inquiries into the character or conduct of one formerly employed

by the person to whom the inquiry is addressed, and of whom the

information is sought with a view to guiding the inquirer in his

own action in determining upon employing the same per-

son ;1 answers to inquiries by one tradesman of another * as [* 426]

to the solvency of a person whom the inquirer has been

desired to trust;2 answers by a creditor to inquiries regarding the

conduct and dealings of his debtor, made by one who had become

surety for the debt;3 communications from an agent to his prin-

cipal, reflecting injuriously upon the conduct of a third person in

a matter connected with the agency;i communications to a near

relative respecting the character of a person with whom the relative

is in negotiation for marriage;5 and as many more like cases as

would fall within the same reasons.6 The rules of law applicable

1 Pattison v. Jones, 8 B. & C. 578; Elara v. Badger, 23 111. 498; Bradley v.

Heath, 12 Pick. 163. Compare Fryer v. Kinnersley, 15 C. B. n. s. 422.

* Smith v. Thomas, 2 Bing. (N. C.) 372; Story o. Challands, 8 C. & P. 234.

But the reports of a mercantile agency to its customers are not privileged.

Taylor v. Church, 8 N. Y. 452; Stroderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188; s. c.
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7 Am. Rep. 322. Compare Beardsley v. Tappan, 5 Blatch. 497.

3 Dunman v. Bigg, 1 Campb. 269, note.

* Washburn v. Cooke, 3 Denio, 110. See Easley v. Moss, 9 Ala. 266.

6 Todd v. Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 88. But there is no protection to such a com-

munication from a stranger. Joannes v. Bennett, 5 Allen, 170.

8 As to whether a stranger volunteering to give information injurious to

another, to one interested in the knowledge, is privileged in so doing, see Cox-

head v. Richards, 2 M., G. & S. 569; and Bennett v. Deacon, ib. 628. Where

a confidential relation of any description exists between the parties, the commu-

nication is privileged; as where the tenant of a nobleman had written to inform

him of his gamekeeper's neglect of duty. Cockagne v. Hodgkisson, 5 C. & P.

543. Where a son-in-law wrote to warn his mother-in-law of the bad character

of a man she was about to marry. Todd v. Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 88. Where a

banker communicated with his correspondent concerning a note sent to him for

collection; the court saying that "all that is necessary to entitle such communi-

cation to be privileged is, that the relation of the parties should be such as to

afford reasonable ground for supposing an innocent motive for giving the infor-

mation, and to deprive the act of the appearance of officious intermeddling with

the affairs of others." Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 375. Where one commu-

nicated to an employer his suspicions of dishonest conduct in a servant towards

himself. Amann v. Damm, 8 C. B. n. 8. 597. Where a tradesman published in

a newspaper that his servant had left his employ, and taken upon himself to col-

lect the tradesman's bills. Hatch v. Lane, 105 Mass. 394.

[ 499 ]

* 426

[CH. XII.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

to these cases are very well settled, and are not likely to be changed

with a view to greater stringency.1

Libels upon the Government.

At the common law it was indictable to publish any thing against

the constitution of the country, or the established system of gov-

ernment. The basis of such a prosecution was the tendency of

publications of this character to excite disaffection with the govern-

ment, and thus induce a revolutionary spirit. The law

[* 427] always, * however, allowed a calm and temperate discus-

sion of public events and measures, and recognized in

every man a right to give every public matter a candid, full, and

free discussion. It was only when a publication went beyond this,

and tended to excito tumult, that it became criminal.2 It cannot

be doubted, however, that the common-law rules on this subject

were administered in many cases with great harshness, and that

the courts, in the interests of repression and at the instigation of

the government, often extended them to cases not within their

reasons. This was especially true during the long and bloody
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struggle with France, at the close of the last and beginning of the

present century, and for a few subsequent years, until a rising

public discontent with political prosecutions began to lead to

acquittals, and finally to abandonment of all such attempts to

restrain the free expression of sentiments on public affairs. Such

prosecutions have now altogether ceased in England. Like the

censorship of the press, they have fallen out of the British consti-

tutional system. "When the press errs, it is by the press itself

that its errors are left to be corrected. Repression has ceased to

be the policy of rulers, and statesmen have at length realized the

wise maxim of Lord Bacon, that ' the punishing of wits enhances

their authority, and a forbidden writing is thought to be a certain

spark of truth that flies up in the faces of them that seek to tread

it out.'"3

1 See further, Harrison v. Bush, 5 El. & Bl. 344; Shipley v. Todbunter, 7 C.

& P. 680; Lawler v. Earle, 5 Allen, 22; Grimes v. Coyle, 6 B. Monr. 301;

Rector v. Smith, 11 Iowa, 302; Gosslin v. Cannon, 1 Harr. 3; Joannes v. Ben-

nett, 5 Allen, 169; State c. Buruham, 9 N. H. 34.

! Regina v. Collins, 9 C. & P. 456, per Liltledale, J. See the proceedings

against Thomas Paine, 27 State Trials, 357.

3 May, Constitutional History, c. 10.
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We shall venture to express a doubt if the common-law princi-

ples on this subject can be considered as having been practically

adopted in the American States. It is certain that no prosecutions

could now be maintained in the United States courts for libels on

the general government, since those courts have no common-law

jurisdiction,1 and there is now no statute, and never was except

during the brief existence of the Sedition Law, which assumed to

confer any such power.

The Sedition Law was passed during the administration of the

elder Adams, when the fabric of government was still new and

untried, and when many men seemed to think that the breath of

heated party discussions might tumble it about their heads. Its

constitutionality was always disputed by a large party, and its

impolicy was beyond question. It had a direct tendency to pro-

duce the very state of things it sought to repress; the

prosecutions * under it were instrumental, among other [* 428]

things, in the final overthrow and destruction of the party

by which it was adopted, and it is impossible to conceive, at the

present time, of any such state of things as would be likely to bring

about its re-enactment, or the passage of any similar repressive
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statute.2

When it is among the fundamental principles of the government

that the people frame their own constitution, and that in doing so

they reserve to themselves the power to amend it from time to time,

as the public sentiment may change, it is difficult to conceive of any

sound principle on which prosecutions for libels on the system of

government can be based, except when their evident intent and

purpose is to excite rebellion and civil war.3 It is very easy to lay

down a rule for the'discussion of constitutional questions; that

they are privileged, if conducted with calmness and temperance,

and that they are not indictable unless they go beyond the bounds

1 United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32. See, ante, 19, and cases cited in

note.

2 For prosecutions under this law, see Lyon's Case, Wharton's State Trials,

833; Cooper's Case, t'6. 659; Has well's Case, ib. 684; Calender's Case, ib. 688.

And see 2 Randall, Life of Jefferson, 417-421; 5 Hildreth, History of United

States, 247, 365.

'The author of the Life and Times of Warren very truly remarks that " the

common-law offence of libelling a government is ignored in constitutional systems,

as inconsistent with the genius of free institutions." P. 47.

[501]

* 428

[CH. XII.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

of fair discussion. But what is calmness and temperance, and

what is fair in the discussion of supposed evils in the govern-

ment? And if something is to be allowed "for a little feeling

in men's minds," 1 how great shall be the allowance? The beat of

the discussion will generally be in proportion to the magnitude of

the evil as it appears to the party discussing it: must the question

whether he has exceeded due bounds or not, be tried by judge and

jury, who may sit under different circumstances from those under

which he has spoken, or at least after the heat of the occasion has

passed away, and who, feeling none of the excitement themselves,

may think it unreasonable that any one else should ever have felt

it? The dangerous character of such prosecutions would be the

more glaring if aimed at those classes who, not being admitted to

a share in the government, attacked the constitution in the point

which excluded them. Sharp criticism, ridicule, and the exhibi-

tion of such feeling as a sense of injustice engenders, are to be

expected from any discussion in these cases; but when the very

classes who have established the exclusion as proper and reasonable
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are to try as judges and jurors the assaults made upon it,

[* 4 29J they will be very likely to enter upon the * examination

with a preconceived notion that such assaults upon their

reasonable regulations must necessarily be unreasonable. If any

such principle of repression should ever be recognized in the

common law of America, it might reasonably be anticipated that

in times of high party excitement it would lead to prosecutions

by the party in power, to bolster up wrongs and sustain abuses and

oppressions by crushing adverse criticism and discussion. The

evil, indeed, could not be of long continuance; for, judging from

experience, the reaction would be speedy, th6rough, and effectual;

but it would be no less a serious evil while it lasted, the direct

tendency of which would be to excite discontent and to breed a

rebellious spirit. Repression of full and free discussion is danger-

ous in any government resting upon the will of the people. The

people cannot fail to feel that they are deprived of rights, and will

be certain to become discontented, when their discussion of public

measures is sought to be circumscribed by the judgment of others

upon their temperance or fairness. They must be left at liberty

to speak with the freedom which the magnitude of the supposed

1 Regina v. Collins, 9 C. &. P. 460, per Littledale, J.
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wrongs appears in their minds to demand; and if they exceed all

the proper bounds of moderation, the consolation must be, that

the evil likely to spring from the violent discussion will probably

be less, and its correction by public sentiment more speedy, than

if the terrors of the law were brought to bear to prevent the dis-

cussion.

The English common-law rule which made libels on the consti-

tution or the government indictable, as it was administered by the

courts, seems to us unsuited to the condition and circumstances of

the people of America, and therefore never to have been adopted

in the several States. If we are correct in this, it would not be in

the power of the State legislatures to pass laws which should make

mere criticism of the constitution or of the measures of government

a crime, however sharp, unreasonable, and intemperate it might be.

The constitutional freedom of speech and of the press must mean a

freedom as broad as existed when the constitution which guarantees

it was adopted, and it would not be in the power of the legislature

to restrict it, unless it might be in those cases of publications inju-

rious to private character, or public morals or safety, which come
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strictly within the reasons of civil or criminal liability at the

common law, but in which, nevertheless, the common law as we

have adopted it failed to provide a remedy. It certainly could not

be said that freedom of speech was violated by a law which

should * make imputing the want of chastity to a female [* 430]

actionable without proof of special damage; for the charge

is one of grievous wrong, without any reason in public policy

demanding protection to the communication, and the case is strictly

analogous to many other cases where the common law made the

party responsible for his false accusations. The constitutional

provisions do not prevent the modification of the common-law rules

of liability for libels and slanders, but they would not permit

bringing new cases within those rules when they do not rest upon

the same or similar reasons.1

1 In Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates, 267, the defendant was indicted in 1805

for-publishing the following in a public newspaper: "A democracy is scarcely

tolerated at any period of national history. Its omens are always sinister, and

its powers are unpropitious. With all the lights of experience blazing before our

eyes, it is impossible not to discover the futility of this form of government. It

was weak and wicked at Athens, it was bad in Sparta, and worse in Rome. It

has been tried in France, and terminated in despotism. It was tried in England,
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[* 481] * Criticism upon Officers and Candidates for Office.

There are certain cases where criticism upon public officers,

their actions, character, and motives, is not only recoguized as

and rejected with the utmost loathing and abhorrence. It is on its trial here,

and its issue will be civil war, desolation, and anarchy. No wise man but discerns

its imperfections, no good man but shudders at its miseries, no honest man but

proclaims its fraud, and no brave man but draws his sword against its force.

The institution of a scheme of polity so radically contemptible and vicious is a

memorable example of what the villany of some men can devise, the folly of

others receive, and both establish in spite of reason, reflection, and sensation."

Judge Yeates charged the jury, among other things, as follows: "The seventh

section of the ninth article of the constitution of the State must be our guide

upon this occasion : it forms the solemn compact between the people and the

three branches of the government, — the legislative, executive, and judicial

powers. Neither of them can exceed the limits prescribed to them respectively.

To this exposition of the public will every branch of the common law and of our

municipal acts of assembly must conform; and if incompatible therewith, they

must yield and give way. Judicial decisions cannot weigh against it when re-
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pugnant thereto. It runs thus: 'The printing-presses shall be free to every per-

son who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch

of the government; and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof.

The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights

of man; and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being

responsible for the abuse of that liberty. In prosecutions for the publication of

papers, investigating the official conduct of officers or men in a public capacity,

or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof

may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a

right to determine the law and the facts under the direction of the court, as in

other cases.' Thus it is evident that legislative acts, or of any branch of the

government, are open to public discussion; and every citizen may freely speak,

write, or print on any subject, but is accountable for the abuse of that privilege.

There shall be no licensers of the press. Publish as you please in the first instance,

without control; but you are answerable both to the community and the individ-

ual if you proceed to unwarrantable lengths. No alteration is hereby made in

the law as to private men affected by injurious publications, unless the discussion

be proper for public information. But 'if one uses the weapon of truth wan-

tonly for disturbing the peace of families, he is guilty of a libel.' Per General

Hamilton, in Oroswell's Trial, p. 70. The matter published is not proper for

public information. The common weal is not interested in such a communication,

except to suppress it.

"What is the meaning of the words 'being responsible for the abuse of that

liberty,' if the jury are interdicted from deciding on the case? Who else can

constitutionally decide on it? The expressions relate to and pervade every part

of the sentence. The objection that the determinations of juries may vary at

different times, arising from their different political opinions, proves too much.
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* legitimate, but large latitude and great freedom of [* 432]

expression are permitted, so long as good faith inspires

The same matter may be objected against them when party spirit runs high, in

other criminal prosecutions. But we have no other constitutional mode of de-

cision pointed out to us, and we are bound to use the method described.

"It is no infraction of the law to publish temperate investigations of the

nature and forms of government. The day is long past since Algernon Sidney's

celebrated treatise on government, cited on this trial, was considered as a trea-

sonable libel. The enlightened advocates of representative republican govern-

ment pride themselves in the reflection that the more deeply their system is

examined, the more fully will the judgments of honest men be satisfied that it is

the most conducive to the safety and happiness of a free people. Such matters

are ' proper for public information.' But there is a marked and evident distinc-

tion between such publications and those which are plainly accompanied with a

criminal intent, deliberately designed to unloosen the social band of union, totally

to unhinge the minds of the citizens, and to produce popular discontent with the

exercise of power by the known constituted authorities. These latter writings

are subversive of all government and good order. 'The liberty of the press

consists in publishing the truth, from good motives and for justifiable ends, though
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it reflects on government or on magistrates.' Per General Hamilton, in Cros-

well's Trial, pp. 63, 64. It disseminates political knowledge, and, by adding to

the common stock of freedom, gives a just confidence to every individual. But

the malicious publications which I have reprobated infect insidiously the public

mind with a subtle poison, and produce the most mischievous and alarming con-

sequences by their tendency to anarchy, sedition, and civil war. We cannot,

consistently with our official duty, declare such conduct dispunishable. We be-

lieve that it is not justified by the words or meaning of our constitution. It is

true it may not be easy in every instance to draw the exact distinguishing line.

To the jury it peculiarly belongs to decide on the intent and object of the writing.

It is their duty to judge candidly and fairly, leaning to the favorable side when

the criminal intent is not clearly and evidently ascertained.

"It remains, therefore, under our most careful consideration of the ninth

article of the Constitution, for the jury to divest themselves of all political preju-

dices (if any such they have), and dispassionately to examine the publication which

is the ground of the present prosecution. They must decide on their oaths, as

they will answer to God and their country, whether the defendant, as a factious

and seditious person, with the criminal intentions imputed to him, in order to

accomplish the objects stated in the indictment, did make and publish the writing

in question. Should they find the charges laid against them in the indictment to

he well founded, they are bound to find him guilty. They must judge for them-

selves on the plain import of the words, without any forced or strained construc-

tion of the meaning of the author or editor, and determine on the correctness

of the innuendoes. To every word they will assign its natural sense, but will col-

lect the true intention from the context, the whole piece. They will accurately

weigh the probabilities of the charge against a literary man. Consequences they

will wholly disregard, but firmly discharge their duty. Representative republican
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the communication. There are cases where it is clearly the duty

of every one to speak freely what he may have to say concerning

public officers, or those who may present themselves for public

positions. Through the ballot-box the electors approve or con-

demn those who ask their suffrages; and if they condemn, though

upon grounds the most unjust or frivolous, the law affords no

redress. Some officers, however, are not chosen by the people

directly, but designated through some other mode of ap-

[* 433] pointment. But the public have a right to be * heard on

the question of their selection; and they have the right,

for such reasons as seem to their minds sufficient, to ask for their

dismissal afterwards. They have also the right to complain of

official conduct affecting themselves, and to petition for a redress

of grievances. A principal purpose in perpetuating and guarding

the right of petition is to insure to the public the privilege of being

heard in these and the like cases.

In a case in the Court for the Correction of Errors of the State

of New York, a party was prosecuted for a libel contained in a
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petition signed by him and a number of other citizens of his

county, and presented to the council of appointment, praying for

the removal of the plaintiff from the office .of district attoruey of

the county, which, the petition charged, he was prostituting to

governments stand on immovable bases, which cannot be shaken by theoretical

systems. Yet if the consciences of the jury shall be clearly satisfied that the pub-

lication was seditiously, maliciously, and wilfully aimed at the independence of

the United States, the Constitution thereof or of this State, they should convict

the defendant. If, on the other hand, the production was honestly meant to in-

form'the public mind, and warn them against supposed dangers in society, though

the subject may have been treated erroneously, or that the censures on democracy

were bestowed on pure unmixed democracy, where the people en masse execute

the sovereign power without the medium of their representatives (agreeably to

our forms of government), as have occurred at different times in Athens, Sparta,

Rome, France, and England, then, however the judgments of the jury may in-

cline them to think individually, they should acquit the defendant. In the first

instance the act would be criminal; in the last it would be innocent. If the jury

should doubt of the criminal intention, then also the law pronounces that he

should be acquitted. 4 Burp. 2552, per Lord Mansfield." Verdict, not guilty.

The fate of this prosecution was the same that would attend any of a similar char-

acter in this country, admitting its law to be sound, except possibly in ca*es of

violent excitement, and when a jury could be made to believe that the defendant

contemplated and was laboring to produce a change of government, not by con-

stitutional means, but by rebellion and civil wap.
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private purposes. The defendant did not justify the truth of this

allegation, and the plaintiff had judgment. On error, the sole

question was, whether the communication was to be regarded as

privileged, that character having been denied it by the court

below. The prevailing opinion in the court of review character-

ized this as "a decision which violates the most sacred and

unquestionable rights of free citizens; rights essential to the very

existence of a free government; rights necessarily connected with

the relations of constituent and representative; the right of peti-

tioning for a redress of grievances, and the right of remonstrating

to the competent authority against the abuse of official functions."

And it was held that the communication was privileged, and could

not support an action for libel, unless the plaintiff could show that

the petition was malicious and groundless, and presented for the

purpose of injuring his character.1 Such a petition, it was said,

although containing false and injurious aspersions, did not prima

facie carry with it the presumption of malice.2 A similar ruling

was made by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, where a party,

was prosecuted for charges against a justice of the peace, con-
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tained in a deposition made to be presented to the governor.8

The subsequent case of Howard v. Thompson 4 has enlarged this

rule somewhat, and has required of the plaintiff, in order to sus-

tain his action in any such case, to prove not only malice

in the * defendant, but also a want of probable cause for [* 434]

believing the injurious charges which the petition con-

tained. The action for libel, in such a case, it was said, was in

the nature of an action for malicious prosecution; and in that

action malice and want of probable cause are both necessary ingre-

dients. And it has also been held that in such a case the court

will neither compel the officer to whom it was addressed to pro-

duce the petition in evidence, nor will they suffer its contents to

be proved by parol.6

The rule of protection in these cases does not appear to be dis-

puted, and has been laid down in other cases coming within the

1 Thorn ». Blanchard, 5 Johns. 528, per Clinton, Senator.

* Ibid. p. 526, per VHommedieu, Senator.

» Gray e. Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23.

4 21 Wend. 319. See Harris v. Harrington, 2 Tyler, 129; Bodwell v. Osgood,

3 Pick. 379.

6 Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23. See Hare v. Mellor, 3 Lev. 138.
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same reasons.1 The rule, however, is subject to this qualification,

that the petition or remonstrance must be addressed to the body

or officer having the power of appointment or removal, or the

authority to give the redress or grant the relief which is sought;

or at least that the petitioner should really and in good faith

believe he is addressing himself to an authority possessing power

in the premises.2

[* 435] * Such being the rule of privilege when one interested

in the discharge of powers of a public nature is addressing

himself to the body having the authority of appointment, super-

vision, or removal, the question arises whether the same reasons

do not require the like privilege when the citizen addresses himself

to his fellow-citizens in regard to the conduct of persons elevated

to office by their suffrages, or in regard to the character, capacity,

1 In Kershaw v. Bailey, 1 Exch. 743, the defendant was prosecuted for slander

in a communication made by him to the vestry, imputing perjury to the plaintiff

as a reason why the vestry should not return him on the list of persons qualified

to serve as constables. The defendant was a parishioner, and his communication
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was held privileged. In O'Donaghue v. McGovern, 23 Wend. 26, a communica-

tion from a member of a church to his bishop, respecting the character, moral

conduct, and demeanor of a clergyman of the church, was placed upon the same

footing of privilege. And see Reid v. Delorme, 2 Brev. 70 ; .Chapman v. Calder,

14 Penn. St. 365. A remonstrance to the board of excise, against the granting of

a license to the plaintiff, comes under the same rule of protection. Vanderzee r.

McGregor, 12 Wend. 545. See also Rendition v. Maltby, 1 Car. & Marsh. 402;

Woodward v. Landor, 6 C. & P. 548; Strcety v. Wood, 15 Barb. 105; Bradley

r. Heath, 12 Pick. 163.

8 This principle is recognized in all the cases referred to. See also Fairman r.

Ives, 5 B. & Aid. 642. In that case a petition addressed by a creditor of an offi-

cer in the army to the Secretary of War, bona fide and with a view of obtaining

through his interference the payment of a debt due, and containing a statement of

facts which, though derogatory to the officer's character, the creditor believed to

be true, was held not to support an action. A letter to the Postmaster-General

complaining of the conduct of a postmaster, with a view to the redress of griev-

ances, is privileged. Woodward v. Lander, 6 C. & P. 548; Cook v. Hill, 3 Sandf.

341. And a complaint to a master, charging a servant with a dishonest act which

had been imputed to the complaining party, has also been held privileged. Cow-

ard v. Wellington, 7 C. & P. 531. And see, further. Hosmer v. Loveland, 19

Barb. 111. A petition is privileged while being circulated. Vanderzee r.

McGregor, 12 Wend. 545; Streety r. Wood, 15 Barb. 105. If, however, a

petition is circulated and exhibited, but never presented, the fact that the libel-

lous charge has assumed the form of a petition will not give it protection. State

v. Burnham, 9 N. H. 34. And see Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173; Van Wyek

v. Aspinwall, 17 N. Y. 190.
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or fitness of those who may present themselves, or be presented by

their friends,— which always assumes their assent,— as candidates

for public positions.

When Morgan Lewis was Governor of the State of New York,

and was a candidate for re-election, a public meeting of his oppo-

nents was called, at which an address was adopted condemning

his conduct in various particulars. Among other things, he was

charged with want of fidelity to his party, pursuing a system of

family aggrandizement in his appointments, signing the charter of

a bank with notice that it bad been procured by fraudulent prac-

tices, publishing doctrines unworthy of a chief magistrate and sub-

versive of the dearest interests of society, attempting to destroy

the liberty of the press by vexatious prosecutions, and calling out

the militia without occasion, thereby putting them to unnecessary

trouble and expense. These seem to have been the more serious

charges. The chairman of the meeting signed the address, and he

was prosecuted by the governor for the libel contained therein.

No justification was attempted upon the facts, and the Supreme

Court held the circumstances to constitute no protection in the
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law. We quote from the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice

Tho7)ipson : —

"Where the act is in itself unlawful, the proof of justification

or excuse lies on the defendent, and on failure thereof the law im-

plies a criminal intent.1 If a libel contains an imputation of a crime,

or is actionable without showing special damage, malice is, prima

facie, implied; and if the defendant claims to be exonerated, on

the ground of want of malice, it lies on him to show it was pub-

lished under such circumstances as to rebut this presumption of

law.2 The manner and occasion of the publication have been

relied on for this purpose, and in justification of the libel.

It has * not been pretended but that the address in ques- [* 436]

tion would be libellous if considered as the act of an indi-

vidual; but its being the act of a public meeting, of which the

defendant was a member, and the publication being against a

candidate for a public office, have been strenuously urged as

affording a complete justification. The doctrine contended for by

the defendant's counsel results in the position that every publica-

tion ushered forth under the sanction of a public political meeting,

1 5 Burr. 2667; I T. R. 127.

'IT. R. 110.

[ 509 ]

*436

[ch. xn.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

against a candidate for an elective office, is beyond the reach of

legal inquiry. To such a proposition I can never yield my assent.

Although it was urged by the defendant's counsel, 1 cannot

discover any analogy whatever between the proceedings of such

meetings and those of courts of justice, or any other organized

tribunals known in our law for the redress of grievances. That

electors should have a right to assemble, and freely and openly

to examine the fitness and qualifications of candidates for public

offices, and communicate their opinions to others, is a position to

which I most cordially accede. But there is a wide difference

between this privilege and a right irresponsibly to charge a candi-

date witli direct specific and unfounded crimes. It would, iu my

judgment, be a monstrous doctrine to establish, that, when a man

becomes a candidate fur an elective office, he thereby gives to others

a right to accuse him of any imaginable crimes, with impunity.

Candidates have rights as well as electors; and those rights and

privileges must be so guarded and protected as to harmonize one

with the other. If one hundred or one thousand men, when as-
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sembled together, undertake to charge a man with specific crimes,

'I see no reason why it should be less criminal than if each one

should do it individually, at different times and places. All that

is required, in the one case or the other, is, not to transcend the

bounds of truth. If a man has committed a crime, any one has a

right to charge him with it, and is not responsible for the accusa-

tion; and can any one wish for more latitude than this? Can it

be claimed a privilege to accuse ad libitum a candidate with the

most base and detestable crimes? There is nothing upon the

record showing the least foundation or pretence for the charges.

The accusations, then, being false, the prima facie presumption of

law is, that the publication was malicious; and the circumstance

of the defendant being associated with others does notjser se rebut

this presumption. How far this circumstance ought to

[* 437] affect the measure of damages * is a question not arising

on the record. It may in some cases mitigate, in others

enhance, them. Every case must necessarily, from the nature of

the action, depend upon its own circumstances, which are to be

submitted to the sound discretion of a jury. It is difficult, and

perhaps impossible, to lay down any general rule on the subject."1

1 Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. 1, 35. See also Curtis v. Mussey, 6 Grav, 261;

Aldrich v. Printing Co., 9 Minn. 13 5.
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The difficulty one meets with in the examination of this opinion

is in satisfying himself in what manner the privileges of electors,

of which it speaks, are protected by it. It is not discovered that

the citizen who publicly discusses the qualifications and fitness of

the candidate for public office who challenges his suffrage is, by

this decision, so far as suits for recovery of private damages are

concerned, placed on any different footing in the law from that

occupied by one who drags before the public the character of a

private individual. In either case, if the publication proves to be

false, the law, it seems, attaches to it a presumption of malice.

Nothing in the occasion justifies or excuses the act in either case.

It is true it is intimated that it may lie in the sound discretion of

a jury to be moderate in the imposition of damages, but it is also

intimated that the jury would be at liberty to consider the circum-

stances of the public meeting an aggravation. There is abso-

lutely Ho privilege of discussion to the elector under such a rule;

no right to canvass the fitness of candidates beyond what exists

in other cases. Whatever reasons he may give his neighbors for

voting against a candidate, he must be prepared to support by

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

evidence in the courts. In criminal prosecutions, if he can prove

the truth of his charges, he may be protected in some cases where

he would not be if the person assailed was only a private individ-

ual; because in the latter case he must make a showing of a justi-

fiable occasion for uttering even the truth. But in all cases where

the matter is proper for the public information, the truth justifies

its publication.

The case above quoted has the sanction of a subsequent decision

of the Court for the Correction of Errors, which in like manner

repudiated the claim of privilege.1 The office then in question was

that of Lieutenant-Governor, and the candidate was charged in

public newspapers with habits of intoxication which unfitted him

for the position. And this last decision has since been followed as

authority by the Superior Court of New York; in a case, however,

which does not seem to be analogous, since there the gen-

eral public * was addressed in regard to a candidate for [* 438]

au office which was not elective, but was to be filled by an

appointing board.2

1 King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113.

'Hunt v. Bennett, 4 E. D. Smith, 647; s. c. 19 N. Y. 173. See Duncombe

e. Daniell, 8 C. & P. 213.
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The case of King v. Root1 will certainly strike any one as a very

remarkable one, when the evidence given in the case is considered.

The Lieutenant-Governor was charged in the public press with in-

toxication in the Senate Chamber, exhibited as he was proceeding

to take his seat as presiding officer of that body. When prosecuted

for libel, the publishers justified the charge as true, and brought

a number of witnesses who were present on the occasion, and who

testified to the correctness of the statement. There was therefore

abundant reason for supposing the charge to have been published

in the full belief in its truth. If it was true, there was abundant

reason, on public grounds, for making the publication. Neverthe-

less, the jury were of opinion that the preponderance of evidence

was against the truth of the charge, and being instructed that the

only privilege the defendants had was " simply to publish the truth,

and nothing more," and that the unsuccessful attempt at justifica-

tion — which in fact was only the forming of such an issue, and

putting in such evidence as showed the defendants had reason for

making the charge—was in itself an aggravation of the offence,

they returned a verdict for the plaintiff, with large damages.

Throughout his instructions to the jury by the judge presiding
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at the trial, no privilege of discussion whatever is conceded to

the elector, springing from the relation of elector and candidate,

or of citizen and representative, but the case is considered as one

where the accusation was to be defended precisely as if no public

considerations had in any way been involved.2

The law of New York is not placed by these decisions on a foot-

ing very satisfactory to those who claim the utmost freedom of

discussion in public affairs. The courts have considered the sub-

ject as if there were no middle ground between absolute immunity

for falsehood and the application of the same strict rules which

prevail in other cases. Whether they have duly considered the

importance of publicity and discussion on all matters of general

concern in a representative government must be left to the con-

sideration of judicial tribunals, as these questions shall come be-

fore them in the future. It is perhaps safe to say that the

[* 489] general public * sentiment and the prevailing customs

allow a greater freedom of discussion, and hold the elector

1 4 Wend. 113. See the same case in the Supreme Court, 7 Cow. 613.

8 See also Onslow v. Hone, 3 Wil?. 177; Harwood v. Astlev, 1 New Rep. 47.
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less strictly to what he may be able to justify as true than is done

by these decisions.1

A much more reasonable rule — though still, we think, not

sufficiently comprehensive and liberal — was indicated by Pollock,

C. B., in a case where it was urged upon the court that a sermon,

preached but not published, was the subject of criticism in the

enlarged style of commentary which that word seems to introduce

according to the decided cases; and that the conduct of a clergy-

man with reference to the parish charity, and especially the rules

of it, justified any bona fide remarks, whether founded in truth in

point of fact, or justice in point of commentary, provided only they

were an honest and bona fide comment. "My brother Wilde," he

says, " urged upon the court the importance of this question; and

I own I think it is a question of very grave and deep importance.

He pressed upon us that, whenever the public had an interest in

such a discussion, the law ought to protect it, and work out the

public good by permitting public opinion, through the medium of

the public press, to operate upon such transactions. I am not

sure that so extended a rule is at all necessary to the public good.

I do not in any degree complain; on the contrary, I think it quite

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

right that all matters that are entirely of a public nature — con-

duct of ministers, conduct of judges, the proceedings of all persons

who are responsible to the public at large — are deemed to be pub-

lic property; and that all bona fide and honest remarks upon such

persons, and their conduct, may be made with perfect freedom, and

1 "Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free government; when this

support is taken away, the constitution of a free society is dissolved, and tyranny

is erected on its ruins. Republics and limited monarchies derive their strength

and vigor from a popular examination into the action of the magistrates; this

privilege in all ages has been and always will be abused. The best of men could

not escape the censure and envy of the times they lived in. Yet this evil is not so

great as it might appear at first sight. A magistrate who sincerely aims at the

good of society will always have the inclinations of a great majority on his side,

and an impartial posterity will not fail to render him justice. Those abuses of

the freedom of speech are the excesses of liberty. They ought to be repressed;

but to whom dare we commit the care of doing it? An evil magistrate, intrusted

with power to punish for words, would be armed with a weapon the most de-

structive and terrible. Under pretence of pruning off the exuberant branches,

he would be apt to destroy the tree." Franklin, Works by Sparks, Vol. II.

p. 285.
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without being questioned too nicely for either truth or justice."1

But these remarks were somewhat aside from the case then before

the learned judge, and though supported by similar remarks from

his associates, yet one of those associates deemed it important to

draw such a distinction as to detract very much from the value of

this privilege. "It seems," he says, "that there is a distinction,

although I must say I really can hardly tell what the limits of it

are, between the comments on a man's public conduct and ou his

private conduct. I can understand that you have a right to com-

ment ou the public acts of a minister, upon the public acts of a

general, upon the public judgments of a judge, upon the public

skill of an actor; I can understand that; but I do not know

where the limit can be drawn distinctly between where the

[* 440] * comment is to cease, as being applied solely to a man's

public conduct, and where it is to begin as applicable to

his private character; because, although it is quite competent for

a person to speak of a judgment of a judge as being an extremely

erroneous aud foolish one, — and no doubt comments of that sort
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have great tendency to make persons careful of what they say, —

and although it is perfectly competent for persons to say of an actor

that he is a remarkably bad actor, and ought not to be permitted

to perform such and such parts, because he performs them so ill,

yet you ought not to be allowed to say of an actor that he has dis-

graced himself in private life, nor to say of a judge or a minister

that he has committed felony, or any thing of that description,

which is in no way connected with his public conduct or public

judgment; and therefore there must be some limits, although I do

not distinctly see where those limits are to be drawn. No doubt,

if there are such limits, my brother Wilde is perfectly right in say-

ing that the only ground on which the verdict and damages can go

is for the excess, and not for the lawful exercise of the criticism."1

The radical defect in this rule, as it seems to us, consists in its

assumption, that the private character of a public officer is some-

thing aside from, and not entering into or influencing, his public

conduct; that a thoroughly dishonest man maybe a just minister,

and that a judge who is corrupt and debauched in private life may

1 Gathercole v. Miall, 15 M. & W. 831-333. See Commonwealth p. Clap,

4 Mass. 163, per Parsons, Ch. J.; Townsend on Libel and Slander, § 260.

* Alderson, B., same case, p. 838.
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be pure and upright in his judgments; in other words, that an

evil tree is as likely as any other to bring forth good fruits. Any

such assumption is false to human nature, and contradictory to

general experience; and whatever the law may say, the general

public will still assume that a corrupt life will influence public

conduct, and that a man who deals dishonestly with his fellows as

individuals will not hesitate to defraud them in their aggregate

and corporate capacity, if the opportunity shall be given him.

They are, therefore, interested in knowing what is the character of

their public servants, and what sort of persons are offering them-

selves for their suffrages. And if this be so, it would seem that

there should be some privilege of comment; that that privilege

could only be limited by good faith and just intention; and that of

these it was the province of a jury to judge, in view of the nature

of the charges made and the reasons which existed for making

them.

Recent English cases give considerable latitude of comment to

publishers of public journals, upon subjects in the discussion of

which the public may reasonably be supposed to have an

interest, and they hold the discussions to be * privileged if [* 441]
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conducted within the bounds of moderation and reason.1

1 In Kelley v. Sherlock, 1 Law Rep. Q. B. 686, it was held that a sermon

commenting upon public affairs — e. g., the appointment of chaplains for prisons

and the election of a Jew for mayor — was a proper subject for comment in the

papers. And in Kelley v. Tinling, 1 Law Rep. Q. B. 699, a church-warden,

having written to the plaintiff, the incumbent, accusing him of having desecrated

the church by allowing books to be sold in it during service, and by turning the

vestry-room into a cooking-apartment, the correspondence was published without

the plaintiffs permission in the defendant's newspaper, with comments on the

plaintiff's conduct. Held, that this was a matter of public interest, which might

he made the subject of public discussion; and that the publication was therefore

not libellous, unless the language used was stronger than, in the opinion of the

jury, the occasion justified.

In Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73, the proprietor of the " London Times"

was prosecuted for comments in his paper upon a debate in the House of Lords.

The plaintiff had presented a petition to that body, charging Sir Fitzroy Kelly

with having, many years before, made a statement false to his own knowledge, in

order to deceive a- committee of the House of Commons; and praying inquiry,

and his removal from an office he held, if the charge was found true. A debate

ensued, and the charge was wholly refuted. Held, that this was a subject of

great public concern, on which a writer in a public newspaper had full right to

comment; and the occasion was therefore so far privileged that the comments

would not be actionable so long as a jury should think them honest, and made in
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And in this country it has been held that where a charge against

an officer or a candidate respects only his qualifications for the

office, and does not impugn his character, it forms no basis for a

recovery of damages. To address to the electors of a district let-

ters charging that a candidate for office is of impaired understand-

ing, and his mind weakened by disease, is presenting that subject

to "the proper and legitimate tribunal tQ try the question."

"Talents and qualifications for office are mere matters of opinion,

of which the electors are the only competent judges." 1

Statements in the Course of Judicial Proceedings.

There are some cases which are so absolutely privileged on rea-

sons of public policy, that no inquiry into motives is permitted in

an action for slander or libel. Of these, the case of a party who

is called upon to give evidence in the course of judicial proceed-

ings is a familiar illustration. No action will lie against a witness

at the suit of a party aggrieved by his false testimony, even though

malice be charged. The remedy against a dishonest witness is

confined to the criminal prosecution for perjury.2 So what a juror
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may say to his fellows in the jury room while they are considering

their verdict, concerning one of the parties to the suit who has

been a witness therein, cannot be the subject of an action for

slandep.3 False accusations, however, contained in the affidavits

or other proceedings, by which a prosecution is com-

[* 442] menced for supposed crime, * or in any other papers in

the course of judicial proceedings, are not so absolutely

a fair spirit, and such as were justified by the circumstances disclosed in the

debate. The opinion by Chief Justice Cockburn is very clear and pointed, and

reviews all the previous decisions. See, further, Fairchild v. Adams, II Cash.

549; Terry p. Fellows, 21 La. Ann. 375.

1 Mayrant v. Richardson, 1 Nott & McCord, 348.

* But a qualification of this rule is made where what is said by the witness is

not pertinent or material to the cause, and he has been actuated by malice in

stating it. White v. Carroll, 42 N. Y. 166; s. c. 1 Am. Rep. 504. He is not,

however, to be himself the judge of what is pertinent or material when questions

are put to him, and no objection or warning comes to him from court or counseL

Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193. See also Warner v. Paine, 2 Sandf. 195; Garr

p. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91; Jennings v. Paine, 4 Wis. 358; Perkins v. Mitchell, SI

Barb. 461; Revis v. Smith, 18 C. B. 126; Grove v. Brandenburg, 7 Black, 234;

Cunningham v. Brown, 18 Vt. 123; Dunlap p. Glidden, 81 Me. 435.

'Dunham v. Powers, 42 Vt. 1.
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protected. They are privileged,1 but the party making them is

liable to action, if actual malice be averred and proved.2 Prelim-

inary information, furnished with a view to set on foot an inquiry

into an alleged offence, or to institute a criminal prosecution, is,

in like manner, privileged;3 but the protection only extends to

those communications which are in the course of the proceedings

to bring the supposed offender to justice, or are designed for the

purpose of originating or forwarding such proceedings; and com-

munications not of that character are not protected, even although

judicial proceedings may be pending for the investigation of the

offence which the communication refers to.4 Still less would a

party be justified in repeating a charge of crime, after the person

charged has been examined on his complaint, and acquitted of all

guilt.5

1 Astley v. Younge, Burr. 807; Strauss v. Meyer, 48 111. 385.

• Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. & El. 380; Kine v. Sewell, 3 M. & W. 297;

Burlingame r. Burlingame, 8 Cow. 141; Kidder v. Parkhurst, 3 Allen, 893;

Doyle v. O'Doherty, 1 Car. & Marsh. 418; Wilson p. Collins, 5 C. & P. 373;

Home v. Bentinck, 2 Brod. & Bing. 130; Jarvis v. Hatheway, 3 Johns. 180.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

In Goslin v. Cannon, 1 Harr. 3, it was held that where a crime had been com-

mitted, expressions of opinion founded upon facts within the knowledge of the

party, or communicated to him, made prudently and in confidence, to discreet

persons, and made obviously in good faith with a view only to direct their watch-

fulness, and enlist their aid in recovering the money stolen, and detecting and

bringing to justice the offender, were privileged. The cause, occasion, object,

and end, it was said, was justifiable, proper, and legal, and such as should actuate

every good citizen.

3 Grimes r. Coyle, 6 B. Monr. 301. The subject of communications privi-

leged on grounds of public policy will be found considered, at some length and

with much ability, in the recent case of Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, Law Rep. 5 C. B.

94. The publication complained of was by a military officer to his superior con-

cerning the qualifications and capacity of the plaintiff as a subordinate military

officer under him; and it was averred that the words were published by the

defendant of actual malice, and without any reasonable, probable, or justifiable

cause, and not bona fide, or in the bona fide discharge of defendant's duty as

superior officer. On demurrer, a majority of the court (Mellor and Lush, JJ.)

held the action would not lie: planting themselves, in part, on grounds of public

policy, and in part, also, on the fact that the military code provided a remedy

for wrongs of the nature complained of; and quoting with approval Johnstone v.

Sutton, 1 T. R. 544, and Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, 4 F. & F. 841. Cockbum,

Ch. J., delivered an able dissenting opinion.

4 Dancaster v. Hewson, 2 M. & Ry. 176. As to the privilege connected with

church trials and investigations, see Dunn v. Winters, 2 Humph. 512; York v.

Pease, 2 Gray, 282.

5 Burlingame v. Burlingame, 8 Cow. 141. In Mower v. Watson, 11 Vt. 586,
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Privilege of Counsel.

One of the most important cases of privilege, in a constitutional

point of view, is that of counsel employed to represent a

[* 443] party in * judicial proceedings. The benefit of the consti-

tutional right to counsel depends very greatly on the free-

dom with which he is allowed to act, and to comment on the facts

appearing in the case, and on the inferences deducible therefrom.

The character, conduct, and motives of parties and their witnesses,

as well as of other persons more remotely connected with the pro-

ceedings, enter very largely into any judicial inquiry, and must

form the subject of comment, if they are to be sifted and weighed.

To make the comment of value, there must be the liberty of exam-

ination in every possible light, and of suggesting any view of the

circumstances of the case, and of the motives surrounding it,

which seems legitimate to the person discussing them. It will

often happen, in criminal proceedings, that, while no reasonable

doubt can exist that a crime has been committed, there may be

very great doubt whether the prosecutor or the accused is the guilty
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party; and to confine the counsel for the defence to such remarks

concerning the prosecutor as he might justify, if he had made them

without special occasion, would render the right to counsel, in

many cases, of no value. The law justly and necessarily, in view

of the importance of the privilege, allows very great liberty in these

cases, and surrounds them with a protection that is always a com-

plete shield, except where the privilege of counsel has been plainly

and palpably abused.

The rule upon this subject was laid down in these words in an

early English case: "A counsellor hath privilege to enforce any

thing which is informed him by his client, and to give it iu

evidence, it being pertinent to the matter in question, and not to

an action was brought for slander in saying to a witness who was giving bis tes-

timony on a material point in a cause then on trial to which defendant was a

party, " That's a lie," and for repeating the same statement to counsel for the

opposite party afterwards. The words were held not to be privileged. To the

same effect are the cases of McClaughry v. Wetmore, 6 Johns. 82, and Kean

v. McLaughlin, 2 S. & R. 469. See also Torrey v. Field, 10 Vt. 353; Gilbert

v. People, 1 Denio, 41. A report made by a grand jury upon a subject which

they conceive to be within their jurisdiction, but which is not, is nevertheless

privileged. Rectors. Smith, 11 Iowa, 302.
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examine whether it be true or false; for a counsellor is at his peril

to give in evidence that which his client informs him, being perti-

nent to the matter in question; but matter not pertinent to the

issue, or the matter in question, he need not deliver; for he is to

discern in his discretion what he is to deliver, and what not; and

although it be false, he is excusable, it being pertinent to the

matter. But if he give in evidence any thing not material to the

issue, which is scandalous, he ought to aver it to be true; other-

wise he is punishable; for it shall be considered as spoken ma-

liciously and without cause; which is a good ground for the

action. ... So if counsel object matter against a witness which

is slanderous, if there be cause to discredit his testimony, and it be

pertinent to the matter in question, it is justifiable, what

he * delivers by information, although it be false." 1 The [* 444]

privilege of counsel in these cases is the same with that of

the' party himself,2 and the limitation upon it is concisely suggested

in a Pennsylvania case, " that if a man should abuse his privilege,

and, under pretence of pleading his cause, designedly wander from

the point in question, and maliciously heap slander upon his adver-

sary, I will not say that he is not responsible in an action at law." 3
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Chief Justice Shaw has stated the rule very fully and clearly:

"We take the rule to be well settled by the authorities that words

spoken in the course of judicial proceedings, though they are such

as impute crime to another, and therefore if spoken elsewhere

would import malice and be actionable in themselves, are not

actionable, if they are applicable and pertinent to the subject of

the inquiry. The question, therefore, in such cases is, not whether

the words spoken are true, not whether they are actionable in

themselves, but whether they were spoken in the course of judi-

cial proceedings, and whether they are relevant or pertinent to

the cause or subject of the inquiry. And in determining what is

pertinent, much latitude must be allowed to the judgment and

discretion of those who are intrusted with the conduct of a cause

in court, and a much larger allowance made for the ardent and

excited feelings with which a party, or counsel who naturally and

1 Brook r. Montagne, Cro. Jac. 90. See this case approved and applied

in Hodgson r. Scarlett, 1 B. & Aid. 232. And see Mackay v. Ford, 5

H. & N. 792.

• Hoar r. Wood, 3 Met. 194, per Shaw, Ch. J.

• McMillan v. Birch, 1 Binney, 178, per Tilghman, Ch. J.
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almost necessarily identifies himself with his client, may become

animated, by constantly regarding one side only of an interesting

and animated controversy, in which the dearest rights of such

party may become iuvolved. And if these feelings sometimes man-

ifest themselves in strong invectives, or exaggerated expressions,

beyond what the occasion would strictly justify, it is to be recol-

lected that this is said to a judge who hears both sides, in whose

mind the exaggerated statement may be at once controlled and met

by evidence and argument of a contrary tendency from the other

party, and who, from the impartiality of his position, will naturally

give to an exaggerated assertion, not warranted by the occasion,

no more weight than it deserves. Still, this privilege must be

restrained by some limit, and we consider that limit to be this:

that a party or counsel shall not avail himself of his situ-

[* 445] ation to * gratify private malice by uttering slanderous

expressions, either against a party, witness, or third per-

son, which have no relation to the cause or subject-matter of the

inquiry. Subject to this restriction, it is, on the whole, for the
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public interest, and best calculated to subserve the purposes of

justice, to allow counsel full freedom of speech in conducting the

cases and advocating and sustaining the rights of their constit-

uents; and this freedom of discussion ought not to be impaired by

numerous and refined distinctions." 1

Privilege of Legislators.

The privilege of a legislator in the use of language in debate is

made broader and more complete than that of the counsel or party

in judicial proceedings by constitutional provisions, which give

him complete immunity, by forbidding his being questioned in any

other place for any thing said in speech or debate.2 In an early

1 Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met. 197. See also Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. & El.

880; Ringr. Wheeler, 7 Cow. 725; Mower ». Watson, 11 Vt. 536; Gilbert r.

People, 1 Denio, 41; Hastings t>. Lusk, 22 Wend. 410; Bradley c. Heath, 12

Pick. 1G3. In Hastings v. Lusk, it is said that the privilege of counsel is as

broad as that of a legislative body; however false and malicious may be the

charge made by him affecting the reputation of another, an action of slander will

not lie, provided what is said be pertinent to the question under discussion. And

see Warner v. Paine, 2 Sandf. 195; Garr v. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91; Jennings v.

Paine, 4 Wis. 358.

* There are provisions to this effect in every State constitution except those of
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case in Massachusetts, the question of the extent of this constitu-

tional privilege came before the Supreme Court, and was largely

discussed, as well by counsel as by the court. The constitutional

provision then in force in that State was as follows: "The free-

dom of deliberation, speech, and debate in either house cannot be

the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or com-

plaint, in any other court or place whatsoever." The defendant

was a member of the General Court, and was prosecuted for utter-

ing slanderous words to a fellow-member in relation to the plain-

tiff. The member to whom the words were uttered had moved a

resolution, on the suggestion of the plaintiff, for the appointment

of an additional notary-public in the county where the

plaintiff * resided. The mover, in reply to an inquiry [* 446]

privately made by defendant, as to the source of his infor-

mation that such appointment was necessary, had designated the

plaintiff, and the defendant had replied by a charge against the

plaintiff of a criminal offence. The question before the court was,

whether this reply was privileged. The house was in session at

the time, but the remark was not made in course of speech or

debate, and had no other connection with the legislative proceed-
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ings than is above shown.

Referring to the constitutional provision quoted, the learned

judge who delivered the opinion of the court in this case thus

expressed himself: "In considering this article, it appears to me

that the privilege secured by it is not so much the privilege of the

house as an organized body, as of each individual member com-

posing it, who is entitled to this privilege even against the declared

will of the house. For he does not hold this privilege at the

pleasure of the house, but derives it from the will of the people

expressed in the constitution, which is paramount to the will of

either or both branches of the legislature. In this respect, the

privilege here secured resembles other privileges attached to each

member by another part of the constitution, by which he is ex-

empted from arrest on mesne (or original) process, during his

going to, returning from, or attending the General Court. Of these

North Carolina, South Carolina, Mississippi, Texas, California, and Nevada.

Mr. Cushing, in his work on the law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies,

§ 602, has expressed the opinion that these provisions were unnecessary, and that

the protection was equally complete without them.
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privileges, thus secured to each member, he cannot be deprived by

a resolve of the house, or by an act of the legislature.

"These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of

protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit,

but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their repre-

sentatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of

prosecution, civil or criminal. I therefore think the article ought

not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it

may be answered. I will not confine it to delivering an opinion,

uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate, but will extend it to

the giving of a vote, to the making of a written report, and to every

other act resulting from the nature and in the execution of the

office; and I would define the article as securing to every member

exemption from prosecution for every thing said or done by him,

as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office,

without inquiring whether the exercise was regular according to

the rules of the house, or irregular and against their rules.

[* 447] I do * not confine the member to his place in the house, and
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I am satisfied that there are cases in which he is entitled

to this privilege when not within the walls of the representatives'

chambep. He cannot be exercising the functions of his office as

member of a body, unless the body is in existence. The house

must be in session to enable him to claim this privilege, and it is in

session notwithstanding occasional adjournments for short intervals

for the convenience of the members. If a member, therefore, be

out of the chamber, sitting in committee, executing the commission

of the house, it appears to me that such member is within the

reason of the article, and ought to be considered within the privi-

lege. The body of which he is a member is in session, and he, as

a member of that body, is in fact discharging the duties of his office.

He ought, therefore, to be protected from civil or criminal prosecu-

tions for every thing said or done by him in the exercise of his

functions as a representative, in a committee, either in debating

or assenting to or draughting a report. Neither can I deny the

member his privilege when executing the duties of the office, in a

convention of both houses, although the convention may be holden

in the Senate Chamber." And after considering the hardships that

might result to individuals in consequence of this privilege, he

proceeds: "A more extensive construction of the privilege of the

members secured by this article I cannot give, because it could
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not be supported by the language or the manifest intent of the

article. When a representative is not acting as a member of the

house, he is not entitled to any privilege above his fellow-citizens;

nor are the rights of the people affected if he is placed on the same

ground on which his constituents stand." And coming more par-

ticularly to the facts then before the court, it was shown that the

defendant was not in the discharge of any official duty at the time

of uttering the obnoxious words; that they had no connection or

relevancy to the business then before the house, but might with

equal pertinency have been uttered at any other time or place,

and consequently could not, even under the liberal rule of pro-

tection whioh the court had laid down, be regarded as within the

privilege.1

* Publication of privileged Communications through the [* 448]

Press.

If now we turn from the rules of law which protect communi-

cations because of the occasion on which they are made and the

duty resting upon the person making them, to those rules which
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concern the spreading before the world the same communications,

we shall discover a very remarkable difference. It does not follow

because a counsel may freely speak in court as he believes or is

instructed, that therefore he may publish his speech through the

public press. The privilege in court is necessary to the complete

discharge of his duty to his client; but when the suit is ended,

that duty is discharged, and he is not called upon to appeal from

the court and the jury to the general public. Indeed such an

appeal, while it could not generally have benefit to the client in

view, would be unfair and injurious to the parties reflected upon

by the argument, inasmuch as it would take only a partial and one-

sided view of the case, and the public would not have, as the court

and jury did, all the facts of the case as given in evidence before

them, so that they might be in position to weigh the arguments

fairly and understandingly, and reject injurious inferences not

warranted by the evidence.

The law, however, favors publicity in legal proceedings, so far as

that object can be attained without injustice to the persons imme-

1 Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1. See Jefferson's Manual, § 8; Hosmer p. Love-

land, 19 Barb. Ill; State p. Burnham, 9 N. H. 84.
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diately concerned. The public are permitted to attend nearly all

judicial inquiries, and there appears to be no sufficient reason why

they should not also be allowed to see in print the reports of trials,

if they can thus have them presented as fully as they are in court,

or at least all the material portion of the proceedings stated impar-

tially, so that one shall not, by means of them, derive erroneous

impressions, which he would not have received from hearing the

case in court.

It seems to be a settled rule of law, that a fair and impartial

account of judicial proceedings, which have not been ex parte, but

in the hearing of both parties, is, generally speaking, a justifiable

publication.1 But it is said that, if a party is to be allowed to

publish what passes in a court of justice, he must publish the

whole case, and not merely state the conclusion which he himself

draws from the evidence.2 A plea that the supposed libel

[* 449] was, in * substance, a true account and report of a trial

has been held bad ;3 and a statement of the circumstances

of a trial as from counsel in the case has been held not privileged.4
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The report must also be strictly confined to the actual proceedings

in court, and must contain no defamatory observations or comments

from any quarter whatsoever, in addition to what forms strictly and

properly the legal proceedings.6 And if the nature of the case is

such as to make it improper that the proceedings should be spread

before the public, because of their immoral tendency, or of the

blasphemous or indecent character of the evidence exhibited, the

publication, though impartial and full, will be a public offence, and

punishable accordingly.6

1 Hoare v. Silverlock, 9 C. B. 20; Lewis p. Levy, E. B. & E., 537; Ryalls v.

Leader, Law Rep. 1 Exch. 296. And see Stanley p. Webb, 4 Sandf. 21; Cin-

cinnati Gazette Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio, n. s. 548. But not if the matter

published is indecent or blasphemous. Rex p. Carlisle, 3 B. & Aid. 167: Rex

p. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273. The privilege extends to the publication of testi-

mony taken on an investigation by Congress. Terry v. Fellows, 21 La. Ann.

375.

• Lewis p. Walter, 4 B. & Aid. 611.

• Flint p. Pike, 4 B. & C. 473.

4 Saunders p. Mills, 6 Bing. 213; Flint p. Pike, 4 B. & C, 473. And see

Stanley p. Webb, 4 Sandf. 26; Lewis p. Walter, 4 B. & Aid. 605.

6 Stiles p. Nokes, 7 East, 493; Delegal p. Highley, 3 Bing. (N. C.) 950.

And see Lewis p. Clement, 3 B. & Aid. 702; Pittock p. O'Neill, 63 Penn. St.

253; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 544.

• Rex p. Carlile, 3 B. & Aid. 167; Rex p. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273.
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It lias, however, been held, that the publication of ex parte pro-

ceedings, or mere preliminary examinations, though of a judicial

character, is not privileged; and when they reflect injuriously

upon individuals, the publisher derives no protection from their

having already been delivered in court.1 The reason for

•distinguishing these cases from those where the parties [*450]

are heard is thus stated by Lord Ellenborough, in the early

case of the King v. Fisher:2 " Jurors and judges are still but men;

1 Duncan v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 556; Flint v. Pike, 4 B. & C. 473; Stanley

v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 21; Charlton v. Watton, 6 C. & P. 385; Cincinnati Gazette

Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio, n. s. 548; Mathews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 256; Huff

v. Bennett, 4 Sandf. 120. It seems, however, that if the proceeding has resulted

in the discharge of the person accused, or in a decision that no cause exists for

proceeding against him, a publication of an account of it is privileged. In Curry

v. Walter, 1 B. & P. 525, the Court of Common Pleas held that, in an action for

libel, it was a good defence, under the plea of not guilty, that the alleged libel

was a true account of what had passed upon a motion in the Court of King's

Bench for an information against two magistrates for corruption in refusing to

license an inn; the motion having been refused for want of notice to the magis-

trates. In Lewis v. Levy, El. Bl. & El. 537, the publisher of a newspaper gave
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a full report of an examination before a magistrate on a charge of perjury^

resulting in the discharge of the defendant; and the Court of Queen's Bench

sustained the claim of privilege; distinguishing the case from those where the

party was held for trial, and where the publication of the charges and evidence

might tend to his prejudice on the trial. The opinion of Lord Campbell in the

case, however, seems to go far towards questioning the correctness of the deci-

sions above cited. See especially his quotation from the opinion of Lord Denman,

delivered before a committee of the House of Lords in the year 1843, on the

law of libel: "I have no doubt that [police reports] are extremely useful for the

detection of guilt by making facts notorious, and for bringing those facts more

correctly to the knowledge of all parties interested in unravelling the truth. The

public, I think, are perfectly aware that those proceedings are ex parte, and they

become more and more aware of it in proportion to their growing intelligence;

they know that such proceedings arc only in course of trial, and they do not

form their opinion until the trial is had. Perfect publicity in judicial proceed-

ings is of the highest importance in other points of view, but in its effects on

character I think it desirable. The statement made in open court will probably

find its way to the ears of all in whose good opinion the party assailed feels an

interest, probably in an exaggerated form, and the imputation may often rest

upon the wrong person; both these evils are prevented by correct reports." In

the case of Lewis v. Levy, it was insisted that the privilege of publication only

extended to the proceedings of the superior courts of law and equity; but the

court gave no countenance to any such distinction. See also Wason v. Walter,

L. R. 4 Q. B. 73; Terry v. Fellows, 21 La. Ann. 375.

'2 Camp. 563.
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they cannot always control feeling excited by inflammatory lan-

guage. If they are exposed to be thus warped and misled, in-

justice must sometimes be done. Trials at law, fairly reported,

although they may occasionally prove injurious to individuals, have

been held to be privileged. Let them continue so privileged. The

benefit they produce is great and permanent, and the evil that

arises from them is rare and incidental. But these preliminary

examinations have no such privilege. Their only tendency is to

prejudge those whom the law still presumes to be innocent, and to

poison the sources of justice. It is of infinite importance to us

all, that whatever has a tendency to prevent a fair trial should be

guarded against. Every one of us may bo questioned in a court

of law, and called upon to defend his life and character. We would

then wish to meet a jury of our countrymen with unbiassed minds.

But for this there can be no security, if Buch publications are per-

mitted." And in another case it has been said: "It is our boast

that we are governed by that just and salutary rule upon which

security of life and character often depends, that every man is pre-

sumed innocent of crimes charged upon him, until he is proved

guilty. But the circulation of charges founded upon ex parte tes-
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timony, of statements made, often under excitement, by persons

smarting under real or fancied wrongs, may prejudice the public

mind, and cause the judgment of conviction to be passed long

before the day of trial has arrived. When that day of

[* 451] trial comes, the rule has been * reversed, and the pre-

sumption of guilt has been substituted for the presump-

tion of innocence. The chances of a fair and impartial trial are

diminished. Suppose the charge to be utterly groundless. If every

preliminary ex parte complaint which may be made before a police

magistrate may, with entire immunity, be published and scattered

broadcast over the land, then the character of the innocent, who

may be the victim of a conspiracy, or of charges proved afterwards

to have arisen entirely from misapprehension, may be cloven down,

without any malice on the part of the publisher. The refutation

of slander, in such cases, generally follows its propagation at dis-

tant intervals, and brings often but an imperfect balm to wounds

which have become festered, and perhaps incurable. It is not to

be denied, that occasionally the publication of such proceedings

is productive of good, and promotes the ends of justice. But, in

[ 626]
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such cases, the publisher must find his justification, not in privi-

lege, but in the truth of the charges." 1

Privilege of Publishers of News.

Among the inventions of modern times, by which the world has

been powerfully influenced, and from which civilization has received

a new and wonderful impulse, must be classed the newspaper.

Beginning with a small sheet, insignificant alike in matter and

appearance, published at considerable intervals, and including but

few in its visits, it has become the daily vehicle, to almost every

family in the land, of information from all quarters of the globe,

and upon every subject. Through it, and by means of the electric

telegraph, the public proceedings of every civilized country, the

debates of the leading legislative bodies, the events of war, the

triumphs of peace, the storms in the physical world, and the agita-

tions in the moral and mental, are brought home to the knowledge

of every reading person, and, to a very large extent, before the day

is over on which the events have taken place. And not public

events merely are discussed and described, but the actions and

words of public men are made public property; and any

person sufficiently notorious * to become an object of pub- [• 452]
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lie interest will find his movements chronicled in this index

of the times. Every party lias its newspaper organs; every shade

of opinion on political, religious, literary, moral, industrial, or

financial questions has its representative; every locality has its

press to advocate its claims, and advance its interests, and even the

days regarded as sacred have their special papers to furnish read-

ing suitable for the time. The newspaper is also the medium by

means of which all classes of the people communicate with each

other concerning their wants and desires, and through which they

offer their wares, and seek bargains. As it has gradually increased

in value, and in the extent and variety of its contents, so the

exactions of the community upon its conductors have also in-

creased, until it is demanded of the newspaper publisher, that he

1 Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 30. See this case approved and followed in Cin-

cinnati Gazette Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio, N. s. 548, where, however, the court

are careful not to express an opinion whether a publication of the proceedings on

preliminary examinations may not be privileged, where the accused is present,

with full opportunity of defence.

[527]
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shall daily spread before his readers a complete summary of the

events transpiring in the world, public or private, so far as those

readers can reasonably be supposed to take an interest in them;

and he who does not comply with this demand must give way to

him who will.

The newspaper is also one of the chief means for the education

of the people. The highest and the lowest in the scale of intelli-

gence resort to its columns for information; it is read by those

who read nothing else, and the best minds of the age make it the

medium of communication with each other on the highest and most

abstruse subjects. Upon politics it may be said to be the chief

educator of the people; its influence is potent in every legislative

body; it gives tone and direction to public sentiment on each

important subject as it arises; and no administration in any free

country ventures to overlook or disregard an element so pervading

in its influence, and withal so powerful.

And yet it may be doubted if the newspaper, as such, has ever

influenced at all the current of the common law, in any particular
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important to the protection of the publishers. The railway has

become the successor of the king's highway, and the plastic rules

of the common law have accommodated themselves to the new con-

dition of things; but the changes accomplished by the public press

seem to have passed unnoticed in the law, and, save only where

modifications have been made by constitution or statute, the

publisher of the daily paper occupies to-day the position in the

courts that the village gossip and retailer of scandal occupied two

hundred years ago, with no more privilege and no more pro-

tection.

[* 453] * We quote from an opinion by the Supreme Court of

New York, in a case where a publisher of a newspaper was

prosecuted for libel, and where the position was taken by counsel,

that the publication was privileged: "It is made a point in this

case, and was insisted upon in argument, that the editor of a public

newspaper is at liberty to copy an item of news from another paper,

giving at the same time his authority, without subjecting himself

to legal responsibility, however libellous the article may be, unless

express malice is shown. It was conceded that the law did not,

and ought not, to extend a similar indulgence to any other class of

citizens; but the counsel said that a distinction should be made in

favor of editors, on the ground of the peculiarity of their occupa-
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tion. That their business was to disseminate useful information

among the people; to publish such matters relating to the current

events of the day happening at home or abroad as fell within the

sphere of their observation, and as the public curiosity or taste

demanded; and that it was impracticable for them at all times to

ascertain the truth or falsehood of the various statements contained

in other journals. We were also told that if the law were not thus

indulgent, some legislative relief might become necessary for the

protection of this class of citizens. Undoubtedly if it be desirable

to pamper a depraved public appetite or taste, if there be any such,

by the republication of all the falsehoods and calumnies upon pri-

vate character that may find their way into the press, — to give

encouragement to the widest possible circulation of these vile and

defamatory publications by protecting the retailers of them,— some

legislative interference will be necessary, for no countenance can

be found for the irresponsibility claimed in the common law. That

reprobates the libeller, whether author or publisher, and subjects

him to both civil and criminal responsibility. His offence is there

ranked with that of the receiver of stolen goods, the perjurer and
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suborner of perjury, the disturber of the public peace, the conspir-

ator, and other offenders of like character." And again: "The

act of publication is an adoption of the original calumny, which

must be defended in the same way as if invented by the defendant.

The republication assumes and indorses the truth of the charge,

and when called on by the aggrieved party, the publisher should be

held strictly to the proof. If he chooses to become the indorser

and retailer of private scandal, without taking the trouble to in-

quire into the truth of what he publishes, there is no

ground for * complaint if the law, which is as studious to [* 454]

protect the character as the property of a citizen, holds

him to this responsibility. The rule is not only just and wise in

itself, but, if steadily and inflexibly adhered to and applied by

courts and juries, will greatly tend to the promotion of truth, good

morals, and common decency on the part of the press, by incul-

cating caution and inquiry into the truth of charges against private

character before they are published and circulated throughout the

community."1

1 Hotchkiss r. Oliphant, 2 Hill, 513, per Nelson, Ch. J. And see King r.

Root, 4 Wend. 138, per Walworth, Chancellor. "It baa been urged upon you

that conductors of the public press are entitled to peculiar indulgences and have

S4 [ 529 ] ,
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If this strong condemnatory language were confined to the cases

where private character is dragged before the public for detraction

and abuse, to pander to a depraved appetite for scandal, its pro-

priety and justice and the force of its reasons would be at once

conceded. But a very large proportion of what the newspapers

spread before the public relates to matters of public coucern, but

in which, nevertheless, individuals figure, and must therefore be

mentioned in any account. To a great extent, also, the informa-

tion comes from abroad; the publisher can have no knowledge

concerning it, and no inquiries which he could make would be

likely to give him more definite information, unless he delays ibe

publication until it ceases to be of value to his readers. Whatever

view the law may take, the public sentiment does not brand the

publisher of a newspaper as libeller, conspirator, or villain, because

the telegraph despatches transmitted to him from all parts of the

world, without any knowledge on his part concerning the facts, are

published iu his paper, in reliance upon the prudence, care, and

honesty of those who have charge of the lines of communication,

and whose interest it is to be vigilant and truthful. The public

demand and expect accounts of every important meeting, of every
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important trial, and of all the events which have a bearing upon

trade and business, or upon political affairs. It is impossible that

these shall be given in all cases without matters being mentioned

derogatory to individuals; and if the question were a new one in

the law, it might be worthy of inquiry whether some line of dis-

tinction could not be drawn which would protect the publisher

when giving in good faith such items of news as would be proper,

if true, to spread before the public, and which he gives in the

regular course of his employment, in pursuance of a public demand,

and without any negligence, as they come to him from the

[* 455] * usual and legitimate sources, which he has reason to •

rely upon; at the same time leaving him liable when he

makes his columns the vehicle of private gossip, detraction, and

malice.

especial rights and privileges. The law recognizes no such peculiar rights, priv-

ileges, or claims to indulgence. They have no rights but such as are common to

all. They have just the same rights that the rest of the community have, and no

more. They have the right to publish the truth, but no right to publish false-

hood to the injury of others with impunity." Instructions approved in Sheckell

v. Jackson, 10 Cush. 26. And see Palmer v. Concord, 48 N. H. 216.

. [530]
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The question, however, is not new, and the authorities have

generally held the publisher of a paper to the same rigid responsi-

bility with any other person who makes injurious communications.

Malice on his part is conclusively inferred, if the communications

are false. It is no defence that they have been copied with or

without comment from another paper;1 or that the source of the

information was stated at the time of the publication ;2 or that the

publication was made in the paper without the knowledge of

the proprietor, as an advertisement or otherwise ;3 or that it con-

sists in a criticism on the course and character of a candidate for

public office;4 or that it is a correct and impartial account of a

1 Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill, 510. Even though they be preceded by the

statement that they are so copied. Sanford v. Bennett, 24 N. Y. 20.

'Dole v. Lyon, 10 Johns. 447; Mapes v. Weeks, 4 Wend. 659; Inman v.

Foster, 8 Wend. 602; Hotchkiss r. Oliphant, 2 Hill, 514.

3 Andres v. Wells, 7 Johns. 260; Huff v. Bennett, 4 Sandf. 120; s. c. 6 N. Y.

337; Marten v. Van Schaick, 4 Paige, 479 ; Commonwealth t>. Nichols, 10 Met.

259.

* King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113. The action was for a libel, published in the
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"New York American," reflecting upon Root, who was candidate lor lieutenant-

governor. We quote from the opinion of the chancellor: "It is insisted that

this libel was a privileged communication. If so, the defendants were under no

obligation to prove the truth of the charge, and the party libelled had no right

to recover, unless he established malice in fact, or showed that the editors knew

the charge to be false. The effect of such a doctrine would be deplorable.

Instead of protecting, it would be destroying the freedom of the press, if it

were understood that an editor could publish what he pleased against candidates

for office, without being answerable for the truth of such publications. No honest

man could afford to be an editor, and no man who had any character to lose

would be a candidate for office under such a construction of the law of libel.

The only safe rule to adopt in such cases is to permit editors to publish what

they please in relation to the character and qualifications of candidates for office,

but holding them responsible for the truth of what they publish." Notwithstand-

ing the deplorable consequences here predicted from too great license to the

press, it is matter of daily observation that the press, in its comments upon public

events and public men, proceeds in all respects as though it were privileged;

public opinion would not sanction prosecutions by candidates for office for

publications amounting to technical libels, but which were nevertheless published

without malice in fact; and the man who has a " character to lose " presents him-

self for the suffrages of his fellow-citizens in the full reliance that detraction by

the public press will be corrected through the same instrumentality, and that

unmerited abuse will react on the public opinion in his favor. Meantime the

press is gradually becoming more just, liberal, and dignified in its dealings with

political opponents, and vituperation is much less common, reckless, and bitter

[631]
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f* 456] public * meeting,1 or of any proceedings in which the

public have an interest, unless they were legislative or

judicial in their character, and where both parties had

[* 457] opportunity to be heard.2 Criticisms on * works of art and

literary productions are allowable, if fair, reasonable, and

now than it was at the beginning of the century, when repression was more often

resorted to as a remedy.

1 Dawson v. Duncan, 7 El. & Bl. 229.

* Sanford v. Bennett, 24 N. Y. 20. Bennett was sued for publishing in the

"New York Herald " the speech of a person convicted of murder, made upon the

scaffold as he was about to be executed, and reflecting upon the counsel who had

defended him. The principal question in the case was, whether a statute of the

State, passed after the publication but before the trial, was applicable. The

statute privileged any fair and true report in a newspaper, of a judicial, legis-

lative, or other public official proceeding, or statement, speech, argument, or

debate in the course of the same. The court held the statute not applicable,

both because it was not retrospective in its provisions, and therefore could not

apply to publications previously made, and also because this was not any such
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proceeding as the statute contemplated. Upon the question whether the pub-

lication was not privileged, independent of the statute, Denio, J., says: "The

want of legal connection between the words spoken and the proceeding which

was going forward at the same time and place, which has led me to the conclusion

that the statute does not apply, shows that it is not within the reason upon which

the common-law rule is based. That rule assumes that the public may have a

legitimate interest in being made acquainted with the proceedings of courts of

justice and of legislative bodies. The free circulation of such intelligence is of

vast advantage in every country, and particularly here, where all reforms in

legal or administrative polity must proceed from the people at large. But neither

the reason of the rule, nor, as I believe, the rule itself, has any application to a

proceeding in which neither forensic debate nor legislative or administrative

deliberations or determinations have any place. Where the proceeding is a mere

act, with which neither oral nor written communications have any thing more than

an accidental or fortuitous connection, there is no room for the application of the

doctrine of privilege to whatever may be spoken or written at the time and place

where and when it is transpiring. Such transactions are subject to be reported,

described, and published in newspapers or otherwise, like other affairs in which

individuals and communities feel a curiosity, and with the same liability attaching

to the publisher to answer for any injury which may happen to the character of

individuals if, in the course of such publications, libellous imputations are applied

to any one. It is of course perfectly lawful to publish all the circumstances

attending a public execution, including the dying speech of the malefactor; but

it is a necessary condition of that right, that if scandalous imputations are used

by the culprit or any one else which are untrue, he who publishes them afterwards

must be responsible for the wrong and injury thereby occasioned to the person

attacked." Mason, J., in the same case gives a reason for concurring in the

conclusion of the court, which seems to us to possess some force, independent of

[ 532 ]
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temperate; but the artist or author is not to be criticised through

his works, and his personal character is not made the property of

the public by his publications.1 For further privilege it would seem

that publishers of news must appeal to the protection of public

opinion, or they must call upon the legislature for such modifica-

tion of the law as may seem important to their just protection.

The publisher of a newspaper, however, though responsible for

all the actual damage which a party may suffer in consequence of

injurious publications in his paper, cannot properly be made liable

for exemplary or vindictive damages, where the article complained

of was inserted in his paper without his personal knowledge, and

he has been guilty of no negligence in the selection of agents, or

of personal misconduct, and is not shown habitually to make his

paper the vehicle of detraction and malice.2

Publication of Legislative Proceedings.

Although debates, reports, and other proceedings in legislative

bodies are privileged, it does not seem to follow that the publica-

tion of them is always equally privileged. The English decisions

do not place such publications on any higher ground of right than
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any other communication through the public press. A member of

Parliament, it is said, has a right to publish his speech, but it

must not be made the vehicle of slander against any individual,

and if it is, it is a libel.3 And in another case: "A member of

the question of privilege. It is that the provisions of law then in force, requir-

ing capital executions to be within the walls of the prison, or in an adjoining

enclosure, and excluding all spectators with limited exceptions, must be regarded

as indicating a legislative policy adverse to the publicity of what passes on such

occasions.

1 The libel suits brought by J. Fenimore Cooper may be usefully consulted in

this connection. Cooper v. Stone, 24 Wend. 434; Cooper v. Barber, 24 Wend.

105; Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio, 347 ; Stone p. Cooper, 2 Denio, 293. As to

criticisms on public entertainments, see Fry p. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 54, and 28

N. Y. 324; Dibdin v. Swan, 1 Esp. 28; Green v. Chapman, 4 Bing. (N. C.) 92.

As to how far sermons, preached, but not otherwise published, form a proper sub-

ject for comment and criticism by the public press, see Gathercole v. Miall, 15

M. & W. 318.

* Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, and Detroit Free Press v. Same, 16 Mich.

447.

1 Rex p. Lord Abington, 1 Esp. 226. In this case the defendant was fined,

imprisoned, and required to find security for his good behavior, for a libel con-

tained in a speech made by him in Parliament, and afterwards published.

[533 ]
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[* 458] [* the House of Commons] has spoken what he thought

material, and what he was at liberty to speak, in his char-

acter'as a member of that house. So far he is privileged; but he

has not stopped there, but, unauthorized by the house, has chosen

to publish an account of that speech, in what he has pleased to call

a corrected form, and in that publication has thrown out reflections

injurious to the character of an individual." And he was convicted

and fined for the libel.1

The circumstance that the publication was unauthorized by the

house was alluded to in this opinion, but the rule of law would

seem to be unaffected by it, since it was afterwards held that au

order of the house directing a report made to it to be published

did not constitute any protection to the official printer, who had

published it in the regular course of his duty, in compliance with

such order. All the power of the house was not sufficient to

protect its printer in obeying the order to make this publication;

and a statute was therefore passed to protect in the future persons

publishing parliamentary reports, votes, or other proceedings, by

order of either house.2

1 Rex v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 278.
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s Stat. 3 and 4 Victoria, c. 9. The case was that of Stockdale v. Hansard,

very fully reported in 9 Al. & El. 1. See also 11 Al. & El. 253. The Messrs.

Hansard were printers to the House of Commons, and had printed by order of

that house the report of the inspectors of prisons, in which a book, published by

Stockdale, and found among the prisoners in Newgate, was described as obscene

and indecent. Stockdale brought an action against the printers for libel, and

recovered judgment. Lord Denman, presiding on the trial, said that " the fart

of the House of Commons having directed Messrs. Hansard to publish all tbeir

parliamentary reports is no justification for them, or for any bookseller who

publishes any parliamentary report containing a libel against any man." The

house resented this opinion and resolved, "that the power of publishing such of

its reports, votes, and proceedings as it shall deem necessary or conducive to the

public interests is an essential incident to the constitutional functions of Parlia-

ment, more especially of this house as the representative portion of it." They

also resolved that for any person to institute a suit in order to call its privileges

in question, or for any court to decide upon matters of privilege inconsistent

with the determination of either house, was a breach of privilege. Stockdale,

however, brought other actions, and again recovered. When he sought to

enforce these judgments by executions, his solicitor and himself were proceeded

against for contempt of the house, and imprisoned. While in prison, Stockdale

commenced a further suit. The sheriffs, who had been ordered by the House of

Commons to restore the money which they had collected, were, on the other

hand, compelled by attachments from the Queen's Bench to pay it over to Stock-

[ 534 ]
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* It has been intimated, however, that what a representa- [* 459]

tive is privileged to address to the house of which he is a

member, he is also privileged to address to his constituents; and

dale. In this complicated state of affairs, the proper and dignified mode of

relieving the difficulty by the passage of a statute making such publications privi-

leged for the future was adopted. For an account of this controversy, in addition

to what appears in the law reports, see May, Law and Practice of Parliament,

156-159, 2d ed.; May, Constitutional History, c. 7. A case in some respects

similar to that of Stockdale v. Hansard is that of Popham v. Pickburn, 7 Hurl.

& Nor. 891. The defendant, the proprietor of a newspaper, was sued for

publishing a report made by a medical officer of health to a vestry board, in

pursuance of the statute, and which reflected severely upon the conduct of the

plaintiff. The publication was made without any comment, and as a part of

the proceedings of the vestry board. It was held not to be privileged, notwith-

standing the statute provided for the publication of the report by the vestry

board, — which, however, had not yet been made. Wilde, B., delivering the

opinion of the court, said: "The defendant has published that of the plaintiff

which is undoubtedly a libel, and which is untrue. He seeks to protect himself

on the ground that the publication is a correct report of a document read at a

meeting of the Clerkenwell vestry, which document must have been published
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and sold at a small price by the vestry in a short time. But we are of opinion

this furnishes no defence. Undoubtedly the report of a trial in a court of justice

in which this document had been read would not make the publisher thereof

liable to an action for libel, and reasonably, for such reports only extend that

publicity which is so important a feature of the administration of the law in

England, and thus enable to be witnesses of it not merely the few whom the

court can hold, but the thousands who can read the reports. But no case has

decided that the reports of what takes place at the meeting of such a body as

this vestry are so privileged; indeed the case eited in the argument [Rex v.

Wright, 8 T. R. 293] is an authority that they are not. Then, is the publication

justified by the statute? It is true that the document would have been accessible

to the public in a short time, though not published by the defendant; but this

cannot justify his anticipating the publication, and giving it a wider circulation,

and possibly without an answer which the vestry might have received in some

subsequent report or otherwise, and which would then have been circulated with

the libel. This defence therefore fails.

"It was further contended that this libel might be justified as a matter of

public discussion on a subject of public interest. The answer is: This is not a

discussion or comment. It is the statement of a fact. To charge a man incor-

rectly with a disgraceful act is very different from commenting on a fact relating

to him truly stated; there the writer may, by his opinion, libel himself rather

than the subject of his remarks.

"It is to be further observed that this decision does not determine or affect

the question whether, after the statutory publication, it might or might not be

competent to others to republish these reports, with or without reasonable com-

ments."

[535 ]
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that the bona fide publication for that purpose of his speech is the

house is protected.1 And the practice in this country

[* 460] appears to proceed on * this idea; the speeches and pro-

ceedings in Congress being fully reported by the press,

and the exemption of the member from being called to account for

his speech being apparently supposed to extend to its publication

also. When complete publicity is thus practised, perhaps every

speech published should be regarded as addressed bona fide by the

representative, not only to the house, but also to his constituents.

But whether that view be taken or not, if publication is provided

for by law, as in the case of Congressional debates, the publishing

must be considered as privileged.

The Jury as Judges of the Law.

In a considerable number of the State constitutions it is provided

that, in prosecutions for libel, the jury shall have a right to deter-

mine the law and the fact. In some it is added, "as in other

cases ;" in others, "under the direction of the court." For the

necessity of these provisions we must recur to the rulings of
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the English judges in the latter half of the last century, and the

memorable contest in the courts and in Parliament, resulting at

last in the passage of Mp. Fox's Libel Act, declaratory of the rights

of juries in prosecutions for libel.

In the year 1770, Woodfall, the printer of the " Morning Adver-

tiser," was tried before Lord Mansfield for having published in his

paper what was alleged to be a libel on the king; and his lordship

told the jury that all they had to consider was, whether the de-

fendant had published the paper set out in the information, and

whether the innuendoes, imputing a particular meaning to particu-

lar words were true, as that "the K "meant his Majesty

King George III.; but that they were not to consider whether the

publication was, as alleged in the information, false and malicious,

those being mere formal words; and that whether the letter was

libellous or innocent was a pure question of law, upon which the

opinion of the court might be taken by a demurrer, or a motion in

arrest of judgment. His charge obviously required the jury, if

1 Lives of Chief Justices, by Lord Campbell, Vol. III. p. 167; Davison v.

Duncan, 7 El. & Bl. 229, 233.
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satisfied the publication was made, and had the meaning attributed

to it, to render a verdict of guilty, whether they believed the pub-

lication false and malicious or not; in other words, to convict the

party of guilt, notwithstanding they might believe the essential

element of criminality to be wanting. The jury, dissatisfied with

these instructions, and unwilling to make their verdict

cover * matters upon which they were not at liberty to [* 461]

exercise their judgment, returned a verdict of " guilty of

printing and publishing only" but this the court afterwards rejected

as ambiguous, and ordered a new trial.1

In Miller's case, which was tried the same year, Lord Mansfield

instructed the jury as follows: "The direction I am going to give

you is with a full conviction and confidence that it is the language

of the law. If you by your verdict find the defendant not guilty,

^the fact established by that verdict is, he did not publish a paper of

that meaning; that fact is established, and there is an end of the

prosecution. You are to try the fact, because your verdict estab-

lishes that fact, that he did not publish it. If you find that,

according to your judgment, your verdict is final, and if you find

it otherwise, it is between God and your consciences, for that is the
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basis upon which all verdicts ought to be founded; then the fact

finally established by your verdict, if you find him guilty, is, that

he printed and published a paper of the tenor and of the meaning

Bet forth in the information; that is the only fact finally established

by your verdict; and whatever fact is finally established never can

be controverted in any shape whatever. But you do not by that

verdict give an opinion, or establish whether it is or not lawful to

print or publish a paper of the tenor and meaning in the informa-

tion; for, supposing the defendant is found guilty, and the paper

is such a paper as by the law of the land may be printed and pub-

lished, the defendant has a right to have judgment respited, and to

have it carried to the highest court of judicature."2

Whether these instructions were really in accordance with the

law of England, it would be of little importance now to inquire.

They were assailed as not only destructive to the liberty of the

1 20 State Trials, 895.

* 20 State Trials, 870. For an account of the raising of the same question

in Pennsylvania, so early as 1692, see The Forum, by David Paul Brown, Vol. I.

p. 280.
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press, but as taking from the jury that right to cover by their verdict

all the matter charged and constituting the alleged offence, as it

was conceded was their right in all other cases. In no other case

could the jury be required to find a criminal intent which they did

not believe to exist. In the House of Lords they were assailed by

Lord Chatham; and Lord Camden, the Chief Justice of the Common

Pleas, in direct contradiction to Lord Mansfield, declared

[* 462] his instructions not to be the law of England. * Never-

theless, with the judges generally the view of Lord Mant-

field prevailed, and it continued to be enforced for more than

twenty years, so far as juries would suffer themselves to be con-

i trolled by the directions of the courts.

The act known as Mp. Fox's Libel Act was passed in 1792,

against the protest of Lord Thurlow and five other lords, who

predicted from it "the confusion and destruction of the law of

England." It was entitled " An act to remove doubts respecting

the functions of juries in cases of libel," and it declared and

enacted that the jury might give a general verdict of guilty or not

guilty, upon the whole matter put in issue upon the indictment or
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information, and should not be required or directed by the court

or judge before whom it should be tried to find the defendant

guilty, merely on the proof of the publication of the paper charged

to be a libel, and of the sense ascribed to the same in the indict-

ment or information: Provided, that on every such trial the court

or judge before whom it should be tried should, according to their

discretion, give their opinion and direction to the jury on the

matter in issue, in like manner as in other criminal cases: Pro-

vided also, that nothing therein contained should prevent the jury

from finding a special verdict in their discretion, as in other

criminal cases: Provided also, that in case the jury should find

the defendant guilty, he might move in arrest of judgment on such

ground and in such manner as by law he might have doue before

the passing of the act.

Whether this statute made the jury the rightful judges of the

law as well as of the facts in libel cases, or whether, on the other

hand, it only placed these cases on the same footing as other crim-

inal prosecutions, leaving it the duty of the jury to accept and

follow the instructions of the judge upon the criminal character of

the publication, are questions upon which there are still differences
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of opinion. Its friends have placed the former construction upon

it, while others adopt the opposite view.1

In the United States the disposition of the early judges was to

adopt the view of Lord Mansfield as a correct exposition of the

respective functions of court and jury in cases of libel; and on

the memorable trial of Callendar, which led to the impeachment

of Judge Chase, of the United States Supreme Court, the

right of the *jury to judge of the law was the point in [* 463]

dispute upon which that judge first delivered his opinion,

and afterwards invited argument. The charge there was of libel

upon President Adams, and was prosecuted under the Sedition

Law so called, which expressly provided that the jury should have

the right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of

the court, as in other cases. The defence insisted that the Sedition

Law was unconstitutional and void, and proposed to argue that

question to the jury, but were stopped by the court. The question

of the constitutionality of a statute, it was said by Judge Chase,

was a judicial question, and could only be passed upon by the

court; the jury might determine the law applicable to the case

under the statute, but they could not inquire into the validity of
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the statute by which that right was given.2

Whatever may be the true import of Mr. Fox's Libel Act, it

would seem clear that a constitutional provision which allows the

jury to determine the law refers the questions of law to them for

their rightful decision. Wherever such provisions exist, the jury,

we think, are the judges of the law; and the argument of counsel

upon it is rightfully addressed to both the court and the jury.

Nor can the distinction be maintained which was taken by Judge

Chase, and which forbids the jury considering questious affecting

the constitutional validity of statutes. When the question before

them is, what is the law of the case, the highest and paramount

law of the case cannot be shut from view. Nevertheless, we con-

ceive it to be proper, and indeed the duty of the judge, to instruct

the jury upon the law in these cases, and it is to be expected that

they will generally adopt and follow his opinion.

Where, however, the constitution provides that they shall be

judges of the law "as in other cases," or may determine the law

1 Compare Forsyth on Trial by Jury, c. 12, with May's Constitutional History

of England, c. 9.

» Wharton's State Trials, 688.
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and the fact "under the direction of the court," we must perhaps

conclude that the intention has been simply to put libel cases on

the same footing with any other criminal prosecutions,1 and that

the jury will be expected to receive the law from the court.

1 "By the last clause of the sixth section of the eighth article of the Consti-

tution of this State, it is declared that, in all indictments for libel, the jury shall

have the right to determine the law and the facts under the direction of the court

as in other cases. It would seem from this that the framers of our Bill of Rights

did not imagine that juries were rightfully judges of the law and fact in criminal

cases, independently of the directions of courts. Their right to judge of the

law is a right to be exercised only under the direction of the courts; and if they

go aside from that direction and determine the law incorrectly, they depart from

their duty, and commit a public wrong; and this in criminal as well as in civil

cases." Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio, 427. See also State p. Allen, 1

McCord, 525.

The Constitution of Pennsylvania declares that " in all indictments for libels

the jury shall have a right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction

of the court, as in other cases." In Pittock v. O'Neill, 63 Penn. St. 256; s. C.
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3 Am. Rep. 544, Sharswood, J., says: "There can be no doubt that both in

criminal and civil cases the court may express to the jury their opinion as to

whether the publication is libellous. The difference is that in criminal cases tbey

are not bound to do so, and if they do, their opinion is not binding on the jury,

who may give a general verdict in opposition to it; and if that verdict is for the

defendant, a new trial cannot be granted against his consent. As our declaration

of rights succinctly expresses it, the jury have the right to determine the law and

the facts in indictments for libel as in other cases. But in civil cases the judge is

bound to instruct the jury as to whether the publication is libellous, supposing the

innuendoes to be true; and if that instruction is disregarded, the verdict will be

set aside as contrary to law. In England, the courts have recently disregarded,

to some extent, this plain distinction between criminal and civil proceedings. It

appears to be upon the ground that Mp. Fox's act, though limited in terms to

indictments and informations, was declaratory of the law in all cases of libel;

upon what principle of construction, however, it is not very easy to understand.

It is there the approved practice for the judge in civil actions, after explaining to

the jury the legal definition of a libel, to leave to them the question whether the

publication upon which the action is founded falls within that definition. Folkafd's

Stark. 202; Baylis v. Lawrence, 11 A. & E. 920; Parmiter p. Coupland, 6

M. & W. 105; Campbell p. Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S. 781; Cox v. Lee, L. R.

4 Exch. 284. These cases were followed in Shattuck v. Allen, 4 Gray, 540.

Yet it is clearly held that a verdict for the defendant upon that issue will be set

aside, and a new trial granted. Hakewell v. Ingram, 28 Eng. Law & Eq. 413.

'Though in criminal proceedings for libel,' says JarvU, Ch. J., 'there may be no

review, in civil matters there are cases in which verdicts for the defendant are

set aside upon the ground that the matter was a libel, though the jury have found

it was not.' This must be conceded to be an anomaly; and it will be best to

avoid a practice which leads to such a result. The law, indeed, may be con-
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*" Good Motives and Justifiable Ends" [*464]

In civil suits to recover damages for slander or libel, the truth

is generally a complete defence, if pleaded and established.1 In

criminal prosecutions it was formerly not so. The basis of the

prosecution being that the libel was likely to disturb the peace

and order of society, that liability was supposed to be all the

greater if the injurious charges were true, as a man would be

more likely to commit a breach of the peace when the matters

alleged against him were true than if they were false, in which

latter case he might, perhaps, afford to treat them with contempt.

Hence arose the common maxim, "The greater the truth the

greater the libel," which subjected the law on this subject to a

great deal of ridicule and contempt. The constitutional provisions

we have quoted generally make the truth a defence if published

with good motives and for justifiable ends. Precisely what show-

ing shall establish good motives and justifiable occasion must be

settled by future decisions. In one case the suggestion was thrown

out that proof of the truth of the charge alone might be sufficient,2

but this was not an authoritative decision, and it could not be true

in any case where the matter published was not fit to be spread
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before the public, whether true or false. It must be held, we think,

that where the defendant justifies in a criminal prosecution, the

burden is upon him to prove, not only the truth of the charge, but

sidered as settled in this State by long practice, never questioned, but incidentally

confirmed in McConkle p. bums, 5 Bmn. 340, and Hays v. Brierly, 4 Watts, 392.

It was held in the case last cited that where words of a dubious import are used,

the plaintiff has a right to aver their meaning by innuendo, and the truth of such

innuendo is for the jury. In New York, siuce the recent English cases, the ques-

tion has been ably discussed and fully considered in Snyder p. Andrews, t> barb.

43; Green v. Telfair, 20 Ibid. 11; Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173; and the law

established on its old foundations."

1 Foss v. Hildreth, 10 Allen, 76. See ante, 455.

3 Charge of Judge BetU to the jury in King v. Root, 4 Wend. 121: "Should

the scope of proofs and circumstances lead you to suppose the defendants had

no good end iu contemplation, that they were instigated to these charges solely to

avenge personal and political resentments against the plaintiff, stiil, if they have

satisfactorily shown the charges to be true, they must be acquitted of all liability

to damage in a private action on account of the publication. Indeed, if good

motives and justifiable ends must be shown, tuey migbt weil be implied from the

establishment of the truth of a charge, lor the like reason that mabce is mferred

from its falsity."
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also the "good motives and justifiable ends" of the publication.

These might appear from the very character of the publication

itself, if it was true; as where it exhibited the misconduct or un-

fitness of a candidate for public office ; but where it related

[* 465] to a * person in private life, and who was himself taking

no such action as should put his character in issue before

the public, some further showing would generally be requisite after

the truth had been proved.1

1 In Commonwealth v. Bonner, 9 Met. 410, the defendant was indicted for s

libel on one Oliver Brown, in the following words: "However, there were few

who, according to the old toper's dictionary, were drunk; yea, in all conscience,

drunk as a drunken man; and who and which of you desperadoes of the town got

them so? Was it you whose groggery was open, and the rat soup measured out

at your bar to drunkards, while a daughter lay a corpse in your house, and even

on the day she was laid in her cold and silent grave, a victim of God's chasten-

ing rod upon your guilty drunkard-manufacturing head? Was it you who refusui

to close your drunkery on the day that your aged father was layl in the narrow

house appointed for all the living, and which must ere long receive your recreant

carcass? We ask again, Was it you? Was it you?" On the trial the defend-

ant introduced evidence to prove, and contended that he did prove, all the facts
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alleged in his publication. The court charged the jury that the burden wis

upon the defendant to show that the matter charged to be libellous was published

with good motives and for justifiable ends; that malice is the wilful doing of in

unlawful act, and does not necessarily imply personal ill-will towards the person

libelled. The defendant excepted to the ruling of the court as applied to the

facts proved, contending that, having proved the truth of all the facts alleged in

the libel, and the publication being in reference to an illegal traffic, a public

nuisance, the jury should have been instructed that it was incumbent on the

government to show that defendant's motives were malicious, in the popular sense

of the word, as respects said Brown. By the court, Shatc, Ch. J.: "The court

are of opinion that the charge of the judge of the Common Pleas was strictly

correct. If the publication be libellous, that is, be such as to bring the person

libelled into hatred, contempt, and ridicule amongst the people, malice is pre-

sumed from the injurious act. But by Rev. Stat. c. 133, § 6, ' in every prosecu-

tion for writing or publishing a libel, the defendant may give in evidence, in his

defence upon the trial, the truth of the matter contained in the publication

charged as libellous: provided, that such evidence shall not be deemed a sufficient

justification, unless it shall be further made to appear, on the trial, that the matter

charged to be libellous was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.'

Nothing can be more explicit. The judge, therefore, was right in directing the

jury that, after the publication had been shown to have been made by the defend-

ant, and to be libellous and malicious, the burden was on the defendant, not only

to prove the truth of the matter charged as libellous, but likewise that it was

published with good motives and for justifiable ends. We are also satisfied that

the judge was right in his description or definition of legal malice, that it ia not
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malice in its popular sense; viz., that of hatred and ill-will to the party libelled,

but an act done wilfully, unlawfully, and in violation of the just rights of another."

And yet it would seem as if, conceding the facts published to be true, the jury

ought to have found the occasion a proper one for correcting such indecent con-

duct by public exposure. See further on this subject, Regina v. New-

man, * 1 El. & Bl. 268 and 558; 8. c. 18 Eng. El. & Eq. 113; Bar- [*466]

thelemy v. People, 2 Hill, 248; State v. White, 7 Ired. 180; State v.

Burnham, 9 N. H. 84; Cole v. Wilson, 18 B. Monr. 217; Hagan v. Hendry, 18

Md. 191; Bradley v. Heath, 12 Pick. 163; Snyder v. Fulton, 34 Md. 128; Com-

monwealth v. Snelling, 15 Pick. 337. The fact that the publication is copied from

another source is clearly no protection, if it is not true in fact. Regina v. New-

man, ubi sup. Compare Saunders v. Mills, 6 Bing. 213; Creevy v. Carr, 7 C. &

P. 64. Neither are the motives or good character of the defendant, if he lias

published libellous matter which is false. Barthelemy v. People, 2 Hill, 248;

Commonwealth v. Snelling, 15 Pick. 337; Wilson v. Noonan, 27 Wis. 610.
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[*467] 'CHAPTER XIII.

OP RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.

Whoever shall examine with care the American constitutions will

find nothing more fully stated or more plainly expressed than the

desire of their authors to preserve and perpetuate religious liberty,

and to guard against the slightest approach towards the establish-

ment of inequality in the civil or political rights of citizens, based

upon differences, of religious belief. The American people came

to the work of framing their fundamental laws after centuries of

religious oppression and persecution, sometimes by one party or

sect and sometimes by another, had taught them the utter futility

of all attempts to propagate religious opinions by the rewards,

penalties, or terrors of human laws. They could not fail to per-

ceive, also, that a union of Church and State, like that which

existed in England, if not wholly impracticable in America, was

certainly opposed to the spirit of our institutions, and that any

domineering of one sect over another was repressing to the ener-

gies of the people, and must necessarily tend to discontent and
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disordep. Whatever, therefore, may have been their individual

sentiments upon religious questions, or upon the propriety of the

State assuming supervision and control of religious affairs under

other circumstances, the general voice has been, that persons of

every religious persuasion should be made equal before the law,

and that questions of religious belief and religious worship should

be questions between each individual man and his Maker, of which

human tribunals are not to take cognizance, so long as the public

order is not disturbed, except as the individual, by his voluntary

action in associating himself with a religious organization, may

have conferred upon such organization a jurisdiction over him in

ecclesiastical matters.1 These constitutions, therefore, have not

1 The religious societies which exist in America are mere voluntary societies,

having little resemblance to those which constitute a part of the machinery of

government in England. They are for the most part formed under general

laws, which permit the voluntary incorporation of attendants upon religious
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established religious toleration merely, but religious equality; in

that particular being far in advance not only of the mother country,

worship, with power in the corporation to hold real and personal estate for the

purposes of their organization, but not for other purposes. Such a society is

"a voluntary association of individuals or families, united for the purpose of

having a common place of worship, and to provide a proper teacher to instruct

them in religious doctrines and duties, and to administer the ordinances of bap-

tism, &c. Although a church or body of professing Christians is almost uniformly

connected with such a society or congregation, the members of the church have

no other or greater rights than any other members of the society who statedly

attend with them for the purposes of divine worship. Over the church, as such,

the legal or temporal tribunals of the State do not profess to have any jurisdic-

tion whatever, except so far as is necessary to protect the civil rights of others,

and to preserve the public peace. All questions relating to the faith and prac-

tice of the church and its members belong to the church judicatories, to which

they have voluntarily subjected themselves. But, as a general principle, those

ecclesiastical judicatories cannot interfere with the temporal concerns of the con-

gregation or society with which the church or the members thereof are con-
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nected." Walworth, Chancellor, in Baptist Church v. Wetherell, 3 Paige, 301.

See Ferraria v. Vasconeellos, 31 111. 25; Lawyer v. Clipperly, 7 Paige, 281;

Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Monr. 258; German, &c, Cong. v. Pressler, 17 La. An.

127. Such a corporation is not an ecclesiastical, but merely a private civil cor-

poration, the members of the society being the corporators, and the trustees the

managing officers, with such powers as the statute confers, and the ordinary

discretionary powers of officers in civil corporations. Robertson v. Bullions,

11 N. Y. 249; Miller v. Gable, 2 Dcnio, 492. Compare Watson v. Jones,

13 Wall. 679. The church connected with the society, if any there be, is not

recognized in the law as a distinct entity; the corporators in the society are not

necessarily members thereof, and the society may change its government, faith,

form of worship, discipline, and ecclesiastical relations at will, subject only to the

restraints imposed by their articles of association, and to the general laws of the

State. Keyser v. Stansifer, 6 Ohio, 363; Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N. Y. 249;

Parish of Bellport v. Tooker, 29 Barb. 256; Same Case, 21 N. Y. 267; Burrel

v. Associated Reform Church, 44 Barb. 282. The courts of the State have no

general jurisdiction and control over the officers of such corporations in respect

to the performance of their official duties; but as in respect to the property which

they hold for the corporation they stand in position of trustees, the courts may

exercise the same supervision as in other cases of trust. Ferraria v. Vasconeellos,

31 111. 25; Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511; Watson v. Avery, 2 Bush, 322. But

the courts will interfere where abuse of trust is alleged only in clear cases,

especially if the abuse alleged be a departure from the tenets of the founders of

a charity. Happy v. Morton, 33 III. 398. The articles of association will deter-

mine who may vote when the State law does not prescribe qualifications. State

v. Crowell, 4 Halst. 390. Should there be a disruption of the society, the title to

the property will remain with that part of it which is acting in harmony with its

own law; seceders will be entitled to no part of it. McGinnis t>. Watson, 41
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but also of much of the colonial legislation, which, though more

liberal than that of other civilized countries, nevertheless exhib-

ited features of discrimination based upon religious beliefs or pro-

fessions.1

Penn. St. 9; M. E. Church p. Wood, 5 Ohio, 286; Keyser p. Stansifer, 6 Ohio,

368; Shannon p. Frost, 8 B. Monp. 253; Gibson p. Armstrong, 7 B. Monp. 281;

Hadden v. Chorn, 8 B. Monp. 70; Ferraria p. Vasconcellos, 23 Ill. 456. And

this even though there may have been a change in doctrine on the part of the

controlling majority. Keyser p. Stansifer, 6 Ohio, 363. See Petty p. Topker,

21 N. Y. 267; Horton v. Baptist Church, 34 Vt. 309; Eggleston p. Doolittle, 33

Conn. 396; Miller p. English, 1 Zab. 317. The administration of church rules

or discipline the courts of the State do not interfere with, unless civil rights

become involved, and then only for the protection of such rights. Hendrickson

p. Decow, Sax. Ch. 577; Baptist Church p. Wetherell, 8 Paige, 801; German

Reformed Church p: Seither, 3 Penn. St. 291; Watson p. Farris, 45 Mo. 183;

German Reformed Church p. Seibert, 8 Penn. St. 291 ; McGinnis p. Watson, 41

Penn. St. 21. And see Watson p. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, and the recent case of

Chase p. Cheney in the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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1 For the distinction between religious toleration and religious equality, see

Bloom p. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 890. And see Madison's views, in his Life by

Rives, Vol. I. p. 140. It was not easy, two centuries ago, to make men

educated in the ideas of those days understand how there could be complete

religious liberty, and at the same time order and due subordination to authority in

the State. "Coleridge said that toleration was impossible until indifference made

it worthless." Lowell, "Among my Books," 836. Roger Williams explained

and defended his own views, and illustrated the subject thus: "There goes many

a ship to sea, with many hundred souls in one ship, whose weal and woe is com-

mon, and is a true picture of a commonwealth, or human combination or society.

It hath fallen out sometimes that both Papists and Protestants, Jews and Turks,

may be embarked in one ship; upon which supposal I affirm that all the liberty

of conscience I ever pleaded for turns upon these two hinges: that none of the

Papists, Protestants, Jews, or Turks be forced to come to the ship's prayers or

worship if they practice any. I further add that I never denied that, notwith-

standing this liberty, the commander of this ship ought to command the ship's

course, yea, and also command that justice, peace, and sobriety be kept and

practised, both among the seamen and all the passengers. If any of the seamen

refuse to perform their service, or passengers to pay their freight; if any refuse

to help, in person or purse, towards the common charges or defence; if any

refuse to obey the common laws and orders of the ship, concerning their com-

mon peace and preservation; if any shall mutiny and rise up against their com-

manders and officers; if any should preach or write that there ought to be no

commanders or officers, because all are equal in Christ, therefore no masters nor

officers, no laws nor orders, no corrections nor punishments ; I say I never denied

but in 8ui h cases, whatever is pretended, the commander or commanders may

judge, re.-ist, compel, and punish such transgressors according to their deserts
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* Considerable differences will appear in the provisions [*468]

in the State constitutions on the general subject of the

present chapter; some of them being confined to declarations and

prohibitions whose purpose is to secure the most perfect equality

before the law of all shades of religious belief, while some exhibit

a jealousy of ecclesiastical authority by making persons who exer-

cise the functions of clergyman, priest, or teacher of any religious

persuasion, society, or sect, ineligible to civil office;1 and still

others show some traces of the old notion, that truth and a sense

of duty are inconsistent with scepticism in religion.2 There are

and merits." Arnold's History of Rhode Island, Vol. I. p. 254, citing Knowles,

279, 280.

1 There are provisions to this effect, more or less broad, in the Constitutions

of Tennessee, Louisiana, Delaware, Maryland, and Kentucky.

* The Constitution of Pennsylvania provides "that no person who acknowl-

edges the being of God, and a future state of rewards and punishments, shall, on

account of bis religious sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of

trust or profit under this commonwealth." Art. 9, § 4.— The Constitution of North
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Carolina: "The following classes of persons shall be disqualified for office:

First. All persons who shall deny the existence of Almighty God," &Ci Art.

6, § 5. —The Constitutions of Mississippi and South Carolina: " No person who

denies the existence of the Supreme Being shall hold any office under this Con-

stitution." — The Constitution of Tennessee: "No person who denies the being

of a God, or of a future state of rewards and punishments, 6hall hold any office

in the civil department of this State." On the other hand the Constitutions of

Georgia, Kansas, Virginia, West Virginia, Maine, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa,

Oregon, Ohio, New Jersey, Nebraska, Minnesota, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas,

and Wisconsin expressly forbid religious tests as a qualification for office or pub-

lic trust. The Constitution of Maryland provides "that no religious lest ought

ever to be required as a qualification for any office of trust or profit in this State,

other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God; nor shall the legis-

lature prescribe any other oath of office than the oath prescribed by this constitu-

tion." Declaration of Rights, Art. 37. — The Constitution of Illinois provides

that " the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without

discrimination shall for ever be guaranteed; and no person shall be denied any

civil or political right, privilege, or capacity, on account of his religious opinions;

but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense

with oalhs or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices

inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. No person shall be required

to attend or support any ministry or place of worship against his consent, nor

shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of

worship." Art. 2, § 3. Some other constitutions contain provisions that liberty

of conscience is not to justify licentiousness or practices inconsistent with the

peace and moral safety of society. The Constitution of Tennessee declares that

"no political or religious test, other than an oath to support the Constitution of
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[* 469] exceptional * clauses, however, not many in number;

and it is believed that, where they exist, they are not

often made use of, to deprive any person of the civil or political

rights or privileges which are placed by law within the reach of his

fellows.

Those things which are not lawful under any of the American

constitutions may be stated thus : —

1. Any law respecting an establishment of religion. The legis-

latures have not been left at liberty to effect a union of Church

and State, or to establish preferences by law in favor of any one

religious persuasion or mode of worship. There is not complete

religious liberty where any one sect is favored by the State and

given an advantage by law over other sects. Whatever establishes

a distinction against one class or sect is, to the extent to which

the distinction operates unfavorably, a persecution; and if based

on religious grounds, a religious persecution. It is not mere toler-

ation which is established in our system, but religious equality.

2. Compulsory support, by taxation or otherwise, of religious

instruction. Not only is no one denomination to be favored at the

expense of the rest, but all support of religious instruction must
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be entirely voluntary. It is not within the sphere of government

to coerce it.1

3. Compulsory attendance upon religious worship. Whoever is

not led by choice or a sense of duty to attend upon the ordinances

of religion is not to be compelled to do so by the State. It is the

province of the State to enforce, so far as it may be found practi-

cable, the obligations and duties which the citizen may be under

or may owe to his fellow-citizen or to society; but those which

spring from the relations between himself and his Maker are to be

enforced by the admonitions of the conscience, and not by the

penalties of human laws. Indeed, as all real worship must essen-

the United States, and of this State, shall ever be required as a qualification to

any "office or public trust under the State;" but afterwards, with singular incon-

sistency, proceeds to disqualify certain classes as above stated.

1 AVe must exempt from this the State of New Hampshire, whose constitution

permits the legislature to authorize "the several towns, parishes, bodies corpo-

rate, or religious societies within this State to make adequate provisions, at their

own expense, for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of

piety, religion, and morality;" but not to tax those of other sects or denominations

for their support. Part 1, Art. 6.
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tially and necessarily consist in the free-will offering of adoration

and gratitude by the creature to the Creator, human laws are ob-

viously inadequate to incite or compel those internal and voluntary

emotions which shall induce it, and human penalties at most could

only enforce the observance of idle ceremonies, which, when un-

willingly performed, are alike valueless to the participants and

devoid of all the elements of true worship.

4. Restraints upon the free exercise of religion according to the

dictates of the conscience. No external authority is to

place itself * between the finite being and the Infinite [* 470]

when the former is seeking to render the homage that is

due, and in a mode which commends itself to his conscience and

judgment as being suitable for him to render and acceptable to its

object.

5. Restraints upon the expression of religious belief. An ear-

nest believer usually regards it as his duty to propagate his opin-

ions, and to bring others to his views. To deprive him of this

right is to take from him the power to perform what he considers
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a most sacred obligation.

These are the prohibitions which in some form of words are to

be found in the American constitutions, and which secure freedom

of conscience and of religious worship.1 No man in religious mat-

1 This whole subject was considered very largely in the case of Minor v. The

Board of Education, in the Superior Court of Cincinnati, involving the right

of the school board of that city to exclude the reading of the Bible from the

public schools. The case was reported and published by Robert Clarke and

Co., Cincinnati, under the title, "The Bible in the Public Schools," 1870. The

point of the case may be briefly stated. The constitution of the State, after

various provisions for the protection of religious liberty, contained this clause:

"Religion, morality and knowledge, however, being essential to good govern-

ment, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass suitable laws to

protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own

mode of public worship, and to encourage schools and the means of instruction."

There being no legislation on the subject, except such as conferred large discre-

tionary power on the Board of Education in the management of schools, that body

passed a resolution," that religious instruction and the reading of religious books,

including the Holy Bible, are prohibited in the Common Schools of Cincinnati; it

being the true object and intent of this rule to allow the children of the parents of

all sects and opinions, in matters of faith and worship, to enjoy alike the benefit

of the Common School fund." Certain tax-payers and citizens of said city, on

the pretence that this action was against public policy and morality, and in violation

of the spirit and intent of the provision in the constitution which has been quoted,
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ters is to be subjected to the censorship of the State or of any

public authority; and the State is not to inquire into or take notice

of religious belief, when the citizen performs his duty to the State

and to his fellows, and is guilty of no breach of public morals or

public decorum.1

But while thus careful to establish, protect, and defend religious

freedom and equality, the American constitutions contain no pro-

visions which prohibit the authorities from such solemn recog-

nition of a superintending Providence in public transactions and

exercises as the general religious sentiment of mankind inspires,

and as seems meet and proper in finite and dependent

[* 471] beings. Whatever may be the shades * of religious belief,

all must acknowledge the fitness of recognizing in inter-

filed their complaint in the Superior Court, praying that the board be enjoined

from enforcing laid resolution. The Superior Court (Judge Tafl dissenting)

made an order granting the prayer of the complaint: but the Supreme Court, on

appeal, reversed it, holding that the provision in the constitution requiring the

passage of suitable laws to encourage morality and religion, was one addressed

solely to the judgment and discretion of the legislative department; anil that, in

the absence of any legislation on the subject, the Board of Education could not
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be compelled to permit the reading of the Bible in the schools.

1 Congress is forbidden, by the first amendment to the Constitution of the

United States, from making any law respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Mp. Story says of this provision: "It was

under a solemn consciousness of the dangers from ecclesiastical ambition, the

bigotry of spiritual pride, and the intolerance of sects, exemplified in our do-

mestic, as well as in foreign annals, that it was deemed advisable to exclude

from the national government all power to act upon the subject. The situation,

too, of the different States equally proclaimed the policy as well as the necessity

of such an exclusion. In some of the States, Episcopalians constituted the pre-

dominant sect; iu others, Presbyterians; in others, Congregationalists; in

others, Quakers; and in others again there was a close numerical rivalry among

contending sects. It was impossible that there should not arise perpetual strife

and perpetual jealousy on the subject of ecclesiastical ascendency, if the national

government were left free to create a religious establishment. The only security

was in extirpating the powep. But this alone would have been an imperfect

security, if it had not been followed up by a declaration of the right of the free

exercise of religion, and a prohibition (as we have seen) of all religious tests.

Thus, the whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the State

governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice and the

State constitutions; and the Catholic and the Protestant, the Calvinist and the

Arminian, the Jew and the infidel, may sit down at the common table ot

the national councils, without any inquisition into their faith or mode of wor-

ship." Story on the Constitution, § 1879.
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tant human affairs the superintending care and control of the great

Governor of the Universe, and of acknowledging with thanksgiving

his boundless favors, or bowing in contrition when visited with the

penalties of liis broken laws. No principle of constitutional law

is violated when thanksgiving or fast days are appointed; when

chaplains are designated for the army and navy; when legislative

sessions are opened with prayer or the reading of the Scriptures,

or when religious teaching is encouraged by a general exemption

of the houses of religious worship from taxation for the support

of State government. Undoubtedly the spirit of the constitution

will require, in all these cases, that care be taken to avoid discrim-

ination in favor of or against any one religious denomina i' n or

sect; but the power to do any of these tliings does not become

unconstitutional simply because of its susceptibility to abuse. This

public recognition of religious worship, however, is not based en-

tirely, perhaps not even mainly, upon a sense of what is due to

the Supreme Being himself as the author of all good and of all

law; but the same reasons of State policy which induce the gov-
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ernment to aid institutions of charity and seminaries of instruc-

tion will incline it also to foster religious worship and religious

institutions, as conservators of the public morals, and valuable, if

not indispensable, assistants to the preservation of the public

order.

Nor, while recognizing a superintending Providence, are we

always precluded from recognizing also, in the rules prescribed

for the conduct of the citizen, the notorious fact that the prevail-

ing religion in the States is Christian. Some acts would be offen-

sive to public sentiment in a Christian community, and would tend

to public disorder, which in a Mahometan or Pagan country might

be passed by without notice, or even be regarded as meritorious;

just as some things would be considered indecent, and worthy of

reprobation and punishment as such, in one state of society which

in another would be in accord with the prevailing customs, and

therefore defended and protected by the laws. The criminal laws

of every country are shaped in greater or less degree by the pre-

vailing public sentiment as to what is right, proper, and decorous,

or the reverse; and they punish those acts as crimes which disturb

the peace and order, or tend to shock the moral sense or sense of

propriety and decency, of the community. The moral sense is

largely regulated and controlled by the religious belief; and there-
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fore it is that those things which, estimated hy a Christian stand-

ard, are profane and blasphemous, are properly punished as crimes

against society, since they are offensive in the highest degree to

the general public sense, and have a direct tendency to under-

mine the moral support of the laws, and to corrupt the com-

munity.

[* 472] * It is frequently said that Christianity is a part of the

law of the land. In a certain sense and for certain pur-

poses this is true. The best features of the common law, and

especially those which regard the family and social relations;

which compel the parent to support the child, the husband to sup-

port the wife; which make the marriage-tie permanent and forbid

polygamy,— if not derived from, have at least been improved and

strengthened by the prevailing religion and the teachings of its

sacred Book. But the law does not attempt to enforce the precepts

of Christianity on the ground of their sacred character or divine

origin. Some of those precepts, though we may admit their con-

tinual and universal obligation, we must nevertheless recognize as
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being incapable of enforcement by human laws. That standard of

morality which requires one to love his neighbour as himself we

must admit is too elevated to bo accepted by human tribunals as

the proper test by which to judge the conduct of the citizen; and

one could hardly be held responsible to the criminal laws if in

goodness of heart and spontaneous charity he fell something short

of the Good Samaritan. The precepts of Christianity, moreover,

affect the heart, and address themselves to the conscience; while

the laws of the State can regard the outward conduct only: and

for these several reasons Christianity is not a part of the law of the

land in any sense which entitles the courts to take notice of and

base their judgments upon it, except so far as they can find that

its precepts and principles have been incorporated in and made a

component part of the positive law of the State.1

Mr. Justice Story has said in the Girard Will case that, al-

though Christianity is a part of the common law of the State, it is

only so in this qualified sense, that its divine origin and truth are

admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly re-

viled and blasphemed against, to the annoyance of believers or to

1 Andrew v. Bible Society, 4 Sandf. 182; Ayres v. Methodist Church, 3 Sandf.

377; State v. Chandler, 2 Hair. 555; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio, N. s. 387.
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the injury of the public.1 It may be doubted, however, if the pun-

ishment of blasphemy is based necessarily upon an admission of

the divine origin or truth of the Christian religion, or incapable of

being otherwise justified.

Blasphemy has been defined as consisting in speaking evil of the

Deity, with an impious purpose to derogate from the divine majesty,

and to alienate the minds of others from the love and reverence of

God. It is purposely using words concerning the Supreme Being

calculated and designed to impair and destroy the reverence, re-

spect, and confidence due to him, as the intelligent Creator, Gov-

ernor, and Judge of the world. It embraces the idea of detraction

as regards the character and attributes of God, as calumny usually

carries the same idea when applied to an individual. It is a wilful

and malicious attempt to lessen men's reverence of God, by

denying his existence or his attributes as an intelligent Creator,

Governor, and Judge of men, and to prevent their having

confidence in him as such.2 * Contumelious reproaches [*473]

and profane ridicule of Christ or of the Holy Scriptures
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have the same evil effect in sapping the foundations of society and

of public order, and are classed under the same head.3

In an early case where a prosecution for blasphemy came before

Lord Hale, he is reported to have said: "Such kind of wicked,

blasphemous words are not only an offence to God and religion,

but a crime against the laws, State, and government, and therefore

punishable in the Court of King's Bench. For to say religion is a

cheat, is to subvert all those obligations whereby civil society is

preserved; that Christianity is a part of the laws of England, and

to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in subversion of

the law."4 Eminent judges in this country have adopted this

1 Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 198. Mp. Webster's argument that Chris-

tianity is a part of the law of Pennsylvania, is given in 6 Webster's Works,

p. 175.

* Shaw, Ch. J., in Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 218.

'People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290; Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick.

213; Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394; State p. Chandler, 2 Harp.

553; Rex v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26; Rex v. Carlile, 3 B. & Aid. 161;

Cowan p. Milbourn, Law R. 2 Exch. 230.

* The King v. Taylor, 3 Keb. 607, Vent. 293. See also The King v. Wool-

aston, 2 Stra. 844, Fitzg. 64, Raym. 162, in which the defendant was convicted

of publishing libels, ridiculing the miracles of Christ, his life and conversation.

Lord Ch. J. Raymond in that case says: "I would have it taken notice of, that
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language, and applied it to prosecutions for blasphemy, where the

charge consisted in malicious ridicule of the Author and Founder

of the Christian religion. The early cases in New York and Mas-

sachusetts 1 are particularly marked by clearness and precision oa

this point, and Mp. Justice Clayton, of Delaware, has also adopted

and followed the ruling of Lord Chief Justice Sale, with such ex-

planations of the true basis and justification of these prosecutions

as to give us a clear understanding of the maxim that Christianity

is a part of the law of the land, as understood and applied by

the courts in these cases.2 Taken with the explanation

[* 474] * given, there is nothing in the maxim of which the

believer in any creed, or the disbeliever of all, can justly

complain. The language which the Christian regards as blas-

phemous, no man in sound mind can feel under a sense of duty to

make use of under any circumstances, and no person is therefore

deprived of a right when he is prohibited, under penalties, from

uttering it.

But it does not follow, because blasphemy is punishable as a

crime, that therefore one is not at liberty to dispute and argue
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against the truth of the Christiau religion, or of any accepted

dogma. Its "divine origin and truth" are not so far admitted in

we do not meddle with the difference of opinion, and that we interfere only where

the root of Christianity ia struck at."

1 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 291; Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick.

203.

* State p. Chandler, 2 Harp. 555. The case is very full, clear, and instruc-

tive, and cites all the English and American authorities. The conclusion at

which it arrives is, that "Christianity was never considered a part of the com-

mon law, so far as that for a violation of its injunctions, independent of the

established laws of man, and without the sanction of any positive act of Parlia-

ment made to enforce those injunctions, any man could be drawn to answer in a

common-law court. It was a part of the common law, 'so far that any person

reviling, subverting, or ridiculing it might be prosecuted at common law' as

Lord Mansfield has declared; because, in the judgment of our English ancestors

and their judicial tribunals, he who reviled, subverted, or ridiculed Christianity,

did an act which struck at the foundation of our civil society, and tended by its

necessary consequences to disturb that common peace of the land of which (as

Lord Coke had reported) the common law was the preservep. The common law

. . . adapted itself to the religion of the country just so far as was necessary for

the peace and safety of civil institutions; but it took cognizance of offences

against God only, when, by their inevitable effects, they became offences against

man and his temporal security." See, also, what is said on this subject by Duer,

J., in Andrew v. Bible Society, 4 Sandf. 182.
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the law as to preclude their being controverted. To forbid dis-

cussion on tliis subject, except by the various sects of believers,

would be to abridge the liberty of speech and of the press in a

point which, with many, would be regarded as most important of

all. Blasphemy implies something more than a denial of any of

the truths of religion, even of the highest and most vital. A bad

motive must exist; there must be a wilful and malicious attempt

to lessen men's reverence for the Deity, or for the accepted religion.

But outside of such wilful and malicious attempt, there is a broad

field for candid investigation and discussion, which is as much

open to the Jew and the Mahometan as to the professors of the

Christian faith. "No author or printer who fairly and conscien-

tiously promulgates the opinions with whose truths he is impressed,

for the benefit of others, is answerable as a criminal. A malicious

and mischievous intention is, in such a case, the broad boundary

between right and wrong; it is to be collected from the offensive

levity, scurrilous and opprobrious language, and other circum-

stances, whether the act of the party was malicious." 1 Legal
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blasphemy implies that the words were uttered in a wanton man-

ner, " with a wicked and malicious disposition, and not in a serious

discussion upon any controverted point in religion." a The courts

have always been careful, in administering the law, to say that

they did not intend to include in blasphemy disputes betweeii

learned men upon particular controverted points.8 The

constitutional * provisions for the protection of religious [* 475]

liberty not only include within their protecting power all

sentiments and professions concerning or upon the subject of

1 Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 894. Ia Ayres v. Methodist

Churcli, 3 Sandf. 377, Duer, J., in speaking of "pious uses," says: "If the

Presbyterian and the Baptist, the Methodist and the Protestant Episcopalian, must

each be allowed to devote the entire income of his real and personal estate, for

ever, to the support of missions, or. the spreading of the Bible, so must the

Roman Catholic; his to the endowment of a monastery, or the founding of a per-

petual mass for the safety of his soul; the Jew his to the translation and publi-

cation of the Mishna or the Talmud, and the Mahometan (if in that colluvies

gentium to which this city [New York], like ancient Rome, seems to be doomed,

such shall be among us), the Mahometan his to the assistance or relief of the

annual pilgrims to Mecca."

• People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 293, per Kent, Ch. J.

3 Rex v. Woolaston, Stra. 834, Fitzg. 64; People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 293,

per Kent, Ch. J.
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religion, but they guarantee to every one a perfect right to form

and to promulgate such opinions and doctrines upon religions

matters, and in relation to the existence, power, attributes, and

providence of a Supreme Being as to himself shall seem reasonable

and correct. In doing this he acts under an awful responsibility,

but it is not to any human tribunal.1

1 Per Shaw, Ch. J., in Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 2:M. The lan-

guage of the courts has perhaps not always been as guarded as it should hare

been on this subject. In the King v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26, the defendant

was on trial for blasphemous libel, in saying that Jesus Christ was an impostor,

and a murderer in principle. One of the jurors asked the Lord Chief Justiee

(Abbott), whether a work which denied the divinity of the Saviour was a libel.

The Lord Chief Justice replied that "a work speaking of Jesus Christ in the

language used in the publication in question was a libel, Christianity being a

part of the law of the land." This was doubtless true, as the wrong motive was

apparent; but it did not answer the juror's question. On motion for a new trial,

the remarks of Best, J., are open to a construction which answers the question

in the affirmative: "My Lord Chief Justice reports to us that he told the jury
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that it was an indictable offence to speak of Jesus Christ in the manner in which

he is spoken of in the publication for which this defendant is indicted. It cannot

admit of the least doubt that this direction was correct. The 53 Geo. IH. p. 160,

has made no alteration in the common law relative to libel. If, previous to the

passing of that statute, it would have been a libel to deny, in any printed book,

the divinity of the second person in the Trinity, the same publication would be

a libel now. The 53 Geo. IH. p. 160, as its title expresses, is an act to relieve

persons who impugn the doctrine of the Trinity from certain penalties If we

look at the body of the act to see from what penalties such parties are relieved,

we find that they are the penalties from which the 1 W. & M. Sess. 1, p. 18,

exempted all Protestant dissenters, except such as denied the Trinity, and the

penalties or disabilities which the 9 & 10 W. III. imposed on those who denied

the Trinity. The 1 W. & M. Sess. 1, p. 18, is, as it has been usually called, an

act of toleration, or one which allows dissenters to worship God in the mode that

is agreeable to their religious opinions, and exempts them from punishment for

non-attendance at the Established Church and non-conformity to its rights. The

legislature, in passing that act, only thought of easing the conscience of dis-

senters, and not of allowing them to attempt to weaken the faith of the members

of the church. The 9 & 10 W. III. was to give security to the government, by

rendering men incapable of office, who entertained opinions hostile to the estab-

lished religion. The only penalty imposed by that statute is exclusion from

office, and that penalty is incurred by any manifestation of the dangerous opinion,

without proof of intention in the person entertaining it, either to induce others

to be of that opinion, or in any manner to disturb persons of a different per-

suasion. This statute rested on the principle of the test laws, and did not in-

terfere with the common law relative to blasphemous libels. It is not necessary

for me to say whether it be libellous to argue from the Scriptures against the

divinity of Christ ; that is not what the defendant professes to do; he argues
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* Other forms of profanity, besides that of blasphemy, [* 476]

are also made punishable by statutes in the several States.

The cases these statutes take notice of are of a character no one

can justify, and their punishment involves no question of religious

liberty. The right to use profane and indecent language is recog-

nized by no religious creed, and the practice is reprobated by right-

thinking men of every nation and every religious belief. The

statutes for the punishment of public profanity require no further

justification than the natural impulses of every man who believes

in a Supreme Being, and recognizes his right to the reverence of

his creatures.

The laws against the desecration of the Christian Sabbath, by

labor or sports, are not so readily defensible by arguments the

force of which will be felt and admitted by all. It is no hardship to

any one to compel him to abstain from public blasphemy or other

profanity, and none can complain that his rights of conscience are

invaded by this enforced respect to a prevailing religious sentiment.

But the Jew who is forced to respect the first day of the week,
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when his conscience requires of him the observance of the seventh

also, may plausibly urge that the law discriminates against his

religion, and by forcing him to keep a second Sabbath in each

week, unjustly, though by indirection, punishes him for his belief.

The laws which prohibit ordinary employments on Sunday are

to be defended, either on the same grounds which justify the

against the divinity of Christ by denying the truth of the Scriptures. A work

containing such arguments, published maliciously (which the jury in this case

have found), is by the common law a libel, and the legislature has never altered

this law, nor can it ever do so while the Christian religion is considered the

basis of that law." It is a little difficult, perhaps, to determine precisely how

far this opinion was designed to go in holding that the law forbids the public

denial of the truth of the Scriptures. That arguments against it, made in good

faith by those who do not accept it, are legitimate and rightful, we think there

is no doubt; and the learned judge doubtless meant to admit as much when

he required a malicious publication as an ingredient in the offence. However,

when we are considering what is the common law of England and of this country

as regards offences against God and religion, the existence of a State church in

that country and the effect of its recognition upon the law, are circumstances to

be kept constantly in view.

In People v. Porter, 2 Park. Cr. R. 14, the defence of drunkenness was made

to a prosecution for a blasphemous libel. Walworth, Circuit Judge, presiding at

the trial, declared the intoxication of defendant, at the time of uttering the

words, to be an aggravation of the offence rather than an excuse.
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punishment of profanity, or as establishing sanitary regulations,

based upon the demonstration of experience that one day's rest in

seven is needful to recuperate the exhausted energies of

[* 477] body and mind. If * sustained on the first ground, the

view must be that such laws only require the proper defer-

ence and regard which those not accepting the common belief may

justly be required to pay to the public conscience. The Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania have preferred to defend such legislation on

the second ground rather than the first;1 but it appears to us that

if the benefit to the individual is alone to be considered, the argu-

ment against the law which he may make who has already observed

the seventh day of the week, is unanswerable. But on the other

ground it is clear that these laws are supportable on authority,

notwithstanding the inconvenience which they occasion to those

whose religious sentiments do not recognize the sacred character

of the . rst day of the week.2

1 "It intermeddles not with the natural and indefeasible right of all men to

worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; it
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compels none to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain

any ministry against his consent; it pretends not to control or to interfere with

the rights of conscience, and it establishes no preference for any religious estab-

lishment or mode of worship. It treats no religious doctrine as paramount in

the State; it enforces no unwilling attendance upon the celebration of divine

worship. It says not to the Jew or Sabbatarian, 'You shall desecrate the day

you esteem as holy, and keep sacred to religion that we deem to be so.' It

enters upon no discussion of rival claims of the first and seventh days of the

week, nor pretends to bind upon the conscience of any man any conclusion upon

a subject which each must decide for himself. It intrudes not into the domestic

circle to dictate when, where, or to what god its inmates shall address their

orisons; nor does it presume to enter the synagogue of the Israelite, or the

church of the seventh-day Christian, to command or even persuade their attend-

ance in the temples of those who especially approach the altar on Sunday. It

does not in the slightest degree infringe upon the Sabbath of any sect, or curtail

their freedom of worship. It detracts not one hour from any period of time

they may feel bound to devote to this object, nor does it add a moment beyond

what they may choose to employ. Its sole mission is to inculcate a temporary

weekly cessation from labor, but it adds not to this requirement any religious

obligation." Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Penn. St. 312. See also Charleston

p. Benjamin, 2 Strob. 508; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 887; McGatru k p.

Wason, 8 Ohio St. 566; Hudson p. Geary, 4. R. I. 485.

* Commonwealth v. Wolf, 8 S. & R. 50; Commonwealth p. Fisher, 17 S. &

R. 160; Shover v. State, 5 Eng. 529; Voglesong v. State, 9 Ind. 112; Stater.

Ambs, 20 Mo. 214; Cincinnati v. Rice, 15 Ohio, 225. In Simonds's Ex'rs p.

Gratz, 2 Pen. & Watts, 416, it was held that the conscientious scruples of a Jew
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Whatever deference tlie constitution or the laws may require to

be paid in some cases to the conscientious scruples or religious

convictions of the majority, the general policy always is,

to * avoid with care any compulsion which infringes on [* 478]

the religious scruples of any, however little reason may

seem to others to underlie them. Even in the important matter

of bearing arms for the public defence, those who cannot in

conscience take part are excused, and their proportion of this

great and sometimes imperative burden is borne by the rest of the

community.1

Some of the State constitutions have also done away with the

distinction which existed at the common law regarding the admis-

sibility of testimony in some cases. All religions were recognized

by the law to the extent of allowing all persons to be sworn and

to give evidence who believed in a superintending Providence, who

rewards and punishes, and that an oatli was binding on their

conscience.2 But the want of such belief rendered the person

to appear and attend a trial of his cause on Saturday were not sufficient cause
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for a continuance. But quare of this. In Frolickstein v. Mayor of Mobile,

40 Ala. 725, it was held that a statute or municipal ordinance prohibiting the

sale of goods by merchants on Sunday, in its application to religious Jews " who

believe that it is their religious duty to abstain from work on Saturdays, and to

work on all the other six days of the week," was not violative of the article in

the State constitution which declares that no person shall, "upon any pretence

whatsoever, be hurt, molested, or restrained in his religious sentiments or per-

suasions.''

1 There are constitutional provisions to this effect in New Hampshire, Ala-

bama, Texas, 11linois, Indiana, Vermont, and Tennessee, and statutory provi-

sions in other States.

* See upon this point the leading case of Ormichund v. Barker, Willes, 538,

and 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 535, where will be found a full discussion of this

subject. Some of the earlier American cases required of a witness that he should

believe in the existence of God, and of a state of rewards and punishments after

the present life. See especially Atwood p. Wclton, 7 Conn. 66. But this rule

did not generally obtain; belief in a Supreme Being who would punish false

swearing, whether in this world or in the world to come, being regarded sufficient.

Cubbison p. McCreary, 7 \V. & S. 262; Blocker v. Burness, 2 Ala. 354; Jones

c. Harris, 1 Strob. 160; Shaw v. Moore, 4 Jones. 25; Hunscum p. Hunscum, 15

Mass. 184; Brock v. Milligan, 10 Ohio, 121; Bennett p. Mate, 1 Swan, 411;

Central R.R. Co. p. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541; Arnold v. Arnold, 13 Vt. 362.

But one who lacked this belief was not sworn, because there was no mode known

to the law by which it was supposed an oath could be made binding upon his

conscience. Arnold v. Arnold, 13 Vt. 362.
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incompetent. Wherever the common law remains unchanged, it

must, we suppose, be held no violation of religious liberty to recog-

nize and enforce its distinctions; but the tendency is to do away

with them entirely, or to allow one's unbelief to go to his credi-

bility only, if taken into account at all.1

1 The States of Iowa, Minnesota, Michigan, Oregon, Wisconsin, Arkansas,

Florida, Missouri, California, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, and

New York have constitutional provisions expressly doing away with incompe-

tency from want of religious belief. Perhaps the general provisions in some of

the other constitutions declaring complete equality of civil rights, privileges, and

capacities are sufficiently broad to accomplish the same purpose. Perry's Case,

3 Grat. 632. In Michigan and Oregon a witness is not to be questioned concern-

ing his religious belief. See People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305. In Georgia the code

provides that religious belief shall only go to the credit of a witness, and it has been

held inadmissible to inquire of a witness whether he believed in Christ as the

Savioup. Donkle p. Kohn, 44 Geo. 266. In Maryland no one is incompetent

as a witness or juror "provided he believes in the existence of God, and that,

under His dispensation, such person will be held morally accountable for his acts,
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and be rewarded or punished therefor, either in this world or the world to come,''

Const. Dep. of Rights, § 36.
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*CHAPTER XIV. [*479]

THE POWER OP TAXATION.

I

The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and

so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare

that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest

in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. It reaches

to every trade or occupation; to every object of industry, use,

or enjoyment; to every species of possession; and it imposes a

burden which, in case of failure to discharge it, may be followed

by seizure and sale or confiscation of property. No attribute of

sovereignty is more pervading, and at no point does the power of

the government affect more constantly and intimately all the

relations of life than through the exactions made under it.

Taxes are defined to be burdens or charges imposed by the

legislative power upon persons or property, to raise money for

public purposes.1 The power to tax rests upon necessity, and is

inherent in every sovereignty. The legislature of every free State
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will possess it under the general grant of legislative power,

whether particularly specified in the constitution among the

powers to be exercised by it or not. No constitutional govern-

ment can exist without it, and no arbitrary government without

regular and steady taxation could be any thing but an oppressive

and vexatious despotism, since the only alternative to taxation

would be a forced extortion for the needs of government from such

persons.or objects as the men in power might select as victims.

Chief Justice Marshall has said of this power: "The power of

taxing the people and their property is essential to the very

1 Blackwell on Tax Titles, 1. A tax is a contribution imposed by government

on individuals for the service of the State. It is distinguished from a subsidy

as being certain and orderly, which is shown in its derivation from Greek, rafif,

ordo, order or arrangement. Jacob, Law Die.; Bouvier, Law Die. "The

revenues of a State are a portion that each subject gives of his property in

order to secure, or to have, the agreeable enjoyment of the remaindep." Mon-

tesquieu*, Spirit of the Laws, B. 12, p. 30.
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existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised on

the objects to which it is applicable to the utmost extent to which

the government may choose to carry it. The only security against

the abuse of this power is found in the structure of the

[* 480] government itself. In imposing a * tax, the legislature

acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a suf-

ficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. The

people of a State, therefore, give to their government a right of

taxing themselves and their property; and as the exigencies of

the government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to the

exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the

legislator, and on the influence of the constituents over their

representative, to guard them against its abuse." 1

And the same high authority has said in another case: "The

power of legislation, and consequently of taxation, operates on all

persons and property belonging to the body politic. This is an

original principle, which has its foundation in society itself. It is

granted by all for the benefit of all. It resides in the government

as part of itself, and need not be reserved where property of any

description, or the right to use it in any manner, is granted to in-
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dividuals or corporate bodies. However absolute the right of anj

individual may be, it is still in the nature of that right that it

must bear a portion of the public burdens, and that portion must

be determined by the legislature. This vital power may be abused;

but the interest, wisdom, and justice of the representative body,

and its relations with its constituents, furnish the only security

against unjust and excessive taxation, as well as against unwise

taxation." 2 And again, the same judge says it is " unfit for the

judicial department to inquire what degree of taxation is the

legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the abuse, of

the power."3 And the same general views have been frequently

expressed in other cases.4

1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 428.

8 Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 561.

* McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 430.

4 Kirby c. Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 200; Sharpless v. Mayor, &c, 21 Penn. St.

168; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 478; Wingate v. Sluder, 6 Jones, Law, 552;

Hcrrick v. ltaudolph, 13 Vt. 529; Armington v. Barnct, 15 Vt. 745; Thomas r.

Leland, 24 Wend. 65; People v. Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 425; Portland

Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252.
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Notwithstanding the pervading nature of this power, there are

some things under our system of government which, by necessary

implication, are exempted from its exercise. Thus, the States

cannot tax the agencies of the general government; for, if they

could, it would be within their power to impose taxation

to an extent that might cripple, if not wholly defeat, * the [* 481]

operations of the national authorities within their proper

sphere of action. "That the power to tax," says Chief Justice

Marshall, " involves the power to destroy; that the power to de-

stroy may defeat and render useless the power to create; that

there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one government a

power to control the constitutional measures of another, which

other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be su-

preme over that which exerts the control,— are propositions not

to be denied." And referring to the argument that confidence in

the good faith of the State governments must forbid our indulging,

the anticipation of such consequences, he adds: "But all inconsis-

tencies are to be reconciled by the magic word, — confidence.
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Taxation, it is said, does not necessarily and unavoidably destroy.

To carry it to the excess of destruction would be an abuse, to pre-

sume which would banish that confidence which is essential to all

government. But is this a case of confidence? Would the people

of any one State trust those of another with a power to control the

most insignificant operations of their State government? We know

they would not. Why then should we suppose that the people of

any one State would be willing to trust those of another with a

power to control the operations of a government to which they

have confided their most important and most valuable interests?

In the legislature of the Union alone are all represented. The

legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the

people with the power of controlling measures which concern all,

in the confidence that it will not be abused. This, then, is not a

case of confidence."1

1 McCulloch p. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 431. The case involved the right of the

State of Maryland to impose taxes upon the operations, within its limits, of the

Bank of the United States, created by authority of Congress. "If," continues

the Chief Justice, " we apply the principle for which the State of Maryland con-

tends to the Constitution generally, we shall find it capable of changing totally

the character of that instrument. We shall find it capable of arresting all the

measures of the*government, and of prostrating it at the foot of the States. The
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[* 482] * It follows as a logical result from this doctrine that

if the Congress of the Union may constitutionally create

a Bank of the United States, as an agency of the national govern-

ment in the accomplishment of its constitutional purposes, any

power of the States to tax such bank, or its property, or the means

of performing its functions, is precluded by necessary implication.1

For the like reasons a State is prohibited from taxing an officer of

the general government for his office or its emoluments, since such

a tax, having the effect to reduce the compensation for the services

provided by the act of Congress, would to that extent conflict

with such act, and tend to neutralize its purpose.2 So the States

may not impose taxes upon the obligations or evidences of debt

issued by the general government upon the loans made to it, un-

less such taxation is permitted by law of Congress, and then only

in the manner such law shall prescribe, — any such tax being an

impediment to the operations of the government in negotiating

loans, and in greater or less degree, in proportion to its magnitude,

American people have declared their Constitution, and the laws made in pursu-

ance thereof, to be supreme; but this principle would transfer the supremacy in

fact to the States. If the States may tax one instrument employed by the gov-
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eroment in the execution of its powers, they may tax any and every other instru-

ment. They may tax the mail; they may tax the mint; they may tax patent

rights; they may tax the papers of the custom-house; they may tax judicial

process; they may tax all the means employed by the government to an excess

which would defeat all the ends of government. This was not intended by the

American people. They did not design to make their government dependent on

the States." In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, it was held competent for

Congress, in aid of the circulation of the national banks, to impose restraints

upon the circulation of the State banks in the form of taxation. Perhaps no

other case goes so far as this, in holding that taxation may be imposed for other

purposes than the raising of revenue, though the levy of duties upon import)

with a view to incidental protection to domestic manufactures is upon a similar

principle.

1 McCullocb p. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn v. United States Bank, 9

Wheat. 738; Dobbins p. Commissioners of Erie Co., 16 Pet. 435. But the doc-

trine which exempts the instrumentalities of the general government from the

influence of State taxation, being founded on the implied necessity for the use of

such instruments by the government, such legislation as does not impair the use-

fulness or capability of such instruments to serve the government, is not within

the rule of prohibition. National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall 353; Thomp-

son v. Pacific R.R. Co., ib. 579.

* Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie Co., 16 Pet. 435.
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tending to cripple and embarrass the national power.1 The tax

upon the national securities is a tax upon the exercise of the

power of Congress " to borrow money on the credit of the United

States." The exercise of this power is interfered with to the

extent of the tax imposed under State authority, and the liability

of the certificates of stock or other securities to taxation by a

State, in the hands of individuals, would necessarily affect their

value in market, and therefore affect the free and unrestrained

exercise of the power. M If the right to impose a tax exists, it is

a right which, in its nature, acknowledges no limits. It may be

carried to any extent within the jurisdiction of the State or corpo-

ration which imposes it, which the will of such State or corporation

may prescribe."2

* If the States cannot tax the means by which the [* 483]

national government performs its functions, neither, on

the other hand, and for the same reasons, can the latter tax the

agencies of the state governments. "The same supreme power

which established the departments of the general government
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determined that the local governments should also exist for their

own purposes, and made it impossible to protect the people in

their common interests without them. Each of these several

agencies is confined to its own sphere, and all are strictly subor-

dinate to the constitution which limits them, and independent of

other agencies, except as thereby made dependent. There is

nothing in the Constitution [of the United States] which can be

1 Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2

Black, 620; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200; Van Allen e. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573;

People r. Commissioners, 4 Wall. 244; Bradley v. People, ib. 459 ; The Banks o.

The Mayor, 7 Wall. 16; Bank v. Supervisors, ib. 26. For a kindred doctrine,

see State v. Jackson, 33 N. J. 450.

4 Weston v. Charleston, 4 Pet. 449; Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2

Black, 631. This principle is unquestionably sound, but a great deal of difficulty

has been experienced in consequence of it, under the law of Congress establishing

the National Banking System, which undertakes to subject the National Banks

to State taxation, but at the same time to guard those institutions against unjust

discriminations, by providing that their shares shall only be taxed at the place

where the bank is located, and in the same manner as shares in the State banks

are taxed. The difficulty is in harmonizing the State and national laws on the

subject, and it will be illustrated in a measure by some of the cases above cited;

though the full extent of the difficulty is only perceived in other cases where the

taxation of State banks is fixed by constitutional provisions, which provide modes

that cannot be harmonized at all with the law of Congress.
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made to admit of any interference by Congress with the secure

existence of any State authority within its lawful bounds. And

any such interference by the indirect means of taxation is quite

as much beyond the power of the national legislature as if the

interference were direct and extreme." 1 It has therefore been

held that the law of Congress requiring judicial process to be

stamped could not constitutionally be applied to the process of

the State courts; since otherwise Congress might impose such

restrictions upon the State courts as would put an end to their

effective action, and be equivalent practically to abolishing them

altogethep.2 And a similar ruling has been made in other cases.

1 Fi6eld v. Close, 15 Mich. 509. "In respect to the reserved powers, the

State is as sovereign and independent as the general government. And if the

means and instrumentalities employed by that government to carry into operation

the powers granted to it are necessarily, and for the sake of self-preservation,

exempt from taxation by the States, why are not those of the States depending

upon their reserved powers, for like reasons, equally exempt from Federal tax-

ation? Their unimpaired existence in the one case is as essential as in the othep.
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It is admitted that there is no express provision in the Constitution that prohibiu

the general government from taxing the means and instrumentalities of the Sutes.

nor is there any prohibiting the States from taxing the means and instrumentalities

of that government. In both cases the exemption rests upon necessary implication,

and is upheld by the great law of self-preservation; as any government, whose

means employed in conducting its operations, if subject to the control of another

and distinct government, can only exist at the mercy of that government. Of what

avail are these means if another power may tax them at discretion?" Per Nelson,

J., in Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 124.

* Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 279; Jones v. Estate of Keep, 19 Wis. 369; Fifield

v. Close, 15 Mich. 505; Union Bank p. Hill, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 325; Smith p.

Short, 40 Ala. 796. "State governments," it is said in the Indiana case,

"are to exist with judicial tribunals of their own. This is manifest all the way

through the Constitution. This being so, these tribunals must not be subject to be

encroached upon or controlled by Congress. This would be incompatible with

their free existence. It was held, when Congress created a United States Bank,

and is now decided, when the United States has given bonds for borrowed money1

that as Congress had rights to create such fiscal agents, and issue such bonds, it

would be incompatible with the full and free enjoyment of those rights to allow

that the States might tax the bank or bonds; because, if the right to so tax them

was conceded, the States might exercise the right to the destruction of congres-

sional powep. The argument applies with full force to the exemption of State

governments from Federal legislative interference.

"There must be some limit to the power of Congress to lay stamp taxes.

Suppose a State to form a new, or to amend her existing constitution; could

Congress declare that it should be void, unless stamped with a Federal stamp?

Can Congress require State legislatures to stamp their bills, journals, laws, &p.
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* Strong as is the language employed to characterize the [* 484]

taxing power in some of the cases which have considered

in order that they shall be valid? Can it require the executive to stamp all

commissions? If so, where is he to get the money? Can Congress compel the

State legislatures to appropriate it? Can Congress thus subjugate a State by

legislation? We think this will scarcely be pretended. Where, then, is the line

of dividing power in this particular? Could Congress require voters in State

and corporation elections to stamp their tickets to render them valid? Under

the old Confederation, Congress legislated upon States, not upon the citizens

of the State. The most important change wrought in the government by the

Constitution was that legislation operated upon the citizens directly, enforced by

Federal tribunals and agencies, not upon the States. Another established con-

stitutional principle is, that the government of the United States, while sovereign

within its sphere, is still limited in jurisdiction and power to certain specified

subjects. Taking these three propositions then as true, — 1. States are to exist

with independent powers and institutions within their spheres; 2. The Federal

government is to exist with independent powers and institutions within its sphere;

3. The Federal government operates within its sphere upon the people in their
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individual capacities, as citizens and subjects of that government, within its

sphere of power, and upon its own officers and institutions as a part of itself, —

taking these propositions as true, we say, it seems to result as necessary to har-

mony of operation between the Federal and State governments, that the Federal

government must be limited, in its right to lay and collect stamp taxes, to the

citizens and their transactions as such, or as acting in the Federal government,

officially or otherwise; and cannot be laid upon and collected from individuals

or their proceedings when acting, not as citizens transacting business with each

other as such, but officially or in the pursuit of rights and duties in and through

State official agencies and institutions. When thus acting, they are not acting

under the jurisdiction nor within the power of the United States; not acting as

subjects of that government, not within its sphere of power over them; and

neither they nor their proceedings are subject to interference from the United

States. Can Congress regulate or prescribe the taxation of costs in a State

court? The Federal government may tax the governor of a State, or the

clerk of a State court, and his transactions as an individual, but not as a State

officer. This must be so, or the State may be annihilated at the pleasure of

the Federal government. The Federal government may perhaps take by tax-

ation most of the property in a State, if exigencies require; but it has not a

right, by direct or indirect means, to annihilate the functions of the State gov-

ernment."

The case of Hoyt «. Benner, 22 La. Am. 858, is opposed to those above

cited as to the power of the government to tax the process of State courts,

but the soundness of those decisions was really conceded by Congress in repeal-

ing the.provision of law that provided for the tax, and was recognized by Judge

Clifford, in Day r. Buffington, Am. Law Rev., Oct., 1870, p. 176.

It has been repeatedly decided that the act of Congress which provided that

certain papers not stamped should not be received in evidence must be limited in
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this subject, subsequent events have demonstrated that it was by

no means extravagant. An enormous national debt hat

[* 485] not only made * imposts necessary \vhich in some cases

reach several hundred per cent of the original cost of the

articles upon which they are imposed, but the systems of State

banking which were in force when the necessity for contracting

that debt first arose have been literally taxed out of existence by

burdens avowedly imposed for that very purpose.1 If taxation is

thus unlimited in its operation upon the objects within its reach.it

cannot be extravagant to say that the agencies of government are

necessarily excepted from it, since otherwise its exercise might

altogether destroy the government through the destruction of its

agencies. That which was predicted as a possible event has been

demonstrated by actual facts to be within the compass of the

power; and if considerations of policy were important, it might

be added that, if the States possessed the authority to tax the

agencies of the national government, they would hold within their

its operation to the Federal courts. Carpenter v. Snelling, 97 Mass. 452; Green
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v. Holway, 101 Mass. 250; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 839; Clemens r. Conrad, 19 Mich.

170; Haight ». Grist, 64 N. C. 739; Griffin v. Ranney, 35 Conn. 239; People t.

Gates, 43 N. Y. 40; Bowen v. Byrne, 55 111. 467; Hale o. Wilkinson, 21 Grsi.

75; Atkins v. Plympton, 44 Vt. 21; Bumpas v. Taggart, 26 Ark. 398; s. c. I

Am. Rep. 623; Sammons v. Holloway, 21 Mich. 162; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 165;

Duffy v. Hobson, 40 Cal. 240; Sporrer r. Eifler, 1 Heisk. 633; McEWain t.

Mudd, 44 Ala. 48; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 106; Burnson v. Huntington, 21 Mich. 415;

S. C. 4 Am. Rep. 497; Davis v. Richardson, 45 Miss. 499; a. c. 7 Am. Kef

732; Hunter v. Cobb,.6 Bush, 239; Craig v. Dimmock, 47 111. 308; Mooret.

Moore, 47 N. Y. 467; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 466. Several of these cases have gone

still farther, and declared that Congress cannot preclude parties from entering

into contracts permitted by the State laws, and that to declare them void was not

a proper penalty for the enforcement of tax laws. Congress cannot make void»

tax deed issued by a State. Sayles v. Davis, 22 Wis. 225. Nor require a stamp

upon the official bonds of State officers. State v. Garton, 32 Ind. 1. Nor tax tie

salary of a State officer. Day v. Buffington, Am. Law Rev. Oct. 1870, 176;

8. C. in error, 11 Wall. 113 ; Freedman v. Sigcl, 10 Blatch. 327. Nor forbid tie

recording of an unstamped instrument under the State laws. Moore r. Quirk,

105 Mass. 49; 8. c. 7 Am. Rep. 499. "Power to tax for State purposes isu

much an exclusive power in the States, as the power to lay and collect taxes to

pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of tie

United States is an exclusive power in Congress." Clifford, J., Ward v. Marr-

land, 12 Wall. 427.

1 The constitutionality of this taxation was sustained by a divided court it

Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533.
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hands a constitutional weapon which factious and disappointed

parties would be able to wield with terrible effect when the policy

of the national government did not accord with their views ; while,

on the other hand, if the national government possessed a corre-

sponding power over the agencies of the State governments, there

would not be wanting men who, in times of strong party excite-

ment, would be willing and eager to resort to this power as a

means of coercing the States in their legislation upon the subjects

remaining under their control.

There are other subjects which are or may be removed from the

sphere of State taxation by force of the Constitution of the United

States, or of the legislation of Congress under it. That instru-

ment declares that "no State shall, without the consent of Con-

gress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what

may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws."

This prohibition has led to some difficulty in its practical applica-

tion. Imports, as such, are not to be taxed generally, but it was

not the purpose of the Constitution to exclude permanently from
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the sphere of State taxation all property brought into the country

from abroad; and the difficulty met with has been in indicating

with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes the point of time at

which articles imported cease to be regarded as imports within the

meaning of the prohibition. In general terms it has been said

that when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported

that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of

property in the country, it has perhaps lost its distinctive character

as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the

State; but that while remaining the property of the importer, in

his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it

was * imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on im- [* 486]

ports to escape the prohibition in the Constitution.1 And

in the application of this rule it was declared that a State law

winch, for revenue purposes, required an importer to take a license

and pay fifty dollars before he should be permitted to sell a pack-

age of imported goods, was equivalent to laying a duty upon

imports. It has also been held in another case, that a stamp duty

imposed by the legislature of. California upon bills of lading for

gold or silver, transported from that State to any port or place out

1 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 441, per Marshall, Ch. J.

[569]
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of the State, was in effect a tax upon exports, and the law w

consequently void.1

Congress also is vested with power to regulate commerce; but

this power is not so far exclusive as to prevent regulations by the

States also, when they do not conflict with those established by

Congress.2 The States may unquestionably tax the subjects of

commerce; and no necessary conflict with that complete control

which is vested in Congress appears until the power is so exercised

as to defeat or embarrass the congressional legislation. Where

Congress has not acted at all upon the subject, the State taxation

cannot be invalid on this ground; but when national regulations

exist, under which rights are established or privileges given, the

State can impose no burdens which shall in effect make the enjoy-

ment of those rights and privileges contingent upon the payment

of tribute to the State.8

It is also believed that that provision in the Constitu-

[* 487] tion of the * United States, which declares that "the

citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges

and immunities of the citizens of the several States," 4 will pre-

clude any State from imposing upon the property within its limits
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belonging to citizens of other States any higher burdens by way of

taxation than are imposed upon the like property of its own citi-

zens. This is the express decision of the Supreme Court of

1 Almy v. People, 24 How. 169. See also Brumagim ». Tillinghast, 18 Cal.

265; Garrison v. Tillinghast, to. 404.

* Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299. See also Wilson r. Blackbird

Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245.

* In Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 141, it was held that a license fee of fifty

dollars, required by the State of an importer before he should be permitted to

sell imported goods, was unconstitutional, as coming directly in conflict with the

regulations of Congress over commerce. For further discussion of this subject,

see New York o. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; License Cases, 5 How. 504; Lin Sing r.

Washburn, 20 Cal. 534; Erie Railway Co. v. New Jersey, 2 Vroom, 531, revers-

ing same case in 1 Vroom; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 3 Grant,

128; Hinsen o. Lott, 40 Vt. 133; Commonwealth ». Erie R.R., 62 Penn. St.

286; Osborn v. Mobile, 44 Ala. 493; Woleott v. People, 17 Mich. 6a In

Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, it was held that a State law imposing a tax of

one dollar on each person leaving the State by public conveyance was not void is

coming in conflict with the control of Congress over commerce, though set aside

on other grounds. This general subject underwent some discussion in the recent

case of Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 ; and also in Case of State Freight Tax,

15 Wall. 232, and Case of tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284.

* Art. 4, § 2.
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Alabama,1 following in this particular the dictum of an eminent

Federal judge at an early day,2 and the same doctrine has been

recently affirmed by the Federal Supreme Court.3

Having thus indicated the extent of the taxing power, it is neces-

sary to add that certain elements are essential in all taxation, and

that it will not follow as of course, because the power is so vast,

that every thing which may be done under pretence of its exercise

will leave the citizen without redress, even though there be no con-

flict with express constitutional inhibitions. Every thing that may

be done under the name of taxation is not necessarily a tax; and

it may happen that an oppressive burden imposed by the govern-

ment, when it comes to be carefully scrutinized, will prove, instead

of a tax, to be an unlawful confiscation of property, unwarranted

by any principle of constitutional government.

In the first place, taxation having for its only legitimate object

the raising of money for public purposes and the proper needs of

government, the exaction of moneys from the citizens for other
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purposes is not a proper exercise of this power, and must therefore

be unauthorized. In this place, however, we do not use the word

public in any narrow and restricted sense, nor do we mean to be

understood that whenever the legislature shall overstep the legit-

imate bounds of their authority, the case will be such that the

courts can interfere to arrest their action. There are many cases

of unconstitutional action by the representatives of the people

which can be reached only through the ballot-box; and there are

other cases where the line of distinction between that which is

allowable and that which is not is so faint and shadowy that the

decision of the legislature must be accepted as final, even though

the judicial opinion might be different. But there are still

other cases where * it is entirely possible for the legisla- [* 488]

ture so clearly to exceed the bounds of due authority that

we cannot doubt the right of the courts to interfere and check

what can only be looked upon as ruthless extortion, provided the

nature of the case is such that judicial process can afford relief.

1 Wiley ». Parmer, 14 Ala. 627.

* Washington, J., in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 880. And see Camp-

bell r. Morris, 8 H. & McH. 554; Ward v. Morris, 4 H. & McH. 340; and other

cases cited, ante, p. 16, note. See also Oliver ». Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268.

» Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 430. Case of State Tax on foreign held bonds,

15 Wall. 300.
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An unlimited power to make any and every thing lawful which the

legislature might see fit to call taxation, would be, when plainly

stated, an unlimited power to plunder the citizen.1

It must always be conceded that the proper authority to deter-

mine what should and what should not properly constitute a public

burden is the legislative department of the State. This is not only

true for the State at large, but it is true also in respect to each

municipality or political division of the State; these inferior cor-

porate existences having only such authority in this regard as the

legislature shall confer upon them.2 And in determining this

question, the legislature cannot be held to any narrow or technical

rule. Certain expenditures are not only absolutely necessary to

the continued existence of the government, but as a matter of

policy it may sometimes be proper and wise to assume other bur-

dens which rest entirely on considerations of honor, gratitude, or

charity. The officers of government must be paid, the laws print-

ed, roads constructed, and public buildings erected; but with a

view to the general well-being of society, it may also be important
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that the children of the State should be educated, the poor kept

from starvation, losses in the public service indemnified, and incen-

tives held out to faithful and fearless discharge of duty in the

future, by the payment of pensions to those who have been faithful

public servants in the past. There will therefore be necessary

expenditures, and expenditures which rest upon considerations of

policy alone; and in regard to the one as much as to the other,

the decision of that department to which alone questions of State

policy are addressed must be accepted as conclusive.

Very strong language has been used by the courts, in some of

1 Tyson o. School Directors, 51 Penn. St. 9; Morford v. linger, 8 Iowa, 92;

Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 421; Hansen v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28; Allen v. Jay,

60 Me. 139; Ferguson ». Landraw, 5 Bush, 230; People v. Township Board of

Salem, 21 Mich. 459; Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St. 353; s. c. 8 Am. Rep.

255. "It is the clear right of every citizen to insist that no unlawful or unauthor-

ized exaction shall be made upon bim under the guise of taxation. If any such

illegal encroachment is attempted, he can always invoke the aid of the judicial

tribunals for his protection, and prevent his money or other property from being

taken and appropriated for a purpose and in a manner not authorized by the Con-

stitution and laws." Per Bigelow, Ch. J., in Freeland r. Hastings, 10 Allen, 575.

See Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 379 ; People v. Suprs. of Saginaw, 26 Mich. 22.

* Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123. See anie, p. 230, and cases cited in

note to p. 489.
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the cases on this subject. In a case where was questioned

the * validity of the State law confirming township action [*489]

which granted gratuities to persons enlisting in the mili-

tary service of the United States, the Supreme Court of Connec-

ticut assigned the following reasons in its favor: —

"In the first place, if it be conceded that it is not competent for

the legislative power to make a gift of the common property, or of

a sum of money to be raised by taxation, where no possible public

benefit, direct or indirect, can be derived therefrom, such exercise

of the legislative power must be of an extraordinary character

to justify the interference of the judiciary; and this is not that

case.

"Second. If there be the least possibility that making the gift

will be promotive in any degree of the public welfare, it becomes a

question of policy, and not of natural justice, and the determination

of the legislature is conclusive. And such is this case. Such gifts

to unfortunate classes of society, as the indigent blind, the deaf

and dumb, or insane, or grants to particular colleges or schools, or
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grants of pensions, swords, or other mementos for past services,

involving the general good indirectly and in slight degree, are fre-

quently made and never questioned.

"Third. The government of the United States was constituted

by the people of the State, although acting in concert with the

people of the other States, and the general good of the people of

this State is involved in the maintenance of that general govern-

ment. In many conceivable ways the action of the town might

not only mitigate the burdens imposed upon a class, but render the

service of that class more efficient to the general government, and

therefore it must be presumed that the legislature found that the

public good would be thereby promoted.

"And fourth. It is obviously possible, and therefore to be

intended, that the General Assembly found a clear equity to justify

their action."1

1 Booth p. Woodbury, 82 Conn. 128. See to the same effect Speer v. School

Directors of Blairville, 50 Penn. St. 150. The legislature is not obliged to con-

sult the will of the people concerned in ordering the levy of local assessments

for the public purposes of the local government. Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monp.

350; Slack p. Maysville, &c, R.R. Co., 13 B. Monp. 26; Cypress Fond Drain-

ing Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met (Ky.) 353. Compare People p. Common Council of

Detroit, 27 Mich.
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And the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has said: "To justify the

court in arresting the proceedings and in declaring the tax void,

the absence of all possible public interest in the purposes for which

the funds are raised must be clear and palpable; so clear and pal-

pable as to be perceptible by every mind at the first blush. .. It is

not denied that claims founded in equity and justice, in the

[* 490] * largest sense of those terms, or in gratitude or charity, will

support a tax. Such is the language of the authorities."1

But we think it clear in the words of the Supreme Court of

Wisconsin, that "the legislature cannot ... in the form of a tax

take the money of the citizen and give to an individual, the public

interest or welfare being in no way connected with the transaction.

The objects for which money is raised by taxation must be public,

and such as subserve the common interest and well-being of the

community required to contribute." 2 Or, as stated by the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania, " the legislature has no constitutional right

to . . . levy a tax, or to authorize any municipal corporation to

do it, in order to raise funds for a mere private purpose. No such
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authority passed to the assembly by the general grant of the legis-

lative power. This would not be legislation. Taxation is a mode

of raising revenue for public purposes. When it is prostituted to

objects in no way connected with the public interest or welfare, it

ceases to be taxation and becomes plunder. Transferring money

from the owners of it into the possession of those who have no tide

to it, though it be done under the name and form of a tax, is

unconstitutional for all the reasons which forbid the legislature to

usurp any other power not granted to them." 3 And by the same

court, in a still later case, where the question was whether the

legislature could lawfully require a municipality to refund to a

bounty association the sums which they had advanced to relieve

themselves from an impending military conscription," such an en-

actment would not be legislation at all. It would be in the nature

of judicial action, it is true, but wanting the justice of notice to

1 Brodhead v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 652; Mills v. Charlton, 29 Wis.

411; Springe. Russell, 7 Greenl. 273; Williams v. School District, 33.

8 Per Dixon, Ch. J., in Brodhead r. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 652. See also

Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 282; Opinions of Judges, 58 Me. 590; Moulton t.

Raymond, 60 Me. 121; post, 494 aud note.

* Per Black, Ch. J., in Sharpless v. Mayor, &c, 21 Penn. St. 168. See

Opinions of Judges, 58 Me. 690.
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parties to be affected by the hearing, trial, and all that gives sanc-

tion and force to regular judicial proceedings; it would much more

resemble an imperial rescript than constitutional legislation: first,

in declaring an obligation where none was created or previously

existed; and next, in decreeing payment, by directing the money ,

or property of the people to be sequestered to make the payment.

The legislature can exercise no such despotic functions."1

'Tyson v. School Directors of Halifax, 51 Penn. St. 9. See also Grim v.

Weisenburg School District, 57 Penn. St. 433. The decisions in Miller v.

Grandy, 13 Mich. 540, Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9, and Shackford

v. Newington, 46 N. H. 415, so far as they hold that a bounty law is not to be

held to cover moneys before advanced by an individual without any pledge of

the public credit, must be held referable, we think, to the same principle. We

are aware that there are some cases, the doctrine of which seems opposed to

those we have cited, but perhaps a careful examination will enable us to harmo-

nize them all. One of these is Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb.

615, and 13 N. Y. 143. The facts in that case were as follows: Cornell and

Clark were formerly commissioners of highways of the town of Guilford, and as
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such, by direction of the voters of the town, had sued the Butternut and Oxford

Turnpike Road Company. They were unsuccessful in the action, and were,

after a long litigation, obliged to pay costs. The town then refused to reimburse

them these costs. Cornell and Clark sued the town, and, after prosecuting the

action to the court of last resort, ascertained that they had no legal remedy.

They then applied to the legislature, and procured an act authorizing the ques-

tion of payment or not by the town to be submitted to the voters at the succeed-

ing town meeting. The voters decided that they would not tax themselves for

any such purpose. Another application was then made to the legislature, which

resulted in a law authorizing the county judge of Chenango County to appoint

three commissioners, whose duty it should be to hear and determine the amount

of costs and expenses incurred by Cornell and Clark in the prosecution and

defence of the suits mentioned. It authorized the commissioners to make an

award, which was to be filed with the county clerk, and the board of supervisors

were then required, at their next annual meeting, to apportion the amount of

the award upon the taxable property of the town of Guilford, and provide for

its collection in the same manner as other taxes are collected. The validity

of this act was affirmed. It was regarded as one of those of which Denio, J.,

says "the statute book is full, perhaps too full, of laws awarding damages and

compensation of various kinds to be paid by the public to individuals, who had

failed to obtain what they considered equitably due to them by the decision of

administrative officers acting under the provisions of former laws. The courts

have no power to supervise or review the doings of the legislature in such cases."

It is apparent that there was a strong equitable claim upon the township in this

case for the reimbursement of moneys expended by public officers under the direc-

tion of their constituents, and perhaps no principle of constitutional law was

violated by the legislature thus changing it into a legal demand, and compelling

[ 675]
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[*491] *The Supreme Court of Michigan has proceeded upon

the same principle in a recent case. The State is forbid-

its satisfaction. Mp. Sedgwick criticises this act, and says of it that it "may be

called taxation, but in truth it is the reversal of a judicial decision." Sedg. on

Stat, and Const. Law, 414. There are very many claims, however, j-esting in

equity, which the courts would be compelled to reject, but which it would be

very proper for the legislature to recognize, and provide for by taxation. Brew-

ster v. City of Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116. Another case, perhaps still stronger

than that of Guilford p. The Supervisors, is Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65.

Persons at Utica had given bond to pay the extraordinary expense that would

be caused to the State by changing the junction of the Chenango Canal from

Whitesborough to Utica, and the legislature afterwards passed an act requiring

the amount to be levied by a tax on the real property of the city of Utica.

The theory of this act may be stated thus: The canal was a public way. The

expense of constructing all public ways may be properly charged on the commu-

nity specially or peculiarly benefited by it. The city of Utica was specially and

peculiarly benefited by having the canal terminate there; and as the expense of

construction was thereby increased, it was proper and equitable that the property
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to be benefited should pay this difference, instead of the State at large. The

act was sustained by the courts, and it was well remarked that the fact that a

bond had been before given securing the same money could not detract from its

validity. Whether this case can stand with some others, and especially with that

of Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 83, we have elsewhere expressed a doubt,

and it must be conceded that, for the legislature in any case to compel a munici-

pality to assume a burden, on the ground of local benefit or local obligation,

against the will of the citizens, is the exercise of an arbitrary power little in

harmony with the general features of our republican system, and only to be jus-

tified, if at all, in extreme cases. The general idea of our tax system is, that

those shall vote the burdens who are to pay them; and it would be intolerable

that a central authority should have power, not only to tax localities, for local pur-

poses of a public character which they did not approve, but also, if it so pleased,

to compel them to assume and discharge private claims not equitably chargeable

upon them. See the New York cases above referred to criticised in State p.

Tappan, 29 Wis. 674, 680. See also Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm. 416. The cases of

Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monp. 880; Sharp's Ex. v. Dunavan, 17 B. Monp. 228;

Maltus p. Shields, 2 Met. (Ky.) 553, will throw some light on this general sub-

ject The case of Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met. (Ky.) 350, is

also instructive. The Cypress Pond Draining Company was incorporated to

drain and keep drained the lands within a specified boundary, at the cost of the

owners, and was authorized by the act to collect a tax on each acre, not exceed-

ing twenty-five cents per acre, for that purpose, for ten years, to be collected by

the sheriff. With the money thus collected, the board of managers, six in num-

ber, named in the act, was required to drain certain creeks and ponds within

said boundary. The members of the board owned in the aggregate 3,840 acres,

the larger portion of which was low land, subject to inundation, and of little or

no value in its then condition, but which would be rendered very valuable by
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den by the * constitution to engage in works of public im- [* 492]

provement, except in the expenditure of grants or other

property made to it for this purpose. The State, witli this prohibi-

tion in force, entered into a contract with a private party for the

construction by such party of an improvement in the

Muskegon River, for which the State was to pay * the [* 493]

contractor fifty thousand dollars, from the Internal Im-

provement Fund. The improvement was made, but the State

officers declined to draw warrants for the amount, on the ground

that the fund from which payment was to have been made was

exhausted. The State then passed an act for the levying of tolls

upon the property passing through the improvement sufficient to

pay the contract price within five years. The court held this act

void. As the State had no power to construct or pay for such a

work from its general fund, and could not constitutionally have

agreed to pay the contractors from tolls, there was no theory on

which the act could be supported, except it was that the State had

misappropriated the Internal Improvement Fund, and therefore

ought to provide payment from some other source. But if the

State had misappropriated the fund, the burden of reimbursement
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would fall upon the State at large ; it could not lawfully be imposed

upon a single town or district, or upon the commerce of a single

town or district. The burden must be borne by those upon whom

it justly rests, and to recognize in the State a power to compel

some single district to assume and discharge a State debt would

be to recognize its power to make an obnoxious district or an ob-

noxious class bear the whole burden of the State government. An

act to that effect would not be taxation, nor would it be the exer-

cise of any legitimate legislative authority.1. And it may be said

the contemplated draining. The corporate boundary contained 14,621 acres,

owned by sixty-eight persons. Thirty-four of these, owning 5975 acres, had

no agency in the passage of the act, and no notice of the application therefor,

gave no assent to its provisions, and a very small portion of their land, if any,

would be benefited or improved in value by the proposed draining; and they

resisted the collection of the tax. As to these owners the act of incorporation

was held unconstitutional and inoperative. See also The City of Covington v.

Southgate, 15 B. Monr. 491; Lovingston r. Wider, 58 111. 302; Curtis v.

Whipple, 24 Wis. 350; People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401; People v. Bacheller,

Albany Law Journal, Aug. 23, 1873; People v. Common Council of Detroit, 27

Mich.

1 Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269. See also People v. Springwells, 25 Mich.153.
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of such an act, that, so far as it would operate to make those.,*

would pay the tolls pay more than their proportion of the

[* 494] State obligation, it * was in effect taking their property for

the private benefit of other citizens^of the State, and was

obnoxious to all the objections against the appropriation of private

property for private purposes which could exist in any other case.

And the Supreme Court of Iowa has said: "If there be such a

flagrant and palpable departure from equity in the burden imposed;

if it be imposed for the benefit of others, or for purposes in which

those objecting have no interest, and are therefore not bound to

contribute, it is no matter in what form the power is exercised,—

whether in the unequal levy of a tax, or in the regulation of the

boundaries of the local government, which results in subjecting the

party unjustly to local taxes, — it must be regarded as coming

within the prohibition of the constitution designed to protect pri-

"Uniformity in taxation implies equality in the burden of taxation." Bankt.

Hines, 3 Ohio, S. s. 15. "This equality in the burden constitutes the very sub-

stance designed to be secured by the rule." Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10

Wis. 258. See also Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 273; State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 660.

The reasoning of these cases seems not to have been satisfactory to the New Yon;
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Court of Appeals. See Gordon v. Comes, 47 N. Y. 614, in which an act was sus-

tained which authorized "and required" the village of Brockport to'levy a tu

for the erection of a State Normal School building at that place. No recent cast,

we think, has gone so far as this. Compare State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 674;

Mayor of Mobile v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310. "There can be no doubt that, as>

general rule, where an expenditure is to be made for a public object, the execution

of which will be substantially beneficial to every portion of the Commonweaka

alike, and in the benefits and advantages of which all the people will equally

participate, if the money is to be raised by taxation, the assessment would

be deemed to come within that class which was laid to defray one of the general

charges of government, and ought therefore to be imposed as nearly as possible

with equality upon all persons resident and estates lying within the Common-

wealth. . . . An assessment for such a purpose, if laid in any other manner,

could not in any just or proper sense be regarded as ' proportional' within tk

meaning of the Constitution." Merrick v. Inhabitants of Amherst, 12 Allen, 504,

per Bigelow, Ch. J. This case holds that local taxation for a State purpose may

be permitted in consideration of local benefits, and only differs in principle from

Gordon v. Cornes, in that the one permitted what the other required. The case

of Marks v. Trustees of Pardue University, 37 Ind. 165, follows Merrick r.

Amherst. Taxation not levied according to the principles upon which the right

to tax is based, is an unlawful appropriation of private property to public usei

City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Monr. 498; People ». Township Board of

Salem, 20 Mich. 452; Tide Water Co. v. Costar, 3 C. E. Green, 519; H&mmett

v. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St. 146; s. O. 8 Am. Rep. 615.
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vate rights against oppression however made, and whether under

color of recognized power or not." 1

When, therefore, the legislature assumes to impose a pecuniary

burden upon the citizen in the form of a tax, two questions may

always be raised: First, whether the purpose of such burden may

properly be considered public on any of the grounds above indi-

cated ;2 and second, if public, then whether the burden is one which

should properly be borne by the district upon which it is imposed.

If either of these questions is answered in the negative, the legis-

lature must be adjudged to harve assumed an authority not con-

ferred in the general grant of legislative power, and which is

therefore unconstitutional and void. "The power of taxation,"

says an eminent writer, "is a great governmental attribute, with

which the courts have very wisely shown extreme unwillingness to

interfere; but if abused, the abuse should share the fate of all

other usurpations." 3 In the case of burdens thus assumed by the

legislature on behalf of the State, it is not always that a speedy

and safe remedy can be properly afforded in the courts. It would

certainly be a very dangerous exercise of power for a court to

attempt to stay the collection of State taxes because an illegal
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demand was included in the levy; and indeed, as State taxes are

not usually levied for the purpose of satisfying specific demands,

but a gross sum is raised which it is calculated will be sufficient

for the wants of the year, the question is not one usually of the

unconstitutionality of taxation, but of the misappropriation of

moneys which have been raised by taxation. But if the State

should order a city, township, or village to raise money by taxa-

tion to establish one of its citizens in business, or for any other

object equally removed from the proper sphere of government, or

should undertake to impose the whole burden of the govern-

ment upon a fraction of the State, the usurpation of authority

1 Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 92. See Durant v. Kauffman, 34 Iowa, 194.

* Though the legislature first decides that the use is public, the decision is not

conclusive. They cannot make that a public purpose which is not so in fact.

Gove v. Eppiug, 41 N. H. 539; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Freeland p.

Hastings, 10 Allen, 570; Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 379; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me.

124; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 651 ; Ferguson v. Landraw, 5 Bush, 230; Kelly

p. Marshall, 69 Penn. St. 319; People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401; Curtis v. Whip-

ple, 24 Wis. 350.

3 Sedgwick on Const, and Stat. Law, 414.
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[* 495] would not only be * plain and palpable, but the proper

remedy would also be plain, and no court of competent

jurisdiction could feel at liberty to decline to enforce the paramount

law.

In the second place, it is of the very essence of taxation that it

be levied with equality and uniformity, and to this end, that there

should be some system of apportionment. Where the burden i

common, there should be common contribution to discharge it.1

Taxation is the equivalent for the protection which the government

affords to the persons and property of its citizens; and as all are

alike protected, so all alike should bear the burden, in proportion

to the interests secured. Taxes by the poll are justly regarded as

odious, and are seldom resorted to for the collection of revenue;

and when taxes are levied upon property there must be an appor-

tionment with reference to a uniform standard, or they degenerate

into mere arbitrary exactions. Iu this particular the State consti-

tutions have been very specific, though in providing for equality and

uniformity they have done little more than to state in concise lan-

guage a principle of constitutional law which, whether declared or
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not, would inhere in the power to tax.

Taxes may assume the form of duties, imposts, and excises:

and those collected by the national government are very largely of

this character. They may also assume the form of license fees, for

permission to carry on particular occupations, or to enjoy special

franchises. They may be specific; such as are often levied upon

corporations, in reference to the amount of capital stock, or to the

business done, or profits earned by them. Or they may be direct,

upon property, iu proportion to its value, or upon some other basis

of apportionment, which the legislature shall regard as just, and

which shall keep in view the general idea of uniformity. The taxes

collected by the States are mostly of the latter class, and it is to

them that the constitutional principles we shall have occasion to

discuss will more particularly apply.

As to all taxation apportioned upon property, there must be

taxing districts, and within these districts the rule of absolute

uniformity must be applicable. A State tax is to be apportioned

1 2 Kent, 231; Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 273 ; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich.

269; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268; Tidewater Co. v. CosUr, 5

C. E. Green, 519.
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(

through the State, a county tax through the county, a city tax

through the city; while in the case of local improvements, benefit-

ing in a special and peculiar manner some portion of the State or

of a county or city, it is competent to arrange a special taxing

district, within which the expense shall be apportioned.

School districts and road districts are * also taxing dis- [* 496]

tricts for the peculiar purposes for which they exist, and

villages may have special powers of taxation distinct from the

townships of which they form a part. Whenever it is made a

requirement of the State constitution that taxation shall be upon

property according to value, such a requirement implies an assess-

ment of valuation by public officers at such regular periods as

shall be provided by law, and a taxation upon the basis of such

assessment until the period arrives for making it anew. Thus, the

Constitutions of Maine and Massachusetts require that there should

be a valuation of estates within the Commonwealth to be made

at least every ten years;1 the Constitution of Michigan requires

the annual assessments which are made by township officers to be

equalized by a State board, which reviews them for that purpose
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every five years; 2 and the Constitution of Rhode Island requires

the legislature "from time to time" to provide for new valuations

of property for the assessment of taxes in such manner as they

may deem best.8 Some other Constitutions contain no provisions

upon this subject; but the necessity for valuation is nevertheless

implied, though the mode of making it, and the periods at which

it shall be made, are left to the legislative discretion.

There are some kinds of taxes, however, that are not usually

assessed according to the value of property, and some which could .

not be thus assessed. And there is probably no State which does

not levy other taxes than those which are imposed upon property.4

Every burden which the State imposes upon its citizens with a view

to a revenue, either for itself or for any of the municipal govern-

ments, or for the support of the governmental machinery in any

of tiie political divisions, is levied under the power of taxation,

whether imposed under the name of tax, or under some other

1 Constitution of Maine, art. 9, § 7; Constitution of Mass., Part 2, c. 1, § 1,

art. 4.

* Constitution of Mich., art. 14, § 13.

* Constitution of Rhode Island, art. 4, § 15.

* See Bright v. McCulloch, 27 Ind. 223.
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designation. The license fees which are sometimes required to

be paid by those who follow particular employments are, when

imposed for purposes of revenue, taxes; the tolls upon the per-

sons or property making use of the works of public improvement

owned and controlled by the State, are a species of tax; stamp

duties when imposed are taxes, and it is not uncommon, as we

have already stated, to require that corporations shall pay

[* 497] a certain sum annually, in proportion to their * capital

stock, or by some other standard, and which is the mode

regarded by the State as most convenient and suitable for the

taxation of such organizations. It is evident, therefore, that the

constitutional requirements sometimes met with, that taxation upon

property shall be according to value, do not include every species

of taxation; but all special cases like those we have here referred

to are, by implication, excepted.

But in addition to these cases, there are others where taxes are

levied directly upon property, which are nevertheless held not to

be within the constitutional provisions. Assessments for the open-
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ing, making, improving, or repairing of streets, the draining of

swamps, and the like local works, have been generally made upon

property, with some reference to the supposed benefits which the

property would receive therefrom. Instead, therefore, of making

the assessment include all the property of the municipal organiza-

tion in which the improvement is made, a new aud special taxing

district is created, whose bounds are confined to the limits within

which property receives a special and peculiar benefit, in conse-

quence of the improvement. Even within this district the assess-

ment is sometimes made by some other standard than that of

value; and it is evident that if it be just to create the taxing

district with reference to special benefits, it would be equally just

and proper to make the taxation within the district have reference

to the benefit each parcel of property receives, rather than to its

relative value. The opening or paving of a street may increase

the value of all property upon or near it; and it may be just that

all such property should contribute to the expense of the improve-

ment: but it by no means follows that each parcel of the property

will receive from the improvement a benefit in proportion to the

previous value. One lot upon the street may be greatly increased

in value, another at a little distance may be but slightly benefited;

and if no constitutional provision interferes, there is consequently

[ 582]
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abundant reason why the tax levied within the taxing district

should have reference, not to value, but to benefit.

It has been objected, however, to taxation upon this basis, that

inasmuch as the district upon which the burden is imposed is com-

pelled to make the improvement for the benefit of the general

public, it is, to the extent of the tax levied, an appropriation of

private property for the public use; and as the persons taxed, as a

part of the public, would be entitled of right to the enjoyment of

the improvement when made, such right of enjoyment could not

be treated as compensation for the exaction made, and such exac-

tion would therefore be opposed to those constitutional principles

which declare the inviolability of private property. But those

principles have no reference to the taking of property under the

right of taxation. When the constitution provides that private

property shall not be taken for public use without just

compensation made therefore, it has reference to * an [* 498]

appropriation thereof under the right of eminent domain.

Taxation and eminent domain indeed rest substantially on the
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same foundation, as each implies the taking of private property for

the public use on compensation made; but the compensation is

different in the two cases. When taxation takes money for the

public use, the tax-payer receives, or is supposed to receive, his

just compensation in the protection which government affords to

his life, liberty, and property, and in the increase in the value of

his possessions by the use to which the government applies the

money raised by the tax,1 and either of these benefits will support

the burden.

But if these special local levies are taxation, do they come under

the general provisions on the subject of taxation to be found in

our State constitutions? The Constitution of Michigan provides

that "the legislature shall provide an uniform rule of taxation,

except on property paying specific taxes; and taxes shall be levied

upon such property as shall be prescribed by law;"2 and again:

"All assessments hereafter authorized shall be on property at its

cash value." 3 The first of these provisions has been regarded as

1 People p. Mayor, &p., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 422; Williams v. Mayor, &c,

of Detroit, 2 Mich. 565; Scovills v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, n. s. 126; Northern

Indiana R.R. Co. p. Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. s. 165; Washington Avenue, 69 Penn.

St. 853 ; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 255.

• Art. 14, § 11.

3 Art. 14, § 12.
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confiding to the discretion of the legislature the establishment of

the rule of uniformity by which taxation was to be imposed; and

the second as having reference to the annual valuation of property

for the purposes of taxation, which it is customary to make in that

State, and not to the actual levy of a tax. And a local tax, there-

fore, levied in the city of Detroit, to meet the expense of paving a

public street, and which was levied, not in proportion to the value

of property, but according to an arbitrary scale of supposed benefit,

was held not invalid under the constitutional provision.1

So the Constitution of Illinois provides that " the General As-

sembly shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every

person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value

of his or her property; such value to be ascertained by some per-

son or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the

General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise,"2 &c. The

charter of the city of Peoria provided that, when a public

[* 499] street * was opened or improved, commissioners should be

appointed by the county court to assess upon the property
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benefited the expense of the improvement in proportion to the

benefit. These provisions were held to be constitutional, on the

ground that assessments of this character were not such taxation

as was contemplated by the general terms which the constitution

employed.3 And a similar view of these local assessments has

been taken in other cases.4

1 Williams v. Mayor, &c, of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560. And see Woodbridge t>.

Detroit, 8 Mich. 274. * Art 9, § 2.

* City of Peoria v. Kidder, 26 111. 357. See also Canal Trustees t>. Chicago,

12 111. 406. In the subsequent case of Chicago e. Larned, 34 111. 203, it was

decided, after very full argument and consideration, that, while taxation for these

local assessments might constitutionally be made in proportion and to the extent

of the benefits received, it could not be made on the basis of frontage. This case

was followed in Wright v. Chicago, 46 111. 44.

* People v. Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn, 4 N. T. 419; Matter of Mayor, &c, of

New York, 11 Johns. 77; Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76; Livingston v. Mayor, &c, of

New York, 8 Wend. 85; Matter of Furman St., 17 Wend. 649 ; Nichols ». Bridge-

port, 23 Conn. 189; Schenley v. City of Alleghany, 25 Penn. St. 128; Wray v. Pitts-

burg, 46 Penn. St. 865; Hammett o. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St. 146; s. c. 3 Am.

Rep. 615; Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St. 353; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 255; McBride

v. Chicago, 22 111. 574; Chicago v. Larned, 34 111. 203; City of Lexington v.

McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513; Barnes p. Atchison, 2 Kansas, 454; Hinea r. Leav-

enworth, 3 Kansas, 186; St. Joseph t>. O'Donoghue, 31 Mo. 345; Egyptian Levee

Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495; St. Joseph v. Anthony, 30 Mo. 537 ; Burnet v. Sacra-

-
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But whatever may be the basis of the taxation, the requirement

that it shall be uniform is universal. It applies as much to these

local assessments as to any other species of taxes. The difference

is only in the character of the uniformity, and in the basis on which

it is established. But to render taxation uniform in any case, two

things are essential. The first of these is that each taxing district

should confine itself to the objects of taxation within its limits.

Otherwise there is, or may be, duplicate taxation, and of course

inequality. Assessments upon real estate not lying within the

taxing districts would be void,1 and assessments for per-

sonal property * made against persons not residing in the [* 500]

district would also be void, unless made with reference to

the actual presence of the property in such district.2

mento, 12 Cal. 76; Teatman v. Crandell, 11 La. An. 220; Wallace v. Shelton, 14

La. An. 498 ; Richardson v. Morgan, 16 La. An. 429; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, n. a.

243 ; Marion v. Epler, t'6.250; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio, N. 8. 333;

Northern Ind. R.R. Co. v. Connolly, 10 Ohio, N. s. 159; Baker v. Cincinnati,

11 Ohio, N. s. 534; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, n. s. 636; State r. Dean, 3
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Zab. 335 ; State v. Mayor, &c., of Jersey City, 4 Zab. 662; Bond o. Kenosha, 17

Wis. 289; City of Fairfield ». Ratcliff, 20 Iowa, 396; Municipality No. 2 v.

White, 9 La. An. 447; Cumming v. Police Jury, ib. 503; Northern Liberties v.

St. John's Church, 13 Penn. St. 107; McGee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40; Goodrich

e. Winchester, &c, Turnpike Co., 26 Ind. 119; Emery e. Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345;

Palmer v. Stumpb, 29 Ind. 329; Dergan v. Boston, 12 Allen, 223. In Alabama

a recent decision has been made the other way. The constitution provides that

"all taxes levied on property in this State shall be assessed in exact proportion

to the value of such property; provided, however, that the General Assembly

may levy a poll tax not to exceed one dollar and fifty cents on each poll, which

shall be applied exclusively in aid of the public school fund." This, it was

decided, would preclude the levy of a local assessment for the improvement of a

street by the foot front. Mayor of Mobile v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310. The cases

of Weeks o. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242, and Lumsden v. Cross, ib. 282, recognize

the fact that these local burdens are generally imposed under the name of assess-

ments instead of taxes, and that therefore they are not covered by the general

provisions in the constitution of the State on the subject of -taxation. And see

Bond v. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 284; Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599. An exemption

of church property from taxation will not preclude its being assessed for improv-

ing streets in front of it. See post, 514, note.

1 But sometimes, when a parcel of real estate lies partly in two districts,

authority is given by law to assess the whole in one of these districts, and the

whole parcel may then be considered as having been embraced within the district

where taxed, by an enlargement of the district bounds to include it. Saunders v.

Springstein, 4 Wend. 429.

* People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 N. Y. 663; Mygatt v. Washburn,

[ 585 ]

* 500

[CH. XIV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

In Wells v. City of Weston,1 the Supreme Court of Missouri

deny the right of the legislature to subject property located in one

taxing district to taxation in another, upon the express ground

that it is .in substance the arbitrary taxation of the property of

one class of citizens for the benefit of another class. The case was

one where the legislature sought to subject real estate lying out-

side the limits of a city to taxation for city purposes, on the theory

that it received some benefit from the city government, and ought

to contribute to its support. In Kentucky2 and Iowa3 decisions

have been made which, while affirming the same principle as the

case above cited, go still further, and declare that it is not

competent for the legislature to increase the limits of a city, in

order to include therein farming lands, occupied by the owner for

agricultural purposes, and not required for either streets or houses,

or other purposes of a town, and solely for the purpose of increas-

ing the city revenue by taxation. The courts admit that the

extension of the limits of a city or town, so as to include its actual

enlargement, as manifested by houses and population, is to be
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deemed a legitimate exercise of the taxing power, but they declare

that an indefinite or unreasonable extension, so as to embrace

lands or farms at a distance from the local government, does not

rest upon the same authority. And although it may be a delicate

as well as a difficult duty for the judiciary to interpose, the court

had no doubt but strictly there are limits beyond which the legis-

lative discretion cannot go. "It is not every case of injustice or

oppression which may be reached; and it is not every case which

will authorize a judicial tribunal to inquire into the minute opera-

tion of laws imposing taxes, or defining the boundaries of local

jurisdictions. The extension of the limits of the local authority

may in some cases be greater than is necessary to include the

adjacent population, or territory laid out into city lots,

[* 501] without a * case being presented in which the courts

would be called upon to apply a nice and exact scrutiny as

to its practical operation. It must be a case of flagrant injustice

15 N. Y. 316; Brown v. Smith, 24 Barb. 419 ; Hartland v. Church, 47 Me. 169;

Lessee of Hughey v. Horrell, 2 Ohio, 231.

1 22 Mo. 385.

* City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Monp. 491; Arbegust p. Louisville,

3 Bush, 271.

3 Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82.
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and palpable wrong, amounting to the taking of private properly

without such compensation in return as the tax-payer is at liberty

to consider a fair equivalent for the tax." This decision has been

subsequently recognized and followed as authority, in the last-

named State.1

The second essential is that there should be uniformity in the

manner of the assessment, and approximate equality in the amount

of exactions within the district; and to this end that all the objects

of taxation within the district should be embraced. The correct-

ness of this principle will be conceded, but whether in practice it

has been applied or not, it may not always be easy to determine.

"With the single exception of specific taxes," says Ohrwtiancy,

J., in Woodbridge v. Detroit,2 " the terms ' tax ' and ' assessment'

both, I think, wheu applied to property, and especially to lands,

always include the idea of some ratio or rule of apportionment, so

that of the whole sum to be raised, the part paid by one piece of

property shall bear some known relation to, or be affected by, that

paid by anothep. Thus, if one hundred dollars are to be raised
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from tracts A, B, and C, the amount paid by A will reduce by so

much that to be paid by B and C, and so of the others. In the case

of specific taxes, as well as duties and imposts, though the amount

paid by one is not affected by that paid by another, yet there is a

known and fixed relation of one to the other, a uniform rate by

which it is imposed upon the whole species or class of property or

persons to which the specific tax applies; and this is so of duties

and imposts, whether specific or ad valorem. To compel individuals

to contribute money or property to the use of the public, without

1 Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 86; Fulton v. Davenport, 17 Iowa, 404;

Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 28'2. These cases were cited and followed in Bradshaw

p. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16. These cases, however, do not hold the legislative act

which enlarges the city limits to be absolutely void, but only hold that they

will limit the exercise of the taxing power as nearly as practicable to the line

where the extension of the boundaries ceases to be beneficial to the proprietor

in a municipal point of view. For this purpose they enter into an inquiry of

fact, whether the lands in question, in view of their relative position to the grow-

ing and improved parts of the town, and partaking more or less of the benefits

of municipal government, are proper subjects of municipal taxation; and if not,

they enjoin the collection of such taxes. It would seem as if there must be

great practical difficulties — if not some of principle — in making this disposition

of such a case. ,

* 8 Mich. 301. See also Chicago p. Larned, 34 1ll. 203; Creote v. Chicago,

56 1ll. 422.
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reference to any common ratio, and without requiring the

[* 502] sum * paid by one piece or kind of property, or by one

person, to bear any relation whatever to that paid by

another, is, it seems to me, to lay a forced contribution, not a tax,

duty, or impost, within the sense of these terms, as applied to

the exercise of powers by any enlightened or responsible govern-

ment."

In the case of Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County,1 an

important and interesting question arose, involving the very point

now under discussion. The Constitution of Wisconsin provides

that "the rule of taxation shall be uniform," which, if we are

correct in what we have already stated, is no more than an affirm-

ance of a settled principle of constitutional law. The city of

Janesville included within its territorial limits, not only the land

embraced within the recorded plat of the village of Janesville and

its additions, but also a large quantity of the adjacent farming or

agricultural lands. Conceiving the owners of these lands too

greatly and unequally burdened by taxation for the support of the

city government, the legislature passed an act declaring that " in

no case shall the real and personal property within the territorial
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limits of said city, and not included within the territorial limits of

the recorded plat of the village of Janesville, or of any additions to

said village, which may be used, occupied, or reserved for agricul-

tural or horticultural purposes, be subject to an annual tax to

defray the current expenses of said city, exceeding one-half of one

per cent, nor for the repair and building of roads and bridges, and

the support of the poor, more than one-half as much on each

dollar's valuation shall be levied for such purposes as on the prop-

erty within such recorded plats, nor shall the same be subject to

any tax for any of the purposes mentioned in § 3 of c. 5 of [the city

charter], nor shall the said farming or gardening lands be subject

to any tax, other than before mentioned, for any city purpose what-

ever." Under the charter the property of the city was liable to an

annual tax of one per cent to defray the current expenses of the

city; and also an additional tax of such sum as the common

council might deem necessary for the repair and building of roads

and bridges, and for the support of the poor. Thus it will be

perceived that the legislature, within the same taxing district,

1 9 Wis. 410.
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undertook to provide that a portion of the property should be taxed

at one rate in proportion to value, and another portion at a much

lower rate; while from taxation for certain proper local purposes

the latter class was exempted altogether.

* " It was contended in argument," say the court, " that [* 503]

as those provisions fixed one uniform rate without the

recorded plats, and another within them, thus taxing all the prop-

erty without alike, and all within alike, they do not infringe the

Constitution. In other words, that for the purpose of taxation, the

legislature have the right arbitrarily to divide up and classify

the property of the citizens, and, having done so, they do not

violate the constitutional rule of uniformity, provided all the prop-

erty within a given class is rated alike.

"The answer to this argument is, that it creates different rules

of taxation, to the number of which there is no limit, except that

fixed by legislative discretion, while the constitution establishes

but one fixed, unbending, uniform rule on the subject. It is be-

lieved that if the legislature can, by classification, thus arbitrarily,

and without regard to value, discriminate in the same municipal

corporation between personal and real property within, and per-
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sonal and real property without, a recorded plat, they can also by

the same means discriminate between lands used for one purpose

and those used for another, such as lands used for growing wheat

and those used for growing corn, or any other crop; meadow-lands

and pasture-lands, cultivated and uncultivated lands; or they can

classify by the description, such as odd-numbered lots and blocks

and even numbered ones, or odd and even-numbered sections.

Personal property can be classified by its character, use, or descrip-

tion, or, as in the present case, by its location, and thus the rules

of taxation may be multiplied to an extent equal in number to the

different kinds, uses, descriptions, and locations of real and per-

sonal property. We do not see why the system may not be carried

further, and the classification be made by the character, trade,

profession, or business of the owners. For certainly this rule of

uniformity can as well be applied to such a classification as any

other, and thus the constitutional provision be saved intact. Such

a construction would make the constitution operative only to the

extent of prohibiting the legislature from discriminating in favor

of particular individuals, and would reduce the people, while con-

sidering so grave and important a proposition, to the ridiculous
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attitude of saying to the legislature, 'You shall not discriminate

between single individuals or corporations; but you may divide

the citizens up into different classes, as the followers of different

trades, professions, or kinds of business, or as the owners

[* 504] of * different species or descriptions of property, and legis-

late for one class, and against another, as much as you

please, provided you serve all of the favored or unfavored classes

alike ;' thus affording a direct and solemn sanction to a system of

taxation so manifestly and grossly unjust that it will not find an

apologist anywhere, at least outside of those who are the recipients

of its favop. We do not believe the framers of that instrument

intended such a construction, and therefore cannot adopt it." 1

The principle to be deduced from the Iowa and Wisconsin cases,

assuming that they do not in any degree conflict, seems to be this:

The legislature cannot arbitrarily include within the limits of a

village, borough, or city, property and persons not properly charge-

able with its burdens, and for the sole purpose of increasing the

corporate revenues by the exaction of the taxes. But whenever
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the corporate boundaries are established, it is to be understood

that whatever property is included within those limits has been

thus included by the legislature, because it justly belongs there, as

being within the circuit which is benefited by the local government,

and which ought consequently to contribute to its burdens. The

legislature cannot, therefore, after having already, by including the

property within the corporation, declared its opinion that such

property should contribute to the local government, immediately

turn about and establish a basis of taxation which assumes that the

1 Per Dixon, Ch. J., 9 Wis. 421. Besides the other cases referred to, see,

on this same general subject, Lin Sing p. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534; State v. Mer-

chants Ins. Co., 12 La An. 802; Adams v. Somerville, 2 Head, 363; McComb

v. Bell, 2 Minn. 295; Attorney-General v. Winnebago Lake and Fox River P. R.

Co., 11 Wis. 35; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; O'Kane v. Treat, 25 111.

557; Philadelphia Association, &p. v. Wood, 39 Penn. 73; Sacramento p.

Crocker, 16 Cal. 119. There was a provision in the charter of Covington that a

street might be paved with the Nicholson pavement at the expense of the adjoining

owners, when the owners of the larger part of the frontage should petition therefop.

An amendatory act authorized it as to a portion of a certain street without such

a petition; thus permitting a special improvement on that street, at the expense

of the owners of adjoining lots, on a different principle from that adopted for the

city generally. In Howell v. Bristol, tS Bush, 493, this amendment was held in-

consistent with the fundamental principles of taxation, and consequently void.
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property is not in fact urban property at all, but is agricultural

lands, and should be assessed accordingly. The rule of apportion-

ment must be uniform throughout the taxing district, applicable to

all alike; but the legislature have no power to arrange the taxing

districts arbitrarily, and without reference to the great fundamental

principle of taxation, that the burden must be borne by those upon

whom it justly rests. The Kentucky and Iowa decisions hold that,

in a case where they have manifestly and unmistakably done so,

the courts may interfere and restrain the imposition of municipal

burdens on property which does not properly belong within the

municipal taxing district at all.

* This rule of uniformity has perhaps been found most [* 505]

difficult of application in regard to those cases of taxation

which are commonly known under the head of assessments, and

which are made either for local improvement and repair, or to

prevent local causes resulting in the destruction of health or prop-

erty. In those cases where it has been held that such assessments

were not covered by the constitutional provision that taxation
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should be laid upon property in proportion to value, it has, neverthe-

less, been decided that the authority to make them must be referred

to the taxing power, and not to the police power of the State,

under which sidewalks have sometimes been ordered to be con-

structed. Apportionment of the burden was therefore essential,

though it need not be made upon property in proportion to its

value. But the question then arises: What shall be the rule of

apportionment? Can a street be ordered graded and paved, and

the expense assessed exclusively upon the property which, in the

opinion of the assessors, shall be peculiarly benefited thereby, in

proportion to such benefit? Or may a taxing district be created

for the purpose, and the expense assessed in proportion to the area

of the lots? Or may the street be made a taxing district, and the

cost levied in proportion to the frontage? Or may each lot owner

be required to grade and pave in front of his lot? These are grave

questions, and they have not been found of easy solution.

The case of The People v. The Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn,1 is a

leading case, holding that a statute authorizing a municipal corpora-

tion to grade and improve streets, and to assess the expense among

the owners and occupants of lands benefited by the improvement, in

1 4 N. Y. 410; reversing same case, 6 Barb. 209.

«
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proportion to the amount of such benefit, is a constitutional and

valid law. The court in that case concede that taxation cannot

be laid without apportionment, but hold that the basis of apportion-

ment in these cases is left by the constitution with the legislature.

The application of any one rule or principle of apportionment to

all cases would be manifestly oppressive and unjust. Taxation is

sometimes regulated by one principle, and sometimes by another;

and very often it has been apportioned without reference to local-

ity, or to the tax-payer's ability to contribute, or to any proportion

between the burden and the benefit. "The excise laws, and taxes

on carriages and watches, are among the many examples

[* 506] of * this description of taxation. Some taxes affect classes

of inhabitants only; All duties on imported goods are

taxes on the class of consumers. The tax on one imported article

falls on a large class of consumers, while the tax on another affects

comparatively a few individuals. The duty on one article con-

sumed by one class of inhabitants is twenty per cent of its value,

while on another, consumed by a different class, it is forty per
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cent. The duty on one foreign commodity is laid for the purpose

of revenue mainly, without reference to the ability of its consumers

to pay, as in the case of the duty on salt. The duty on another is

laid for the purpose of encouraging domestic manufacture of the

same article, tints compelling the consumer to pay a higher price

to one man than he could otherwise have bought the article for

from anothep. These discriminations may be impolitic, and in

some cases unjust; but if the power of taxation upon importations

had not been transferred by the people of this State to the Federal

government, there could have been no pretence for declaring them

to be unconstitutional in State legislation.

"A property tax for the general purposes of the government,

either of the State at large or of a county, city, or other district, is

regarded as a just and equitable tax. The reason is obvious. It

apportions the burden according to the benefit more nearly than

any other inflexible rule of general taxation. A rich man derives

more benefit from taxation, in the protection and improvement of

his property, than a poor man, and ought therefore to pay more.

But the amount of each man's benefit in general taxation cannot

be ascertained and estimated with any degree of certainty; and for

that reason a property tax is adopted, instead of an estimate of

benefits. In local taxation, however, for special purposes, the
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local benefits may in many cases be seen, traced, and estimated

to a reasonable certainty. At least this has been supposed and

assumed to be true by the legislature, whose duty it is to pre-

scribe the rules on which taxation is to be apportioned, and whose

determination of this matter, being within the scope of its lawful

power, is conclusive."

The reasoning of this case has been generally accepted as satis-

factory, and followed in subsequent cases.1

1 Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. s. 126; Hill e. Higdon, 5 Ohio, n. s. 243;

Marion v. Epler, ib. 260; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, n. s. 636; City of Peoria

v. Kidder, 26 1ll. 351; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio, x. s. 333;

Garrett p. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505; Uhrig v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 463; Bradley v.

McAtee, 7 Bush, 667 ; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 309; Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass. 461;

Sessions p. Crnnkilton, 20 Ohio, n. s. 349 ; State v. Fuller, 84N. J. 227. The

legislation in Ohio on the subject has authorized the cities and villages, in open-

ing and improving streets, to assess the expense either upon the lots abutting on

the street in proportion to the street front, or upon the lands in proportion to

their assessed value. In a case whore the former mode was resorted to, and an
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assessment made upon property owned by the Northern Indiana Railroad Com-

pany for its corporate purposes, Peck, J., thus states and answers an ohjection

to the validity of the tax: " But it is said that assessments, as distinguished from

general taxation, rest solely upon the idea of equivalents; a compensation pro-

portioned to the special benefits derived from the improvement, and that, in the

case at bar, the railroad company is not, and in the nature of things cannot be,

in any degree benefited by the improvement. It is quite true that the right to

impose such special taxes is based upon a presumed equivalent; but it by no

means follows that there must be in fact such full equivalent in every instance,

or that its absence will render the assessment invalid. The rule of apportion-

ment, whether by the front foot or a percentage upon the assessed valuation, must

be uniform, affecting all the owners and all the property abutting on the street

alike. One rule cannot be applied to one owner, and a different rule to another

ownep. One could not be assessed ten per cent, another five, another three,

and another left altogether unassessed because he was not in fact benefited. It

is manifest that the actual benefits resulting from the improvement may be as

various almost as the number of the owners and the uses to which the property

may be applied. No general rule, therefore, could be laid down which would do

equal and exact justice to all. The legislature have not attempted so vain a thing,

bnt have prescribed two different modes in which the assessment may be made,

and left the city authorities free to adopt eithep. The mode adopted by the

council becomes the statutory equivalent for the benefits conferred, although in

fact the burden imposed may greatly preponderate. In such case, if no fraud

intervene, and the assessment does not substantially exhaust the owner's interest

in the land, his remedy would seem to be to procure, by a timely appeal to the

city authorities, a reduction of the special assessment, and its imposition, in whole
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[* 507] * On the other hand, and on the like reasoning, it hag

been held equally competent to make the street a taxing

district, and assess the expense of the improvement upon the lots

in proportion to the frontage.1 Here also is apportionment by a

rule which approximates to what is just, but which, like any other

rule that can be applied, is only an approximation to absolute

equality. But if, in the opinion of the legislature, it is the

proper rule to apply to any particular case, the courts must en-

force it.

[* 508] * But a very different case is presented when the legis-

lature undertakes to provide that each lot upon a street

shall pay the whole expense of grading and paving the street along

its front. For while in such a case there would be something

having the outward appearance of apportionment, it requires but

slight examination to discover that it is a deceptive semblance

only, and that the measure of equality which the constitution

requires is entirely wanting. If every lot owner is compelled to

construct the street in front of his lot, his tax is neither increased
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or in part, upon the public at large." Northern Indiana R.R. Co. v. Connelly,

10 Ohio, N. s. 165. And see Howell v. Bristol, 8 Bush, 493.

1 Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich.- 560; Northern Ind. R.R. Co. ». Connelly.

10 Ohio, n. s. 159; Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 282. And see St. Joseph r.

O'Donoghue, 31 Mo. 145; Burnet v. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76; Scoville v. Cleve-

land, 1 Ohio, N. 8. 133; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, n. s. 246; Ernst v. Kunkle, ib.

520; Hints v. Leavenworth, 3 Kansas, 186; Magee v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn.

St. 388; Wray o. Pittsburg, ib. 865; Palmer v. Stumpb, 29 Ind. 329. In Ham-

mett v. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St. 146, 8. c. 3 Am. Rep. 615, while the cases here

cited are approved, it is denied that a street already laid out and in good con-

dition can be taken and improved for a public drive or carriage way at the expense

of the adjacent owners; this not being an improvement,for local but for general

purposes. Compare Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St. 358; s. c. 8 Am. Rep.

255; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174 (case of water-rents); Willard e. Presbury, 14

Wall. 676 ; Hoyt v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 89; s. C. 2 Am. Rep. 76 ; La Fayette

v. Fowler, 34 Ind. 140; Chambers t>. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497; Bradley v. McAtec,

7 Bush, 667 ; 8. c. 3 Am. Rep. 309. In Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St. 353,

S. c. 8 Am. Rep. 255, it is denied that this principle can be applied to the country

and to farming lands. Agnew, J., says: "To apply it to the country, or to farm

lands, would lead to such inequality and injustice as to deprive it of all soundness

as a rule, or as a substitute for a fair and impartial valuation of benefits in pursu-

ance of law; so that at the very first blush every one would pronounce it palpably

unreasonable and unjust." We commend the. able opinion in this case as a Tery

satisfactory and very thorough examination of the principles on which local assess-

ments are supported.
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nor diminished by the assessment upon his neighbors; nothing is

divided or apportioned between him and them; and each particu-

lar lot is in fact arbitrarily made a taxing district, and charged

with the whole expenditure therein, and thus apportionment

avoided. If the tax were for grading the street simply, those lots

which were already at the established grade would escape alto-

gether, while those on either side, which chanced to be above and

below, must bear the whole burden, though no more benefited by

the improvement than the others.1 It is evident, therefore, that a

law for making assessments on this basis could not have in view

such distribution of burdens in proportion to benefits as ought to

be a cardinal idea in every tax law.2 It would be nakedly an arbi-

trary command of the law to each lot owner to construct the street

in front of his lot at his own expense, according to a prescribed

standard; and a power to issue such command could never be

exercised by a constitutional government, unless we are at liberty

to treat it as a police regulation, and place the duty to make the

streets upon the same footing as that to keep the sidewalks free
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from obstruction and fit for passage. But any such idea is clearly

inadmissible.3

1 In fact, lots above and below an established grade are usually less benefited

by the grading than the others; because the improvement subjects them to new

burdens, in order to bring the general surface to the grade of the street, which

the others escape.

* The case of Warren v. Henley, 31 Iowa, 38, is opposed to the reasoning of

the text; but the learned Judge who delivers the opinion concedes that he is

unable to support his conclusions on the authorities within his reach.

3 See City of Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513, and opinions of

Campbell and Christiancy, JJ., in Woodbridge p. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274. The case

of Weeks p. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 258, seems to be contra. We quote from the

opinion of the court by Paine, J. After stating the rule that uniformity in taxation

implies equality in the burden, he proceeds: "The principle upon which these

assessments rest is clearly destructive of this equality. It requires every lot owner

to build whatever improvements the public may require on the street in front of

his lot, without reference to inequalities in the value of the lots, in the expense of

constructing the improvements, or to the question whether the lot is injured or

benefited by their construction. Corner lots are required to construct and keep

in repair three times as much as other lots; and yet it is well known that the

difference in value bears no proportion to this difference in burden. In front of

one lot the expense of building the street may exceed the value of the lot; and

its construction may impose on the owner additional expense, to render his lot

accessible. In front of another lot, of even much greater value, the expense is

comparatively slight. These inequalities are obvious; and I have always thought
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[* 509] * In many other cases, besides the construction, im-

provement, and repair of streets, may special taxing

the principle of such assessments was radically wrong. They have been very

extensively discussed, and sustained upon the ground that the lot should pay

because it receives the benefit. But if this be true, that the improvements in

front of a lot are made for the benefit of the lot only, then the right of the public

to tax the owner at all for that purpose fails; because the public has no right to

tax the citizen to make him build improvements for his own benefit merely. It

must be for a public purpose; and it being once established that the construction

of streets is a public purpose that will justify taxation, I think it follows, if tbe

matter is to be settled on principle, that the taxation should be equal and uniform,

and that to make it so the whole taxable property of the political division in which

the improvement is made should be taxed by a uniform rule for the purpose of

its construction.

"But in sustaining these assessments when private property was wanted for a

street, it has been said that the State could take it, because the use of a street

was a public use; in order to justify a resort to the power of taxation, it is said

the building of a street is a public purpose. But then, having got the land to

build it on, and the power to tax by holding it a public purpose, they immediately

abandon that idea, and say that it is a private benefit, and make the owner of the
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lot build the whole of it. I think this is the same in principle as it would be to

say that the town, in which the county seat is located, should build the county

buildings, or that the county where the capital is should construct the public

edifices of the State, upon the ground that, by being located nearer, they derived

a greater benefit than others. If the question, therefore, was, whether the sys-

tem of assessment could be sustained upon principle, I should have no hesitation

in deciding it in the negative. I fully agree with the reasoning of the Supreme

Court of Louisiana in the case of Municipality No. 2 v. White, 9 La. An. 447,

upon this point.

"But the question is not whether this system is established upon sound prin-

ciples, but whether the legislature has power, under the constitution, to establish

such a system. As already stated, if the provision requiring the rule of taxation

to be uniform was the only one bearing upon the question, I should answer this

also in the negative. But there is another provision which seems to me so im-

portant, that it has changed the result to which I should otherwise have arrived.

That provision is § 3 of art. 11, and is as follows: 'It shall be the duty of the

legislature, and they are hereby empowered, to provide for the organization of

cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict their power of taxation, assess-

ment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning. their credit, so as to

prevent abuses in assessments and taxation, and in contracting debts by such

municipal corporations.1

"It cannot well be denied that if the word ' assessment,' as used in this sec-

tion, bad reference to this established system of special taxation for municipal

improvements, that then it is a clear recognition of the existence and legality of

the powep." And the court, having reached the conclusion that the word did

have reference to such an established system, sustain the assessment, adding:
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districts be created, with a * view to local improvements. [* 510]

The cases of drains to relieve swamps, marshes, and other

low lands of their stagnant water, and of levees to prevent lands

being overflowed by rivers, will at once suggest themselves. In

providing for such cases, however, the legislature exercises another

power besides the power of taxation. On the theory that the

drainage is for the sole purpose of benefiting the lands of individ-

uals, it might be difficult to defend such legislation. But if the

stagnant water causes or threatens disease, it may be a nuisance,

which, under its power of police, the State would have authority

"The same effect was given to the same clause in the Constitution of Ohio, by

the Supreme Court of that State, in a recent decision in the case of Hill v. Higdon,

5 Ohio, n. s. 243. And the reasoning of Chief Justice Ranney on the question

I think it impossible to answer."

If the State of Wisconsin had any settled and known practice, designated as

assessments, under which each lot owner was compelled to construct the streets

in front of his lot, then the constitution as quoted may well be held to recognize

such practice. In this view, however, it is still difficult to discover any "restric-
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tion " in a law which perpetuates the arbitrary and unjust custom, and which still

permits the whole expense of making the street in front of each lot to be imposed

upon it. The only restriction which the law imposes is, that its terms exclude

uniformity, equality, and justice, which surely could not be the restriction the

constitution designed. Certainly the learned judge shows very clearly that such

a law is unwarranted as a legitimate exercise of the taxing power; and as it

cannot be warranted under any other power known to constitutional government,

the authority to adopt it should not be found in doubtful words. The case of

Hill v. Higdon, referred to, is different. There the expense of improving the

street was assessed upon the property abutting on the street, in proportion to the

foot front. The decision there was, that the constitutional provision that "laws

shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all moneys, &c, and also all real and

personal property, according to its true value in money," had no reference to

these local assessments, which might still be made, as they were before the con-

stitution was adopted, with reference to the benefits conferred. The case, there-

fore, showed a rule of apportionment which was made applicable throughout the

taxing district, to wit, along the street so far as the improvement extended.

The case of State v. City of Portage, 12 Wis. 562, holds that a law authorizing

the expense of an improvement to be assessed upon the abutting lots, in pro-

portion to their front orvsize, would not justify and sustain city action which

required the owner of each lot to bear the expense of the improvement in front

of it

It has been often contended that taxation by frontage was in effect a taking of

property for the public use, but the courts have held otherwise. People v.

Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174; Warren v.

Henley, 31 Iowa, 39; Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St. 353; B.C. 8 Am.

Rep. 255.
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to abate. The laws for this purpose, so far as they have fallen

under our observation, have proceeded upon this theory.

[* 511] Nevertheless, when the State incurs * expense in the exer-

cise of its police power for this purpose, it is proper to

assess that expense upon the portion of the community specially

and peculiarly benefited. The assessment is usually made with

reference to the benefit to property; and it is difficult to frame or

to conceive of any other rule of apportionment that would operate

so justly and so equally in these cases. There may be difficulty

in the detail; difficulty in securing just and impartial assessments;

but the principle of such a law would not depend for its sound-

ness upon such considerations.1

1 See Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio, N. s. 333; French v. Kirk-

land, 1 Paige, 117 ; Philips v. Wickham, ib. 590. In Woodruff v. Fisher, 17

Barb. 224, Hand, J., speaking of one of these drainage laws, says: "If the

object to be accomplished by this statute may be considered a public improve-

ment, the power of taxation seems to have been sustained upon analogous prin-

ciples. [Citing People v. Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Thomas e.

Leland, 24 Wend. 65; and Livingston r. Mayor, &c, of New York, 8 Wend.

101.] But if the object was merely to improve the property of individuals, I
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think the statute would be void, although it provided for compensation. The

water privileges on Indian River cannot be taken or affected in any way solely

for the private advantage of others, however numerous the beneficiaries. Sev-

eral statutes have been passed for draining swamps, but it seems to me thit

the principle above advanced rests upon natural and constitutional law. The

professed object of this statute is to promote public health. And one question

that arises is, whether the owners of large tracts of land in a state of nature can

be taxed to pay the expense of draining them, by destroying the dams, &c, of

other persons away from the drowned lands, and for the purposes of public

health. This law proposes to destroy the water power of certain persons against

their will, to drain the lands of others, also, for all that appears, against tbeir

will; and all at the expense of the latter, for this public good. If this taxation is

illegal, no mode of compensation is provided, and all is illegal." "The owners

of these lands could not be convicted of maintaining a public nuisance because

they did not drain them; even though they were the owners of the lands upon

which the obstructions are situated. It does not appear by the act or the com-

plaint that the sickness to be prevented prevails among inhabitants on the wet

lands, nor whether these lands will be benefited or injured by draining; and cer-

tainly, unless they will be benefited, it would seem to be partial legislation to tax

a certain tract of land, for the expense of doing to it what did not improve it,

merely because, in a state of nature, it may be productive of sickness. Street

assessments are put upon the ground that the land assessed is improved, and its

value greatly enhanced." The remarks of Green, J., in Williams o. Mayor, &c,

of Detroit, 2 Mich. 567, may be here quoted: "Every species of taxation, in

every mode, is in theory and principle based upon an idea of compensation, ben-
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* In certain classes of cases, it has been customary to [* 512]

call upon the citizen to appear in person and perform ser-

vice for the State, in the nature of police duties. The burden of

improving and repairing the common highways of the country,

except in the urban districts, is generally laid upon the people in

the form of an assessment of labor. The assessment may be upon

each citizen, in proportion to his property; or, in addition to the

property assessment, there may be one also by the poll. But

though the public burden assumes the form of labor, it is still tax-

ation, and must therefore be levied on some principle of uniform-

ity. But it is a peculiar species of taxation; and the general terms

"tax," or "taxation," as employed in the State constitutions,

would not generally be understood to include it. It has been de-

cided that the clause in the Constitution of Illinois, that "the

mode of levying a tax shall be by valuation, so that every person

shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of the property he or she

has in his or her possession," did not prevent the levy of poll-taxes

in highway labor. "The framers of the constitution intended to
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direct a'uniform mode of taxation on property, and not to prohibit

any other species of taxation, but to leave the legislature the power

to impose such other taxes as would be consonant to public justice,

and as the circumstances of the country might require. They prob-

ably intended to prevent the imposition of an arbitrary tax on prop-

efit, or advantage to the person or property taxed, either directly or indirectly.

If the tax is levied for the support of the government and general police of the

State, for the education and moral instruction of the citizens, or the construction

of works of internal improvement, he is supposed to receive a just compensation

in the security which the government affords to his person and property, the means

of enjoying his possessions, and their enhanced capacity to contribute to his

comfort and gratification, which constitute their value."

It has been held incompetent, however, for a city which has itself created a

nuisance on the property of a citizen, to tax him for the expense of removing or

abating it. Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 258.

In Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495, it was held that a special

assessment for the purpose of reclaiming a district from inundation might prop-

erly be laid upon land in proportion to its area, and that the constitutional pro-

vision that taxation should be levied on property in proportion to its valuation

did not preclude this mode of assessment. The same ruling was made in Louisi-

ana cases. Crowley v. Copley, 2 La. An. 329; Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 La. An.

220; Wallace ». Shelton, 14 La. An. 498; Bishop v. Marks, 15 La. An. 147;

Richardson r. Morgan, 16 La. An. 429; McGeheer. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40; Jones

r. Boston, 104 Mass. 461.
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erty, according to kind and quantity, and without reference to

value. The inequality of the mode of taxation was the object to

be avoided. We cannot believe that they intended that all Je

public burdens should be borne by those having property in pos-

session, wholly exempting the rest of the community, who,

[*513] by the * same constitution were made secure in the exer-

cise of the rights of suffrage, and all the immunities of

the citizen." 1 And in another case, where an assessment of high-

way labor is compared with one upon adjacent property for widen-

ing a street, — which had beeu held not to be taxation, as that term

was understood in the Constitution,— it is said: "An assessment

of labor for the repair of roads and streets is less like a tax than

is such an assessment. The former is not based upon, nor has it

any reference to, property or values owned by the person of whom

it is required, whilst the latter is based alone upon the property

designated by the law imposing it. Nor is an assessment a capi-

tation tax, as that is a sum of money levied upon each poll. This

rate, on the contrary, is a requisition for so many days' labor, which

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

may be commuted in money. No doubt, the number of days' levied,

and the sum which may be received by commutation, must be uni-

form within the limits of the district or body imposing the same.

This requisition for labor to repair roads is not a tax, and hence

this exemption is not repugnant to the constitution." 2

It will be apparent from what has already been said, that it is

not essential to the validity of taxation that it be levied according

to rules of abstract justice.3 It is only essential that the legis-

lature keep within its proper sphere of action, and not impose

burdens under the name of taxation which are not taxes in fact;

and its decision as to what is proper, just, and politic, must then

be final and conclusive. Absolute equality and strict justice are

unattainable in tax proceedings. The legislature must be left to

1 Sawyer v. City of Alton, 3 Scam. 130.

* Town of Pleasant v. Kost, 29 111. 494.

1 Frellsen v. Mahan, 21 La. An. 79; People v. Whyler, 41 Cal. 351; War-

ren v. Henley, 31 Iowa, 43. In this last case, Beck, J., criticises the position

taken ante, pp. 507, 508, that the cost of a local improvement cannot be imposed

on the adjoining premises irrespective of any apportionment, and appears to sup-

pose our views rest upon the injustice of such a proceeding. This is not strictly

correct; it may or may not be just in any particular case; but taxation necessa-

rily implies apportionment, and even a just burden cannot be imposed as a tax

without it.
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decide for itself how nearly it is possible to approximate so desir-

able a result. It must happen under any tax law that some prop-

erty will be taxed twice, while other property will escape taxation

altogethep. Instances will also occur where persons will be taxed

as owners of property which has ceased to exist. The system in

vogue for taking valuations of property fixes upon a certain time

for that purpose, and a party becomes liable to be taxed upon

what he possesses at the time the valuing officer calls upon him.

Yet changes of property from person to person are occurring while

the valuation is going on, and the same parcel of property is found

by the assessor in the hands of two different persons, and is twice

assessed, while another parcel for similar reasons is not assessed

at all. Then the man who owns property when the as-

sessment is * taken may have been deprived of it by acci- [* 514]

dent or other misfortune before the tax becomes payable;

but the tax is nevertheless a charge against him. And when the

valuation is only made once in a series of years, the occasional

hardships and inequalities in consequence of relative changes in

the value of property from various causes become sometimes very

glaring. Nevertheless, no question of constitutional law is in-
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volved in these cases, and the legislative control is complete.1

The legislature must also, except when an unbending rule has

been prescribed for it by the constitution, have power to select in

its discretion the subjects of taxation. The rule of uniformity re-

quires an apportionment among all the subjects of taxation within

the districts; but it does not require that every thing which the

1 In Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm. 418, objection was taken to an assessment made

for a local improvement under a special statute, that the commissioners, in deter-

mining who should be liable to pay the tax, and the amount each should pay,

were to be governed by the last assessment of taxable property in the county.

It was insisted that this was an unjust criterion, for a man might have disposed

of all the taxable property assessed to him in the last assessment before this tax

was actually declared by the commissioners. The court, however, regarded the

objection as more refined than practical, and one that, if allowed, would at once

annihilate the power of taxation. "In the imposition of taxes, exact and critical

justice and equality are absolutely unattainable. If we attempt it, we might have

to divide a single year's tax upon a given article of property among a dozen dif-

ferent individuals who owned it at different times during the year, and then be

almost as far from the desired end as when we started. The proposition is Uto-

pian. The legislature must adopt some practicable system; and there is no more

danger of oppression or injustice in taking a former valuation than in relying

upon one to be made subsequently."
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legislature might make taxable shall be made so in fact. Many

exemptions are usually made from taxation from reasons the co-

gency of which is at once apparent. The agencies of the national

government, we have seen, are not taxable by the States; and the

agencies and property of States, counties, cities, boroughs, towns,

and villages are also exempted by law, because, if any portion of

the public expenses was imposed upon them, it must in some form

be collected from the citizens before it can be paid. No beneficial

object could therefore be accomplished by any such assessment.

The property of educational and religious institutions is also gen-

erally exempted from taxation by law upon very similar considera-

tions, and from a prevailing belief that it is the policy and the

interest of the State to encourage them.1 If the State

[*515] *may cause taxes to be levied from motives of charity or

gratitude, so for the like reasons it may exempt the objects

of charity and gratitude from taxation. Property is sometimes

released from taxation by contract with the State and corporations,

and specified occupations are sometimes charged with specific

taxes in lieu of all taxation of their property. A broad field is here

opened to legislative discretion. As matter of State policy it
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might also be deemed proper to make general exemption of suffi-

cient of the tools of trade or other means of support to enable

the poor man, not yet a pauper, to escape becoming a public bur-

den. There is still ample room for apportionment after all such

exemptions .have been made. The constitutional requirement of

equality'and uniformity only extends to such objects of taxation

as the legislature shall determine to be properly subject to the

burden.2 The power to determine the persons and the objects to

be taxed is trusted exclusively to the legislative department;3

1 As in the case of other special privileges, exemptions from taxation are to

be strictly construed. Trustees of M. E. Church v. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3; State v.

Mills, 34 N. J. 177. It has been generally held that an exemption from taxation

would not exempt the property from being assessed for a local improvement.

Matter of Mayor, &c, 11 Johns. 77; Baltimore p. Cemetery Co., 7 Md. 517;

La Fayette v. Orphan Asylum, 2 La. An. 1; Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 Penn.

St. 69; Le Fever p. Detroit, 2 Mich. 586; Lockwood p. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20;

Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 Bush, 508; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 480.

* State v. North, 27 Mo. 464; People v. Colman, 3 Cal. 46 ; Durach's Appeal,

62 Penn. St. 494.

3 Wilson v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 4 E. D. Smith, 675; Hill p. Higdon,

5 Ohio, n. s. 245; State v. Parker, 33 N. J. 313. Notwithstanding a require-
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but over all those the burden must be spread, or it will be

unequal and unlawful as to those who are selected to make the

payment.1

ment that " the rule of taxation shall be uniform," the legislature may levy

specific State taxes on corporations, and exempt them from municipal taxation.

So held on the ground of stare decisis. Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454.

1 In the case of Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242, a somewhat peculiar exemp-

tion was made. It appears that several lots in the city upon which a new

hotel was being constructed, of the value of from $150,000 to $200,000, were

purposely omitted to be taxed, under the direction of the Common Council, " in

view of the great public benefit which the construction of the hotel would be to

the city." Paine, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "I have no

doubt this exemption originated in motives of generosity and public spirit. And

perhaps the same motives should induce the tax-payers of the city to submit to

the slight increase of the tax thereby imposed on each, without questioning its

strict legality. But they cannot be compelled to. No man is obliged to be

more generous than the law requires, but each may stand strictly upon his legal

rights. »That this exemption was illegal, was scarcely contested. I shall, there-
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fore, make no effort to show that the Common Council had no authority to

suspend or repeal the general law of the State, declaring what property shall be

taxable and what exempt. But the important question presented is, whether,

conceding it to have been entirely unauthorized, it vitiates the tax assessed upon

other property. And upon this question I think the following rule is established,

both by reason and authority. Omissions of this character, arising from mistakes

of fact, erroneous computations, or errors of judgment on the part of those to

whom the execution of the taxing laws is intrusted, do not necessarily vitiate

the whole tax. But intentional disregard of those laws, in such manner as to

impose illegal taxes on those who are assessed, does. The first part of the rule

is necessary to enable taxes to be collected at all. The execution of these laws

is necessarily intrusted to men, and men are fallible, liable to frequent mistakes

of fact and errors of judgment. If such errors, on the part of those who are

attempting in good faith to perform their duties, should vitiate the whole tax, no

tax could ever be collected. And, therefore, though they sometimes increase

improperly the burdens of those paying taxes, that part of the rule which holds

the tax not thereby avoided is absolutely essential to a continuance of govern-

ment. But it seems to me clear that the other part is equally essential to the

just protection of the citizen. If those executing these laws may deliberately

disregard them, and assess the whole tax upon a part only of those who are

liable to pay it, and have it still a legal tax, then the laws afford no protection,

and the citizen is at the mercy of those officers, who, by being appointed to exe-

cute the laws, would seem to be thereby placed beyond legal control. I know

of no considerations of public policy or necessity that can justify carrying the

rule to that extent. And the fact that in this instance the disregard of the law

proceeded from good motives ought not to affect the decision of the question.

It is a rule of law that is to be established; and, if established here because the

motives were good, it would serve as a precedent where the motives were bad,
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In some of the States it has been decided that the par-

[* 516] ticular * provisions inserted in their constitutions to insure

uniformity are so worded as to forbid exemptions. Thus

the Constitution of Illinois provided that "the General Assembly

shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every person

and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his

or her property." 1 Under this it has been held that exemption

by the legislature of persons residing in a city from a tax levied

to repair roads beyond the city limits, by township authority,—

the city being embraced within the township which, for that pur-

pose, was the taxing district, — was void.2 It is to be observed of

these cases, however, that they would have fallen within the

general principle laid down in Knowlton v. Supervisors of

[* 517] Rock Co.,3 and the legislative acts * under consideration

might perhaps have been declared void on general prin-

ciples, irrespective of the peculiar wording of the constitution.

These cases, notwithstanding, as well as others in Illinois, recog-

nize the power ill the legislature to commute for a tax, or to con-
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tract for its release for a consideration. The Constitution of Ohio

provides1 that "laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all

moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock com-

panies, or otherwise; and also all real and personal property,

according to its true value in money." Under this section it was

held not competent for the legislature to provide that lands within

the limits of a city should not be taxed for any city purpose,

except roads, unless the same were laid off into town lots and

and the power usurped for purposes of oppression." pp. 263-265. See also

Henry v. Chester, 15 Vt. 460; State v. Collector of Jersey City, 4 Zab. 108;

Insurance Co. 8. Yard, 17 Penn. St. 331; Williams v. School District, 21 Pick.

75; Hersey v. Supervisors of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 185; Crosby v. Lyon, 37 Cal.

2-12. But it seems that an omission of property from the tax-roll by the assessor,

unintentionally, through want of judgment and lack of diligence and business

habits, will not invalidate the roll. Dean v. Gleason, 16 Wis. 1. In Scofield

v. Watkins, 22 111. 72, and Merritt v. Farriss, ib. 811, it appears to be decided

that even in the case of intentional omissions, the tax-roll would not be invali-

dated, but the parties injured would be left to their remedy against the assessor.

See also Dunhanio. Chicago, 55 111. 361.

1 Art. 9, § 2, of the old Constitution.

• O'Kane v. Treat, 25 111. 561; Hunsaker ». Wright, 30 111. 116. See also

Trustees v. McConnell, 12 111. 138.

3 9 Wis. 410.

4 Art. 12, § 2.
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recorded as such, or into out-lots not exceeding five acres each.1

Upon this case we should make the same remark as upon the

Illinois cases ahove referred to.

It is, moreover, essential to valid taxation that the taxing offi-

cers be able to show legislative authority for the burden they

assume to impose in every instance. Taxes can only be voted by

the people's representatives. They are in every instance an appro-

priation by the people to the government, which the latter is to

expend in furnishing the people protection, security, and such

facilities for enjoyment as it properly pertains to government to

provide. This principle is a chief corner-stone of Anglo-Saxon

liberty; and it has operated not only as an important check on

government, in preventing extravagant expenditures, as well as

unjust and tyrannical action, but it has been an important guaranty

of the right of private property. Property is secure from the law-

less grasp of the government, if the means of existence of the gov-

ernment depend upon the voluntary grants of those who own the

property. Our ancestors coupled their grants witli demands for
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the redress of grievances; but in modern times the surest protec-

tion against grievances has been found to be to vote specific taxes

for the specific purposes to which the people's representatives are

willing they shall be devoted;2 and the persons exercising the

functions of government must then become petitioners if they

desire money for other objects. And then these grants are only

made periodically. Only a few things, such as the salaries of

officers, the interest upon the public debt, the support

*of schools, and the like, are provided for by permanent [* 518]

laws; and not always is this done. The government is

dependent from year to year on the periodical vote of supplies.

And this vote will come from representatives who are newly

chosen by the people, and who will be expected to reflect their

views regarding the public expenditures. State taxation, there-

fore, is not likely to be excessive or onerous, except when the

people, in times of financial ease, excitement, and inflation, have

allowed the incurring of extravagant debts, the burden of which

remains after the excitement has passed away.

But it is as true of the political divisions of the State as it is of

1 Zanesville v. Auditor of Muskingum County, 5 Ohio, N. 8. 589.

! Hoboken v. Phinney, 5 Dutch. 66.
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the State at large, that legislative authority must be shown for

every levy of taxes.1 The power to levy taxes by these divisions

comes from the State. The State confers it, and at the same time

exercises a parental supervision by circumscribing it. Indeed, on

general principles, the power is circumscribed by the rule that the

taxation by the local authorities can only be for local purposes.3

Neither the State nor the local body can authorize the imposition

of a tax on the people of a county or town for an object in which

the people of the county or town are not concerned. And by some

of the State constitutions it is expressly required that the State,

in creating municipal corporations, shall restrict their power of

taxation over the subjects within their control. These require-

ments, however, impose an obligation upon the legislature which

only its sense of duty can compel it to perform.3 It is evident

that if the legislature fail to enact the restrictive legislation, the

courts have no power to compel such action. Whether in any case

a charter of incorporation could be held void on the ground that

it conferred unlimited powers of taxation, is a question that could
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not well arise, as a charter is probably never granted which does

not impose some restrictions; and where that is the case, it must

be inferred that those were all the restrictions the legislature

deemed important, and that therefore the constitutional duty of

the legislature has been performed.4

1 Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494; Burlington v. Kellar, 18 Iowa, 59;

Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio, n. s. 273.

• Foster v. Kenosha, 12 Wis. 616. See ante, p. 213.

5 In Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, n. s. 248, Itanney, J., says of this provision:

"A failure to perform this duty may be of very serious import, but lays no

foundation for judicial correction." And see Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, n. S.

638.

4 The Constitution of Ohio requires the legislature to provide by general laws

for the organization of cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict their

power of taxation, assessment, &c. The general law authorizing the expense of

grading and paving streets to be assessed on the grounds bounding and abutting

on the street, in proportion to the street front, was regarded as being passed in

attempted fulfilment of the constitutional duty, and therefore valid. The chief

restriction in the case was, that it did not authorize assessment in any other or

different mode from what had been customary. Northern Indiana R.R. Co. t.

Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. a. 165. The statute also provided that no improvement

or repair of a street or highway, the cost of which was to be assessed upon the

owners, should be directed without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members

elected to the municipal council, or unless two-thirds of the owners to be charged
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* When, however, it is said to be essential to valid [* 519]

taxation that there be legislative authority for every tax

that is laid, it is not meant that the legislative department of the

State must have passed upon the necessity and propriety

of every particular tax; * but those who assume to seize [* 520]

the property of the citizen for the satisfaction of the tax

must be able to show that that particular tax is authorized, either

by general or special law. The power inherent in the government

to tax lies dormant until a constitutional law has been passed call

ing it into action, and is then vitalized only to the extent provided

by the law. Those, therefore, who act under such law should be

careful to keep within its limits, lest they remove from their acts

should petition in writing therefor. In Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. 8. 639,

Peck, J., says: "This may be said to be a very imperfect protection; and in

some cases will doubtless prove to be so; but it is calculated and designed, by

the unanimity or the publicity it requires, to prevent any flagrant abuses of the

power. Such is plainly its object; and we know of no rights conferred upon

courts to interfere with the exercise of a legislative discretion which the consti-
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tution has delegated to the law-making power." And see Weeks v. Milwaukee,

10 Wis. 242. The Constitution of Michigan requires the legislature, in providing

for the incorporation of cities and villages, to " restrict their power of taxation,"

&c. The Detroit Metropolitan Police Law made it the duty of the Board of

Police to prepare and submit to the city controller, on or before the first day of

May in each year, an estimate in detail of the cost and expense of maintaining

the police department, and the Common Council was required to raise the same

by general tax. These provisions, it was claimed, were in conflict with the

constitution, because no limit was fixed by them to the estimates that might be

made. In People v. Mahaney, ,13 Mich. 498, the court say: "Whether this

provision of the constitution can be regarded as mandatory in a sense that would

make all charters of municipal corporations and acts relating thereto which are

wanting in this limitation invalid, we do not feel called upon to decide in this

case, since it is clear that a limitation upon taxation is fixed by the act before us.

The constitution has not prescribed the character of the restriction which shall

be imposed, and from the nature of the case it was impossible to do more than

to make it the duty of the legislature to set some bounds to a power so liable to

abuse. A provision which, like the one complained of, limits the power of tax-

ation to the actual expenses as estimated by the governing board, after first

limiting the power of the board to incur expense within narrow limits, is as much

a restriction as if it confined the power to a certain percentage upon taxable

property, or to a sum proportioned to the number of inhabitants in the city.

Whether the restriction fixed upon would as effectually guard the citizen against

abuse as any other which might have been established was a question for the

legislative department of the government, and does not concern us on this

inquiry."
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the shield of its protection. While we do not propose to enter

upon any attempt to point out the various cases in which a failure

to obey strictly the requirements of the law will render the pro-

ceedings void, and in regard to which a diversity of decision would

be met with, we think we shall be safe in saying that, in cases of

this description, which propose to dispossess the citizen of his

property against his will, not only will any excess of taxation

beyond what the law allows render the proceedings void, but anj

failure to comply with such requirements of the laws as are made

for the protection of the owner's interest will also render them

void.

There are several cases in which taxes have been levied but

slightly in excess of legislative power, in which it has been urged

in defence of the proceedings that the law ought not to take notice

of such unimportant matters; but an excess of jurisdiction is never

unimportant. In one case in Maine the excess was eighty-seven

cents only in a tax of $225.75, but it was held sufficient to render

the proceedings void. We quote from Mellen, Ch. J., delivering
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the opinion of the court: "It is contended that the sum of eighty-

seven cents is such a trifle as to fall within the range of the maxim

de mi?iimis, &c.; but if not, that still this small excess does not

vitiate the assessment. The maxim is so vague in itself as to

form a very unsafe ground of proceeding or judging; and it may

be almost as difficult to apply it as a rule in pecuniary concerns as

to the interest which a witness lias in the event of a cause; and

in such case it cannot apply. Any interest excludes him. The

assessment was therefore unauthorized and void. If the line

which the legislature has established be once passed, we know of

no boundary to the discretion of the assessors." 1 The same view

has been taken by the Supreme Court of Michigan, by

[* 521] which the * opinion is expressed that the maxim de

minimis lex non curat should be applied with great caution

to proceedings of this character, and that the excess could not be

held unimportant and overlooked where, as in that case, each

dollar of legal tax was perceptibly increased thereby.2 Perhaps

1 Huse v. Merriam, 2 Greenl. 376. See Joyner v. School District, 3 Cush.

667; Kemper v. McClelland, 19 Ohio, 824; School District o. Merrills, 12 Conn.

437; Elwell v. Shaw, 1 Greenl. 336; Wells p. Burbank, 17 N. H. 393; Kins-

worthy v. Mitchell, 21 Ark. 146.

* Case p. Dean, 16 Mich. 12.
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however, a slight excess, not the result of intention, but of

erroneous calculations, may be overlooked, in view of the great

difficulty in making all such calculations mathematically correct,

and the consequent impolicy of requiring entire freedom from all

errors.1

Wherever a tax is invalid because of excess of authority, or

because the requisites in tax proceedings which the law lias pro-

vided for the protection of the tax-payer are not complied with,

any sale of property based upon it will be void also. The owner is

not deprived of his property by " the law of the land," if it is taken

to satisfy an illegal tax. And if property is sold for the satis-

faction of several taxes, any one of which is unauthorized, or for

any reason illegal, the sale is altogether void.2 And the general

1 This was the view taken by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Kelley p.

Corson, 8 Wis. 182, where an excess of $8.61 in a tax of $6,654.57 was held not

to be fatal; it appearing not to be the result of intention, and the court thinking

that an accidental error no greater than this ought to be disregarded.

'This has been repeatedly held. Elwell v. Shaw, 1 Greenl. 335; Lacy v.
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Davis, 4 Mich. 140; Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass. 188; Thurston v. Little, 3 Mass.

429; Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547; Stetson p. Kemp ton, 13 Mass. 283;

Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass. 144; Hayden v. Foster, 13 Pick. 492; Torrey v.

Millbury, 21 Pick. 70; Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick. 418; Drew v. Davis, 10 Vt.

506; Doe v. McQuilkin, 8 Blackf. 335; Kemper v. McClelland, 19 Ohio, 324.

This is upon the ground that the sale being based upon both the legal and the

illegal tax, it is manifestly impossible afterwards to make the distinction, so that

the act shall be partly a trespass and partly innocent. But when a party asks

relief in equity before a sale against the collection of taxes, a part of which are

legal, he will be required first to pay that part, or at least to so distinguish them

from the others that process of injunction can be so framed as to leave the legal

taxes to be enforced; and failing in this, his bill will be dismissed. Conway v.

Waverley, 15 Mich. 257; Palmer p. Napoleon, 16 Mich. 176; Hcrsey v. Super-

visors of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 182; Bond p. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 288; Myrick v.

La Crosse, ib. 442.

As to the character and extent of the irregularities which should defeat the

proceedings for the collection of taxes, we could not undertake to speak here.

We think the statement in the text, that a failure to comply with any such re-

quirements of the law as are made for the protection of the owner's interest will

prove fatal to a tax sale, will be found abundantly sustained by the authorities,

while many of the cases go still further in making irregularities fatal. It appears

to us that where the requirement of the law which has failed of observance was

one which had regard simply to the due and orderly conduct of the proceedings,

or to the protection of the public interest, as against the officer, so that to the tax-

payer it is immaterial whether it .was complied with or not, a failure to comply

ought not to be recognized as a foundation for complaint by him. But those safe-

39 ' [ 609 ]
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rule is applicable here, that where property is taken under statu-

tory authority in derogation of common right, every requisite of

the statute having a semblance of benefit to the owner must be

complied with or the proceeding will be ineffectual.1

guards which the legislature has thrown around the estates of citizens, to protect

them against unequal, unjust, and extortionate taxation, the courts are not it

liberty to do away with by declaring them non-essential. To hold the require-

ment of the law in regard to them directory only, and not mandatory, is in effect

to exercise a dispensing power over the laws. Mr. Blackwell, in his treatise on

tax titles, has collected the cases on this subject industriously, and perhaps we

shall be pardoned for saying also with a perceptible leaning against that species

of conveyance. As illustrations how far the courts will go, in some cases, to sus-

tain irregular taxation, where officers have acted in good faith, reference is made

to Kellcy c. Corson, 11 Wis. 1; Hersey v. Supervisors of Milwaukee, 16 Wis.

185. See also Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 497, where the court endeavors to lay

down a general rule as to the illegalities which should render a tax roll invalid.

A party bound to pay a tax, or any portion thereof, cannot get title to the land

by neglecting payment and allowing a sale to be made at which he becomes the

purchaser. McMinn v. Whelan, 27 Cal. 800. See Butler v. Porter, 13 Mich.

292.
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1 See ante, 74-78. Also Newell v. Wheeler, 48 N. Y. 486; Westfkll c.

Preston, 49 N. Y. 353.
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THE EMINENT DOMAIN.

Every sovereignty possesses buildings, lands, and other property,

which it holds for the use of its officers and agents, to enable them

to perform their public functions. It may also have property from

the rents, issues, and profits, or perhaps the sale, of which

it is expected the State will derive a revenue. Such property

constitutes the ordinary domain of the State. In respect to its

use, enjoyment, and alienation, the same principles apply which

govern the management and control of like property of individuals;

and the State is in fact but an individual proprietor, whose title

and rights are to be tested, regulated, and governed by the same

rules that would have pertained to the ownership of the same

property by any of its citizens. There are also cases in which

property is peculiarly devoted to the general use and enjoyment of

the individual citizens who compose the organized society, but the

regulation and control of which are vested in the State by virtue of

its sovereignty. The State may be the proprietor of this property,
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and retain it for the common use', as a means of contributing to

the general health, comfort, or happiness of the people; but gener-

ally it is not strictly the owner, but rather the governing and

supervisory trustee of the public rights in such property, vested

with the power and charged with the duty of so regulating, pro-

tecting, and controlling them, as to secure to each citizen the

privilege to make them available for his purposes, eo far as may

be consistent with an equal enjoyment by every other citizen of

the same privilege.1 In some instances these rights are of such

1 In The Company of Free Fishers, &e. p. Gann, 20 C. B., n. s. 1, it was

held that the ownership of the crown in the bed of navigable waters is for the

benefit of the subject, and cannot be used in any such manner as to derogate

from or interfere with the right of navigation, which belongs by law to all the

subjects of the realm. And that consequently the grantees of a particular por-

tion, who occupied it for a fishery, could not be lawfully authorized to charge and

collect anchorage dues from vessels anchoring therein. As regards public and
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a nature, or the circumstances are such, that the most feasible

mode of enabling every citizen to participate therein may seem to

be, for the State to transfer its control, wholly or partially, to

individuals, either receiving by way of augmentation of the pub-

lic revenues a compensation therefor, or securing in return a

release to the citizens generally from some tax or charge

[* 524] which would have rested upon them in * respect to such

rights, had the State retained the usual control in its

own hands, and borne the incidental burdens.

The rights of which we here speak are considered as pertaining

to the State by virtue of an authority existing in every sovereignty,

and which is called the eminent domain. Some of these are com-

plete without any action on the part of the State; as is the case

with the rights of navigation in its seas, lakes, and public rivers,

the rights of fishery in public waters, and the right of the State to

the precious metals which may be mined within its limits.1 Others

only become complete and are rendered effectual through the State

displacing, either partially or wholly, the rights of private owner-
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ship and control; and this it accomplishes either by contract with

the owner, by accepting his gift, or by appropriating his property

against his will through an exercise of its superior authority. Of

these, the common highway furnishes an example; the public

rights therein being acquired either by the grant or dedication of

the owner of the land over which they run, or by a species of

forcible dispossession when the public necessity demands the way,

and the private owner will neither give nor sell it. All these

rights rest upon a principle which in every sovereignty is essential

to its existence and perpetuity, and which, so far as when called

into action it excludes pre-existing individual rights, is sometimes

spoken of as being based upon an implied reservation by the

government when its citizens acquire property from it or under its

protection. And as there is not often occasion to speak of the

eminent domain except in reference to those cases in which the

exclusive rights of fishery in this country, see Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush.

63; Lakeman v. Burnham, 7 Gray, 440; Angell on Watercourses, § 65 a. and

cases cited.

1 1 Bl. Com. 294; 8 Kent, 378, note. In California it has been decided that

a grant of public lands by the government carries with it to the grantee the tide

to all mines. Boggs v. Merced, &c, Co., 14 Cal. 279; Moore v. Smaw, 17 CaJ.

199.'
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government is called upon to appropriate property against the will

of the owners, the right itself is generally denned as if it were

restricted to such cases, and is said to be that superior right of

property pertaining to the sovereignty by which the private prop-

erty acquired by its citizens under its protection may be taken or

its use controlled for the public benefit without regard to the

wishes of its owners. More accurately, it is the rightful authority,

which exists in every sovereignty, to control and regulate those

rights of a public nature which pertain to its citizens in common,

and to appropriate and control individual property for the public

benefit, as the public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare may

demand.1

* When the existence of a particular power in the gov- [* 525]

ernment is recognized on the ground of necessity, no

delegation of the legislative power by the people can be held to

vest authority in the department which holds it in trust, to bargain

away such power, or to so tie up the hands of the government as

to preclude its repeated exercise, as often and under such circum-
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stances as the needs of the government may require. For if this

were otherwise, the authority to make laws for the government and

welfare of the State might be so exercised, in strict conformity

with its constitution, as at length to preclude the State performing

1 Vattel, p. 20, § 34; Bynkershoek, lib. 2, p. 15; Ang. on Watercourses,

§ 457 ; 2 Kent, 338-40; Redf. on Railw. p. 11, § 1. "The right which belongs

to the society or to the sovereign of disposing, in case of necessity, and for the

public safety, of all the wealth contained in the State, is called the eminent

domain." McKinley, J., in Pollard's Lessee v. Hogan, 3 How. 223. "Not-

withstanding the grant to individuals, the "highest and most exact idea of prop-

erty remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their

sovereign capacity; and they have a right to resume the possession of the prop-

erty, in the manner directed by the constitution and laws of the State, when-

ever the public interest requires it. This right of resumption may be exercised,

not only where the safety, but also where the interest or even the expediency

of the State is concerned; as where the land of the individual is wanted for a

road, canal, or other public improvement." Walworth, Chancellor, in Beekman

v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige, 73. The right is inherent in

all governments, and requires no constitutional provision to give it force. Brown

p. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 143. "Title to property is

always held upon the implied condition that it must be surrendered to the

government, either in whole or in part, when the public necessities, evidenced

according to the established forms of law, demand." Eogeboom, J., in People

p. Mayor, &c, of New York, 32 Barb. 112. And see Heyward p. Mayor, &c,

of New York, 7 N. Y. 314.
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its ordinary and essential functions, and the agent chosen to

govern the State might put an end to the State itself. It must

follow that any legislative bargain in restraint of the complete,

continuous, and repeated exercise of the right of eminent domain is

unwarranted and void; and that provision of the Constitution of

the United States which forbids the States violating the obligation

of contracts could not be so construed as to render valid and

effectual such a bargain, which originally was in excess of proper

authority. Upon this subject we shall content ourselves with

referring in this place to what has been said in another connec-

tion.1

As under the peculiar American system the protection and

regulation of private rights, privileges, and immunities in general

properly pertain to the State governments, and those governments

are expected to make provision for those conveniences and neces-

sities which are usually provided for their citizens through the

exercise of the right of eminent domain, the right itself, it would

seem, must pertain to those governments also, rather than to the
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government of the nation; and such has been the conclusion of

the authorities. In the new territories, however, where the gov-

ernment of the United States exercises sovereign author-

[* 52G] ity, it possesses, * as incident thereto, the right of eminent

domain, which it may exercise directly or through the

territorial governments; but this right passes from the nation to

the newly formed State whenever the latter is admitted into the

Union.2 So far, however, as the general government may deem it

1 See ante, p. 281. •

8 Pollard's Lessee r. Hogan, 3 How. 212; Goodtitle v. Kibbee, 9 How. 471;

Doe t>. Beebe, 13 How. 25; United States v. The Railroad Bridge Co., 6 McLean,

517; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229. The States have sometimes assumed

authority, under the eminent domain, to appropriate the property of individuals

in order to donate it to the general government for national purposes; but the

right to do this would seem doubtful. The authority of the general government

to appropriate private property for its needs is unquestionable; but every sov-

ereignty must judge of its needs for itself, and the right to decide upon and sup-

ply them by dispossessing private rights cannot, as it seems to us, be assumed by

any other authority without the incorporation of some new principle into the lav

of eminent domain. The following decisions have been made on this subject

In Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 478, proceedings in Maryland, under its laws, to

appropriate lands for the purpose of supplying the city of Washington with

water, were sustained. The opinion affirms the right generally to employ the

State eminent domain for the purposes of the general government; but the court
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important to appropriate lands or other property for its own pur-

poses, and to enable it to perform its functions, — as must some-

times be necessary in the case of forts, light-houses, military posts

or roads, and other conveniences and necessities of government, —

the general government may still exercise the authority, as well

within the States as within the territory under its exclusive

jurisdiction, and its right to do so may be supported by the same

attach importance to the fact that in ceding its portion of the District of Colum-

bia to the United States, " the State never intended to abandon all interest in the

District. The relation, therefore, between the District of Columbia, composed

of territory ceded by Maryland for certain purposes only, and the State of whose

soil it forms a part, is more intimate and close than that which it bears to any

other State." Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229, was a proceeding in the State

court, on the application of the United States by its agent, to condemn lands for

the purposes of a light-house. The right to maintain it was contested, but sus-

tained. A similar decision was made in Burt p. Merchants Ins. Co., 106 Mass.

356. Considerable reliance is placed in the opinion on the course of legislation

in that State upon the subject, which it was said to be too late to question; and
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it is noticeable that the learned judge (Chapman, Ch. J.) who delivered the opin-

ion makes no allusion to any necessity for State action in such a case; an omission

that could hardly have occurred, had he been considering the case unembarrassed

by legislative precedents. In Trombley v. Auditor-General, 23 Mich. 471, an act

of the legislature authorizing the Governor to take proceedings to condemn lands

for the use of the general government was held invalid, on the grounds that every

sovereignty possesses inherent authority to appropriate the property of its citi-

zens or subjects for public uses, and must be the judge of its own needs. The

facts in that case would illustrate very forcibly some of the difficulties of any

other view. Those were that after the Governor, at the request of an agent of

the general government, had taken proceedings to condemn lands for a light-house,

and had had the damages assessed, he was notified by the Federal authorities

that they had decided not to take the land. . By the terms of the law, however,

the damages, when assessed, were to be paid from the State treasury, and the

owner now demanded payment; so that the aid of the court was invoked, not to

enable the United States to obtain lands it wanted, but to compel the State to

pay for lands for the United States which were not wanted. The case differs

from the others in the important particular that in this the State authorities were

the acting parties, while in the others the Federal authorities were the petitioners.

In the one the State was seeking to condemn lands for the nation; in the others

the nation was employing State laws and State courts to condemn lands for itself.

Even if the latter may be done, some curious results might follow in some cases.

Some of the State constitutions require the necessity for the taking of property

to be affirmed by a jury; and it would be singular, to say the least, if the right

of the United States to take lands for important national purposes, after the

taking had been decided upon by the proper national authority, could be made

to depend upon a finding of its necessity by twelve men selected by lot in one of

the States.
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reasons which support the right in any case; that is to say, the

absolute necessity that the means in the government for perform-

ing its functions and perpetuating its existence should not be

liable to be controlled or defeated by the want of consent of

private parties, or of any other authority.

What Property is subject to the Right.

Every species of property which the public needs may require,

and which government cannot lawfully appropriate under any other

right, is subject to be seized and appropriated under the right

of eminent domain.1 Lands for the public ways; timber, stone,

and gravel with which to make or improve the public ways ;2 build-

ings standing in the way of contemplated improvements, or which

for any other reason it becomes necessary to take, remove, or

destroy for the public good ;8 streams of water ;4 corporate fran-

1 People v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 32 Barb. 102; Bailey ». Miltenberger,

31 Penn. St. 37.

* Wheeloek v. Young, 4 Wend. 647 ; Lyon v. Jerome, 15 Wend. 569; Jerome

v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315; Bliss v. Hosmer, 15 Ohio, 44; Watkins v. Walker
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Co., 18 Texas, 585. In Eldridge t>. Smith, 34 Vt. 484, it was held competent

for a railroad company to appropriate lands for piling the wood and lumber used

on the road, and brought to it to be transported thereon.

* Wells v. Somerset, &e., K.R. Co., 47 Me. 345. But the destruction of a pri-

vate house during a fire to prevent the spreading of a conflagration has beeohehi

not to be an appropriation under the right of eminent domain, but an exercise of

the police power. Sorocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69. "The destruction was author-

ized by the law of overruling necessity; it was the exercise of a natural right

belonging to every individual, not conferred by law, but tacitly excepted from

all human codes." Per Sherman, Senator, in Russell v. Mayor, &c, of New

York, 2 Denio, 473. See also Stone v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 25 Wend.

157; McDonald v. Redwing, 13 Minn. 38. But see Hale v. Lawrence, 1 Z»b.

714; Same v. Same, 3 Zab. 590.

* Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162. In this case a stream was appro-

priated in order to supply a town with water. The appropriation might, of

course, be made for any other object of public utility; and a stream may even

be diverted from its course to remove it out of the way of a public improvement

when not appropriated. See Johnson ». Atlantic, &c, R.R. Co., 35 N. H. 569;

Baltimore, &c, R.R. Co. v. Magruder, 34 Md. 79; 8. c. 6 Am. Rep. 310.

But in general, in constructing a public work, it is the duty of those concerned

to avoid diverting streams, and to construct the necessary culverts, bridges, &c,

for that purpose. March v. Portsmouth, &c, R.R. Co., 19 N. H. 372; Baugh-

ton v. Carter, 18 Johns. 405; Rowe v. Addison, 34 N. H. 306 ; Proprietors, &c.
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chises ;1 and generally, it may be said, legal and equitable

rights of * every description are liable to be thus appro- [* 527]

priated. From this statement, however, must be excepted

money, or that which in ordinary use passes as such, and which

the government may reach by taxation, and also rights in action,

which can only be available when made to produce money ; neither

of which can it be needful to take under this powep.2

p. Nashua & Lowell R.R. Co., 10 Cush. 388; Haynes p. Burlington, 38 Vt. 361.

And see Pettigrew p. Janesville, 25 Wis. 23; Arimond p. Green Bay Co., 31

Wis. 316; Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130. As to the obligation of a railroad

company to compensate parties whose lands are flooded by excavations or em-

bankments of the company, see Brown v. Cayuga, &c, R.R. Co., 12 N. Y-.

486; Norris v. Vt. Cent. R.R. Co., 28 Vt. 99. Compare Eaton v. Boston, C.

& M. R.R. Co., 51 N. H. 504, where it was decided that a corporation which

flooded a man's land by removing a natural protection in the construction of

their road was liable for the injury, even though their road was constructed with

due care, with Bellinger v. N. Y. Central R.R. Co., 22 N. Y. 42, and other

cases cited, post, pp. 570, 571.
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1 Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35; Crosby p. Han-

over, 36 N. H. 420; Boston Water Power Co. p. Boston, and Worcester R R.

Co., 23 Pick. 360; Central Bridge Corporation v. Lowell, 4 Gray, 474; West

River Bridge v. Dix, 6 Plow. 507; Richmond R.R. Co. v. Louisa R.R. Co., 13

How. 81, per Orier, J.; Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore and Ohio

R.R. Co., 4 Gill & J. 1; State p. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Red River Bridge Co. e.

Clarksville, 1 Sneed, 176 ; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt. 745; White River Turn-

pike Co. v. Vermont Central R.R. Co., 21 Vt. 594; Newcastle, &c, R.R. Co. v.

Peru and Indiana R.R. Co., 3 Ind. 464; Springfield v. Connecticut River R.R.

Co., 4 Cush. 63; Forward v. Hampshire, &c, Canal Co., 22 Pick. 462; Com-

monwealth v. Pittsburg, &c, R.R.Co., 58 Penn. St. 50. "The only true rule of

poliuy as well as of law is, that a grant for one public purpose must yield to

another more urgent and important, and this can be effected without any infringe-

ment on the constitutional rights of the subject. If in such cases suitable and

adequate provision is made by the legislature for the compensation of those

whose property or franchise is injured or taken away, there is no violation of

public faith or private right. The obligation of the contract created by the orig-

inal charter is thereby recognized." Per Bigdovo, J., in Central Bridge Corpo-

ration v. Lowell, 4 Gray, 482. This subject receives a very full and satisfactory

examination by Judges Pearson and Sharswood, in Commonwealth v. Pennsyl-

vania Canal Co., 66 Penn. St. 41; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 329.

* Property of individuals cannot be appropriated by the State under this

power for the mere purpose of adding to the revenues of the State. Thus it has

been held in Ohio, that in appropriating the water of streams for the purposes

of a canal, more could not be taken than was needed for that object, with a view

to raising a revenue by selling or leasing it. "The State, notwithstanding the

sovereignty of her character, can take only sufficient water from private streams
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Legislative Authority requisite.

The right to appropriate private property to public uses

[* 528] lies * dormant in the State, until legislative action is had,

pointing out the occasions, the modes, conditions, and

agencies for its appropriation.1 Private property can only be

taken pursuant to law; but a legislative act declaring the neces-

sity, being the customary mode in which that fact is determined,

must be held to be for this purpose "the law of the laud," and no

further finding or adjudication can be essential, unless the consti-

tution of the State has expressly required it.2 When, however,

for the purposes of the canal. So far the law authorizes the commissioners to

invade private right as to take what may be necessary for canal navigation, and

to this extent authority is conferred by the constitution, provided a compensation

be paid to the owner. The principle is founded on the superior claims of a whole

community over an individual citizen; but then in those cases only where private

property is wanted for public use, or demanded by the public welfare. We know

of no instances in which it has or can be taken, even by State authority, for the

mere purpose of raising a revenue by sale or otherwise; and the exercise of such
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a power would be utterly destructive of individual right, and break down all the

distinctions between meum and tuum, and annihilate tbem for ever at the pleasure

of the State." Wood, J., in Buckingham v. Smith, 10 Ohio, 296. To the same

effect is Cooper v. Williams, 5 Ohio, 392.

Taking money under the right of eminent domain, when it must be compen-

sated in money afterwards, could be nothing more nor less than a forced loan,

only to be justified as a last resort in a time of extreme peril, where neither the

credit of the government nor the power of taxation could be made available. It

is impossible to lay down rules for such a case, except such as the law of over-

ruling necessity, which for the time being sets aside all the rules and protections

of private right, shall then prescribe. See post, p. 530, note.

1 Barrow v. Page, 5 Hayw. 97.

* "Whatever may be the theoretical foundation for the right of eminent

domain, it is certain that it attaches as an incident to every sovereignty, and

constitutes a condition upon which all property is holden. When the public

necessity requires it, private rights to property must yield to the paramount

right of the sovereign power. We have repeatedly held that the character of the

work for which the property is taken, and not the means or agencies employed

for its construction, determines the question of power in/the exercise of this right.

It requires no judicial condemnation to subject private property to public uses.

Like the power to tax, it resides in the legislative department to whom the dele-

gation is made. It may be exercised directly or indirectly by that body; and it

can only be restrained by the judiciary when its limits have been exceeded, or its

authority has been abused or perverted." Kramer v. Cleveland and Pittsburg

R.R. Co., 5 Ohio, n. a. 146.
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action is had for this purpose, there must be kept in view that

general as well as reasonable and just rule, that, whenever in

pursuance of law the property of an individual is to be devested

by proceedings against his will, a strict compliance must be had

with all the provisions of law which are made for his protection

and benefit, or the proceeding will be ineffectual.1 Those pro-

visions must be regarded as in the nature of conditions precedent,

which are not only to be observed and complied witli before the

right of the property owner is disturbed, but the party claiming

authority under the adverse proceeding must show affirmatively

such compliance. For example, if by a statute prescribing the

mode of exercising the right of eminent domain, the damages to

be assessed in favor of the property owner for the taking of his

land are to be so assessed by disinterested freeholders of the mu-

nicipality, the proceedings will be ineffectual unless they show on

their face that the appraisers were such freeholders and inhabi-

tants.2 So if a statute' only authorizes proceedings in invitum

after an effort shall have been made to agree with the owner on
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the compensation to bo paid, the fact of such effort and its failure

must appear.3 So if the statute vests the title to lands

appropriated in the State or in * a corporation on payment [* 529]

therefor being made, it is evident that, under the rule

stated, the payment is a condition precedent to the passing of the

title.4 And where a general railroad law authorized routes to be

1 Gillinwater v. Mississippi, &c, R.R. Co., 18 111. 1; Stanford v. Worn, 27

Cal. 171.

* Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; Judson v. Bridgeport, 25 Conn. 428;

People v. Brighton, 20 Mich. 57.

3 Reitenbaugh v. Chester Valley R.R. Co., 21 Penn. St. 100; West Va.

Transportation Co. v. Volcanic Oil and Coal Co., 5 W. Va. 382. But it was

held in this case that if the owner appears in proceedings taken for the assess-

ment of damages, and contests the amount without objecting the want of any

such attempt, the court must presume it to have been made.

* Stacy v. Vermont Central R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 44. By the section of the statute

under which the land was appropriated, it was provided that when land or other

real estate was taken by the corporation, for the use of their road, and the parties

were unable to agree upon the price of the land, the same should be ascertained

and determined by the commissioners, together with the costs and charges

accruing thereon, and upon the payment of the same, or by depositing the amount

in a bank, as should be ordered by the commissioners, the corporation should be

deemed to be seised and possessed of the lands. Held, that, until the payment

was made, the company had no right to enter upon the land to construct the
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surveyed by associated persons desirous of constructing roads, and

provided that if the legislature, on being petitioned for the purpose,

should decide by law that a proposed road would be of sufficient

utility to justify its construction, then the company, when organ-

ized, might proceed to take land for the way, it was held that,

until the route was approved by the legislature, no authority could

be claimed under the law to appropriate land for the purpose.1

These cases must suffice as illustrations of a general rule, which

indeed would seem to be too plain and obvious to require either

illustration or discussion.2

[* 530] * So the powers granted by such statutes are not to be

enlarged by intendment, especially where they are being

exercised by a corporation by way of appropriation of land for its

corporate purposes. "There is no rule more familiar or better set-

tled than this: that grants of corporate power, being in derogation

of common right, are to be strictly construed; and this is espe-

cially the case where the power claimed is a delegation of the right

of eminent domain, one of the highest powers of sovereignty per-
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road, or to exercise any act of ownership over it; and that a court of equity

would enjoin them from exercising any such right, or they might be prosecuted

in trespass at law. This case follows Baltimore and Susquehanna R.R. Co. c.

Nesbit, 10 How. 395, and Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend.

10, where the statutory provisions were similar. In the case in Howard it is

said: "It can hardly be questioned that without acceptance in the mode pre-

scribed [i. e., by payment of the damages assessed], the company were not bound;

that if they had been dissatisfied with the estimate placed on the land, or could

have procured a more eligible site for the location of their road, they would have

been at liberty, before such acceptapce, wholly to renounce the inquisition. The

proprietors of the land could have no authority to coerce the company into its

adoption." Daniel, J., 10 How. 399.

1 Gillinwater v. Mississippi, &c, R.R. Co., 13 HI. 1. "The statute sirs

that, after a certain other act shall have been passed, the company may then

proceed to take private property for the use of their road; that is equivalent to

saying that that right shall not be exercised without such subsequent act. The

right to take private property for public use is one of the highest prerogatives of

the sovereign power; and here the legislature has, in language not to be mis-

taken, expressed its intention to reserve that power until it could judge for itself

whether the proposed road would be of sufficient public utility to justify the use

of this high prerogative. It did not intend to cast this power away, to be gath-

ered up and used by any who might choose to exercise it." fl>id, p. 4.

* See further the cases of Atlantic and Ohio R.R. Co. v. Sullivant, 5 Ohio,

N. 8. 277; Parsons v. Howe, 41 Me. 218; Atkinson v. Marietta and Cincinnati

R.R. Co., 15 Ohio, n. b. 21.
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taining to the State itself, and interfering most seriously and often

vexatiously with the ordinary rights of property."1 It has accord-

ingly been held that where a railroad company was authorized by

law to " enter upon any land to survey, lay down, and construct its

road," "to locate and construct branch roads," &c.,to appropriate

land "for necessary side tracks," and "a right of way over ad-

jacent lands sufficient to enable such company to construct and

repair its road," and the company had located, and was engaged

in the construction of its main road along the north side of a town,

it was not authorized under this grant of power to appropriate a

temporary right of way for a term of years along the south side of

the town, to be used as a substitute for the main track whilst the

latter was in process of construction.2 And substantially the same

strict rule is applied when the State itself seeks to appropriate pri-

vate property; for it is not unreasonable that the property owner

should have the right to insist that the State, which selects the

occasion and prescribes the conditions for the appropriation of his

property, should confine its action strictly within the limits which
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it has marked out as sufficient. So high a prerogative as that of

devesting one's estate against his will should only be exercised

where the plain letter of the law permits it, and under a careful

observance of the formalities prescribed for the owner's protection.

The Purpose.

The definition given of the right of eminent domain implies

that the purpose for which it may be exercised must not be a mere

private purpose; and it is conceded on all hands that the legisla-

ture has no power, in any case, to take the property of one indi-

vidual and pass it over to another without reference to some use

to which it is to be applied for the public benefit.3 "The right of

1 Currier v. Marietta and Cincinnati R.R. Co., 11 Ohio, n. s. 231; Miami

Coal Co. v. Wigton, 19 Ohio, N. s. 560. See ante, pp. 394-396.

* Currier v. Marietta and Cincinnati R.R. Co., 11 Ohio, N. s. 228. And see

Gilmer v. Lime Point, 19 Cal. 47; Bensley v. Mountain Lake, &c, Co., 13 Cal.

306; Brunnig v. N. O. Canal and Banking Co., 12 La. An. 541; West Virginia

Transportation Co. p. Volcanic Oil and Coal Co., 5 W. Va. 382.

* In a work of this character, we have no occasion to consider the right of

the government to seize and appropriate to its own use the property of individuals

in time of war, through its military authorities. That is a right which depends

on the existence of hostilities, and the suspension, partially or wholly, of the
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eminent domain," it has been said, " does not imply a right in the

sovereign power to take the property of one citizen and transfer it

to another, even for a full compensation, where the public interest

will be in no way promoted by such transfep.1 It seems

[* 531] not to be allowable, therefore, to authorize * private roads

to be laid out across the lands of unwilling parties by an

exercise of this right. The easement in such a case would be the

property of him • for whom it was established; and although the

owner would not be deprived of the fee in the land, the beneficial

use and exclusive enjoyment of his property would in greater or

less degree be interfered with. Nor would it be material to inquire

what quantum of interest would pass from him: it would be suffi-

cient that some interest, the appropriation of which detracted from

his right and authority, and interfered with his exclusive posses-

sion as owner, had been taken against his will; and if taken for a

purely private purpose, it would be unlawful.2 Nor could it be of

civil laws. For recent cases in which it has been considered, see Mitchell p.

Harmony, 13 How. 128; Wilson v. Crockett^ 43 Mo. 216; Williams p, Wicker-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

man, 44 Mo. 484; Yost p. Stout, 4 Cold. 205; Sutton p. Tiller, 6 Cold. 593;

Taylor v. Nashville, &c, R.R. Co., t'6. 646; Coolidge p. Guthrie, 8 Am. Law

Reg. (n. s.) 22; Echols v. Staunton, 3 W. Va. 574; Wilson p. Franklin, 63 N. C.

259; Ferguson v. Loar, 5 Bush, 689.

1 Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige, 73; Hepburn's

Case, 3 Bland, 95; Sadler p. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Pittsburg v. Scott, 1 Penn.

St. 139; Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend. 149; Matter of John and Cherry

Streets, 19 Wend. 659; Cooper p. Williams, 5 Ohio, 393 ; Buckingham p. Smith,

10 Ohio, 296; Reeves p. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio, n. s. 333. See this

subject considered on principle and authority by Senator Tracy in Bloodgood p.

Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 55 et seq. See also Embury p. Conner,

3 N. Y. 511; Kramer p. Cleveland and Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 5 Ohio, n. s. 146;

Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 603; Concord R.R. p. Greeley, 17 N. H. 47; N. Y.

and Harlaem R.R. Co. p. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 385.

'Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 142, per Bronson, J.; Clack v. White, 2 Swan,

540; White p. White, 5 Barb. 474; Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Pittsburg

p. Scott, 1 Penn. St. 139; Nesbitt p. Trumbo, 39 HI. 110; Osborn v. Hart, 24

Wis. 90; s. c. 1 Am. Rep. 161; Tyler p. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648; Bankhead v. Brown,

25 Iowa, 540. A neighborhood road is only a private road, and taking land for it

would not be for a public use. Dickey p. Tennison, 27 Mo. 373. To avoid this

difficulty, it is provided by the constitutions of some of the States that private

roads may be laid out under proceedings corresponding to those for the establish-

ment of highways. There are provisions to that effect in the Constitutions of

New York, Georgia, and Michigan. But in Harvey p. Thomas, 10 Watts, 65,

it was held that the right might be exercised in order to the establishment of

private ways from coal fields to connect them with the public improvements,
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importance that the public would receive incidental benefits, such

as usually spring from the improvement of lands or the establish-

ment of prosperous private enterprises: the public use implies a

possession, occupation, and enjoyment of the land by the public at

large, or by public agencies ;1 and a due protection to the rights of

private property will preclude the government from seizing it in

the hands of the owner, and turning it over to another on vague

grounds of public benefit to spring from the more profitable use to

which the latter may devote it.

We find ourselves somewhat at sea, however, when we

undertake to define,* in the light of the judicial decisions, [*532]

what constitutes a public use. It has been said by a

learned jurist that, " if the public interest can be in auy way pro-

there being nothing in the constitution forbidding it. See also the Pocopson

Road, 16 Penn. St. 15. But this doctrine is directly opposed to Young v.

McKenzie, 3 Georgia, 44; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 14G; Buffalo and N. Y.

R.R. Co. v. Brainerd, 9 N. Y. 108; Bradley v. N. Y. and N. H. R.R. Co.,

21 Conn. 305; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio, n. s. 344, and many
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other cases: though possibly convenient access to the great coal fields of the

State might be held to be so far a matter of general concern as to support an

exercise of the power on the ground of the public benefit. In Eldridge v. Smith,

34 Vt. 484, it was held that the manufacture of railroad cars was not so legit-

imately and necessarily connected with the management of a railroad that the

company would be authorized to appropriate lands therefor. So, also, of land

for the erection of dwelling-houses to rent by railroad companies to their employes.

But under authority to a railroad company to take land for constructing and

operating its road, it may take what is needful for depot grounds. N. Y. and

Harlaem R.R. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546; 8. c. 7 Am. Rep. 385.

In the text we have stated what is unquestionably the result of the authorities;

though if the question were an open one, it might well be debated whether the

right to authorize the appropriation of the property of individuals did not rest

rather upon grounds of general public policy than upon the public purpose to

which it was proposed to devote it. There are many cases in which individuals

or private corporations have been empowered to appropriate the property of

others when the general good demanded it, though the purpose was no more

public than it is in any case where benefits are to flow to the community generally

from a private enterprise. The case of appropriations for mill-dams, railroads,

and drains to improve lands are familiar examples. These appropriations have

been sanctioned under an application of the term "public purpose," which might

also justify the laying out of private roads, when private property could not

otherwise be made available. Upon this general subject, the reader is referred

to an article by Hon. J. V. Campbell in the "Bench and Bar," for July, 1871.

1 Per Tracy, Senator, in Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 18

Wend. 60.
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moted by the taking of private property, it must rest in the wis-

dom of the legislature to determine whether the benefit to the

public will be of sufficient importance to render it expedient for

them to exercise the right of eminent domain, and to authorize an

interference with the private rights of individuals for that pur-

pose.1 It is upon this principle that the legislatures of several of

the States have authorized the condemnation of the lands of indi-

viduals for mill, sites, when from the nature of the country such

mill sites could not be obtained for the accommodation of the in-

habitants without overflowing the lands thus condemned. Upon

the same principle of public benefit, not only the agents of the

government, but also individuals and corporate bodies have been

authorized to take private property for the purpose of making pub-

lic highways, turnpike roads, and canals; of erecting and con-

structing wharves and basins; of establishing ferries; of draining

swamps and marshes, and of bringing water to cities and villages.

In all such cases the object of the legislative grant of power is the

public advantage expected from the contemplated improvement,
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whether such improvement is to be effected directly by the agents

of the government, or through the medium of corporate bodies, or

of individual enterprise."2

It would not be entirely safe, however, to apply with much lib-

erality the language above quoted, that, " where the public interest

can be in any way promoted by the taking of private property,"

the taking can be considered for a public use. It is certain that

there are very many cases in which the property of some individual

owners would be likely to be better employed or occupied to the

advancement of the public interest in other hands than in their

own; but it does not follow from this circumstance alone that they

may rightfully be dispossessed. It may be for the public benefit

that all the wild lands of the State be improved and cultivated, all

the low lands drained, all the unsightly places beautified, all di-

lapidated buildings replaced by new; because all these things tend

to give an aspect of beauty, thrift, and comfort to the country, and

thereby to invite settlement, increase the value of lands, and gratify

the public taste; but the common law has never sanctioned an

1 2 Kent Com. 340.

* Walworth, Chancellor, in Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co., 3

Paige, 73. And see Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 251.
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appropriation of property based upon these considerations alone;

and some further element must therefore be involved be-

fore the appropriation can be regarded as sanctioned * by [* 533]

our constitutions. The reason of the case and the settled

practice of free governments must be our guides in determining

what is or is not to be regarded a public use; and that only can

be considered such where the government is supplying its own

needs, or is furnishing facilities for its citizens in regard to those

matters of public necessity, convenience, or welfare, which, on

account of their peculiar character, and the difficulty — perhaps

impossibility — of making provision for them otherwise, it is alike

proper, useful, and needful for the government to provide.

Every government is expected to make provision for the public

ways, and for this purpose it may seize and appropriate lands.

And as the wants of traffic and travel require facilities beyond

those afforded by the common highway, over which any one may

pass with his own vehicles, the government may establish the

higher grade of highways, upon some of which only its own vehi-
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cles can be allowed to run, while others, differently constructed,

shall be open to use by all on payment of toll. The common high-

way is kept in repair by assessments of labor and money ; the tolls

paid upon turnpikes, or the fares on railways, are the equivalents

to these assessments; and when these improved ways are required

by law to be kept open for use by the public impartially, they also

may properly be called highways, and the use to which land for

their construction is put be denominated a public use. The gov-

ernment also provides court-houses for the administration of jus-

tice; buildings for its seminaries of instruction;1 aqueducts to

convey pure and wholesome water into large towns;2 it builds

levees to prevent the country being overflowed by the rising

streams ;3 it may cause drains to be constructed to relieve swamps

and marshes of their stagnant water;4 and other measures of gen-

1 Williams v. School District, 33 Vt. 271. See Hooper v. Bridgewater, 102

Mass. 512.

* Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444; Kane v. Baltimore, 15 Md. 240: Gardner v.

Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162; Ham t>. Salem, 10 Mass. 350.

3 Mithoff v. Carrollton, 12 La. An. 185; Cash v. Whitworth, 13 La. An. 401;

Inge v. Police Jury, 14 La. An. 117.

4 Anderson o. Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind. 199; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood

County, 8 Ohio, n. s. 344. See a clear statement of the general principle and

its necessity in the last-mentioned case. The drains, however, which can be
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eral utility, in which the public at large are interested, and which

require the appropriation of private property, are also within the

power, where they fall within the reasons underlying the cases

mentioned.1

[* 534] * Whether the power of eminent domain can rightfully

be exercised in the condemnation of lands for manufac-

turing purposes, where the manufactories are to be owned and

occupied by individuals is a question upon which the authorities

are at variance. Saw-mills, grist-mills, and various other manu-

factories, are certainly a public necessity; and while the country

is new, and capital not easily attainable for their erection, it some-

times seems to be essential that government should offer large

inducements to parties who will supply this necessity. Before

steam came into use, water was almost the sole reliance for motive

power; and as reservoirs were generally necessary for this pur-

pose, it would sometimes happen that the owner of a valuable mill

site was unable to render it available, because the owners of lauds

which must be flowed to obtain a reservoir would neither consent

to the construction of a dam, nor sell their lands except at extrav-

agant and inadmissible prices. The legislatures in some of the
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States have taken the matter in hand, and have surmounted the

difficulty, sometimes by authorizing the land to be appropriated,

and at other times by permitting the erection of the dam, but re-

quiring the mill owner to pay annually to the proprietor of the

authorized to be cut across the land of unwilling parties, or for which individuals

can be taxed, must not be mere private drains, but must have reference to tie

public health, convenience, or welfare. Reeves v. Treasurer, &c, supra. And

see People v. Nearing, 27 N. Y. 306. It is competent under the eminent douiaia

to appropriate and remove a dam owned by private parties, in order to recliio

a considerable body of lands flowed by means of it, paying the owner of the

dam its value. Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417.

1 Such, for instance, as the construction of a public park, which, in large

cities, is as much a matter of public utility as a railway or a supply of pure

water. See Matter of Central Park Extension, 16 Abb. Pr. Rep. 56; Owners

of Ground v. Mayor, &c., of Albany, 15 Wend. 374. Brooklyn Park Coui'rst.

Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 70. Or sewers in cities. Hit

dreth v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 345. A city may be authorized to appropriate land!

in order to fill them up, and thereby abate a nuisance upon them. Dingier r.

Boston, 100 Mass. 544. A private corporation may be empowered to exercise

the right of eminent domain to obtain a way along which to lay pipe for the

transportation of oil to a railroad or navigable water. West Va. Transportation

Co. v. Volcanic Oil and Coal Co., 5 W. Va. 382.
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land the damages caused by the flowing, to be assessed in some

impartial mode.1 The reasons for such statutes have been grow-

ing weaker with the introduction of steam power and the progress

of improvement, but their validity has repeatedly been recognized

in some of the States, and probably the same courts would con-

tinue still to recognize it, notwithstanding the public necessity may

no longer appear to demand such laws.2 The rights granted by

these laws to mill owners are said by Chief Justice Shaw, of Massa-

chusetts, to be "granted for the better use of the water power,

upon considerations of general policy and the general good ; "3 and

in this view, and in order to render available a valuable property

which might otherwise be made of little use by narrow,

selfish, and * unfriendly conduct on the part of individuals, [* 535]

such laws may perhaps be sustained on the same grounds

which support an exercise of the right of eminent domain to pro-

tect, drain, and render valuable the lauds which, by the overflow

of a river, might otherwise be an extensive and worthless swamp.4

1 See Angell on Watercourses, p. 12, for references to the statutes on this
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subject.

* "The encouragement of mills has always been a favorite object with the

legislature; and though the reasons for it may have ceased, the favor of the

legislature continues." Wolcott Woollen Manufacturing Co. v. Upham, o Pick.

294.

* French v. Braintree Manufacturing Co., 23 Pick. 220.

4 Action on the case for raising a dam across the Merrimac River, by which a

mill stream emptying into that river, above the site of said dam, was set back

and overflowed, and a mill of the plaintiff situated thereon, and the mill privi-

lege, were damaged and destroyed. Demurrer to the declaration. The defend-

ant company were chartered for the purpose of constructing a dam across the

Merrimac River, and constructing one or more locks and canals, in connection

with said dam, to remove obstructions in said river by falls and rapids, and to

create a water power to be used for mechanical and manufacturing purposes.

The defendants claimed that they were justified in what they had done, by an

act of the legislature exercising the sovereign power of the State, in the right of

eminent domain; that the plaintiff's property in the mill and mill privilege was

taken and appropriated under this right ; aud that his remedy was by a claim of

damages under the act, and not by action at common law as for a wrongful and

unwarrantable encroachment upon his right of property. Shaw, Ch. J.: "It is

contended that if this act was intended to authorize the defendant company to

take the mill power and mill of the plaintiff, it was void because it was not taken

for public use, and it was not within the power of the government in the exercise

of the right of eminent domain. This is the main question. In determining it,

we must look to the declared purposes of the act; and if a public use is declared,
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[* 536] * On the other hand, it is said that the legislature of New

York has never exercised the right of eminent domain in

favor of mills of any kind, and that " sites for steam-engines, hotels,

it will be so held, unless it manifestly appears by the provisions of the act that

they can have no tendency to advance and promote such public use. The

declared purposes are to improve the navigation of the Merrimac River, and to

create a large mill power for mechanical and manufacturing purposes. In general,

whether a particular structure, as a bridge, or a lock, or canal, or road, is for

the public use, is a question for the legislature, and which may be presumed to

have been correctly decided by them. Commonwealth v. Breed, 4 Pick.«J63.

That the improvement of the navigation of a river is done for the public use

has been too frequently decided and acted upon to require authorities. And so

to create a wholly artificial navigation by canals. The establishment of a great

mill power for manufacturing purposes, as an object of great public interest,

especially since manufacturing has come to be one of the great industrial pur-

suits of the commonwealth, seems to have been regarded by the legislature, and

sanctioned by the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth, and in our judgment

rightly so, in determining what is a public use, justifying the exercise of right of
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eminent domain. See St. 1825, p. 148, incorporating the Salem Mill Dam Cor-

poration; Boston and Roxbury Mill Dam Corporation v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467.

The acts since passed, and the cases since decided on this ground, are very

numerous. That the erection of this dam would have a strong and direct ten-

dency to advance both these public objects, there is no doubt. We are, therefore,

of opinion that the powers conferred on the corporation by this act were so done

within the scope of the authority of the legislature, and were not a violation of

the Constitution of the Commonwealth." Hazen p. Essex Company, 12 Cush.

477. See also Boston and Roxbury Mill Corporation v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467;

Fiske v. Framingham Manufacturing Co., t'6. 67; Harding v. Goodlett, 3 Yerg.

41. The courts of Wisconsin have sustained such laws. Newcome V. Smith,

1 Chand. 71; Thieu v. Voegtlander, 3 Wis. 465; Pratt v. Brown, ib. 603. Bat

with some hesitation of late. See Fisher p. Horricon Co., 10 Wis. 351; Curtis p.

Whipple, 24 Wis. 350. And see the note of Judge liedfield to Allen p. Inhabi-

tants of Jay, Law Reg., Aug., 1873, p. 493. And those of Connecticut. Olmstead

v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532. And of Maine. Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. 317.

And of Minnesota. Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn. 365. And they have been

enforced elsewhere without question. Burgess v. Clark, 13 Ired. 109; McAfee's

Heirs v. Kennedy, 1 Lit. 92; Smith p. Connelly, 1 T. B. Monp. 58; Shackleford

v. Coffey, 4 J. J. Marsh. 40; Crenshaw p. Slate River Co., 6 Rand. 245. The

whole subject was very fully considered and the validity of such legislation

affirmed in Great Falls Manuf. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N. H. 444. And see Ash

v. Cummings, 50 N. H. 591. In Loughbridge p. Harris, 42 Geo. 500, an act

for the condemnation of land for a grist mill was held unconstitutional, though

the tolls were regulated and discrimination forbidden. In Newell p. Smith, 15

Wis. 101, it was held not constitutional to authorize the appropriation of the

property, and leave the owner no remedy except to subsequently recover its

value in an action of trespass.
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churches, and other public conveniences, might as well be taken by

the exercise of this extraordinary powep." 1 A. somewhat similar

view has been taken by the Supreme Court of Alabama.2 It is quite

possible that, in any State in which this question would be entirely

a new one, and where it would not be embarrassed by long acqui-

escence, or by either judicial or legislative precedents, it might be

held that these laws are not sound in principle, and that there is

110 such necessity, and consequently no such imperative reasons

of public policy, as would be essential to support an exercise of the

right of eminent domain.3 But accepting as correct the decisions

which have been made, it must be conceded that the term "public

use," as employed in the law of eminent domain, has a meaning

much controlled by the necessity, and somewhat different from

that which it bears generally.4

1 Hay v. Colioes Company, 3 Barb. 47.

'Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311. In this case, however, it was assumed

that lands for the purposes of grist-mills which grind for toll, and were required

to serve the public impartially, might, under proper legislation, be taken under
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the right of eminent domain. The case of Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Geo.

500, is contra. In Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648, it was held not competent,

where the mills were subject to no such requirement. See the case, 8 Am.

Rep. 398. And see note by Redfield, Am. Law Reg. Aug. 1873, p. 493.

5 See this subject in general discussed in a review of Angell on AVatercourses,

2 Am. Jurist, p. 25.

* In People v. Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich., the court consider the

question whether a use which is regarded as public for the purposes of an exer-

cise of the right of eminent domain, is necessarily so for the purposes of taxation.

They say: "Reasoning by analogy from one of the sovereign powers of gov-

ernment to another is exceedingly liable to deceive and mislead. An object may

be public in one sense and for one purpose, when in a general sense and for

other purposes it would be idle or misleading to apply the same term. All

governmental powers exist for public purposes, but they are not necessarily

to be exercised under the same conditions of public interest. The sovereign

police power which the State possesses is to be exercised only for the general

public welfare, but it reaches to every person, to every kind of business, to

every species of property within the Commonwealth. The conduct of every

individual, and the use of alt property and of all rights is regulated by it, to

any extent found necessary for the preservation of the public order, and also

for the protection of the private rights of one individual against encroachment

by others. The sovereign power of taxation is employed in a great many cases

where the power of eminent domain might be made more immediately efficient

and available, if constitutional principles could suffer it to be resorted to; but

each of these has its own peculiar and appropriate sphere, and the object which
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The Taking of Property.

Although property can only be taken for a public use, and the

legislature must determine in what cases, it has been long settled

that it is not essential the taking should be to or by the State

is public for the demands of the one is not necessarily of a character to permii

the exercise of the other.

"If we examine the subject critically, we shall find that the most important

consideration in the case of eminent domain is the necessity of accomplishing

some public good which is otherwise impracticable; and we shall also find that

the law does not so much regard the means as the need. The power is much

nearer akin to that of the public police than to that of taxation; it goes but a

step farther, and that step is in the same direction. Every man has an abstract

right to the exclusive use of his own property for his own enjoyment in such

manner as he shall choose; but if he should choose to create a nuisance upOD it,

or to do any thing which would preclude a reasonable enjoyment of adjacent

property, the law would interfere to impose restraints. He is said to own his

private lot to the pentre of the earth, but he would not be allowed to excavate

it indefinitely, lest his neighbor's lot should disappear in the excavation. The
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abstract right to make use of his own property in his own way is compelled to

yield to the general comfort and protection of the community, and to a proper

regard to relative rights in others. The situation of his property may even be

such that he is compelled to dispose of it because the law will not suffer his

regular business to be carried on upon it. A needful and lawful species of

manufacture may so injuriously affect the health and comfort of the vicinity that

it cannot be tolerated in a densely settled neighborhood, and therefore the owner

of a lot in that neighborhood will not be allowed to engage in that manufacture

upon it, even though it be his regular and legitimate business. The butcber in

the vicinity of whose premises a village has grown up, finds himself compelled

to remove his business elsewhere, because his right to make use of his lot ill

place for the slaughter of cattle has become inconsistent with the superior right

of community to the enjoyment of pure air and the accompanying blessings

and comforts. The owner of a lot within the fire limits of a city may be com-

pelled to part with the property, because he is unable to erect a brick or stone

structure upon it, and the local regulations will not permit one of wood. Eminent

domain only recognizes and enforces the superior right of the community against

the selfishness of individuals in a similar way. Every branch of needful industry

has a right to exist, and community has a right to demand that it be permitted

to exist; and if for that purpose a peculiar locality already in possession of

an individual is essential, the owner's right to undisturbed occupancy must yield

to the superior interest of the public. A railroad cannot go around the farm of

every unwilling person, and the business of transporting persons and property

for long distances by rail, which has been found so essential to the general

enjoyment and welfare, could never have existed if it were in the power of any

unwilling person to stop the road at his boundary, or to demand unreasonable
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itself, if by any other agency, in the opinion of the legislature, the

use can be made equally effectual for the public benefit. There

are many cases in which the appropriation consists simply in

throwing the property open to use by such persons as may see fit

to avail themselves of it; as in the case of common highways and

public parks. In these cases the title of the owner is not dis-

turbed, except as it is charged with this burden; and the State

defends the easement, not by virtue of any title in the property,

but by means of criminal proceedings when the general

right is disturbed.* But in other cases it seems impor- [*537]

tant to take the title; and in many of these it is conven-

ient, if not necessary, that the taking be, not by the State, but by

the municipality for which the use is specially designed, and to

whose care and government it will be confided. When property is

needed for a district school-house, it is proper that the district

appropriate it; and it is strictly in accordance witli the general

theory as well as with the practice of our government for the State

to delegate to the district the exercise of the power of eminent

domain for this special purpose. So a county may be authorized

to take lands for its court-house or jail; a city, for its town hall, its
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reservoirs of water, its sewers, and other public works of like im-

portance. In these cases no question of power arises; the taking

is by the public; the use is by the public; and the benefit to ac-

crue therefrom is shared in greater or less degree by the whole

public.

If, however, it be constitutional to appropriate lands for mill

dams or mill sites, it ought also to be constitutional that the tak-

terms as a condition of passing him. The law interferes in these cases, and

regulates the relative rights of the owner and of the community with as strict

regard to justice and equity as the circumstances will permit. It does not

deprive the owner of his property, but it compels him to dispose of so much of

it as is essential on equitable terms. While, therefore, eminent domain estab-

lishes no industry, it so regulates the relative rights of all that no individual

shall have it in his power to preclude its establishment." On this general subject

see Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, in which it was very fully and carefully

considered.

What is a public use is a question for the courts; though where a use has

been declared public by the legislature, the courts will hold it to be such unless

the contrary clearly appears. Bankhead v. Brown, 25 1ll. 540. See Olmstead v.

Camp, 33 Conn. 551; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648; Loughbridge v. Harris, 42

Geo. 500.
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ing be by individuals instead of by the State or any of its organized

political divisions; since it is no part of the business of the gov-

ernment to engage in manufacturing operations which come in

competition with private enterprise; aiid the cases must be very

peculiar and very rare where a State or municipal corporation

could be justified in any such undertaking. And although the

practice is not entirely uniform on the subject, the general senti-

ment is adverse to the construction of railways by the State, and

the opinion is quite prevalent, if not general, that they can be

better managed, controlled, and operated for the public benefit in

the hands of individuals than by State or municipal officers or

agencies.

And while there are unquestionably some objections to compel-

ling a citizen to surrender his property to a corporation, whose cor-

porators, in receiving it, are influenced by motives of private gain

and emolument, so that to them the purpose of the appropriation

is altogether private, yet conceding it to be settled that these facil-

ities for travel and commerce are a public necessity, if the legisla-
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ture, reflecting the public sentiment, decide that the general benefit

is better promoted by their construction through individuals or

corporations than by the State itself, it would clearly be pressing a

constitutional maxim to an absurd extreme if it were to be held

that the public necessity should only be provided for in the

[* 538] way which is least consistent with the public * interest.

Accordingly, on the principle of public benefit, not onlj

the State and its political divisions, but also individuals and cor-

porate bodies, have been authorized to take private property for the

construction of works of public utility, and when duly empowered

by the legislature so to do, their private pecuniary interest does

not preclude their being regarded as public agencies in respect to

the public good which is sought to be accomplished.1

1 Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige, 73; Wilson r.

Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 251; Buonaparte v. Camden and Amboy

R.R. Co., 1 Bald. 205; Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend.

1; Lebanon v. Olcott, 1 N. H. 339; Petition of Mount Washington Road Co.,

35 N. H. 141; Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 603; Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427;

Stevens v. Middlesex Canal, 12 Mass. 466: Boston Mill Dam v. Newman, 12

Pick. 467; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt

750; White River Turnpike v. Central Railroad, 21 Vt. 590; Rileigh, &c,

R.R. Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & Bat. 451; Whiteman's Ex'r v. Wilmington, &c,

R.R. Co., 2 Harr. 514; Bradley v. N. Y. and N. H. R.R. Co., 21 Conn. 294;
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The Necessity for the Taking.

The authority to determine in any case whether it is needful to

permit the exorcise of this power must rest with the State itself;

and the question is always one of strictly political character, not

requiring any hearing upon the facts or any judicial determination.

Nevertheless, when a work or improvement of local importance

only is contemplated, the need of which must be determined upon

a view of the facts which the people of the vicinity may be sup-

posed best to understand, the question of necessity is generally

referred to some local tribunal, and it may even be submitted to a

jury to decide upon evidence.1 But parties interested have no con-

stitutional right to be heard upon the question, unless the State

constitution clearly and expressly recognizes and provides for it.

On general principles, the final decision rests with the legislative

department of the State; and if the question is referred to any

tribunal for trial, the reference and the opportunity for being heard

are matters of favor and not of right. The State is not under any

obligation to make provision for a judicial contest upon that ques-
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tion. And where the case is such that it is proper to delegate to

individuals or to a corporation the power to appropriate property,

it is also competent to delegate the authority to decide upon the

necessity for the taking.2

Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532; Eaton v. Boston, C. & M. R.R. Co., 51

N. H. 504.

1 Iron R.R. Co. v. Ironton, 19 Ohio, N. s. 299. The constitutions of some of

the States require the question of the necessity of any specific appropriation to

be submitted to a jury; and this requirement cannot be dispensed with. Mans-

field, &c, R.R. Co. v. Clark, 23 Mich. 519.

s People r. Smith, 21 N. Y. 597; Ford v. Chicago and N. W. R.R. Co., 14

Wis. 617; Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. 152; Lyon v. Jerome, 26 Wend.

484; Hays v. Risher, 32 Penn. St. 169; North Missouri R.R. Co. v. Lackland,

25 Mo. 51.3; Same v. Gott, ib. 540; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540. In the

case first cited, Denio, J., says: "The question is, whether the State, in.the

exercise of the power to appropriate the property of individuals to a public use,

where the duty of judging of the expediency of making the appropriation, in a

class of cases, is committed to public officers, is obliged to afford to the owners

of the property an opportunity to be heard before those officers when they sit for

the purpose of making the determination. I do not speak now of the process for

arriving at the amount of compensation to be paid to the owners, but of the

determination whether, under the circumstances of a particular case, the prop-

erty required for the purpose shall be taken or not; and I am of opinion that the
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[* 539] * How much Property may he taken.

The taking of property must always be limited to the

necessity of the case, and consequently no more can be

[* 540] appropriated in any * instance than the proper tribunal

shall adjudge to be needed for the particular use for which

State is not under any obligation to make provision for a judicial contest upon

that question. The only part of the constitution which refers to the subject is

that which forbids private property to be taken for public use without compen-

sation, and that which prescribes the manner in which the compensation shall be

ascertained. It is not pretended that the statute under consideration violates

either of those provisions. There is, therefore, no eonstilutional injunction on

the point under consideration. The necessity for appropriating private property

for the use of the public or of the government is not a judicial question. The

power resides in the legislature. It may be exercised by means of a statute

which shall at once designate the property to be appropriated and the purpose of

the appropriation; or it may be delegated to public officers, or, as it has been

repeatedly held, to private corporations established to carry on enterprises in

which the public are interested. There is no restraint upon the power, except
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that requiring compensation to be made. And where the power is committed to

public officers, it is a subject of legislative discretion to determine what pruden-

tial regulations shall be established to secure a discreet and judicious exercise of

the authority. The constitutional provision securing a trial by jury in certain

cases, and that which declares that no citizen shall be deprived of his property

without due process of law, have no application to the case. The jury trial can

only be claimed as a constitutional right where the subject is judicial in its char-

acter. The exercise of the right of eminent domain stands on the same ground

with the power of taxation. Both are emanations from the law-making power.

They are attributes of political sovereignty, for the exercise of which the legis-

lature is under no necessity to address itself to the courts. In imposing a tax,

or in appropriating the property of a citizen, or of a class of citizens, for a public

purpose, with a proper provision for compensation, the legislative act is itself

due process of law; though it would not be if it should undertake to appropriate

the property of one citizen for the use of another, or to confiscate the property

of one person or class of persons, or a particular description of property upon

some view of public policy, where it could not be said to be taken for a public

use. It follows from these views that it is not necessary for the legislature, in

the-exercise of the right of eminent domain, either directly, or indirectly through

public officers or agents, to invest the proceedings with the forms or substance

of judicial process. It may allow the owner to intervene and participate in the

discussion before the officer or board to whom the power is given of determining

whether the appropriation shall be made in a particular case, or it may provide

that the officers shall act upon their own views of propriety and duty, without the

aid of a forensic contest. The appropriation of the propriety is an act of public

administration, and the form and manner of its performance is such as the legis-

lature in its discretion shall prescribe."
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the appropriation is made. When a part only of a man's premises

is needed by the public, the necessity for the appropriation of that

part will not justify the taking of the whole, even though com-

pensation be made therefor. The moment the appropriation goes

beyond the necessity of the case, it ceases to be justified on the

principles which underlie the right of eminent domain.1

If, * however, the statute providing for such appropriation [* 541]

is acted upon, and the property owner accepts the compen-

sation awarded to him under it, he will be precluded by this

implied assent from afterwards objecting to the excessive appro-

priation.2 And where land is taken for a public work, there is

1 By a statute of New York it was enacted that whenever a part only of a lot

or parcel of land should be required for the purposes of a city street, if the com-

missioners for assessing compensation should deem it expedient to include the

whole lot in the assessment, they should have power so to do; and the part not

wanted for the particular street or improvement should, upon the confirmation of

the report, become vested in the corporation, and might be appropriated to pub-

lic uses, or sold in case of no such appropriation. Of this statute it was said by
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the Supreme Court of New York: "If this provision was intended merely to

give to the corporation capacity to take property under such circumstances with

the consent of the owner, and then to dispose of the same, there can be no objec-

tion to it; but if it is to be taken literally, that the commissioners may, against

the consent of the owner, take the whole lot, when only a part is required for

public use, and the residue to be applied to private use, it assumes a power

which, with all respect, the legislature did not possess. The constitution, by

authorizing the appropriation of property to public use, impliedly declares that

for any other use private property shall not be taken from one and applied to the

private use of another. It is in violation of natural right; and if it is not in

violation of the letter of the constitution, it is of its spirit, and cannot be sup-

ported. This power has been supposed to be convenient when the greater part

of a lot is taken, and only a small part left, not required for public use, and that

small part of but little value in the hands of the owner. In such case the cor-

poration has been supposed best qualified to take and dispose of such parcels, or

goers, as they have sometimes been called; and probably this assumption of

power has been acquiesced in by the proprietors. I know of no case where the

power has been questioned, and where it has received the deliberate sanction of

this court. Suppose a case where only a few feet, or even inches, are wanted,

from one end of a lot to widen a street, and a valuable building stands upon the

other end of such lot; would the power be conceded to exist to take the whole

lot, whether the owner consented or not? The quantity of the residue of any

lot cannot vary the principle. The owner may be very unwilling to part with

only a few feet; and I hold it equally incompetent for the legislature to dispose

of private property, whether feet or acres are the subject of this assumed power."

Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. 151, per Savage, Ch. J.

* Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511. There is clearly nothing in constitutional
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nothing in the principle we have stated which will preclude the

appropriation of whatever might be necessary for incidental con-

veniences; such as the workshops or depot buildings of a railway

company,1 or materials to be used in the construction of their road,

and so on. Express legislative power, however, is needed for

these purposes; it will not follow that, because such things are

convenient to the accomplishment of the general object, the public

may appropriate them without express authority of law; but the

power to appropriate must be expressly conferred, and the public

agencies seeking to exercise this high prerogative must be careful

to keep within the authority delegated, since the public necessity

cannot be held to extend beyond what has been plainly declared

on the face of the legislative enactment.

What constitutes a Taking of Property.

Any proper exercise of the powers of government, which does

not directly encroach upon the property of an individual, or disturb

him in its possession or enjoyment, will not entitle him to compen-

sation, or give him a right of action.2 If, for instance, the
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[* 542] * State, under its power to provide and regulate the public

highways, should authorize the construction of a bridge

across a navigable river, it is quite possible that all proprietary

interests in land upon the river might be injuriously affected; but

principles which would preclude the legislature from providing that a man's prop-

erty might be taken with his assent, whether the assent was evidenced by deed or

not; and if he accepts payment, he must be deemed to assent. The more recent

case of House v. Rochester, 15 Barb. 517, is not, we think, opposed to Embury

v. Conner, of which it makes no mention.

1 Chicago B. and Q. U.K. Co. v. Wilson, 17 111. 123; Low v. Galena and C. U.

R.R. Co., 18 111. 324; Giesy v. Cincinnati, W. and Z. R.R. Co., 4 Ohio, n. s.

808.

2 Zimmerman v. Union Canal Co., 1 W. & S. 34G; Shrunk v. Schuylkill Nav-

igation Co., 14 S. & R. 71; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S.

101; Davidson v. Boston & Maine R.R. Co., 3 Cush. 91; Gould v. Hudson

River R.R. Co., 12 Barb. G16, and 6 N. Y. 522; Radcliff v. Mayor, &c, of

Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195; Murray o. Menifee, 20 Ark. 501; Hooker v. New

Haven and Northampton Co., 14 Conn. 146; People if. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 193;

Fuller v. Eddings, 11 Rich. Law, 239; Eddings v. Seabrook, 12 Rich. Law, 504;

Richardson v. Vermont Central R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 465; Kennett's Petition, 4

Post. 139; Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247; Richmond, &c, Co. v. Rog-

ers, 1 Duvall, 135; Harvey v, Lackawana, &c, R.R. Co., 47 Penn. St. 428;

Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Penn. St. 21.
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such injury could no more give a valid claim against the State for

damages, than could any change in the general laws of the State,

which, while keeping in view the general good, might injuriously

affect particular interests.1 So if, by the erection of a dam in order

to improve navigation, the owner of a fishery finds it diminished in

value,2 or if by deepening the channel of a river to improve the

navigation a spring is destroyed,3 or by a change in the grade of

a city street the value of adjacent lots is diminished,4—in these

1 Davidson v. Boston and Maine R.R. Co., 3 Cusli. 91.

* Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation Co., 14 S. & R. 71.

3 Commonwealth v. Richter, 1 Ponn. St. 4(37. It is justly said by Mr. Justice

Miller, in Pumpelly r. The Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 180, that the decisions " that

for,the consequential injury to the property of an individual from the prosecution

of improvement of roads, streets, rivers, and other highways for the public good,

there is no redress," " have gone to the extreme and limit of sound judicial con-

struction in favor of this principle, and in some cases beyond it; ami it remains

true that where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of

water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed
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on it, so as effectually to destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking within the

meaning of the constitution." This whole subject is most elaborately considered

by Smith, J., in Eaton t>. Boston, C. & M. R.R. Co., 51 N. H. 604. It was

decided in that case that, notwithstanding a party had received compensation for

the taking of his land for a railroad, he was entitled to a further remedy at the

common law for the flooding of his land in consequence of the road being cut

through a ridge on the land of another; and that this flooding was a taking of his

property within the meaning of the constitution. The cases to the contrary are

all considered by the learned judge, who is able to adduce very forcible reasons

for his conclusions. Compare Aldrich v. Cheshire R.R. Co., 21 N. II. 869 ; West

Branch, &c, Canal Co. v. Mulliner, 68 Penn. St. 357; Bellinger v. N. Y. Cen-

tral R.R. Co., 23 N. Y. 42; Hatch v. Vt. Central R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 49.

4 British Plate Manufacturing Co. v. Meredith, 4 T. R. 794; Matter of Fur-

man Street, 17 Wend. 649 ; Radcliff's Ex'rs v. Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y.

195; Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; Wilson r. Mayor, &c, of New York, 1 Denio,

595; Murphy.w. Chicago, 29 111. 279; Roberts v. Chicago, 26 111. 249; Charlton

v. Alleghany City, 1 Grant, 208; La Fayette v. Bush, 19 Ind. 326; Macy v.

Indianapolis, 17 Ind. 267; Vincennes v. Richards, 23 Ind. 381; Green v. Read-

ing, 9 Watts, 382; O'Conner v. Pittsburg, 18 Penn. St. 187; In re Ridge

Street, 29 Penn. St. 391; Callendar v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 417; Creal v. Keokuk, 4

Greene (Iowa), 47; Smith v. Washington, 20 How. 135; Skinner v. Hartford

Bridge Co., 29 Conn. 523 ; Benden v. Nashua, 17 N. H. 477; Goszler v. George-

town, 6 Wheat. 703. The cases of McComb v. Akron, 15 Ohio, 474, and 18

Ohio, 229; and Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio, N. s. 459, are contra. Those

cases, however, admit that a party whose interests are injured by the original

establishment of a street grade can have no claim to compensation ; but they hold

that when the grade is once established, and lots are improved in reference to it,
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and similar cases the law affords no redress for the injury. 60

if, in consequence of the construction of a public work, an injury

occurs, but the work was constructed on proper plan and without

negligence, and the injury is caused by accidental and extraor-

dinary circumstances, the injured party cannot demand com-

pensation.1

[* 543] * This principle is peculiarly applicable to those cases

where property is appropriated under the right of eminent

domain. It must frequently occur that a party will find his rights

seriously affected though no property to which he has lawful claim

is actually appropriated. As where a road is laid out along the line

of a man's land without taking any portion of it, in consequence of

which he is compelled to keep up the whole of what before was a

partition fence, one-half of which his neighbor was required to sup-

port.2 No property being taken in this case, the party has 110 relief,

unless the statute shall give it. The loss is damnum absque injuria.

So a turnpike company, whose profits will be diminished by the

construction of a railroad along the same general line of travel, ia
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not entitled to compensation.3 So where a railroad company, in

constructing their road in a proper manner on their own land,

raised a high embankment near to and in front of the plaintiff's

the corporation has no right to change the grade afterwards, except on payment

of the damages.

1 As in Sprague 0. Worcester, 13 Gray, 193, where, in consequence of the

erection of a bridge over a stream on which a mill was situated, the mill was

injured by an extraordinary rise in the stream; the bridge, however, being in all

respects properly constructed. And in firouse v. Cayuga, &c, R.R. Co., 12

N. Y. 480, where bridge proprietors were held liable for similar injuries on the

ground of negligence. And compare Norris v. Vt. Central R.R. Co., 28 Vt.

102, with Mellen v. Western R.R. Corp., 4 Gray, 301. And see note 1, supra.

* Kennett's Petition, 4 Fost. 139. See Eddings v. Seabrook, 12 Rich. Law,

504; Slatter v. Des Moines Valley R. R. Co. 29 Iowa, 154.

8 Troy and Boston R.R. Co. v. Northern Turnpike Co., 16 Barb. 100. See

La Fayette Plank Road Co. v. New. Albany and Salem R.R Co., 13 Lid. 90;

Richmond, &c Co. v. Rogers, 1 Duvall, 135. So an increased competition with

a party's business caused by the construction or extension of a road is not a ground

of claim. Harvey v. Lackawana, &c, R.R. Co., 47 Penn. St 428. "Every

great public improvement must, almost of necessity, more or less, affect individ-

ual convenience and property; and when the injury sustained is remote and con-

sequential, it is damnum absque injuria, and is to be borne as a part of the price

to be paid for the advantages of the social condition. This is founded upon the

principle that the general good is to prevail over partial individual convenience."

Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 149.
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house, so as to prevent his passing to and from the same with the

same convenience as before, this consequential injury was held to

give no claim to compensation.1 So the owner of dams erected

by legislative authority is without remedy, if they are after-

wards rendered valueless by the construction of a canal.2

•And iu New York it has been held that, as the land [* 5-14]

where the tide ebbs and flows, between high and low

water mark, belongs to the public, the State may lawfully authorize

a railroad company to construct their road along the water front

below high-water mark, and that the owner of the adjacent bank

1 Richardson v. Vermont Central R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 465. But qucere if this

could be so, if the effect were to prevent access from the lot to the highway. In

certain Indiana cases it is said that the right of the owner of adjoining land to

the use of the highway is as much property as the land itself; that it is appurte-

nant to the land, and is protected by the constitution. Haynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind.

38; Protzman v. Indianapolis, &c, R.R. Co., 9 Ind. 409; New Albany and

Salem R.R. Co. r. O'Dailey, 13 Ind. 403. The same doctrine is recognized in

Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio, N. 6. 459, and Street Railway v. Cumminsville,
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14 Ohio, n. 8. 523. In the Vermont case above cited it was held that an exca-

vation by the company on their own land, so near the line of the plaintiff's that

his land, without any artificial weight thereon, slid into the excavation, would

render the company liable for the injury; the plaintiff being entitled to the

.lateral support for his land.

8 Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Wright, 9 W. & S. 9; Monongahela Navigation

Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 101. In any case, if parties exercising the right of

eminent domain shall cause injury to others by a negligent or improper construc-

tion of their work, they may be liable in damages. Rowe v. Granite Bridge

Corporation, 21 Pick. 348; Sprague v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 193. And if a

public work is of a character to necessarily disturb the occupation and enjoyment

of his estate by one whose land is not taken, he may have an action on the case

for the injury, notwithstanding the statute makes no provision for compensation.

As where the necessary, and not simply the accidental, consequence was, to flood

a man's premises with water, thereby greatly diminishing their value. Hooker v.

New Haven and Northampton Co., 14 Conn. 146; 8. c. 15 Conn. 312 ; Evansville,

&c, R.R. Co. b. Dick, 9 Ind. 433; Robinson o. N. Y. and Erie R.R. Co., 27

Barb. 512; Trustees of Wabash and Erie Canal v. Spears, 10 Ind. 441; Eaton

v. Boston, C. & M. R.R. Co., 51 N. H. 504. So where, by blasting rock in

making an excavation, the fragments are thrown upon adjacent buildings so as

to render their occupation unsafe. Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159; Tremain

v. Same, ib. 163; Carman v. Steubenville and Indiana R.R. Co., 4 Ohio, n. s.

399; Sunbury and Erie R.R. Co. v. Hummel, 27 Penn. St. 99. There has been

some disposition to hold private corporations liable for all incidental damages

caused by their exercise of the right of eminent domain. See Tinsman v. Bel-

videre and Delaware R.R. Co., 2 Dutch. 148; Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis.

255.
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could claim no compensation for the consequential injury to his

interests.1 So the granting of a ferry right with a landing on

private property within a highway terminating on a private stream

is not an appropriation of property,2 the ferry being a mere

continuation of the highway, and the landing place upon the

private property having previously been appropriated to public

uses.

These cases must suffice as illustrations of the principle stated,

though many others might be referred to. On the other hand, any

injury to the property of an individual which deprives the owner of

the ordinary use of it is equivalent to a taking, and entitles him to

compensation.3 Water front on a stream where the tide does not

ebb and flow is property, and if taken must be paid for as such.4

So with an exclusive right of wharfage upon tide water.5 So with

the right of the owner of land to use an adjoining street,

[* 545] whether he is owner of the land over which the * street is

laid out or not.6 So with the right of pasturage in streets,

which belongs to the owners of the soil.7 So a partial destruction

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

1 Gould v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 6 N. Y. 522. And see Stevens v. Pater-

son, &c, R.R. Co., 34 N. J. 532; Tomlin v. Dubuque, &c., R.R. Co., 32

Iowa, 106; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 176. So far as these cases hold it competent to

cut off a riparian proprietor from access to the navigable water, they seem to ns

to justify an appropriation of his property without compensation; for even those

courts which hold the fee in the soil under navigable waters to be in the State

admit valuable riparian rights in the adjacent proprietor. See Yates c. Milwau-

kee, 10 Wall. 497.

* Murray v. Menifee, 20 Ark. 561.

3 Hooker v. New Haven and Northampton Co., 14 Conn. 146.

♦ Varick ». Smith, 9 Paige, 547. See Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497.

6 Murray v. Sharp, 1 Bosw. 539.

• Lackland v. North Missouri R.R. Co., 31 Mo. 180. See supra, p. 543,

note.

'Tonawanda R.R. Co. r. Munger, 5 Denio, 255; Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn.

165. In this case it was held that a by-law of a town giving liberty to the inhab-

itants to depasture their cows in the public highways under certain regulations,

passed under the authority of a general statute empowering towns to pass such

by-laws, was of no validity, because it appropriated the pasturage, which was

private property, to the public use, without making compensation. The contrary

has been held in New York as to all highways laid out while such a statute was

in existence; the owner being held to be comjjensated for the pasturage as well

as for the use of the land for other purposes, at the time the highway was laid

out. Griffin v. Martin, 7 Barb. 297; Hardcnburgh v. Lockwood, 25 Barb. 9.

See also Kerwliacker v. Cleveland C. and C. R.R. Co., 3 Ohio, N. s. 177; where
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or diminution of value of property by an act of the government

which directly and not merely incidentally affects it, is to that

extent an appropriation.1

It sometimes becomes important, where a highway has been

laid out and opened, to establish a different and higher grade of

way upon the same line, with a view to accommodate an increased

public demand. The State may be willing to surrender the control

of the streets in these cases, and authorize turnpike, plank-road, or

railroad corporations to occupy them for their purposes; and if it

shall give such consent, the control, so far as is necessary to the

purposes of the turnpike, plank-road, or railway, is thereby passed

over to the corporation, and their structure in what was before a

common highway cannot be regarded as a public nuisance.2 But

the municipal organizations in the State have no power to give

such consent, without express legislative permission; the general

control of their streets which is commonly given by municipal

charters not being sufficient authority for this purpose.3 When

it was held that by ancient custom in that State there was a right of pasturage
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by the public in the highways.

1 See Glover v. Powell, 2 Stockt. 211; Eaton v. Boston, C. & M. R.R. Co.,

51 N. H. 504.

s See Commonwealth v. Erie, & N. E. R.R. Co., 27 Penn. St. 389; Ten-

nessee, &c, R.R. Co. p. Adams, 3 Head, 596.

3 Lackland v. North Missouri R.R. Co., 31 Mo. 180; New York and Harlem

R.R. Co. v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 1 Hilt. 562; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y.

611; State p. Cincinnati, &c, Gas Co., 18 Ohio, n. s. 262. In inhabitants of Spring-

field v. Connecticut River R.R. Co., 4 Cush. 71, it was held that legislative author-

ity to construct a railroad between certain termini, without prescribing its precise

course and direction, would not prima facie confer power to lay out the road on

and along an existing public highway. Per Shaw, Ch. J.: "The whole course

of legislation on the subject of railroads is opposed to such a construction. The

crossing of public highways by railroads is obviously necessary, and of course

warranted; and numerous provisions are industriously made to regulate such

crossings, by determining when they shall be on the same and when on different

levels, in order to avoid collision, and when on the same level what gates, fences,

and barriers shall be made, and what guards shall be kept to insure safety.

Had it been intended that railroad companies, under a general grant, should

have power to lay a railroad over a highway longitudinally, which ordina-

rily is not necessary, we think that would have been done in express terms,

accompanied with full legislative provisions for maintaining such barriers and

modes of separation as would tend to make the use of the same road, for both

modes of travel, consistent with the safety of travellers on both. The absence

of any such provision affords a strong inference that, under general terms, it was
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[* 546] however, the * public authorities have thus assented, it

may be found that the owners of the adjacent lots, who

are also owners of the fee in the highway subject to the public

easement, may be unwilling to assent to the change, and may find

or believe their interests seriously and injuriously affected thereby.

The question may then arise, Is the owner of the laud, who has

been once compensated for the injury he has sustained in the

appropriation of his land as a highway entitled to a new assess-

ment for any further injury he may sustain in consequence of the

street being subjected to a change in the use not contemplated at

the time of the original taking, but nevertheless in furtherance of

the samo general purpose?

When a common highway is made a turnpike or a plank-road,

upon which tolls are collected, there is much reasou for holding

that the owner of the soil is not entitled to any further compensa-

tion. The turnpike or the plank-road is still an avenue for public

travel, subject to be used in the same manner as the ordinary high-

way was before, and if properly constructed is generally expected

to increase rather than diminish the value of property along its

line; and though the adjoining proprietors are required to pay
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toll, they are supposed to be, and generally are, fully compensated

for this burden by the increased excellence of the road, and by

their exemption from highway labor upon it.1 But it is different

when a highway is appropriated for the purposes of a railroad.

"It is quite apparent that the use by the public of a high-

[* 547] way, and the use thereof by a * railroad company, is essen-

tially different. In the one case every person is at liberty

to travel over the highway in any place or part thereof, but he

has no exclusive right of occupation of any part thereof except

while he is temporarily passing over it. It would be trespass (or

him to occupy any part of the highway exclusively for any longer

not intended that such a power should be given." See also Commonwealth r.

Erie and N. E. R.R Co., 27 Penn. St. 339; Attorney-General v. Morris and

Essex R.R. Co., 4 C. E. Green, 586.

1 See Commonwealth o. Wilkinson, 16 Pick. 175; Benedict t>. Goit, 3 Barb.

459; Wright r. Carter, 3 Dutch. 76; State v. Laverack, 34 N. J. 207; Chajrria

Falls and Cleveland Plank-Road Co. v. Cane, 2 Ohio, N. s. 419; Douglifl

r. Turnpike Co., 22 Md. 219. But see* Williams t>. Natural Bridge Plan's

Road Co., 21 Mo. 680. In Murray v. County Commissioners of Berkshire.

12 Met. 455, it was held that owners of lands adjoining a turnpike were not

entitled to compensation when a turnpike was changed to a common highway.
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period of time than was necessary for that purpose, and the stop-

pages incident thereto. But a railroad company takes exclusive

and permanent possession of a portion of the street or highway.

It lays down its rails upon, or imbeds them in, the soil, and thus

appropriates a portion of the street to its exclusive use, and for

its own particular mode of conveyance. In the one case, all

persons may travel on the street or highway in their own com-

mon modes of conveyance. In the other, no one can travel on or

over the rails laid down, except the railroad company and with

their cars specially adapted to the tracks. In one case the use is

general and open alike to all. In the other, it is peculiar and

exclusive.

"It is true that the actual use of the street by the railroad may

not be so absolute and constant as to exclude the public also from

its use. With a single track, and particularly if the cars used

upon it were propelled by horse-power, the interruption of the pub-

lic easement in the street might be very trifling and of no prac-

tical consequence to the public at large. But this consideration
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cannot affect the question of the right of property, or of the in-

crease of the burden upon the soil. It would present simply

a question of degree in respect to the enlargement of the ease-

ment,, and would not affect the principle, that the use of a

street for the purposes of a railroad imposed upon it a new

burden." 1

1 Wager v. Troy Union R.R. Co., 25 N. Y. 532, approving Williams p. New

York Central R.R. Co., 16 N. Y. 97; Carpenter v. Oswego and Syracuse R.R.

Co., 24 N. Y. 655; Mahon v. New York Central R.R. Co., ib. 658; Starr v.

Camden and Atlantic R.R. Co., 4 Zab. 592. In inhabitants of Springfield v.

Connecticut River R.R. Co., 4 Cush. 71, where, however, the precise question

here discussed was not involved, Chief Justice Shaw, in comparing railroads

with common highways, says: "The two uses are almost, if not wholly, incon-

sistent with each other, so that taking the highway for a railroad will nearly

supersede the former use to which it had been legally appropriated." See also

Presbyterian Society of Waterloo v. Auburn and Rochester R.R. Co., 3 Hill,

667; Craig p. Rochester, &c, R.R. Co., 39 Barb. 494; Schurmeicr p. St. Paul,

&c, R.R. Co., 10 Minn. 82; Gray v. First Division, &c, 13 Minn. 365; Cen-

tral R R. Co. v. Hetfield, 5 Dutch. 206; South Carolina R.R. Co. v. Steiner, 44

Geo. 546. The cases of Philadelphia and Trenton R.R. Co.. 6 Whart. 25, and

Morris and Essex R.R. Co. v. Newark, 2 Stockt. 352, are opposed to the New

York cases. And see Wolfe v. Covington, Ac, R.R. Co., 15 B. Monp. 404; Com.

v. Erie and N. E. R.R. Co., 27 Penn. St. 339; Snyder v. Pennsylvania R.R.

Co., 55 Penn. St. 344; Peddicord v. Baltimore, Ac, R.R. Co., 34 Md. 463.
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[* 548] * The case from which we here quote is approved in

recent cases in Wisconsin, where importance is attached

to the different effect the common highway and the railroad will

have upon the value of adjacent property. "The dedication to the

public as a highway," it is said, "enhances the value of the lot,

and renders it more convenient and useful to the ownep. The use

by the railroad company diminishes its value, and renders it incon-

venient and comparatively useless. It would be a most unjust and

oppressive rule which would deny the owner compensation under

such circumstances." 1

It is not always the case, however, that the value of a lot of

land will be enhanced by the laying out of a common highway

across it, or diminished by the construction of a railway over the

Bame line afterwards. The constitutional question cannot depend

upon the accidental circumstance that the new road will or will

not have an injurious effect; though that circumstance is properly

referred to, since it is difficult to perceive how a change of use

which may possibly have an injurious effect not contemplated in

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the original appropriation can be considered any thing else than

the imposition of a new burden upon the owner's estate. In Con-

necticut, where the authority of the legislature to authorize a rail-

road to be constructed in a common highway without compensation

to land owners is also denied, importance is attached to the terms

of the statute under which the original appropriation was made,

and which are regarded as permitting the taking for the purposes

of a common highway, and for no othep. The reasoning of the

court appears to us sound; and it is applicable to the statutes of

the States generally.2

1 Ford v. Chicago and Northwestern R.R. Co., 14 Wis. 616; followed in

Pomcroy v. Chicago and M. R.R. Co., 16 Wis. 640.

s Imlay v. Union Branch R.R. Co., 26 Conn. 255. "When land is condemned

for a special purpose," say the court, "on the score of public utility, the seques-

tration is limited to that particular use. Land taken for a highway is not thereby

converted into a common. As the property is not taken, but the use only, lbe

right of the public is limited to the use, the specific use, for which the proprietor

has been devested of a complete dominion over his own estate. These are propo-

sitions which are no longer open to discussion. But it is contended that land

once taken and still held for highway purposes may be used for a railway without

exceeding the limits of the easement already acquired by the publip. If this ii

true, if the new use of the land is within the scope of the original sequestration

or dedication, it would follow that the railway privileges are not an encroach-
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* It would appear from the cases cited that the weight [* 549]

of judicial authority is against the power of the legislat-

ment on the estate remaining in the owner of the soil, and that the new mode of

enjoying the public easement will not enable him rightfully to assert a claim to

damages therefor. On the contrary, if the true intent and efficacy of the original

condemnation was not to subject the land to such a burden as will be imposed

upon it when it is confiscated to the uses and control of a railroad corporation, it

cannot be denied that in such a case the estate of the owner of the soil is injuri-

ously affected by the supervening servitude; that his rights are abridged, and

that in a legal sense his land is again taken for public uses. Thus it appears that

the court have simply to decide whether there is such an identity between a high-

way and a railway, that statutes conferring a right to establish the former include

an authority to construct the latter.

"The term ' public highway,' as employed in such of our statutes as convey

the right of eminent domain, has certainly a limited import. Although, as sug-

gested at the bar, a navigable river or a canal is, in some sense, a public highway,

yet an easement assumed under the name of a highway would not enable the

public to convert a street into a canal. The highway, in the true meaning of
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the word, would be destroyed. But as no such destruction of the highway is

necessarily involved in the location of a railroad track upon it, we are pressed

to establish the legal proposition that a highway, such as is referred to in

these statutes, means or at least comprehends a railroad. Such a construction

is possible only when it is made to appear that there is a substantial practical

or technical identity between the uses of land for highway and for railway

purposes.

"No one can fail to see that the terms ' railway 1 and 'highway ' are not con-

vertible, or that the two uses, practically considered, although analogous, are

not identical. Land as ordinarily appropriated by a railroad company is incon-

venient, and even impassable, to those who would use it as a common highway.

Such a corporation does not hold itself bound to make or to keep its embank-

ments and bridges in a condition which will facilitate the transitu* of such vehi-

cles as ply over an ordinary road. A practical dissimilarity obviously exists

between a railway and a common highway, and is recognized as the basis of a

legal distinction between them. It is so recognized on a large scale when

railway privileges are sought from legislative bodies, and granted by them.

If the terms 'highway ' and ' railway' are synonymous, or if one of them includes

the other by legal implication, no act could be more superfluous than to require

or to grant authority to construct railways over localities already occupied as

highways.

"If a legal identity does not subsist between a highway and a railway, it is

illogical to argue that, because a railway may be so constructed as not to inter-

fere with the ordinary uses of a highway, and so as to be consistent with the

highway right already existing, therefore such a new use is included within the

old use. It might as well be urged, that if a common, or a canal, laid out over

the route of a public road, could be so arranged as to leave an ample road-

way for vehicles and passengers on foot, the land should be held to be origi-
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[* 550] ure to appropriate a * common highway to the purposes

of a railroad, unless at the same time provision ia made

nally condemned for a canal or a common, as properly incident to the highway

use.

"There is an important practical reason why courts should be slow to recog-

nize a legal identity between the two uses referred to. They are by no means

the same thing to the proprietor whose land is taken; on the contrary, they sug-

gest widely different standards of compensation. One can readily conceive of

cases where the value of real estate would be directly enhanced by the opening

of a highway through it; while its confiscation for a railway at the same or a sub-

sequent time would be a gross injury to the estate, and a total subversion of the

mode of enjoyment expected by the owner when he yielded his private rights to

the public exigency.

"But essential distinctions also exist between highway and railway powers, as

conferred by statute, — distinctions which are founded in the very nature of the

powers themselves. In the case of the highway, the statute provides that, after

the observance of certain legal forms, the locality in question shall be forever

subservient to the right of every individual in the community to pass over the

thoroughfare so created at all times. This right involves the important implica-

tion that he shall so use the privilege as to leave the privilege of all others as
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unobstructed as his own, and that he is therefore to use the road in the manner

in which such roads are ordinarily used, with such vehicles as will not obstruct,

or require the destruction of the ordinary modes of travel thereon. He is not

anthorized to lay down a railway track, and run his own locomotive and car upon

it. No one ever thought o regarding highway acts as conferring railway privi-

leges, involving a right in every individual, not only to break up ordinary travel,

but also to exact tolls from the public for the privilege of using the peculiar con-

veyances adapted to a railroad. If a right of this description is not conferred

when a highway is authorized by law, it is idle to pretend that any proprietor is

devested of such a right. It would seem that, under such circumstances, the

true construction of highway laws could hardly be debatable, and that the ab-

sence of legal identity between the two uses of which we speak was patent and

entire.

"Again, no argument or illustration can strengthen the self-evident proposi-

tion that, when a railway is authorized over a public highway, a right is created

against the proprietor of the fee, in favor of a person, an artificial person, to

whom he before bore no legal relation whatevep. It is understood that when

such an easement is sought or bestowed, a new and independent right will accrue

to the railroad corporation as against the owner of the soil, and that, without any

reference to the existence of the highway, his land will forever stand charged

with the accruing servitude. Accordingly, if such a highway were to be discon-

tinued according to the legal forms prescribed for that purpose, the railroad cor-

poration would still insist upon the express and independent grant of an easement

to itself, enabling it to maintain its own road on the site of the abandoned road-

way. We are of opinion, therefore, as was distinctly intimated by this court in

a former case (see opinion of Hinman, J., in Nicholson v. N. Y. and N. H.
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for compensation to the owners of the fee. * These cases, [* 551]

however, have had reference to the common railroad, oper-

ated by steam. In one of the New York cases1 it is intimated,

and in another case in the same State it was directly decided, that

the ruling should be the same in the case of the street railway

operated by horse-power.3 There is generally, however, a very

great difference in the two cases, and some of the considerations

to which the courts have attached importance could have no appli-

cation in many cases of common horse railways. A horse railway,

as a general thing, will interfere very little with the ordinary use

of the way by the public, even upon the very line of the road ; and

in many cases it would be a relief to an overburdened way, rather

than an impediment to the previous use. In Connecticut, after it

had been decided, as above shown, that the owner of the fee sub-

ject to a perpetual highway was entitled to compensation when the

highway was appropriated for an ordinary railroad, it was also held

that the authority to lay and use a horse-railway track in a public

street was not a new servitude imposed upon the land for which
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the owner of the fee would be entitled to damages, but that it was

a part of the public use to which the land was originally subjected

when taken for a street.3 The same distinction between horse rail-

ways and those operated by steam is also taken in recent New York

cases.4 But whether the mere difference in the motive-power will

make different principles applicable, is a question which the courts

will probably have occasion to consider further. Conceding that

the interests of individual owners will not generally suffer, or their

use of the highway be incommoded by the laying down and use of

the track of a horse railway upon it, there are nevertheless cases

where it might seriously impede, if not altogether exclude, the

general travel and use by the ordinary modes, and very greatly

reduce the value of all the property along the line. Suppose, for

R.R. Co., 22 Conn. 85), that to subject the owner of the soil of a highway to a

further appropriation of his land to railway uses is the imposition of a new ser-

vitude upon his estate, and is an act demanding the compensation which the law

awards when land is taken for public purposes." And see South Carolina R.R.

Co. v. Steiner, 44 Geo. 546,

1 Wager v. Troy Union R.R. Co., 25 N. Y. 532.

8 Craig ». Rochester City and Brighton R.R. Co., 39 Barb. 449.

3 Elliott o. Fair Haven and Westville R.R. Co., 32 Conn. 586.

4 Brooklyn Central, &c, R.R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 33 Barb. 422;

People v. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357; s. c. 27 N. Y. 188.
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instance, a narrow street in a city, occupied altogether by whole-

sale houses, which require constantly the use of the whole street

in connection with their business, and suppose this to be turned

over to a street-railway company, whose line is such as to make

the road a principal avenue of travel, and to require such

[* 552] * constant passage of cars as to drive all drayage from the

street. The corporation, under these circumstances, will

substantially have a monopoly in the use of the street; their

vehicles will drive the business from it, and the business propertj

will become comparatively worthless. And if property owners are

without remedy in such case, it is certainly a very great hardship

upon them, and a very striking and forcible instance and illustra-

tion of damage without legal injury.

When property is appropriated for a public way, and the pro-

prietor is paid for the public easement, the compensation is gen-

erally estimated, in practice, at the value of the land itself.1 If,

therefore, no other circumstances were to be taken into the ac-

count in these cases, the owner, who has been paid the value of

his land, could not reasonably complain of any use to which it

might afterwards be put by the public. But, as pointed out in the
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Connecticut case,2 the compensation is always liable either to ex-

ceed or to fall below the value of the land taken, in consequence

of incidental injuries or benefits to the owner as proprietor of the

land which remains. These injuries or benefits will be estimated

with reference to the identical use to which the property is appro-

priated; and if it is afterwards put to another use, which causes

greater incidental injury, and the owner is not entitled to further

compensation, it is very evident that he has suffered a wrong by

the change which could not have been foreseen and provided

against. And if, on the other hand, he is entitled in any case to

an assessment of damages in consequence of such an appropriation

of the street affecting his rights injuriously, then he must be enti-

tled to such an assessment in every case, and the question involved

will be, not as to the right, but only of the quantum of damages.

The horse railway either is or is not the imposition of a new bur-

den upon the estate. If it is not, the owner of the fee is entitled

to compensation in no case; if it is, he is entitled to have an

assessment of damages in every case.

1 Murray v. County Commissioners, 12 Met. 457, per Shaw, Ch. J.

* Imlay v. Union Branch K.R. Co., 26 Conn. 257.
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In New York, where, by law, when a public street is laid out or

dedicated, the fee in the soil becomes vested in the city, it has

been held that the legislature might authorize the construction of

a horse railway in a street, and that neither the city nor the owners

of lots were entitled to compensation, notwithstanding it

was * found as a fact that the lot owners would suffer in- [* 553]

jury from the construction of the road. The city was not

entitled, because, though it held the fee, it held it in trust for the

use of all the people of the State, and not as corporate or munici-

pal property; and the land having been originally acquired under

the right of eminent domain, and the trust being pullici juris, it

was under the unqualified control of the legislature, and any

appropriation of it to public use by legislative authority could not

be regarded as an appropriation of the private property of the city.

And so far as the adjacent lot owners were concerned, their inter-

est in the streets, as distinct from that of other citizens, was only

as having a possibility of reverter after the public use of the land

should cease; and the value of this, if any thing, was inappreci-
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able, and could not entitle them to compensation.1

So in Indiana, where the title in fee to streets in cities and

villages is vested in the public, it is held that the adjacent land

owners are not entitled to the statutory remedy for an assessment

of damages in consequence of the street being appropriated to the

use of a railroad; and this without regard to the motive power by

which the road is operated. At the same time it is also held that

the lot owners may maintain an action at law if, in consequence of

the railroad, they are cut off from the ordinary use of the street.2

1 People v. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357; s. c. 27 N. Y. 188. The same ruling as to

the right of the city to compensation was had in Savannah, &c, R.R. Co. v.

Mayor, &c, of Savannah, 45 Geo. 602i And see Brooklyn Central, &c,

R.R. Co. p. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., "33 Barb. 420; Brooklyn and Newtown

R.R. Co. v. Coney Island R.R. Co., 35 Barb. 364; New York v. Kerr,

38 Barb. 369; Chapman p. Albany and Schenectady R.R. Co., 10 Barb.

360 Although, in the case of People v. Kerr, the several judges seem gener-

ally to have agreed on the principle as stated in the text, it is not very clear

how much importance was attached to the fact that the fee to the street was in

the city, nor that the decision would have been different if that had not been the

case.

'Protzman v. Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.R. Co., 9 Ind. 467; New Albany

and Salem R.R. Co. e. ODaily, 13 Ind. 353; Same v. Same, 12 Ind. 551. See

also Street Railway v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio, n. s. 523; State v. Cincinnati Gas,

&p., Co., 18 Ohio, N. s. 292.
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So in Iowa it is held that where the title to city streets is in the

corporation in trust for the public, the legislature may authorize

the construction of an ordinary railroad through the same, with the

consent of the city, and without awarding compensation to lot

owners ;1 or even without the consent of the municipal authorities,

and without entitling the city to compensation.2 So in 11linois, in

a case where a lot owner had filed a bill in equity to restrain the

laying down of the track of a railroad, by consent of the common

council, to be operated by steam in one of the streets of Chicago,

it was held that the bill could not be maintained; the title to the

street being in the city, which might appropriate it to any proper

city purpose.3

1 Millburn v. Cedar Rapids, &c, R.R. Co., 12 Iowa, 246.

* Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, &c, RR. Co., 24 Iowa, 455.

3 Moses v. Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne, and Chicago R.R. Co., 21 1ll. 522. We

quote from the opinion of Caion, Ch. J.: "By the city charter, the common

council is vested with the exclusive control and regulation of the streets of the

city, the fee-simple title to which we have already decided is vested in the munic-

ipal corporation. The city charter also empowers the common council to direct

and control the location of railroad tracks within the city. In granting this
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permission to locate the track in Beach Street, the common council acted under

an express power granted by the legislature. So that the defendant has all the

right which both the legislature and the common council could give it, to occupy

the street with its track. But the complainant assumes higher ground, and

claims that any use of the street, even under the authority of the legislature

and the common council, which tends to deteriorate the value of his property on

the street, is a violation of that fundamental law which forbids private property

to be taken for public use without just compensation. This is manifestly an

erroneous view of the constitutional guaranty thus invoked. It must necessarily

happen that streets will be used for various legitimate purposes, which will, to a

greater or less extent, incommode persons residing or doing business upon them,

and just to that extent damage their property; and yet such damage is incident

to all city property, and for it a party can claim no remedy. The common

council may appoint certain localities where hacks and drays shall stand waiting

for employment, or whpre wagons loaded with hay or wood, or other commodi-

ties, shall stand waiting for purchasers. This may drive customers away from

shops or stores in the vicinity, and yet there is no remedy for the damage. A

street is made for the passage of persons and property; and the law cannot

define what exclusive means of transportation and passage shall be used. Uni-

versal experience shows that this can best be left to the determination of the

municipal authorities, who are supposed to be best acquainted with the wants

and necessities of the citizens generally. To say that a new mode of passage

shall be banished from the streets, no matter how much the general good may

require it, simply "because streets were not so used in the days of Blackstone,
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* It is not easy, as is very evident, to trace a clear line [* 554]

of authority running through the various decisions bear-

ing upon the * appropriation of the ordinary highways and [* 555]

streets to the use of railroads of any grade or species;

but a strong inclination is apparent to hold that, when the fee in

the public way is taken from the former owner, it is taken for any

public use whatever to which the public authorities, with the legis-

lative assent, may see fit afterwards to devote it, in furtherance

would hardly comport with the advancement and enlightenment of the present

age. Steam has but lately taken the place, to any extent, of animal power for

land transportation, and for that reason alone shall it be expelled the streets?

For the same reason camels must be kept out, though they might be profitably

employed. Some fancy horse or timid lady might be frightened by such uncouth

objects. Or is the objection not in the motive-power, but because the carriages

are larger than were formerly used, and run upon iron, and are confined to a

given track in the street? Then street railroads must not be admitted; they

have large carriages which run on iron rails, and are confined to a given track.

Their momentum is great, and may do damage to ordinary vehicles or foot pas-
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sengers. Indeed we may suppose or assume that streets occupied by them are

not so pleasant for other carriages or so desirable for residences or business

stands, as if not thus occupied. But for this reason the property owners along

the street cannot expect to stop such improvements. The convenience of those

who live at a greater distance from the centre of a city requires the use of such

improvements, and for their benefit the owners of property upon the street must

submit to the burden, when the common council determine that the public good

requires it. Cars upon street railroads are now generally, if not universally, pro-

pelled by horses, but who can say how long it will be before it will be found safe

and profitable to propel them with steam, or some other power besides horses?

Should we say that this road should be enjoined, we could advance no reason for

it which would not apply with equal force to street railroads; so that consistency

would require that we should stop all. Nor would the evil which would result

from the rule we must lay down stop here. We must prohibit every use of a

street which discommodes those who reside or do business upon it, because their

property will else be damaged. This question has been presented in other

States, and in some instances, where the public have only an easement in the

street, and the owner of the adjoining property still holds the fee in the street,

it has been sustained; but the weight of authority, and certainly, in our appre-

hension, all sound reasoning, is the other way."

All the cases from which we have quoted assume that the use of the street by

the railroad company is still a public use; and probably it would not be held that

an appropriation of a street, or of any part of it, by an individual or company,

for his or their own private use, unconnected with any accommodation of the

public, was consistent with the purpose for which it was originally acquired. See

Brown v. Duplessis, 14 La. An. 842; Green v. Portland, 32 Me. 431.
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of the general purpose of the original appropriation ;1 and if .his

is so, the owner must be held to be compensated at the time of the

original taking for any such possible use; and he takes his chances

of that use, or any change in it, proving beneficial or deleterious

to any remaining property he may own, or business he may be

engaged in; and it must also be held that the possibility that the

land may, at some future time, revert to him, by the public use

ceasing, is too remote and contingent to be considered as property

at all.2 At the same time it must be confessed that it is difficult

to determine precisely how far some of the decisions made have

been governed by the circumstance that the fee was or was not in

the public, or, on the other hand, have proceeded on the theory

that a railway was only in furtherance of the original pur-

[* 556] pose of the appropriation, and not * to be regarded as the

imposition of any new burden, even where an easement

only was originally taken.3

1 On this subject see, in addition to the other cases cited, West p. Bancroft,

82 Vt. 367; Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. 410; Ohio and Lexington R.R. Co. v.
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Applegate, 8 Dana, 289; Hinchman v. Paterson Horse R. Co., 2 C. E. Green, 76.

When, however, land is taken or dedicated specifically for a street, it would seem,

although the fee is taken, it is taken for the restricted use only; that is to say,

for such uses as streets in cities are commonly put to. See State v. Laverack,

34 N. J. 201; Railroad Co. p. Shurmeir, 7 Wall. 272.

'As to whether there is such possibility of reverter, see Heyward v. Mayor,

&c, of New York, 7 N. Y. 314; People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 211, per Wright, J.;

Plitt p. Cox, 43 Penn. St. 486.

3 There is great difficulty, as it seems to us, in supporting important dis-

tinctions upon the fact that the fee was originally taken for the use of the

public instead of a mere easement. If the fee is appropriated or dedicated, it is

for a particular use only; and it is a conditional fee, — a fee on condition that

the land continue to be occupied for that use. The practical difference in the

cases is, that when the fee is taken, the possession of the original owner is

excluded; and in the case of city streets where there is occasion to devote them

to many other purposes besides those of passage, but nevertheless not incon-

sistent, such as for the laying of water and gas pipes, and the construction of

sewers, this exclusion of any private right of occupation is important, and will

sometimes save controversies and litigation. But to say that when a man has

declared a dedication for a particular use, under a statute which makes a dedi-

cation the gift of a fee, he thereby makes it liable to be appropriated to other

purposes, when the same could not be done if a perpetual easement had been

dedicated, seems to be basing important distinctions upon a difference which

after all is more technical than real, and which in any view does not affect the

distinction made. The same reasoning which has sustained the legislature in

authorizing a railroad track to be laid down in a city street would support its
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Perhaps the true distinction in these cases relates, not to the

motive-power of the railway, or to the question whether the fee-

simple or a mere easement was taken in the original appropria-

tion, but depends upon the question whether the railway constitutes

a thoroughfare, or, on the other hand, is a mere local convenience.

When land is taken or dedicated for a town street, it is unques-

tionably appropriated for all the ordinary purposes of a town

street; not merely the purposes to which such streets were for-

merly applied, but those demanded by new improvements and new

wants. Among these purposes is the use for carriages which run

upon a grooved track; and the preparation of important streets in

large cities for their use is not only a frequent necessity, which must

be supposed to have been contemplated, but it is almost as much a

matter of course as the grading and paving. The appropriation of

a country highway for the purposes of a railway, on the other hand,

is neither usual nor often important; and it cannot with any justice

be regarded as within the contemplation of the parties when

* the highway is first established. And if this is so, it is [* 557]
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clear that the owner cannot be considered as compensated

for the new use at the time of the original appropriation.

The cases thus far considered are those in which the original uso

is not entirely foreign to the purpose of the new appropriation ; and

it is the similarity that permits the question which has been dis-

cussed. Were the uses totally different, there could be no question

action in authorizing it to be made into a canal; and the purpose of the original

dedication or appropriation would thereby be entirely defeated. Is it not more

consistent with established rules to hold that a dedication or appropriation to one

purpose confines the use to that purpose; and when it is taken for any other, the

original owner has not been compensated for the injury he may sustain in conse-

quence, and is therefore entitled to it now? Notwithstanding a dedication which

vests the title in the public, it must be conceded that the interest of the adjacent

lot owners is still property. "They have a peculiar interest in the street, which

neither the local nor the general public can pretend to claim; a private right of

the nature of an incorporeal hereditament, legally attached to their contiguous

grounds and the erections thereon; an incidental title to certain facilities and

franchises assured to them by contracts and by law, and without which their

property would be comparatively of little value. This easement, appurtenant to

the lots, unlike any right of one lot owner in the lot of another, is as much

property as the lot itself." Crawford p. Delaware, 7 Ohio, x. s. 459. See some

very pertinent and sensible remarks on the same subject by Ranney, J., in Street

Railway p. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio, n. s. 541.
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whatever that a new assessment of compensation must be made

before the appropriation could be lawful.1

1 Where lands were appropriated by a railroad company for their purpose!,

and afterwards leased out for private occupation, it was held that the owner of

the fee was entitled to maintain a writ of entry to establish his title and recover

damages for the wrongful use. Proprietors of Locks, &c. v. Nashua and Lowell

R.R. Co., 104 Mass. 1; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 181. Where land has been taken

for a street, it cannot be appropriated for the erection of a market building with-

out making compensation. State v. Mayor, &c, of Mobile, 5 Port. 279; State

v. Laverack, 34 N. J., 201. The opinion of Beasley, Ch. J., in the New Jersey

case, will justify liberal quotations. He says (p. 204): "I think it undeniable

that the appropriation of this land to the purposes of a market was an additional

burthen upon it. Clearly it was not using it as a street. So far from that, what

the act authorized to be done was incongruous with such use; for the market was

an obstruction to it, considered merely as a highway. . . . When, therefore, the

legislature declared that these streets in the city of Paterson might be used for

market purposes, the power which was conferred in substance was an authority

to place obstructions, in these public highways. The consequence is that there is
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no force in the argument, which was the principal one pressed upon our attention,

that the use of these streets for the purpose now claimed is as legitimate as the

use of a public highway by a horse-railroad, which latter use has been repeatedly

sanctioned by the courts of the State. The two cases, so far as relates to prin-

ciple, stand precisely opposite. I have said that a market is an obstruction to >

street, that it is not a use of it as a street, but, if unauthorized, is a nuisance.

To the contrary of this, a horse-railroad is a new mode of using a street as such,

and it is precisely upon this ground that it has been held to be legal. The cases

rest upon this foundation. That a horse-railway was a legitimate use of a highway

was decided in Uinchman v. Paterson Horse Railroad Co., 2 C. E. Greene, 76;

md, in his opinion, Chancellor Greene assigns the following as the reasons of bis

judgment: 'The use of the road is nearly identical with that of the- ordinary

highway. The motive power is the same. The noise and jarring of the street

by the cars is not greater, and ordinarily less than that produced by omnibuses

and other vehicles in ordinary use. Admit that the nature of the use, as respects

the travelling public, is somewhat variant, how does it prejudice the land-owner?

Is his property taken? Are his rights as a land-owner affected? .Does it interfere

with the use of his property any more than the ordinary highway?' It is dear

that this reasoning can have no appropriate application to a case in which it

appears that the use of the street is so far from being nearly identical with that

of the ordinary highway that in law it has always been regarded as an injury

to such public easement, and on that account an indictable offence.

"I regard, then, a right to hold a market in a street as an easement additional

to, and in a measure inconsistent with, its ordinary use as a highway. The question

therefore is presented, Can such easement be conferred by the legislature on tbe

public without compensation to the land-owner? I have already said that from

the first it has appeared to me this question must be answered in the negative. I

think the true rule is, that land taken by the public for a particular use cannot be
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Although the regulation of a navigable stream will give to the

persons incidentally affected, no right to compensation, yet if the

stream is diverted from its natural course, so that those entitled to

its benefits are prevented from making use of it as before, the

applied under such a sequestration to any other use to the detriment of the land-

owner. This is the only rule which will adequately protect the constitutional

right of the citizen. To permit land taken for one purpose, and for which the

land-owner has been compensated, to be applied to another and additional pur-

pose, for which he has received no compensation, would be a mere evasion of the

spirit of the fundamental law of the State. Land taken and applied for the

ordinary purpose of a street would often be an improvement of the adjacent

property: an appropriation of it to the uses of a market would, perhaps, as often

be destructive of one half the value of such property. Compensation for land,

therefore, to be used as a highway, might, and many times would be, totally

inadequate compensation if such land is to be used as a public market place.

Few things would be more unjust than, when compensation has been made for

land in view of one of these purposes, to allow it to be used without compensa-

tion for the other. The right of the public in a highway consists in the privilege
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of passage, and such privileges as are annexed as incidents by usage or custom,

as the right to make sewers and drains and to lay gas and water pipes.

These subordinate privileges are entirely consistent with the primary use of the

highway, and are no detriment to the land-owner. But I am not aware of any'

case in which it has been held that the public has any right in a highway which

is incongruous with the purpose for which it was originally created, and which

at the same time is injurious to the proprietor of the soil. Such certainly has

not been the course of judicial decision in our own courts. Indeed the cases

appear to be all ranged on the opposite side. I have shown that the legalization

of the use of a street by a horse-railroad has been carefully placed on the ground

that such an appropriation of the street was merely a new mode of its legitimate

and ordinary use. The rationale adopted excludes by necessary implication the

hypothesis that the dedication of a street to a new purpose, inconsistent with its

original nature, would be legal with respect to the uncompensated land-owner.

But beyond this it has been expressly declared that such superadded use would

be illegal. In the opinion of Mr. Justice Haines, in Starr v. Camden and Atlan-

tic R.R. Co., 4 Zab. 592, it is very explicitly held that the constitution of this

State would prevent the legislature from granting to a railroad company a right

to use a public highway as a bed for their road without first making compensation

to the owner of the soil. And in the case of Hinchman v. The Paterson Horse-

Railroad Co. already cited, Chancellor Greene quotes these views, and gives the

doctrine the high sanction of his own approval. See also the Central R.R. Co.

t>. Hetfiild, 5 Dutch. 206."

The learned judge then distinguishes Carter v. Wright, 3 Dutch. 76, and

quotes, as sustaining his own views, State r. Mayor, &c, of Mobile, 5 Porter,

279; Trustees of Presbyterian Society v. Auburn and Rochester R.R. Co.,

8 Hill, 569; Williams v. N. Y. C. R.R. Co., 16 N. Y. Ill; Angell on High-

way8. §^243 et seq., and cases cited.
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deprivation of this right is a taking which entitles them to compen-

sation, notwithstanding the taking may be for the purpose of

creating another and more valuable channel of navigation.1 The

owners of land over which such a stream flows, although they do

not own the. flowing water itself, yet have a property in the use of

that water as it flows past them, for the purpose of producing

mechanical power, or for any of the other purposes for which

they can make it available, without depriving those below them

of the like use, or encroaching upon the rights of those above;

and this property is equally protected with any of a more tangible

character.2

What Interest in Land can be taken under the Right of Eminent

Domain.

Where land is appropriated to the public use under the right of

eminent domain, and against the will of the owner, we have seen

how careful the law is to limit the public authorities to their pre-

cise needs, and not to allow the dispossession of the owner from

any portion of his freehold which the public use does not require.
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This must be so on the general principle that the right being based

on necessity cannot be any broader than the necessity which sup-

ports it. For the same reason, it would seem that, in respect to

the land actually taken, if there can be any conjoint occupation of

the owner and the public, the former should not be altogether ex-

cluded, but should be allowed to occupy for his private purposes

to any extent not inconsistent with the public use. As a general

rule, the laws for the exercise of the right of eminent domaiu

do not assume to go further than to appropriate the use,

[* 558] and the title * in fee still remains in the original owner.

In the common highways, the public have a perpetual

easement, but the soil is the property of the adjacent owner, and

he may make any use of it which does not interfere with the public

right of passage, and the public can use it only for the purposes

usual with such ways.3 And when the land ceases to be used by

1 People v. Canal Appraisers, 13 Wend. 355. And see Hatch v. Vermont

Central R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 49; Bellinger v. New York Central R.R. Co., 23

N. Y. 42; Gardner t>. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162.

■ Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 284; s. c. 35 N. Y. 454; Gardner p. Newburg,

2 Johns. Ch. 162.

3 In Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb. 390, a person who stood in the public wav
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the public as a way, the owner will again become restored to his

complete and exclusive possession, and the fee will cease to be

encumbered with the easement.1

It seems, however, to be competent for the State to appropriate

the title to the land in fee, and so to altogether exclude any use by

the former owner, except that which every individual citizen is en-

titled to make, if in the opinion of the legislature it is needful that

the fee be taken.2 The judicial decisions to this effect proceed

upon the idea that, in some cases, the public purposes cannot be

fully accomplished without appropriating the complete title; and

where this is so in the opinion of the legislature, the same reasons

which support the legislature in their right to decide absolutely

. and finally upon the necessity of the taking will also support their

decision as to the estate to be taken. The power, it is said in one

case, " must of necessity rest in the legislature, in order to secure

the useful exercise and enjoyment of the right in question. A

case might arise where a temporary use would be all that the public

interest required. Another case might require the permanent and
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apparently the perpetual occupation and enjoyment of the property

by the public; and the right to take it must be coextensive with

the necessity of the case, and the measure of compensation should

of course be graduated by the nature and the duration of the

estate or interest of which the owner is deprived." 3 And it was

therefore held, where the statute provided that lands might be

compulsorily taken in fee-simple for the purposes of an almshouse

extension, and they were taken accordingly, that the title of the

original owner was thereby entirely devested, so that when the

and abused the occupant of an adjoining lot was held liable in trespass as being

unlawfully there, because not using the highway for the purpose to which it was

appropriated.

1 Dean v. Sullivan R.R. Co., 2 Fost. 321; Blake v. Rich, 34 N. H. 282;

Henry v. Dubuque and Pacific R.R Co., 2 Iowa, 288; Weston p. Foster, 7 Met.

299; Quimby p. Vermont Central R.R. Co., 23 Vt. 387; Giesy v. Cincinnati,

&c, R.R. Co., 4 Ohio, n. s. 327.

* This, however, is forbidden by the Constitution of 11linois of 1870, in the

case of land taken for railroad tracks. Art. 2, § 13. And we think it would be

difficult to demonstrate the necessity for appropriating the fee in case of any

thoroughfare; and if never needful, it ought to be held incompetent.

3 Heyward p. Mayor, &c, of New York, 7 N. Y. 314. See also Dingley v.

Boston, 100 Mass. 544; Brooklyn Park Com'rs p. Armstrong, 2 Lans. 429; s. c.

on appeal, 45 N. Y. 234; and 6 Am. Rep. 70.
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[* 559] land ceased to * be used for the public purpose, the

title remained in the municipality which had appropriated

it, and did not revert to the former owner or his heirs.1 And it

does not seem to be uncommon to provide that, in the case of

some classes of public ways, and especially of city and village

streets, the dedication or appropriation to the public use shall vest

the title to the laud in the State, county, or city; the purposes for

which the land may be required by the public being so numerous

and varied, and so impossible of complete specification in advance,

that nothing short of a complete ownership in the public is deemed

sufficient to provide for them. In any case, however, an easement

only would bo taken, unless the statute plainly contemplated and

provided for tho appropriation of a larger interest.2

Compensation for Property taken.

It is a primary requisite, in the appropriation of lands for public

purposes, that compensation shall be made therefor. Eminent

domain differs from taxation in that, in the former case, the citizen

is compelled to surrender to the public something beyond his due

proportion for the public benefit. The public seize and appropriate

his particular estate, because it has special need for it, and not

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

because it is right, as between him and the government, that he

should surrender it.3 To him, therefore, the benefit and protection

he receives from the government are not sufficient compensation;

for those benefits are the equivalent for the taxes he pays, and the

other public burdens he assumes in common with the community at

large. And this compensation must be pecuniary in its character,

because it is in the nature of a payment for a compulsory purchase.'

1 Heyward v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 7 N. Y. 314. And see Baker r.

Johnson, 2 Hill, 348; Wheeler v. Rochester, &c., R.R. Co.. 12 Barb. JJJ|

Hunger v. Tonawanda R.lt. Co., 4 N. Y. 349; Rexford v. Knight, 11 1«*.T.

308; Commonwealth v. Fisher, 1 Pen. & Watts, 462; De Varaigue o. Fos,:!

Blatch. 96; Coster v. N. J. R.R. Co., 3 Zab. 227; Plitt v. Cox, 43 Perm. St.

486; Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234; s. c. 6 Am. Bep. 70.

s Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498; Rust v. Lowe, 6 Mass. 90; Jict-

son v. Rutland and B. R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 151; Jackson v. Hathaway, Is

Johns. 447.

3 People v. Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn, 4 N. S. 419; Woodbridge v. Detroit,

8 Mich. 278; Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 130.

4 The effect of the right of eminent domain against the individual " amouoti

to nothing more than a power to oblige him to sell and convey when the public
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*The time when the compensation must be made may [*560]

d epend upon the peculiar constitutional provisions of tlie

State. In some of the States, by express constitutional direction,

compensation must be made before the property is taken. No

c onstitutional principle, however, is violated by a statute which

all ows private property to be entered upon and temporarily occu-

pied for the purpose of a survey and other incipient proceedings,

with a view to judging and determining whether the public needs

require the appropriation or not, and, if so, what the proper loca-

tion shall be; and the party acting under this statutory author-

ity would neither be bound to make compensation for the temporary

possession, nor be liable to action of trespass.1 When, however,

the land has been viewed, and a determination arrived at to ap-

propriate it, the question of compensation is to be considered; and

in the absence of any express constitutional provision fixing the

time and the manner of making it, the question who is to take the

property — whether the State, or one of its political divisions or

municipalities, or, on the other hand, some private corporation —
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may be an important consideration.

When the property is taken directly by the State, or by any

municipal corporation by State authority, it has been repeatedly

held not to be essential to the validity of a law for the exercise of

the right of eminent domain, that it should provide for making

compensation before the actual appropriation. It is sufficient if

provision is made by the law by which the party can obtain com-

pensation, and that an impartial tribunal is provided for assess-

ing it.2 The decisions upon this point assume that, when the

necessities require it." Johnson, J., in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 145. And

see Bradshaw p. Rogers, 20 Johns. 103, per Spencer, Ch. J.; People p. Mayor,

&c, of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Carson v. Coleman, 3 Stockt. 106; Young p.

Harrison, 6 Geo. 131; United States v. Minnesota, &c, R.It. Co., 1 Minn. 127;

Railroad Co. p. Ferris, 26 Texas, 603; Curran v. Shattuck, 24 Cal. 427; State

v. Graves, 19 Md. 351.

1 Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 14 Wend. 51, and 18 Wend.

9; Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247; Nichols v. Somerset, &c, R.R. Co., 43 Me.

356; Mercer p. McWilliams, Wright (Ohio), 132; Walther p. Warner, 25 Mo.

277; Fox v. W. P. R.R. Co., 31 Cal. 538.

* Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9; Rogers p. Brad-

shaw, 20 Johns. 744; Calking p. Baldwin, 4 Wend. 667; Case v. Thompson, 6

Wend. 634; Fletcher p. Auburn and Syracuse R.R. Co., 25 Wend. 462; Rex-

ford p. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308; Taylor p. Marcy, 25 1ll. 518; Callison v. Hedrick,
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[* 561] State * has provided a remedy by resort to which the party

can have his compensation assessed, adequate means are

afforded for its satisfaction; since the property of the municipality,

or of the State, is a fund to which he can resort without risk of

loss.1 It is essential, however, that the remedy be one to which

the party can resort on his own motion; if the provision be such

that only the public authorities appropriating the land are author-

ized to take proceedings for the assessment, it must be held to be

void.2 But if the remedy is adequate, and the party is allowed to

pursue it, it is not unconstitutional to limit the period in which he

15 Grat. 214; Jackson v. Winn's Heirs, 4 Lit. 323; People v. Green, 3 Mick

496; Lyon ». Jerome, 26 Wend. 497, per Verplanek, Senator; Gardner v. Xe»-

burg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162; Charlestown Branch R.R. Co. e. Middlesex, 7 Met 78;

Harper v. Richardson, 22 Cal. 251; Baker v. Johnson, 2 Hill, 342; People c.

Harden, 6 Hill, 359; Long r. Fuller, 68 Penn. St. 170 (case of a school district).

"Although it may not be necessary, within the constitutional prorision, that the

amount of compensation should be actually ascertained and paid before property

is thus taken, it is, I apprehend, the settled doctrine, cren as against the Stat*

itself, that at least certain and adequate prorision must first be made by
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(except in cases of public emergency), so that the owner can coerce payment

through the judicial tribunals or otherwise, without any unreasonable or unneces-

sary delay; otherwise the law making the appropriation is no better than blank

paper. Bloodgood c. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9. The pro-

visions of the statute prescribing the mode of compensation in cases like the

present, when properly understood and administered, come fully up to this

great fundamental principle; and even if any doubt could be entertained about

the true construction, it should be made to lean in favor of the one that is found

to be most in conformity with the constitutional requisite." People v. Harden,

6 Hill, 359. "A provision for compensation is an indispensable attendant upon

the due and constitutional exercise of the power of depriving an individual of

his property." Gardner v. N^wburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 168; Buffalo, &c, R.R. Co.

v. Ferris, 26 Texas, 588; Ash v. Cummings, 50 N. H. 613; Haverhill Bridge

Proprietors v. County Com'rs, 103 Mass. 120; 8. c. 4 Am. Rep. 518; LangforJ

v. Com'rs of Ramsay Co., 16 Minn. 380; Southwestern R.R. Co. v. Telegraph

Co., 46'Geo. 43.

1 In Commissioners, &c. v. Bowie, 34 Ala. 461, it was held that a provision

by law that compensation when assessed should be paid to the owner by the

county treasurer sufficiently secured its payment. And see Talbot v. Hudson.

16 Gray, 417.

2 Shepardson v. Milwaukee and Beloit R.R. Co., 6 Wis. 605; Powers r. Bears.

12 Wis. 220. See McCann v. Sierra Co., 7 Cal. 121; Colton v. Rossi, 9 &L

595; Ragatz v. Dubuque, 4 Iowa, 343. But in People r. Hayden, 6 Hill. 359.

where the statute provided for appraisers who were to proceed to appraise the

land as soon as it was appropriated, the proper remedy of the owner, if they

failed to perform this duty, was held to be to apply for a mandamus.
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shall resort to it, and to provide that, unless he shall take pro-

ceedings for the assessment of damages within a specified time, all

right thereto shall be barred.1 The right to compensation, when

property is appropriated by the public, may always be

waived ;2 and a failure to apply for and * have the com- [* 562]

pensation assessed, when reasonable time and opportunity

and a proper tribunal are afforded for the purpose, may well be

considered a waivep.

Where, however, the property is not taken by the State, or by a

municipality, but by a private corporation which, though for this

purpose to be regarded as a public agent, appropriates it for the

benefit and profit of its members, and which may or may not be

sufficiently responsible to make secure and certain the payment,

in all cases, of the compensation which shall be assessed, it is cer-

tainly proper, and it has sometimes been questioned whether it

was not absolutely essential, that payment be actually made before

the owner could be devested of his freehold.3 Chancellor Kent has

expressed the opinion, that compensation and appropriation should

be concurrent. "The settled and fundamental doctrine is, that

government has no right to take private property for public pur-
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poses, without giving just compensation; and it seems to bo neces-

sarily implied that the indemnity should, in cases which will admit

of it, be previously and equitably ascertained, and be ready for

reception, concurrently in point of time with the actual exercise of

the right of eminent domain."4 And while this is not an inflex-

ible rule unless in terms established by the constitution, it is so

just and reasonable that statutory provisions for taking private

property very generally make payment precede or accompany the

appropriation, and by several of the State constitutions this is

expressly required.6 And on general principles, it is essential

1 People v. Green, 3 Mich. 496; Charlestown Branch R.R. Co. v. Middlesex,

7 Met. 78; Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308; Taylor p. Marcy, 25 Ill. 518;

Callison v. Hedrick, 15 Grat. 244; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Harper

v. Richardson, 22 Cal. 251; Cupp v. Commissioners of Seneca, 19 Ohio,

n. s. 173.

• Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. 149; Brown v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 31. •

3 This is the intimation in Shepardson v. Milwaukee and Beloit R.R. Co., 6

Wis. 605; Powers v. Bears. 12 Wis. 220; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351; Dron-

berger v. Reed, 11 Ind. 420. But see Calking v. Baldwin, 4 Wend. 667.

4 2 Kent, 399, note.

4 The Constitution of Florida provides "that private propertv shall not be
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that an adequate fund be provided from which the owner of the

property can certainly obtain compensation; it is not competent to

deprive him of his property, and turn him over to an action at law

against a corporation which may or may not prove respon-

[* 5G3] sible, * and to a judgment of uncertain efficacy.1 For

the consequence would be, in some cases, that the party

might lose his estate without redress, in violation of the inflexible

maxim upon which the right is based.

What the tribunal shall be which is to assess the compensation

must be determined either by the constitution or by the statute

which provides for the appropriation. The case is not one where,

as a matter of right, the party is entitled to a trial by jury, un-

less the constitution has provided that tribunal for the purpose.5

Nevertheless, the proceeding is judicial in its character, and the

party in interest is entitled to have an impartial tribunal, and the

usual rights and privileges which attend judicial investigations.

It is not competent for the State itself to fix the compensation

through the legislature, for this would make it the judge in its

own cause.3 And, if a jury is provided, the party must have the

ordinary opportunity to appear when it is to be impanelled, that
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he may make any legal objections.4 And he lias the same right to

notice of the time and place of assessment that he would have in

taken or applied to public use, unless just compensation be first made therefor."

Art. 1, § 14. See also, to the same effect, Constitution of Georgia, art. 1, § 17;

Constitution of Iowa, art. 1, § 18; Constitution of Kansas, art. 12, § 4; Consti-

tution of Kentucky, art. 13, § 14; Constitution of Minnesota, art. 1, § 13;

Constitution of Mississippi, art. 1, § 13; Constitution of Nevada, art. 1, § S;

Constitution of Ohio, art. 1, § 19. The Constitution of Indiana, art. 1, § 21,

and that of Oregon, art. 1, § 19, require compensation to be first made, except

when the property is appropriated by the State.

1 Sliepardson v. Milwaukee and Beloit R.R. Co., 6 Wis. 605; Walther r.

Warner, 25 Mo. 277; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Curran v. Shattuck,

24 Cal. 427; Memphis and Charleston R.R. Co. v. Payne, 37 Miss. 700;

Henry v. Dubuque and Pacific R.R. Co., 10 Iowa, 540; Ash i\ Cummings, 50

N. H. 591; Carr ». Georgia R.R. Co., 1 Kelly, 532; Southwestern RR. Co. r.

Telegraph Co., 46 Geo. 43.

» Petition of Mount Washington Co., 35 N. H. 134.

3 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 344; s. c. 11 Pet. 571,

per McLean, J.

* People o. Tallman, 36 Barb. 222 ; Booneville v. Ormrod, 26 Miss. 193. A

jury, without further explanation in the law, must be understood as one of twelve

persons. Lamb o. Lane, 4 Ohio, N. 8. 167.
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any other case of judicial proceedings, and the assessment will

be invalid if no such notice is given.1 These are just as well as

familiar rules, and they are perhaps invariably recognized in legis-

lation.

It is not our purpose to follow these proceedings, and to atteitfpt

to point out the course of practice to be observed, and which is so

different under the statutes of different States. An inflexible rule

should govern them all, that the interest and exclusive right of the

owner is to be regarded and protected so far as may be consistent

with a recognition of the public necessity. While the owner is

not to be disseised until compensation is provided, neither, on the

other hand, when the public authorities have taken such steps as

to finally settle upon the appropriation, ought he to be left

in a * state of uncertainty, and compelled to wait for com- [* 564]

pensation until some future time, when they may see fit

to occupy it. The land should either be his or he should be paid

for it. Whenever, therefore, the necessary steps have been taken

on the part of the public to select the property to be taken, locate
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the public work, and declare the appropriation, the owner becomes

absolutely entitled to the compensation, whether the public pro-

ceed at once to occupy the property or not. If a street is legally

established over the land of an individual, he is entitled to demand

payment of his damages, without waiting for the street to be

opened.2 And if a railway line is located across his land, and the

damages are appraised, his right to payment is complete, and he

cannot be required to wait until the railway company shall actu-

ally occupy his premises, or enter upon the construction of the

road at that point. It is not to be forgotten, however, that the

proceedings for the assessment and collection of damages are stat-

utory, and displace the usual remedies; that the public agents who

1 Hood v. Finch, 8 Wis. 381; Dickey v. Tennison. 27 Mo. 373.

* Philadelphia v. Dickson, 38 Penn. St. 247; Philadelphia v. Dyer, 41 Penn.

St. 463; Hallock v. Franklin County, 2 Met. 559; Harrington r. County Com-

missioners, 22 Pick. 268; Blake v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 66; Higgins r. Chicago,

18 111. 276; County of Peoria v. Harvey, ib. 364; Shaw r. Charlestown, 3 Allen,

538; Hampton v. Coffin, 4 N. H. 517; Clough v. Unity, 18 N. H. 77. And

where a city thus appropriates land for a street, it would not be allowed to set

up in defence to a demand for compensation its own irregularities in the pro-

ceedings taken to condemn the land. Higgins v. Chicago, 18 111. 276; Chicago

r. Wheeler, 25 111. 478.

[ 663 ]

* 564

£CH. XV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

keep within the statute are not liable to common-law action ;1 tlv

it is only where they fail to follow the statute that tiny render

themselves liable as trespassers;2 though if they construct their

work in a careless, negligent, and improper manner, by means of

which carelessness, negligence, or improper construction a party is

injured in his rights, ho may have an action at the common law as

in other cases of injurious negligence.3 ,

[*565] * The principle upon which the damages are to be

assessed is always an important consideration in these

cases; and the circumstances of different appropriations are some-

times so peculiar that it has been found somewhat difficult to

establish a rule that shall always be just and equitable. If the

whole of a man's estate is taken, there can generally be little diffi-

culty in fixing upon the measure of compensation; for it is appar-

ent that, in such a case, he ought to have the whole market value

of his premises, and he cannot reasonably demand more. The

question is reduced to one of market value, to be determined upon

the testimony of those who have knowledge upon that subject,
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or whose business or experience entitles their opinions to weight

It may be that, in such a case, the market value may not seem to

the owner an adequate compensation; for he may have reasons

peculiar to himself, springing from association, or other cause,

which make him unwilling to part with the property on the esti-

mate of his neighbors; but such reasons are incapable of being

taken into account in legal proceedings, where the question is one

of compensation in money, inasmuch as it is manifestly impossible

to measure them by any standard of pecuniary value. Concede

to the government a right to appropriate the property on paying

for it, and we are at once remitted to the same standards for esti-

mating values which are applied in other cases, and which neces-

1 East and West India Dock, &c, Co. v. Gattke, 15 Jap. 61; Kimble p.

White Water Valley Canal, 1 Ind. 285; Mason v. Kennebec, &c, R.R. Co., 31

Me. 215; Aldrich v. Cheshire R.R. Co., 1 Fost. 359; Brown v. Beatty, 84 Miss.

227; Pettibone v. La Crosse and Milwaukee R.R. Co., 14 Wis. 443; Vilas v.

Milwaukee and Mississippi R.R. Co., 15 Wis. 233.

* Dean v. Sullivan R.R. Co., 2 Fost. 316; Furniss v. Hudson River R.R. Co.,

5 Sandf. 551.

5 Lawrence v. Great Northern R. Co., 20 L. J. Rep. Q. B. 293; Bagnall p.

London and N. W. R., 7 H. & N. 423; Brown p. Cayuga and Susquehanna

R.R. Co., 12 N. Y. 487.
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sarily measure the worth of property by its value as an article of

sale, or as a means of producing pecuniary returns.

When, however, only a portion of a parcel of land is appropri-

ated, just compensation may perhaps depend upon the effect which

the appropriation may have on the owner's interest in the remain-

der, to increase or diminish its value, in consequence of the use to

which that taken is to be devoted, or in consequence of the con-

dition in which it may leave the remainder in respect to conven-

ience of use. If, for instance, a public way is laid out through a

tract of land which before was not accessible, and if in conse-

quence it is given a front, or two fronts, upon the street, which

furnish valuable and marketable sites for building lots, it may be

that the value of that which remains is made, in consequence of

taking a part, vastly greater than the whole was before, and that

the owner is benefited instead of damnified by the appropriation.

Indeed, the great majority of streets in cities and villages are

dedicated to the public use by the owners of lands, with-

out any other * compensation or expectation of compensa- [* 566]

tion than the increase in market value which is expected

to be given to such lands thereby; and this is very often the case
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with land for other public improvements, which are supposed to be

of peculiar value to the locality in which they are made. But

where, on the other hand, a railroad is laid out across a man's

premises, running between his house and his outbuildings, neces-

sitating, perhaps, the removal of some of them, or upon such a

grade as to render deep cuttings or high embankments necessary,

and thereby greatly increasing the inconveniences attending the

management and use of the land, as well as the risks of accidental

injuries, it will often happen that the pecuniary loss which he

would suffer by the appropriation of the right of way would greatly

exceed the value of the land taken, and to pay him that value only

would be to make very inadequate compensation.

It seems clear that, in these cases, it is proper and just that the

injuries suffered and the benefits received, by the proprietor, as

owner of the remaining portion of the land, should be taken into

account in measuring the compensation. This, indeed, is generally

conceded; but what injuries shall be allowed for, or what benefits

estimated, is not always so apparent. The question, as we find it

considered by the authorities, seems to be, not so much what the

value is of that which is taken, but whether what remains is.
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reduced in value by the appropriation, and, if so, to what extent;

in other words, what pecuniary injury the owner sustains by a part

of his land being appropriated. But, in estimating either the

injuries or the benefits, those which the owner sustains or receives

in common- with the community generally, and which are not

peculiar to him and connected with his ownership, use, and enjoy-

ment of the particular parcel of land, should be altogether ex-

cluded, as it would be unjust to compensate him for the one, or

to charge him with the other, when no account is taken of such

incidental benefits and injuries with other citizens who receive.or

feel them equally with himself, but whose lands do not chance to

be taken.1

1 In Somerville and Easton R.R. Co. ads. Doughty, 2 Zab. 495, a motion »u

made for a new trial on an assessment of compensation for land taken by a rail-

road company, on the ground that the judge in his charge to the jury informed

them " that they were authorized by law to ascertain and assess the damages sus-

tained by the plaintiff to his other lands not taken and occupied by the defend-

ants; to his dwelling-house, and other buildings and improvements, by reducing
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their value, changing their character, obstructing their free use, by subjecting his

buildings to the hazards of fire, his family and stock to injury and obstruction in

their necessary passage across the road, the inconvenience caused by embank-

ments or excavations, and, in general, the effect of the railroad upon his adjacent

lands, in deteriorating their value, in the condition they were found, whether

adapted for agricultural purposes only, or for dwellings, stores, shops, or other

like purposes."

"On a careful review of this charge," says the judge, delivering the opinion

of the court, " I cannot see that any legal principle was violated, or any unsound

doctrine advanced. . The charter provides that the jury shall assess the value of

the land and materials taken by the company, and the damages. The damages

here contemplated are not damages to the land actually occupied or covered by

the road, but such damages as the owner may sustain in his other and adjacent

lands not occupied by the company's road. His buildings may be reduced in

value by the contiguity of the road, and the use of engines upon it. His landa

and buildings, before adapted and used for particular purposes, may, from the

same cause, become utterly unfitted for such purposes. The owner may be in-

commoded by high embankments or deep excavations on the line of the road, his

buildings subjected to greater hazard from fire, his household and stock to injury

or destruction, unless guarded with more than ordinary care. It requires no

special experience or sagacity to perceive that such are the usual and natural

effects of railroads upon the adjoining lands, and which necessarily deteriorate

not only their marketable but their intrinsic value. The judge, therefore, did

not exceed his duty in instructing the jury that these were proper subjects for

their consideration in estimating the damages which the plaintiff might sustain by

reason of the location of this road upon and across his lands." And in the same

. case it was held that the jury, in assessing compensation, were to adopt as the
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* The question, then, in these cases, relates first to the [* 567]

value of the land appropriated; which is to be assessed

with reference to what * it is worth for sale, in view of the [* 568]

uses to which it may be applied, and not simply in refer-

ence to its productiveness to the owner in the condition in which

he has seen fit to leave it.1 Second, if less than the whole estate

is taken, then there is further to be considered how much the por-

standard of value for the lands taken, not such a price as they would bring at a

forced sale in the market for money, but such a price as they could be purchased

at, provided they were for sale, and the owner asked such prices as, in the opinion

of the community, they were reasonably worth; that it was matter of universal

experience that land would not always bring at a forced sale what it was reason-

ably worth, and the owner, not desiring to sell, could not reasonably be required

to take less. In Sater v. Burlington and Mount Pleasant Plank-Road Co., 1 Iowa,

393, Isbell, J., says: "The terms used in the constitution, 'just compensation,'

are not ambiguous. They undoubtedly mean a fair equivalent; that the person

whose property is taken shall be made whole. But while the end to be attained

is plain, the mode of arriving at it is not without its difficulty. On due consid-

eration, we see no more practical rule than to first ascertain the fair marketable
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value of the premises over which the proposed improvement is to pass, irrespective

of such improvement, and also a like value of the same, in the condition in which

they will be immediately after the land for the improvement has been taken,

irrespective of the benefit which will result from the improvement, and the dif-

ference in value to constitute the measure of compensation. But in ascertaining

the depreciated value of the premises after that part which has been taken for

public use has been appropriated, regard must be bad only to the immediate, and

not remote, consequence of the appropriation; that is to say, the value of the

remaining premises is not to be depreciated by heaping consequence on conse-

quence. While we see no more practical mode of ascertainment than this, yet

it must still be borne in mind that this is but a mode of ascertainment; that,

after all, the true criterion is the one provided by the constitution, namely, just

compensation for the property taken." See this rule illustrated and applied in

Henry v. Dubuque and Pacific R.R. Co., 2 Iowa, 800, where it is said: "That

the language of the constitution means that the person whose property is taken

for public use shall have a fair equivalent in money for the injury done him by

such taking; in other words, that he shall be made whole so far as money is a

measure of compensation, we are equally cleap. This just compensation should

be precisely commensurate with the injury sustained by having the property

taken; neither more nor less." And see the recent Kentucky cases of Richmond,

&p., Co. v. Rogers, 1 Duvall, 135; Robinson p. Robinson, to. 162.

1 Matter of Furman Street, 17 Wend. 669 ; Tide-Water Canal Co. v. Archer,

9 Gill & J. 480; State v. Burlington, &c, R.R. Co., 1 Iowa, 386; Parks p.

Boston, 15 Pick. 206; First Parish, l8sp. v. Middlesex, 7 Gray, 106; Dickenson

v. Inhabitants of Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546; Lexington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369.
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tion not taken is increased or diminished in value in consequence

of the appropriation.1

1 Denton r. Polk, 9 Iowa, 594; Parks ». Boston, 15 Pick. 198; Dickenson r.

Fitcbburg, 13 Gray, 546; Harvey v. Lackawana, &c, R.R. Co., 47 Penn. St. 428;

Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 258; Pacific R.R. Co. ». Chrystal, it.;Ai\

Somerville and Eastern R.R. Co. ads. Doughty, 2 Zab. 495; Carpenter o. Lan-

dalT, 42 N. H. 218; Troy and Boston R.R. Co. v. Lee, 13 Barb. 169; Tide-

Water Canal Co. c. Archer, 9 Gill and J. 480; Winona and St. Paul R.R. Co.

v. Waldron, 11 Minn. 515; Nicholson v. N. Y. and N. H. R.R. Co., 22 Conn.

74; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189. "Compensation is an equivalent for

property taken, or for an injur)'. It must be ascertained by estimating the

actual damage the party has sustained. That damage is the sum of the actual

value of the property taken, and of the injury done to the residue of the property

by the use of that part which is taken. The benefit is, in part, an equivalent to

the loss and damage. The loss and damage of the defendant is the value of the

land the company has taken, and the injury which the location and use of the

road through his tract may cause to the remainder. The amount which maybe

assessed for these particulars the company admits that it is bound to pay. But

as a set-off, it claims credit for the benefit the defendant has received from the
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construction of the road. That benefit may consist in the enhanced value of the.

residue of his tract. When the company has paid the defendant the excess of

his loss or damage over and above the benefit and advantage he has derived from

the road, he will have received a just compensation. It is objected that the

enhanced salable value of the land should not be assessed as a benefit to the

defendant, because it is precarious and uncertain. The argument admits that

the enhanced value, if permanent, should be assessed. But whether the appreci-

ation is permanent and substantial, or transient and illusory, is a subject about

which the court is not competent to determine. It must be submitted to a jury,

who will give credit to the company according to the circumstances. The argu-

ment is not tenable, that an increased salable value is no benefit to the owner of

land unless he sells it. This is true if it be assumed that the price will decline.

The chance of this is estimated by the jury, in the amount which they may assess

for that benefit. The sum assessed is therefore (so far as human foresight can

anticipate the future) the exponent of the substantial increase of the value of the

land. This is a benefit to the owner, by enlarging his credit and his ability to

pay his debts or provide for his family, in the same manner and to the same extent

as if his fortune was increased by an acquisition of property." Greenville and

Columbia R.R. Co. v. Partlow, 5 Rich. 437. And see Pennsylvania RR. Co.

v. Reiley, 8 Penn. St. 445; Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend. 153; Upton r.

South Reading Branch R.R., 8 Cush. 600; Proprietors, &c. v. Nashua and Lowell

R.R. Co., 10 Cush. 385; Mayor, &c, of Lexington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369; St.

Louis, &c, R.R. Co. o. Richardson, 45 Mo. 468; Little Miami R.R. Co. t.

Collett, 6 Ohio, n. s. 182; Bigelow v. West Wisconsin R.R. Co., 27 Wis. 487.

In Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 358, the right to assess benefits was referred

to the taxing power; but this seems not necessary, and indeed somewhat difficult

on principle. See Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville, 5 Dana, 30-34.
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* But, in making tins estimate, there must be excluded [* 569]

from consideration those benefits which the owner receives

only in common with the community at large in conse-

quence of his ownership of other property,1 * and also those [* 570]

incidental injuries to other property, such as would not

give to other persons a right to compensation,2 while allowing those

1 Dickenson v. Inhabitants of Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546; Newby v. Platte

County, 25 Mo. 258; Pacific R.R. Co. ». Chrystal, to. 5-14; Carpenter v. Lan-

daff, 42 N. H. 218; Mount Washington Co.'s Petition, 35 N. H. 134; Penrice

v. Wallis, 37 Miss. 172; Palmer Co. ». Ferrill, 17 Pick. 58; Meacham v. Fitch-

burg R.R. Co., 4 Cush. 291, where the jury were instructed that, if they were

satisfied that the laying out and constructing; of the railroad had occasioned any

benefit or advantage to the lands of the petitioner through which tin; ro.id passed,

or lands immediately adjoining or connected therewith, rendering the part not

taken for the railroad more convenient or useful to the petitioner, or giving it

some peculiar increase in value compared with other lands generally in the

vicinity, it would be the doty of the jury to allow for such benefit, or increase of
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value, by way of set-off, in favor of the railroad company; but, on the other

hand, if the construction of the railroad, by increasing the convenience of the

people of the town generally as a place for residence, and by its anticipated and

probable effect in increasing the population, business, and general prosperity of

the place, had been the occasion of an increase in the salable value of real estate

generally near the station, including the petitioner's land, and thereby occasion-

ing a benefit or advantage to him, in common with other owners of real estate in

the vicinity, this benefit was too contingent, indirect, and remote to be brought

into consideration in settling the question of damages to the petitioner for taking

his particular parcel of land. Upton v. South Reading Branch R.R. Co., 8 Cush.

600. It has sometimes been objected, with great force, that it was unjust, and

oppressive to set off benefits against the loss and damage which the owner of the

property sustains, because thereby he is taxed for such benefits, while his neigh-

bors, no part of whose land is taken, enjoy the same benefits without the loss;

and the courts of Kentucky have held it to be unconstitutional, and that full com-

pensation for the land taken must be made in money Sutton o. Louisville, 5

Dana, 28; Rice v. Turnpike Co., 7 Dana, 81; Jacob v. Louisville, 9 Dana, 114.

And some other States have established, by their constitutions, the rule that ben-

efits shall not be deducted. Sec Deaton v. County of Polk, 9 Iowa, 596; Giesy

t. Cincinnati, W. and Z. R.R. Co., 4 Ohio, n. s. 308; Woodfolk v. Nashville

R.R. Co., 2 Swan, 422. But the cases generally adopt the doctrine stated in

the text; and if the owner is paid his actual damages, he has no occasion to

complain because his neighbors are fortunate enough to receive a benefit. Green-

ville and Columbia R.R. Co. v. Partlow, 5 Rich. 438; Mayor, &c, of Lexington

v. Long, 31 Mo. 869.

4 Somerville, &c., R.R. Co. ads. Doughty, 2 Zab. 495; Dorian v. East Bran-

dywine, &c, R.R. Co., 46 Penn. St. 520; Proprietors, &c. v. Nashua and Lowell

R.R. Co., 10 Cush. 385; Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. t>. Thompson, 18 B.

Monr. 735; Winona and St. Peter's R.R. Co. v. Denman, 10 Minn. 267.
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which directly affect the value of the remainder of the land not

taken; such as the necessity for increased fencing, and the like.1

And if an assessment on these principles makes the benefits equal

the damages, and awards the owner nothing, he is nevertheless to

be considered as having received full compensation, and conse-

quently as not being in position to complain.2

The statutory assessment of compensation will cover all conse-

quential damages which the owner of the land sustains by means

of the construction of the work, except such as may result

[* 571] from * negligence or improper construction,8 and for which

an action at the common law will lie, as already stated.

1 Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Reiley, 8 Penn. St. 445; Greenville and Columbis

R.R. Co. v. Partlow, 5 Rich. 439; Dearborn v. Railroad Co., 4 Fost. 179; Car-

penter v. LandafT, 42 N. H. 220; Dorian v. East Brandywine, &c., R.R. Co.,

46 Penn. St. 520; Winona and St. Peter's R.R. Co. c. Denman, 10 Minn. 267;

Mount Washington Co.'s Petition, 35 N. H. 134. Where a part of a meeting-

house lot was taken for a highway, it was held that the anticipated annoyance to

worshippers by the use of the way by noisy and dissolute persons on the Sabbatk
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could form no basis for any assessment of damages. First Parish in Wobum r.

Middlesex County, 7 Gray, 106.

'.White v. County Commissioners of Norfolk, 2 Cush. 361; Whitman v. Bos-

ton and Maine R.R. Co., 3 Allen, 133; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189.

But it is not competent for the commissioners who assess the compensation to

require that which is to be made to be in whole or in part in any thing else than

money. An award of "one hundred and fifty dollars, with a wagon-way and

stop for cattle,"' is void, as undertaking to pay the owner in part in convenience

to be furnished him, and which he may not want, and certainly cannot be com-

pelled to take instead of money. Central Ohio R.R. Co. v. Holler, 7 Ohio,

n. s. 225.

3 Philadelphia and Reading R.R. Co. v. Yeiser, 8 Penn. St. 36C; O'Connor

v. Pittsburg, 18 Penn. St. 187; Aldrich v. Cheshire R.R. Co., 1 Fost. 359;

Dearborn v. Boston, Concord, and Montreal R.R. Co., 4 Fost. 179; Eaton r

Boston R.R. Co., 51 N. H. 504; Dodge v. County Commissioners, 3 Met. 380;

Brown v. Providence, W. and B. R.R. Co., 5 Gray, 35; Mason p. Kennebec

and Portland R.R. Co., 31 Me. 215; Bellinger v. N. Y. Central R.R. Co., 23

N. Y. 42; Hatch v. Vt. Central R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 49; Slatten v. Des Moinea

Valley R.R. Co., 29 Iowa, 154. A corporation appropriating property under the

right of eminent domain is always liable for any abuse of the privilege or neglect

of duty under the law under which they proceed. Fehr v. Schuylkill Nav. Co..

G9 Penn. St. 161; Eaton v. Boston, C. and M. R.R. Co., 51 N. H. 504; Tore

Haute, &c, R.R. Co. v. McKinley, 33 Ind. 274.
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THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATES.

On questions of conflict between national and State authority,

and on questions whether the State exceeds its just powers in deal-

ing with the property and restraining the actions of individuals, it

often becomes necessary to consider the extent and proper bounds

of a power in the States, which, like that of taxation, pervades

every department of business and reaches to every interest and

every subject of profit or enjoyment. We refer to what is known

as the police power.

The police of a State, in a comprehensive sense, embraces its

system of internal regulation, by which it is sought not only to

preserve the public order and to prevent offences against the State,

but also to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen

those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are

calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the

uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably con-

sistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others.1

In the present chapter we shall take occasion to speak of the

police power principally as it affects the use and enjoyment of
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property; the object being to show the universality of its presence,

1 Blackstone defines the public police and economy as "the due regulation

and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the inhabitants of a. State, like

members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior

to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be

decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations." 4 Bl. Com.

162. Jeremy Bentham, in his General View of Public Offences, has this defini-

tion: "Police is in general a system of precaution, either for the prevention of

crimes or of calamities. Its business may be distributed into eight distinct

branches: 1. Police for the prevention of offences; 2. Police for the prevention

of calamities; 3. Police for the prevention of endemic diseases; i. Police of

charity; 5. Police of interior communications; 6. Police of public amusements;

7. Police for recent intelligence; 8. Police for registration." Edinburgh Ed. o£

Works, Part IX. p. 157.

[671]
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and to indicate, so far as may be practicable, the limits which set-

tled principles of constitutional law assign to its interference.

"We think it is a settled principle," says Chief Justice

[* 573] Shaw, * " growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil

society, that every holder of property, however absolute

and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability

that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of

others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property,

nor injurious to the rights of the community. AU property in this

Commonwealth is . . . held subject to those general regulations

which are necessary to the common good and general welfare.

Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights,

are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as

shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable

restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature,

under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the

constitution, may think necessary and expedient. This is very dif-

ferent from the right of eminent domain,— the right of a govern-
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ment to take and appropriate private property whenever the public

exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of pro-

viding a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude

to is rather the police power; the power vested in the legislature

by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of

wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either

with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as

they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the Common-

wealth, and of the subjects of the same. It is much easier to per-

ceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to

mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise." 1

"This police power of the State," says another eminent judge,

"extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and

quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the

State. According to the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non

1 Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 84. See also Commonwealth p. Tewks-

bury, 11 Met. 57; Hart v. Mayor, &c, of Albany, 9 Wend. 571; New Albany

and Salem R.R. Co. v. Tilton, 12 Ind. 3; Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.K. Co.

v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84 j Ohio and Mississippi R.R. Co. v. McClelland, 25

111. 140; People v. Draper, 25 Barb. 874; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 390;

Police Commissioners v. Louisville, 3 Bush, 597; Wynehamer v. People, 13

N. Y. 402.
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Icedas, which being of universal application, it must, of course, be

within the range of legislative action to define the mode and man-

ner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure

others." And again: [By this] "general police power of the

State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints

and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,

health, and prosperity of the * State; of the perfect right [* 574]

in the legislature to do which, no question ever was, or,

upon acknowledged general principles, ever can be made, so far

as natural persons are concerned."1

In the American constitutional system, the power to establish

the ordinary regulations of police has been left with the individual

States, and cannot be assumed by the national government.2

Neither can the national government through any of its depart-

ments or officers assume any supervision of the police regulations

of the States, so long as they do not invade the sphere of national

sovereignty, and obstruct or impede the exercise of any authority

which the constitution has confided to the nation.3 But on the
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1 Redfield, Ch. J., in Thorpe p. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 149.

See the maxim, Sic utere, &c, —" Enjoy your own property in such manner as

not to injure that of another," — in Broom, Legal Maxims, 5th Am. ed. p. 327.

See also Turbeville v. Stampe, 1 Ld. Raym. 264, and 1 Salk. 13; Jeffries v.

Williams, 5 Exch. 792; Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739; Pixley v. Clark,

35 N. Y. 520.

'So decided in United States v. DeWitt, 9 Wall. 41, in which a section of the

Internal Revenue Act of 1867 — which undertook to make it a misdemeanor to

mix for sale naphtha and illuminating oils, or to sell oil of petroleum inflammable

at a less temperature than 110° Fahrenheit — was held to be a mere police regu-

lation, and as such void within the States.

3 See this subject considered at large in the License Cases, 5 How. 504, and

the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283. Congress has no power to authorize a busi-

ness within a State which is prohibited by the State. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall.

471, per Chase, Ch. J. A claim has recently been advanced at New Orleans,

that the Civil Rights Bill, in connection with the new amendments to the national

Constitution, has so far enlarged the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, as to

authorize them, at the suit of citizens of a State, to review one of its statutes

purporting to establish a police regulation, and to adjudge it void if in their

opinion it wrongfully abridged the right of citizens to follow a lawful employ-

ment; but this claim has not been sustained either in the Supreme Court of

Louisiana, or in the Federal Supreme Court. See Live Stock, &c, Association

v. Crescent City, &c, Co., recently decided in the latter court; Story on Const.

Appendix to Vol. 2.

In State p. Hairston, 63 N. C. 451, it was decided that the recent amend-
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other hand it is easy to see that the power in the States might be

so employed as to interfere with the jurisdiction of the general

government; and some of the most serious questions regarding the

police of the States concern the cases in which authority has been

conferred upon Congress. In those cases it has sometimes been

claimed that the ordinary police jurisdiction is by necessary impli-

cation excluded, and that, if it were not so, the State would be

found operating within the sphere of the national powers, and

establishing regulations which would either abridge the rights

which the national Constitution undertakes to render absolute, or

burden the privileges which are conferred by law of Congress, and

which therefore cannot properly be subject to the interference or

control of any other authority. But any accurate statement of the

theory upon which the police power rests will render it apparent

that a proper exercise of it by the State cannot come in conflict

with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. If

the power extends only to a just regulation of rights with a view

to the due protection and enjoyment of all, and does not deprive
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any one of that which is justly and properly his own, it is obvious

that its possession by the State, and its exercise for the regulation

of the property and actions of its citizens, cannot well constitute at

invasion of national jurisdiction, or afford a basis for an appeal to

the protection of the national authorities.

The occasions to consider this subject in its bearings upon ik

clause of the Constitution of the United States which forbids tie

States passing any laws violating the obligation of contracts have

been frequent and varied; and it has been held without dissent

that this clause does not so far remove from State control tbe

rights and properties which depend for their existence or enforce

ment upon contracts, as to relieve them from the operation of sud

general regulations for the good government of the State and tla

protection of the rights of individuals as may be deemed important.

All contracts and all rights, it is declared, are subject to this power;

and not only may regulations which affect them be established br

the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change froc

time to time, as the general well-being of the community mif

ments to the national Constitution have not had the effect to repeal a State In

forbidding marriages between white persons and negroes. And see fln/«iSI.

note.

[674]

CH. XVI.]

* 574

THE POLICE POWER OP THE STATES.

require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience

may demonstrate the necessity.1

1 In the case of Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, a

question arose under a provision in the Vermont General Railroad Law of 1849,

which required each railroad corporation to erect and maintain fences on the line

of their road, and also cattle guards at all farm and road crossings, suitable and

sufficient to prevent cattle and other animals from getting upon the railroad, and

which made the corporation and its agents liable for all damages which should

be done by their agents or engines to cattle, horses, or other animals thereon, if

occasioned by the want of such fences and cattle guards. It was not disputed

that this provision would be valid as to such corporations as might be afterwards

created within the State; but in respect to those previously in existence, and

whose charters contained no such provision, it was claimed that this legislation

was inoperative, since otherwise its effect would be to modify, and to that extent

to violate, the obligation of the charter-contract. "The case," say the court,

"resolves itself into the narrow question of the right of the legislature, by gen-

eral statute, to require all railways, whether now in operation or hereafter to be

chartered or built, to fence their roads upon both sides, and provide sufficient
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cattle guards at all farm and road crossings, under penalty of paying all damages

caused by their neglect to comply with such requirements . . . We think the

power of the legislature to control existing railways in this respect may be found

in the general control over the police of the country, which resides in the law-

making power in all free States, and which is, by the fifth article of the bill of

rights of this State, expressly declared to reside perpetually and inalienably in

the legislature; which is, perhaps, no more than the enunciation of a general

principle applicable to all free States, and which cannpt therefore be violated so

as to deprive the legislature of the power, even by express grant to any mere

public or private corporation. And when the regulation of the police of a city or

town, by general ordinances, is given to such towns and cities, and the regula-

tion of their own internal police is given to railroads to be carried into effect by

their by-laws and other regulations, it is of course always, in all such cases, sub-

ject to the superior control of the legislature. That is a responsibility which

legislatures cannot devest themselves of if they would.

"So far as railroads are concerned, this police power which resides primarily

and ultimately in the legislature is twofold: 1. The police of the roads, which,

in the absence of legislative control, the corporations themselves exercise over

their operatives, and to some extent over all who do business with them, or come

upon their grounds, through their general statutes, and by their officers. We

apprehend there can be no manner of doubt that the legislature may, if they

deem the public good requires it, of which they are to judge, and in all doubtful

cases their judgment is final, require the several railroads in the State to establish

and maintain the same kind of police which is now observed upon some of the

more important roads in the country for their own security, or even such a police

as is found upon the English railways, and those upon the continent of Europe.

No one ever questioned the right of the Connecticut legislature to require trains

upon all of their railroads to come to a stand before passing draws in bridges; or
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[* 575] * Perhaps the most striking illustrations of the principle

here stated will be found among the judicial decisions

[* 576] which have held * that the rights insured to private cor-

porations by their charters, and the manner of their exer-

cise, are subject to such new regulations as from time to time maj

be made by the State with a view to the public protection, health,

of the Massachusetts legislature to require the same thing before passing another

railroad. And by parity of reasoning may all railways be required so to conduct

themselves as to other persons, natural or corporate, as not unreasonably to injure

them or their property. And if the business of railways is specially dangerous,

they may be required to bear the expense of erecting such safeguard* as will

render it ordinarily safe to others, as is often required of natural persons under

such circumstances.

"There would be no end of illustrations upon this subject. ... It maybe

extended to the supervision of the track, tending switches, running upon the

time of other trains, running a road with a single track, using improper rails, not

using proper precaution by way of safety-beams in case of the breaking of axle-

trees, the number of brakemen upon a train with reference to the number of cars,
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employing intemperate or incompetent engineers and servants, running beyond

a given rate of speed, and a thousand similar things, most of which have bees

made the subject of legislation or judicial determination, and all of which maybe.

Hegeman p. Western R. Co., 16 Barb. 353.

"2. There is also the general police power of the State, by which persons and

property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure

the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in

the legislature to do whieh^no question ever was, or, upon acknowledged general

principles, ever can be, made, so far as natural persons are concerned. And it is

certainly calculated to excite surprise and alarm that the right to do the same in

regard to railways should be made a serious question." And the court proceed

to consider the various cases in which the right of the legislature to regulate nut-

ters of private concern with reference to the general public good has been acted

upon as unquestioned, or sustained by judicial decisions, and quote, as pertinent

to the general question of what laws are prohibited on the ground of impairing

the obligation of contracts, the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth

College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 629, that " the framers of the Constitution

did not intend to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil institutions,

adopted for internal government, and that the instrument they have given us is

not to be so construed." See, to the same effect, Suydam r. Moore, 8 Barb.

358; Waldron r. Rensselaer and Saratoga R.R. Co., 8 Barb. 390; Galena and

Chicago U. R.R. Co. v. Loomis, 13 111. 548; Fitchburg R.R. p..Grand Junction

R.R. Co., 1 Allen, 552; Veazie v. Mayo, 45 Me. 560; Peters v. Iron Mountain

R.R. Co., 23 Mo. 107; Grannahan p. Hannibal, Ac, R.R. Co., 30 Mo. 546;

Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.R. Co. r. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 81; Galena and

Chicago U. R.R. Co. p. Appleby, 28 111. 283; Blair v. Milwaukee, &c, R.R

Co., 20 Wis. 254; State p. Mathews, 44 Mo. 523; Commissioners, &c. p. Hol-

yoke Water Power Co., 104 Mass. 446.
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and safety, and in order to guard properly the rights of other indi-

viduals and corporations. Although these charters are to be re-

garded as contracts, and the rights assured by them are inviolable,

it does not follow that these rights are at once, by force of the

charter-contract, removed from the sphere of State regulation, and

that the charter implies an undertaking, on the part of the

State, that in the same way in which their exercise is * per- [* 577]

missible at first, and under the regulations then existing,

and those only, may the corporators continue to exercise their

rights while the artificial existence continues. The obligation of

the contract by no means extends so far; but, on the contrary,

the rights and privileges which come into existence under it are

placed upon the same footing with other legal rights and privileges

of the citizen, and subject in like manner to proper rules for their

due regulation, protection, and enjoyment.

The limit to the exercise of the police power in these cases must

be this: the regulations must have reference to the comfort, safety,

or welfare of society; they must not be in conflict with any of the
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provisions of the charter; and they must not, under pretence of

regulation, take from the corporation any of the essential rights

and privileges which the charter confers. In short, they must be

police regulations in fact, and not amendments of the charter in

curtailment of the corporate franchise.1 The maxim, Sic utere tuo

ut alienum non Icedas, is that which lies at* the foundation of the

1 Washington Bridge Co. v. State, 18 Conn. 63; Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c,

R.R. Co., 4 Harr. 389; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Pingrey v. Washburn,

1 Aiken, 268; Miller v. N. Y. and Erie R.R. Co., 21 Barb. 513; People v.

Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co., 9 Mich. 307. In Benson v. Mayor, &c,

of New York, 10 Barb. 245, it is said, in considering a ferry right granted to a

city: "Franchises of this description are partly of a public and partly of a pri-

vate nature. So far as the accommodation of passengers is concerned, they are

publici juris; so far as they require capital and produce revenue, they are privati

juris. Certain duties and burdens are imposed upon the grantees, who are com-

pensated therefor by the privilege of levying ferriage and security from spoliation

arising from the irrevocable nature of the grant. The State may legislate touch-

ing them, so far as they are publici juris. Thus, laws may be passed to punish

neglect or misconduct in conducting the ferries, to secure the safety of passengers

from danger and imposition, &c But the State cannot take' away the ferries

themselves, nor deprive the city of their legitimate rents and profits." And

see People v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 32 Barb. 102, 116; Commonwealth

v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 66 Penn. St. 41; Hegemen o. Western R.R, 13

N. Y. 1.
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power; and to whatever enactment affecting the management and

business of private corporations it cannot fairly be applied, the

power itself will not extend. It has accordingly been held that

where a corporation was chartered with the right to take toll from

passengers over their road, a subsequent statute authorizing a

certain class of persons to go toll free was void.1 This was nota

regulation of existing rights, but it took from the corpora-

ls* 578] tion that * which they before possessed, namely, the right

to tolls, and conferred upon individuals that which before

they had not, namely, the privilege to pass over the road free of

toll. "Powers," it is said in another case, "which can only be

justified on this specific ground [that they are police regulations],

and which would otherwise be clearly prohibited by the constitu-

tion, can be such only as are so clearly necessary to the safety,

comfort, and well-being of society, or so imperatively required by

the public necessity, as to lead to the rational and satisfactory con-

clusion that the framers of the constitution could not, as men of

ordinary prudence and foresight, have intended to prohibit their
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exercise in the particular case, notwithstanding the language of

the prohibition would otherwise include it." 2 And it was there-

fore held that an act subsequent to the charter of a plank-road

company, and not assented to by the corporators, which subjected

them to a total forfeiture of their franchises for that which by the

charter was cause for partial forfeiture only, was void as violating

the obligation of contracts.3 And even a provision in a corporate

charter, empowering the legislature to alter, modify, or repeal it,

would not authorize a subsequent act which, on pretence of amend-

ment, or of a police regulation, would have the effect to appropriate

a portion of the corporate property to the public use.4 And where

1 Pingrey ». Washburn, 1 Aiken, 268. Of course the charter reserved do

right to make such an amendment.

* Christiancy, J., in People v. Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co., 9

Mich. 307. Compare Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 66 Penn. St. 41.

3 Ibid. And see State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189. Compare Camden, &c, R.R-

Co. v. Briggs, 2 N. J. 623; and the opinion of Bates, Chancellor, in the case of

Philadelphia, &c, R.R. Co. v. Bowers, just decided in the Delaware Court of

Appeals, in which an act regulating freights and fares, where no such power wis

reserved in the charter, was held void.

4 The reservation of a right to amend or repeal would not justify an act

requiring a railroad company to cause a proposed new street or highway to be

taken across their track, and to cause the necessary embankments, excavation!,
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by its charter the corporation was empowered to construct over a

river a certain bridge, which must necessarily constitute an ob-

struction to the navigation of'the river, a subsequent amendment

making the corporation liable for such obstruction was held void,

as in effect depriving the corporation of the very right which the

charter assured to it.1 So where the charter reserved to the legis-

lature the right of modification after the corporators had been

reimbursed their expenses in constructing the bridge,

with twelve per cent interest thereon, * an amendment [*579]

before such reimbursement, requiring the construction of

a fifty-foot draw for the passage of vessels, in place of one of thirty-

two feet, was held unconstitutional and void.2 So a power to a

municipal corporation to regulate the speed of railway carriages

would not authorize such regulation except in the streets and pub-

lic grounds of the city; such being the fair construction of the

power, and the necessity for this police regulation not extending

further.3

On the other hand, the right to require existing railroad corpo-

rations to fence their track, and to make them liable for all beasts

killed by going upon it, has been sustained on two grounds: first,
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as regarding the division fence between adjoining proprietors, and

in that view being but a reasonable provision for the protection of

domestic animals; and second, and chiefly, as essential to the pro-

tection of persons being transported in the railway carriages.4

and other work to be done for that purpose at their own expense; thus not only

appropriating a part of their property to another public use, but compelling them

to fit it for such use. Miller v. N. Y. and Erie R.R Co., 21 Barb. 513.

1 Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c, R.R. Co., 4 Harr. 389. Compare Common-

wealth v. Penn. Canal Co., 66 Penn. St. 41; 8. c. 5 Am. Rep. 329.

• Washington Bridge Co. r. State, 18 Conn. 53.

» State v. Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 170. In Buffalo and Niagara Falls R.R. Co.

c. Buffalo, 5 Hill, 209, it was held that a statutory power in a city to regulate the

running of cars within the corporate limits would justify an ordinance entirely

prohibiting the use of steam for propelling cars through any part of the city.

And see Great Western R.R. Co. v. Decatur, 33 111. 381; Branson v. Philadel-

phia. 47 Penn. St. 329; Whitson v. Franklin, 34 Ind. 396.

4 Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 156; New Albany and

Salem R.R. Co. v. Tilton, 12 Ind. 3; Same v. Maiden, ib. 10; Same r. McNam-

ara, 11 Ind. 543; Ohio and Mississippi R.R. Co. v. McClelland, 25 111. 145;

Madison and Indianapolis R.R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 230; Indianapolis and

Cincinnati R.R. Co. v. Townsend, 10 Ind. 38; Same v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84;

Corwin v. N. Y. and Erie R.R. Co., 13 N. Y. 42; Horn v. Atlantic and St. Law-
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Having this double purpose in view, the owner of beasts killed or

injured may maintain an action for the damage suffered, notwith-

standing he may not himself be free from negligence.1 But it

would, perhaps, require an express legislative declaration that the

corporation should be liable for the beasts thus destroyed

[* 580] to * create so great an innovation in the common law. The

general rule, where a corporation has failed to obey the

police regulations established for its government, would not make

the corporation liable to the party injured, if his own negligence

contributed with that of the corporation in producing the injury.1

rence R.R. Co., 35 N. H. 169, and 36 to. 440; Fawcett v. York and NorthMid-

land R. Co., 15 Jur. 173; Smith v. Eastern R.R. Co., 35 N. H. 856; Bulkier t.

N. Y. and N. H. R.R. Co., 27 Conn. 479; Jones v. Galena, &C..R.R. Co., 16

Iowa, 6 ; Winona, &c., R.R. Co. v. Waldron, 11 Minn. 515 ; Bradley e. Buffalo,

&c, R.R. Co., 34 N. Y. 429; Sawyer v. Vermont. &c, R.R. Co., 105 Mia.

196; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Riblet, 66 Penn. St. 164; s. c. 5 Am. Rep.

360. As to the degree of care required of railroad companies in keeping up their

fences, compare Antisdel». Chicago, &c, R.R. Co., 26 Wis. 145; Lemmon c. Chi-
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cago, &c, R.R. Co., 32 Iowa, 161; Chicago, &c, R.R. Co. c. Barrie, 55 111. 226,

and cases cited therein. A statute making railroad companies liable for injuries

by fire communicated by their locomotive engines was sustained as to companies

previously in existence, in Lyman v. Boston and Worcester R.R. Co., 4 Cush,

288. And see Camden and Amboy R.R. Co. v. Briggs, 2 Zab. 623; Trice r.

Hannibal, &c, R.R. Co., 49 Mo. 188.

1 Corwin c. N. Y. and Erie R.R. Co., 13 N. Y. 42; Indianapolis and Cincin-

nati R.R. Co. v. Townsend, 10 Ind. 38; Jeffersonville, &c, R.R. Co. r. Nich-

ols, 30 Ind. 321; Same v. Parkhurst, 34 Ind. 501; Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb.

358; Fawcett t>. York and North Midland R. Co., 15 Jur. 173; Waldron I.

Rensselaer and Schenectady R.R. Co., 8 Barb. 390; Home v. Atlantic and

St. Lawrence R.R. Co., 35 N. H. 169; O'Bannon v. Louisville, &c, R.R. Co.,

8 Bush, 348; Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Arnold, 47 LI. 178; Hinman p. Chicago,

&c, R.R. Co., 28 Iowa, 491.

a Jackson v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 150. And see Marsh

v. N. Y. and Erie R.R. Co., 14 Barb. 864; Joliet and N. I. R.R. Co. t. Jones,

20 111. 221; Tonawanda R.R. Co. v. Munger, 5 Denio, 255, and 4 N. Y. 255;

Price v. New Jersey R.R. Co., 31 N. J. 229; Drake r. Philadelphia, &c, R.R.

Co., 51 Penn. St. 240. In Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.R. Co. t>. KercbeTa!,16

Ind. 84, it was held that a clause in the charter of a railroad corporation which

declared that when the corporators should have procured a right of way as therein

provided, they should be seised in fee-simple of the right to the land, and should

have the sole use and occupation of the same, and no person, body corporate or

politic, should in any way interfere therewith, molest, disturb, or injure any of

the rights and privileges thereby granted, &c, would not take from the State the

power to establish a police regulation making the corporation liable for cattle

killed by their cars.
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The State may also regulate the grade of railways, and prescribe

how, and upon what grade, railway tracks shall cross each other;

and it may apportion the expense of making the necessary cross-

ings between the corporations owning the roads.1 And it may

establish regulations requiring existing railways to ring the bell

or blow the whistle of their engines immediately before passing

highways at grade, or other places where their approach might be

dangerous to travel.2 And it has even been intimated that it

might be competent for the State to make railway corporations

liable as insurers for the safety of all persons carried by them, in

the same manner that they are by law liable as carriers of goods;

though this would seem to be pushing the police power to

an 'extreme.8 But those statutes which have recently [*581]

become common, and which give an action to the repre-

1 Fitchburg R.R. Co. v. Grand Junction R.R. Co., 1 Allen, 552, and 4 Allen,

198.

* "The legislature has the power, by general laws, from time to time, as the

public exigencies may require, to regulate corporations in their franchises, so as
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to provide for the public safety. The provision in question is a mere police

regulation, enacted for the protection and safety of the public, and in no manner

interferes with or impairs the powers conferred on the defendants in their act of

incorporation." Galena and Chicago U. R.R. Co. r. Loomis, 13 111. 548. And

see Stuyvesantt). Mayor, &c, of New York, 7 Cow. 604; Benson v. Mayor, &c,

of New York, 10 Barb. 240; Bulkley t>. N. Y. and N. H. R.R. Co., 27 Conn.

486; Veazie v. Mayo, 45 Me. 560; 8. c. 49 Me. 156; Galena and Chicago U.

R.R. Co. v. Dill, 22 111. 264; Same v. Appleby, 28 111. 283; Ohio and Missis-

sippi R.R. Co. o. McClelland, 25 111. 145; Clark's Adm'r v. Hannibal and

St. Jo. R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 202; Chicago, &c, R.R. Co. v. Triplett, 38 111.

482; Commonwealth o. Eastern R.R Co., 103 Mass. 254; s. C. 4 Am. Rep.

555.

s Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 152. Carriers of goods

are liable as insurers, notwithstanding they may have been guiltless of negligence,

because such is their contract with the shipper when they receive bis goods for

transportation; but carriers of persons assume no such obligations at the common

law; and where a company of individuals receive from the State a charter which

makes them carriers of persons, and chargeable as such for their own default or

negligence only, it may well be doubted if it be competent for the legislature

afterwards to impose upon their contracts new burdens, and make them respond

in damages where they have been guilty of no default. In other words, whether

that could be a proper police regulation which did not assume to regulate the

business of the carrier with a view to the just protection of the rights and inter-

ests of others, but which imposed a new obligation, for the benefit of others, upon

a party guilty of no neglect of duty. But perhaps such a regulation would not go

further than that in Stanley v. Stanley, 26 Me. 191, where it was held competent

[681]
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sentatives of persons killed by the wrongful act, neglect, or default

of another, may unquestionably be made applicable to corporations

previously chartered, and may be sustained as only giving a rem-

edy for a wrong for which the common law had failed to make

provision.1 And it cannot be doubted that there is ample power

in the legislative department of the State to adopt all necessary

legislation for the purpose of enforcing the obligations of railway

companies as carriers of persons and goods to accommodate the

public impartially, and to mako every reasonable provision for

carrying with safety and expedition.2

Those statutes which regulate or altogether prohibit the sale of

intoxicating drinks as a beverage have also been, by some persons,

supposed to conflict with the Federal Constitution. Such of these,

however, as assume to regulate only, and to prohibit sales by other

persons than those who should be licensed by the public author-

ities, have not suggested any serious question of constitutional

power. They are but the ordinary police regulations, such as the

State may make in respect to all classes of trade or employment.3

But those which undertake altogether to prohibit the manufacture

and sale of intoxicating drinks as a beverage have been assailed
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for the legislature to pass an act making the stockholders of existing banks liable

for all corporate debts thereafter created ; or in Peters v. Iron Mountain R.R. Co.,

23 Mo. 107, and Grannahan t>. Hannibal, &c, R.R. Co., 30 Mo. 54G, wherein

act was sustained which made companies previously chartered liable for the debts

of contractors to the workmen whom they had employed.

1 Southwestern R.R. Co. v. Paulk, 24 Geo. 356; Coosa River Steamboat Co.

v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120. In Boston, Concord, and Montreal R.R. v. State, 35

N. H. 215, a statute making railroad corporations liable to indictment and fine,

in case of the loss of life by the negligence or carelessness of the proprietors or

their servants, was adjudged constitutional, as applicable to corporations pre-

viously in existence.

1 On this subject in general, see Redf. on Railw. c. 32, c. 2; Louisville, &c,

R.R. Co. v. Burke, 6 Cold. 45; New Albany and Salem R.R. Co. v. Tilton, li

Ind. 3; Buckley o. N. Y. & N. H. R.R. Co., 27 Conn. 479 j Ohio & Mississippi

R.R. Co. v. McClelland, 25 111. 144; Bradley v. Buffalo, &c, R.R. Co., 34 N. Y.

429; Boston, C, & M. R.R. Co. v. State, 32 N. H. 215; Pennsylvania R.R.

Co. v. Riblet, 66 Penn. St. 164; 8. c. 5 Am. Rep. 360. And see other cases

cited, ante, p. 578-79, notes.

* Bode v. State, 7 Gill, 326; Bancroft t>. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456; Thomasson c.

State, 15 Ind. 449; License Cases, 5 How. 504; Metropolitan Board of Excise

v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 111. 59; Kettering v. Jack-

sonville, 50 111. 39; State v. Allmond, 2 Houst. 612.
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as violating express provisions of the national Constitu-

tion, and also as * subversive of fundamental rights, and [* 582]

therefore not within the grant of legislative power.

That legislation of this character was void, so far as it affected

imported liquors, or such as might be introduced from one State

into another, because in conflict with the power of Congress over

commerce, was strongly urged in the License Cases before the Su-

preme Court of the United States; but that view did not obtain

the assent of the court. The majority of the court expressed the

opinion — which, however, was obiter in those cases — that the in-

troduction of imported liquors into a State, and their sale in the

original packages as imported, could not be forbidden, because to

do so would be to forbid what Congress, in its regulation of com-

merce, and in the levy of imposts, had permitted;1 but it was

conceded by aU, that when the original package was broken up for

use or for retail by the importer, and also when the commodity

had passed from his hands into the hands of a purchaser, it ceased

to be an import, or a part of foreign commerce, and thereby
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became subject to the laws of the State, and might be taxed for

State purposes, and the sale regulated by the State like any other

property.2 It was also decided, in these cases, that the power of

Congress to regulate commerce between the States did not ex-

clude regulations by the States, except so far as they might come

in conflict with those established by Congress; and that, conse-

quently, as Congress had not undertaken to regulate commerce in

liquors between the States, a law of New Hampshire could not be

held void which punished the sale, in that State, of gin purchased

in Boston and sold in New Hampshire, notwithstanding the sale

was in the cask in which it was imported, but by one not licensed

by the selectmen.3

It would seem, from the views expressed by the several mem-

bers of the court in these cases, that the State laws known as Pro-

1 Taney, Ch. J., 5 How. 574; McLean, J., ib. 589; Catron, J., ib. 608. And

see Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 ; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 335. Bradford

v. Stevens, 10 Gray, 379; State c. Robinson, 49 Me. 285.

* Daniel, J., held that the right to regulate was not excluded, even while the

packages remained in the hands of the importer unbroken (p. 612). See also the

views of Grier, J. (p. 631).

3 See also Bode v. State, 7 Gill, 326; Jones o. People, 14 111. 196; State v.

Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 202; Commonwealth p. Clapp,

5 Gray, 97: Metropolitan Board v. Barrie, 84 K. Y. 657.
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hibitory Liquor Laws, the purpose of which is to prevent

[* 583] altogether * the manufacture and sale of intoxicating

drinks as a beverage, so far as legislation can accomplish

that object, cannot be held void as in conflict with the power of

Congress to regulate commerce, and to levy imposts and duties.

And it has been held that they were not void, because tending to

prevent the fulfilment of contracts previously made, and thereby

violating the obligation of contracts.1

The same laws have also been sustained, when the question of con-

flict with State constitutions, or with general fundamental princi-

ples, lias been raised. They are looked upon as police regulations

established by the legislature for the prevention of intemperance,

pauperism, and crime, and for the abatement of nuisances.* It

has also been held competent to declare the liquor kept for sale a

nuisance, and to provide legal process for its condemnation and

destruction, and to seize and condemn the building occupied as a

dram shop on the same ground.3 And it is only where, in framing

such legislation, care has not been taken to observe those principles
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of protection which surround the persons and dwellings of indi-

viduals, securing them against unreasonable searches and seizures,

and giving them a right to trial before condemnation, that the

courts have felt at liberty to declare that it exceeded the proper

1 People p. Hawley, 3 Mich. 830; Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179.

* Commonwealth v. Kendall, 12 Cush. 414; Commonwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray,

97; Commonwealth p. Howe, 13 Gray, 26; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 202; One

House v. State, 4 Greene (Iowa), 172; Ztunhoff v. State, to. 526; State v.

Donehey, 8 Iowa, 396; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; Reynolds v. Geary. 26

Conn. 179; Oviatt v. Pond. 29 Conn. 479; People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330; Peo-

ple v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Jones v. People, 14 11l. 196 : State v. Prescott, 27

Vt. 194; Lincoln p. Smith, ib. 328; Gill v. Parker, 31 Vt. 610. Compare

Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501; Mcshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 484; Wynehamer p.

People, 13 N. Y. 378. In Reynolds p. Geary, 26 Conn. 179, it was held that

the State law forbidding suit* for the price of liquors sold was to be applied to

contracts made out of the State, and lawful where made.

5 One House p. State, 4 Greene (Iowa), 172. See also Lincoln v. Smith, 27

Vt. 828; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479; State p. Robinson, 33 Maine, 568;

License Cases, 5 How. 589. But see Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378;

Welch v. Stowell, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 332. A statute providing for the appointment

of guardians for drunkards is competent under the police power, and its oper-

ation would not be an unlawful deprivation of property. Devin v. Scott, 34 Ind.

67.
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province of police regulation.1 Perhaps there is no instance in

which the power of the legislature to make such regulations as

may destroy the value of property, without compensation to the

owner, appears in a more striking light than in the case of these

statutes. The trade in alcoholic drinks being lawful, and

the * capital employed in it being fully protected by law, [*584]

the legislature then steps in, and, by an enactment based

on general reasons of public utility, annihilates the traffic, destroys'

altogether the employment, and reduces to a nominal value the

property on hand. Even the keeping of that, for the purposes of

sale, becomes a criminal offence; and, without any change what-

ever in his own conduct or employment, the merchant of yesterday

becomes the criminal of to-day, and the very building in which he

lives and conducts the business which to that moment was lawful

becomes the subject of legal proceedings, if the statute shall so

declare, and liable to be proceeded against for a forfeiture.2 A

statute which can do this must be justified upon the highest rea-

sons of public benefit; but, whether satisfactory or not, they address

themselves exclusively to the legislative wisdom.

Within the last two or three years, new questions have arisen in
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regard to these laws, and other State regulations, arising out of

the imposition of burdens on various occupations by Congress, with

a view to raising revenue for the national government. These bur-

dens are imposed in the form of what are called license fees; and

it has been claimed that, when the party paid the fee, he was

thereby licensed to carry on the business, despite the regulations

which the State government might make upon the subject. This

view, however, has not been taken by the courts, who have re-

garded the congressional legislation imposing a license fee as only

a species of taxation, without the payment of which the business

could not lawfully be carried on, but which, nevertheless, did not

propose to make any business lawful which was not lawful before,

or to relieve it from any burdens or restrictions imposed by the

1 Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 125; Fisher r. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1. But see

Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 484; Wynehamer v. People, 18 N. Y. 378.

* In a number of the States statutes have recently been passed to make the

owners of premises on which traffic in intoxicating liquors is carried on re-

sponsible for all damages occasioned by such traffic. It is believed to be entirely

competent for the legislature to pass such statutes; but whether they can apply in

cases where leases had previously been made, must be a serious question.
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regulations of the State. The licenses give no authority, and are

mere receipts for taxes.1

Numerous other illustrations might be given of the power in

the States to make regulations affecting commerce, which are sus-

tainable as regulations of police. Among these, quarantine regu-

lations and health laws of every description will readily suggest

themselves, and these are or may be sometimes carried to the ex-

tent of ordering the destruction of private property when infected

with disease or otherwise dangerous.2 These regulations

[* 585] * liave generally passed unchallenged. The right to pass

inspection laws, and to levy duties so far as may be neces-

1 License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; PHrvear p. Commonwealth, ib. 475;

Commonwealth v. Holbrook, 10 Allen, 200; Block v. Jacksonville, 36 1ll.

301. As to when license fees are taxes, see ante, 201 and note.

* See remarks of Grier, J., in License Cases, 5 How. 632; Meeker v. Van

Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 397. A liquor law may annul a previous license, and not

be invalid on that ground. Metropolitan Board of Excise p. Barric, 34 N. Y.

667; ante, p. 283, note. Under the police power, the dealing in liquors even for
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lawful purposes may be restricted to persons approved for moral charactep. In re

Ruth, 32 Iowa, 250.

It is usual, either by general law or by municipal charters, to confer very exten-

sive powers upon local boards of health, under which, when acting in good faith,

they may justify themselves in taking possession of, purifying, or even destroying,

the buildings or other property of the citizen, when the public health or comfort

demands such strong measures. See Harrison p. Baltimore, 1 Gill, 2fi4; Van

Wormer v. Albany, 15 Wend. 262; Coe v. Shultz, 47 Barb. 64.

They may forbid offensive trades being carried on in populous districts. Ex

parte Shradcn, 33 Cal. 279; Metropolitan Board v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661;

Live Stock, &c, Association v. Crescent City, &c, Co., 16 Wallace; Wyne-

hamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 402; Coe v. Shultz, 47 Barb. 64; Ashbrook p. Com-

monwealth, 1 Bush, 139; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 95; Potter's Dwarris on Stat.

458.

If they forbid the keeping of swine in certain parts of a city, their regulations

will be presumed reasonable and needful. Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass.

221, citing with approval Pierce v. Bartrum, Cowp. 269. And though they can-

not be vested with authority to decide finally upon one's right to property when

they proceed to interfere with it as constituting a danger to health, yet they are

vested with quasi judicial power in deciding upon what constitutes a nuisance, and

all presumptions favor their action. See Van Wormer v. Albany, 15 Wend. 262;

Kennedy p. Phelps, 10 La. An. 227; Metropolitan Board v. Heister, 37 N. Y.

661. And they may unquestionably be vested with very large power to establish

pest-houses, and make very stringent regulations to prevent the spread of con-

tagious diseases. As to the power of the public authorities to establish a public

slaughter-house, or to require .all slaughtering of beasts to be done at one estab-

lishment, see Milwaukee v. Gross, 21 Wis. 241; Live Stock, &c, Association p.
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sary to render them effectual, is also undoubted, and is expressly

recognized by the Constitution.1 But certain powers which still

more directly affect commerce may sometimes be exercised where

the purpose is not to interfere with congressional legislation, but

merely to regulate the times and manner of transacting business

with a view to facilitate trade, secure order, and prevent con-

fusion.

An act of the State of New York declared that the harbor-

masters appointed under the State laws should have authority to

regulate and station all ships and vessels in the stream of the East

and North rivers, within the limits of the city of New York, and

the wharves thereof, and to remove from time to time such vessels

as were not employed in receiving and discharging their cargoes,

to make room for such others as required to be more immediately

accommodated, for the purpose of receiving and discharging theirs;

and that the harbor-masters or either of them should have author-

ity to determine how far and in what instances it was the duty of

the masters and others, having charge of ships or vessels, to
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accommodate each other in their respective situations; and it

imposed a penalty for refusing or neglecting to obey the directions

of the harbor-masters or either of them. In a suit brought against

the master of a steam vessel, who had refused to move his vessel

a certain distance as directed by one of the harbor-masters, in order

to accommodate a new arrival, it was insisted on the defence that

the act was an unconstitutional invasion of the power of Congress

over commerce, but it was sustained as being merely a regulation

prescribing the manner of exercising individual rights over prop-

erty employed in commerce.2

Crescent City, &c, Co., 16 Wallace. Compare as to right to establish monopo-

lies, Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344.

A regulation forbidding the growing of rice within a city, on the ground of

injurious effect upon health, was held valid in Green v. Savannah, 6 Geo. 1.

1 Art. 1, § 10, clause 2.

* Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 351. Woodworth, J., in this case states very

clearly the principle on which police regulations, in such cases, are sustainable:

"It seems to me the power exercised in this case is essentially necessary for the

purpose of protecting the rights of all concerned. It is not, in the legitimate

sense of the term, a violation of any right, but the exercise of a power indispen-

sably necessary, where an extensive commerce is carried on. If the harbor is

crowded with vessels arriving daily from foreign parts, the power is incident to

such a state of things. Disorder and confusion would be the consequence, if
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[* 586] * The line of distinction between that which constitutes

an interference with commerce, and that which is a mere

police regulation, is sometimes exceedingly dim and shadowy, and

it is not to be wondered at that learned jurists differ when endeav-

oring to classify the cases which arise. It is not doubted that

Congress has the power to go beyond the general regulations of

commerce which it is accustomed to establish, and to descend to

the most minute directions, if it shall be deemed advisable; and

that to whatever extent ground shall be covered by those directions,

the exercise of State power is excluded. Congress may establish

police regulations, as well as the States; confining their operation

to the subjects over which it is given control by the Constitution.

But as the general police power can better be exercised under the

supervision of the local authority, and mischiefs are not likely to

spring therefrom so long as the power to arrest collision resides in

the national courts, the regulations which are made by Congress

do not often exclude the establishment of others by the State

covering very many particulars. Moreover, the regulations of
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commerce are usually, and in some cases must be, general and

uniform for the whole country; while in some localities, State and

local policy will demand peculiar regulations with reference to

special and peculiar circumstances.

there was no control. . . . The right assumed under the law would not be upheld, if

exerted beyond what may be considered a necessary police regulation. The line

between what would be a clear invasion of right on the one hand, and regulations

not lessening the value of the right, and calculated for the benefit of all, must be

distinctly marked. . . . Police regulations are legal and binding, because for the

general benefit, and do not proceed to the length of impairing any right, in the

proper sense of that term. The sovereign power in a community, therefore, may

and ought to prescribe the manner of exercising individual rights over property.

It is for the better protection and enjoyment of that absolute dominion which the

individual claims. The power rests on the implied right and duty of the supreme

power to protect all by statutory regulations; so that, on the whole, the benefit of

all is promoted. Every public regulation in a city may, and does in some sense,

limit and restrict the absolute right that existed previously. But this is not

considered as an injury. So far from it, the individual, as well as others, is

supposed to be benefited. It may, then, be said that such a power is incident to

every well-regulated society, and without which it could not well exist." See

Cooley p. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 289; Owners of James Gray p. Owners

of The John Frazer, 21 How. 184; Benedict v. Vanderbilt, 1 Robertson, 194;

Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Port Wardens v. The Ward, 14 La. An.

289; Gilman e. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 726, 731; Cisco v. Roberts, 36 N. Y.

292.
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The State of Maryland passed an act requiring all importers of

foreign goods, by the bale or package, <fec, to take out a license,

for which they should pay fifty dollars, and, in case of neglect or

refusal to take out such license, subjected them to certain forfeit-

ures and penalties. License laws are of two kinds: those which

require the payment of a license fee by way of raising a revenue,

and are therefore the exercise of the power of taxation;

and those * which are mere police regulations, and which [* 587]

require the payment only of such license fee as will cover

the expense of the license and of enforcing the regulation.1 The

Maryland act seems to fall properly within the former of these

classes, and it was held void as in conflict with that provision of

the Constitution which prohibits a State from laying any impost,

&c, and also with the clause which declares that Congress shall

have the power to regulate commerce. The reasoning of the court

was this: Sale is the object of all importation of goods, and the

power to allow importation must therefore imply the power to au-

thorize the sale of the thing imported; that consequently a penalty
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inflicted for selling an article in the character of importer was in

opposition to the act of Congress, which authorized importation;

that a power to tax an article in the hands of the importer the

instant it was landed was the same in effect as a power to tax

it whilst entering the port; that consequently the law of Maryland

was obnoxious to the charge of unconstitutionality, on the ground

of its violating the two provisions referred to.2 And a State law

which required the master of every vessel engaged in foreign

commerce to pay a certain sum to a State officer, on account of

every passenger brought from a foreign country into the State,

or before landing any alien passenger, was held void for similar

reasons.3

On the other hand, a law of the State of New York was sus-

tained which required, under a penalty, that the master of every

vessel arriving from a foreign port should report to the mayor or

1 Ash v. People,* 11 Mich. 347. See ante, p. 201. Also Dillon, Mun. Corp.

§§ 291-294 and notes.

• Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419.

* Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; see also Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534,

where a State law imposing a special tax on every Chinese person over eighteen

years of age for each month of his residence in the State was held unconstitu-

tional, as in conflict with the power of Congress over commerce.

44 [ 689 ]
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recorder of the city of New York an account of his passengers;

the object being to prevent New York from being burdened by an

influx of persons brought thither in ships from foreign countries

and the other States, and for that purpose to require a report of

the names, places of birth, &c, of all passengers, that the neces-

sary steps might be taken by the city authorities to prevent them

from becoming chargeable as paupers.1 And a State regulation of

pilots and pilotage was held unobjectionable, though it was con-

ceded that Congress had full power to make regulations

[* 588] on the same * subject, which, however, it had not exer-

cised.2 These several cases, and the elaborate discussions

with which the decisions in each were accompanied, together with

the leading case of Gibbons v. Ogden,3 may be almost said to ex-

haust the reasoning upon the subject, and to leave little to be done

by those who follow beyond the application of such rules for classi-

fication as they have indicated.

We have elsewhere referred to cases in which laws requiring all

persons to refrain from their ordinary callings on the first day of
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the week have been held not to encroach upon the religious liberty

of those citizens who do not observe that day as sacred. Neither

are they unconstitutional as a restraint upon trade and commerce,

or because they have the effect to destroy the value of a lease of

property to be used on that day, or to make void a contract for

Sunday services.4

The highways within and through a State are constructed by the

State itself, which has full power to provide all proper regulations

of police to govern the action of persons using them, and to make

from time to time such alterations in these ways as the proper

authorities shall deem proper.5 A very common regulation is that

parties meeting shall turn to the right; the propriety of which

none will question. So the speed of travel may be regulated with

1 City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102. See also State v. The Constitution,

42 Cal. 581.

» Cooley n. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299. See Baniai>y v. State, 21 Iai

450; Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Cisco c. Roberts, 36 N. Y. 292.

3 9 Wheat. 1. And see Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713.

* Lindcnmuller «. People, 33 Barb. 576. And see Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal.

678; Ex parte Bird, 19 Cal. 130; ante, 477, and notes; post, 596.

5 As to the right to change the grade of a street from time to time without

liability to parties incidentally injured, see ante, 207.
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a view to safe use and general protection, and to prevent a public

nuisance.1 So beasts may be prohibited from running at large,

under the penalty of being seized and sold.2 And it has been held

competent under the same power to require the owners of urban

property to construct and keep in repair and free from obstructions

the sidewalks in front of it, and in case of their failure to do so to

authorize the public authorities to do it at the expense of the prop-

erty,3 the courts distinguishing this from taxation, on the

* ground of the peculiar interest which those upon whom [* 589]

the duty is imposed have in its performance, and their

peculiar power and ability to perform it with the promptness which

the good of the community requires.4 For the like reasons it has

been held competent, where a district of country was liable to be

inundated by the overflow of a large river, to require the owners

of lands lying upon the river to construct levees on the river front

at their own expense, and, on their failure to comply with this

regulation, to cause such levees to be constructed under the direc-

tion of the public authorities, and the expense assessed upon the
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land of such owners.5 And the right of eminent domain is some-

times exercised in order to drain considerable tracts of country,

1 Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 473; Commonwealth v. Stodder,

2 Cush. 562; Day v. Green, 4 Cush. 433; People v. Jenkins, 1 Hill, 469;

People v. Roe, ib. 470; Washington v. Nashville, 1 Swan, 177; State v. Foley,

31 Iowa, 527.

• McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Monr. 433; Municipality v. Blanc, 1 La. An. 385;

Whitfield v. Longest, 6 Ired. 268; Gooselink v. Campbell, 4 Iowa, 296;

Roberts v. Ogle, 30 111. 459; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 9 Allen, 206.

1 Godard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504; Bonsall v. Mayor of Lebanon, 19 Ohio,

418; Paxson t>. Sweet, 1 Green (N. J.), 196; Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met. 180;

Washington v. Mayor, &c, of Nashville, 1 Swan, 177 ; Mayor, &c v. Medbury, 6

Humph. 368; Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 309, per Christiancy, J.; Matter

of Dorrance St., 4 R. I. 230; Deblois v. Barker, ib. 445; Hart v. Brooklyn, 36

Barb. 226. So in Pennsylvania it has been held competent to require the owners

of city lots, in front of which sewers are constructed, to pay the expense thereof

in proportion to the street front. Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Penn. St. 400;

Stroud v. Philadelphia, 61 Penn. St. 255. And see Boston v. Shaw, 1 Met. 130;

Hildreth v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 345; Cone v. Hartford, 28 Conn. 363; State v.

Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 441.

4 See especially the case of Godard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504, for a clear and

strong statement of the grounds on which such legislation can be supported. Also

Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 687.

4 Crowley o. Copley, 2 La. An. 329. Compare Sessions v. Crunklinton, 20

Ohio, N. s. 349.
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for the twofold reason, that the standing water threatens the pub-

lic health, and also precludes the cultivation and improvement of

the soil.1

Navigable waters are also a species of public highway, and as

such come under the control of the States. The term "navi-

gable," at the common law, was only applied to those waters where

the tide ebbed and flowed, but all streams which were of sufficient

capacity for useful navigation, though not called navigable, were

public, and subject to the same general rights which the public

exercised in highways by land.2 In this country there has been a

very general disposition to consider all streams public which are

useful as channels for commerce, wherever they are found of suf-

ficient capacity to float the products of the mines, the forests, or

the tillage of the country through which they flow, to market.3

And if a stream is of sufficient capacity for the floating of rafts

and logs in the condition in which it generally appears by nature,

it will be regarded as public, notwithstanding there may

[*590] be times when it becomes too dry and *shallow for the
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purpose. "The capacity of a stream, which generally

appears by the nature, amount, importance, and necessity of the

business done upon it, must be the criterion. A brook, although

it might carry down saw-logs for a few days, during a freshet, is

not therefore a public highway. But a stream upon which and its

tributaries saw-logs to an unlimited amount can be floated every

spring, and for the period of from four to eight weeks, and for the

distance of one hundred and fifty miles, and upon which unques-

tionably many thousands will be annually transported for many

years to come, if it be legal so to do, has the character of a public

1 See7 Reeves v. Treasurer, &p., 8 Ohio, n. s. 333; ante, 510, 511, 533, and

notes.

* Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 26; Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 283.

• Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9; Knox v. Chaloner, 42 Me. 150; Lancey

v. Clifford, 54 Me. 489; Gerrish v. Brown, 51 Me. 256; Scott v. Willson, 3

N. H. 321; Shaw p. Crawford, 10 Johns. 236; Munson p. Hungerford, 6 Barb.

265; Browne v. Scofield, 8 Barb. 239; Morgan p. King, 18 Barb. 284, 30 Barb.

9, and 35 N. Y. 454; Cates p. Wadlington, 1 McCord, 580; Commonwealth p.

Chapin, 5 Pick. 199 ; Moore v. Sanbourne, 2 Mich. 519; Lorman p. Benson, 8

Mich. 18; Depew v. Board of Commissioners, &e., 5 Ind. 8; Board of Commis-

sioners v. Pidge, tp. 13; Stuart v. Clark, 2 Swan, 9; Elder v. Barrus, 6 Humph.

364; Dalrymple p. Mead, 1 Grant's Cases, 197; Commissioners of Homochitto

River v. Withers, 29 Miss. 21; Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ala. 578; McManus p. Car-

michael, 3 Iowa, 1; Weise v. Smith, 3 Oregon, 445; s.c. 8 Am. Rep. 621.
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stream for that purpose. So far the purpose is useful for trade

aud commerce, and to the interests of the community. The float-

ing of logs is not mentioned by Lord Hale [in De Jure Maris],

aud probably no river in Great Britain was, in his day, or ever

will be, put to that use. But here it is common, necessary, and

profitable, especially while the country is new; and if it be con-

sidered a lawful mode of using the river, it is easy to adapt well-

settled principles of law to the case. And they are not the less

applicable because this particular business may not always con-

tinue; though if it can of necessity last but a short time, and the

river can be used for no other purpose, that circumstance would

have weight in the consideration of the question." 1 But if the

stream was not thus useful in its natural condition, but has been

rendered susceptible of use by the labors of the owner of the soil,

the right of passage will be in the nature of a private way, and the

public do not acquire a right to the benefit of the owner's labor,

unless he sees fit to dedicate it to their use.2

All navigable waters are for the use of all the citizens; and
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there cannot lawfully be any exclusive private appropriation of any

portion of them.3 The question what is a navigable stream would

seem to be a mixed question of law and fact;4 and though it is

said that the legislature of the State may determine

whether a * stream shall be considered a public highway [* 591]

or not,6 yet if in fact it is not one, the legislature cannot

make it so by simple declaration, since, if it is private property,

1 Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 288; Moore v. Sanbourne, 2 Mich. 519; Brown

e. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9; Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 552; Weise c. Smith, 3 Or.

445; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 621; contra, Hubbard v. Bell, 54 HI. 110.

s Wadsworth's Adm'r v. Smith, 11 Me. 278; Ward v. Warner, 8 Mich. 521.

3 Commonwealth v. Charlestown, 1 Pick. 180; Kean v. Stetson, 6 Pick. 492;

Arnold r. Mundy, 1 Ilalst. 1; Bird v. Smith, 8 Watts, 434. They are equally

for the use of the public in the winter when covered with ice; and one who cuts

a hole in the ice in an accustomed way, by means of which one passing upon

the ice is injured, is liable to an action for the injury. French v. Camp, 6

Shep. 433. An obstruction to a navigable stream is a nuisance which any

one having occasion to use it may abate. Inhabitants of Arundel v. McCulloch,

10 Mass. 70; State v. Moffett, 1 Greene Clowa), 247; Selman v. Wolfe, 27

Texas, 68.

4 See Treat p. Lord, 42 Me. 552; Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445; s. c. 8 Am.

Rep. 621.

4 Glover v. Powell, 2 Stockt. 211; American River Water Co. v. Amsden,

6 (Jal. 443 ; Baker v. Lewis, 33 Penn. St. 301.
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the legislature cannot appropriate it to a public use without pro-

viding for compensation.1

The general right to control and regulate the public use of nav-

igable waters is unquestionably in the State; but there are certain

restrictions upon this right growing out of the power of Congress

over commerce. Congress is empowered to regulate commerce

with foreign nations and among the several States; and wherever

a river forms a highway upon which commerce is conducted with

foreign nations or between States, it must fall under the control

of Congress, under this power over commerce. The circumstance,

however, that a stream is navigable, and capable of being used for

foreign or inter-State commerce, does not exclude regulation by

the State, if in fact Congress has not exercised its power in regard

to it;2 or having exercised it, the State law does not come in con-

flict with the congressional regulations, or interfere with the rights

which are permitted by them.

The decisions of the Federal judiciary in regard to navigable

waters seem to have settled the following points: —

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

1. That no State can grant an exclusive monopoly for the navi-

gation of any portion of the waters within its limits upon which

commerce is carried on under coasting licenses granted under the

authority of Congress,3 since such a grant would come directly in

conflict with the power which Congress has exercised. But a State

law granting to an individual an exclusive right to navigate the

upper waters of a river, lying wholly within the limits of the State,

separated from tide water by falls impassable for purposes

[* 592] of * navigation, and not forming a part of any continuous

track of commerce between two or more States, or with a

1 Morgan p. King, 18 Barb. 284; s. c. 35 N. Y. 454.

* Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245. In this ease it was

held that a State law permitting a creek navigable from the sea to be dammed so

as to exclude vessels altogether was not opposed to the Constitution of the United

States, there being no legislation by Congress with which it would come in con-

flict. And see Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. 518; and 18 How. 421.

1 Gibbons p. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. The case was the well-known historical

one, involving the validity of the grant by the State of New York to Robert

Fulton and his associates of the exclusive right to navigate the waters of that

State with vessels propelled by steam. This subject is further considered in Gil-

man v. Philadelphia, 8 Wall. 713; and in The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, in

which the meaning of the term " navigable waters of the United States " is defined.

And see Craig p. Kline, 65 Penn. St. 399; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 636.
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foreign country, does not come within the reason of this decision,

and cannot be declared void as opposed to the Constitution of the

United States.1

2. The States have the same power to improve navigable waters

which they possess over other highways ;2 and where money has

been expended in making such improvement, it is competent for

the State to impose tolls on the commerce which passes through

and has the benefit of the improvement, even where the stream is

one over which the regulations of commerce extend.3

3. The States may authorize the construction of bridges over

navigable waters, for railroads as well as for every other species of

highway, notwithstanding they may to some extent interfere with

the right of navigation.4 If the stream is not one which is subject

to the control of Congress, the State law permitting the erection

cannot be questioned on any ground of public inconvenience. The

legislature must always have power to determine what public ways

are needed, and to what extent the accommodation of travel over

one way must yield to the greater necessity for another. But if the
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stream is one over which the regulations of Congress extend, the

question is somewhat complicated, and it becomes necessary to

consider whether such bridge will interfere with the regulations or

not. But the bridge is not necessarily unlawful, because it may

constitute, to some degree, an obstruction to commerce, if it is

properly built, and upon a proper plan, and if the general traffic

of the country will be aided rather than impeded by its construc-

tion. There are many cases where a- bridge over a river may be

vastly more important than the navigation; and there are other

1 Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568. The exclusive right granted in this case was

to the navigation of the Penobscot River above Old Town, which was to continue

for twenty years, in consideration of improvements in the navigation to be made

by the grantees. Below Old Town there were a fall and several dams on the

river, rendering navigation from the sea impossible. And see McReynoIds v.

Smallhouse, 8 Bush, 447.

* The improvement of a stream by State authority will give no right of action

to an individual incidentally injured by the improvement. Zimmerman t. Union

CW Co., 1 W. & S. 346.

* Palmer v. Cuyahoga Co., 3 McLean, 226; Kellogg v. Union Co., 12 Conn. 7;

Thames Bank v. Lovell, 18 Conn. 600; McReynoIds r. Smallhouse, 8 Bush,

447.

4 See Commonwealth o. Breed, 4 Pick. 460; Depew t>. Trustees of W. and E.

Canal, 5 Ind. 8; Dover t;. Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N. H. 200; Illinois, &c, Co.

r. Peoria, &c, Association, 38 111. 467.
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cases where, although the traffic upon the river is impor-

[* 593] tant, yet an * inconvenience caused by a bridge with draws

would be much less seriously felt by the public, and be a

much lighter burden upon trade and travel than a break in a line

of railroad communication necessitating the employment of a ferry.

In general terms it may be said that the State may authorize such

constructions, provided they do not constitute material obstructions

to navigation; but whether they are to be regarded as material

obstructions or not is to be determined in each case upon its owu

circumstances. The character of the structure, the facility afforded

for vessels to pass it, the relative amount of traffic likely to be

done upon the stream and over the bridge, and whether the traffic

by rail would be likely to be more incommoded by the want of the

bridge than the traffic by water with it, are all circumstances to be

taken into account in determining this question. It is quite evi-

dent that the same structure might constitute a material obstruc-

tion on the Ohio or the Mississippi, where vessels are constantly

passing, which would be unobjectionable on a stream which a boat
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only enters at intervals of weeks or months. The decision of the

State legislature that the erection is not an obstruction is not con-

clusive; but the final determination will rest with the Federal

courts, who have jurisdiction to cause the structure to be abated,

if it be found to obstruct unnecessarily the traffic upon the watep.

Parties constructing the bridge must be prepared to show, not

only the State authority, and that the plan and construction are

proper, but also that it accommodates more than it impedes the

general commerce.1

4. The States may lawfully establish ferries over navigable

waters, and grant licenses for keeping the same, and forbid un-

licensed persons from running boats or ferries without such

license. This also is only the establishment of a public way,

and it can make no difference whether or not the water is entirely

within the State, or, on the other hand, is a highway for inter-

State or foreign commerce.2

•

1 See this subject fully considered in the Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. 518.

See also Columbus Insurance Co. v. Peoria Bridge Co., 6 McLean, 72; Same p.

Curtenius, ib. 209; Jolly v. Terre Haute Draw-Bridge Co., t'6. 237; U. S. v.

New Bedford Bridge, 1 W. & M. 401; Commissioners of St. Joseph Co.

v. Pidge, 5 Ind. 13.

* Conway v. Taylor's Ex'r, 1 Black, 603; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43.
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5. The State may also authorize the construction of

dams across * navigable waters; and where no question [* 594]

of Federal authority is involved, the legislative permission

to ere'ct a dam will exempt the structure from being considered a

nuisance,1 and it would seem also that it must exempt the party

constructing it from liability to any private action for injury to

navigation, so long as he keeps withiu the authority granted, and

is guilty of no negligence.2

6. To the foregoing it may be added that the State has the same

power of regulating the speed and general conduct of ships or

other vessels navigating its water highways, that it has to regulate

the speed and conduct of persons and vehicles upon the ordinary

highway; subject always to the restriction that its regulations

must not come in conflict with any regulations established by Con-

gress for the foreign commerce or that between the States.3

It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in

which police power is or may be exercised, because the various cases

in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may conflict

with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the pub-

lic order or safety, are infinite in number and in variety. And
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there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the public

authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their

property, and even to destroy it, where the owners themselves have

In both these cases the State license law was sustained as against a vessel enrolled

and licensed under the laws of Congress. And see Fanning v. Gregorie, 16 How.

534. Ferry rights may be so regulated as to rates of ferriage, and ferry fran-

chises and privileges so controlled in the hands of grantees and lessees, that

they shall not be abused to the serious detriment or inconvenience of the public.

Where this power is given to a municipality, it may be recalled at any time.

People t). Mayor, &c, of New York, 82 Barb. 102.

1 Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; Brown v. Common-

wealth, 3 S. & R. 273; Bacon v. Arthur, 4 Watts, 437; Hogg v. Zanesville Co.,

5 Ohio, 410; Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257. And see Flanagan v. Phil-

adelphia, 42 Penn. St. 219; Depew v. Trustees of W. and E. Canal, 5 Ind. 8;

Woodburn r. Kilbourne Manuf. Co., 1 Bissell, 546; Hinchman v. Patterson, &c,

R.R. Co., 2 Green (N. J.), 75.

• See Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c, R.R. Co., 4 Harr. 889; Roush v. Walter,

10 Watts, 86; Parker c. Cutler Mill Dam Co., 7 Sbep. 358; Zimmerman v.

Union Canal Co., 1 W. & S. 846; Depew v. Trustees of W. and E. Canal, 5

Ind. 8.

3 People c. Jenkins, 1 Hill, 469; People v. Roe, 1 Hill, 470. As to the right

to regulate fisheries in navigable waters, see Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409; Phippa

v. State, 22 Md. 380; People v. Reed, 47 Barb. 235.
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fully observed all their duties to their fellows and to the State, but

where, nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the

interference or destruction. A strong instance of this description

is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the private

property of individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the

ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any

other great public xialamity.1 Here the individual is in no

[* 595] degree in * fault, but his interest must yield to that

"necessity " which " knows no law." The establishment

of limits within the denser portions of cities and villages, within

which buildings constructed of inflammable materials shall not

be erected or repaired, may also, in some cases, be equivalent to

a destruction of private property; but regulations for this purpose

have been sustained notwithstanding this result.2 Wharf lines

may also be established for the general good, even though they

prevent the owners of water-fronts from building out on that which

constitutes private property.3 And, whenever the legislature deem

it necessary to the protection of a harbor to forbid the removal of
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stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regula-

tions to that effect under penalties, and make them applicable to

the owners of the soil equally with other persons. Such regula-

tions are only " a just restraint of an injurious use of property,

which the legislature have authority " to impose.4

So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden,

where, by a change of circumstances, and without the fault of the

1 Saltpetre Case, 12 Coke, 13; Mayor, &e., of New York v. Lord, 18 Wend.

129; Russell v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 2 Denio, 461; Sorocco p. Geary, 3

Cal. 69; Hale v. Lawrence, 1 Zab. 714; American Print Works v. Lawrence, ib.

248; Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 397; McDonald v. Redwing, 13 Minn.

38; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 756-759. And see Jones v. Richmond, 18 Grat. 517,

for a case where the municipal authorities purchased and took possession of the

liquors of a city about to be occupied by a capturing military force, and destroyed

it to prevent the disorders that might be anticipated from free access to intox-

icating drinks under the circumstances. And as to appropriation by military

authorities, see Harmony v. Mitchell, 1 Blatch. 549; s. c. in error, 13 How.

115.

* Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates, 493; Wadleigh v. Gilman, 3 Fairf. 403;

Brady v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 11 Mich. 425: Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow.

352, per Woodworih, J.

* Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53. See Hart p. Mayor, &c, of Albany,

9 Wend. 571.

4 Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55.
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owner, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable

has now become a public nuisance, endangering the public health

or the public safety. Mill-dams are sometimes destroyed upon this

ground ;1 and churchyards which prove, in the advance of urban

population, to be detrimental to the public health, or in danger of

becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery

purposes.2 The keeping of gunpowder in unsafe quantities in

cities or villages;3 the sale of poisonous drugs, unless labelled;

allowing unmuzzled dogs to be at large when danger of hydropho-

bia is apprehended ;4 or the keeping for sale unwholesome

* provisions, or other deleterious substances, — are all sub- [* 596]

ject to be forbidden under this powep. And, generally, it

may be said that each State has complete authority to provide

for the abatement of nuisances, whether they exist by the fault of

individuals or not,6 and even though in their origin they may have

been permitted or licensed by law.6

The preservation of the public morals is peculiarly subject to

legislative supervision, which may forbid the keeping, exhibition,

or sale of indecent books or pictures, and cause their destruction

if seized; or prohibit or regulate the places of amusement that
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1 Miller v. Craig, 3 Stockt. 175. And offensive manufactures maybe stopped.

Coe v. Schultz, 47 Barb. 64. See League p. Journeay, 26 Texas, 172; ante,

584, and cases cited in note.

* Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 5 Cow. 538;

Coates v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 7 Cow. 604; Kincuid's Appeal, 66 Penn.

St. 411; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 377. And see ante, 584, note.

* Foote v. Fire Department, 5 Hill, 99; Williams v. Augusta, 4 Geo. 509.

And see License Cases, 5 How. 589, per McLean, J.; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray,

27, per Shaw, Ch. J.

4 Morey p. Brown, 42 N. H. 373. Dogs, which are animals in which the

owner has no absolute property, are subject to such regulations as the legislature

may prescribe, and it is not unconstitutional to authorize their destruction, with-

out previous adjudication, when found at large without being licensed and collared

according to the statutory regulation. Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136. And

see Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis. 298; Morey v. Brown, supra. As a measure of

internal police, the State has the power to encourage the keeping of sheep, and

to discourage the keeping of dogs, by imposing a penalty upon the owner of a

dog for keeping the same. Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind. 62.

* See Miller p. Craig, 3 Stockt. 175; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242.

But under this power it would not be competent for a city to tax a lot owner for

the expense of abating a nuisance on bis lot which the city itself had created.

Weeks v. Milwaukee, t'6. See Barring v. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. 95.

6 See cases of repealing licenses, ante, p. 283 and note.
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may be resorted to for the purpose of gaming;1 or forbid altogether

the keeping of implements made use of for unlawful games; or

prevent the keeping and exhibition of stallions in public places.2

And the power to provide for the compulsory observance of the

first day of the week is also to be referred to the same authority.3

So the markets are regulated, and particular articles allowed to

be sold in particular places only, or after license;4 weights and

measures are established, and dealers compelled to conform to the

fixed standards under penalty,6 and persons following particular

occupations of a nature requiring special public supervision, such

as auctioneers, draymen, hackmen, hucksters, victuallers, and the

like, are required to take out licenses, and to conform to such rules

and regulations as are deemed important for the public convenience

and protection.6 These instances are more than sufficient to illus-

trate the pervading nature of this power, and we need uot weary

1 Tanner v. Trustees of Albion, 5 Hill, 121; Commonwealth p. Colton,

8 Gray, 488; State p. Hay, 29 Me. 457; State p. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426.

* Nolin v. Mayor of Franklin, 4 Yerg. 163. A city may forbid the keeping
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of swine within its densely settled portions. Commonwealth p. Patch, 97

Mass. 221.

3 Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Penn. St. 312; City Council p. Benjamin, 2

Strobh. L. 508; State p. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214; St. Louis v. Cafferata. 24 Mo. 94;

Adams p. Hamel, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 73; Vogelsong p. State, 9 Ind. 112; Sbover

p. State, 5 Eng. 259; Bloom p. Richards, 2 Ohio, n. s. 387; Lindenmuller p.

People, 33 Barb. 548; Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678; Ex parte Bird, 19 Cal.

130; Hudson v. Geary, 4 R. I. 485; Frolickstein p. Mobile, 40 Ala. 725.

* Nightingale's Case, 11 Pick. 168; Buffalo p. Webster, 10 Wend. 99; Bush

p. Seabury, 8 Johns. 418; Ash p. People, 11 Mich. 347; State p. Leiber, 1l

Iowa, 407; Le Claire p. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 210; White p. Kent, 11 Ohio, ir. s.

550. The power is continuing, and markets once established may be changed st

the option of the authorities, and they cannot even by contract deprive themselves

of this powep. Gale p. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; Gall p. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio,

N. s. 563; Cougot p. New Orleans, 16 La. An. 21.

* Guillotte p. New Orleans. 12 La. An. 432; Page p. Fazackerly, 36 Barb.

892; Raleigh p. Sorrell, 1 Jones, L. 49; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 323, 324, and

cases cited.

« Commonwealth p. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 291-296.

As to license fees, and when they are taxes, see ante, 201, 495; Mayor, &c, of

Mobile p. Yuille, 3 Ala. 139. The sale of pure milk and pure water mixed may

be made a penal offence. Commonwealth p. Waite, 11 Allen, 264. As to market

regulations in general, see Wartman p. Philadelphia, 33 Penn. St. 202; Spauld-

ing p. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71; Gall p. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio, n. s. 563; Municipality

p. Cutting, 4 La. An. 335; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 313-318.
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the reader with further enumeration. Many of them have been

previously referred to under the head of municipal by-laws.

Whether the prohibited act or omission shall be made a criminal

offence, punishable under the general laws, or subject to punish-

ment under municipal by-laws, or, on the other hand, the party be

deprived of all remedy for any right which, but for the

* regulation, he might have had against other persons, are [* 597]

questions which the .legislature must decide. It is suffi-

cient for us to have pointed out that, in addition to the power to

punish misdemeanors and felonies, the State has also the authority

to make extensive and varied regulations as to the time, mode, and

circumstances in and under which parties shall assert, enjoy, or

exercise their rights, without coming in conflict with any of those

constitutional principles which are established for the protection of

private rights or private property.
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[*598] 'CHAPTER XVII.

THE EXPRESSION OP THE POPULAR WILL.

Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the

exercise of sovereign powers to the several departments, they have

not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty. They retain

in their own hands a power to control the governments they create

so far as they have thought it needful to do so, and the three de-

partments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed,

changed, or abolished by them. But this control and direction

must be exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon.

The voice of the people, in their sovereign capacity, can only be of

legal force when expressed at the times and under the conditions

which they themselves have prescribed and pointed out by the

constitution, or which, consistently with the constitution, have

been prescribed and pointed out for them by the legislature; and

if by any portion of the people, however large, an attempt should

be made to interfere with the regular working of the agencies of

government at any other time or in any other mode than as allowed
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by existing law, either constitutional or statutory, it would be

revolutionary in character, and must be .resisted and repressed bj

the officers who, for the time being, represent legitimate govern-

ment.1

1 "The maxim which lies at the foundation of our government is that ill

political power originates with the people. But since the organization of gov-

ernment it cannot be claimed that either the legislative, executive, or judicial

powers, either wholly or in part, can be exercised by them. By the institution

of government, the people surrender the exercise of all these sovereign func-

tions of government to agents chosen by themselves, who at least theoretically

represent the supreme will of their constituents. Thus all power possessed

by the people themselves is given and centred in their chosen representatives."

Davis, Ch. J., in Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 291.

Under some of the constitutions certain votes can only be carried by a major-

ity of the electors voting favorably. This must be understood to mean, a majority

of those voting at the election on any question. Taylor p. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107.

Compare Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544; State v. Mayor, &c, 87 Mo. 270;

State o. Binder, 38 Mo. 450; Bayard p. Klinge, 16 Minn. 249.
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The authority of the people is exercised through elections, by

means of which they choose legislative, executive, and judicial

officers, to whom are to be intrusted the exercise of powers of gov-

ernment. In some cases also they pass upon other questions spe-

cially submitted to them, and adopt or reject a measure according

as a majority vote for or against it. It is obviously impossible

that any considerable people should in general meeting consider,

mature, and adopt their own laws; but when a law has been per-

fected, and it is deemed desirable to take the expression of public

sentiment upon it, or upon any other single question, the ordinary

machinery of elections is adequate to the end, and the expression

is easily and without confusion obtained by submitting such law or

such question for an affirmative or negative vote. In this manner

constitutions and amendments thereof are adopted or rejected, and

matters of local importance in many cases, like the location of a

county seat, the contracting of a local debt, the erection of a public

building, the acceptance of a municipal charter, and the like, are

passed upon and determined by the people whom they

concern, * under constitutional or statutory provisions [* 599]

which require or permit it.
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The Right to participate in Elections.

In another place we have said that, though the sovereignty is in

the people, as a practical fact it resides in those persons who by

the constitution of the State are permitted to exercise the elective

franchise.1 Each State establishes its own regulations on this

subject; subject only to the fifteenth amendment to the national

Constitution, which forbids that the right of citizens to vote shall

be denied or abridged on account of race, color, or previous

condition of servitude. Participation in the elective franchise is

a privilege rather than a right, and it is granted or denied on

grounds of general policy; the prevailing view being that it should

be as general as possible consistent with the public safety. Aliens

are generally excluded, though in some States they are allowed to

vote after residence for a specified period, provided they have

declared their intention to become citizens in the manner pre-

scribed by law. The fifteenth amendment, it will be seen, does

not forbid denying the franchise to citizens except upon certain

1 Ante, p. 29.
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specified grounds, and it is matter of public history that its pur-

pose was to prevent discriminations in this regard as against the

newly enfranchised slaves. Minors, who equally with adult per-

sons are citizens, are still excluded, as are also women, and some-

times persons who have been convicted of infamous crimes.1 In

some States laws will be found in existence which, either generally

or in particular cases, deny the right to vote to those persons who

lack a specified property qualification, or who do not pay taxes. In

some States idiots and lunatics are also expressly excluded; and

it has been supposed that these unfortunate classes, by the common

political law of England and of this country, were excluded with

women, minors, and aliens from exercising the right of suffrage,

even though not prohibited therefrom by any express constitutional

or statutory provision.2 Wherever the constitution has prescribed

the qualifications of electors, they cannot be changed or added to

by the legislature,3 or otherwise than by an amendment of the

constitution.

One of the most common requirements is, that the party offer-
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ing to vote shall reside within the district which is to be affected

by the exercise of the right. If a State officer is to be chosen,

the voter should be a resident of the State; and if a county, city,

or township officer, he should reside within such county, city, or

1 Story on Const. 4th. ed. § 1972.

* See Cushing's Legislative Assemblies, § 24. Also § 27, and notes referring

to legislative cases. Drunkenness is regarded as temporary insanity. Ibid.

Idiots and lunatics are expressly excluded by the Constitutions of Delaware,

Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon,

Florida, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina,

Texas, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Paupers are excluded ia

New York, California, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,

Rhode Island, South Carolina, Delaware, Texas, Wisconsin, and West Virginia.

Persons under guardianship are excluded in Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,

Minnesota, Florida, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Persons under

interdiction are excluded in Louisiana; and persons excused from paying taxes at

their own request, in New Hampshire. Capacity to read is required in Connecti-

cut, and capacity to read and write in Massachusetts.

'See Green v. Shumway, 89 N. Y. 418; Brown v. Grover, 6 Bush, 1; Quinn

v. State, 35 Ind. 485; Huber v. Reiley, 58 Penn. St. 112; ante, 64, note 8.

Compare State p. Neal, 42 Mo. 119. Where a disqualification to vote is made

to depend upon the commission of crime, the election officers cannot be made

the triers of the offence. Huber p. Reiley, supra; State v. Symonds, 59 Me.

151.
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township. This is the general rule; and for the more convenient

determination of the right to vote, and to prevent fraud, it is now

generally required that the elector shall only exercise

within the municipality where he has * his residence his [* 600J

right to participate in either local or general elections.

Requiring him to vote among his neighbors, by whom he will be

likely to be generally known, the opportunities for illegal or fraud-

ulent voting will be less than if the voting were allowed to take

place at a distance and among strangers. And wherever this is

the requirement of the constitution, any statute permitting voters

to deposit their ballots elsewhere must necessarily be void.1

A person's residence is the place of his domicile, or the place

where his habitation is fixed, without any present intention of

removing therefrom.2 The words "inhabitant," "citizen," and

"resident," as employed in different constitutions to define the

qualifications of electors, mean substantially the same thing; and

one is an inhabitant, resident, or citizen at the place where he

has his domicile or home.3 Every person at all times must be

considered as having a domicile somewhere, and that which he
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has acquired at one place is considered as continuing until

another is acquired at a different place. It has been held that

a student in an institution of learning, who has residence there

for purposes of instruction, may vote at such place, provided he

1 Opinions of Judges, 30 Conn. 591; Hulseman v. Rems, 41 Penn. St 396;

Chase v. Miller, ib. 403; Opinions of Judges, 44 N. H. 633; Bourland v. Hil-

dreth, 26 Cal. 161; People c. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127; Opinions of Judges,

37 Vt. 665; Day v. Jones, 31 Cal. 201. The case of Morrison v. Springer, 15

Iowa, 301, is not in harmony with those above cited. So far as the election of

representatives in Congress and electors of president and vice-president is con-

cerned, the State constitutions cannot preclude the legislature from prescribing

the " times, places, and manner of holding" the same, as allowed by the national

Constitution, — art. 1, § 4, and art. 2, § 1, — and a statute permitting such

election to be held out of the State would consequently not be invalid. Opinions

of Justices, 45 N. H. 595; Opinions of Judges, 37 Vt. 665. There are now con-

stitutional provisions in New York, Michigan, Missouri, Connecticut, Maryland,

Kansas, Mississippi, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania, which permit

soldiers in actual service to cast their votes where they may happen to be sta-

tioned at the time of voting. It may also be allowed in Ohio. Lehman v.

McBride, 15 Ohio, n. s. 573.

* Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; Rue High's Case, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 523;

Story, Confl. Laws, § 43.

1 Cusbing's Law and Practice .of Legislative Assemblies, § 36.
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is emancipated from his father's family, and for the time has no

home elsewhere.1

1 Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350;

VVilbraham v. Ludlow, 99 Mass. 587. "The questions of residence, inhabitancy,

or domicile — for although not in all respects precisely the same, they are nearly

so, and depend much upon the same evidence — are attended with more difficulty

than almost any other which are presented for adjudication. No exact definition

can be given of domicile; it depends upon no one fact or combination of circum-

stances; but, from the whole taken together, it must be determined in each par-

ticular case. • It is a maxim that every man must have a domicile somewhere, and

also that he can have but one. Of course it follows that his existing domicile

continues until he acquires another; and pt'ce verm, by acquiring a new domicile he

relinquishes his former one. From this view it is manifest that very slight circum-

stances must often decide the question. It depends upon the preponderance

of the evidence in favor of two or more places; and it may often occur that the

evidence of facts tending to establish the domicile in one place would be entirely

conclusive, were it not for the existence of facts and circumstances of a still more

conclusive and decisive character, which fix it beyond question in anothep. So,
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on the contrary, very slight circumstances may fix one's domicile, if not con-

trolled by more conclusive facts fixing it in another place. If a seaman, without

family or property, sails from the place of his nativity, which may be con-

sidered his domicile of origin, although he may return only at long intervals,

or even be absent many years, yet if he does not by some actual residence or

other means acquire a domicile elsewhere, he retains his domicile of origin."

Shaw, Ch. J., Thorndike p. City of Boston, 1 Met. 245. And see Alston

p. Newcomer, 42 Miss. 186. In Inhabitants of Abington p. Inhabitants of

North Bridgewater, 23 Pick. 170, it appeared that a town line ran through the

house occupied by a party, leaving a portion on one side sufficient to form a

habitation, and a portion on the other not sufficient for that purpose. Held,

that the domicile must be deemed to be on the side first mentioned. It was

intimated also that where a house was thus divided, and the party slept habitually

on one side, that circumstance should be regarded as a preponderating one to fix

his residence there, in the absence of other proof. And see Rex p. St. Olave's,

1 Strange, 51.

By the constitutions of several of the States, it is provided, in substance, that

no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his

presence or absence, while employed in the service of the United States; nor

while a student in any seminary of learning; nor while kept at any almshouse

or asylum at public expense, nor while confined in any public prison. See Const,

of New York, 11linois, Indiana, California, Michigan, Rhode Island, Minnesota,

Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, and Wisconsin. In several of the other States there

are provisions covering some of these cases, but not all. A provision that no

person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his pres-

ence or absence in the service of the United States, does not preclude one from

acquiring a residence in the place where, and in the time while he is present in

such service. People v. Holden, 28 Cal. 123. If a man takes up his permanent
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* 601

* Conditions to the Exercise of the Elective Franchise. [*601]

While it is true that the legislature cannot add to the constitu-

tional qualifications of electors, it must nevertheless devolve upon

that body to establish such regulations as will enable all persons

entitled to the privilege to exercise it freely and securely, and ex-

clude all who are not entitled from improper participation therein.

For this purpose the times of holding elections, the manner of

conducting them and of ascertaining the result, are prescribed,

and heavy penalties are imposed upon those who shall vote ille-

gally, or instigate others to do so, or who shall attempt to preclude

a fair election or to falsify the result. The propriety, and indeed

the necessity, of such regulations is undisputed. In some of the

States it has also been regarded as important that lists of voters

should be prepared before the day of election, in which should be

registered the name of every person qualified to vote. Under

such a regulation, the officers whose duty it is to administer the

election laws are enabled to proceed with more deliberation in the

discharge of their duties, and to avoid the haste and confusion

that must attend the determination upon election day of the vari-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ous and sometimes difficult questions concerning the right of indi-

viduals to exercise this important franchise. Electors, also, by

means of this registry, are notified in advance what persons claim

the right to vote, and are enabled to make the necessary examina-

tion to determine whether the claim is well founded, and to exer-

cise the right of challenge if satisfied any person registered is

unqualified. When the constitution has established no such rule,

and is entirely silent on the subject, it has sometimes been claimed

that the statute requiring voters to be registered before the day of

election, and excluding from the right all whose names do not

appear upon the list, was unconstitutional and void, as adding

abode at the place of an institution of learning, the fact of his entering it as a

student will not preclude his acquiring a legal residence there; but if he is domi-

ciled at the place for the purposes of instruction only, it is deemed proper and

right that he should neither lose his former residence nor gain a new one in con-

sequence thereof.

That persons residing upon lands within a State, but set apart for some national

purpose, and subjected to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, are not

voters, see Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio, n. s. 806.

[ 707 ]
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another test to the qualifications of electors which the

[* 602] constitution * has prescribed, and as having the effect,

where electors are not registered, to exclude from voting

persons who have an absolute right to that franchise by the funda-

mental law.1 This position, however, has not been generally ac-

cepted as sound by the courts. The provision for a registry

deprives no one of his right, but is only a reasonable regulation

under which the right may be exercised.2 Such regulations must

always have been within the power of the legislature, unless for-

bidden. Many resting upon the same principle are always pre-

scribed, and have never been supposed to be open to objection.

Although the constitution provides that all male citizens twenty-

one years of age and upwards shall be entitled to vote, it would

not be seriously contended that a statute which should require all

such citizens to go to the established place for holding the polls,

and there deposit their ballots, and not elsewhere, was a violation

of the constitution, because prescribing an additional qualification,

namely, the presence of the elector at the polls. All such reason-
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able regulations of the constitutional right which seem to the legis-

lature important to the preservation of order in elections, to guard

against fraud, undue influence, and oppression, and to preserve

the purity of the ballot-box, are not only within the constitutional

power of the legislature, but are commendable, and at least some

of them absolutely essential. And where the law requires such a

registry, and forbids the reception of votes from any persons not

registered, an election in a township where no such registry has

ever been made will be void, and cannot be sustained by making

proof that none in fact but duly qualified electors have voted. It

is no answer that such a rule may enable the registry officers, by

neglecting their duty, to disfranchise the electors altogether; the

remedy of the electors is by proceedings to compel the perform-

ance of the duty; and the statute, being imperative and manda-

tory, cannot be disregarded.3 The danger, however, of any such

1 See Page v. Allen, 58 Penn. St. 838.

'Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485; People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 342; State

p. Bond, 38 Mo. 425; State v. Hilmantel, 21 Wis. 566; Byler v. Asher, 47 III.

101; Edmonds v. Banbury, 28 Iowa, 270; Ensworth v. Albin, 46 Mo. 450. As

to the conclusiveness of the registry, see Hyde p. Brush, 34 Conn. 454.

3 People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 342. The law does not become unconstitu-

tional, because of the fact that, by the neglect of the officers to attend to the

registry, voters may be disfranchised. Ibid.; Ensworth p. Albin, 46 Mo. 450.
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misconduct on the part of officers is comparatively small, when the

duty is intrusted to those who are chosen in the locality where the

registry is to be made, and who are consequently immediately

responsible to those who are interested in being registered.

All regulations of the elective franchise, however, must be rea-

sonable, uniform, and impartial; they must not have for their

purpose directly or indirectly to deny or abridge the constitutional

right of citizens to vote, or unnecessarily to impede its exercise;

if they do, they must be declared void.1

In some other cases preliminary action by the public authorities

may be requisite before any legal election can be held.

If an * election is one which a municipality may hold or [* 603]

not at its option, and the proper municipal authority de-

cides against holding it, it is evident that individual citizens must

acquiesce, and that any votes which may be cast by them on the

assumption of right must be altogether nugatory.2 The same

would be true of an election to be held after proclamation for that

purpose, and which must fail if no such proclamation has been

made.3 Where, however, both the time and the place of an elec-

tion are prescribed by law, every voter has a right to take notice of
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the law, and to deposit his ballot at the time and place appointed,

notwithstanding the officer, whose duty it is to give notice of the

1 Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 488; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, n. s. 665.

Under the Constitution of Ohio, the right of suffrage is guaranteed to "white

male citizens "; and by a long series of decisions it was settled that persons hav-

ing a preponderance of white blood were "white" within its meaning. It was

also settled that judges of election were liable to an action for refusing to receive

the vote of a qualified electop. A legislature unfriendly to the construction of

the constitution above stated, passed an act which, while prescribing penalties

against judges of election who should refuse to receive or sanction the rejection

of a ballot from any person knowing him to have the qualifications of an elector,

concluded with a proviso that the act and the penalties thereto " shall not apply

to clerks or judges of election for refusing to receive the votes of persons having

a distinct and visible admixture of African blood, nor shall they be liable to

damages by reason of such rejection." Other provisions of the act plainly dis-

criminated against the class of voters mentioned, and it was held to be clearly

unreasonable, partial, calculated to subvert or impede the exercise of the right

of suffrage by this class, and therefore void. Monroe v. Collins, supra.

'Opinions of Judges, 7 Mass. 52o; Opinions of Judges. 15 Mass. 537.

3 People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 26; McKune v. Weller, 11 Cal. 49; People v.

Martin, 12 Cal. 409; Jones v. State, 1 Kansas, 273; Barry v. Lauck, 5 Cold.

588.
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election, has failed in that duty. The notice to be thus given is

only additional to that which the statute itself gives, and is pre-

scribed for the purpose of greater publicity; but the right to hold

the election comes from the statute, and not from the official notice.

It has therefore been frequently held that when a vacancy exists in

an office, which the law requires shall be filled at the next general

election, the time and place of which are fixed, and that notice of

the general election shall also specify the vacancy to be filled, an

election at that time and place to fill the vacancy will be valid, not-

withstanding the notice is not given; and such election cannot be

defeated by showing that a small portion only of the electors were

actually aware of the vacancy or cast their votes to fill it.1 But

this would not be the case if either the time or the place were

not fixed by law, so that notice became essential for that pur-

pose.2

1 People r. Cowles, 13 N. T. 350; People v. Brenahm, 3 Cal. 477; State c.

Jones, 19 Ind. 356; People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508; Dishon v. Smith, 10

Iowa, 212; State v. Orvis, 20 Wis. 235; State v. Goetze, 22 Wis. 363. The

Case of Foster ». Scarff, 15 Ohio, n. s. 532, would seem to be contra. A gen-

eral election was to be held, at which by law an existing vacancy in the office of
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Judge of Probate was required to be filled. The sheriff, however, omitted all

mention of this office in his notice of election, and the voters generally were not

aware that a vacancy was to be filled. Nominations were made for the other

offices, but none for this, but a candidate presented himself for whom less than a

fourth of the vot«rs taking part in the election cast ballots. It was held that the

election to fill the vacancy was void.

* State v. Young, 4 Iowa, 561. An act had been passed for the incorporation

of the city of Washington, and by its terms it was to be submitted to the people

on the 16th of the following February, for their acceptance or rejection, at an

election to be called and holden in the same manner as township elections under

the general law. The time of notice for the regular township elections was, bv

law, to be determined by the trustees, but for the first township meeting fifteen

days1 notice was made requisite. An election was holden, assumed to be under

the act in question; but no notice was given of it, except by the circulation, on

the morning of the election, of an extra newspaper containing a notice that an

election would be held on that day at a specified place. It was held that the

election was void. The act contemplated some notice before any legal vote

could be taken, and that which was given could not be considered any notice at

all. This case differs from all of those above cited, where vacancies were to be

filled at a general election, and where the law itself would give to the.electors all

the information which was requisite. In this case, although the time was fixed,

the place was not; and, if a notice thus circulated on the morning of election

could be held sufficient, it might well happen that.the electors generally would fail

[710]
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* Tlie Manner of Exercising the Right. [* 604]

The mode of voting in this country, at all general elections, is

almost universally by ballot.1 "A ballot may be defined to be a

piece of paper, or other suitable material, with the name written or

printed upon it of the person to be voted for; and where the suf-

frages are given in this form, each of the electors in person depos-

its such a vote in the box, or other receptacle provided for the

purpose, and kept by the proper officers."2 The distinguishing

feature of this mode of voting is, that every voter is thus enabled

to secure and preserve the most complete and inviolable secrecy in

regard to the persons for whom he votes, and thus escape the in-

fluences which, under the system of oral suffrages, may be brought

to bear upon him with a view to overbear and intimidate, and thus

prevent the real expression of public sentiment.3

to be informed, so that their right to vote might be exercised. See also Barry

v. Lauek, 5 Cold. 588.

'The ballot was also adopted in England in 1872.

* Cush. Leg. Assemb. § 103.

3 "In this country, and indeed in every country where officers are elective-,
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different modes have been adopted for the electors to signify their choice. The

most common modes have been either by voting viva voce, that is, by the elector

openly naming the person he designates for the office, or by ballot, which is

depositing in a box provided for the purpose a paper on which is the name of

the person he intends for the office. The principal object of this last mode is to

enable the elector to express his opinion secretly, without being subject to be

overawed, or to any ill-will or persecution on account of his vote for either of

the candidates who may be before the public. The method of voting by tab-

lets in Rome was an example of this manner of voting. There certain officers

appointed for that purpose, called Diribitores, delivered to each voter as many

tablets as there were candidates, one of whose names was written upon every

tablet. The voter put into a chest prepared for that purpose which of these

tablets he pleased, and they were afterwards taken out and counted. Cicero

defines tablets to be little billets, in which the people brought their suffrages.

The clause in the constitution directing the election of the several State officers

was undoubtedly intended to provide that the election should be made by this

mode of voting to the exclusion of any other. In this mode the freemen can

individually express their choice, without being under the necessity of publicly

declaring the object of their choice; their collective voice can be easily ascer-

tained, and the evidence of it transmitted to the place where their votes are to

be counted, and the result declared with as little inconvenience as possible."

Temple v. Mead, 4 Vt. 541. In this case it was held that a. printed ballot was

within the meaning of the constitution which required all ballots for certain
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[* 605] * In order to secure as perfectly as possible the benefits

anticipated from this system, statutes have been passed,

in some of the States, which prohibit ballots being received or

counted unless the same are written or printed upon white paper,

without any marks or figures thereon intended to distinguish one

ballot from anothep.1 These statutes are simply declaratory of a

State officers to be " fairly written." To the same effect is Henshaw v. Foster,

9 Pick. 312.

1 See People v. Kilduff, 15 1ll. 500. In this case it was held that the common

lines on ruled paper did not render the ballots void. See also Druliner v. State,

29 Ind. 308, in which it was decided that a caption to the ticket folded inside was

unobjectionable. To the same effect is Millholland p. Bryant, 39 Ind. 363.

In the recent case of Williams v. Stein, 38 Ind. 90, the Supreme Court of

Indiana declared to be void the following enactment: "It shall be the duty of

the inspector of any election held in this State, on receiving the ballot of any

voter, to have the same numbered with figures, on the outside or back thereof,

to correspond with the number placed opposite the name of such voter on the

poll lists kept by the clerks of said election." Pettit, J., delivering the opinion
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of the court, after quoting several authorities, among others Commonwealth p.

Woelper, 3 S. & R. 29; People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45; People p. Cicotte, 16

Mich. 283; Temple v. Mead, 4 Vt. 535, and the text above, says: "It is believed

that these authorities establish, beyond doubt, that the ballot implies absolute and

inviolable secrecy, and that the principle is founded in the highest considerations

of public policy. When our present constitution was framed, voting by ballot

was in vogue in nearly every State in the Union. That mode of voting had been

known and understood for centuries. The term ballot, as designating a mode of

election, was then well ascertained and clearly defined. The eminent framers of

the constitution certainly employed this term with a full knowledge of its mean-

ing. Many of the most distinguished members of the constitutional convention

of 1850 were members of the legislature of 1852, the first that met under the

present constitution. That they regarded the ballot system as securing inviolable

secrecy, is clearly shown by the following law, which they then helped to enact:

'If any judge, inspector, clerk, or other officer of an election, shall open or

mark, by folding or otherwise, any ticket presented by such elector at such elec-

tion, or attempt to find out the names thereon, or suffer the same to be done by

any other person, before such ticket is deposited in the ballot-box, he shall be

fined in any sum not exceeding one hundred dollars.' 2 G. & II. 473, sep. 60.

If the constitution secures to the voter, in popular elections, the protection and

immunity of secrecy, there can be no doubt- that section 2 of the act of 1869,

which authorized the inspector to number ballots, is clearly in conflict with it and

is void. I am not unmindful of the rule that all doubts are to be solved in

favor of the constitutionality of legislative enactments. This rule is well estab-

lished, and is founded in the highest wisdom. But my convictions are clear that

our constitution was intended to, and does, secure the absolute secrecy of a bal-

lot, and that the act in question, which directs the numbering of tickets, to cop-
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constitutional principle that inheres in the system of voting by

ballot, and which ought to be inviolable whether declared or not.

In the absence of such a statute, all devices by which party man-

agers are enabled to distinguish ballots in the hand of the voter,

and thus determine whether he. is voting for or against them, are

opposed to the spirit of the Constitution, inasmuch as they tend to

defeat the design for which voting by ballot is established, and,

though they may not render an election void, they are exceedingly

reprehensible, and ought to be discountenanced by all good citizens.

The system of ballot-voting rests upon the idea that every elector

is to be entirely at liberty to vote for whom he pleases and with

what party he pleases, and that no one is to have the right, or be

in position, to question him for it, either then or at any subsequent

time.1 The courts have held that a voter, even in case of a con-

tested election, cannot be compelled to disclose for whom he

voted; and for the same reason we think others who may acci-

dentally, or by trick or artifice, have acquired knowledge

on the subject should not be allowed to testify * to such [* 606]

knowledge, or to give any information in the courts upon
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the subject. Public policy requires that the veil of secrecy should

be impenetrable, unless the voter himself voluntarily determines

to lift it ;2 his ballot is absolutely privileged; and to allow evidence

respond with the numbers opposite the names of the electors on the poll lists, is

in palpable conflict not only with the spirit, but with the substance of the consti-

tutional provision. This act was intended to, and does, clearly identify every

man's ticket, and renders it easy to ascertain exactly how any particular person

voted. That secrecy which is esteemed by all authority to be essential to the free

exercise of suffrage, is as much violated by this law as if it had declared that the

election should be viva voce."

1 "The right to vote in this manner has usually been considered an important

and valuable safeguard of the independence of the humble citizen against the

influence which wealth and station might be supposed to exercise. This object

would be accomplished but very imperfectly if the privacy supposed to be secured

was limited to the moment of depositing the ballot. The spirit of the system

requires that the elector should be secured then and at all times thereafter against

reproach or animadversion, or any other prejudice on account of having voted

according to his own unbiassed judgment; and that security is made to consist

in shutting up within the privacy of his own mind all knowledge of the manner

in which he has bestowed his suffrage." Per Denio, Ch. J., in People v. Pease,

27 N. Y. 81.

'"The ballot," says Cicero, "is dear to the people, for it uncovers men's

faces, and conceals their thoughts. It gives them the opportunity of doing what
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of its contents when he has not waived the privilege, is to encour-

age trickery and fraud, and would in effect establish this remark-

able anomaly, that, while the law from motives of public policy

establishes the secret ballot with a view to conceal the elector's

action, it at the same time encourages a system of espionage, by

means of which the veil of secrecy may be penetrated and the

voter's action disclosed to the public.1

they like, and of promising all that they are asked." Speech in defence of

Plaucius. Forsyth's Cicero, Vol. I. p. 889.

1 See this subject fully considered in People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283. And

see also State v. Hilniantel, 23 Wis. 422. A very loose system prevails in the

contests over legislative elections, and it has been held that when a voter refuses

to disclose for whom he voted, evidence is admissible of the general reputation

of the political character of the voter, and as to the party to which hp belonged

at the time of the election. Cong. Globe, XVI. App. 456. This is assuming

that the voter adheres strictly to party, and always votes the " straight ticket";

an assumption which may not be a very violent one in the majority of cases, but

which is scarcely creditable to the manly independence and self-reliance of any
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free people; and however strongly disposed legislative bodies may be to act upon

it, we are not prepared to see any such rule of evidence adopted by the courts.

If a voter chooses voluntarily to exhibit his ballot publicly, perhaps there is no

reason why those to whom it was shown should not testify to its contents; but in

other cases the knowledge of its contents is his own exclusive property, and he

can neither be compelled to part with it, nor, as we think, is any one else who

accidentally or surreptitiously becomes possessed of it, or to whom the ballot

has been shown with a view to information, advice, or alteration, at liberty to

make the disclosure. Such third person might be guilty of no legal offence if

he should do so; but he is certainly invading the constitutional privileges of his

neighbor, and we are aware of no sound principle of law which will justify a

court in compelling or even permitting him to testify to what he has seen.

And as the law does not compel a voter to testify, " surely it cannot be so incon-

sistent with itself as to authorize a judicial inquiry upon a particular subject, and

at the same time industriously provide for the concealment of the only material

facts upon which the results of such an inquiry must depend." Per Denio,

Ch. J., in People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 81. It was held in People v. Cicotte, 16

Mich. 283, that until it was distinctly shown that the elector waived his privilege

of secrecy, any evidence as to the character or contents of his ballot was inad-

missible. It was also held that where a voter's qualification was in question, but

his want of right to vote was not conceded, the privilege was and must be the

the same; as otherwise any person's ballot might be inquired into by simply

asserting his want of qualification. In State p. Olin, 23 Wis. 319, it was decided

that where persons who had voted at an election had declined to testify concern-

ing their qualifications, and how they had voted, it was competent to prove their

declarations that they were unnaturalized foreigners, and had voted a particular

way. Compare State p. Hilmantel, 23 Wis. 422.
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Every ballot should be complete in itself, and ought not to re-

quire extensive evidence to enable the election officer to

determine * the voter's intention. Perfect certainty, how- [* 607]

ever, is not required in these cases. It is sufficient if an

examination leaves no reasonable doubt upon the intention, and

technical accuracy is never required in any case. The cardinal

rule is to give effect to the intention of the voter, whenever it is not

left in uncertainty ;1 but if an ambiguity appears upon its face, the

elector cannot be received as a witness to make it good by testify-

ing for whom or for what office he intended to vote.2

The ballot in no case should contain more names than are au-

thorized to be voted for, for any particular office at that election;

and, if it should, it must be rejected for the obvious impossibility

of the canvassing officers choosing from among the names on the

ballot, and applying the ballot to some to the exclusion of others.

The choice must be made by the elector himself, and be expressed

by the ballot. Accordingly, where only one supervisor was to be

chosen, and a ballot was deposited having upon it the names of two

persons for that office, it was held that it must be rejected for am-
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biguity.8 It has been decided, however, that if a voter shall write

a name upon a printed ballot, in connection with the title to an

office, this is such a designation of the name written for that office

as sufficiently to demonstrate his intention, even though he omit to

strike off the printed name of the opposing candidate. The writing

in such a case, it is held, ought to prevail as the highest evidence

1 People v. Matteson, 17 111. 169; People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; State v.

Elwood, 12 Wis. 551; People v. Bates, 11 Mich. 362.

* People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409. The mental purpose of an elector is not

provable; it must be determined by his acts. People c. Saxton, 22 N. Y. 309.

And where the intent is to be gathered from the ballot, it is a question of law,

and cannot be submitted to the jury as one of fact. People v. McManus, 34

Barb. 620.

'People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409. See also Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis.

420; People r. Loomis, 8 Wend. 396; People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y.

67. Such a vote, however, could not be rejected as to candidates for other offices

regularly named upon the ballot; it would be void only as to the particular office

for which the duplicate ballot was cast. Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420.

If the name of a candidate for an office is given -more than once, it is proper to

count it as one ballot, instead of rejecting it as illegally thrown. People v.

Holden, 28 Cal. 123.

[715]
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of the voter's intention, and the failure to strike off the printed

name will be regarded as an accidental oversight.1

[* 608J * The name on the ballot should be clearly expressed,

and ought to be given fully. Errors in spelling, however,

will not defeat the ballot, if the sound is the same ;2 nor abbrevia-

tions,3 if such as are in common use and generally understood, so

that there can be no reasonable doubt of the intent. And it would

seem that where a ballot is cast which contains only the initials of

the Christian name of the candidate, it ought to be sufficient, as it

designates the person voted for with the same certainty which is

commonly met with in contracts and other private writings, and

the intention of the voter cannot reasonably be open to

[* 609] any doubt.4 As the law knows only * one Christian name,

1 People v. Saxton, 22 N. Y. 309. This ruling suggests this query: Suppose

at an election where printed slips containing the names of candidates, with I

designation of the office, are supplied to voters, to be pasted over the names of

opposing candidates, — as is very common, — a ballot should be found in the boi

containing the names of a candidate for one office, — say the county clerk, — with

a designation of the office pasted over the name of a candidate for some other

office, —say coroner; so that the ballot would contain the names of two persons
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for county clerk, and of none for coroner. In such a case, is the slip the highest

evidence of the intention of the voter as to who should receive his suffrage for

county clerk, and must it;be counted for that office? And if so, then does not

the ballot also show the intention of the elector to cast his vote for the person for

coroner whose name is thus accidentally pasted over, and should it not be counted

for that person? The case of People u. Saxton would seem to be opposed to

People i>. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409, where the court refused to allow evidence to be

given to explain the ambiguity occasioned by the one name being placed upon

the ticket, without the other being erased. "The intention of the elector cannot

be thus inquired into, when it is opposed or hostile to the paper ballot which be

has deposited in the ballot-box. We might with the same propriety permit it to

be proved that he intended to vote for one man, when bis ballot was cast for

another; a species of proof not to be tolerated." Per Whittlesay, J. The

case of People r. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 28:5, is also opposed to People r. Saxton.

In the Michigan case, a slip for the office of sheriff was pasted over the name of

the candidate for another county office, so that the ballot contained the names

of two candidates for shei-Hf. It was argued that the slip should be counted as

the best evidence of the voter's intention; but the court held that the ballot could

be counted for neither candidate, because of its ambiguity.

• People v. Mayworm, 5 Mich. 146; Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 430.

3 People v. Furguson, 8 Cow. 102. See also upon this subject, People r.

Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67; and People v. Tisdale, 1 Dong. (Mich.)

65.

4 In People v. Furguson, 8 Cow. 102, it was held, that, on the trial of a con-
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the giving of an initial to a middle name when the party

has none, or the giving of a wrong initial, will * not ren- [* 610]

tested election case before a jury, ballots cast for H. F. Yates should be counted

for Henry F. Yates, if, under the circumstances, the jury were of the opinion

they were intended for him; and to arrive at that intention, it was competent to

prove that he generally signed bis name H. F. Yates; that he had before held

the same office for which these votes were cast, and was then a candidate again;

that the people generally would apply the abbreviation to him, and that no

other person was known in the county to whom it would apply. This ruling was

followed in People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409, and in People v. Cook, 14 Barb.

259, and 8 N. Y. 67. The courts also held, in these cases, that the elector

voting the defective ballot might give evidence to enable the jury to apply it, and

might testify that he intended it for the candidate the initials of whose name he

had given. In Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 429, a rule somewhat different

was laid down. In that case, Matthew H. Carpenter was candidate for the office

of prosecuting attorney; and besides the perfect ballots there were others, cast

for "D. M. Carpenter," "M. D. Carpenter," "M. T. Carpenter," and "Car-

pentep." The jury found that there was no lawyer in the county by the name of

D. M. Carpenter, M. D. Carpenter, M. T. Carpenter, or whose surname was
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Carpenter, except the relator, Matthew H. Carpenter; that the relator was a

practising attorney of the county, and eligible to the office, and that the votes

above mentioned were all given and intended by the electors for the relatop.

The court say: "How was the intention of the voter to be ascertained? By

reading the name on the ballot, and ascertaining who was meant and intended by

that name? Is no evidence admissible to show who was intended to be voted

for under the various appellations, except such evidence as is contained in the

ballot itself? Or may you gather the intention of the voter from the ballot,

explained by the surrounding circumstances, from facts of a general public nature

connected with the election, and the different candidates which may aid you in

coming to the right conclusion? These facts and circumstances might, perhaps,

be adduced so clear and strong as to lead irresistibly to the inference that a vote

given for Carpenter was intended to be cast for Matthew II. Carpentep. A con-

tract may be read by the light of the surrounding circumstances, not to contra-

dict it, but in order more perfectly to understand the intent and meaning of the

parties who made it. By analogous principles, we think that these facts, and

others of like nature connected with the election, could be given in evidence, for

the purpose of aiding the jury in determining who was intended to be voted fop.

In New York, courts have gone even farther than this, and held, that not only

facts of public notoriety might be given, in evidence to show the intention of the

elector, but that the elector who cast the abbreviated ballot may be sworn as to

who was intended by it. People v. Ferguson, 8 Cow. 102. But this is pushing

the doctrine to a great extent; further, we think, than consideration of public

policy and the well-being of society will warrant; and to restrict the rule, and

say that the jury must determine from an inspection of the ballot itself, from the let-

ters upon it, aside from all extraneous facts, who was intended to be designated

bv the ballot, is establishing a principle unnecessarily cautious and limited. In
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der the ballot nugatory;1 nor will a failure to give the addi-

tion to a name — such as "Junior " — render it void, as that is a

mere matter of description, not constituting a part of the name,

and if given erroneously may be treated as surplusage.2 But

the present case, the jury, from the evidence before them, found that the votes

[above described] were, when given and cast, intended, by the electors who gave

and cast the same respectively, to be given and cast for Matthew EL Carpenter,

the relator. Such being the case, it clearly follows that they should be counted

for him." See also State v. Elwood, 12 Wis. 561; and People v. Pease, 27 N. Y.

84, per Denio, Ch. J.

On the other band, it was held, in Opinions of Judges, 38 Maine, 559, that

vote* could not be counted for a person of a different name from that expressed

by the ballot, even though the only difference consisted in the initial to the mid-

dle name. But see People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67. And in

People v. Tisdale, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 65, followed in People v. Uiggins, 3 Mich.

233, it was held that no extrinsic evidence was admissible in explanation or sup-

port of the ballot; and that, unless it showed upon its face for whom it un-

designed, it must be rejected. And it was also held, that a ballot for "J. A.

Dyer" did not show, upon its face, that it was intended for the candidate James

A. Dyer, and therefore could not be counted with the ballots cast for him by his
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full name. This rule is convenient of application, but it probably defeats the

intention of the electors in every case to which it is applied, where the rejected

votes could influence the result, — an intention, too, which we think is so apparent

on the ballot itself, that no person would be in real doubt concerning it. In

People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 64, in which Moses M. Smith was a candidate for

county treasurer, Seidell, J., Bays: "According to well-settled rules, the board

of canvassers erred in refusing to allow to the relator the nineteen votes given

for Moses Smith and M. M. Smith"; and although we think this doctrine cor-

rect, the cases he cites in support of it (8 Cow. 102, and 5 Denio, 409) would

only warrant a jury, not the canvassers, in allowing them; or, at least, those cast

for M. M. Smith. The case of People v. Tisdale was again followed in People

t'. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 2i<3; the majority of the court, however, expressing the

opinion that it was erroneous in principle, but that it had (for twenty-five yean)

been too long the settled law of the State to be disturbed, unless by the legis-

lature.

1 People t>. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, 8 N. Y. 67. But see Opinions of Judge*,

38 Maine, 597.

* People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67. In this case, the jury found,

as matter of fact, that ballots given lor Benjamin Welch were intended for Ben-

jamin Welch, Jr.; and the court held, that, as a matter of law, they should

have been counted lbr him. It was not decided, however, that the canvassers

were at liberty to allow the votes to Benjamin Welch, Jr.; and the judge, deliv-

ering the prevailing opinion in the Court of Appeals, says (p. 81), that the State

canvassers cannot be charged with error in refusing to add to the votes for Ben-

jamin Welch, Jr., those which were given for Benjamin Welch, without the junior.

"They had not the means which the court possessed, on the trial of this issue, of
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where the * name upon the ballot is altogether different [*611]

from that of a candidate, and not the same in sound and

not a mere abbreviation, the evidence of the voter cannot be re-

ceived to show for whom it was intended.1

Upon the question how far extrinsic evidence is admissible by

way of helping out any imperfections in the ballot, no rule can be

laid down which cau be said to have a preponderating weigiit of

obtaining, by evidence aliunde, the several county returns, the intention of the

voters, and the identity of the candidate with the name on the defective ballots.

[Their judicial power extends no further than to take notice of such facts of pub-

lic notoriety as that certain well-known abbreviations are generally used to

designate particular names, and the like." So far as this case holds, that the

canvassers are not chargeable with error in not counting the ballots with the name

Benjamin Welch for Benjamin Welch, Jr., it is, doubtless, correct. But suppose

the canvassers had seen fit to do so, could the court hold they were guilty of

usurpation in thus counting and allowing them? Could not the canvassers take

notice of such facts of general public notoriety as everybody else would take

notice of? Or must they shut their eyes to facts which all other persons must

see? The facts are these: Benjamin Welch, Jr., and James M. Cook are the
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candidates, and the only candidates, for State Treasurer. These facts are noto-

rious, and the two political parties make determined efforts to elect one or the

other. Certain votes are cast for Benjamin Welch, with the descriptive word

"junior" omitted. The name is correct, but, as thus given, it may apply to some

one else; but it would be to a person notoriously not a candidate. Under these

circumstances, when the facts of which it would be necessary to take notice have

occurred under their own supervision, and are universally known, so that the

result of a contest in the courts could not be doubtful, is there any reason why

the canvassers should not take notice of these facts, count the votes which a jury

would subsequently be compelled to count, and thus save the delay, expense,

vexation, and confusion of a contest? If their judicial power extends to a deter-

mination of what are common and well-known abbreviations, and what names

spelled differently are idem sonans, why may it not also extend to the facts, of

which there will commonly be quite as little doubt, as to who are the candidates

at the election over which they preside? It seems to us, that, in every case

where the name given on the ballot, though in some particulars imperfect, is not

different from that of the candidate, and tacts of general notoriety leave no doubt

in the minds of canvassers that it was intended for him, the canvassers should be

at liberty to do what a jury would afterwards be compelled to do, — count it for

such candidate.

1 A vote for "Pence" cannot be shown to have been intended for " Spence."

Hart v. Evans, 8 Peun. St. 13. Where, however, wrong initials were given to

the Christian name, the ballots were allowed to the candidate; the facts of public

notoriety being such as to show that they were intended for hiin. Attorney-Gen-

eral v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420. This case goes farther in permitting mistakes in ballots

to be corrected on parol evidence than any other in the books.
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authority in its support. We think evidence of such facts as may

be called the circumstances surrounding the election — such as

who were the candidates brought forward by the nominating con-

ventions; whether other persons of the same names resided in the

district from which the officer was to be chosen, and if so whether

they were eligible or had been named for the office ; if a ballot was

printed imperfectly, how it came to be so printed, and the like —

is admissible for the purpose of showing that an imperfect ballot

was meant for a particular candidate, unless the name is so differ-

ent that to thus apply it would be to contradict the ballot itself;

or unless the ballot is so defective that it fails to show any inten-

tion whatever: in which cases it is not admissible. And

[* 612] we also * think that in any case to allow a voter to testify

by way of explanation of a ballot otherwise fatally defec-

tive, that he voted the particular ballot, and intended it for a par-

ticular candidate, is exceedingly dangerous, invites corruption and

fraud, and ought not to be suffered. Nothing is more easy than

for reckless parties thus to testify to their intentions, without the
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possibility of disproving their testimony if untrue; and if one

falsely swears to having deposited a particular ballot, unless the

party really depositing it sees fit to disclose his knowledge, the

evidence must pass unchallenged, and the temptation to suborna-

tion of perjury, when public offices are at stake, and when it may

be committed with impunity, is too great to allow such evidence to

be sanctioned. While the law should seek to give effect to the in-

tention of the voter, whenever it can be fairly ascertained, yet this

intention must be that which is expressed in due form of law, not

that which remains hidden in the elector's breast; and where the

ballot, in connection with such facts surrounding the election as

would be provable if it were a case of contract, does not enable

the proper officers to apply it to one of the candidates, policy, coin-

ciding in this particular with the general rule of law as applicable

to other transactions, requires that the ballot shall not be counted

for such candidate.1

The ballot should also/sufficiently show on its face for what office

the person named upon it is designated; but here again technical

1 This is substantially the New York rule as settled by the later decisions, if

we may accept the opinion of Denio, Ch. J., in People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 84, «

taking the correct view of those decisions. See People v. Cieotte, 16 Mich. 283,

for a discussion of this point.
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accuracy is not essential, and the office is sufficiently named if it

be so designated that no reasonable doubt can exist as to what is

meant. A great constitutional privilege — the highest under the

government — is not to be taken away on a mere technicality, but

the most liberal intendment should bo made in support of the elec-

tor's action wherever the application of the common-sense rules

which are applied in other cases will enable us to understand and

render it effectual.1

* Where more than one office is to be filled at an election, [* 613]

the law may either require all the persons voted for, for

the several offices, to be so voted for by each elector on the same

ballot, or it may provide a different receptacle for the ballots for

some one office or set of offices from that which is to receive the

others. In such a case each elector will place upon the ballot to

be deposited in each the names of such persons as he desires to

vote for, for the different offices to be filled at the election for which

that box is provided. If, for instance, State and township officers

are to be chosen at the same election, and the ballots are to be

kept separate, the elector must have different ballots for each; and

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

1 In People p. Matteson, 17 1ll. 167, it was held that where "police magis-

trates" were to be chosen, votes cast for " police justices " should be counted, as

they sufficiently showed upon their face the intention of the voters. So where

the question was'submitted to the people, whether a part of one county should

be annexed to another, and the act of submission provided that the electors might

express their choice by voting "for detaching R ," or "against detaching

R ," it was held that votes cast for "R attached," and for "R

detached," and "for division," and "against division," were properly counted

by the canvassers, as the intention of the voters was clearly ascertainable from

the ballots themselves with the aid of the extrinsic facts of a public nature con-

nected with the election. State v. Elwood, 12 Wis. 551. So where trustees of

common schools were to be voted for, it was held that votes for trustees of public

schools should be counted; there being no trustees to be voted for at that elec-

tion except trustees of common schools. People v. McManus, 34 Barb. 620. In

Phelps p. Goldthwaite, 16 Wis. 146, where a city and also a county superinten-

dent of schools were to be chosen at the same election, and ballots were cast for

"superintendent of schools," without further designation, parol evidence of sur-

rounding circumstances was admitted to enable the proper application to be

made of the ballots to the respective candidates. In Peck v. Weddell, 17 Ohio,

N. s. 271, an act providing for an election on the question of the removal of a

county seat to the "town " of Bowling Green, was held not invalid by reason of

Bowling Green being in law not a "town," but an incorporated village. In

voting for a county seat it was held proper to count votes cast for a town by its

popular, which differed from its legal name. State v. Cavers, 22 Iowa, 343.

46 [ 721 ]
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if he should designate persons for a township office on the State

ballot, such ballot would, to that extent, be void, though the im-

proper addition would not defeat the ballot altogether, but would

be treated as surplusage, and the ballot be held good as a vote for

the State officers designated upon it.1 But an accidental error in

depositing the ballot should not defeat it. If an elector should

deliver the State and township ballots to the inspector of election,

who by mistake should deposit them in the wrong boxes respec-

tively, this mistake is capable of being corrected without confusion

when the boxes are opened, and should not prevent the ballots

being counted as intended. And it would seem that, in any case,

the honest mistake, either of the officer or the elector, should not

defeat the intention of the latter, where it was not left in doubt by

his action.2

The elector is not under obligation to vote for every office to be

filled at that election; nor where several persons are to be chosen

to the same office is he required to vote for as many as

[* 614] are to be * elected. He may vote for one or any greater

number, not to exceed the whole number to be chosen.
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In most of the States a plurality of the votes cast determines the

election. In others, as to some elections, a majority; but in de-

termining upon a majority or plurality, the blank votes, if any, are

not to be counted; and a candidate may therefore be chosen with-

out receiving a plurality or majority of voices of those who actually

participated in the election. Where, however, two offices of the

same name were to be filled at the same election, but the notice

of election specified one only, the political parties each nominated

one candidate, and, assuming that but one was to be chosen, no

elector voted for more than one, it was held that the one having a

majority was alone chosen ; the opposing candidate could not claim

to be also elected, as having received the second highest number of

votes, but as to the other office there had been a failure to hold au

election.3

1 See People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67.

* People v. Bates, 11 Mich. 362. See Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. An. 175;

McKinney p. O'Connor, 26 Texas, 5.

3 People v. Kent County Canvassers, 11 Mich, 111.
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The Freedom of Elections.

To keep every election free of all the influences and surround-

ings which might bear improperly upon it, or might impel the

electors to cast their suffrages otherwise than as their judgments

would dictate, has always been a prominent object in American

legislation. We have referred to fundamental principles which

protect the secrecy of the ballot, but in addition to these there

are express constitutional and statutory provisions looking to the

accomplishment of the same general purpose. It is provided by

the constitutions of several of the States that bribery of an elector

shall constitute a disqualification of the right to vote or to hold

office;1 the treating of an elector, with a view to influence his

vote, is in some States made an indictable offence;2 courts are not

allowed to be held, for the two reasons, that the electors ought to

be left free to devote their attention to the exercise of this

high trust, and that * suits if allowed on that day might [* 615]

be used as a means of intimidation ;3 legal process in

some States, and for the same reasons, is not permitted to be

served on that day; intimidation of voters by threats or otherwise
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is made punishable;4 and generally all such precautions as the

people in framing their organic law, or the legislature afterwards,

have thought might be made available for the purpose, have been

1 See the Constitutions of Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, West Virginia,

Oregon, California, Kansas, Texas, Arkansas, Rhode Island, Alabama, Florida,

New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Nevada, Tennessee, Con-

necticut, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Wisconsin. And it has been held on gen-

eral principles that if an elector is induced to vote in a particular way by the

payment or promise of any money or other valuable consideration for such vote,

his vote should be rejected as illegal. State v. Olin, 23 Wis. 327.

* State v. Rutledge, 8 Humph. 32. And see the provision in the Constitution

of Vermont on this subject. A resort to this species of influence would gen-

erally, at the present time, prejudice the candidate's interests instead of advancing

them, but such has not always been the case. Mp. Madison, after performing

valuable service for the State in its legislature, was defeated when offering him-

self for re-election, in the very crisis of the Revolution, by the treating of his

opponent. See his Life by Rives, Vol. I. p. 179.

'But it was held in New York that the statute of that State forbidding the

holding of courts on election days did not apply to the local elections. Matter of

Election Law, 7 Hill, 194; Redfield v. Florence, 2 E. D. Smith, 339.

* As to what shall constitute intimidation, see Respublica v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates,

429.
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provided with a view to secure the most completely free and un-

biassed expression of opinion that shall be possible.

Betting upon elections is illegal at the common law, on grounds

of public policy ;1 and all contracts entered into with a view im-

properly to influence an election would be void for the same rea-

son.2 And with a just sense of the danger of military interference,

where a trust is to be exercised, the highest as well as the most

delicate in the whole machinery of government, it has not been

thought unwise to prohibit the militia being called out on election

days, even though for no other purpose than for enrolling and or-

1 Bonn v. Riker, 4 Johns. 426; Lansing v. Lansing, 8 Johns. 454; Ball p.

Gilbert, 12 Met. 397; Laval v. Myers, 1 Bailey, 486; Smyth p. McMasters, 2

Browne, 182; McAllister v. Hoffman, 16 S. & R. 147; Stoddard v. Martin, 1

R.L1; Wroth p. Johnson, 4 H. & M. 284; Tarelton v. Baker, 18 Vt. 9; Davis

v. Holbrook, 1 La. An. 176; Freeman p. Hardwick, 10 Ala. 316; Wheeler r.

Spencer, 15 Conn. 28; Russell p. Pyland, 2 Humph. 131; Porter p. Sawyer, 1

Hair. 517; Hickerson v. Benson, 8 Mo. 8; Machir v. Moore, 2 Grat. 257; Rust

v. Gott, 9 Cow. 169; Brush e. Keeler, 5 Wend. 250.

* In Jackson v. Walker, 5 Hill, 27, it was held that an agreement by the
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defendant to pay the plaintiff $1000, in consideration that the latter, who had

built a log-cabin, would keep it open for political meetings to further the suc-

cess of certain persons nominated for members of Congress, &c, by one of the

political parties, was illegal within the statute of New York, which prohibited

contributions of money "for any other purpose intended to promote the election

of any particular person or ticket, except for defraying the expenses of printing

and the circulation of votes, handbills, and other papers." This case is criticised

in Hurley v. Van Wagner, 28 Barb. 109, and it is possible that it went further

than either the statute or public policy would require. In Nichols v. Mudgett,

32 Vt. 546, the defendant being indebted to the plaintiff, who was a candidate for

town representative, the parties agreed that the former should use hia influence

for the plaintiff's election, and do what he could for that purpose, and that if the

plaintiff was elected, that should be a satisfaction of his claim. Nothing was

specifically said about the defendant's voting for the plaintiff, but he did vote for

him, and would not have done so, nor favored his election, but for this agree-

ment. The plaintiff was elected. Held, that the agreement was void, and con-

stituted, no bar to a recovery upon the demand. See also Meachem p. Dow, 32

Vt. 721, where it was held that a note executed in consideration of the payee's

agreement to resign public office in favor of the maker, and use influence in favor

of the latter's appointment as his successor, was void in the hands of the payee.

In Pratt v. People, 29 11l. 54, it was held that an agreement between two electors

that they should " pair off," and both abstain from voting, wae illegal, and the

inspectors could not refuse to receive a vote of one of the two, on the ground of

his agreement.
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ganizing them.1 The ordinary police is the peace force of the

State, and its presence suggests order, individual safety, and pub-

lic security; but when the military appear upon the stage, even

though composed of citizen militia, the circumstances must be

assumed to be extraordinary, and there is always an appearance

of threatening and dangerous compulsion which might easily in-

terfere seriously with that calm and unimpassioned discharge of

the elector's duty which the law so justly favors. The soldier in

organized ranks can know no law but such as is given him by his

commanding officer; and when he appears at the polls, there is

necessarily a suggestion of the presence of an enemy against

whom he may be compelled to exercise the most extreme and de-

structive force; and that enemy must generally be the party out

of power, while the authority that commands the force directed

against them will be the executive authority of the State for the

time being wielded by their opponents. It is consequently of the

highest importance that the presence of a military force at the polls

be not suffered except in serious emergencies, when disorders exist

or are threatened for the suppression or prevention of which the

ordinary peace force is insufficient; and any statute which should
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provide for or permit such presence as a usual occurrence or ex-

cept in the last resort, though it might not be void, would never-

theless be a serious invasion of constitutional right, and should

not be submitted to in a free government without vigorous remon-

strance.2

'.

1 See Hyde c. Melvin, 11 Johns. 521.

'The danger, and we may say also, the folly of military interference with the

deliberations or action of electors except in the last necessity, was fearfully illus-

trated in the case of the " Manchester Massacre," which occurred in 1819. An

immense meeting of radical parliamentary reformers, whose objects and purposes

appeared threatening to the government, was charged upon by the military, with

some loss of life, and with injury to the persons of several hundred people. As

usual in such cases, the extremists, of one party applauded tbe act and compli-

mented the military, while the other party was exasperated in the last degree, by

what seemed to them an unnecessary, arbitrary, and unconstitutional exercise of

force. The most bitter and dangerous feeling was excited throughout the country

by this occurrence, and it is not too much to say that if disorders were threaten-

ing before, the government had done nothing in this way to strengthen its authority,

or to insure quiet or dispassionate action. No one had been conciliated; no one

had been reduced to more calm and deliberate courses; but, on the other hand,

even moderate men had been exasperated and inclined to opposition by this

[ 725 ]
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[* 616J * The Elector not to be deprived of hi» Vote.

That one entitled to vote shall not be deprived of the privilege

by the action of the authorities, is a fundamental principle.

It lias been held, on constitutional grounds, that a law creating

a new county, but so framed as to leave a portion of its territory

unorganized, so that the voters within such portion could not par-

ticipate in the election of county officers, was inoperative and void.1

So a law submitting to the voters of a county the question of re-

moving the county seat is void if there is no mode under the law

by which a city within the county can participate in the election.1

And although the failure of one election precinct to hold an elec-

tion, or to make a return of the votes cast, might not render the

whole election a nullity, where the electors of that precinct were

at liberty to vote had they so chosen, or where, having voted but

failed to make return, it is not made to appear that the votes not

returned would have changed the result,8 yet if any action was

required of the public authorities preliminary to the election, and

that which was taken was not such as to give all the electors the
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opportunity to participate, and no mode was open to the electors

by which the officers might be compelled to act, it would seem

that such neglect, constituting as it would the disfranchisement of

the excluded electors pro hac vice, must on general principles

render the whole election nugatory; for that cannot be called an

election or the expression of the popular sentiment where a part

only of the electors have been allowed to be heard, and the others,

without being guilty of fraud or negligence, have been excluded.1

violent, reckless, and destructive display of coercive power. See Hansard's

Debates, Vol. XLI. pp. 4, 61, 230.

1 People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 471. For similar reasons the act for the

organization of Schuyler County was held invalid in Lanning p. Carpenter, 20

N. Y. 477.

* Attorney-General v. Supervisors of St. Clair, 11 Mich. 63. For a similar

principle see Foster v. Scarff, 15 Ohio, N. s. 532.

5 See Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42; Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. ».

County Court of Davidson, 1 Sneed, 637. Also Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan, 68.

4 Sue Fort Dodge v. District Township, 17 Iowa, 85; Barry v. Lauck, 5 Cold.

588. In People t>. Salomon, 46 111. 415, it was held that where an act of the

legislature, before it shall become operative, is required to be submitted to the

vote of the legal electors of the district to be affected thereby, if the election

which is attempted to be held is illegal within certain precincts containing a
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If the inspectors of elections refuse to receive the vote of an

elector duly qualified, they may be liable both civilly and crimi-

nally for so doing: criminally, if they were actuated by improper

and corrupt motives; and civilly, it is held in some of the States,

even though there may have been no malicious design in

so doing;1 * but other cases hold that, where the inspec- [* 617]

tors are vested by the law with the power to pass upon

the qualifications of electors, they exercise judicial functions in so

doing, and are entitled to the same protection as other judicial

officers in the discharge of their duty, and cannot be made liable

except upon proof of express malice.2 Where, however, by the

law under which the election is held, the inspectors are to receive

the voter's ballot, if ho takes the oath that he possesses the con-

stitutional qualifications, the oath is the conclusive evidence on

which the inspectors are to act, and they are not at liberty to

refuse to administer the oath, or to refuse the vote after the oath

has been taken. They are only ministerial officers in such a

case, and have no discretion but to obey the law and receive

the vote.3
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The Conduct of the Election.

The statutes of the different States point out specifically the

mode in which elections shall be conducted; but, although there

are great diversities of detail, the same general principles govern

them all. As the execution of these statutes must very often fall

majority of the voters of the district, then the act will not be deemed to have

been submitted to the required vote, and the result will not be declared upon the

votes legally cast, adverse to what it would have been had no illegality inter-

vened.

'Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236; Gardner v. Ward, 2 Mass. 244, note; Lin-

coln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350; Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485; Gates v. Neal,

23 Pick. 308; Blanchard p. Stearns, 5 Met. 298; Jeffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio,

372; Chrisman v. Bruce, 1 Duvall, 63; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, n. s. 665;

Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544.

* Carter v. Harrison, 5 Blackf. 138; Rail p. Potts, 8 Humph. 225; Peavey v.

Robbins, 3 Jones, Law, 339; Gordon v. Farrar, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 411; Caulfield

p. Bullock, 18 B. Monp. 494; Morgan v. Dudley, ib. 693; Friend p. Hamill, 34

Md. 298; Goetcheus p. Matthewson, 5 Lans. 214.

3 Spriggins v. Houghton, 2 Scam. 377; State p. Robb, 17 Ind. 536; People v.

Pease, 30 Barb. 588. And see People v. Gordon, 5 Call. 235; Chrisman p. Bruce,

1 Duvall, 63; Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544.
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to the hands of men unacquainted with the law and unschooled in

business, it is inevitable that mistakes shall sometimes occur, and

that very often the law will fail of strict compliance. Where an

election is thus rendered irregular, whether the irregularity shall

avoid it or not must depend generally upon the effect the failure

to comply strictly with the law may have had in obstructing the

complete expression of the popular will, or the production of sat-

isfactory evidence thereof. Election statutes are to be tested like

other statutes, but with a leaning to liberality, in view of the great

public purposes which they accomplish; and except where they

specifically provide that a thing shall be done in the man-

[* 618] ner indicated and not otherwise, * their provisions designed

merely for the information and guidance of the officers

must be regarded as directory only, and the election will not be

defeated by a failure to comply with them, providing the irregu-

larity has not hindered any who were entitled from exercising the

right of suffrage, or rendered doubtful the evidences from which

the result was to be declared. In a leading case the following
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irregularities were held not to vitiate the election:. the accidental

substitution of another book for the holy evangelists in the admin-

istration of an oath, both parties being ignorant of the error at

the time; the holding of the election by persons who were not

officers de jure, but who had colorable authority, and acted de facto

in good faith;1 the failure of the board of inspectors to appoint

clerks of the election; the closing of the outer door of the room

where the election was held at sundown, and then permitting the

persons within the room to vote; it not appearing that legal voters

were excluded by closing the door, or illegal allowed to vote; and

the failure of the inspectors or clerks to take the prescribed oath

of office. And it was said, in the same case, that any irregularity

in conducting an election which does not deprive a legal voter of

his vote, or admit a disqualified voter to vote, or cast uncertainty

on the result, and has not been occasioned by the agency of a

party seeking to derive a benefit from it, should be overlooked in

a proceeding to try the right to an office depending on such elec-

1 As to what constitutes an officer de facto, the reader is referred to the care-

ful opinion in State v. Carroll, 88 Conn. 449; 8. c. 9 Am. Rep. 409. Also to

Fowler ». Beebe, 9 Mass. 231; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 131; Commonwealth

o. McCombs, 56 Penn. St. 486; Ex parte Strang, 21 Ohio, N. 8. 610; Kimball

v. Alcorn, 45 Miss. 151, and authorities referred to in these cases severally.

[ 728 ]
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tion.1 This rule is an eminently proper one, and it furnishes a

very satisfactory test as to what is essential and what not

in election laws.2 And where a party contests * an election [* 619]

on the ground of these or any similar irregularities, he

ought to aver and be able to show that the result was affected by

1 People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67. To the same effect, see

Clifton v. Cook, 7 Ala. 114; Truehart r. Addicks, 2 Texas, 217; Dishon v.

Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420; State v. Jones, 19

Ind. 356; People v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233; Gorham v. Campbell, 2 Cal. 135;

People v. Bates, 11 Mich. 362; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 112; People v.

McManus, 34 Barb. 620 ; Whipley v. McCune, 12 Cal. 352; Bourland v. Hildreth,

26 Cal. 161; Day v. Kent, 1 Oregon, 123; Piatt v. People, 29 111. 54; Ewing v.

Fillcy, 43 Penn. St. 384; Howard v. Shields, 16 Ohio, n. s. 184; State v. Stumpf,

21 Wis. 579; McKinnoy v. O'Connor, 26 Texas, 5; Sprague v. Norway, 31 Cal.

173. In Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42, it was held, that, where the statute required

the inspectors to certify the result of the election on the next day thereafter, or

sooner, the certificate made the second day thereafter was sufficient, the statute

as to time being directory merely. In People v. McManus, 34 Barb. 620, it

was held that an election was not made void by the fact that one of the three

inspectors was by the statute disqualified from acting, by being a candidate at
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the election, the other two being qualified. In Sprague v. Norway, 31 Cal. 173,

it was decided that where the judges of an election could not read, and for that

reason a person who was not a member of the board took the ballots from the

box, and read them to the tellers, at the request of the judges, the election was

not affected by the irregularity.

* This rule has certainly been applied with great liberality, in some cases. In

People r. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233, it was held that the statute requiring ballots to

be sealed up in a package, and then locked up in the ballot-box, with the orifice

at the top sealed, was directory merely, and that ballots which had been kept in

a locked box, but without the orifice closed or the ballots sealed up, were admis-

sible in evidence in a contest for an office depending upon this election. This

case was followed in People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, and it was held that whether

the ballots were more satisfactory evidence than the inspector's certificates, where

a discrepancy appeared between them, was a question for the jury. In Morril

v. Haines, 2 N. H. 246, the statute required State officers to be chosen by a

check-list, and by delivery of the ballots to the moderator in person; and'it was

held that the requirement of a check-list was mandatory, and the election in the

town was void if none was kept. The decision was put upon the ground that

the check-list was provided as an important guard against indiscriminate and

illegal voting, and the votes given by ballot without this protection were there-

fore as much void as if given viva voce. An election adjourned without warrant

to another place, as well as an election held without the officers required by law,

is void. Commonwealth v. County Commissioners, 5 Rawle, 75. An unauthor-

ized adjournment of the election for dinner — it appearing to have been in good

faith, and no one having been deprived of his vote thereby — will not defeat the

election. Fry v. Booth, 19 Ohio, n. s. 25.
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them.1 Time and place, however, are of the substance of every

election,2 and a failure to comply with the law in these particulars

is not generally to be treated as a mere irregularity.3

What is a Sufficient Election.

Unless the law under which the election is held expressly re-

quires more, a plurality of the votes cast will be sufficient to elect,

notwithstanding these may constitute but a small portion

[*620] of those * who are entitled to vote,4 and notwithstanding

the voters generally may have failed to take notice of the

law requiring the election to be held.6

If several persons are to be chosen to the same office, the requi-

site number who shall stand highest on the list will be elected.

But without such a plurality no one can be chosen to a public

office; and if the person receiving the highest number of votes was

1 Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. An. 175; People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283 ; Tay-

lor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107.

• Dickey v. Hurlburt, 5 Cal. 343; Knowles v. Yeates, 31 Cal. 82.

1 The statute of Michigan requires the clerks of election to keep lists of the
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persons voting, and that at the close of the polls the first duty of the inspectors

shall be to compare the lists with the number of votes in the box, and if the

count of the latter exceeds the former, then to draw out unopened and destroy a

sufficient number to make them correspond. In People p. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283,

it appeared that the inspectors in two wards of Detroit, where a surplus of votes

had been found, had neglected this duty, and had counted all the votes without

drawing out and destroying any. The surplus in the two wards was sixteen.

The actual majority of one of the candidates over the other on the count as it

stood (if certain other disputed votes were rejected) would be foup. It was held

that this neglect of the inspectors did not invalidate the election; that had the

votes been drawn out, the probability was that each candidate would lose a num-

ber proportioned to the whole number which he had in the box; and this being a

probability which the statute providing for the drawing proceeded upon, the court

should apply it afterwards, apportioning the excess of votes between the candi-

dates in that proportion.

4 Augustin v. Eggleston, 12 La. An. 366; Gillespie p. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544.

See also State v. Mayor, &c, of St. Joseph, 37 Mo. 270; State v. Binder, 38

Mo. 450.

'People p. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508. Even if the majority expressly dissent,

yet if they do not vote, the election by the minority will be valid. Oldknow p.

Wainwright, 1 W. Bl. 229; Rex p. Foxcroft, 2 Burp. 1017; Rex p. Withers,

referred to in same case. Minority representation in certain cases has been

introduced in New York, Pennsylvania, and 11linois, and the principle is likely

to find favor elsewhere.

[ 780 ]
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ineligible, the votes cast for him will still be effectual so far as to

prevent the opposing candidate being chosen, and the election

must be considered as having failed.1

The admission of illegal votes at an election will not necessarily

defeat it, but to warrant its being set aside on that ground it

should appear that the result would have been different had they

been excluded.2 And the fact that unqualified persons are allowed

to enter the room, and participate in an election, does not justify

legal voters in refusing to vote, and treating the election as void,

but it will be held valid if the persons declared chosen had a

plurality of the legal votes actually cast.3 So it is held that an

exclusion of legal votes—not fraudulently, but through error in

judgment — will not defeat an election; notwithstanding the error

in such a case is one which there was no mode of correcting, even

by the aid of the courts, since it cannot be known with certainty

afterwards how the excluded electors would have voted, and it

would obviously be dangerous to receive and rely upon their sub-

sequent statements as to their intentions, after it is ascer-

tained precisely what effect their * votes would have upon [* 621]

the result.4 If, however, the inspectors of election shall

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

exclude legal voters, not because of honest error in judgment, but

1 State v. Giles, 1 Chand. 112; Opinions of Judges, 38 Maine, 597; State v.

Smith, 14 Wis. 497; Saunders v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 145; Fish v. Collens, 21 La.

An. 289; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 135. In People v. Molliter, 23 Mich. 841, a

minority candidate claimed the election on the ground that the votes cast for his

opponent, though a majority, were ineffectual because the name was abbreviated.

Held, that they were at least effectual to preclude the election of a candidate who

received a less numbeV. But it has been held that if the ineligibility is notorious,

so that the electors must be deemed to have voted with full knowledge of it, the

votes for the ineligible candidate must be declared void, and the next highest

candidate is chosen. Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93; Carson v. McPhetridge, 15

Ind. 327; People v. Clute, 50 N. Y. 451. So if the law which creates the dis-

qualification expressly declares all votes cast for the disqualified person void,

they must be treated as mere blank votes, and cannot be counted for any

purpose.

* Ex parte Murphy, 7 Cow. 153; First Parish in Sudbury v. Stearns, 21 Pick.

148; Blandford School District v. Gibbs, 2 Cush. 39; People v. Cicotte, 16

Mich. 283; Judkins v. Hill, 60 N. H. 140. Votes received illegally will be

rejected by the court in an action to try title to an office. State v. Hilmantel,

21 Wis. 566.

* First Parish in Sudbury v. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148.

4 Newcum v. Kirtley, 13 B. Monr. 615. See Burke o. Supervisors of Monroe,

4 W. Va. 371.

[731]
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wilfully and corruptly, and to an extent that affects the result, or

if by riots or otherwise legal voters are intimidated and prevented

from voting, or for any other reasons the electors have not had

opportunity for the expression of their sentiments through the

ballot-box, the election should be set aside altogether, as having

failed in the purpose for which it was called.1 Errors of judgment

are inevitable, but fraud, intimidation, and violence the law can

and should protect against. A mere casual affray, however, or

accidental disturbance, without any intention of overawing or

intimidating the electors, cannot be considered as affecting the

freedom of the election;2 nor in any case would electors be justi-

fied in abandoning the ground for any light causes, or for improper

interference by others where the officers continue in the discharge

of their functions, and there is opportunity for the electors to

vote.3 And, as we have already seen, a failure of an election in

one precinct, or disorder or violence which prevent a return from

that precinct, will not defeat the whole election, unless it appears

that the votes which could not be returned in consequence of the
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violence would have changed the result.4 It is a little difficult at

times to adopt the true mean between those things which should

and those which should not defeat an election; for while on the

one hand the law should seek to secure the due expression of his

will by every legal voter, and guard against any irregularities or

misconduct that may tend to prevent it, so, on the other hand, it

is to be borne in mind that charges of irregularity and misconduct

are easily made, and that the dangers from throwing elections

open to be set aside or controlled by oral evidence, are perhaps as

great as any in our system. An election honestly conducted under

the forms of law ought generally to stand, notwithstanding indi-

vidual electors may have been deprived of their votes, or unquali-

fied voters have been allowed to participate. Individuals may

1 Where one receives a majority of all the votes cast, the opposing candidate

cannot be declaped elected on evidence that legal voters sufficient to change the

result offered to vote for him, but were erroneously denied the right; but the

election may be declared to have failed, and a new election be ordered. Renner

v. Bennett, 21 Ohio, n. s. 431. See also Matter of Long Island R.R. Co., 19

Wend. 37; People v. Phillips, 1 Denio, 389; State p. McDaniel, 22 Ohio, w. s.

354.

* Cush. Leg. Assemb. § 184.

'See First Pariah in Sudbury p. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148.

* Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42. Sec ante, p. 616 and note.
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suffer wrong in such cases, and a candidate who was the real

choice of the people may sometimes be deprived of his election;

but as it is generally impossible to arrive at any greater

certainty of "result by resort to oral evidence, public [*622]

policy is best subserved by allowing the election to stand,

and trusting to a strict enforcement of the criminal laws for

greater security against the like irregularities and wrongs in the

future.

The Canvass and the Return.

If the election is purely a local one, the inspectors who have had

charge of the election canvass the votes and declare the result. If,

on the other hand, their district is one precinct of a larger district,

they make return in writing of the election over which they have

presided to the proper board of the larger district; and if the

election is for State officers, this district board will transmit the

result of the district canvass to the proper State board, who will

declare the general result. In all this the several boards act for

the most part ministerially only, and are not vested with judicial

powers to correct the errors and mistakes that may have occurred
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with any officer who preceded them in the performance of any duty

connected with the election, or to pass upon any disputed fact

which may affect the result.1 Each board is to receive the returns

transmitted to it, if in due form, as correct, and is to ascertain and

declare tire result as shown by such returns ;2 and if other matters

are introduced into the return than those which the law provides,

they are to that extent unofficial, and such statements must be

disregarded.8 If a district or State board of canvassers assumes

1 State v. Charleston, 1 S. C. (n. 8.) 30. And see cases cited in the next

note.

9 Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42; Brower v. O'Brien, 2 Ind. 423; People v. Hil-

liard, 29 I1L 413 ; People v. Jones, 19 Ind. 357; Ballou r. York County Com'rs,

13 Shcp. 491; Mayo v. Freeland, 10 Mo. 629; Thompson v. Circuit Judge,

9 Ala. o38; People v. Kilduff. 16 III. 492; O'Farrell c. Colby, 2 Minn. 180;

People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 362; People v. Van Slyck, 4 Cow. 297; Morgan

v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 72; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; People v. Cook,

14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67 ; Hartt v. Harvey, 32 Barb. 55; Attorney-General

v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567; Attorney-General v. Ely, ib. 420; State v. Governor,

1 Dutch. 331; State v. Clerk of Passaic, ib. 354; Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan,

68; People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45.

• Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42.
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to reject returns transmitted to it on other grounds than those

appearing upon its face, or to declare persons elected who are not

shown by the returns to have received the requisite plurality, it is

usurping functions, and its conduct will be reprehensible, if not

even criminal. The action of such boards is to be carefully con-

fined to an examination of the papers before them, and a

[* 623] determination of the * result therefrom, in the light of

such facts of public notoriety connected with the election

as every one takes notice of, and which may enable them to apply

such ballots as are in any respect imperfect to the proper candi-

dates or offices for which they are intended, provided the intent is

sufficiently indicated by the ballot in connection with such facts, so

that extraneous evidence is not necessary for this purpose. If

canvassers refuse or neglect to perform their duty, they may be

compelled by mandamus;1 though as these boards are created

for a single purpose only, and are dissolved by an adjournment

without day, it has been held that, after such adjournment, man-

damus would be inapplicable, inasmuch as there is no longer any
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board which can act;2 and the board themselves, having once

performed and fully completed their duty, have no power after-

wards to reconsider their determination and come to a different

conclusion.3

Contesting Elections.

As the election officers perform for the most part ministerial

functions only, their returns, and the certificates of election which

are issued upon them, are not conclusive in favor of the officers

who would thereby appear to be chosen, but the final decision must

rest with the courts.4 This is the general rule, and the exceptions

1 Clark v. McKenzie, 7 Bush, 523; Burke v. Supervisors of Monroe, 4 W.

Va. 371; State v. County Judge, 7 Iowa, 186; Magee v. Supervisors, 10 Cal.

876.

* Clark v. Buchanan, 2 Minn. 316; People p. Supervisors, 12 Barb. 217.

Contra, State v. Gibbs, 13 Fla. 55.

• Hadley v. Mayor, &c, 33 N. Y. 603; State v. Warren, 1 Houston, 43;

State v. Harrison, 38 Mo. 540. If they recount and give the certificate to

another, such action is a mere nullity. Bowen v. Hixon, 45 Mo. 340; People

v. Robertson, Mich. Sup. Court, July, 1873.

4 State v. Justices of Middlesex, Coxe, 244; Hill p. Hill, 4 McCord, 277;

Wammack v. Holloway, 2 Ala. 31; State p. Clerk of Passaic, 1 Dutch. 354;

Marshall p. Kerns, 2 Swan, 68; Attorney-General v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567; At-
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are of those cases where the law under which the canvass is made

declares the decision conclusive, or where a special statutory board

is established with powers of final decision.1 And it mat-

ters not how * high and important the office; an election [* 624]

to it is only made by the candidate receiving the requisite

plurality of the legal votes cast; and if any one, without having

r eceived such plurality, intrudes into an office, whether with or

without a certificate of election, the courts have jurisdiction to

oust, as well as to punish him for such intrusion.2

torney-General r. Ely, ib. 420; People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 362; People

v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa, 211; State v. Johnson, 17

Ark. 407; State r. Fetter, 12 Wis. 566; State v. Avery, 14 Wis. 122; People v.

Jones, 20 Cal. 50; Newcum v. Kirtley, 13 B. Monr. 515 ; People t». Van Slyck, 4

Cow. 297; People o. Vail, 20 Wend. 12; People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409; Peo-

ple r. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67; People v. Matteson, 17 111. 167;

Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107; Calaveras County r. Brockway, 30 Cal. 325.

An illegal election may be contested and set aside even though but one person

was voted for. Ex parte Ellyson, 20 Grat. 10.

1 See Grier v. Shackleford, Const. Rep. 642; Batman r. Megowan, 1 Met.
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(Ky.) 533; People v. Goodwin, 22 Mich. 496; State p. Marlow, 15 Ohio, n. 8.114.

For the proceedings in the State of New York in the canvass of votes for governor

in 1792, where the election of John Jay to that office was defeated by the rejec-

tion of votes cast for him for certain irregularities, which under the more recent

judicial decisions ought to have been overlooked, see Hammond's Political His-

tory of New York, c. 3. The law then in force made the decision of the State

canvassers final and conclusive.

* Barstow, being Governor of Wisconsin, was candidate for re-election against

Bashford. A majority of the votes was cast for Bashford, but certain spurious

returns were transmitted to the State canvassers, which, together with the legal

returns, showed a plurality for Barstow, and he was accordingly declared chosen.

Proceedings being taken against him by quo warranto in the Supreme Court,

Barstow objected to the jurisdiction, on the ground that the three departments of

the State government, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, were equal,

co-ordinate, and independent of each other, and that each department must be

and is the ultimate j udge of the election and qualification of its own member or

members, subject only to impeachment and appeal to the people; that the question

who is rightfully entitled to the office of governor could in no case become a

judicial question; and that as the constitution provides no means for ousting a

successful usurper of either of the three departments of the government, that

power rests exclusively with the people, to be exercised by them whenever they

think the exigency requires it. A strange doctrine in this country of laws! but

which, of course, received no countenance from the able court to which it was

addressed. In People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, the opinion is expressed by two

of the judges, that one claiming a public office has a constitutional right to a trial

by jury, and that this right cannot be taken away from him by any law which
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Where, however, the question arises collaterally, and not in a

direct proceeding to try the title to the office, the correctness of

the decision of the canvassers cannot' be called in question, but

must be conclusively presumed to be correct;1 and where the

election was to a legislative office, the final decision, as well by

parliamentary law as by constitutional provisions, rests with the

legislative body itself, and the courts, as we have heretofore seen,2

cannot interfere.

The most important question which remains to be mentioned,

relates to the evidence which the courts are at liberty to receive,

and the facts which it is proper to spread before the jury

[* 625] for their * consideration when an issue is made upon an

election for trial at law.

The questions involved in every case are, first, has there been

an election? and second, was the party who has taken possession

of the office the successful candidate at such election, by having

received a majority of the legal votes cast? These are ques-

tions which involve mixed considerations of law and fact, and
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the proper proceeding in which to try them in the courts is by quo

warranto, when no special statutory tribunal is created for the

purpose.3

Upon the first question, we shall not add to what we have

already said. When the second is to be considered, it is to be

constantly borne in mind that the point of inquiry is the will of the

electors as manifested by their ballots; and to this should all the

evidence be directed, and none that does not bear upon it should

be admissible.

We have already seen that the certificates or determinations of

the various canvassing boards, though conclusive in collateral

inquiries, do not preclude an investigation by the courts into the

facts which they certify. They are prima facie evidence, however,

shall undertake to make the decision of the canvassing board conclusive. But see

Ewing v. Filley, 48 Penn. St. 384; Commonwealth v. Leech, 44 Penn. St. 332.

1 Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 72; Hadley p. Mayor, &c, 33 N. Y. 603;

Howard p. Diarmid, 26 Ark. 100. And see Hulseman v. Rens, 41 Penn. St. 396,

where it was held that the court could not interfere summarily to set aside a

certificate of election, where it did not appear that the officers had acted cor-

ruptly, notwithstanding it was shown to be based in part upon forged returns.

* See ante, p. 133. See also Commonwealth v. Meeser, 44 Penn. St. 341.

* People v. Matteson, 17 Ill. 167; People v. Cover, 50 11l. 100.
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even in the courts;1 and this is so, notwithstanding alterations

appear; the question of their fairness in such a case being for the

jury.2 But back of this prima facie case the courts may go, and

the determinations of the State board may be corrected by those of

the district boards, and the latter by the ballots themselves when

the ballots are still in existence and have been kept as required by

law.3 If, however, the ballots have not been kept as required by

law, and surrounded by such securities as the law has prescribed

with a view to their safe preservation as the best evidence of the

election, it would seem that they should not be received in evi-

dence at all,4 or, if received, that it should be left to the jury to

determine, upon all the circumstances of the case, whether they

constitute more reliable evidence than the inspectors' certificate,6

which is usually prepared immediately on the close of

* the election, and upon actual count of the ballots as [* 626]

then made by the officers whose duty it is to do so.

Something has already been said regarding the evidence which -

can be received where the elector's ballot is less complete and

perfect in its expression of intention than, it should have been.
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There can be no doubt under the authorities that, whenever a

question may arise as to the proper application of a ballot, any

evidence is admissible with a view to explain and apply it which

would be admissible under the general rules of evidence for the

purpose of explaining and applying other written instruments.

But the rule, as it appears to us, ought not to go further. The

evidence ought to be confined to proof of the concomitant circum-

stances; such circumstances as may be proved in support or

explanation of a contract, where the parties themselves would not

be allowed to give testimony as to their actual intention, when

1 Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan, 68; Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 72;

Calaveras County v. Brockway, 30 Cal. 325.

* State v. Adams, 2 Stew. 231. See State v. Hilmantel, 23 Wis. 422.

'People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 362; People v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233; State

v. Clerk of Passaic, 1 Dutch. 354; State v. Judge, &c, 13 Ala. 805; People v.

Cook, 14 Barb. 259; s. c. 8 N. Y. 67; People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283; At-

torney-General o. Ely, 4 Wis. 420. The ballot is always the best evidence of

the voter's action. Wheat v. Ragsdale, 27 Ind. 191; People v. Holden, 28 Cal.

123.

4 People o. Sackett, 14 Mich. 320. But see People v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233.

s People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283.
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unfortunately the intention was ineffectually expressed.1 And we

have seen that no evidence is admissible as to how parties intended

to vote who were wrongfully prevented or excluded from so doing.

Such a case is one of wrong without remedy, so far as candidates

are concerned.2 There is more difficulty, however, when the

question arises whether votes which have been cast by incom-

petent persons, and which have been allowed in the canvass, can

afterwards be inquired into and rejected because of the want of

qualification.

If votes were taken viva voce, so that it could always be deter-

mined with absolute certainty how every person had voted, the

objections to this species of scrutiny after an election had been

held would not be very formidable. But when secret balloting is

the policy of the law, and no one is at liberty to inquire how any

elector has voted, except as he may voluntarily have waived his

privilege, and when consequently the avenues to correct informa-

tion concerning the votes cast are carefully guarded against ju-

dicial exploration, it seems exceedingly dangerous to permit auy
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question to be raised upon this subject. For the evidence volun-

tarily given upon any such question will usually come from those

least worthy of credit, who, if they have voted without legal right

in order to elect particular candidates, will be equally

[* 627] ready to testify * falsely, if their testimony can be made

to help the same candidates; especially when, if they give

evidence that they voted the opposing ticket, there cau usually be

no means, as they will well know, of showing the evidence to be

untrue.3 Moreover, to allow such scrutiny is to hold out strong

temptation to usurpation of office, without pretence or color of

right; since the nature of the case, and the forms and proceed-

ings necessary to a trial are such that, if an issue may be made on

the right of every individual voter, it will be easy, in the case of

1 People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 84, per Denio, Ch. J., commenting upon previ-

ous New York cases. See also Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420.

* See ante, 620.

* It has been decided in Wisconsin that where an unqualified person is called

to prove that he voted at an election, and declines to testify, the fact of his having

voted may be proved, and then his declarations may be put in evidence to. show

how he voted. State v. Olin, 23 Wis. 319. This may give the incompetent

voter a double vote. First, he votes for the ticket of his choice, and then, on a

contest, he declares he voted the other way, and a deduction is made from the

opposite vote accordingly.
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important elections, to prolong a contest for the major part if not

the whole of an official term, and to keep perpetually before the

courts the same excitements, strifes, and animosities which char-

acterize the hustings, and which ought, for the peace of the com-

munity, and the safety and stability of our institutions, to terminate

with the close of the polls.1

Upon this subject there is very little judicial authority, though

legislative bodies, deriving their precedents from England, where

the system of open voting prevails, have always been, accustomed

to receive such evidence, and have indeed allowed a latitude of

inquiry which makes more to depend upon the conscience of the

witnesses, and of legislative committees, in some cases, than upon

the legitimate action of the voters. The question of the right to

inquire into the qualifications of those who had voted at an elec-

tion, on a proceeding in the nature of a quo warranto, was directly

presented in one case to the Supreme Court of New York, and the

court was equally divided upon it.'- On error to the Court of

Appeals, a decision in favor of the right was rendered with the

concurrence of five judges, against three dissentients.3 The same
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question afterwards came before the Supreme Court of Michigan,

and was decided the same way, though it appears from the opin-

ions that the court were equally divided in their views.4 To these

cases we must refer for a full discussion of the reasons influencing

the several judges; but future decisions alone can give the ques-

tion authoritative settlement.5

1 This is one reason, perhaps, why in the case of State officers a statutory

tribunal is sometimes provided with powers of summary and final decision.

• People v. Pease, 30 Barb. 588.

» People v. Pease, 29 N. Y. 45.

4 People v. Cicotte, 1G Mich. 283. See further the case of State v. Hilmantel,

23 Wis. 422, where it was decided that those who had voted illegally might be

compelled to testify for whom they voted. The question was discussed but briefly,

and as one of privilege merely.

* Considerable stress was laid by the majority of the New York Court of

Appeals on the legislative practice, which, as it seems to us, is quite too loose in

these cases to constitute a safe guide. Some other rulings in that case also seem

more latitudinarian than is warranted by sound principle and a due regard to the

secret ballot system which we justly esteem so important. Thus, Selden, J.,

says: "When a voter refuses to disclose or fails to remember for whom he voted,

I think it is competent to resort to circumstantial evidence to raise a presump-

tion in regard to that fact. Such is the established rule in election cases before

legislative committees, which assume to be governed by legal rules of evidence
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(Cush. Leg. Assem. §§ 199 and 200); and within that rule it was proper, in

connection with the other circumstances stated by the witness Loftis, to ask him

for whom he intended to vote; not, however, on the ground that his intention,

as an independent fact, could be material, but on the ground that it was a cir-

cumstance tending to raise a presumption for whom he did vote." Now a«, in

the absence of fraud or mistake, you have arrived at a knowledge of how the

man voted, when you have ascertained how, at the time, he intended to vote, it

is difficult to discover much value in the elector's privilege of secrecy under this

ruling. And if " circumstances" may be shown to determine how he probably

voted, in cases where he insists upon his constitutional right to secrecy, then, as

it appears to us, it would be better to abolish altogether the secret ballot than to

continue longer a system which falsely promises secrecy, at the same time that it

gives to party spies and informers full license to invade the voters privilege in

secret and surreptitious ways, and which leaves jurors, in the absence of any

definite information, to act upon their guesses, surmises, and vague conjectures

as to the contents of a ballot.

Upon the right to inquire into the qualifications of those who have voted, in a

proceeding by quo warranto to test the right to a public office, Justice Chris-
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tiancy, in People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 311, expresses his views as follows: —

"I cannot go to the extent of holding that no inquiry is admissible in any case

into the qualification of voters or the nature of the votes given. Such a rule, I

admit, would be easy of application, and, as a general rule, might not be produc-

tive of a great amount of injustice, while the multitude of distinct questions of

fact in reference to the great number of voters whose qualifications may be con-

tested, is liable to lead to some embarrassment, and sometimes to protracted

trials, without a more satisl'actory result than would have been attained under a

rule which should exclude all such inquiries. Still, I cannot avoid the conclusion

that in theory and spirit our constitution and our statutes recognize as valid

those votes only which are given by electors who possess the constitutional quali-

fications; that they recognize as valid such elections only as are effected by the

votes of a majority of such qualified electors; and though the election boards of

inspectors and canvassers, acting only ministerially, are bound in their decisions

by the number of votes deposited in accordance with the forms of law regulating

their action, it is quite evident that illegal votes may have been admitted by the

perjury or other fault of the voters, and that the majority to which the inspectors

have been constrained to certify and the canvassers to allow has been thus wrong-

fully and illegally secured; and I have not been able to satisfy myself that in

such a case, these boards, acting thus ministerially, and often compelled to admit

votes which they know to be illegal, were intended to constitute tribunals of last

resort for the determination of the rights of parties claiming an election. If this

were so, and there were no legal redress, I think there would be much reason to

apprehend that elections would degenerate into mere contests of fraud.

"The person having the greatest number of the votes of legally qualified

electors, it seems to me, has a constitutional right to the office; and if no inquiry

can be had into the qualification of any voter, here is a constitutional right de-

pending upon a mode of trial unknown to the constitution, and, as I am strongly

inclined to think, oppoed to its provisions. I doubt the competency of the
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legislature, should they attempt it, which I think they have not, to make the

decision of inspectors or canvassers final under our constitution."

The opposite view is expressed by Justice Campbell as follows (ib. p. 294): —

"The first inquiry is whether an election can be defeated as to any candidate

by showing him to have received illegal votes. The authorities upon election

questions are, in this country, neither numerous nor satisfactory. In England,

where votes are given viva voce, it is always easy to determine how any voter has

given his voice. And in some States of the Union, a system seems to prevail

of numbering each ballot as given, and also numbering the voter's name on the

poll list, so as to furnish means of verification when necessary. It has always

been held, and is not disputed, that illegal votes do not avoid an election, unless

it can be shown that their reception affects the result. And where the illegality

consists in the casting of votes by persons unqualified, unless it is shown for

whom they voted, it cannot be allowed to change the result.

"The question of the power of courts to inquire into the action of the author-

ities in receiving or rejecting votes is, therefore, very closely connected with the

power of inquiring what persons were voted for by those whose qualifications are

denied. It is argued for the relator that neither of these inquiries can be made.

No use can fairly be made in such a controversy as the present of decisions or

practice arising out of any system of open voting. The ballot system was de-
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signed to prevent such publicity, and not to encourage it. And the course

adopted by legislative bodies cannot be regarded as a safe guide for courts of

justice. There is little uniformity in it, and much of it is based on English pre-

cedents belonging to a different practice. The view taken of contested elections

by these popular bodies is not always accurate, or consistent with any settled

principles.

"There is no case so far as I have been able to discover, under any system of

voting by closed ballot, which has held that any account could be taken of re jected

votes in a suit to try title for office. The statutes here, and probably elsewhere,

require the election to be made out by the votes given. But it is plain enough

that in most cases it would be quite as easy to determine for whom a rejected

voter would have voted as for whom any other actually did vote. In many cases

it would be easier, because the vote is always ready and tendered with better

opportunities of observation than are given where it is received and deposited.

But the element of uncertainty has been regarded as sufficient to cause the rejec-

tion of any such inquiry, and, in most cases, probably it would not be admissible

under the statutes. But the policy which leads to this result must have some

bearing upon the construction of the whole system.

"So far as I have been able to discover by means of the somewhat imperfect

indexes on this head, there is but one case in which the decision has turned upon

the propriety of allowing inquiry into the qualifications of voters, and the iden-

tification of their tickets when claimed to be disqualified. That case was the

case of People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45. In the Supreme Court the judges,

although arriving at a general result, were equally divided on this point. In the

Court of Appeals, the judges elected to that tribunal were also equally divided,

and the majority of the Supreme Court judges, belonging to it by rotation,

turned the scale, and decided that the inquiry was proper. The decision was

based chiefly upon English authorities; the previous New York decisions hav-
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ing turned principally on other errors which rest upon somewhat different

grounds.

"New York, so far as may be inferred from the absence of decisions else-

where, seems, until recently, to have been the only State preserving the ballot

system, in which the right to office by election is open to examination on the

merits to any considerable extent. The courts of that State have gone farther

than any others in opening the door to parol proof. Some of the Western

States have, upon the authority of the New York cases, permitted some of these

matters to be litigated, but they are not in any majority. And it is quite mani-

fest that the decisions have not in general acted upon any careful consideration

of the important questions of public policy underlying the ballot system, which

are so forcibly explained by Denio, Ch. J., in his opinion in People v. Pease;

and it is a little remarkable that in New York, while so many doors have been

opened by the decisions, the law requires all the ballots, except a single speci-

men of each kind, to be destroyed; thus leaving the number of votes of each

kind, in all cases, to be determined by the inspectors, and rendering any cor-

rection impossible. I think the weight of reasoning is in favor of the view of

Judge Denio in the New York case, that no inquiry can be made into the legality
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of votes actually deposited by a voter upon any ground of personal right as an

elector.

"The reasons why such an inquiry should be prevented do not necessarily rest

on any assumption that the inspectors act throughout judicially, although under

our registration system that objection has a force which would not otherwise be

so obvious. Neither do they rest in any degree upon the assumption that one

rule or another is most likely to induce perjury, as very hastily intimated in

People v. Ferguson, 8 Cow. 102. But a very strong ground for them is found

in the fact that our whole ballot system is based upon the idea that, unless invio-

lable secrecy is preserved concerning every voter's action, there can be no safety

against those personal or political influences which destroy individual freedom of

choice.

"It is altogether idle to expect that there can be any such protection where

the voter is only allowed to withhold his own oath concerning the ticket he has

voted, while any other prying meddler can be permitted in a court of justice to

guess under oath at its contents. If the law could permit an inquiry at all, there

is no reason whatever for preventing an inquiry from the voter himself, who

alone can actually know how he voted, and who can suffer no more by being

compelled to answer than by having the fact established otherwise. The reason

why the ballot is made obligatory by our constitution is to secure every one the

right of preventing any one else from knowing how he voted, and there is no

propriety in any rule which renders such a safeguard valueless.

"It has always been the case that the rules of evidence have, on grounds of

public policy, excluded proof tending to explain how individuals have acted in

positions where secrecy was designed for their protection or that of the public.

No grand juror could be permitted to disclose as a witness the ballots given by

himself or others upon investigations of crime. Informers cannot be compelled

to disclose to whom they have given their information. And many official facts

are denied publicity. In all of these cases, the rule is not confined to one person

any more than to another; for public policy is against publication from any
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source. And if, as is clear, a man is entitled to keep his own vote secret, it is

difficult to see how any testimony whatever can be allowed, from any source, to

identify and explain it.

"The statutes contain some provisions bearing upon these topics with consid-

erable force. By sec. 47 of the Compiled Laws, every voter is compelled to

deliver bis ballot folded; and, by sec. 52, the inspector is prohibited from either

opening or permitting it to be opened.

"The devices adopted for creating different appearances in the ballots of

different parties are such palpable evasions of the spirit of the law as to go very

far towards destroying the immunity of the voter, and in some States it has

been found desirable to attempt by statute the prevention of such tricks; but the

difficulty of doing this effectually is exemplified in People v. Kiiduff, 15 111. 492,

where the evidence seems to have shown that a uniform variation may be entirely

accidental. Unless some such difference exists, it would be idle to attempt any

proof how a person voted, and it would be better to do away at once with the

whole ballot than to have legal tribunals give any aid or countenance to indirect

violations of its security; and the evidence received in the present case exempli-

fies the impropriety of such investigations. In some instances, at least, the only

proof that a voter, complained of as illegal, cast his ballot for one or the other

of these candidates, was, that he voted a ticket externally appearing to belong to
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one of the two political parties, and containing names of both State and county

officers. To allow such proof to be received in favor of or against any particular

candidate on the ticket, is to allow very remote circumstances indeed to assume

the name of evidence. And the necessity of resorting to such out-of-the-way

proofs only puts in a clearer light the impropriety and illegality of entering upon

any such inquiry, when the law sedulously destroys the only real proofs, and will

not tolerate a resort to them. And the whole State is much more interested than

any single citizen can be, in emancipating elections from all those sinister influ-

ences, which have so great a tendency to coerce or deceive electors into becoming

the mere instruments of others. *

"But there are further provisions bearing more directly on the propriety and

necessity of allowing no inquisition into individual votes.

"County officers are among those included under sec. 31 of the Compiled

Laws, which declares that ' the persons having the greatest number of votes shall

be deemed to have been duly elected.1 The law does not confine this to votes

cast by authorized voters, and can only be applied to votes cast and recorded in

the manner provided by law. And although this section, standing alone, might

be open to construction, yet, when the whole law is taken together, there are

provisions not to be reconciled with any rule allowing single voters and their

votes to be made the subject of inquiry. It will not be denied, that an inquiry

into the legality of a particular voter's qualifications, after his vote has been

cast, is of a strictly judicial nature; and it cannot be proper or legal to allow

such an inquiry in one case, and not in another. But it will be found not only

that the rejection of votes from the count is required to be in such a way as to

preclude any consideration of the person giving or putting them in, but that

there are cases where even a legal inquiry into the ballots themselves is pre-

vented.

"In the first place, when two or more ballots are so folded together as to
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present tbe appearance of one, and if counted will make tbe ballots exceed the

names on the poll-list, they are to be destroyed. And whenever, for any other

reason, the number of ballots found in tbe box exceed.i the number of names on

the corrected poll-lists, the inspectors are required to draw out and destroy un-

opened a number equal to the excess. This is, of course, upon the assumption

that the excess has probably been caused by fraud, and assumes that no man'i

vote ought to be counted, unless the testimony of the poll-lists shows that be

actually handed in his ballot. It is, therefore, altogether likely, upon any theorj

of probabilities, that, in drawing out these extra ballots, they will really be bal-

lots lawfully put in, and this probability is in the ratio furnished by a comparison

of numbers between lawful and unlawful votes. In other words, it is more than

likely to punish the innocent, instead of the guilty. The true method of arriving

at the truth would be to inquire what vote each voter on the list actually cast, and

destroy the remainder. The absurdity of this process upon such a large scale

is such as to need no pointing out. But unless something very like it is done in

such a case as the present, the result obtained by any partial inquiry will be no

better than guesswork. AVhere votes are thrown out, no one can tell whether

the illegal voter whose vote is sought to be assailed has not already had his vote

cancelled. The adoption of the principle of allotment is the most sensible and
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practicable measure which could be devised, and I cannot conceive how it can be

improved upon by any subsequent search.

"But when the inspectors have made their returns to the county canvassers,

and by those returns a tie vote appears between two or more candidates, who are

highest on the list, their right to the office is to be determined by lot, and the

person drawing the successful slip is to be ' deemed legally elected to the office in

question.' Compiled Laws, §§ 76, 132, 183.

"In case the State canvassers (who can only connt the votes certified to tbem)

find a tie vote, the legislature has power to choose between the candidates. Con-

stitution, art. H, § 5. In these cases, there can be no further scrutiny; and in

the case of State officers, if such a scrutiny were had, no end could be reached

within any reasonable time, and there would be a practical impossibility in attempt-

ing to conduct it in any time within the official term, 0r to approach accuracy in

a count of some thousand or more ballot-boxes before a jury. Yet State offi-

cers are not less important to the private elector, and, of course, are not to the

community at large, than local. And the nearer a vote approaches a tie, the

more likely it is that a rigid scrutiny might change its character. There is no

more reason for preventing investigation behind the ballots in the one case than

in the other.

"The statute also takes very efficient measures to prevent any needless litiga-

tion by shutting out any preliminary resort to the means of information. If the

officers do their duty, no one else can ever know whether their count is correct

or not, until a suit is brought and issue joined upon it. The ballots are required

to be sealed up, and not opened except for the inspection of the proper author-

ities, in case of a contest. The only ballots open to public inspection are those

which are rejected upon the canvass for defects apparent on their face. These

ballots are not sealed up with the rest, but are filed; while, therefore, it can be

determined by inspection whether votes which have been thrown out should have

been counted, the law does not seem to favor any unnecessary disturbance of the
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official returns, and any one who assumes to dispute an election is compelled to

begin his suit before he can have access to the means of proof. This is not the

usual course of litigation, and the rule has a strong bearing upon the policy to

be deduced from the law.

"Under our statute, there is no general provision which makes the canvass

for local officers conclusive in all cases, and therefore the rule is recognized

that the election usually depends upon the ballots, and not upon the returns.

These being written and certain, the result of a recount involves no element

of difficulty or ambiguity, beyond the risk of mistakes in counting or footing

up numbers, which may, in some respects, be more* likely in examining the

ballots of a whole county than in telling off those of a town or ward, but which

involves no great time or serious disadvantage. But the introduction of parol

evidence concerning single voters in a considerable district, can rarely reach

all cases of illegality effectually, and must so multiply the issues as to seriously

complicate the inquiry. And when we consider, that, for many years, legisla-

tion has been modified for the very purpose of suppressing illegal voting, and

when we know that hundreds of elections must have been turned by the ballots

of unqualified voters, the absence of any body of decisions upon the subject

is very strong proof that inquiry into private ballots is felt to be a violation
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of the constitutional safeguard on which we pride ourselves as distinguishing

our elections from those which we are wont to regard as conducted on unsafe

principles."

[ 745 ]
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INDEX.

A.

ABBREVIATIONS,

when ballots rendered ineffectual by, 608, 609.

AB INCONVENIENTI,

doctrine of, in construction, 67-71.

ACCUSATIONS OF CRIME,

are actionable, per se, 423.

self, not to be compelled, 313-317.

how made with a view to investigation and trial, 309.

(See Personal Liberty.)

varying form of, cannot subject party to second trial, 328. •

ACCUSED PARTIES,

testimony of, in their own behalf, 317, 318 and notes.

confessions of, 314, 315.

(See Personal Liberty.)

ACTION,

against election officers for refusing to receive votes, 616.

for negligent or improper construction of public works, 571.

for property taken under right of eminent domain, 559-564.

(See Eminent Domain.)
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for exercise of legislative power by municipal bodies, 208.

for slander and libel, rules for, 422-425.

modification of, by statute, 430.

(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)

rights in, cannot be created by mere legislative enactment, 369.

nor taken away by legislature, 362.

nor appropriated under right of eminent domain, 527.

nor forfeited, except by judicial proceedings, 362, 363.

statutory penalties may be taken away before recovery of judgment,

362, n.; 383, n.

limitation to suits, 364-367.

statutes for, are unobjectionable in principle, 365.

subsequent repeal of statute cannot revive rights, 293, 365.

principle on which statutes are based, 365.

cannot apply against a party not in default, 366.

must give parties an opportunity for trial, 366.

for causing death by negligence, &c, 581.
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INDEX.

ACTS OF THE LEGISLATURE,

(See Statutes.)

ADJOURNMENT OF SUIT,

from regard to religious scruples of party, 477, n.

ADJOURNMENT OF THE LEGISLATURE,

on its own motion, 132.

by the governor, 132.

ADMINISTRATORS,

(See Executors and Administrators.)

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION,

exercise of, by the Revolutionary Congress, 6.

conferred upon courts of United States, 11.

ADMISSIONS,

of accused parties as evidence, 313-318.

(See Confessions.)

ADVERTISEMENT,

notice to foreign parties by, 404.

not effectual to warrant a personal judgment, 404, 405.

AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT,
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not to be taxed, 18, 482-485.

AGREEMENTS,

(See Contracts.)

ALABAMA,

divorces not to be granted by legislature, 110, n.

revenue bills in, 131, n.

legislative rules concerning pardons, 116, n.

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

protection of person and property by law of the land, 351, n.

liberty of speech and the press, 417, n.

legislature may make rules respecting pardons, 116, n.

privileges of members, 134, n.

persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478.

ALIENS,

exclusion of, from suffrage, 29, 30, 599.

ALIMONY,

payment of, cannot be ordered by legislature, 114.

decree for, not valid unless process served, 405.

AMBASSADORS,

jurisdiction of United States courts in respect to, 11.

AMENDMENT,

of money bills, may be made by Senate, 131.

of indictments, 272.

of statutes, 151, 152.

republication of statute amended, 151.

by implication, 152.

at the same session of their passage, 152.

of defective proceedings by legislation, 293, 371-381.

of State constitutions, 21.

(See State Constitutions.)

INDEX.
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AMERICAN COLONIES,

(See Colonies.)

AMUSEMENT,

regulation of places of, 596.

APPEAL,

right of, may be taken away, 384.

effect of change in the law pending an appeal, 381.

APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE,

(See Office.)

APPORTIONMENT,

of powers between the States and the nation, 2.

between the departments of the State government, 33-87,[39,'90-92.

of taxes, 495.

(See Taxation.)

APPRAISAL,

of private property taken by the public, 559-570.

APPRAISEMENT LAWS,

how far invalid, 290.

APPRENTICE,
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control of master over, 340.

APPROPRIATION,

of private property to public use, 525.

(See Eminent Domain.)

ARBITRARY ARRESTS,

illegality of, 300, 302.

(See Personal Liberty.)

ARBITRARY EXACTIONS,

distinguished from taxation, 490, 491.

ARBITRARY POWER,

unknown among common-law principles, 22.

cannot be exercised under pretence of taxation, 490, 508.

ARBITRARY RULES,

of construction, danger of, 59, 61, 62, 83.

of presumption, 326, n.

ARBITRATION,

submission of controversies to, 399.

ARGUMENTUM AB INCONVENIENTI,

in constitutional construction, 70, 71, n.

ARKANSAS,

divorces not to be granted by legislature, 110, n.

legislative rules concerning pardons, 116, n.

special acts for sale of lands of infants, &c, forbidden, 98, n.

revenue bills in, 131, n.

privilege of members in, 134, n.

protection of person, &c, by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of speech and of the press, 414, n.

legislature may regulate granting of pardons, 116, n.

exclusion from office for want of religious belief, 468, n.

ARMS,

right to bear, 350.

750 INDEX.

ARMS, — continued.

exemption from bearing of persons conscientiously opposed, 478.

ARMY,

quartering in private houses, 308.

jealousy of standing army, 350.

ARREST,

privilege of legislators from, 134.

on criminal process. (See Crimes.)

of judgment, new trial after, 328 and n.

ART, WORKS OF,

criticism of, how far privileged, 457.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION,

adoption of, 7.

why superseded, 7, 8.

ASSESSMENTS,

for local improvements, generally made in reference to benefits, 497.

special taxing districts for, 497.

not necessarily made on property according to value, 497.

are made under the power of taxation, 498.

not covered by the general constitutional provisions respecting taxation,
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498.

not unconstitutional to make benefits the basis for, 499, 505, 511.

apportionment necessary in cases of, 499.

may be made in reference to frontage, 507.

but each lot cannot be compelled to make the improvement in front of it,

508.

for drains, levees, &c, 510.

in labor for repair of roads, 512.

ATTAINDER,

meaning of the term, 259.

bills of, not to be passed by State legislatures, 15, 33, 259.

cases of such bills, 259-264.

bills of pains and penalties included in, 261.

ATTORNEYS,

exclusion of, from practice is a punishment, 263, 264.

right to notice of proceedings therefor, 337, n., 404, n.

laws requiring service from, without compensation, 393, 394.

punishment of, for misconduct, 337.

(See Counsel.)

AUTHORS,

not to be assailed through their works, 457.

criticism of works of, how far privileged, 457.

B.

BALL,

accused parties entitled to, 309-311.

unreasonable, not to be demanded, 310.

on habeas corpus. 348.

control of bail over principal, 341.

INDEX.
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BAILMENT,

(See Common Carriers.)

BALLOT,

correction of abuses by, 193; n.

system of voting by, generally prevails, 604.

right of the elector to secrecy, 605.

must be complete in itself, 606.

abbreviated names, 608.

how far open to explanation, 611, 626.

(See Elections.)

BANKRUPTCY.

power of Congress over, 10.

legislation by the States, 18, 293, 294.

revival of debts barred by discharge, 293.

BEARING ARMS,

persons conscientiously opposed to, are excused, 478.

constitutional right of, 350.

BEASTS,

police regulations regarding, 596.
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regulations making railway companies liable for killing, 579.

BENEFITS,

may be taken into account in assessments for local improvements, 499,

505, 511.

what may be deducted when private property is taken by the public, 565.

BETTERMENT LAWS,

principle of, 386.

are constitutional, 387.

owner cannot be compelled to improve his lands, 385.

not applicable to lands appropriated by the public, 389, n.

BETTING ON ELECTIONS,

illegality of, 615.

BEVERAGES,

police regulations to prevent the sale of intoxicating, 581.

BILL OF RIGHTS (English),

a declaratory statute, 23, 257.

BILL OF RIGHTS (Xational),

not originally inserted in Constitution, 256.

reasons for omission, 266.

objections to Constitution on that ground, 257-259.

afterwards added by amendments, 259.

BILL OF RIGHTS (State),

generally found in constitution, 35.

classes of provisions in, 35, 36.

what prohibitions not necessary, 175.

BILLS, LEGISLATIVE,

constitutional provisions for three readings, 80, 81, 139, 140.

title of, to express object, 81, 141-151.

(See Legislature of the State.)

BILLS OF ATTAINDER,

not to be passed by State legislature, 15, 33, 259.
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INDEX.

BILLS OF ATTAINDER,— continued.

meaning of attainder, 259.

cases of such bills, 259- 264.

BILLS OF CREDIT,

States not to emit, 15.

BILLS OF PAINS AND PENALTIES,

included in bills of attainder, 261.

BLASPHEMY,

punishment of, does not violate religious liberty, 471-476.

nor the liberty of speech, 422.

published in account of judicial proceedings is not privileged, 449.

BOATS, /

ferry, licensing of, 593.

speed of, on navigable waters may be regulated by States, 594.

BONA FIDE PURCHASERS,

not to be affected by retrospective legislation, 378, 379, 382, n.

BONDS,

issue of, by municipalities in aid of internal improvements, 119, 213-219.

BOOKS,
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criticism of, how far privileged, 457.

indecent, sale of, may be prohibited, 596.

BOUNTIES,

when earned, become vested rights, 383, 384.

payment of, to soldiers by municipal corporations, 219-229.

BOUNTY SUBSCRIPTIONS,

by municipal corporations, how far valid, 219-229.

BRIDGES,

erection of, by State authority over navigable waters, 592.

(See Navigable Waters.)

BUILDINGS,

condemnation and forfeiture of, as nuisances, 583, 584.

destruction of, to prevent spread of fires, 526, n.

appropriation of, under right of eminent domain, 526.

BURLESQUES,

libels by means of, 423.

BY-LAWS,

of municipal corporations, 198-203.

must be reasonable, 200-203.

must be certain, 202.

must not conflict with constitution of State or nation, 198.

nor with statutes of State, 198.

imposing license fees, 201.

'c.

CALIFORNIA,

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

privileges of members, 134, n.

title of acts to express their object, 142, n.

protection of property, &c, by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of speech and of the press in, 416.

INDEX.

CANALS,

appropriation of private property for, 533.

when are private property, 590.

CANDIDATES FOR OFFICE,

criticism of, how far privileged, 431-441, 455.

ineligibility of, how to affect election, 620.

CANVASSERS,

act ministerially in counting and returning votes, 622.

whether they may be compelled by mandamus to perform duty, 623.

certificate of, conclusive in collateral proceedings, 624.

(See Elections.)

CARRIERS,

police regulations making them liable for beasts killed, 570.

change of common-law liability of, by police regulations, 580, 581.

may be made responsible for death caused by negligence, &c, 581.

CATTLE,

police regulations making railway companies liable for killing, 579.

CEMETERIES,

further use of, may be prohibited when they become nuisances, 595.

CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS,
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in England and America, 417-419, 420.

CENTRALIZATION,

American system the opposite of, 189.

CHARACTER,

bad, of attorney, sufficient reason to exclude him from practice, 837.

slander of, 422-424.

good, of defendant in libel suit, no defence to false publication, 466.

benefit of, in criminal cases, 325, n.

CHARTERS,

of liberty, 24, n.

colonial, swept away by Revolution, 26.

exceptions of Connecticut and Rhode Island, 26.

municipal, do not constitute contracts, 193.

control of legislature over, 192, 193.

construction of, 195, 211.

(See Municipal Corporations.)

of private corporations are contracts, 279.

police regulations affecting, 577-579.

strict construction of, 394-396.

amendment of, 279, 577, n.

CHASTITY,

accusation of want of, not actionable per se, 423, 424.

statutory provisions on the subject, 424.

CHILDREN,

control of parent, &c, over, 339, 340.

obtaining possession of, by habeas corpus, 848.

decree for custody of, in divorce suits, 405.

CHRISTIANITY,

its influence in the overthrow of slavery, 297, 298, and n.

48
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INDEX.

CHRISTIANITY, — continued.

in what sense part of the law of the land, 472-475.

(See Religious Liberty.)

CHURCH ENDOWMENTS,

not to be taken away by legislature, 275, n.

CHURCH ESTABLISHMENTS,

forbidden by State constitutions, 469.

CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS,

powers and control of, 467, n.

discipline of members, 434, n.

CITIES AND VILLAGES,

(See Municipal Corporations.)

CITIZENS,

who are, 11.

of the several States, privileges and immunities of, 11, 15, 16, 391-397.

discriminations in taxation of, 397, 487.

jurisdiction of United States courts in respect to, 11, 12, 294.

CIVIL RIGHTS,

discriminations not to be made in, on account of religious beliefs, 467-470.
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(See Citizens; Class Legislation.)

CLASS LEGISLATION,

private legislation which grants privileges, 389-397.

party petitioning for, estopped from disputing validity, 390.

public laws may be local in application, 390.

special rules for particular occupations, 390, 393.

proscription for opinion's sake unconstitutional, 390.

suspensions of laws must be general, 391, 392.

each individual entitled to be governed by general rules, 391, 392.

discriminations should be based upon reason, 393.

equality of rights, &c, the aim of the law, 393.

strict construction of special burdens and privileges, 393-397.

discriminations not to be made on account of religious beliefs, 467-470.

COINING MONEY,

power over, 10.

COLLUSION,

conviction by, no bar to new prosecution, 327, n.

COLONIES,

union of, before Revolution, 5.

authority of the Crown and Parliament in, 5.

Revolutionary Congress and its powers, 6, 7.

controversy with the mother country, 23, 24.

legislatures of, 25.

substitution of constitutions for charters of, 26.

censorship of the press in, 418.

COLOR,

not to be a disqualification fo suffrage, 11, 599.

COMMERCE,

power of Congress to regulate, 10.

State regulations valid when they do not interfere with those of Congress,

581-587. (See Police Power.)

INDEX.
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COMMERCE, — continued.

State taxation of subjects of, 586, 587.

(See Taxation.)

in intoxicating drinks, how far State regulations may affect, 581-584.

COMMITTEES OF THE LEGISLATURE,

collection of information by, 135.

contempts of witnesses how punished, 185.

employment of counsel before, 189.

COMMON CARRIERS,

police regulations regarding, 576-581.

(See Railway Companies.)

COMMON LAW,

Federal courts acquire no jurisdiction from, 19, 20, 427.

pre-existing the Constitution, 21.

what it consists in, 21.

its general features, 22.

modification of, by statutes, 22, 23.

colonists in America claimed benefits of, 23, 24.

how far in force, 23, n.
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evidences of, 24.

decisions under, as precedents, 51, 52.

gradual modification of, 54, 55.

to be kept in view in construing constitutions, 60.

statutes in derogation of, 61, n.

not to control constitutions, 61.

municipal by-laws must harmonize with, 202.

rules of liability for injurious publications, 417, 422-425.

modification of, by statute, 430.

modification by police regulations of common-law liability of carriers,

579-581.

COMMON RIGHT,

statutes against, said to be void, 165, n, 166, 167, n.

COMPACTS BETWEEN STATES,

must have consent of Congress, 15.

are inviolable under United States Constitution, 275, and n.

COMPENSATION,

for private property appropriated by the public, 659.

(See Eminent Domain.)

what the tax-payer receives as an equivalent for taxes, 498.

COMPLAINTS,

for purposes of search-warrant, 304.

of crime how made, 309.

COMPULSORY TAXATION,

by municipal bodies, 231-233.

CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENTS,

full faith and credit to be given in each State to those of other States, 16,17.

parties and privies estopped by, 47-54, 408.

but not in controversy with new subject-matter, 49.

strangers to suit not bound by, 48.

irregularities do not defeat, 409.

(See Jurisdiction.)
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INDEX.

CONDITIONAL LEGISLATION,

power of the States to adopt, 117.

CONDITIONS,

what may be imposed on right of suffrage, 362, n., 601, 602.

(See Elections.)

precedent to exercise of right of eminent domain, 528, 529.

CONFEDERACY OF 1643,

brought about by tendency of colonies to union, 5.

CONFEDERATE DEBT,

not to be assumed or paid, 11.

CONFEDERATION, ARTICLES OF,

adoption of, 6, 7.

authority to supersede, 8, n.

CONFESSIONS,

dangerous character of, as evidence, 314.

must appear to have been made voluntarily, 313, 314.

excluded if solicitations or threats have been used, 315. •

will not prove the corpus delicti, 315.

CONFIDENCE,
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communications in, when privileged, 425, 426.

between attorney and client, is client's privilege, 334, and n.

CONFIRMING INVALID PROCEEDINGS,

of a judicial nature, 107, 108.

admissible when defects are mere irregularities, 371.

(See Retrospective Laws.)

CONFISCATIONS,

require judicial proceedings, 363, 364.

during the Revolutionary War, 262.

CONFLICT OF LAWS,

in divorce cases, 401, and n.

(See Unconstitutional Laws.)

CONFRONTING WITH WITNESSES,

in criminal cases, 318 and n., 319, n.

CONGRESS OF 1690,

brought together by tendency of colonies to union, 5.

CONGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION,

powers assumed and exercised by, 5-7.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,

general powers of, 10-12.

enabling acts by, for formation of State constitutions, 30, 31.

cannot divest vested rights, 362.

exercise of power of eminent domain by, 525.

regulations of commerce by, are supreme, 581, 591.

(See Police Power.)

CONNECTICUT,

charter government of, 26.

protection of property by law of the land, 852, n.

freedom of speech and of the press in, 414, n.

CONSCIENCE, FREEDOM OF,

(See Religious Liberty, 467-478.)

INDEX.
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CONSENT,

conviction by collusion no bar to new prosecution, 327.

cannot confer jurisdiction of subject-matter upon courts, 398.

cannot authorize jury trial by less than twelve jurors, 319, n.

is a waiver of irregularities in legal proceedings, 409.

waiver of constitutional privileges by, 181, 319, n., 390, and n.

CONSEQUENTIAL INJURIES,

caused by exercise of legal right give no ground of complaint, 384.

do not constitute a taking of property, 542-544.

are covered by assessment of damages when property taken by the public,

570.

but not such as result from negligence or improper construction, 571.

CONSTITUTION,

definition of, 2, 3.

object of, in the American system, 37.

CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND,

theory of, 3, 4.

power of Parliament under, 3.

developed by precedents, 50, n.
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,

origin of, 5-7.

ratification of, 7, 8.

government of enumerated powers, formed by, 9, 10, 173.

general powers of the government under, 10-12.

judicial powers under, 11-13, 19.

(See Courts of the United States.)

prohibition by, of powers to the States, 15, 294, 599.

guaranty of republican government to the States, 17.

implied prohibitions on the States, 18.

and on municipal corporations, 198.

reservation of powers to States and people, 19.

difference between, and State constitutions, 9, 10, 173.

construction of, 9, 10, 19.

amendment of State constitutions how limited by, 33.

protection of person and property by, as against State action, 256-294.

bill of rights not at first inserted in, and why, 256.

addition of, afterwards, 257-259.

bills of attainder prohibited by, 259-264.

(See Bills of Attainder.)

ex post facto laws also forbidden, 264-273.

(See Ex post facto Laws.)

laws impairing obligation of contracts forbidden, 273-294.

what is a contract, 273-279.

what charters of incorporation are, 279.

whether release of taxation is contract, 280, 283.

whether States can relinquish right of eminent domain, 281, 525.

or the police power, 282, 283, 525.

general laws of the States not contracts, 284.

what the obligation of the contract consists in, 525.

power of the States to control remedies, 287-294.
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,—continued.

and to pass insolvent laws, 293, 294.

(See Obligation of Contracts.)

police regulations by the States, when in conflict with, 579, 689.

(See Police Power.)

taxation of the subjects of commerce by the States, 586, 587.

CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES,

compared with that of the United States, 9, 173.

formation and amendment of, 21-37.

construction of, 38-84.

not the source of individual rights, 87.

(See State Constitutions; Construction of State Constitutions.)

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS,

or formation and amendment of State constitutions, 30-32.

proceedings of, as bearing on construction of constitution, 66.

of 1787 sat with closed doors, 419.

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS,

meaning of the term, 2, 3.

CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGES,
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may be waived generally, 181. (See Waiver.)

. CONSTRUCTION,

meaning of and necessity for, 38.

of United States Constitution and laws by United States courts, 12.

of State constitution and laws by State courts, 13, 14, 294.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS,

meaning of the term " construction," 38, n.

necessity for, 38.

questions of, arise whenever powers to be exercised, 39.

who first to decide upon, 39-41. •

in certain States judges may be called upon for opinions in advance, 40.

in what cases construction by legislature or executive to be final, 41-43.

in what cases not, 42, 48.

when questions of, are addressed to two or more departments, 42, 43.

final decision upon, rests generally with judiciary, 43-46, 53, 54.

reasons for this, 44.

this does not imply pre-eminence of authority in the judiciary, 4o, n.

the doctrine of res adjudicata, 47-54.

decisions once made binding upon parties and privies, 47, 48.

force of judgment does not depend on reasons given, 49.

strangers to suit not bound by, 49.

nor the parties in a controversy about a new subject-matter, 49.

the doctrine of stare decisis, 47-54.

only applicable within jurisdiction of court making the decision, 51,51

importance of precedents, 51, n.

when precedents to be disregarded, 52.

when other departments to follow decisions of the courts, and when

not, 53, 54.

uniformity of construction, importance of, 54, 55.

not to be affected by changes in public sentiment, 54, 55.

words of the instrument to control, 55-57, 65, 83, n., 130.

INDEX.
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CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS, — continued.

intent of people in adopting it to govern, 55-57.

intent to be found in words employed, 55, and n., 57.

whole instrument to be examined, 57, 59, n.

words not to be supposed employed without occasion, 57, 58.

effect to be given to whole instrument, 58.

irreconcilable provisions, 58, and n.

general intent as opposed to particular intent, 58, and n.

words to be understood in their ordinary sense, 58, 59, 83, n.

of art, to be understood in technical sense, 60.

importance of the history of the law to, 59, 65.

common law to be kept in view, 59-62.

but not to control constitution, 61.

whether provisions in derogation of, should be strictly construed,

61, n.

arbitrary rules of, dangerous, 59, 61, 62, 83.

and especially inapplicable to constitutions, 58.

same word presumed employed in same sense throughout, 62.

this not a conclusive rule, 62.
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operation to be prospective, 62, 63.

implied powers to carry into effect express powers, 63, 64.

power granted in general terms is co-extensive with the terms, 64.

when constitution prescribes conditions to a right, legislature cannot add

others, 64.

mischief to be remedied, consideration of, 65.

prior state of the law to be examined, 65.

proceedings of constitutional convention may be consulted, 66.

reasons why unsatisfactory, 66, 67.

weight of contemporary and practical construction, 67.

the argument ab inconvenienti, 67-70, 72, n.

deference to construction by executive officers, 69.

plain intent not to be defeated by, 69-73.

injustice of provisions will not render them void, 72, 73.

nor authorize courts to construe them away, 73.

doubtful cases of, duty of officers acting in, 73, 74.

directory and mandatory statutes, doctrine of, 74-78.

not applicable to constitutions, 78-82.

has been sometimes applied, 79-81.

authorities generally the other way, 82.

CONSTRUCTION OK STATUTES,

to be such as to give them effect, if possible, 184.

conflict with constitution not to be presumed, 185, 186.

directory and mandatory, 74-78.

contemporary and practical, weight to be given to, 67-71.

to be prospective, 370.

CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION,

force and effect of, 67-71.

CONTEMPTS,

of the legislature, punishment of, 133-135.

of legislative committees, 135.
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INDEX.

CONTESTED ELECTIONS,

right of the courts to determine upon, 623.

(See Elections.)

CONTESTED FACTS,

cannot be settled by statute, 96, 104, 105.

CONTESTED SEATS,

• legislative bodies to decide upon, 133.

CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,

powers assumed and exercised by, 5-7.

CONTINGENT LEGISLATION,

authority of the States to adopt, 117, 121, n., 122, n.

CONTRACTS,

for lobby services, illegal, 136.

to influence elections, are void, 615.

cannot be made for individuals by legislative act, 369, and n.

charters of municipal corporations do not constitute; 192, 193.

of private corporations are, 279.

of municipal corporations ultra vires void, 196.

invalid, may be validated by legislature. 372-383.
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obligation of, not to be violated, 126, 273.

(See Obligation of Contracts.)

COPYRIGHT,

Congress may secure to authors, 10.

CORPORATE CHARTERS,

(See CHarters.)

CORPORATE FRANCHISES,

may be appropriated under right of eminent domain, 526.

CORPORATE PROPERTY,

legislative control of, 235.

CORPORATIONS,

private, may be authorized to take lands for public use, 536-538.

irregular organization of, may be validated, 371, 374, n.

(See CHarters; Municipal Corporations.)

CORRESPONDENCE,

private, inviolability of, 307, n.

COUNSEL,

constitutional right to, 330-338.

oath of, 330, 331, n.

duty of, 331, 335, 338, n.

denial of, in England, 331-333.

court to assign for poor persons, 334.

whether those assigned may refuse to act, 334.

privilege of, is the privilege of the client, 334, and n.

independence of, 334, 335, n., 337, n.

not at liberty to withdraw from cause, except by consent, 335.

how far he may.go in pressing for acquittal, 335, 336.

duty of, as between the court and the prisoner, 335, n.

whether to address the jury on the law, 336, 337.

summary punishment of, for misconduct, 337.

INDEX.

761

COUESEL, — continued.

limitation of client's control over, 338, and n.

(See Attorneys.)

may be employed before legislative committees, 136, n.

but not as lobbies, 136, n.

not liable to action for what be may say in judicial proceedings, 442-445.

unless irrelevant to the case, 444.

not privileged in afterwards publishing his argument, if it contains injuri-

ous reflections, 448.

newspaper publisher not justified in publishing speech of a criminal reflect-

ing on his counsel, 456.

COUNTERFEITING,

Congress may provide for punishment of, 10, 18.

States also may punish. 18.

COUNTIES AND TOWNS,

difference from chartered incorporations, 240.

(See Municipal Corporations.)

COUNTY SEAT,

change of, 384.
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COURTS,

duty of, to refuse to execute unconstitutional laws, 71, n., 81, 82,159, et seq.

contested elections to be determined by, 623.

not to be directed by legislature in decisions, 94, 95.

action of, not to be set aside by legislature, 95.

must act by majorities, 96.

not to be open on election days, 614.

power to declare laws unconstitutional a delicate one, 159, 160.

will not be exercised by bare quorum, 161.

nor unless necessary, 163.

nor on complaint of one not interested, 163, 164.

nor of one who has assented, 164.

will not declare laws void because solely of unjust provisions, 164-168.

nor because in violation of fundamental principles, 169, 170.

nor because conflicting with the spirit of the constitution, 171-174.

nor unless a clear repugnancy between the laws and the constitution,

173-176,

special, for trial of rights of particular individuals, 392.

of star chamber, 342.

of high commission, 342.

martial, 319, n.

of the United States, to be created by Congress, 10.

general powers of, 11.

removal of causes to, from State courts, 12, 13.

to follow State courts as to State law, 13, 14.

to decide finally upon United States laws, &c, 12, 294.

require statutes to apportion jurisdiction, 19.

have no common-law jurisdiction, 19, 20.

in what cases may issue writs of habeas corpus, 345, 346.

CREDIT,

bills of, 15.
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INDEX.

CREDITOR,

control of debtor by, 341.

CRIMES,

legislative convictions of, prohibited, 15, 33, 259.

ex post facto laws prohibited, 15, 33, 264.

punishment of, by servitude, 299.

search warrants for evidence of. (See Searches axd Seizures.)

accusations of, how made, 309.

presumption of innocence, 309, 311.

right of accused party to bail, 309-311.

• prisoner refusing to plead, 311.

trial to be speedy, 311, 812. •

and public, 312.

and not inquisitorial, 313.

prisoner's right to moke statement, 313-318.

confessions as evidence, 313-318.

prisoner to be confronted with the witnesses, 318.

exceptional cases, 318.

to'be by jury, 309, 319.
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jury must consist of twelve, 319.

right to jury cannot be waived, 319.

prisoner's right to challenges, 319.

jury must be from vicinage, 319, 320.

must unanimously concur in verdict, 320.

must be left free to act, 320.

judge not to express opinion upon the facts, 320.

nor to refuse to receive the verdict, 320.

but is to give instruction in the law, 322.

how far jury may judge of the law, 321-324.

acquittal by jury is final, 321, 322.

accused not to be twice put in jeopardy, 325-328.

what is legal jeopardy, 326, 327.

when nolle prosequi equivalent to acquittal, 327.

when jury may be discharged without verdict, 327.

second trial after verdict set aside, 327, 328.

cruel and unusual punishments prohibited, 328-330.

counsel to be allowed, 330-338.

oath of, 330, 331, n.

duty of, 331, 335, 338, n.

denial of, in England, 331-333.

court to designate for poor persons, 334.

whether one may refuse to act, 334.

privilege of, is the privilege of the client, 334, and n.

not at liberty to withdraw from case, except by consent, 335.

how far he may go in pressing for acquittal, 335, 336.

duty of, as between the court and the prisoner, 335, n.

whether to address the jury on the law, 336, 337.

summary punishment of, for misconduct, 337, 404, n.

not to be made the instrument of injustice, 338.

habeas corpus for imprisoned parties, 838-348.

INDEX.

763

CRIMES, —continued.

accusations of, are libellous, per se, 424-426.

but privileged if made in course of judicial proceedings, 441, 444.

violations of police regulations of States, 596.

CRITICISM,

of works of art and literary productions is privileged, 457.

but not the personal character of the author, 457.

of public entertainments and sermons, 457, n.

CROWN OF GREAT BRITAIN,

succession to, may be changed by Parliament, 86.

union of the colonies under, 5.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS,

constitutional prohibition of, 328-330.

what are, 329, 330.

CUMULATIVE PUNISHMENTS,

for counterfeiting money, 18.

under State and municipal laws, 199.

CURTESY, ESTATE BY THE,

power of legislature to modify or abolish, 360, 361.
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CUSTODY,

of wards, apprentices, servants, and scholars, 340.

of wife by husband, 339.

of children by parents, 340, 348.

of principal by his bail, 341.

CUSTOMS,

(See Common Law; Duties and Imposts.)

D.

DAM,

to obtain water power, condemnation of land for, 532, 534-536.

effect of repeal of act permitting, 383, n.

erection of, across navigable waters by State authority, 593, 594.

destruction of, when it becomes a nuisance, 595.

DAMAGES,

in libel cases, increased by attempt at justification, 438.

when exemplary, not to be awarded, 457.

for property taken by the public, must be paid, 559.

(See Eminent Domain.)

DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA,

what consequentia injuries are, 384, 543.

DEATH,

common carriers may be made liable for causing, 581."

DEBATES,

in Parliament, formerly not suffered to be published, 418.

in American legislative bodies, publication of, 419, 420, 457, 460.

privileges of members in, 445-447.

(See Freedom of Speech and op the Press.)

DEBT,

public, declared inviolable, 11.

confederate, not to be assumed or paid, 11.
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INDEX.

DEBT, — continued.

imprisonment for, may be abolished as to pre-existing obligations, 287.

imprisonment for, now generally abolished, 341.

DEBTOR,

control of creditor over, 341.

DEBTS BY THE STATE,

prohibition of, whether it precludes indebtedness by municipalities, 217,

218.

DECENTRALIZATION,

the peculiar feature in American government, 189.

DECISIONS,

judicial, binding force of, 47-54.

(See Judicial Proceedings.)

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,

was a declaratory statute, 257.

(See Bill of RigHts.)

DECLARATORY STATUTES,

in English constitutional law, 22-24.

are not encroachments upon judicial power, 93-95.
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judgments not to be reversed by means of, 94, 95.

purpose and proper force of, 93-95.

DEDICATION,

of lands to public use, 238, n., 565.

DEEDS.

invalid, may be confirmed by legislature, 377, 378.

but not to prejudice of bona fide purchasers, 378, 379.

DEFENCES,

not based upon equity, may be taken away by legislature, 370-383.

under statute of limitations are vested rights, 365.

DEFINITIONS,

of a State, 1.

of a nation, 1.

of a people, sovereignty and sovereign State, 1.

of a constitution, 2.

of an unconstitutional law. 3, 4.

of construction and interpretation, 38. n.

of legislative power, 90-92, 94.

of judicial power, 91, 92, 94.

of declaratory statutes, 93.

of due process of law, 353.

of law of the land, 3.53.

of personal liberty, 339.

of natural liberty, 393, n.

of liberty of the press, 420, 422.

of liberty of speech, 422.

of religious liberty, 467, 468.

of taxation, 479.

of the eminent domain, 524.

of police power, 572.

of domicile, 600, n.

INDEX.
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DELAWARE,

revenue bills must originate in lower house, 131, n.

protection of property and person by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of speech and of the press in, 415, n.

disqualification of religious teachers for office, 468, n.

religious tests forbidden, 469, n.

DELEGATION OF POWER,

by the legislature not admissible, 116-125.

except as to powers of local government, 191.

by municipal corporations invalid, 204.

DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT,

division of powers between, 33-37, 39, 87-94.

equality of, 45, n., 47, n.

DESECRATION OF THE SABBATH,

constitutional right to punish, 476, 588.

DIRECTORY STATUTES,

what are, and what are mandatory, 74, 78.

'doctrine of, not admissible as to constitutional provisions, 78-83.

DISCRETIONARY POWERS,
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what are, 39-43.

department to which they are confided decides finally upon, 39-43, 115, n.

DISCRIMINATIONS,

cannot be made in taxation between citizens of different States, 487.

in legislation between different classes, 389-397.

in the privileges and immunities of citizens, 11, 15, 16, 397, 599.

not to be made on account of religious belief, 467-470.

DISCUSSION,

right of, 349.

(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)

DISFRANCHISEMENT,

of voters, may render a statute void, 616.

what classes excluded from suffrage, 28-30, 73, 599.

DISTRICTS,

for schools, powers of, 240, 247, 248.

exercise by, of power of eminent domain, 537.

for taxation, necessity for, 495, 497.

not to tax property outside, 499.

taxation to be uniform within, 502.

DIVISION OF POWERS,

between sovereign States, 2.

between the States and the Union, 2.

among departments of State government, 33-37, 39, 87.

DIVISION OF TOWNSHIPS, &c,

question of, may be submitted to people, 119.

disposition of property and debts on, 193, n.

DIVORCE,

question of, is properly judicial, 109.

power of the legislature over, 109, 110.

general doctrine of the courts on the subject, 111.

conflicting decisions, 112, 113.
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INDEX.

DIVORCE, — continued.

legislative divorce cannot go beyond dissolution of the status, 114.

constitutional provisions requiring judicial action, 110, n.

laws for, do not violate contracts, 284.

and may be applied to pre-existing causes, 266, n.

what gives jurisdiction in cases of, 400, 401.

actual residence of one party in the State sufficient, 400, 401.

conflict of decisions on this subject, 401, 402.

not sufficient if residence merely colorable, 401.

necessity for service of process, 402.

cannot be served out of State, 403.

substituted service by publication, 403, 404.

restricted effect of such notice, 405, 406.

order as to custody of children, 405.

alimony not to be awarded if defendant not served, 406.

DOGS,

police regulation of, 595.

DOMAIN,

ordinary, of the State, distinguished from eminent domain, 523.
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DOMICILE,

gives jurisdiction in divorce cases, 400.

but must be bona fide, 401.

of wife, may be different from that of husband, 401, n.

of one party, may give jurisdiction in divorce cases, 400.

of voters, meaning of, 599, 600.

DOUBLE PUNISHMENT,

for same act under State and municipal law, 199.

for counterfeiting money, 18.

DOUBLE TAXATION,

sometimes unavoidable, 513.

DOUBTFUL QUESTIONS,

of constitutional law, duty in case of, 73, 74, 182-186.

DOWER,

legislative control of estates in, 360, 861.

DRAINS,

appropriating property for purposes of, 583.

special assessments for, 491, n., 610, 511.

ordered under police power, 589.

DRUNKENNESS.

does not excuse crime, 476, n.

is a temporary insanity, 599, n.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW,

meaning of the term, 353, 869, n.

(See Law op the Land.)

DUPLICATE PUNISHMENTS,

by States and United States, 18.

by States and municipal corporations, 199.

DUTIES AND IMPOSTS,

to be uniform throughout the United States, 10.

what the States may lay, 15.

INDEX.

DWELLING-HOUSE,

is the owner's castle, 22, 299.

homicide in defence of, 308.

quartering soldiers in, prohibited, 308.

DYING DECLARATIONS,

admissible in evidence on trials for homicide, 318.

inconclusive character of the evidence, 318.

E.

EASEMENTS,.

acquirement by the public under right of eminent domain, 524.

private, cannot be acquired under this right, 530, 531.

(See Eminent Domain.)

ECCLESIASTICAL CORPORATIONS,

powers and control of, 467, u.

ELECTIONS,

on adoption of State constitutions, 27-31.

people exercise the sovereignty by means of, 598.

who to participate in, 599.

constitutional qualifications cannot be added to by legislature, 64,

exclusion of married women, aliens, minors, idiots, &c, 599.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:04 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

conditions necessary to participation, 599, 601, 602.

presence of voter at place of domicile, 599.

what constitutes residence, 599, 600.

registration may be made a condition, 601.

preliminary action by the authorities, notice, &c, 602.

mode of exercising the right, 601.

the elector's privilege of secrecy, 601-606.

a printed ballot is " written," 604.

ballot must be complete in itself, 606.

technical accuracy not essential, 607.

.explanations by voter inadmissible, 607.

must not contain too many names, 607.

name should be given in full, 608.

sufficient if idem sonant, 608.

what abbreviations sufficient, 608, 609.

erroneous additions not to affect, 610.

extrinsic evidence to explain imperfections, 611.

ballot must contain name of office, 612.

but need not be strictly accurate, 612.

different boxes for different ballots, 613.

elector need not vote for every office, 613.

plurality of votes cast to elect, 614, 620.

effect if highest candidate is ineligible, 620.

freedom of elections, 614.

bribery or treating of voters, 614.

miliiiu not to be called out on election day, 615.

courts not to be open on election day, 614.

bets upon election are illegal, 615.

contracts to influence election are void, 615.
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INDEX.

ELECTIONS — continued.

elector not to be deprived of his vote, 862, n., 616.

statutes which would disfranchise voters, 616.

failure to hold election in one precinct, 616.

liability of inspectors for refusing to receive vote, 616.

elector's oath when conclusive on inspector, 617.

conduct of the election, 617.

effect of irregularities upon, 617, 618.

what constitutes a sufficient election, 619.

not necessary that a majority participate, 620. •

admission of illegal votes not to defeat, 620.

unless done fraudulently, 621.

effect of casual affray, 621.

canvass and return, 622.

canvassers are ministerial officers, 622.

canvassers not to question returns made to them, 622.

whether they can be compelled by mandamus to perform duty, 623.

contesting elections in the courts, 628.

canvassers' certificate as evidence, 624.
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courts may go behind certificate, 624.

what surrounding circumstances may be given in evidence, 626.

whether qualification of voters may be inquired into, 627.

to legislative body, house to decide upon, 133.

EMANCIPATION,

of slaves in Great Britain and America, 11, 295-299.

of children by parents, 340.

EMINENT DOMAIN,

distinguished from ordinary domain of States, 523.

definition of, 524.

right of, rests upon necessity, 524.

cannot be bargained away, 281, 525.

general right is in the States, 525. •

for what purposes nation may exercise right, 525, 526.

all property subject to right, 526.

exception of money and rights in action, 527.

legislative authority requisite to, 527.

legislature may determine upon the necessity, 528, 538.

conditions precedent must be complied with, 528, 529.

statutes for exercise of, not to be extended by intendment, 530.

the purpose must be public, 530, 531.

private roads cannot be laid out under, 530, 531.

what constitutes public purpose, 532, 533.

whether erection of mill-dams is, 534-536.

property need not be taken to the State, 536.

individuals or corporations may be public agents for the purpose, 537,538.

the taking to be limited to the necessity, 539-541.

statute for taking more than is needed is ineffectual, unless owner assents,

540, 541.

what constitutes a taking of property, 541.

incidental injuries do not, 542-544.

INDEX.
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EMINENT DOMAIN,— continued.

any deprivation of use of property does, 544.

water front and right to wharfage is property, 544.

right to pasturage in streets is property, 545.

taking of common highway for higher grade of way, 545.

if taken for turnpike, &c, owner not entitled to compensation, 546.

difference when taken for a railway, 546-548.

owner entitled to compensation in such case, 549, 550.

whether he is entitled in case of street railway, 551.

decisions where the fee of the streets is in the public, 552, 555.

distinction between a street railway and a thoroughfare, 656.

right to compensation when course of a stream is diverted, 557.

whether the fee in the land can be taken, 557-559.

compensation must be made for property, 559.

must be pecuniary, 559.

preliminary surveys may be made without liability, 560.

need not be first made when property taken by State, &c, 560.

sufficient if party is given a remedy by means of which he may obtain

it, 560, 661.
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time for resorting to remedy may be limited, 561.

waiver of right to compensation, 561, 562.

when property taken by individual or private corporation, compen-

sation must be first made, 562.

tribunal for assessment of, 563.

time when right to payment is complete, 563, 564.

principle on which compensation to be assessed, 565.

allowance of incidental injuries and benefits, 556.

not those suffered or received in common with public at large, 569,

570.

if benefits equal damages, owner entitled to nothing, 570.

assessment of damages covers all consequential injuries, 570.

for injuries arising from negligence, &c, party may have action, 571.

ENABLING ACT,

to entitle Territory to form State constitution, 27, 28, 30.

ENGLAND,

(See Great Britain.)

ENUMERATED POWERS,

United States, a government of, 9.

EQUALITY,

of protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, 11.

of the several departments of the government, 45, n.

of rights and privileges, the aim of the law, 393.

grants of special privileges construed strictly, 393-396.

religious, 467-478.

(See Religious Liberty.)

EQUITABLE TITLES,

may be thanged by legislature into legal, 377 and n., 878.

ERRONEOUS JUDGMENTS,

may be overruled, 52.

when they should not be, 52.

49

770

INDEX.

ERRORS,

waiver of, in legal proceedings, 409.

judgments, &c, not void by reason of, 408.

curing by retrospective legislation, 370-383.

in conduct of elections, effect of, 613, 617-619.

ESSENTIAL POWERS OF GOVERNMENT,

taxation, eminent domain, &c, cannot be bartered away, 280, 284, 525.

ESTABLISHMENTS,

religious, are forbidden by State constitutions, 469.

ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS,

special legislative authority to sell lands for payment of debts is consti-

tutional, 97-106.

such acts forbidden by some constitutions, 98, n.

legislature cannot adjudicate upon debts, 103, 104.

ESTATES IN LAND,

subject to change by the legislature before they become vested, 360.

but not afterwards, 93, n.

ESTOPPEL,

by judgment only applies to parties and privies, 48.
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does not depend on reasons given by the court, 48, 49.

does not apply in controversy about new subject-matter, 49.

of the State by its legislation, 73, n., 254, n.

of individuals by legislation, 96, 390, and n.

EVASION,

of constitutional provisions, 139, n.

EVIDENCE,

by recitals in statutes, 96.

complete control of legislature over rules of, 288, 867-369.

conclusive rules of, not generally admissible, 368, S69.

confessions of accused parties as, 313-318.

dying declarations, when are, 318.

search-warrants to obtain, not constitutional, 305, 307, n.

correspondence not to be violated to obtain, 807, n.

accused party not compelled to give, against himself, 313.

by accused parties in their own favor, 317, n.

against accused parties, to be given publicly, and in their presence, 312,

318.

communications by client to counsel not to be disclosed, 334.

in State courts, State laws control, 484, n.

to explain imperfections in ballots, 611, 624.

EVIL TO BE REMEDIED,

weight of, in construing constitutions, 65, 83, n.

what in view in requiring title of act to state the object, 142-144.

EXAMINATIONS,

of accused parties, when to be evidence against them, 813, 314.

EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENTS,

constitutional prohibition of, 330.

EXCESSIVE TAXATION,

renders tax proceedings and sales void, 620.

EXCISE TAXES,

Congress may lay, 10.

INDEX.
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EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES,

not to be taken by implication, 393-396.

strict construction of, 282, n., 393-396.

are subject to right of eminent domain, 281.

EXECUTION,

exemptions from, may" be increased without violating pre-existing con-

tracts, 287.

and may be recalled, 383.

imprisonment upon, may be abolished, 287.

EXECUTIVE,

construction of constitution by, 39-43.

weight of practical construction by, 69.

power of, to pardon and reprieve, 115 and n., 116 and n.

approval or veto of laws by, 153, 154.

EXECUTIVE POWER,

what is, 91.

not to be exercised by legislature, 87, 114-116.

of the United States, 11.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS,
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special statute, authorizing sales by, 97-106.

propriety of judicial action in these cases, 97.

legislature cannot adjudicate upon debts, 104.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,

against publisher of newspaper, 457.

EXEMPTIONS,

from taxation, when not repealable, 127, 280, 383, n.

power of the legislature to make, 514.

from public duties, &c, may be recalled, 220, 383.

of property, from right of eminent domain, 281.

of property, from police power of the State, 282.

from execution, may he increased without violating contracts, 287.

of debtor from imprisonment, 287, 341.

privilege of, may be made to de end upon residence, 897.

laws for, not to be suspended for individual cases, 391, n.

EX PARTE PROCEEDINGS,

publication of, not privileged, 449-451.

EXPECTANCY,

interest in, are not vested rights, 359-361.

EXPOSITORY ACTS,

(See Declaratory Statutes.)

EX POST FACTO LAWS,

States not to pass, 15, 33, 264.

meaning of the term, 264.

only applies to criminal laws, 264.

classification of, 265.

laws in mitigation of punishment are not, 267.

what is in mitigation, and what not, 267-272.

modes of procedure in criminal cases may be changed, 272.

punishment of second offences, 273.

772

INDEX.

EXPRESSION OF POPULAR WILL,

must be under forms of law, 598.

(See Elections.)

EXPULSION,

of legislative members for misconduct, 133, 134.

EXTRADITION, •

of criminals as between the States, 15, n.

of persons accused of libel, 320, n.

F.

FACT AND LAW,

province of judge and jury respectively, 320-324.

in libel cases, 460.

FAST DAYS,

appointment of, does not violate religious liberty, 471.

FEDERAL COURTS,

(See Courts of the United States.)

FEDERALIST,

on the power to supersede the Articles of Confederation, 8, n.

reasons of, for dispensing with national bill of rights, 256.
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reference in, to laws violating obligation of contracts, 273.

FEE,

whether the public may appropriate, in taking lands, 557-559.

FEMALES,

accusation of want of chastity not actionable, per se, 423, 424.

statutes on the subject, 424.

excluded from suffrage, 599.

(See Married Women.)

FERRY FRANCHISES,

granted to municipal corporations, may be resumed, 277, 278.

strict construction of, 396.

grants of, by the State across navigable waters, 593.

police regulations respecting, 677.'

FEUDAL SYSTEM,

Mackintosh's definition of, 22 and n.

FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT,

provisions of, 11, 699.

FINE,

remission of, 115, n.

FIRE,

destruction of buildings to prevent spread of, 526, n., 594.

precautions against, by establishing fire limits, 594.

FISHERY,

public rights of, in navigable waters, 524.

restrictions upon, 202, and n.

FLORIDA,

legislative divorces forbidden in, 110, n.

special statutes for sale of lands of minors, &c, forbidden, 97,

legislature may make rules respecting pardons, 116.

INDEX.
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FLORIDA, — continued.

protection of property, &c, by law of the land, 852, n.

liberty of speech and the press in, 416.

religious belief not to disqualify a witness, 478.

disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.

FOREIGNERS, (See Aliens.)

FORFEITURES,

under municipal by-laws, 204, n.

must be judicially declared, 263, 264, 292.

FORMS,

prescribed by constitution are essential, 78-83, 177.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,

protections of, 11, 294, and n., 397.

FOURTH OF JULY,

celebration of, at public expense, 211.

FOX'S LIBEL ACT,

provisions of, 462.

import and purpose of, 462, 463.

FRANCHISES,
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of incorporation, when they constitute contracts, 279.

granted to municipal bodies may be resumed, 239, 276.

repeal of, where right to repeal is reserved, 384, 578.

strict construction of, 195, 394-396.

police regulations respecting, 576-581.

may be appropriated under right of eminent domain, 526.

FRAUD,

as affecting decrees of divorce, 401, and n.

FREEDMEN,

made citizens, 294, 599.

FREEDOM, ,

maxims of, in the common law, 21, 22.

gradually acquired by servile classes in Great Britain, 295, 299.

(See Personal Liberty.)

FREEDOM OF ELECTIONS,

provisions to secure, 614, 615.

bribery and treating of electors, 614.

militia not to be called out on election day, 614.

courts not to be open on election day, 614.

betting on elections illegal, 615.

contracts to influence elections void, 615.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,

Hamilton's reasons why protection of, by bill of rights not important, 256.

opposing reasons by Jefferson, 258, n.

(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)

FREEDOM OF SPEECH,

definition of, 422.

(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)

fugitives from justice,

to be delivered up by the States, 15, 16.

FUNDAMENTAL LAW, .

constitutions are, 2.

774

INDEX.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,

bills of, in State constitutions, 35.

in the national Constitution, 256-259.

in England, 23, 257.

are before constitutions, 36, 37.

statutes in violation of, 169-176.

under fourteenth amendment, 11, 294, 397.

G.

GAMING IMPLEMENTS,

keeping of, for unlawful games, may be prohibited, 596.

GENERAL INTENT,

when to control particular intent, 58, n.

GENERAL LAWS,

required instead of special by some constitutions, 128, 129, n.

in cases of divorce, 110, n.

due process of law does not always require, 353-355, 389-393.

submission of, to vote of people invalid, 116-125.

suspension of, 391.

changes in, give citizens no claim to remuneration, 358.
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respecting remedies, power to change, 267-273, 287-294, 361-367.

GENERAL WARRANTS,

illegality of, 299-303.

GEORGIA,

divorce cases to be adjudged by the courts, 110, n.

revenue bills in, 131, n.

liberty of speech and of the press in, 417, n.

religious liberty in, 468, 478, n.

protection of property by law of the land, 351, n.

disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.

GOOD MOTIVES AND JUSTIFIABLE ENDS,

defence of, in libel cases, 464.

burden of proof on defendant to show, 464.

GOVERNMENT,

constitutional, what is, 2, 3.

republican, to be guaranteed to the States, 17.

of ihe United States, origin of, 5-8.

GOVERNOR,

approval or veto of laws by, 153, 154.

messages to legislature, 155.

power to prorogue or adjourn legislature, 132.

power to convene legislature, 155.

legislative encroachment on powers of, 114-116.

power to pardon, 115, n.

power to reprieve, 116, n.

GRADE OF RAILROADS,

legislature may establish for crossings, 580.

GRADE OF STREETS,

change of, gives parties no right to compensation, 207.

special assessments for grading, 497, 505-509.

INDEX.

GRAND JURY,

criminal accusations by, 309.

presentments by, are privileged, 442 n.

GRANTS,

are contracts, and inviolable, 274.

by States, cannot be resumed, 274, 275, n.

of franchises, strict construction of, 195, 894-396.

when they constitute contracts, 279.

to municipal bodies, may be recalled, 276.

GREAT BRITAIN,

how it became a constitutional government, 3, n., 50, n.

power of Parliament to change constitution, 3.

meaning of unconstitutional law in, 4.

control over American colonies, 5, 23-25.

statutes of, how far in force in America, 23, 24.

bill of rights of, 23, 257.

habeas corpus act of, 23, 344.

local self-government in, 189.

declaration of rights of, 257.

bills of attainder in, 260, 261.
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money bills to originate in the Commons, 132, n.

emancipation of slaves in, 295-299.

prosecutions for libel in, 427, 460-462.

(See Parliament.)

GUARDIANS,

special statutes authorizing sales by, 97-106.

propriety of judicial action in such cases, 97.

control of ward by, 340.

appointment of, in divorce suits, 405.

authority of, is local, 405, n.

GUNPOWDER,

police regulations concerning, 595.

H.

HABEAS CORPUS,

writ of, a principal protection to personal liberty, 338, 342.

personal liberty, meaning of, 339.

restraints upon, to prevent or punish crime, &c, 339.

growing out of relation of husband and wife, 339.

of parent and child, 340.

of guardian and ward, 340.

of master and apprentice, 340.

of master and servant, 341.

of teacher and scholar, 341.

of principal and bail, 341.

of creditor and debtor, 341.

insecurity of, formerly, in England, 342, 343.

habeas corpus act, and its purpose, 23, 344.

general provisions of, 344, 345.
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INDEX.

HABEAS CORPUS, — continued.

adoption of, in America, 345.

writ of, when to be issued by national courts, 345, 346.

generally to issue from State courts, 346.

return to, where prisoner held under national authority, 347.

cases for, determined by common law, 347.

not to be made a writ of error, 347.

what to be inquired into under, 348.

to obtain custody of children, 348.

HARBOR REGULATIONS,

establishment of, by the States, 585.

wharf lines may be prescribed, 595.

HARDSHIP,

of particular cases not to control the law, 71, 72, n.

unjust provisions not necessarily unconstitutional, 72, 73, 513.

HEARING,

right to, in judicial proceedings, 361, 402-406.

in cases of appropriation of lands, 560-563.

HEALTH,
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police regulations for protection of, 584, 595.

draining swamps, &c, in reference to, 510, 589.

HEIRSHIP,

right to modify, 359.

HIGH SEAS,

not subject to exclusive appropriation, 2.

States no authority upon, 128.

HIGHWAYS,

establishment of, under right of eminent domain, 524.

when owner entitled to compensation in such case, 564.

appropriation of, to purposes of turnpike, railroad, &p., whether it

entitles owner to compensation, 545-557.

(See Eminent Domain.)

regulations of, by States under police power, 588, 594.

HOMESTEADS,

exemption of, from execution, 288, n.

HUSBAND AND WIFE,

power of legislature to divorce, 109-114.

jurisdiction in divorce cases, 401-406.

(See Divorce.)

control of husband over wife, 339.

obligation of husband to support wife, 339, n.

right as between, to custody of children, 348.

property rights, how far subject to legislative control, 360, 361.

validating invalid marriage by legislation, 372.

L

IDEM SONANS,

ballots sufficient in cases of, 608.

INDEX.

IDIOTS,

exclusion of, from suffrage, 599.

special legislative authority for sale of lands of, 97-106, 389.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS,

have no obligation, 286.

legalization of, 293, 374-377.

for lobby legislative services, 136, and n.

designed to affect elections, 615.

ILLINOIS,

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

special legislative sessions, 155, n.

when statutes of, to take effect, 156.

title to bill to express the object, 142, n.

protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of speech and the press in, 416.

religious tests forbidden, 469, n.

persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478,

IMMUNITIES,

of citizens of the several States, 15, 16, 397.

citizens not to be deprived of, 11.
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IMPAIRING CONTRACTS,

(See Obligation of Contracts.)

IMPEACHMENT,

of judges for declaring law unconstitutional, 160.

IMPLICATION,

amendments by, not favored, 152.

repeals by, 152.

grant of powers by, in State constitutions, 63, 64.

corporations established by, 197.

IMPLIED POWERS,

of municipal corporations, what are, 194-209.

granted by State constitutions, 63, 64.

IMPLIED PROHIBITIONS,

to the States by the national Constitution, 18.

upon legislative power, 164-177.

IMPORTS,

State taxation of, 586, 587.

IMPOSTS,

to be uniform throughout the Union, 10.

what the States may lay, 15.

taxation by, 495.

IMPRESSMENT OF SEAMEN,

not admissible in America, 299.

IMPRISONMENT,

for legislative contempt must terminate with the session, 134.

for debt may be abolished as to existing contracts, 287.

unlimited, cannot be inflicted for common-law offence, 329.

relief from. (See Habeas Corpus.)

IMPROVEMENTS,

owner of land cannot be compelled to make, 385, 532.

778 INDEX.

IMPROVEMENTS, — continued.

betterment laws, 885-389.

local, assessments for the making of, 497-510.

(See Assessments.)

INCHOATE RIGHTS,

power of the legislature in regard to, 359-861.'

INCIDENTAL INJURIES,

by change in the law, give no claim to compensation, 384.

(See Eminent Domain.)

INCOMPETENT PERSONS,

legislative authority for sale of lands of, 97-106, 389.

exclusion of, from suffrage, 599.

INCONTINENCE,

accusation of, against female, not actionable, per se, 423, 424.

statutory provisions respecting, 424.

INCORPORATIONS,

charters of private, are contracts, 279.

charters of municipal, are not, 192, 276.

control of, by police regulations, 577-579.

(See Charters; Municipal Corporations.)
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INDEBTEDNESS BY STATE,

prohibition of, whether it precludes debts by towns, counties, &c, 217,218.

INDECENT PUBLICATIONS,

sale of, may be prohibited, 596.

parties not free to make, 422.

INDEMNIFICATION,

of officers of municipal corporation where liability is incurred in supposed

discharge of duty, 209, 210.

power of legislature to compel, 211.

not to be made in case of refusal to perform duty, 212.

INDEMNITY,

for property taken for public use.

(See Eminent Domain.)

for consequential injuries occasioned by exercise of legal rights, 384.

INDEPENDENCE,

declaration of, by Continental Congress, 6.

new national government established by, 6.

celebration of, at public expense, 211.

of the traverse jury, 320.

of the bar, 334, 335, n., 337, n.

INDIANA,

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

when laws to take effect without governor's signature, 154, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

privileges of members, 134, n.

prohibition of special laws where general can be made applicable,

129, n.

title of acts to express the object, 142.

liberty of the press in, 416, n.

INDEX.
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INDIANA, — continued.

religious tests for office forbidden, 469, n.

exemption from bearing arms of persons conscientiously opposed, 478, n.

republication of amended statutes, 151, 152.

INDICTMENT,

criminal accusations to be by, 809.

trial on defective, 272, n., 827.

(See Crimes.)

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,

provisions for protection of, in State constitutions, 35, 36.

in national Constitution, 256-259.

do not owe their origin to constitutions, 36, 37.

English statutes declaratory of, 22, 23, 257.

(See Personal Liberty.)

INELIGIBILITY,

of highest candidate, how to affect election, 620.

INFANTS,

excluded from suffrage, 29, 30, 599.

special statutes authorizing sale of lands of, 97-106, 389.
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custody of, by parents, 340, 848.

emancipation of, 340.

control of, by masters, guardians, and teachers, 340, 341.

INFERIOR COURTS,

duty of, to pass upon constitutional questions, 162, n.

distinguished from courts of general jurisdiction, 406.

disproving jurisdiction of, 406, 407.

INFORMALITIES,

right to take advantage of, may be taken away by legislation, 370-383.

do not defeat jurisdiction of court, 408.

waiver of, in legal proceedings, 409.

INHABITANT,

meaning of, in election laws, 599, 600.

INITIALS,

to Christian name of candidate, whether sufficient in ballot, 609.

INJUSTICE,

of constitutional provisions, cannot be remedied by the court, 72, 73.

of statutes, does not render them unconstitutional, 164-168.

in taxation, sometimes inevitable, 513.

INNOCENCE,

of accused parties, presumption of, 309-311.

only to be overcome by confession in open court, or verdict, 811.

conclusive presumptions against, 826, n.

INQUISITORIAL TRIALS,

not permitted where the common law prevails, 313.

accused parties not compellable to give evidence against themselves,

313-317.

INSANITY,

defence of, in criminal cases, 309, n.

INSOLVENT LAWS,

right of the States to pass, 293, 294.
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INDEX.

INSOLVENT LAWS, — continued.

Congressional regulations supersede, 294.

what contracts cannot be reached by, 294.

creditor making himself a party to proceedings is bound, 294.

INSPECTION LAWS,

of the States, imposts or duties under, 15.

constitutionality of, 584, 585.

INSURRECTIONS,

employment of militia for suppression of, 11.

INTENT,

to govern in construction of constitutions, 55.

whole instrument to be examined in seeking, 57, 58.

in ineffectual contracts, may be given effect to by retrospective legislation,

372-383.

question of, in libel cases, 460-466.

in imperfect ballot, voter cannot testify to, 607.

what evidence admissible on question of, 611, 626.

INTEREST,

in party, essential to entitle him to question the validity of a law, 163.
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in judge, precludes his acting, 175, 410-413.

of money, illegal reservation of, may be legalized, 375, 376.

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS,

giving municipal corporations power to subscribe to, is not delegating

legislative power, 119 and n.

constitutionality of municipal subscriptions to, 213-219.

special legislative authority requisite, 215.

negotiable securities issued without authority are void, 215.

prohibition to the State engaging in, whether it applies to municipalities,

216-219.

retrospective legalization of securities, 379, 380.

INTERNATIONAL LAW,

equality of States under, 1.

INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS,

States no jurisdiction over, 128.

INTERPRETATION,

meaning of, 38, n.

(See Construction or State Constitutions.)

INTIMIDATION,

of voters, secrecy as a protection against, 604, 605.

securities against, 614, 615.

INTOXICATING DRINKS,

power of States to require licenses for sale of, 581-584.

power of States to prohibit sales of, 581-584.

payment of license fee to United States does not give right to sell as

against State laws, 584.

furnishing to voters, 614.

INTOXICATION,

not an excuse for crime, 476, n.

is temporary insanity, 599.

INDEX.
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INTRODUCTION OF BILLS,

for revenue purposes, 131, 132.

generally, 137, 138.

INVASIONS,

employment of militia to repel, 11.

INVENTIONS,

securing right in, to inventors, 10.

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE,

gradual abolition of, in England, 295-299.

as a punishment for crime, 299.

(See Personai. Liberty.)

IOWA,

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

special legislative sessions, 155, n.

when statutes of, to take effect, 158.

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

legislative regulations of pardons, 116, n.

liberty of the press in, 416, n.

disqualifications for suffrage, 599.
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religious tests for office forbidden, 469.

religious belief not to be test of competency of witness, 478.

IRREGULARITIES, .

in judicial proceedings, not inquirable into on habeas corpus, 347, 348.

do not render judicial proceedings void, 408.

waiver of, 409.

may be cured by retrospective legislation, 370-383.

effect of, upon elections, 617-619.

IRREPEALABLE LAWS,

legislature cannot pass, 125-127, 284.

Parliament cannot bind its successors, 126.

laws which constitute contracts are inviolable, 127.

whether essential powers of government can be bartered away, 280-284,

525.

municipal corporations cannot adopt, 206-208.

J.

JEOPARDY,

party not to be twice put in, for same cause, 325-328.

what constitutes, 326, 327.

whim jury may be discharged without verdict, 327.

when nolle prosequi is an acquittal, 327.

second trial after verdict set aside, 327, 328.

acquittal on some counts is a bar pro tanto to new trial, 328.

varying form of the charge, S27.

duplicate punishments under State and municipal laws, 199.

JOURNAL OF THE LEGISLATURE,

is a public record, 135.

is evidence whether a law is properly adopted, 135, 136.

presumption of correct action where it is silent, 135, 136.

782

INDEX.

JUDGE,

disqualification of interest, 410-413.

not to urge opinion upon the jury, 320.

to instruct the jury on the law, 322.

JUDGE-MADE LAW,

objectionable nature of, 56, n.

JUDGMENTS,

conclusiveness of those of other States, 17.

general rules as to force and effect, 47-54.

must apply ;he law in force when rendered, 381.

are void if jurisdiction is wanting, 382, 398, 406, 413.

irregularities do not defeat, 347, 348, 408.

(See Judicial Proceedings; Jurisdiction.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS,

of federal courts conclusive on questions of federal jurisdiction, 12.

of State courts followed in other cases, 13.

general rules as to force and effect of, 47-54.

JUDICIAL POWER,

of the United States, 19.
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I.See Courts op the United States.)

not to be exercised by State legislatures, 87-114, 392.

what it is, 90-92, 347, n.

declaratory statutes not an exercise of, 93-95.

such statutes not to be applied to judgments, 94.

instances of exercise of, 95, 96.

is apportioned by legislature, 89, n.

legislature may exercise, in deciding contested seats, 133.

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS,

confirmation of invalid, by legislature, 107, 108, 370.

are void if court has no jurisdiction of the case, 897.

jurisdiction of subject-matter, what is, 398.

consent will not confer, 398.

if wanting, objection may be taken at any time, 398.

law encourages voluntary settlements and arrangements, 899.

arbitrations distinguished from, 399.

transitory and local actions, 399, 400.

jurisdiction in divorce cases, 400, 401.

necessity for service of process, or substitute therefor, 402—404.

proceedings in rem and in personam, 403.

bringing in parties by publication, 404.

no personal judgment in such case, 404, 406.

decree for custody of children, effect of, 405.

contesting jurisdiction, 406, 407.

courts of general and special jurisdiction, 406, 407.

record of, how far conclusive, 406, 407.

irregularities do not defeat, 347, 348, 408.

waiver of, 409.

judicial power cannot be delegated, 410.

right to jury trial in civil cases, 410, n.

judge not to sit when interested, 410-413.

INDEX.
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JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, — continued.

statements in course of, how far privileged, 441-445.

publication of accounts of trials privileged, 448, 449.

but must be fair and full, 448, 449.

and not ex; arte, 449-451.

and not contain indecent or blasphemous matter, 449.

JUDICIARY,

construction of constitution by, 44-46.

equality of, with legislative department, 45, n.

independence of, 46, n.

when its decisions to be final, 44-54.

(See Courts; Judicial Power; Judicial Proceedings.)

JURISDICTION,

of courts, disproving, 17, 406, 407.

want of, cannot be cured by legislation, 107.

of subject-matter, what it consists in, 398.

not to be conferred by consent, 398, 409.

if wanting, objection may be taken at any time, 398.

in divorce cases, what gives, 400, 401.
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necessity for service of process, 402-404.

irregularities do not affect, 347, 348, 408.

interest in judge, effect of, 410-413.

general and special distinguished, 406, 407.

where it exists, proceedings not to be attacked collaterally, 408, 409.

in tax proceedings, 499.

of federal courts, 10-14, 19, 20, 294, 427.

in cases of habeas corpus, 345, 346.

JURY,

independence of, 320, 321 and n., 325, n.

JURY TRIAL,

the mode for the trial of criminal accusations, 309, 319!

importance of, 320, n.

must be speedy, 311. •

and public, 312.

and not inquisitorial, 313.

prisoner to be confronted with witnesses, 318.

to be present during trial, 319.

jury-to consist of twelve, 319, 562, n.

challenges of, 319.

must be from vicinage, 24, 319, 320.

must be left free to act, 320.

how far to judge of the law, 321-324, 414, n.

in libel cases, 460-463.

acquittal by, is final, 321, 322.

judge to instruct jury on the law, 322.

but not to express opinion on facts, 320.

nor to refuse to receive verdict, 320.

accused not to be twice put in jeopardy, 825-828.

what is legal jeopardy, 326, 327.

when jury may be discharged without verdict, 327.
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INDEX.

JURY TRIAL, — continued.

when nolle prosequi equivalent to verdict, 327.

second trial after verdict set aside, 327, 328.

right to counsel, 330-338.

constitutional right to jury trial in civil cases, 19, n., 410, n.

in case of municipal corporations, 233, n.

JUST COMPENSATION,

what constitutes, when property taken by the public, 559-570.

(See Eminent Domain.)

JUSTIFICATION,

in libel cases by showing truth of charge, 424, 464.

showing of good motives and justifiable occasion, 464-466.

unsuccessful attempt at, to increase damages, 438.

K.

KANSAS,

requirement of general laws when they can be made applicable, 129.

power to grant divorces vested in courts, 110, n.

privilege of members of legislature from arrest, 134, n.

title of acts to express the object, 141, n.
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legislative regulation of pardons, 116, n.

republication of amendatory statutes, 151, n.

liberty of the press in, 416, n.

disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.

religious test for office forbidden, 469.

KENTUCKY,

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

title of act? to express the object, 141, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.

persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 468, n.

protection to property by law of the land, 351, n.

L.

LAW,

common, how far in force, 23, n.

(See Common Law.)

and fact, respective province of court and jury as to, 320-324, 460-463.

the jury as judges of, 821-324, 460-463.

LAW-MAKING POWER,

(See Legislatures of tHe States.)

LAW OF THE LAND,

protection of, insured by magna charta, 351.

American constitutional provisions, 11, 15, 351, n.

meaning of the term, 353-357, 369, n.

vested rights protected by, 357.

INDEX.
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LAW OP THE LAND, — continued.

meaning of vested rights, 358, 370, 378.

subjection of, to general laws, 358.

interests in expectancy are not, 859-361.

rights acquired through the marriage relation, 360, 361.

legal remedies not the subject of vested rights, and may be changed,

361, 362.

statutory privileges are not, 383.

rights in action are, 362.

forfeitures must be judicially declared, 363, 364.

limitation laws may be passed, 364-367, 369.

rules of evidence may be changed, 367-369.

retrospective laws, when admissible, 369-384.

cannot create rights in action, 369.

nor revive debts barred by statute of limitations, 369.

may cure informalities, 370-383.

may perfect imperfect contracts, 293, 371-381.

may waive a statutory forfeiture, 375, n., 376, n.

may validate imperfect deeds, 376-379.
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but not as against bona fide purchasers, 378, 379.

cannot validate proceedings the legislature could not have authorized,

381-383.

cannot cure defects of jurisdiction in courts, 882.

consequential injuries give no right to complain, 384.

sumptuary laws inadmissible, 385.

betterment laws, 385-389.

unequal and partial laws, 389-397.

invalid judicial proceedings, 397.

what necessary to give courts jurisdiction, 397-400.

consent cannot confer, 398-400.

in divorce cases, 400, 401, 405.

process must be served or substitute had, 402-404.

proceedings in rem and in personam, 403.

bringing in parties by publication, 403, 404.

no personal judgment in such case, 404, 406.

process cannot be served in another State, 403.

jurisdiction over guardianship of children in divorce cases, 405.

courts of general and special jurisdiction, and the rules as to ques-

tioning their jurisdiction, 406, 407.

irregular proceedings do not defeat jurisdiction, 408.

waiver of irregularities, 409.

judicial power cannot be delegated, 410.

judge cannot sit in his own cause, 410-413.

objection to his interest cannot be waived, 413.

right to jury trial in civil cases, 19, n., 410, n.

(See Taxation; Eminent Domain; Police Power.)

LAWS, ENACTMENT OF,

(See Statutes.)

LAWS IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,

(See Obligation of Contracts.)
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INDEX.

LAWS, EX POST FACTO,

(See Ex Post Facto Laws; Retrospective Laws.)

LEGAL PROCEEDINGS,

publication of accounts of, how far privileged, 448-451.

statements in course of, when privileged, 441-445.

(See Judicial Proceedings.)

LEGAL TENDER,

only gold and silver to be made, by the States, 15.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT,

not to exercise executive or judicial powers, 87-116.

equality of, with other departments, 45, n., 47, n.

(See Legislatures of tHe States.)

LEGISLATIVE DIVORCES,

whether they are an exercise of judicial power, 109-114.

impropriety of, 110, 114, n.

LEGISLATIVE MOTIVES,

not to be inquired into by courts, 135, 136, 186, 187, 208.

presumption of correctness of, 186, 187, 208.

LEGISLATIVE POWERS,
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enactments in excess of, are void, 3, 174.

distingu'shed from judicial, 91.

cannot be delegated, 116-125.

exercise of, will not give right of action, 208.

cannot extend beyond territorial limits, 127.

grant of, will not warrant exercise of executive or judicial powers,

87-116.

LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS,

privilege of publication of, 457-460.

members not to be questioned for words in course of, 445-447.

LEGISLATORS,

contested elections of, to be decided by house, 133.

duty of, not to violate constitution, 185.

presumed correctness of motives, 186, 187.

privilege of, in debate, 445-447.

right of, to publish speeches, 457-460.

LEGISLATURES, COLONIAL,

statutes adopted by, in force at Revolution, 25.

LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES,

power to originate amendments to State constitution, 31, and n.

construction of constitution by, 39-43.

deference due to judicial construction by, 53.

powers of, compared with those of Parliament, 85, 86, 172, 173.

not to exercise executive or judicial powers, 87, 116, 174-176.

complete legislative power vested in, 87, 168, 172, 173.

specification of powers in constitution unnecessary, 88.

declaratory statutes not the exercise of judicial power, 93-95.

cannot set aside judgments, grant new trials, &p., 95, 96, 392.

how far may bind parties by recital of facts in statutes, 96.

power of, to grant divorces, 109-114.

delegation of legislative power inadmissible, 116-125.

INDEX.

LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES, — continued.

but conditional legislation is not, 117.

nor making charters subject to acceptance, 118, 119.

nor conferring powers of local government, 118-125, 191.

irrepealable legislation cannot be passed, 126-127, 284.

but exemptions from taxation may be made, 127, 280, 514.

power of, limited to territory of the State, 127.

discretionary powers of, how restricted, 129.

courts no control over, 129.

enactment of laws by, 130-158.

must be under the constitutional forms, 130, 131.

parliamentary common law of, 130, 131, 134.

division of, into two houses, 131, 132.

when to meet, 132.

proroguement by executive, 132.

rules of order of, 133.

election and qualification of members, determination of, 133.

contempts of, may be punished by, 133, 134.

but not by committees, 135.

members of, may be expelled, 133.
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their privilege from arrest, &c, 134.

committees of, for collection of information, &c, 135.

power of, to terminate with session, 135.

journals of, to be evidence, 135, 136.

action of, to be presumed legal and correct, 135, 136.

motives of members not to be questioned, 135, 186, 187, 208.

"lobby" services illegal, 136, and n.

bills, introduction and passage of, 137-141.

three several readings of, 80, 81, 139, 140.

yeas antl nays to be entered on journal, 140.

vote on passage of, what sufficient, 141.

title of, formerly no part of it, 141.

constitutional provisions respecting, 81, 82, 141, n.

purpose of these, 142.

they are mandatory, 150, 151.

particularity required in stating object, 144, 145.

what is embraced by title, 148-150.

effect if more than one object embraced, 147, 148.

effect if act is broader than title, 148-150.

amended statutes, publication of, at length, 151, 152.

repeal of statutes at session when passed, 152.

signing of bills by officers of the houses, 152.

approval and veto of bills by governor, 153, 154.

governor's messages to, 155.

special sessions of, 155.

when acts to take effect, 155-158.

power of the courts to declare statutes unconstitutional, 159-188.

full control of, over municipal corporations, 192, 193, 226, 233.

legalization by, of irregular municipal action, 221.

of invalid contracts, 293, 371-381.
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INDEX.

LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES, — continued.

of irregular sales, taxation, &c, 370-383.

not to pass bills of attainder, 15, 33, 259.

nor ex post facto laws, 15, 33, 264.

nor laws violating obligation of contracts, 15, 33, 127, 273.

(See Obligation of Contracts.)

insolvent laws, what may be passed, 293, 294.

right to petition, 349.

vested rights protected against, 351-397.

(See Law of tHe Land.)

control by, of remedies in criminal cases, 267-273.

in civil cases, 287-294, 361-367.

control of rules of evidence, 288, 367-369.

may change estates in land, 359-361.

and rights to property under the marriage relation, 360, 361.

limitation laws may be passed by, 364-367.

retrospective legislation by, 369-383.

(See Retrospective Legislation.)

privileges granted by, may be recalled, 383.
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consequential injuries from action of, 384.

sumptuary laws, 385.

betterment laws, 386-389.

unequal and partial legislation, 389-397.

general laws not always essential, 389, 390.

special rules for particular occupations, 390.

proscriptions for opinion's sake, 390, 891.

suspensions of laws in special cases, 891, 392.

special remedial legislation, 389, 391.

special franchises, 393-397.

restrictions upon suffrage, 394.

power of, to determine for what purposes taxes may be levied, 488-492,

517.

cannot authorize property to be taxed out of its district, 499-504.

must select the subjects of taxation, 514.

may determine necessity of appropriating private property to public use,

528, 538, 539.

authority of, requisite to the appropriation, 528.

cannot appropriate property to private use, 530, 531.

LETTERS,

legal inviolability of, 307, n.

LEVEES,

establishment of, under police power, 589.

special assessments for, 510.

LIBEL,

(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)

LIBERTY,

personal,

(See Personal Liberty.)

of the press,

(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)

INDEX.
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LIBERTY, — continued.

religious,

(See Religious Liberty.)

of discussion, 349.

of bearing arms, 350.

of petition, 349.

charters of, 24, n.

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.

Hamilton's reasons why protection of, by bill of rights, was not important,

256.

opposing reasons by Jefferson, 258, n.

Congress to pass no law abridging, 414.

State constitutional provisions respecting, 414, n.

these create no new rights, but protect those already existing, 415, 416.

liberty of the press neither well defined nor protected at the common law, ,

417.

censorship of publications, 417-419.

debates in Parliament not suffered to be published, 418.

censorship in the Colonies, 418, 419.
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secret sessions of Constitutional Convention, 419.

and of United States Senate, 420.

what liberty of speech and of the press consists in, 420, 421, 422.

general purpose of the constitutional provisions, 421, 422.

rules of common-law liability for injurious publications, 422-425.

modification of, by statute, 430.

privileged cases, 425, 426.

libels upon the government indictable at the'common law, 426.

prosecutions for, have ceased in England, 427.

sedition law for punishment of, 427.

whether now punishable in America, 428-430.

criticism upon officers and candidates for office, 431-441.

statements in the course of judicial proceedings, 441-445.

privilege of counsel, 442-445.

privilege of legislators, 445-447.

publication of privileged communications through the press, 448-460.

publication of speeches of counsel, &c, not privileged, 448.

fair and impartial account of judicial trial is, 448.

but not of ex parte proceedings, 448, 449.

whole case must be published, 448, 449.

must be confined to what took place in court, 449.

must not include indecent or blasphemous matter, 449.

privilege of publishers of news, 451-457.

publishers generally held to same responsibility as other persons, 455.

not excused by giving source of information, 455.

nor because the publication was without their personal knowledge, 455.

nor by its being a criticism on a candidate for office, 455.

nor by its constituting a fair account of a public meeting, 455, 456.

criticisms by, on works of art and literary productions, 456, 457.

exemplary damages against publishers, 457.

publication of legislative proceedings, how far privileged, 457.
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INDEX.

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS, — continued.

rule in England, 457, -158.

the case of Stockdale p. Hansard, 458, n.

publication of speeches by members, 457, 459, 460.

the jury as judges of the law in libel eases, 460.

Woodfall's and Miller's cases, 460, 461.

Mp. Fox's Libel Act, 462.

the early rulings on the subject in America, 462, 463.

provisions on the subject in State constitutions, 463.

the truth as a defence when good motives and justifiable ends in the pub-

lication can be shown, 464.

burden of proof on the defendant to show them, 464.

that publication was copied from another source is not sufficient, 466.

motives or character of defendant no protection, if publication is false,

, 466.

LICENSE,

of occupations in general, 596.

for ferry across navigable waters, 593.

revoking, where a fee was received therefor, 283, n.
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LICENSE FEES,

when are taxes, 201, 495.

limited generally to necessary expenses, &c, 201.

payment of, to United States, does not give rights as against State laws.

584.

LICENSER,

of intended publications, 417-419.

(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)

LICENTIOUSNESS,

distinguished from liberty, 339, n.

LIFE,

action for taking, through negligence, &c, 581.

not to be taken but by due process of law, 11, 15, 291, n.

LIMITATION,

of time to apply for compensation for property taken by public, 561.

LIMITATION LAWS,

may cut off vested rights, 364-367.

opportunity to assert rights must first be given, 365, 366.

cannot operate upon party in possession, 366.

legislature to determine what is reasonable time, 366.

suspension of, 365, n., 391, n.

legislature cannot revive demands barred by, 365.

legislature may prescribe form for new promise, 293.

do not applv to State or nation, 367, n.

LIMITATIONS TO LEGISLATIVE POWER,

are only such as the people have imposed by their constitutions, 87.

(See Legislatures of tHe States.)

LITERARY PRODUCTIONS,

copyright to, Congress may provide for, 10.

privilege of criticism of, 457.

INDEX.

LOBBY SERVICES,

contract for, unlawful, 136, and n., 212, n.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT,

State constitutions framed in reference to, 35.

the peculiar feature of the American system, 189.

(See Municipal Corporations.)

LOCAL TAXATION,

(See Taxation.)

LOCALITY OF PROPERTY,

may give jurisdiction to courts, 404, 406.

taxation dependent upon, 499-504, 516.

LOG-ROLLING LEGISLATION,

constitutional provisions to prevent, 142-144.

LORDS DAY,

laws for observance of, how justified, 476, 477.

LOUISIANA,

divorces not to be granted by special laws, 110, n.

revenue bills in, 131, n.

title of acts to express their object, 142, n.

liberty of the press in, 417, n.
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persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 468, n.

republication of amended statutes, 152.

exclusions from suffrage, 599, n.

LUNATICS,

excluded from suffrage, 599.

special statutes for sale of lands of, 97-106.

M.

MAGNA CEAIiTA,

grant of, did not create constitutional government, 3, n.

a declaratory statute, 22, 23, 257.

its maxims the interpreters of constitutional grants of power, 175.

provision in, for trial by peers, &c, 351.

MAILS,

inviolability of, 307, n.

MAINE,

judges of, to give opinions to legislature, 40.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 414, n.

religious tests forbidden in, 469.

periodical valuations for taxation, 496.

exclusions from suffrage, 599, n.

MAJORITY,

what constitutes two thirds, 141.

what sufficient in elections, 598, n., 614.

MALICE,

presumption of, from falsity of injurious publications, 422, 455.

in refusing to receive legal votes, 616.

792

INDEX.

MANDAMUS,

to compel registration of voters, 602.

to compel canvassers to perform duty, 623.

MANDATORY STATUTES,

doctrine of, 74-78.

constitutional provisions always mandatory, 78-83, 140, 150.

but courts cannot always enforce, 129.

MANUFACTURING PURPOSES,

whether dams for, can be established under right of eminent domain,

631-536.

MARKETS,

State power to regulate, 596.

MARRIAGE,

validating invalid, by retrospective legislation, 372.

legislative control of rights springing from, 360, 361.

power of the legislature to annul, 109-114.

statutory regulation of, 319, n.

(See Divorce; Married Women.)

MARRIED WOMEN,
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exclusion of, from suffrage, 29, 599.

statutes enlarging rights of, 61, n.

testimony of, in favor of husband, 317, 318, n.

invalid deeds of, may be validated by legislature, 377, 378.

control of, by husband, 339, 340.

(See Divorce; Dower.)

MARSHES,

draining of, and assessments therefor, 510, 511, 533.

MARTIAL LAW,

when may be declared, 309, n., 319, n.

legality of action under, 362, n.

danger from, 615.

MARYLAND,

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

title of acts to express the object, 141, n.

protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 415, n.

religious liberty in, 468, n., 478, n.

republication of amended statutes, 151, n.

exclusions from suffrage, 599, n.

MASSACHUSETTS,

judges of, to give opinions to legislature, 40.

divorces in, to be granted by courts, 110, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 131, n.

protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 414, n.

periodical valuations for taxation, 496.

exclusions from suffrage, 599, n.

MASTER,

of apprentice, servant, and scholar, power of, 340, 34".

INDEX.
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MAXIMS,

of government, laws in violation of, 169, 170.

of the common law, what they consist in, 22.

gradual growth and expansion of, 54, 55.

for construction of statutes,

a statute is to be construed as prospective, and not retrospective, in

its operation, 62.

such an interpretation shall be put upon a law as to uphold it, and

give effect to the intention of the law-makers, 58.

words in a statute are presumed to be employed in their natural and

ordinary sense, 58, 83, n.

contemporary construction is best and strongest in the law, 67-71.

a statute is to be construed in the light of the mischief it was designed

to remedy, 65.

he who considers the letter merely, goes but skin deep into the

meaning, 84.

statutes in derogation of the common law are to be construed strictly,

61, n.

an argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in the law, 67-71.
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general principles,

no man can be judge in his own cause, 410-418.

consent excuses error, 181, 182, 409.

the law does not concern itself about trifles, 520.

that to which a party assents is not in law an injury, 181, 182.

no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause, 47-54.

every man's house is his castle, 22, 299.

that which was originally void cannot by mere lapse of time become

valid, 866, n.

necessity knows no law, 594.

so enjoy your own as not to injure that of another, 573.

MEANING OF WORDS,

(See Definitions.)

MEASURES AND WEIGHTS,

regulation of, 596.

MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE,

contested seats of, decided by the house, 183.

punishment of, for contempts, &c, 133.

power of the houses to expel, 133, 134.

exemption of, from arrest, 134.

publication of speeches by, 457-460.

privilege of, in debate, &c, 445-448.

MICHIGAN,

right of, to admission to the Union under ordinance of 1787, 28.

repeal of acts of Parliament in, 25, n.

right of married women to property in, 61, n.

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

privilege of legislators from arrest, 134, n.

special legislative sessions in, 155, n.

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

794 INDEX.

1

MICHIGAN, — continued.

when statutes of, to take effect, 156.

protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 416.

religious belief of witness not to be inquired into, 478.

periodical valuation of property for taxation, 496.

MILITARY BOUNTIES,

by municipal corporations, when legal, 219-229.

MILITARY COMMISSIONS,

when not admissible, 319, n.

(See Martial Law.)

MILITIA,

control of, 11, 18, 41, n.

not to be called out on election days, 615.

MILL-DAMS,

construction of, across navigable waters, 594.

abatement of, as nuisances, 595.

MILL-DAM ACTS,

do not confer vested rights, 384.
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constitutionality of, 534-536.

MINNESOTA.

divorces not to be granted by legislature, 110, n.

title of acts to express the object, 141, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

protection to property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 416, n.

religious liberty in, 468, n., 478, n.

disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.

MINORS,

(See Infants.)

MISCHIEF TO BE REMEDIED,

mav throw light on constitutional clause, 65.

Mississippi,

constitutional provision respecting divorces, 110, n.

privileges of members, 134, n.

when statutes to take effect, 156.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

protection to property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 417, n.

religious test for office, 468, 469.

disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.

MISSOURI,

legislative licenses for sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.

judges of, to give opinions to legislature, 40.

restrictions upon legislative power in constitution of, 128,

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 111, n.

privileges of members, 134, n.

special legislative sessions in, 155, n.

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.

INDEX.
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MISSOURI,— continued.

republication of amended statutes, 137, n.

when acts to take effect, 156, n.

protection to property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 416.

disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.

MONEY,

coinage and regulation of, 10, 15.

legal tender, 15.

punishment of counterfeiting, 10, 18.

bills for raising, to originate in lower house in some States, 131, 132.

cannot be appropriated under right of eminent domain, 527.

MONOPOLIES,

odious nature of, 893.

grant of, not presumed, 895.

in navigable waters, 591.

MORTGAGES,

right to possession under, cannot be taken away by legislature, 290, 291.

MOTIVES,
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of legislative body not to be inquired into by courts, 135, 136, 186, 187.

nor those of municipal legislative body, 208.

good, when a defence in libel cases, 464.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,

question of formation or division of, may be submitted to people inter-

ested, 118, 119.

powers of local government may be conferred upon, 118-125, 191.

whether they may engage in internal improvements, &c, 119, 213-219.

general view of the system, 189-192.

legislature prescribes extent of powers, 191.

charter of, the measure of their authority, 192.

complete control of, by legislature, 170, n., 191, 193.

whether it may compel them to assume obligations aside from their ordi-

nary functions, 230-235.

charter of, not a contract, 192.

implied powers of, 194, 209, 210.

effect of changes in, 192, n.

charter to be strictly construed, 195.

contracts, ultra vires, void, 196, 211, 212, 215, and n.

negotiable paper issued by, when valid, 212, 215, and n.

may exist by prescription, 197.

powers thereof, 197.

what by-laws they may make, 195, 198.

must not be opposed to constitution of State or nation, 198.

nor to charter, 198.

nor to general laws of the State, 198.

nor be unreasonable, 200.

nor uncertain, 202.

cannot delegate their powers, 204, 205.

nor adopt irrepealable legislation, 206-208.

nor preclude themselves from exercise of police power, 206-208.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, — continued.

nor grant away use of streets, 207, 208.

incidental injuries in exercise of powers give no right of action, 208.

may indemnify officers, 209, 210.

but not for refusal to perform duty, 212.

may contract to pay for liquors destroyed, 211, n.

powers of, to be construed with reference to the purposes of their cre-

ation, 211.

will not include furnishing entertainments, 211.

or loaning credit or making accommodation paper, 212.

must be confined to territorial limits, 213.

power of, to raise bounty moneys, &c, 219-229.

legislative control of corporate property, 235-239.

towns, counties, &c, how differing from chartered corporations, 240, 247,

248.

judgments against, may be collected of corporators, 241-247.

but only in New England, 246, 247.

not liable for failure of officers to perform duty, 247.

chartered corporations undertake for performance of corporate duty, 247.
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liability to persons injured by failure, 247-253.

corporate organization how questioned, 254.

imperfect acts of, may be validated, 373, 374, n., 379.

must tax all property within their limits alike, 502.

cannot tax property not lying within their limits, 500.

bounds of, cannot be arbitrarily enlarged in order to bring in property for

taxation, 500-504.

obtaining water for, under right of eminent domain, 533.

taking of lands for parks for, 533, 534, n.

MUTE,

wilfully standing when arraigned, 311.

N.

NATION,

definition of, 1.

distinguished from State, 1.

(See United States.,

NATURALIZATION,

power of Congress over, 10.

NAVIGABLE WATERS,

made free by ordinance of 1787, 25, n.

right of States to improve and charge toll, 26, n., 592.

what are, and what not, 589.

are for use of all equally, 590.

general control of, is in the States, 591.

Congressional regulations, when made, control, 591.

States cannot grant monopolies of, 591.

States may authorize bridges over, 592.

when bridges become nuisances, 592.

States may establish ferries across, 593.

INDEX.

NAVIGABLE WATERS, — continued.

States may authorize dams of, 593, 594.

regulation of speed of vessels upon, 594.

rights of fishery in, 524.

frontage upon, is property, 544.

(See Water-Courses.)

NAVIGATION,

right of, pertains to the eminent domain, 524.

(See Navigable Waters.)

NEBRASKA,

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

privilege of members of legislature from arrest, &c, 134, n.

title of acts to express the object, 141, n.

republication of amended statutes, 151, n.

liberty of the press in, 416, n.

religious tests forbidden in, 409, n., 478, n.

NECESSITY,

is the basis of the right of eminent domain, 524, 538.

extent of property to be taken is limited by, 539.

destruction of buildings' to prevent spread of fire, 594.
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NEGLIGENCE,

as a foundation for rights under betterment laws, 388.

carriers of persons may be made responsible for deaths by, 581.

in the construction of public works may give right of action, 671.

NEGOTIABLE PAPER,

when municipal corporations liable upon, 212, 215, and n.

NEVADA,

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

republication of amendatory statutes, 151, n.

when acts to take effect, 156, n.

special legislative sessions in, 155, n.

title of acts to express the subject, 142, n.

protection by the law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 416, n.

religious liberty in, 478, n.

disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.

NEW ENGLAND CONFEDERACY,

of 1643, why formed, 5.

NEW HAMPSHIRE,

judges of, to give opinions to legislature, &c, 40.

causes of divorce to be heard by courts, 110, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

approval of laws, 153, n.

retrospective laws forbidden in, 370.

protection by the law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 414, n.

religious liberty in, 469, n., 478, n.

disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.

NEW JERSEY,

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.
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INDEX.

NEW JERSEY, — continued.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower bouse, 132, n.

liberty of the press in, 415, n.

religious tests forbidden in, 469, n.

disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.

NEWSPAPERS,

publication of privileged communications in, 448-451.

whether they have any privilege in publishing news, 451.

privilege not admitted by the courts, 453-457.

when publisher not liable to vindictive damages, 457.

(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)

NEW STATES,

admission of, 27-37.

NEW TRIALS,

not to be granted by the legislature, 95, 392.

not granted on application of State in criminal cases, 321.

may be had after verdict set aside on application of defendant, 327, 328.
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but not on counts on which he was acquitted, 328.

(See Jeofardy.)

NEW YORK,

divorces only to be granted in judicial proceedings, 110, n.

title of private and local acts to express the subject, 142, n.

amendment of first constitution in, 31.

protection by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 414, n.

witnesses not rendered incompetent from want of religious belief, 478, n.

contested election of governor in, 623, n.

NOBILITY,

titles of, forbidden to be granted, 17.

NOLLE PROSEQUI,

when equivalent to acquittal, 327.

NON COMPOTES MENTIS,

legislative authority for sale of lands of, 97-106.

excluded from suffrage, 599.

NON-RESIDENT PARTIES,

subjecting to jurisdiction of court by publication, 403-406.

restricted effect of the notice, 404,

discrimination in taxation of, 487.

NORTH CAROLINA,

ratification of Constitution by, 8, 9.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 111, n.

protection by the law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 417, n.

infidels disqualified for holding office, 468.

NOTICE,

necessity for, in legal proceedings, 402-406.

bringing in non-resident parties by publication of, 403, 404.

of elections, when essential to their validity, 602, 603.

INDEX. 799

NUISANCE,

when bridges over navigable waters are, 593.

when dams are, and may be abated, 594, 595. ''

obstructions in navigable streams are, 590, n.

forbidding use of cemeteries which have become, 595.

general power in the States to abate, 596.

created by public, not to be abated at expense of individual, 596, n.

O.

OATH,

of attorneys, 330, 331, n.

test, may be punishment, 263, n.

of voter, when conclusive of his right, 617.

blasphemy and profanity punishable by law, 471-476.

OBJECT OF STATUTE,

in some States required to be stated in title, 141-151.

OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,

States not to pass laws violating, 15, 33, 126, 273.

what is a contract, 273-281.

agreements by States are, 274, 275.

executed contracts, 275.
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appointments to office are not, 276. /

municipal charters are not, 192, 193, 276.

franchises granted to municipal corporations are not, 277.

but grants of property in trust are, 277-279.

and grants of property for municipal use, 236.

private charters of incorporation are, 279.

whether an exemption from taxation is, 127, 280-284.

it is if granted for a consideration, 281.

whether right of eminent domain can be relinquished, 281.

or the right to exercise the police power, 282, 283.

change in general laws of the State does not violate, 284.

nor divorce laws, 284.

such laws not to divest rights in property, 284, 285.

what obligation consists in, 285-287.

remedies for enforcement of contracts may be changed, 287-289.

imprisonment for debt may be abolished, 287.

exemptions from execution may be increased,-287.

rules of evidence may be changed, 288.

but all remedy cannot be taken away, 289, 290.

repeal of statute giving remedy cannot destroy contracts, 290.

appraisement laws cannot be made applicable to existing debts, 290.

right to possession under mortgages cannot be taken away, 290.

nor time to redeem lands shortened or extended, 291.

laws staying execution, how far invalid, 292, 293.

when power of municipal taxation may not be taken away, 292.

stockholders liable for corporate debts may not be released by law, 292.

whether a party may release, by contract, a privilege granted for reasons

of Statu policy, 293.
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INDEX.

'OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS, — continued.

when a contract requires new action to its enforcement, changes may be

made as to such action, 293.

new promise to revive a debt may be required to be in writing, 293.

laws validating invalid contracts do not violate Constitution, 293.

nor laws extending corporate franchises, 293.

State insolvent laws, how far valid, 293, 294.

effect of police laws, 574-584.

OBSCENITY,

in legal proceedings, not to be published, 449.

sale of obscene books and papers may be prohibited, 596.

OBSCURITIES,

aids irt interpretation of, 65-73.

(See Construction of State Constitutions.)

OBSTRUCTIONS TO NAVIGATION,

when bridges and dams to be considered such, 592-594.

when channels cut by private parties are private property, 590.

OCEAN,

(See HigH Seas.)
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OFFICE,

appointments to, do not constitute contracts, 276.

whether they pertain to the executive, 115, n.

right to, not to be contested on habeas corpus, 348, n.

OFFICER,

protection of dwelling-house against, 22, 299.

general warrants to, are illegal, 300-302.

may break open house to serve criminal warrant, 303.

service of search-warrant by,

(See SearcHes and Seizures.)

privilege of criticism of, 431-441, 455, 456..

constitutional qualifications cannot be added to, by the legislature, 64.

duty of, when doubtful of constitutional construction, 73, 74.

of the legislature, election of, 133.

de jure, who are, 618, n.

municipal, may be indemnified by corporation, 209, 490.

but not for refusal to perform duty, 212. •

election of,

(See Elections.)

OHIO,

legislature not to grant divorces, or exercise judicial power, 111. n.

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

general laws to be uniform, 63.

appointing power, how exercised, 115.

retrospective laws, what not to be passed, 370, n,

republication of amendatory statutes, 151, n.

liberty of the press in, 415, n.

religious tests forbidden, 469, n., 478, n.

impeachment of judges of, 160, n.

OMNIPOTENCE OF PARLIAMENT,

meaning of the term, 3, 4, 86.

INDEX.
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OPINION,

proscription for, is unconstitutional, 390.

on religious subjects to be free, 467-470.

religious tests forbidden in some States, 469, n.

of witnesses on religious subjects not to constitute disqualification in some

States, 478.

judicial, force of, as precedents, 50-54.

ORDINANCE OF 1787,

how far still in force, 25, 26, n.

admission of States to the Union under, 28, n.

ORDINANCES, MUNICIPAL,

(See Bt-Laws.)

OREGON,

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

privileges of members, 134, n.

title of acts to express the subject, 141, n.

legislative regulation of pardons, 116.
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republication of amendatory statutes, 151, n.

liberty of the press in, 416, n.

religious tests forbidden in, 468, n.

want of religious belief not to render witness incompetent, 478, n.

who excluded from suffrage, 599, n.

OVERRULING DECISIONS,

when should take place, 52.

P.

PAPERS,

private, exempt from seizure, 300, n., 306, n., 307, n.

protected the same as property, 358, n.

PARDON,

power of, to be exercised by governor, 115, n.

constitutional provisions as to rules for, 116, n.

power to, does not include reprieves, 116, n.

PARENT,

right of, to custody of child, 340.

respective rights of father and mother, 348.

PARLIAMENT,

power of, to change the constitution, 3, 4, 86, 175.

acts of, adopted in America, 23, 24.

repeal of acts of, 25, n.

comparison of powers with those of State legislatures, 85, 88, 175, 176.

may exercise judicial authority, 87.

bills of attainder by, 259. •

publication of proceedings of, not formerly allowed, 418.

publication of speeches by members, 457-460.

publication of reports and papers of, 457-460.

51
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PARLIAMENTARY LAW,

influence of, in construction of constitutions, 130, 131.

legislative power in regard to, 133.

power to preserve order, &c, under, 133, 134.

privilege by, of members from arrest, 134.

PARTIAL LEGISLATION,

legislature to govern by equal laws, 392.

special laws for particular individuals not permissible, 892.

suspensions of laws not allowed in special cases, 392, 393.

regulations for special localities or classes, 393.

equality of rights, &c, the aim of the law, 393.

strict construction of special privileges and grants, 393-396.

and of discriminations against individuals and classes, 393, 394.

and of statutes in derogation of the common law, 61, n.

citizens of other States not to be discriminated against, 397.

PARTICULAR INTENT,

control of, by general intent, 58, n.

PARTIES,

defendants in criminal suits, evidence of, 317.
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not compellable to testify against themselves, 313, 394.

how subjected to jurisdiction of courts, 402, 403.

estopped by judgment, 48, 49.

PARTITION,

legislature may authorize sale of lands for purposes of, 102.

PASTURAGE,

right of, in public highway, is property, 545, n.

PASSENGERS,

power of States to require report of, from carriers, and to levy tax upon,

587.

making carriers responsible for safety of, 580, 581.

PAUPERS.

exclusion of, from suffrage, 599.

PAVING STREETS,

assessments for, not within constitutional provisions respecting taxation,

497.

special taxing districts for, 505-507.

assessments may be made in proportion to benefits, 505, 506.

or in proportion to street front, 507.

but each separate lot cannot be made a separate district, 508.

PEACE AND WAR,

power over, of the revolutionary Congress, 6.

of Congress under the Constitution, 20.

PENALTIES,

for the same act under State and municipal laws, 199.

given by statute may be taken away, 362, 375, and n., 383.

for violation of police regulations, 596.

PENNSYLVANIA,

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 111, n.

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

INDEX.
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PENNSYLVANIA, —continued.

protection by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of speech and the press in, 415, n.

religious tests in, 468, n.

PEOPLE,

reservation of powers to, by national Constitution, 19.

sovereignty vested in, 28, 598.

formation and change of constitutions by, 30.

who are the, 28-30, 599.

exercise of sovereign powers by, 598.

PERSONAL LIBERTY,

gradually acquired by servile classes in Great Britain, 295-299.

constitutional prohibition of slavery in America, 299.

of bills of attainder, 15, 33, 259.

(See Bills of Attainder.)

of ex post facto laws, 15, 33, 264.

(See Ex Post Facto Laws.)

of unreasonable searches and seizures, 299-308.

(See Searches and Seizures.)
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of quartering soldiers in private houses, 308, 309.

protection of, in one's dwelling-house, 22, 299, 308.

criminal accusations, how made, 309.

bail for accused parties, 309-311!

unreasonable, not to be demanded, 310.

trials for crimes, 311-338.

(See Crimes.)

meaning of the term, 339, 393.

legal restraints upon, 339-341.

right to, in England, did not depend on any statute, 342.

reason why it was not well protected, 842.

evasions of the writ of habeas corpus, 343.

the habeas corpus act, 23, 344.

did not extend to American Colonies, 345.

general adoption of, 345.

writ of habeas corpus, 345-348.

when national courts may issue, 845, 346.

State courts to issue generally, 346, 347.

return to, when prisoner held under national authority, 347.

not to be employed as a writ of error, 347.

application for, need not be made in person, 347, n.

what the officer to inquire into, 347, 348.

to enforce relative rights, 348.

PETITION,

right of, 349, 433, 434.

PETITION OF RIGHT,

was a declaratory statute, 23, 257.

quartering soldiers upon subjects forbidden by, 308.

PETIT JURY,

trial by,

(See Jury Trial.)
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PICTURES,

libels by, injury presumed from, 423.

indecent, sale of, may be prohibited, 596.

PLURALITY,

sufficient in elections, 630.

POISONS,

regulation of sales of, 595.

POLICE POWER,

pervading nature of, 572, 574.

definition of, 572, n.

the maxim on which it rests, 573.

States no power to relinquish it, 282-284.

power of States to make regulations which affect contracts, 574-581.

how cUartt'rs of private incorporation may be affected by, 575-581.

charters', rannot be amended on pretence of, 577, 578.

nor rigU&s granted by charters taken away, 578, 579.

railroad corporations may be required to fence track, 579.

and made liable for beasts killed on track, 579.

grade of railways and crosS^ngs may be prescribed, 580.
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requirement that bell shall beruTHgoi" whistle sounded at crossings, &c, 580.

whether carriers of persons may-noS^e m»Je insurers, 580.

action may be given for death causediltenegligence, 581.

sale of intoxicating drinks may be regulatSHi^y State3> 581.

regulation of, does not interfere with poSper of Congress over com-

merce, 582. .

•ale of intoxicating drinks as a beverage may b\ prohibited by States,

582,583. \

payment of United States license fee does not give ri^1* " ag^^t State

law, 584. >

quarantine and health regulations by States, 584.

harbor regulations by the States, 585. «

line of distinction between police regulations and interfert1108

merce, 686.

police regulations may be established by Congress, 586.

State requirement of license fee from importers illegal, 586.

State regulations to prevent immigrants becoming a public ch*r^e'

State regulations of pilots and pilotage, 587.

Sunday laws as regulations of police, 588.

regulation by States of use of highways, 588.

owners of urban property may be required to build sidewalks,

construction of levees on river fronts, 589. i

control of navigable waters by States, 589, 591.

restrictions on this control, 591. . *

monopolies not to be granted, 591.

States may improve and charge tolls, 592.

may authorize bridges, 592.

when these bridges to be abated, 593.

may establish ferries, 593.

may authorize dams, 593, 594.

when the dams may be abated, 594, 595.

INDEX.
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POLICE POWER, — continued.

may regulate speed of vessels, 594.

other cases of police regulations, 594.

destruction of property to prevent spread of fire, 594.

establishment of fire limits, wharf lines, &c, 595.

regulations respecting gunpowder, poisons, dogs, unwholesome provisions,

&c, 595, 596.

regulations for protection of public morals, 596.

market regulations, 596.

prohibited act or omission may be made criminal, 596.

POLICE REGULATIONS,

power to establish, may be conferred on municipal corporations, 123-125.

(See Police Power.)

POLICE REPORTS,

publication of, 499, and n.

POLITICAL OPINIONS,

citizens not to be proscribed for, S90, n.

POLITICAL RIGHTS,

equality of, 390, 467-470.
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POPULAR RIGHTS,

not measured by constitutions, 36, 37.

POPULAR VOTE,

submission of laws to, not generally allowable, 116-125.

(See Elections.)

POPULAR WILL,

expression of, as to amendment of constitutions, 31-33.

must be obtained under forms of law, 598.

(See Elections.)

POSSESSION,

importance of, in limitation laws, 366, n.

POST-OFFICES,

and post-roads, Congress may establish, 10.

inviolability of correspondence through, 807, n.

POWDER,

police regulations concerning storage of, 595.

POWERS,

of government, apportionment of, by State constitutions, 33, 37.

of Congress, 10-12.

of State legislatures, 85-129.

(See Judicial Power; Legislative Powers.)

PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION,

weight to be given to, 67-71.

not to override the Constitution, 71.

PRECEDENTS,

importance of, 50, 51, n.

judicial, how far binding, 50-54.

law made by, 56, 57, n.

only authoritative within country where decided, 51, 52.

when to be overruled, 52.

of executive department, force of, 67-71.

80G

INDEX.

PRECIOUS METALS,

in the soil belong to sovereign authority, 524.

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS,

of persons accused of crimes. 313.

publication of proceedings on, not privileged, 449.

PRESCRIPTIVE CORPORATIONS,

powers of, 197.

PRESENCE,

of prisoner at his trial, 319.

PRESIDENT,

powers and duties of. 11.

calling out the militia by, 41, n.

PRESS, LIBERTY OF,

(See Liberty of Speech and of the Press.)

PRESUMPTION,

of constitutionality of statutes, 168, 183.

of existence of corporation, 197.

of innocence of accused party, 309, 310.

of correctness of legislative motives, 186, 187, 208.
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PRINCIPAL AND BAIL,

custody of principal by bail, 841.

. PRINTED BALLOTS,

answer the requirement of written, 605, n.

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,

distinguished from public, 279, 280, n.

charters of, are contracts, 279.

PRIVATE PAPERS,

(See Papers.)

PRIVATE PROPERTY,

right to, is before constitutions, 37, 175, n., 354, n.

of municipal corporations, how far under legislative control, 235.

owners cannot be compelled to improve, 885, 532.

appropriating under right of eminent domain, 523.

trial of right to, 309, and n.

(See Eminent Domain; Vested Rights.)

PRIVATE ROADS,

cannot be laid out under right of eminent domain, 530, 531.

PRIVATE STATUTES,

not evidence against third parties, 96.

to authorize sales by guardians, &c, are constitutional, 97-106, 389.

PRIVIES,

estoppel of, by judgment, 48, 49.

PRIVILEGES,

of citizens of the several States, 15, 16, 487.

citizens not to be deprived of, 11, 294.

protection of, rests with the States, 294, n.

of legislators, 134, 185.

special, strict construction of, 389-397.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS,

meaning of the term, 425.

INDEX.
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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS, —continued.

when made in answer to inquiries, 425, 426.

between principal and agent, 426.

where parties sustain confidential relations, 426.

discussing measures or principles of government, 426-430.

criticising officers or candidates, 431-441.

made in the course of judicial proceedings, 441, 442.

made by counsel, 442-445.

by legislator to constituents, 457-460.

by client to counsel, 334.

PROCEEDINGS,

of constitutional convention may be.looked to on questions of construction,

66, 67.

of legislative bodies, publication of, 418—420, 457-460.

PROFANITY,

in judicial proceedings, publication of, 449.

punishment of, 471-476.

PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATIONS,

not to be disclosed, 334, and n.
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PROFESSIONAL SERVICES,

to influence legislation cannot be contracted for, 136, n.

law requiring, without compensation, to be strictly construed, 393, 394.

(See Counsel.)

PROHIBITIONS ON THE STATES,

in the federal Constitution, 15, 18.

in forming or amending constitutions, 33.

PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAWS,

constitutionality of, 582, 583.

PROPERTY,

qualification for suffrage, 599.

protection of, by fourteenth amendment, 11.

of municipal corporations, control of, 235.

(See Eminent Domain; Private Property; Vested Rights.)

PROROGUEMENT,

of the legislature by governor, 132.

PROSCRIPTION,

of persons, for their opinions, 390, 467-470.

PROSECUTING OFFICERS,

duty of, to treat accused parties with judicial fairness, 311, and n.

PROTECTION,

the equivalent for taxation, 559.

PROVISIONS,

regulations to prevent sale of unwholesome, 595.

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS,

(See Municipal Corporations.)

PUBLIC DEBT,

inviolability of, 11.

PUBLIC GOOD,

laws should have reference to, 117, n., 129.
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INDEX.
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PUBLIC GRANTS,

strict construction of, 394-396.

(See CHarter; FrancHise.)

PUBLIC GROUNDS,

lands dedicated for, not to be put to other uses, 238, n.

PUBLIC MORALS,

regulations for protection of, 596.

{See Religious Liberty.)

PUBLIC OFFICERS,

(See Officer.)

PUBLIC OPINION,

not to affect construction of constitution, 54, 55.

expression of, by elections, 598.

.PUBLIC PURPOSES,

appropriation of property for, 523.

(See Eminent Domain.)

PUBLIC STATUTES,

what are, 390.
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PUBLIC TRIAL,

accused parties entitled to, 312.

not essential that everybody be allowed to attend, 312.

PUBLIC USE,

of property, what constitutes, 531.

(See Eminent Domain.)

PUBLICATION,

of statutes, 156-158.

of debates in Parliament formerly not suffered, 418.

of books, &c, censorship of, 417-419.

of debates in American legislative bodies, 419, 420.

of legislative speeches, 457-460.

of notice to non-resident parties, 403, 404.

(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)

PUBLISHERS OF NEWS,

not privileged in law, 451-457.

PUNISHMENTS,

what changes in, the legislature may make applicable to previous offences,

267-272.

of crimes by servitude, 299.

cruel and unsual, prohibited, 328-330.

must not exceed measure the law has prescribed, 330.

(See Bills of Attainder; Crimes; Ex Post Facto Laws.)

Q.

QUALIFICATIONS,

of officer or voter under constitution cannot be added to by legislature, 64.

of members of legislature to be determined by the two houses, 133.

of voter, inquiring into, on contested election, 627.

QUARANTINE,

regulations by the States, 581.

INDEX.
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QUARTERING SOLDIERS,

in private houses in time of peace forbidden, 308.

QUORUM,

majority of, generally sufficient for passage of laws, 141.

of courts, must act by majorities, 96.

full court generally required on constitutional questions, 161, 162.

R.

RACE,

not to be a disqualification for suffrage, 11.

RAILROADS,

authorizing towns, &c, to subscribe to, is not delegating legislative power,

119.

whether such subscriptions may be made, 213-219.

appropriations of lands for, 633.

and of materials for constructing, 526.

and of lands for depot buildings, &c, 541.

corporations may take, 537, 538.

(See Eminent Domain.)

appropriation of highways for, 645-557.
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must be legislative permission, 545.

whether adjoining owner entitled to compensation, 546-557.

police regulations in respect to, 573.

requiring corporations to fence track and pay for beasts killed, 579.

regulation of grade and crossings, 580.

provisions regarding alarms, 580.

responsibility for persons injured or killed, 580, 581.

bridges for, over navigable waters, 592.

READING OF BILLS.

constitutional provisions for, 80, 139, 140.

REAL ESTATE,

not to be taxed out of taxing district, 499, 500.

within taxing district to be taxed uniformly, 502.

taking for public use,

(See Eminent Domain.)

REASONABLENESS,

of municipal by-laws, 200.

of limitation laws, 366.

REBELLIONS,

employment of militia to suppress, 11.

RECITALS,

in statutes, not binding upon third parties, 96.

when they may be evidence, 96.

RECONSTRUCTION OF STATES,

control over, 34, n.

RECORDS,

public, of the States, full faith and credit to be given to, 15, 16.

judicial, not generally to be contradicted, 407.

(See Judicial Proceedings.)
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INDEX.

REDEMPTION,

right of, cannot be shortened .or extended by legislature, 291.

REFUSAL TO PLEAD,

in criminal cases, consequence of, 311.

REGISTRATION,

of voters, may be required, 601.

REGULATION,

of commerce by Congress, 10, 581-587.

of navigable waters by Congress, 591.

police, by the States,

(See Police Power.)

of the right of suffrage, 601, 602.

right of, does not imply a right to prohibit, 202, 203, n.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,

care taken by State constitutions to protect, 467-470.

distinguished from religious toleration, 467, and n.

does not preclude recognition of superintending Providence by public

authorities, 470, 471.

nor appointment of chaplains, thanksgiving and fast days, 471.

471.
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nor recognition that the prevailing religion of the State is Christian,

the maxim that Christianity is part of the law of the land, 472-477.

punishment of blasphemy does not invade, 472-474.

or of other forms of profanity, 476.

Sunday laws, how justified, 476, 477.

respect for religious scruples, 477, 478.

religious belief, as affecting the competency or credibility of witnesses,

478.

REMEDIAL STATUTES,

liberal construction of, 61, n.

parties obtaining, are bound by, 96.

REMEDY,

power of legislature over, in criminal cases, 267-273.

in civil cases, 287-294, 361-367.

legislature cannot take away all remedy, 289.

may give new remedies, 361.

may limit resort to remedies, 364-367.

for compensation for property taken by public, 560, 561.

REMOVAL,

. of causes from State to national courts, 12, 13.

REPEAL,

of old English statutes, 25, n., 26, n.

all laws subject to, 125-127.

of statutes at same session of passage, 152.

by implication, not favored, 152.

of a law, terminates right to give judgment under it, 381.

of laws conflicting with unconstitutional law, 186.

question of, not to be referred to the people, 123.

REPORTS,

of public meetings, 435.

INDEX.
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REPORTS, —continued.

of legislative proceedings, publication of, 418-420, 457-460.

of judicial proceedings, publication of, 448-451. ,

(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)

REPRIEVE,

power of, not included in power to pardon, 116, n.

REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT,

guarantee of, by United States to the States, 17, 33.

maxims of, do not constitute limitations on legislative power, 169, 170.

REPUBLICATION,

of amended statutes under certain State constitutions, 151, 152.

RESERVED POWERS,

under United States Constitution in the States and people, 19.

RES AD JUDICATA,

parties and privies estopped by judgments, 48.

force of judgment does not depend on reasons assigned, 49.

strangers not bound by, 49.

parties and privies not bound in new controversy, 49.

RESIDENCE,
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gives jurisdiction in divorce suits, 400, 401.

but not unless bona fide, 401.

as affecting right to impose personal taxes, 499.

of voters, what constitutes, 599, 600.

RESTRICTIONS,

on trade by municipal by-laws, 202.

in United States Constitution on powers of the States, 15, 16, 18.

on power of people to amend constitutions, 31, 33.

on powers of legislature,

(See Legislatures of tHe States.)

RESUMPTION OF GRANTS,

by the States is forbidden, 274, 275.

RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION,

when admissible generally, 93, 369-383.

cannot revive demands which are barred, 369.

nor create a demand where none ever equitably existed, 369.

may take away defences based on informalities, 370.

may cure irregularities in legal proceedings, 371.

or in corporate action, &c, 371, 373.

what defects can and what cannot be covered by, 371.

may validate imperfect marriages, 372.

or other imperfect contracts, 374, 376.

or invalid deeds, 376-378.

may take away defence of usury, 375.

bona fide purchasers not to be affected by, 378.

legalizing municipal action, 224, 379.

pendency of suit does not affect power to pass, 381.

cannot make good what the legislature could not originally have permitted,

381, 382.

cannot cure defects of jurisdiction, 382, 383.

forbidden in some States, 370, and notes.
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INDEX.

RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION, — continued.

statutes generally construed to operate prospectively, 370.

prospective construction of constitution, 62, 63.

REVENUE,

in some States bills for, to originate with lower house, 131, 132.

cannot be raised under right of eminent domain, 527.

(See Taxation.)

REVISION,

of State constitutions, 80-37.

of statutes,

(See Statutes.)

REVOLUTION, AMERICAN,

powers of the Crown and Parliament over Colonies before, 5, 6.

Congress of the, its powers, 6, 7.

division of powers of government at time of, 6, n.

REWARDS,

cannot be paid by towns for apprehension of offenders, 212, n.

RHODE ISLAND,

ratification of Constitution by, 8, 9.
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impeachment of judges of, 26, n., 160, n.

charter government, 26, n., 30, n.

privilege of members of legislature from arrest, 134, n.

protection by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 414, n.'

periodical valuation of property, 496. *

exclusions from suffrage, 599, n.

RIGHTS,

distinguished from the remedy, 285-287.

vested,

(See Vested RigHts.)

in action,

(See Action.)

ROADS,

appropriation of private property for, 533.

appropriation of materials for constructing. 526.

appropriation of, for railroads, &c, 545-557.

(See Eminent Domain.)

regulation of use of, by States, 588.

action for exclusion from, 543, n.

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION,

(See Construction of State Constitutions.)

RULES OF EVIDENCE,

power of the legislature to change, 288, 367-369.

(See Evidence.)

RULES OF LEGISLATIVE ORDER,

are under the control of the legislature, 130-136.

(See Legislatures of tHe States.)

INDEX.
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S.

SABBATH,

laws for observance of, 476, 596.

SALE OF LANDS,

of incompetent persons, &c, special legislative authority for, 97-106.

propriety of judicial action in such cases, 97.

SCHOOL-HOUSES,

exercise of right of eminent domain for sites for, 533.

SCOTLAND,

servitude in, 298.

SEAMEN,

impressment of, 299.

SEARCH-WARRANTS,

(See SearcHes and Seizures.)

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,

the maxim that every man's house is his castle, 22, 299.

unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited, 299, 300.

origin of the prohibition, 300.

history of general warrants in England, 300, n.
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general warrants in America, 301, 302.

search-warrants, their arbitrary character, 303.

only granted after a showing of cause on oath, 304.

must specify place to be searched and the object, 304.

particularity of description required, 804.

should be served in daytime, 305.

must be directed to proper officer, 305.

must command accused party and property, &c, to be brought before

officer, 305.

cannot give discretionary power to ministerial officer, 805.

not allowed t* obtain evidence of intended crime, 305.

cases in which they are permissible, 305-307.

not to seize correspondence, 307, n.

for libels, illegal at common law, 307, n.

officer following command of, is protected, 307.

and may break open doors, 308.

SEAS,

(See Hior Seas.)

SECRECY,

inviolability of, in correspondence, 307, n.

elector's privilege of, 604, 605.

privilege of, as between counsel and client, 334.

SEDITION LAW,

passage of, and prosecutions under, 427, 428.

SELF-ACCUSATION,

not to be compelled, 313-317.

SELF-DEFENCE,

right to, 308, n.

SELF-GOVERNMENT,

(See Elections; Municipal Corporations.)
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SERMONS,

privilege of criticism of, 441.

SERVANT,

control of, by master, 341.

SERVICES,

laws requiring, without compensation, strictly construed, 393.

to influence legislation cannot be contracted for, 136, n.

of child, right of father to, 340.

SERVITUDE,

(See Slavery.)

SIDEWALKS,

owners of lots may be compelled to build under police power, 588.

SIGNING OF BILLS,

by officers of legislature, 151.

by the governor, 153, 154.

SLANDER,

general rules of liability for, 422-424.

(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)

SLAVERY,
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former state of, in England, 295.

causes of its disappearance, 296-298.

in Scotland, 298, 299.

in America, 299.

now prohibited, 11.

servitude in punishment of crime, 299.

SOLDIERS,

quartering of, in private houses prohibited, 308.

municipal bounties to, 219-229.

military suffrage laws, 599.

jealousy of standing armies, 350.

SOUTH CAROLINA, t

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

protection by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 417.

religious liberty in, 468, n.

exclusions rom suffrage, 599, n.

SOVEREIGN POWERS,

cannot be granted away, 125, 206, 280-284.

SOVEREIGN STATE,

what it is, 1.

American States not strictly such, 6-9.

SOVEREIGNTY,

definition of, 1,

territorial and other limits of, 2.

in America, rests in people, 28, 598.

division of powers of, in American system, 2, 47, n.

legislature not to bargain away, 125-127, and n., 280-284.

exercise of, by the people, 598.

(See Elections.)

INDEX.
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SPECIAL JURISDICTION,

courts of, 406.

SPECIAL LAWS,

forbidden in certain States where general can be made applicable, 110,

111, n., 128, 129, n.

due process of law does not a'ways forbid, 389-397.

for sale o lands, &c, 97-106.

SPECIAL PRIVILEGES,

strict construction of, 389-397.

SPECIAL SESSIONS OF LEGISLATURE,

calling of, by the governor, 132, 155.

SPEECH, FREEDOM OF,

(See Liberty of Speech and op the Press.)

SPEECHES,

of legislators, publication of, 457-460.

SPEED,

upon public highways, regulation of, 588, 589, 594.

SPEEDS TRIAL,

right of accused parties to, 311.
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SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION,

must be found in the words employed, 72, 73.

laws in supposed violation of, 171, 172.

STALLIONS,

prohibition of standing of, in public places, 596.

STAMP,

defence to contract based on the want of, may be taken away, 378.

cannot be required on process of State courts, 483.'

upon contracts, 484, n.

STAMP ACT CONGRESS,

what led to, 5.

STANDING ARMIES,

jealousy of, 350.

STANDING MUTE,

of accused party, proceeding in case of, 311.

STAR CHAMBER,

court of, 342.

STATE,

definition of, 1.

sovereign, what js, 1.

distinguished from nation, 1.

limits to jurisdiction of, 2.

STATES OF THE UNION,

in what sense sovereign, 6.

always subject to a common government, 9.

suits between, in Federal courts, 11.

division of powers between, and the nation, 2.

not suable by individuals, 12.

powers prohibited to, 15, 16, 18.

faith to be given to public records of, 16, 17.

privileges and immunities of citizens of, 15, 16, 487.

agreements of, are inviolable, 275.

compacts between, are inviolable, 275.
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STATE CONSTITUTIONS,

in existence when United States Constitution was formed, 21.

pre-existing laws, common and statutory, 21-25, 26, n.

ordinance of 1787, 25, n.

colonial charters, 26, 27.

how modified when not containing provisions therefor, 28.

theory that the people are sovereign, 28.

general rules for modification of, 30-37.

right of people of territories to form, 30.

right to amend, rests in people as an orgahized body politic, 31.

will of the people must be expressed under forms of law, 31.

conventions to amend or revise, 32.

limitations by Constitution of the United States on power to amend, 33.

protection of personal rights by, 33, 35, 36.

unjust provisions, &c, must be enforced, 34.

what is generally to be expected in, 34.

are not the origin of individual rights, 36.

are presumed to have been drafted with care, 58.

are successors of English charters of liberty, 59, 60.
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construction of, 38.

(See Construction of State Constitutions.)

STATE COURTS,

removal of causes from, to United States courts, 12, 13.

to decide finally questions of State law, 13, 14.

protection to personal liberty by, 294, n., 345.

(See Courts.)

STATE INDEBTEDNESS,

prohibition of, will not prevent indebtedness by municipal corporations,

217-219.

STATEMENT,

of defendant in criminal case, right to make, and effect of, 313-318.

STATUS,

of marriage, control of, by legislature, 109, 110.

(See Divorce.)

STATUTES,

directory and mandatory, 74-78.

enactment of, 130-158.

constitutional requirements must be observed, 130, 131.

common parliamentary law as affecting, 131.

the two houses must act separately, 131.

to proceed in their own way in collecting information, 135.

journals of houses as evidence, 135, 136.

introduction of bills, 137-139.

three several readings of bills, 80, 81, 139, 140.

yeas and nays, entry of, 140.

what sufficient vote on passage, 141.

title of bill, formerly no part of it, 141.

constitutional provisions requiring object to be expressed, 81, 82,

141.

these provisions mandatory, 150.

INDEX.
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STATUTES, — continued.

evil to be remedied thereby, 142-144.

particularity required in stating object, 144.

"other purposes," ineffectual words in, 145.

examples as to what can be held embraced in, 145, 146.

effect if more than one object embraced, 147, 148.

effect where act broader than title, 148-150.

amendatory, 151, 152.

requirement that act amended be set forth at length, 151.

this not applicable to amendments by implication, 152.

repeal of, at same session of their passage, 152.

by unconstitutional act, 186.

approval of, by the governor, 153, 154.

passage of, at special sessions, 155.

when to take effect, 155-158.

publication of, 157, 158.

presumed validity of, 168, 172-177, 182-186.

power of courts to declare their unconstitutionality, 159, 169.

not to be exercised by bare quorum, 161, 162.
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nor unless decision on the very point necessary, 163.

nor on complaint of party not interested, 163, 164.

nor solely because of unjust provisions, 164-168.

nor because violating fundamental principles, 169, 170.

nor because opposed to spirit of constitution, 171-177.

nor in any doubtful case, 182-186.

may be unconstitutional in part, 177-181.

instances of, 179-181.

constitutional objection to, may be waived, 181.

motives in passage of, not to be inquired into, 186, 187.

consequence when invalid, 188.

whether jury may pass upon, 336, n.

retrospective, 369-383.

construction of, to be such as to give effect, 184.

presumption against conflict with Constitution, 185, 186.

to be prospective, 370.

contemporary and practical, 67-73.

ex post facto, 264-272.

(See Ex Post Facto Laws.)

violating obligation of contracts, 273-294.

(See Obligation op Contracts.)

unequal and partial, 389-397.

of limitation, 364-367.

of Parliament, how far in force in America, 23, 24.

STATUTORY PRIVILEGES,

are not vested rights, 383.

strict construction of, 389-397.

STAY LAWS,

law taking from mortgagees right to possession invalid as to existing

mortgages, 290.

law extending time of redemption of lands previously sold is void, 291.

4
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INDEX.

STAY LAWS,— continued.

law shortening redemption void, 291.

stay of execution on existing demands for unreasonable or indefinite time

is void, 292.

STOCK IN CORPORATIONS,

municipal subscriptions to, 119, 213-219.

when liable for debts cannot be released by legislative act, 292.

STREETS,

power of cities, &c, to change grade of, 207.

special assessments for grading and paving, 505-508.

assessment of labor upon, 512.

exercise of right of eminent domain for, 533.

and for materials for constructing, 526.

when owner of land to receive compensation, 563, 564.

appropriation of, for railways, 545-557.

police regulations for use of, 588, 589.

STRICT CONSTRUCTION,

of laws in derogation of common law, 61, n.

of charters, 195, 894.
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of statutes granting special privileges, 389-397.

of statutes requiring gratuitous services, 393, 894.

of statutes taking property for public use, 528, 529.

SUBJECT OF STATUTE,

required in some States to be stated in title, 141-151.

SUBMITTING LAWS TO POPULAR VOTE,

whether it is a delegation of legislative power, 116-125.

authorities generally do not ajlow, 120.

corporate charters, &c, may be submitted, 118.

and questions of divisions of towns, &p., 119.

and questions of local subscriptions to improvements, 119.

SUBSCRIPTIONS,

to internal improvements by municipal corporations, 119, 213-219.

submitting questions of, to corporation is not delegating legislative power,

119.

power of taxation to provide for, cannot be taken away, 292.

SUCCESSION TO THE CROWN,

power of Parliament to change, 86.

SUFFRAGE,

right of, in forming new constitutions, 28, 80, 34.

restrictions upon, to be construed strictly, 394.

constitutional qualifications for, not to be added to by legislature, 64.

who to exercise generally, 599.

regulation of right of, 601, 6021

(See Elections.)

SUIT,

notification of, by publication, 403, 404.

(See Action.)

SUMPTUARY LAWS,

odious character of, 385.

INDEX.
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SUNDAY,

laws to prevent desecration of, how defended, 476, 477.

police regulations regarding, 59C.

SUPPORT,

of children, liability of father for, 340.

lateral, of lands, right to, 543, n.

SUPREMACY OF PARLIAMENT,

extent of, 3, 4, 86-88, 259.

SUPREME LAW,

Constitution, laws, and treaties of United States to be, 12.

of a State, constitution to be, 2, S.

SURRENDER,

of fugitives from justice, 15, n.

SUSPENSION OF LAWS,

when authorized must be general, 391.

for limitation of actions, 365, n.

SWAMPS,

drains for, 533.

special assessments for draining, 510, 511.
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T.

TAKING OF PROPERTY,

of individuals for public use, 509, n., 524.

(See Eminent Domain; Taxation.)

TAX LAWS.

directory and mandatory provisions in, 75. 76.

(See Taxation.)

TAX SALES,

curing defective proceedings in, by retrospective legislation, 382, 383.

what defects should avoid, 521.

deeds given upon, may be made evidence of tithe, 367.

conditions to redemption from, 369, n.

(See Taxation.)

TAXATION,

and representation to go together, 24, and n., 59, n., 117, n., 169.

right of, compared with eminent domain, 559.

exemptions from, by the States, when not repealable, 127, 280.

can only be for public purposes, 129, 175, 487-495.

must be by consent of the people, 117, n.

license fees distinguished from, 201, 586, 587.

by municipalities, power of legislature over, 118, n., 230-235.

reassessment of irregular, may be authorized, 209.

irregular may be confirmed by legislature, 379, n , 882.

necessary to the existence of government, 479.

unlimited nature of power of, 479-485.

of agencies of national government by the States impliedly forbidden,

480-483.

820

INDEX.

TAXATION, — continued.

of agencies of the States by the national government also forbidden,

488.

of the subjects of commerce by the States, 485, 486, 586.

discriminations in, as between citizens of different States, 487.

legislature the proper authority to determine upon, 488—495.

apportionment essential to, 495.

taxing districts, necessity of, 495, 499.

apportionment not always by values, 496, 501.

license fees and other special taxes, 496.

assessments for local improvements, 497.

benefits from the improvement may be taken into the account, 497,

505, 511.'

general provisions requiring taxation by value do not apply to these

assessments, 498.

taxation of persons or property out of the district is void, 499, 500-504,

516.

must be uniform throughout the district, 502.

local assessments may be made in proportion to frontage, 507.
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necessity for apportionment in such case, 508.

special taxing districts for drains, levees, &c, 509, 510.

taxation in labor for repair of roads, &c., 512.

difficulty in making taxation always equal, 513.

hardships of individual cases do not make it void, 513.

legislature must select the objects of taxation, 514.

exemptions of property from, 514, 515.

constitutional provisions which preclude exemptions, 515, 516.

special exemptions void, 515, n., 516.

legislative authority must be shown for each particular tax, 517-520.

excessive taxation, 520.

the maxim de minimis lex non curat not applicable in tax proceedings,

521.

what defects and irregularities render tax sales void, 521, and n.

TEACHER AND SCHOLAR,

control of former over latter, 341.

TECHNICAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION,

danger of resorting to, 61, n., 83, 84, and n.

TELEGRAPHIC CORRESPONDENCE,

right to secrecy in, 307, n.

TEMi'ERANCE LAWS,

right of the States to pass, 581-583.

TENNESSEE,

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

title of acts to express the object, 141, n.

republication of amended statutes, 151, n.

when acts to take effect, 156, n.

retrospective laws in, 371, n.

protection by the law of the land, 353, n.

freedom of speech and of the press in, 415, n.

exclusion of religious teachers from office, 468, n.

INDEX.
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TENNESSEE, — continued.

religious tests in, 468, n., 469, n.

persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478, n.

TERRITORIAL LIMITATION,

to the powers of sovereignty, 2.

to the exercise of power by the States, 127, 128.

to municipal authority, 213.

to power of taxation, 499, 500-504, 516.

TERRITORIES,

power of eminent domain in, 525.

legislation for, 25, n.

formation of constitutions by people of, 30, 31.

TEST OATHS,

when may constitute a punishment, 263, 264.

forbidden in some States, 469, n.

TEXAS,

admission of, to the Union, 9.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

legislative rules for regulation of pardons, 116, n.
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title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

republication of amendatory statutes, 151, n.

liberty of speech and the press in, 853, n.

exclusion of religious teachers from office, 468, n.

religious tests forbidden in, 468, n.

persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478, n.

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT,

provisions of, 11, 294.

TIME,

loss of remedy by lapse of, 364-367.

and place are of the essence of election laws, 602, 603.

TITLE TO LEGISLATIVE ACT,

requirement that it shall state subject, &c, is mandatory, 81-83, 141-150.

TITLES OF NOBILITY,

States not to grant, 17, 33.

TOLERATION,

as distinguished from religious liberty, 467, 468.

TOWNSHIPS,

importance of, in the American system, 190, n.

origin of, 189, and n.

distinguished from chartered corporations, 240.

collection from corporators of judgments against, 241-247.

not liable for neglect of duty by officers, 247.

apportionment of debts, &c, on division, 237, 290.

indemnification of officers of, 209, 212.

(See Municipal Corporations.)

TRADE,

by-laws in general restraint of, 202.

TRAVEL,

obstructions to, on navigable waters, 592, 593.

regulating speed of, 588, 594.

822

INDEX.

TRAVERSE JURY,

trial of accused parties by, 319-328.

(See Crimes.)

TREASON,

evidence required to convict of, 314, and n.

TREATIES,

of the United States, to be the supreme law, 12.

States forbidden to enter into, 15.

TREATING VOTERS,

laws against, 614.

TRIAL,

of right to property, 369, and a.

new, not to be granted by legislature. 95. 392.

of accused parties to be by jury, 309.'

must be speedy, 311.

must be public, 312.

(See Crimes; Jury Trial.)

TRUST,

the legislative not to be delegated, 116, 20! .
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TRUSTEES,

special statutes authorizing sales by, constitutional, 97-106.

rights of eestuis que trust not to be determined by legislature, 105.

municipal corporations as, 192.

TRUTH,

as a defence in libel cases, 424, 438, 464.

necessity of showing good motives for publication of, 464.

TURNPIKES,

exercise of eminent domain for, 533.

appropriation of highways for, 545.

change of, to common highways, 546, n.

TWICE IN JEOPARDY,

punishment of same act under State and national law, 18.

under State law and municipal by-law, 198, 199.

(See Jeofardy.)

TWO-THIRDS OF HOUSE,

what constitutes, 141.

u.

ULTRA VIRES,

contracts of municipal corporations which are, 196, 211, 212, 215, n.

UNANIMITY,

required in jury trials, 320.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

definition of the term, 3, 4.

first declaration of, 160, n.

power of the courts to annul, 159.

whether jury may pass upon, 336, n.

(See Courts; Statutes.)

INDEX.
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UNEQUAL AND PARTIAL LEGISLATION,

special laws of a remedial nature, 389.

local laws, or laws applying to particular classes, 890-393.

proscription of parties for opinions, 390.

suspensions of the laws must be general, 391, 392.

distinctions must be based upon reason, 393.

equality the aim of the law, 393.

strict construction of special burdens and privileges, 393-896.

discrimination against citizens of other States, 15, 397.

UNIFORMITY,

in construction of constitutions, 54.

in taxation, 495, 499.

(See Taxation.)

UNION,

of the Colonies before the Revolution, 5.

UNITED STATES,

- division of powers between the States and Union, 2.

origin of its government, 5.

Revolutionary Congress, and its powers, 6, 7.
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Articles of Confederation and their failure, 6-8.

formation of Constitution of, 8.

government of, one of enumerated powers, 9, 10, 173.

general powers of, 10-12.

its laws and treaties the supreme law, 12.

judicial powers of, 12, 19.

removal of causes from State courts to courts of, 12, 13.

prohibition upon exercise of powers by the States, 15, 16.

guaranty of republican government to the States, 17.

implied prohibition of powers to the States, 18.

reservation of powers to States and people, 19.

consent of, to formation of State constitutions, 30, 31.

(See Congress; Constitution of United States; Courts of United

States; President.)

UNJUST PROVISIONS,

in constitutions, must be enforced, 72.

in statutes, do not necessarily avoid them, 164-168.

(See Partial Legislation.)

UNLAWFUL CONTRACTS,

(See Illegal Contracts.)

UNMUZZLED DOGS,

restraining from running at large, 595.

UNREASONABLE BAIL,

not to be required, 310.

UNREASONABLE BY-LAWS,

are void, 200.

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,

(See Searches and Seizures.)

UNWHOLSOME PROVISIONS,

prohibiting sale of, 595.'

824 INDEX.

USAGE AND CUSTOM,

(See Common Law.)

USURY,

right to defence of, may be taken away by legislature retrospectively, 375,

376.

V.

VALIDATING IMPERFECT CONTRACTS,

by retrospective legislation, 293, 371-881.

(See Retrospective Legislation.)

VALUATION,

of property for taxation, 496.

(See Taxation.)

of land taken for public use,

(See Eminent Domain.)

VERDICT,

jury not to be controlled by judge in giving, 320.

judge cannot refuse to receive, 320.

jury may return special, 321.

but cannot be compelled to do so, 321.

general, covers both the law and the facts, 321, 323.
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in favor of defendant in criminal case, cannot be set aside, 321, 322, 326".

against accused, may be set aside, 323.

in libel cases, to cover law and fact, 322, 460.

to be a bar to new prosecution, 326.

when defendant not to be deprived of, by nolle prosequi, 327.

not a bar if court bad no jurisdiction, 327.

or if indictment fatally defective, 327.

when jury may be discharged without, 327.

set aside on defendant's motion, may be new trial, 327, 328.

on some of the counts, is bar to new trial thereon, 328.

cannot be received from less than twelve jurors, 319.

VERMONT,

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 142, n.

liberty of speech and the press in, 414, n.

persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478.

betterment law of, 386.

VESTED RIGHTS,

not conferred by charters of municipal incorporation, 192, 193.

grants of property to corporations not revocable, 236-239, 275.

under the marriage relation, cannot be taken away, 284, 285.

not to be disturbed except by due process of law, 175, and n., 202, n.,

357.

meaning of the term, 358, 370, 378.

subjection of, to general laws, 358.

interests in expectancy are not, 359, 361.'

rights under the marriage relation, when are, 360, 361.

INDEX.
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VESTED RIGHTS, — continued.

in legal remedies, parties do not have, 861, 362.

exceptions, 290-292.

statutory privileges are not, 383.

in rights of action, 362.

forfeitures of, must be judicially declared, 363, 864.

time for enforcing, may be limited, 364-367, 369.

do not exist in rules of evidence, 369.

rights to take advantage of informalities are not, 870-378.

or of defence of usury, 875.

VILLAGES AND CITIES,

(See Municipal Corporations.)

VILLEINAGE,

in England, 295-298.

VINDICTIVE DAMAGES,

when publisher of newspaper not liable to, 457.

VIOLATING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,

(See Obligation of Contracts.)

VIRGINIA,
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special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98.

special laws for divorce cases, &c, forbidden, 110, n.

legislative regulation as to pardons, 116, n.

revenue bills in, 131, n.

republication of amendatory statutes, 151, n.

liberty of speech and the press in, 417.

religious liberty in, 468.

VOID CONTRACTS,

(See Contracts.)

VOLD STATUTES,

(See Statutes.)

VOLUNTEERS,

in military service, municipal bounties to, 219-229.

VOTERS,

franchise of, cannot be made to depend on impossible condition, 363, n.

constitutional qualifications of, cannot be added to by legislature, 64, n.

privilege of secrecy of, 605.

whether qualifications of, can be inquired into in contesting election, 627.

(See Elections.)

w.

WAGERS,

upon elections, are illegal, 615.

WAIVER,

of constitutional objection, 181, 182.

of irregularities in judicial proceedings, 409.

of objection to interested judge, 413.

of right to full panel of jurors, 319.

of right to compensation for property taken by public, 561.

INDEX.

WAIVER, —continutd.

in capital cases, 319, n.

of elector's right to secrecy, 606.

WAR AND PEACE,

power of Revolutionary Congress over, 6.

control of questions concerning, by Congress, 10.

WARD,

control of guardian over, 841.

special statutes for sale of lands of, 97-106.

WARRANTS,

general, their illegality, 300-302.

scrvice of, in criminal cases, 803.

search-warrants, 303.

(See Unreasonable SearcHes and Seizures.)

WATER RIGHTS,

right to front on navigable water is property, 544.

right of the States to establish wharf lines, 595.

right to use of, in running stream, 557.

appropriation of streams under right of eminent domain, 526, 533.

(See Navigable Waters; Water-Courses.)
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WATER-COURSES,

navigable, and rights therein, 589-594.

dams across, for manufacturing purposes, 534-536, 594, 595.

bridges over, under State authority, 592, 593.

licensing ferries across, 593.

construction of levees upon, 533.

flooding premises by, the liability for, 544.

incidental injury by improvement of, gives no right of action, 592,

(See Navigable Waters; Water RigHts.)

WAYS,

(See HigHways; Private Roads; Roads; Streets.)

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES,

Congress may fix standard of, 10.

regulation of, by the States, 596.

WEST VIRGINIA,

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 111, n.

special laws for sale of lands of minors, &c, forbidden, 97, n.

protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of speech and of the press in, 415, n.

who excluded from suffrage, 599, n.

WHARFAGE,

right to, is property, 544.

States may establish wharf lines, 595.

WIDOW,

(See Dower.)

WIFE,

(See Divorce J Dower; Married Women.)

WILL,

imperfect, cannot be validated after tide passed, 93, n.

INDEX.
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WISCONSIN,

special statutes for sale of lands of minors, &c, forbidden, 97, n.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

privileges of members, 134, n.

when statutes to take effect, 157.

title of private and local acts to express the subject, 142, n.

republication of amended statutes, 151, n.

liberty of speech and the press in, 416, n.

religious tests forbidden in, 469, n.

want of religious belief in witness does not render him incompetent,

478, n.

contested election of governor in, 624, n.

WITNESSES,

power to summon and examine before legislative committees, 135.

accused parties to be confronted with, 318.

not compellable to be against themselves, 317, 394.

evidence by, in their own favor, 317, n.

not liable to civil action for false testimony, 441.

unless the testimony was irrelevant, 441, n.

and n.
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competency and credibility of, as depending on religious belief, 478,

testimony of wife on behalf of husband, 317, 318, n.

WORKS OF ART,

liberty of criticism of, 457.

WRITS OF ASSISTANCE,

unconstitutional character of, 301, 302, n.

WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS,

(See Habeas Corpus.)

YEAS AND NAYS,

in some States, on passage of laws to be entered on journals, 140.

Cambridge: Press at John Wilson & Son.
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